**Be a Good Person, Not That Theocratic Way**

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**Abstract**

In this article, first of all, I (Hereafter: the writer)² will concur humanist counterexample objection against divine command theory (Hereafter: humanist objection). In addition, the writer will argue if one imagines none of the objections – such as humanist objection- does not work and a theocratic government applies divine command theory, it will struggle with an argument that is in favor of secular ethical theories, the writer calls the argument as the Inapplicability Problem Argument.

**Humanist Objection**

To begin with, the writer concurs humanist objection that is to be a moral person and to have a meaningful and moral life s their individual moral sense is not principally identical to divine command theory (Hereafter: DCT).³⁴

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² The writer's footnote: "Be a Good Person, Not That Theocratic Way" is an early draft and a chapter of the writer’s prospective Ph.D. thesis is "Philosophy of Theocracy", please do not cite without the writer's permission. Also, the writer will be indebted to you if you invite this paper to your peer-review journal. In addition, the writer has applied the writer's permanent methodology to this work. The writer has written this work as a Ph.D. semester requirement in spring 2021.


The writer has chosen DC as a version of Theological Voluntarism and so, the writer knows the other types of it as replaceable with DC.

This objection has been similar to this:5 Recall this note that X as a new humanist ought to satisfy ethical life, since, to fulfilling a new humanist life or to be a new humanist, X has to follow ethical life, though, it is possible that one may recognize oneself as freethinker or atheist without ethical life. To begin with, imagine arguments of Y as a religious person to Ψ as meaningful and moral life is that Y requires theistic arguments and beliefs to have Ψ or to defeat death’s meaningless as the enemy of immortality or to defeat the devil as the enemy of morality. But, conversely, X has some arguments and beliefs in favor of Ψ, since, first of all, if one has a life, it includes moral values and meaning of life in the life, and they are not outside of the life, also, you could fulfill your life and has Ψ, even though, you know that you will die forever, and vice versa, these notes indicate that those arguments and beliefs in favor of Ψ could be independent of Y’s arguments and beliefs. One may object that Ψ naturally belongs (and/or identical with) Y and Φ as meaningless and immoral life naturally belongs (and/or identical with) X. Although, a reply would arise that Ψ includes some subjective meaningful phenomena such as hobbies or fine arts or it also could obtain objective meaningful phenomena such as moral values, thus, you ought to make and/or grasp Ψ and avoid to Φ, Y’s life something and Ψ is something else ontologically. Altogether, everyone has to fulfill one’s life in which the one has to follow meaningful hobbies, create the fine arts, make a relationship with others, do non-profit and voluntary services, protect the environment, go sightseeing, make a love, obey the moral laws and be a good person and so many others, and all of these are inherently and significantly independent from (and prior to) religious arguments and beliefs, and so, we could make and/or grasp the meaningful and moral life here and now. For instance, if you love your child because you ought to do your duties or you have to follow your instinct toward the child and you have passed the special way for him/her, this is naturally different from the point that life is meaningless or death disappears everything.

Inapplicability Problem Argument

The proportion of the writer to the debate is this argument -Inapplicability Problem Argument- and so, let reject the concurrent claim -humanist objection- and presuppose that DCT is true.

The writer would argue that precisely Divine Command Theory in Theocracy (Hereafter: DCTT) is not only suffering from the main mistakes of DCTT in the


6 For similar claims see: (Vaughn, 2003, pp. 85-114), (Norman, 2004, p. 18), (Lamont, 1997, pp. 276-7,322-3)
individual moral sense but also, DCTT violates another mainstream that this argument is in favor of secular ethics in the public sphere, as the writer has named it as the Inapplicability Problem Argument of DCTT (Hereafter: IPA).

A. Let the writer survives the differentials of DCTT and presents IPA:

\[ Z= \text{A theocracy that spins DCTT}, \]
\[ Ys= \text{Citizens of Z}, \]
\[ \Phi = \text{Participating in DCTT}, \]
\[ \Psi = \text{Believing in DCTT}. \]

- **Presupposition A:**

  In this situation, there is Z that would spin DCTT, and there are also Ys who in participate DCT as their individual moral sense, and they also participate in DCT individual moral sense in the public sphere. What's more, it is clear that Ys do not need to believe in DCT, though, they only need to participate in DCT practically. Another note for this situation is that if Z as a theocratic government spins another moral doctrine such as Kantian ethics or Consequentialism, it will remain independent of IPA in favor of secular ethics and/or other theories of normative ethics and it will also remain independent of IPA in disfavor of DCT.

  This presupposition means that imagine this by borrowing some symbols:
  1. DCTT,
  2. Z spins DCTT,
  3. Ys \( \Phi \)-ing in DCTT,
  4. If Ys \( \Phi \)-ing in DCTT \( \vdash \neg \Box \) Ys \( \Psi \)-ing in DCTT (assumption).

- **Presupposition B:**

  In this situation, one more time there is a theocratic government such as Z that has had Ys they not only participate in DCT as moral doctrine in their private and public life as individual sense but also believe that DCT is true and/or have trustworthy moral doctrine in the individual sense. Additionally, the writer thinks A is prior to B since one could participate in DCT without believing that DCT is true. And the writer set aside this common debate that one believes in a moral rule but does not act to the rule correspondingly such as an amoral person.

  This presupposition means that Imagine:
  1. DCTT,
  2. Z spins DCTT,
  3. Ys \( \Phi \)-ing in DCTT,
  4. Ys \( \Psi \)-ing in DCTT,
  5. If Ys \( \Phi \)-ing in DCTT \& Ys \( \Psi \)-ing in DCTT,
  6. \( \neg \) if \( \Diamond \) Ys \( \Phi \)-ing in DCTT \& \( \Diamond \) Ys does not \( \Psi \)-ing in DCTT (assumption).
• Presupposition C:

In the last situation, we suppose presupposition B, although, the writer thinks presupposition C has struggled in IPA in favor of secular ethics and/or other theories of normative ethics and it will be faced with IPA in disfavor of DCT. Moreover, it is a very common idea that normative ethics is only on moral individuality and if it would include societal and political norms and values it will transform into social and political norms and values such as freedom, quality, justice, and rights are based on moral norms and values principally. However, the writer has to mention that IPM has to affect and/or relate to Ys’ the public sphere, even though, it also is clear that they have to remain individual.

This presupposition means that Imagine:
1. DCTT,
2. Z spins DCTT,
3. Ys Φ-ing in DCTT,
4. Ys Ψ-ing in DCTT,
5. If Ys Φ-ing in DCTT & Ys Ψ-ing in DCTT,
6. If Ys Φ-ing in DCTT & Ys Ψ-ing in DCTT, even though, Z struggles in IPA,
7. IPA does not ∈ social and political norms and values (assumption).

Part 6. of this presupposition needs to be explained and the writer of this last claim contains a cluster of reciprocal explanations in favor of IPA.

• The first condition is that if a theocracy very strongly and successfully enrolls DCTT, then it appears that Ys will be grateful for Z, and in this case, no one will claim C. However, if Z do not and/or could not enroll A & B strongly and successfully because there could be many explanations for this i.e. bad politicians, then it seems that C will be presented. As a consequence, Ys could be doubtful whether they have to A & B. It is due to the fact that Y believes if Φ and Ψ and IPA arise, then C will be detrimental to DCT. Ys may think it would be better if Ys place and draw DCT individualistically. In other words:
1. If Z has done DCT in an effective & grateful way functionally,
2. Ys also thinks of DCTT as an effective & grateful way functionally,
3. However, If Z hasn't done DCT in the effective & grateful way functionally,
4. Ys also do not think of DCTT as an effective & grateful way functionally,
5. Therefore, Ys would be doubtful whether they have to do these presuppositions: A & B,
6. It is owing to the fact that if Ys do Φ-ing & Ψ-ing & C arises: IPA, & then it will be pernicious to DCT & morality,
7. It ◇ Ys mull DCT over as an individual moral doctrine & Ys may contemplate replacing DCTT.

- The second condition would be that Ys think another DCTT has to be applied to avoid IPA. Although what if the new DCTT transfer to IPA as mentioned before, or what would be that if one asks why we need to enforce DCT to DCTT when we know it is possible we face IPA and waste DCT unnecessarily.
  1. If Ys do Φ-ing & Ψ-ing & C arises IPA, and then it will be pernicious to DCT and morality,
  2. Then, ◇ Ys do Φ-ing & Ψ-ing, but Ys do it with DCTT',
  3. If ◇ DCTT' leads to another IPA: IPA',
  4. Or ◇ one requires that is it necessary to DCT to DCTT in the condition that ◇ IPA & dissipates DCT.

- The next condition is that imagine Ys ignorantly choosing misguided DCT and after a while, they come up with idea that they have to select another DCT and run it in DCTT. One more time, they waste DCT, since, they expand the wrongful DCT to DCTT publically.
  1. If Ys select inaccurate DCT & then Ys need to select another DCT as DCTT,
  2. It dissipates DCT because Ys do inaccurate Φ-ing & inaccurate Ψ-ing in Z.

- The last condition is that imagines Y follows the true DCT, but, they have applied the wrongful DCTT. Undeniably, they will be struggling with nonconsistency and wasting of DCT as DCTT.
  1. If Ys select accurate DCT,
  2. However, Ys choose misleading DCTT,
  3. There will be a ↓ & it dissipates DCT.

B. There could be so many examples of IPA, and the writer will exemplify IPA. The writer presents an example that could be extended to other examples.

The example would be that Z proclaims if Ys offer and take bribes, it will be a crime since it is a command by God and/or this or that religion to do not break this command and statute, and so we declare this law and Ys shall obey this statute. However, as the first condition what if Z does not and/or could not reach this statute and DCTT functionally? We know that this condition leads to doubt on Φ-ing & Ψ-ing and it could be detrimental to DCT and morality because of the doubtfulness of this DCTT. In addition, as a second condition, if Z enacts another DCTT of the bribe and/or enacts another DCTT, it is feasible that it gets to be another IPA, and this arises this criticism that DCTT and bribe as DCTT is not necessary because of IPA. As
a next condition, what if Z proposes a misguided statute of the bribe and this may point that Z needs to declare another statute of the bribe and these legal acts of Z to change the statute, and the law will dissipate DCT owing to inaccurate Φ-ing & inaccurate Ψ-ing. The last condition is that there would be a gap between DCT and DCTT of the bribe, and this gap will prepare a nonconsistency, and a nonconsistency will dissipate DCT.

C. There are sorts of objections to IPA that the writer will reply to all of them.

The first objection would be that IPA could arise in disfavor of all or most other normative ethical theories and it is not only on DCT. Said differently, IPA could be in disfavor of perfectionism and favor of neutralism.

- First of all, this work is neither on other normative ethical theories, nor it is on perfectionism and neutralism. This work is only on DCT in a theocracy.
- Second of all, set aside the first reply, it is clear that DCTT will be detrimental to DCT in all four conditions because DCT is identical or has overlapped with DCTT and Ys know that DCTT is enormously same as DCT and they will be incredulous to commends of God and/or a religion and this will dissipate the whole of morality and eradicate it.

Conclusion

In this work, first of all, the writer has concurred humanist objection to DCT and then, the writer presents IPA against DCTT. It is explained that four conditions of IPA, thereafter, and it is shown that bribes could be an instance of IPA and the last part of this work is devoted to replies to possible objections of IPA.

Bibliography


