Philosophizing about Theocracy

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This work is dedicated

to

the Greater Iran
Abstract

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Abstract

It is a work on the philosophy of theocracy. In this work, I (hereafter: the writer)\(^1\) prove theocracy as a government in political philosophy is inherently and utterly an unreasonable and immoral government.\(^2\) So, we need work to eradicate theocracy, but there has been no such thing until now,\(^3\) without this work, putting this aim at stake.

This work includes two parts, the first part of this work is on the philosophical foundations of theocracy and the second one is on the two topics in political philosophy and their applications in theocracy:

- The first chapter is on political authority in a theocracy: "Covid-19 Proves Theocracy Is False",
- The second one is on legal language in a theocracy that the writer has named: "W, W, W, We Are Theocracy: Legal Stammer",
- The next chapter is on Divine Command Theory in a theocracy which has been called: "Be a Good Person, Not That Theocratic Way",
- Also, the fourth chapter is on freedom of religion in a theocracy: "The Slap Argument Inclines the Freedom of Religion",
- And the last chapter of this work is on secession in a theocracy: "What Is Wrong with Secession?".

This work is not on a special theocracy, though it is on theocracy. The writer has prepared few non-philosophical details has been structured in footnotes, while significantly other non-philosophical cases and debates are excluded from this work, and so take this note on board that one has to navigate through philosophical details and debates in footnotes principally and purely.

The writer has been working on "Philosophizing about Theocracy" since 2017 and the writer uploaded an early draft of this work somewhere in 2020, though, the last chapter finished in 2019 and the writer has placed it somewhere at the same time. In addition, like other works of the writer, this work allows only four types of sentences and paragraphs: 1. The writer's innovative ideas, 2. Quotations, 3. Interpretations, and 4. Footnotes: 4.1. The writer's footnote (footnotes of mine), 4.2. Literature's footnote (it includes philosophical footnotes and non-philosophical footnotes), the writer named this methodology "Microscopic Analyticity". Also, the writer thanks everyone for their comments, likewise, the writer is indebted to philosophers, social and political scientists,

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\(^2\) The writer's footnote: It is a draft, so please do not cite without the writer's permission.

\(^3\) For a similar view: (Swaine L., 2007, p. 571).
legal scholars, and others who directly sent their works to the writer or sent works of the other authors to the writer.
PART ONE: Foundations
Chapter 1

Covid-19 Sample Proves Theocracy Is False

The Standard View and Theocratic Anti-Model

Normatively, the main relation between religion and Political Philosophy has been called standard view (hereafter: SV), it is SV because some strong democratic arguments have produced a consensus or convergent on the relation philosophers have called this position toward SV as secularism, also, SV produces The Doctrine of Religious Restraint (hereafter: DRR) that is an asymmetry secular restraint on religious roles in public spheres, those roles that do not have a rationale for secular coercive laws. Although,

4 The writer’s footnote: The core idea of the Covid-19 Sample Argument (hereafter: the argument) came to the writer’s mind some years ago, the writer figured out the argument could apply covid-19 pandemic in 2019, and so the writer presented some aspects of the argument as an open letter to the president of the writer’s country on 10th Feb 2020, it was published nine days before the government of the writer’s country officially announced the Covid-19 disease on 19th Feb 2020, the writer thinks that the letter was successful in its own goal, otherwise the pandemic overthrew the society of the writer’s country. The writer has transferred this argument from the letter to this chapter academically as a Ph.D. semester requirement in autumn 2020.

5 The writer’s footnote: Independently, the main arguments of each chapters of this work also has been called the argument.


7 For this political agreement see: (Callaway, 2023), (Eberle & Cuneo, 2017).


The writer’s footnote: Very recently, the writer has found that D. Z. Phillips presented an example "Prayer-Medicine" and Bertrand Russell wrote a chapter "Demonology and Medicine" that would be similar to the Covid-19 Sample Argument. However, first of all, those works are in the Philosophy of Science and/or they are on theoretical authority, and they are not in the Social and Political Philosophy and/or practical authority esp. political authority. Next, the examples are only simple comparisons and without philosophical details, also they are not developed arguments, but the writer’s argument is in-depth. Besides that, those examples need to be examined empirically as Phillips and Russell mentioned, though, the argument of this chapter is a normative and philosophical argument.


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authority as a practical authority. The writer will borrow some symbols and present the argument that is come from the covid-19 pandemic.

A. The Argument: It is the Covid-19 Sample Argument:

X = someone is religious and infected by Covid-19 disease,
OM = otherworldly medical method,
TM = thisworldly medical method,
OTM= otherworldly thisworldly medical method like some medicines that have thisworldly material but it is claimed that they are come from otherworldly prescriptions.

Y = is X who has been cured by OM / TM.
1. ∃X, X OB becomes Y
2. X PE treat with OM (1)
3. ◇, X becomes Y and so, ∃Y (2)
4. X PE treat with TM (1)
5. ◇, X becomes Y and so, ∃Y (4)
6. ◇, r∃Y (2)(3)
7. ◇, r∃Y (4)(5)

N = is X but only believes to treat with OM.
8. ∃N, X OB becomes N
9. N OB treat with OM (for example, praying, miracle, and etc.) & N IM treat with TM (8)
10. ◇, N becomes Y and so, ∃Y (9)
11. ◇, r∃Y (10)
12. If N treats with TM, but, □, N could not treat with TM (9),(11)
13. ⊥ (9)(12)

K = is X but believes to treat with OM, TM, OTM.
14. ∃K, X OB becomes K
15. K PE treat with OM & OTM & TM (based on consistency among them) (14)(15)
16. ◇, K PE treat with OT, ∃K (14)(15)
17. ◇, K PE treat with OTM, ∃K (14)(15)
18. ◇, K PE treat with TH, ∃K (14)(15)
19. ◇, if OTM does not ∈ OM (for example, historically some may ask whether OTM belongs to otherworldly entities?), then what K will do? (14) to (18)
20. ◇, if OTM v TM or OM v TM (Because, 1. there is a new TM that is better than OTM, or there is a new TM that replaces OTM, 2. Or there is a contrast between OTM/ OM and TM), then what K will do? (14) to (18)
21. 13 v r15 (that means it is self-defeating like the death of X or X will face inconsistency). (19) to (21)

11 For a similar view see: General (Christiano T., 2020), theoretical and practical (Renzo & Green, 2022).
If the argument is plausible, then it is true that every theocracy is false and it does not matter whether one has applied this or that religion. As soon as you fill public institutions with religion, you will face the argument. Here are some mainstreams of it:

L1= It is a government that would apply the Y method as a strategy to its public institutions,
Xn= Citizens of the corresponding government.

22. ∃L1, Xn OB applies L1 institutionally
23. □, L1 could not employ Y institutionally
24. Because, □, there could be r∃Y

L2= It is a government that would apply the N method as a strategy to its public institutions,

25. ∃L2, Xn OB applies L2 institutionally
26. □, L2 could not employ N institutionally
27. Because, □, L will face ⊥

L3= is a government that would apply the K method as a strategy to its public institutions,

28. ∃L3, Xn OB applies L3 institutionally
29. □, L2 could not employ N institutionally
30. Because, □, L will face 13v15

The writer is sure that L1, L2, and L3 are the certain future of each theocracy that will be struggled with the Covid-19 Sample Argument. This argument has proved that public spheres and institutions such as society or law or government have to fill and be infused only with knowledge. Besides that, it is clear that theocracies have been filling their public institutions with OTM or OM that will struggle with self-defeating and/or inconsistency. It was the writer's innovative argument that would persist that SV is true and theocracy is false.

B. The Objections: There could be some potential objections against the argument:

The Referendum of Covid-19 Sample Objection: First possible objection would be that one may argue that it is possible for a government organizes a referendum on the Covid-19 sample to know whether citizens of a country would like to be Y, N, K and expand this decision to the public sphere, legally, governmentally, and socially. If this view is true it seems the Covid-19 Sample Argument is false.

- However, one has to remember that you will face Covid-19 die off the humankind if you hold the referendum.

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12 For a similar view see:
Another reply would be that if they want to insist on OM or OTM, it may die off humankind, then they have to remain a staunch advocate of OM or OTM and do not switch to TM. But, we know they ought to do that.

The Feasible Theocratic Human Sciences Objection: One may argue that there is a strict distinction between natural/applied sciences i.e. Medicine or Engineering or Physics or Biology, and on the other side, there are human sciences i.e. Economics or Political Science or Philosophy, and so, the argument could not target theocratic authority. The writer’s reply has four-dimensions:

- First of all, it is a straw man fallacy, since one seems to forget that the writer has chosen the Covid-19 Sample Argument as a sample of the public institutions' epistemic content. You could replace the argument with another one that may come from Engineering. For instance, imagine one needs to call firefighters with a cellphone to rescue herself from a firestorm, but there is a religion that confines yourself to calling by a cellphone, or imagines you have to do that to rescue an official public organization and its employees from the firestorm. In this case, vis-a-vis, you have to follow the argument.

- In addition, the writer is extremely doubtful that one could draw those boundaries among sciences, day to day, more and more, there are multidisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary subjects and aspects among the sciences. Also, on the same page, there are some perspectives in which they have put together social sciences over natural sciences.

- The next is that norms and values that have been found out and/or constructed by philosophy and its branches such as ethics, social and political philosophy, and the philosophy of law are non-replaceable. These epistemic dimensions of these branches of philosophy are categorized as value theory and they are unique among all majors and subjects, they impel one to come up with idea that she could not prevent these aspects of human knowledge, and so, philosophy is the most fundamental segment of the knowledge.

- Another reply would be a thought experiment: imagine a world in which a terrific accident by an employee’s nuclear company has precipitated a temporary power outage in the whole world. In this case, the human being has to live in this painful situation for more than four decades. It is clear that myriad struggles may blow up by this accident. One of them is an opportunist queen of a country who commands her chemists to produce a kind of food that belongs to a religious diet that will addict all indigenous children of some territories. The queen would diminish indigenous cultures, languages, and religions and replace them with the queen's country by addicting and exterminating innocent indigenous children. Disgracefully she would transfer all of the human beings' civilization to the queen’s country. Moreover, there is a theocracy in one of those territories that ludicrously insists on this significant religious diet. There is no electricity for medical doctors to collect information on the addiction and they could not know to treat the children, this ignorance causes the death of children. Fortunately, there are some
social scientists who could gather data and elicit information from furtive citizens on the addiction in that society and caution the theocracy. Social scientists reach a consensus on this consensus has been achieved through positive addiction and death by 9999 cases from 10000 cases, and so, theocracy shall proscribe this diet. Everyone knows that there is no medical treatment and medicine and the only method to know about the diet is the outcome of social scientists' research. One more, vis-a-vis, you have to follow the argument.

The Theocratic Form Objection: Another objection would be one may argue a theocracy could avoid to fill the contents of public institutions epistemologically and ethically, but let its form of it remain theocratically the religious one.\(^\text{13}\)

- The writer would caution this objection is involved a theocratic paradox in which it sets religious authority, but it also tracks the non-religious authority paradoxically.

- Another note is that one may add it is also a meaningless theocracy that recognizes itself as a theocracy but it enforces non-theocratic authority.

The Uninterested Theocrats on Covid-19 Sample Objection: One could present an objection that philosophers caution governments to not apply theocracy as a government, it is because theocracy attacks the most fundamental moral norms and values.\(^\text{14}\) Thus, an argument against theocracy does not need to be anchored in non-moral norms, for instance, the writer does not need to present Covid-19 sample as the argument.

- First of all, the writer would insist this note one has to stand this condition that there could be a theocracy and/or fundamentalists that basically may denounce most fundamental moral norms and values,\(^\text{15}\) and this fact leads the writer to discover what would be another defeater of theocracy and the writer founds out that it is the Covid-19 Sample Argument.

- Second of all, the Covid-19 Sample Argument is not only on epistemic content of public justification of political authority in public spheres i.e. society or government, but also it is on moral content of it since it indicates value of lives of human kind as the covid-19 sample.

The Theocratic Last Version of Knowledge Objection: Another objection has been that religions have to be patient with the new scientific and philosophic discoveries, in other words, a religion would be regarding the last findings of sciences and philosophies, and so it seems there is no inconsistency and/or self-defeating between them that to be an obstacle to a theocracy, so, theory of everything or the most developed version of

\(^\text{13}\) For a similar view see: (Kal, 2020, pp. 120-1).

\(^\text{14}\) For a similar view see: (Swaine L., 2003, p. 375).

\(^\text{15}\) For similar views see: (Swaine L., 2007, p. 569), (Griffin, 2003, p. 1634).
knowledge i.e. sciences and philosophy could lead to being recognized as a whole or part of a religion and this could transfer to a government as a theocracy.\textsuperscript{16}

- The First reply would be that it is the real hypocrisy of those scholars and theocracies. This real hypocrisy of those scholars and theocracies is seriously immoral, harmful and unreasonable to both public institutions and morality of ordinary people.

- Second of all, the question would arise that whether those religions include nothingness or wrongfulness and so, why do we have to keep them as segments of a government as much as those religions include nothingness or wrongfulness and this enforces a government to be meaningless and nonfunctional.

The Theocratic Twin Objection: Some proponents of theocracy and others would recognize theocracy and religious democracy interchangeably.\textsuperscript{17} Therefore, it may conceal the serious and main weaknesses of theocracy. But, the writer believes that there could not be sophisticated examples of this interchangeability.

- First and foremost, first reply is that the mainstream of democracy is that political authority has to place thisworldly, democracy's political authority is not otherworldly and religious.\textsuperscript{18} As a result, it is not only true that theocracy is not religious democracy, but also, it is not a solution to label theocracy as religious democracy, since it remains otherworldly and religious political authority.

- Another cautionary note is that the first reply of this objection indicates that this differentiation is on political authority, thus, other related topics of the differentiation arise after political authority i.e. freedom of religion or religious rights.

- Some other authors whole-heartedly know theocracy and democracy are inherently inconsistent,\textsuperscript{19} and the writer totally agree with this view.

- The last reply is that religious democracy could have only two natures, the first is that it has to be normatively democratic, the second one is that it has to be normatively theocratic, there is no the third selection and a religious democracy could not be both normatively.

\textsuperscript{16} For a similar view see: (Davidson & Harris, 2006, p. 63).

\textsuperscript{17} For similar views see: (Lombardi, 2013, pp. 642-3), (Kal, 2020, p. 117).

\textsuperscript{18} For similar views see: (Eberle & Cuneo, 2017), (Christiano & Bajaj, 2022).

\textsuperscript{19} For this view see: (Onfray, 2007, pp. 177,205), (Kymlicka, 1992, p. 52).
The Appropriate Function of Theocracy Objection: Functionally appropriateness of totalitarian regimes' special attributes inclines theocracy's proponents to dwell on the idea that if theocracy could provide some of those functions, then the opponents have to confirm that theocracy is legitimate.20

- The writer enormously disagrees that the theocracy could provide those functions. It is because of the argument.

- Besides that, not only due to the above-mentioned normative reply but also, there could not be a similarity between other totalitarian regimes and theocracy. It is due to the fact that the authority of the former is placed in a thisworldly manner and may provide some of those functions, but the latter recognizes and puts the authority in an otherworldly manner, this reinforces the idea that theocracy could not provide those functions.

The Theocratic Humanities' Advantages Objection: One tendency among theocracies is their programs on presenting religious perspectives of humanities that exclude social sciences and philosophy because of the replies to The Feasible Theocratic Humanities Objection, this tendency leads to satisfying the proponents of theocracies and consequentially there could exist legitimate theocracies.21

- The first reply is that the aforementioned replies of The Irrelevancy of Humanities Objection could be potential replies to this objection repeatedly since it is very nasty to separate Philosophy and the Social Sciences and Humanities arbitrarily.22

- However, if one could successfully and precisely separate the above-mentioned spheres epistemically, a claim would arise that there could not be humanities as public reasons in public spheres due to the fact that the separation enforces those humanities to remain non-epistemic and unknowledgeable so, from the SV point of view, it is not important to call those humanities with any religious prefixes since they are out of this position.

- Indeed, it is feasible that one insists on some indispensability majors and professions of humanities to the government. Although one could not deny their relations to the Social Sciences and Philosophy, and etc., as a result, one could not employ humanities without methodology of sciences and philosophy to a government. For Instance, one could not initiate a government media as a type of media in humanities without principles, data, and knowledge that come from the Communication Science as a Social Science.

20 For a similar view see: (Potz, 2013, pp. 418-9).

21 For a similar view see:

22 For this view see: (Nisbet & Liah, 2021), (Gorton, 2023), (Britannica, 2021).
Another reply is that if one could exploit humanities with mysterious and unknown basis and principles, then one needs to face Alice in Wonderland.

The Theocratic Judgment Day Objection: Some proponents of theocracy would hoodwink into be patient until Judgment Day of sciences on the earth which means it is possible that it could not possible to choose between some theories i.e. scientific or philosophical theories as a true theory. For instance, it may occur physicians could not select between two candidates of interpretations of quantum theories, and then it seems similar a Judgment Day on the earth, the proponents jump about one of them.

The first reply of the writer to them is recalling the argument to improve this thought that public reasons to the public spheres are inherently different from religious beliefs since the argument indicate religious beliefs are inherently different from our knowledge and it is due to the fact that the argument also proves if one rejects this argument one will face inconsistency and/or self-defeating.

Moreover, the writer thinks this strategy of the proponents not only contravenes standards of academic ethics and political ethics, but also it violates the true function and destination of our knowledge i.e. quantum physics.

It also shows how the proponents and theocracies are identical with real and immoral Machiavellianism.

The Theocratic Integrity Objection: Some insist SV inclines to arbitrary view that is unfairly deal irreligious view to religious view, and this could be an objection to SV in favor of theocracy.

The writer obviously has written an argument in favor of secular government and in disfavor of religious government or theocracy that both are identical in the "Philosophizing about Theocracy". So, it has to be neutral toward irreligious view to religious view to extent that they remain religious issues.

Second of all, the Covid-19 Sample Argument not only indicate legitimacy of SV and secularism, but also it strongly eradicates theocratic authority.

Again, the Covid-19 Sample Argument not only applies morality and values, but also, it could apply sciences and the other segments of knowledge, thus this objection remains irrelevancy or be succumbed.

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24 For a similar view see: (Macedo, 1995, p. 475).
The Theocratic Moral Doctrine Objection: Some authors would propound this idea that a theocratic institution could be an institution propounds comprehensive moral doctrine religiously. This view lead to recognize a theocratic only as a religious moral institution, hence, the Covid-19 Sample Argument will be redundancy.

- The first response is religions may propound a religious moral doctrine, but the religions' main factors include religious worldview and their religious jurisprudence.

- Second of all, the Covid-19 Sample Argument not only pertain to public reasons epistemologically, but also it includes public reasons morally, thus, this objection could not target the argument.

The Autonomous Theocratic Community Objection: Some authors in favor of theocratic communities' interests inclines some versions of autonomy toward those communities in some societies principally e.g. liberal democracies.

- First of all, they wrongfully presuppose that one of the main considerations of theocracies and/or theocratic communities is equality, and if equality fails to achieve the required standards, then theocratic communities will demands other standards. It is wrong presupposition due to the fact that they refuse this idea that not only theocracies and/or theocratic communities suffers from lack of those basic moral values, but also they could not response to the Covid-19 Sample Argument, and the argument is on public reason both epistemologically and ethically.

- Additionally, if equality is insufficient to the communities, legitimate political authorities and governments would require true standards to them, although, autonomous solution to the communities not only eradicates legitimate political authorities and governments e.g. liberal democracies, but also it is not a practical and possible solution because of the Covid-19 Sample Argument. This reply would indicate this note that the communities have been struggling with deeper concepts of politics and law i.e. political authority or government, hence advocators of those standards insist on other political concepts misguided e.g. freedom of religion.

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25 For this view see: (Swaine, 2001, pp. 304-5), (Swaine L. , 2003, pp. 372-3).

26 For a similar view see:


28 For this view see: (Swaine, 2001, pp. 312-4).

29 For a similar view see: (Swaine L. A., 2003, pp. 108-9).
• Some think we could reduce identity of theocracy and theocratic communities to religious groups and tolerantly assert their fully autonomous rights. The writer seriously caution to identify theocracy and theocratic communities only as a religious community since proponents of these plans have naively unrecognized political authority of theocracy and theocratic communities, and then, their challenges toward legitimacy of political authority because of the Covid-19 Sample Argument.

• Also, some may look for convincing theocrats, the writer really is doubtful that one could convince theocrats since the Covid-19 Sample Argument proves how much theocracy is unreasonable and immoral.

• Another solution would be that to apprise them information on a mechanism as a part of a democracy. The writer believes it could be a suicide for a democracy because of the argument.

The Theocratic Ontological Oneness Objection: There is a long history on this caveat that God and/or the Divine is identical to thiswordly manners, and so it is meaningless and untrue to separate between the thisworldly and otherworldly authority in theocracy.

• First of all, undeniably it excludes nonbelievers and secular opponents, and they reasonably could criticize it is an unreasonable position.

• Also, one reasonably could demand which religious metaphysical relation is true to consider as this objection, even though, some dent these religious or anti-religious metaphysical positions i.e. Atheism, Monotheism, Pantheism etc. to be recognized as a public reason, the Covid-19 Sample Argument in favor of legitimate political authority is based on political justification by public reasons - i.e. sciences or Ethics- contrast to and/or inconsistent with religions or irreligions.

• Significantly, the Covid-19 Sample Argument precisely target this objection and proves that it is unreasonable objection.

30 For this view see: (Swaine, 2001, pp. 334-6).
31 For this view see: (Swaine L. , 2003, p. 386), (Swaine L. , 2007, p. 570).
32 For this view see: (Swaine L. , 2003, p. 387).
33 For this view see: (Nasr, 1967, p. 15).
34 For this view see: (Freeman S. , 2020, pp. 50-1).
The Theocratic Religious Advocacy Objection: There could be another objection to the argument which depends on content of a special religions and/or a religion demands toward theocracy, thus those who are believers of this view would promote and/or form a theocracy.\(^{35}\)

- First of all, some thinkers completely disagree with this view that this objection in favor of theocracy necessarily and empirically promote content of a special religious and/or religious demands.\(^{36}\)

- Second of all, the writer thinks as the *Covid-19 Sample Argument* proves theocracy is principally unreasonable view, hence these kind of government could be pernicious to religions.

The Theocratic Blessed Science Objection: Some may promote a blessed science,\(^{37}\) and this position may proportion blessed science to theocracy.

- First of all, the writer would ask that this blessed science in favor of a theocracy could enroll as a medical and/or applied science in favor of the *Covid-19 Sample Argument*. It is clear it could not be a profane or thisworldly science. So, it will be defeated by necessity of public institutions to thisworldly legitimate political authority and its requirement of public reasons.

- Some may argue the blessed science in favor of a theocracy has a special function which means the blessed science is not same as profane or thisworldly science functionally. The writer would also criticize this science to know and belong to a private community and/or private life exclusively, and there is no doubt that it is not related to public spheres and institutions alike a government practically and theoretically. It is due to the fact that if one requires some evidences for the blessed science, there is no doubt its proponents could not present those evidences as accessible and sharable evidences in favor of the blessed science and/or theocracy,\(^{38}\) so the blessed science and/or knowledge is not a science or knowledge in favor of a theocracy functionally.

- Also, the writer has to mention this note we as reasonable agents do not consider those religious or blessed science and/or knowledge as a theoretical authority instead of profane or thisworldly science and/or knowledge neither as practical authority because of the *Covid-19 Sample Argument* nor as theoretical authority owing to the *Covid-19 Sample Argument*.

\(^{35}\) For similar views see: (Palmquist S., 1993), (Swaine L. A., 2003, pp. 94-5).

\(^{36}\) For non-philosophical examples of this view see: (Nasr, 1967, p. 21), (Nasr, 2000, p. 100), (Eberle & Cuneo, 2017).

\(^{37}\) For this view see: (Nasr, 1989, p. 119).

\(^{38}\) For a similar view see: (Freeman S., 2020, p. 49).
The No Theocratic-Democratic Differentiation Objection: Another antagonism to the argument claims there is no real difference between theocracy and democracy, said differently, it is argued existing democratic governments such as democratic monarchies or democratic republics are same as existing theocracies, hence neither existing democracies nor existing theocracies could not serve democratic values.\(^{39}\)

- First of all, the *Covid-19 Sample Argument* validates theocracy is not only grapples with democratic values, but also it encounters resistance knowledge i.e. natural sciences, and so it misses out legitimate political authority.

- Second of all, if we put the argument aside we confirm democracies could appreciate much more democratic values since merely democracies could not preclude democratic values.

- Besides that, there is reply a ceremonial position in a democracy could be to symbolize identity of a country and/or to preserve a culture and/or territorial integrity and public institution of a country remain fully democratic.\(^{40}\) Although, theocracy not only completely unreasonable and immoral governments because of the *Covid-19 Sample Argument*, but also a theocracy could not include a ceremonial position to its clergies and/or others who have political authority because of the replies to another objection that has been called The Religious Democratic Twin Objection.

The Theocratic Democracy Objection: Another objection would make this proclamation a democracy has to include theocratic legitimacy.\(^{41}\)

- First of all, this chapter is not on political legitimacy, though, it is on legitimate political authority.

- More importantly, this objection ignores principal relation between political authority esp. democratic political authority and political legitimacy.\(^{42}\)

- If one insists on correctness of this objection and argues it is possible theocratic legitimacy of democracies, then the writer replies to one misunderstood this relation because the *Covid-19 Sample Argument* improves this idea that legitimate

\(^{39}\) For a similar view see:

\(^{40}\) For a similar view see:

\(^{41}\) For this view see: (Potz, 2013, pp. 414,416).

\(^{42}\) For this view see: (Peter, 2017 ), (Christiano T., 2020).
political authority could not be otherworldly or theocratic, and legitimate political authority ought to be thisworldly necessarily.

The Violent Theocratic Army Objection: Another objection against the argument would be this fact that theocracies and theocrats finally and ultimately propose brawl, force, battle, war, and suppression, violence etc. in favor of theocracy. So, throw in the towel.

- It is a strange objection because the writer prepares a philosophical work on theocracy exclusively and so, it is not a political manifest or proposal of political activism.
- Second of all, the writer thoughtfully believes if the argument is correct, it shows theocracies ultimately will be succumbed because of the argument's truth.
- Importantly, it seems if a theocracy loses normative language, it will replace legitimate political authority with de facto political power or authority, thus it leads to a real jungle and cruel battle of powers.

The Voting Theocracy Objection: A theocracy may include voting and this voting gives a democratic structure and/or political legitimacy to the theocracy.

- Some rightfully caution against democratic structures of theocracies.
- The writer's other replies have been mentioned to The Theocratic Twin Objection, The No Theocratic-Democratic Differentiation Objection, and The Theocratic Democracy Objection.
- Also, it seems there is voting’s inconsistencies between democracies and nondemocratic governments.

43 For this view see: (Swaine L., 2003, p. 376), (Swaine L., 2007, pp. 568-9).

44 For similar views see: (Lombardi, 2013), (Quraishi-Landes, 2015, p. 565).

45 For this view see: (de Gaay Fortman, 2008, p. 58), (Cliteur & Ellian, 2020, p. 109).

46 For this view see: (Brennan, 2020).
Chapter 2

W, W, W, We Are Theocracy: Legal Stammer

Minimalism in Religious Language
Minimalism in religious language has two advantages for the writer, first of all, to the writer's knowledge, minimalist religious language prepares true ambition of religious language, and so, it seems it could explain religious language. Second of all, this theory could not be misused or extended to other subjects of Philosophy of Religion i.e. metaphysics of religion or epistemology of religion. Altogether, the writer believes that if one considers the arguments of this theory, then one will agree that religious language is non-descriptive as Minimalism.

Legal Stammer Argument
The writer presents the Legal Stammer Argument in favor of non-religious language as legal language, and it is clear that principally theocracy applies to religious language as legal language, and so, the argument will be in disfavor of theocray. Conversely, if theocracy applies for non-religious language as a legal language, then the Legal Stammer Argument will not be on this applying. Moreover, the writer argues that due to the fact

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47 The writer's footnote: The writer has written this work as a Ph.D. semester requirement for autumn 2020.


that religious language is non-descriptive and legal language has to be descriptive, religious language could not be legal language.51

A. The Argument: It is the Legal Stammer Argument:

Case 1:

X as a religious language= There is a true scripture that produces this utterance: God will forgive the bankrupts' sin on judgment day.

Y as a legal language= There is a provision that the government will forgive the bankrupts in the last days of every year.

Z= Ana is bankrupt, and she believes in a monotheistic religion that believes in both God and judgment day.

- Z has to pay her debt to a bank,
- Z knows that if she would not pay her debt, 
- But she knows that if she does not pay her debt she will face two matters, 
- Z knows X, 
- Z knows Y, 
- Z believes that she is a sinner but X, 
  - If X, Z after X, Z will not remain a sinner, 
  - If X, then Z will be transformed from a sinner to an innocent religiously, 
  - Because the sin of Z depends on the willingness of God to forgive Z, 
  - It means that the forgiveness of X is otherworldly that first of all, there is sin as a religious concept and God as a religious entity in religious language and then, they have relations with each other, sin depends on God. Thus, religious language is non-descriptive and unique.
- However, Z knows that she is guilty but Y, 
  - If Y, Z after Y is not an offender legally but will remain guilty morally, 
  - Therefore, we know that the government will forgive Z and Z will be transformed from an offender to a guilty legally, 
  - But we know Z after Y, Z will remain guilty morally, because the guilt of Z does not depend on the willingness of the government to forgive Z


moral, bankruptcy is immoral and it is distinguished from forgiveness of the government,

- It means that the forgiveness of Y is thisworldly that first of all, there is the guilt as a legal concept and the government as a legal entity in legal language, besides that, the guilt has the legal aspect and the moral aspect, and so, the guiltiness and the government have relations with each other, but the guiltiness is independent of the government.

Case 2:

X as a religious language= There is a true scripture that produces this utterance: God will forgive the bankrupts’ sin on judgment day.

Y as a legal language= There is a provision that the government will forgive the bankrupts' sin in the last days of every year.

Z’= Ana is bankrupt, but she does not believe in monotheistic religions she does not believe in both God and judgment day, but she does not know Y.

- Z’ has to pay her debt to a bank,
- Z’ knows that if she would not pay her debt,
- But she does not know that if she does not pay her debt she will face two matters,
- Z’ does not know X,
- Z’ does not know Y,
- Z’ does not believe that she is a sinner but X,
  - If X, Z’ after X, will not remain a sinner,
  - If X, then Z’ will be transformed from a sinner to an innocent religiously,
  - Because the sin of Z’ depends on the willingness of God to forgive Z’,
  - It means that the forgiveness of X is otherworldly that first of all, there is sin as a religious concept and God as a religious entity in religious language and then, they have relations with each other, sin depends on God. Thus, religious language is non-descriptive and unique.
- However, Z’ knows that she is guilty but Y,
  - If Y, Z’ after Y is not an offender legally but will remain guilty morally,
  - Z’ does not know Y, and so, reasonably she would not do the bankruptcy, but we know Y,
  - However, imagine Z’ do the bankruptcy, if Y, Z’ after Y is not an offender legally, but will remain guilty morally,
  - Therefore, we know that the government will forgive Z' and Z' will be transformed from an offender to a guilty legally,
  - But we know Z’ after Y, Z’ will remain guilty morally, because the guilty of Z’ does not depend on the willingness of the government to forgive Z' morally, bankruptcy is immoral and it is distinguished from forgiveness of the government,
- It means that the forgiveness of Y is thisworldly that first of all, there is the guiltiness as a legal concept and the government as a legal entity in legal language, besides that, the guiltiness has the legal aspect and the moral aspect, and so, the guiltiness and the government have relations with each other, but the guiltiness is independent of the government.

These cases show that First of all, applying different theistic or atheist beliefs in both cases does not lead to different concepts and entities in a religious language such as different beliefs on God's bankruptcy forgiveness in the scripture, since, it is clear that applying the same religious language is independent of mental or epistemic states, and so, religious language is non-descriptive. Second of all, we discover not only that we could grasp the different aspects of thisworldly concepts and entities such as the moral and legal aspect of guiltiness, but also if we apply different beliefs to non-religious concepts and entities lead to different concepts and entities in a non-religious language such as legal language, and this legal language is descriptive. The first consequence of these cases is that X is an example of religious language, a non-descriptive one. The second consequence of them is that Y is an example of a non-religious language, a descriptive one.

The writer also could present the argument as a second face to insist on the basic requirement of legal language: Radically, imagine another way to prove the Legal Stammer Argument that we have to apply the law of applied physics to civic law because it is necessary to build hydroelectric dams, we know that religious language is not descriptive language and so, legal language could not be religious language, though, it has to be scientific language. Once more, to have theistic or atheistic beliefs on God does not target different concepts and entities in a religious language such as different claims on God's attitudes on otherworldly dams in the scripture, due to the fact that again it is clear to applying of religious language is independent of mental or epistemic states, and so, religious language is non-descriptive. Moreover, we discover not only that we could grasp the different aspects of thisworldly concepts and entities such as the physical, chemical, and environmental aspects of dams, but also if we apply different beliefs to non-religious concepts and entities lead to different concepts and entities in a non-religious language such as legal language.

Additionally, if one would argue in favor of God's attitudes on thisworldly dams in the scripture and recognize it as a descriptive language, one will not be faced with the Legal Stammer Argument, but one'll be faced with the Covid-19 Sample Argument.

Let's the writer formalizes these two faces of the Legal Stammer Argument by borrowing some symbols:

\[
\begin{align*}
\Phi &= \text{Descriptive property} \\
\alpha &= \text{Religious language} \\
\beta &= \text{Legal language} \\
\Theta &= \text{Empty} \\
N_1 &= N_1 \text{ as First descriptive legal code or provision} \\
N_n &= \text{Infinite descriptive legal codes or provisions}
\end{align*}
\]

- \(\alpha\) is \(\Theta\) of \(\Phi\),
• But, $\beta$ needs to be $\Phi$,  
• Because, $\beta$ has to be the bearer of $N_1$ to $N_n$,  
• If $N_1$ is a descriptive discipline like applied physics, then, $\beta$ has to be the bearer of $N_1$,  
• So, $\beta$ has to include $\Phi$,  
• $\alpha$ could not be $\Phi$,  
• Altogether, $\beta$ could not be adopted from $\alpha$.  

\[\Phi \in \beta \text{ iff } \alpha \neq \beta, \text{ because } \alpha \text{ is } \Theta \text{ of } \Phi.\]

All in all, if the legal language has to be a descriptive language that could be the bearer of descriptive sciences and disciplines such as applied physics, engineering, medicine, and/or normative disciplines such as morality then it has not to be the religious one, there are, on the one side, the minimalist necessity of legal language that has to be descriptive, and on the other side, lack of descriptive aspect of religious language, and so, there is arising of the Legal Stammer Argument for non-religious legal language.

The above-mentioned thesis is that religious language is not descriptive, but, one could perceive there are normative languages such as non-religious languages, those could bearer of descriptive and/or normative ones, also, we know that we require a legal language that has to fit bankruptcy as illegal. Altogether, if –religious language– does not indicate that bankruptcy is illegal, then it shall not be a law.

The writer argues the Legal Stammer Argument shows that religious language is non-descriptive and so, normative language like legal language could not be the religious one, because of the descriptive necessity of legal language

**B. The Objections:** There could be some potential objections against the argument:

The Legal Descriptiveness of Religious Experience Objection: There are different relations between religious language and religious experience, and a potential objection may evolve from the connection between religious language and religious experience. It means that a theocracy may argue that its constitutions and provisions and statutes have come from the religious experiences of legislators and many like them i.e. religious feeling, mystical experience, divine revelation. But there would be many replies to the objection.

• One may rationally claim that it is hypocrisy in law to propose personal religious experience as the content of a statute or provision of law. It is hypocrisy because your personal experience plays impersonal roles as statutes or provisions of law.

• Second of all, this hypocrisy is not only a struggle in the religious language problems but also, it could not enroll functional demand of statutes or provisions of law. It is owing to the fact that a statute or provision of law has to be descriptive,

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52 For similar views see: (Bennett-Hunter, 2016), (Forgie, 1985), (Gäb, 2017), (Nasr, 1971), (Schlamm, 1992), (Yadav, 2016), (Wahlberg, 2020 ).
and once more, the religious experience could not enroll the descriptive aspect of legal language and so, functionally it could not enroll as statutes or provisions of law. For instance, a jurist who grasps a religious experience on the unexpected future earthquake that is in contrast to well-settled outcomes of earth sciences, then how could prove that her experience is a description of the future climate change. Also, it could be a descriptive religious experience on climate change, unless all of the related experts and citizens have this experience universally.

- Last but not least, one may strongly object that religious experience and religious language have a reciprocal relationship and their interpretation that make the impossibility of religious language as legal language. Because legal language could not face biting the bullet, this means religious language in legal language disintegrates legal language and so, it leads to the dissolution of the legal system. Legal language only could be fulfilled by descriptive requirement, and non-descriptive property of religious language and religious experience and their reciprocal relationship will disintegrate law.

The Differential Legal Descriptiveness Objection: Another objection might be that religious language is not non-descriptive, but, it has a differential descriptive property that is not similar to descriptive scientific and/or philosophical language, thus, a theocracy could apply religious language in different ways. For instance, fine-tuning argument is descriptive, and so legal language in a theocracy could employ this religious language that is based on fine-tuning argument.

- First of all, the writer has shown that legal language has to be a non-religious one, because, it is true that not only religious language is non-descriptive and has no (differential) descriptive aspect, but also, legal language has to be descriptive, thereby legal language shall not be religious language.

- Also If one insists on the differential descriptiveness of religious language and rejects the argument theoretically in favor of some descriptiveness of religious language and its advantages practically, then one needs to live under the sovereignty of a theocracy to confess that the Legal Stammer Argument is cogent practically.

- Next, another reply would be that existence of God as a religious and otherworldly concept is one thing and fine-tuning argument as a philosophical and thisworldly concept in the favor of the religious concept is another thing. This distinction is cautionary that if one needs descriptive language in legal language, first of all, this perspective suffers from this serious weakness of this distinction, also, if one insists on the fine-tuning argument and then this argument collapse, the legal language will collapse.

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53 For a similar view see: (Scott, 2017).

54 For a similar view see: (Vainio, 2020, p. 34).
• In addition, other otherworldly concepts that may have thisworldly interpretation and/or explanation like a religious experience that may have natural and/or thisworldly explanation, not only suffer from the last reply, but also, it may be true that religious experience may have natural and/or thisworldly explanation, but this discovery will transform an otherworldly religious concept and/or entity to non-religious thisworldly concept and/or entity. As a result, once more, legal language will be infused with the descriptive property of non-religious language that comes from an experience.

• Besides that, if one belongs to a theistic religion and identifies a religious claim e.g. miracle as a descriptive claim, and another one denies this claim owing to the fact that the second person belongs to a non-theistic religion, the first could not prove that the miracle claim is descriptive unless the first one could indicate that the claim could be provable i.e. as a scientific claim.

• Last but not least, it seems very odd that opponents of the argument are catching sight of the outcome of sciences and philosophy, and then, they persuade legal language to fill with the outcomes and suddenly label them as the religious ones.

The Descriptive Legal Revisionary Objection: One may think that it is true religious language is not descriptive, although it has to include descriptiveness. The one indeed claims in favor of revisionary religious language, and so, if the religious language does not a descriptive requirement of legal language in non-revisionary aspect, we have to prepare this requirement to religious language and then it could satisfy the requirement of legal language in a theocracy.

• The first reply to this objection is that one only disguises the non-revisionary aspect of religious language as the revisionary, it means that one would conceal that the religious language is not descriptive.

• Also, it is possible that one would insist religious language necessarily is revisionary. However, one correspondingly has to admit that one labels the non-descriptiveness of religious language as the descriptive one.

• If one comes up with the last reply, one ought to be doubtful and question whether this perspective of religious language as legal language is appropriate functionally and normatively. The writer is very doubtful that this perspective could be appropriate. Imagine it is appropriate, there is a criticism that if those lawmakers, legislators, and politicians compromise this aspect of legal language, there will

55 For this view see: (Kant, 2001, p. 126), (Webb, 2017), (Runehov, 2008), (Katz, 2020), (Moser & Meister, 2020), (James, 1902), (Gellman, 2018), (Lancaster, 2000), (Stace, 1961), (Aminrazavi, 2021).

56 For this view see: (Scott, 2017).
arise the criticism to confirm that they only would exploit loopholes and/or manipulate advantages.

The Naturalist Descriptive Legal Objection: Some legal naturalists believe that legal language is not normative and we have to replace the normativity of legal language with descriptiveness of it,\(^{57}\) thus this replacement will defeat the *Legal Stammer Argument*.

- First of all, the *Legal Stammer Argument* mainly is on the descriptive requirement of legal language. Also, there are extremely few legal philosophers deny this approach.\(^{58}\)
- Also, another reply that could be applied to the argument is legal language is descriptive because it may include empirical sciences.\(^{59}\)
- Besides that, there are only a few philosophers who reject normativity of law and/or legal language,\(^{60}\) and so, the writer presupposes that if A applies legal language to claim that B shall do or do not to \(\Phi\), it means B normatively shall do or do not to \(\Phi\).
- The last reply is that the *Legal Stammer Argument* proves that legal language shall be normative.

The Descriptive Law of Water Sample Objection: One may believe that her religious beliefs include descriptive claims that come from knowledge i.e. natural sciences and/or it is similar and/or identical with them, there are some descriptive claims in religious scripture and/or they are placed among other religious claims as religious language, therefore, those religious claims could be as the content of legal language.\(^{61}\) For instance, image one claims that H2O is the chemical formula of water and it comes from this religious scripture. It could target the *Legal Stammer Argument*.

- The first strict reply has been come from denying this objection as a proposal fundamentally that means those claims couldn't be a public reasons of public justification to a political authority of a theocracy although it is beyond the task of this work.\(^{62}\)

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\(^{57}\) For a similar view see: (Leiter & Etchemendy, 2021).

\(^{58}\) For a similar view see: (Kramer, 2007, p. 75).

\(^{59}\) For similar views see: (Kramer, 2007, p. 76), (Finlay & Plunkett, 2018).

\(^{60}\) For similar views see: (Endicott, 2022), (Carston, 2013, p. 19).

\(^{61}\) For a similar view see:

\(^{62}\) Writer’s footnote: One could study this argument in favor of non-theocratic authority and government and as an objection in disfavor of theocratic authority and government in another chapter: "Covid-19 Proves Theocracy Is False".
• Another reply could be doubtfulness on descriptiveness of H2O is water, but once more it is not the writer's responsibility to think of the philosophy of chemistry.63 Besides that, the writer deplores to relegate descriptiveness of scientific language in favor of religious language's upgrading amply.

• The stimulating reply is that knowledgeable language i.e. formal scientific language or natural scientific language or moral language does not include religious language. It is owing to the fact that first of all, imagine if a religious scripture includes this phrase that H2O is water, although this claim remains scientific claim in the religious scripture, it is not only true that they will remain separated claims on two sorts of claims: religious claims i.e. monotheism, divine attributes, heaven and hell in the scripture and scientific claim: chemical formula of water in the scripture because one could conduct an experiment on the H2O is water claim and share the outcome of this investigation, though, the one could not test a religious claim such as resurrection and share the outcome of it, but also, the Legal Stammer Argument corroborates non-descriptiveness of religious language and descriptive requirement of legal language. Second of all, the religious claim is only an otherworldly claim and the scientific claim is simply a thisworldly claim.

• One may cleverly add to the objection that the formula of water in another world is something else and it is mentioned in the scripture, thereafter it proclaims descriptiveness of religious claim. However, one has forgotten that this example is on another earth in the same world,64 it is not only accessible formula to test within people of another earth and they could share the experiment's outcome with the people, but also, they could share the outcome with people of our earth if they have a method to pass information.

The Multidimensional (Non-)Descriptive Law Objection: It objects to the writer's argument, imagine a series of acts that are forbidden by common law e.g. the law is on drunk driving, the law prohibits drunk driving. The law proscribes drunk driving as follows: "Every driver while the driver is driving a car or vehicle shall be fully conscience which means drinking alcohol beverage and/or taking the drug is banned since declaring of this law. On condition that the driver involves in an accident and/or other torts and/or crimes, the driver will be fully and legally responsible. Although, if police arrest the driver, the driver will receive punishment by a court due to divine law and/or religious jurisprudence and/or theocratic law." So, law has both secular and theocratic dimensions.65

63 For a similar view see: (Weisberg, 2006), a view (Hendry, 2011, p. 293).

64 For a similar view see: (Putnam, 1973).

65 For a similar view see: (Backer, 2006, pp. 118-22,134).
• The first reply of the writer to this objection is that there is no descriptiveness of religious language or religious language as legal language. Thus, this legal language will struggle with a lack of legal descriptiveness the Legal Stammer Argument.

• The second reply to another version of the objection in which one may claim the law has a religious dimension, but it is only as a symbolic and/or virtual and/or fictional, though, the writer would reply this interpretation of the law will break the law since we need the descriptiveness of the law, it has to be not only on the drunk driving banning but also on the punishment.

• This objection also produces another problem, this non-descriptiveness of the law will violate the descriptive dimension of the law, due to the fact that it wastes the function of the law which means the righteousness of the prohibition of drunk driving will be infringed by the criminal legal dimension of the law. It will be violated when the driver would claim "I will not obey the law since I am not a religious citizen and/or I disagree with this interpretation of this religious jurisprudence and/or I only follow the secular legal authority since Legal Stammer Argument inclines the requirement of legal descriptiveness." In this case, the law does not have legal authority.

The Non-Dissolution of Non-Descriptive Law Objection: One may claim if the Legal Stammer Argument is true, there could not be a real and correspondence theocratic system since this theocracy will be disappear under this non-descriptiveness. However, we confirm there could be a theocratic system.

• One reply is that if it is true legal system is on social rules or facts to prepare legal authority, then there could be non-legal social rules without legal authority that enroll this correspondence authority and obligation e.g. a rich culture could enroll partially correspondence obligations.

• Second of all, it is also true that those non-legal authorities and obligations could not enroll those norms and so, those systems will face dissolution gradually.

• Also, we need to keep this thought in mind that some theocratic legal system could enroll their norms as long as the correspondence country is a micronation and or they do not need a legal system at all.

The Partial Theocratic Commensurability Objection: Another objection could run as follow, it is feasible that a theocracy does not fully make theocratic law, but it introduces theocratic law partially, and it could be a defeater to the argument.

• The writer admits that this objection is serious, but it is necessary to remember that the related legal system will face full of non-consistencies and non-functioning.

66 For a similar view see: (Renzo & Green, 2022).
This law-making will create tremendous conflicts of aims and norms of the law, it is equal to having a legal obligation in favor of a secular statute and/or constitution and in disfavor of a related theocratic statute and/or constitution. There is no doubt that it blocks one sort of the two groups of law.

The Theocratic Legal Content Objection: One may insist on the normative force of a religious language as legal language, but one argues its content remains fully secular and its form shall be theocratic.

- The first reply of the writer is that religious beliefs and actions at first face principally claim neutral and/or non-normative and/or non-valued otherworldly concepts and entities, and so they could run this objection.
- If they have some normative forces they are their second-order and so, they are inherently non-normative.
- Another reply is that the religious normative force of statutory or constitutional provisions could conflict and/or contract with secular content and/or other aspects of it.
- The last reply is that the normative force of secular normative language is principally more enforced. It is because it targets directly authoritative normativity of secular language. Although, authoritative normativity of religious language is authoritative since authority on the correspondence laws depends on the authority of religious language and religions.

The Non-Theocratic Divine Legal Content Objection: Another objection would incline to this idea that we ought to denounce theocracy, but we need to confirm divine law or secular law via divine law.67

- The writer thinks this objection struggles not only the Legal Stammer Argument clearly, but also is involved in the Covid-19 Sample Argument and the argument of next chapter, hence it requires religious authority has to be as a political authority.
- Also, the writer ought to mention that some of those proponents' interpretations of theocracy and/or divine law indicate they could understand primary and basic elements of neither political philosophy i.e. political authority or political

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legitimacy, and nor the philosophy of law e.g. legal language and legal interpretation.

The Non-Linguistic Theocratic Law Objection: One may object the *Legal Stammer Argument* is linguistically empty which means one may insist it includes only linguistic properties, but the writer has to extend the argument through non-linguistic concepts and entities in favor of the argument.

- The first reply of the writer is a revision of the argument: The first premise is legal language shall be descriptive, and the second premise is religious language is not descriptive, so legal language has not to be religious language. It obviously amends for this mistake that the argument extends to other non-linguistic concepts and entities.

- Second of all, this argument proves religious language is not the same as descriptive language. For instance, one could consider these examples: if a hot room is full of people and the only way to escape from the hot is that one has to open the window, the other requires "one! You ought to open the window" and reasonably one would open it. This sentence is descriptive sentence since there is a relation between an empirical claim on the hot room and a justified belief and action on the necessity of openness of the window. Although, if a Zoroastrian believer claim to a Buddhist "Believe Ahura Mazada if you want salvation", the Buddhist could reply to the Zoroastrian "Believe Nirvana if you want salvation", and it seems that none of them will be an apostate for their religions because of different religious claim. It means that once more religious language is non-descriptive due to the fact that there is no relation between religious claims on the different religious beliefs and justification of the salvation.

The Theocratic Merits of Secular Law's Weakness Objection: One would argue that weaknesses of the philosophy of law e.g. indeterminacy of law and the disparity among philosophy of law and the practice of law inclines to rethink on the relation of religion and law; and it could be in favor of theocracy.

- First of all, the writer's argument indicate religious language principally could not enroll as a legal language, and the weaknesses of legal theory and legal philosophy could not be a pretext to resurgence of religious language as legal language. If there is such a language then there is no law, there will remain quasi-law that the writer name it legal stammer.

- Second of all, if the argument only improves this idea that religious language is differentially descriptive, once more, the argument also proves that this differentiation insists on the impossibility of religious language as legal language. So, the weaknesses could not conceal this differentiation and the infeasibility.

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68 For this view see: (Modak-Truran, 2007b), (Modak-Truran, 2004).
Also, the writer believe it is deplorable solution of the weaknesses since it is similar with out of the frying pan into the fire. The argument enforces this thought that descriptiveness of legal language is necessary,\(^{69}\) and it seems it is beyond dispute, so one could not mandate non-descriptiveness of religious language to conceal other problems of the philosophy of law or legal language i.e. indeterminacy of law. This fault lead to lose the most significant part of legal language: descriptiveness.

Significantly, there is no causal relation between legal language and ontology or epistemology of law,\(^{70}\) which means it is possible to preserve the descriptive property of legal language, but it is also possible to suspend or do not know on metaphysical theories of law i.e. legal interpretivism or legal positivism.

It is also irrational to assemble this worldly and other worldly worldviews as religions,\(^{71}\) it is not only due to the fact that secularism has to be neutral toward religions and we have to distinguish between different secularisms and its differential interpretation,\(^{72}\) but also this worldly worldviews are irreligious and/or antireligious worldviews.\(^{73}\) Moreover, there are two other notes it seems very odd that to recognize political or economic theories as religions, also the argument proves other worldly views and beliefs do not include a relation to justification and this lead to do not include the descriptiveness or semantic objectivity of law.\(^{74}\) So, religions and religious language could not be as law and legal language.

The Strictly Enforceable Theocratic Law Objection: A believer and/or a proponent of theocracy may confirm the Legal Stammer Argument, one may also maintain it leads to quasi-law or an utterly situated legal stammer in a system of law in theocracy, though, one may has been enforced to obey the religious law.\(^{75}\)

First of all, the writer has shown the Legal Stammer Argument primarily indicates if a system of law shall be descriptive, it shall exclude religious language. So, it does not matter one is enforced to invoke a religious law or not.

\(^{69}\) For a dissimilar view see: (Modak-Truran, 2007b, pp. 165-6).

\(^{70}\) For a dissimilar view see: (Modak-Truran, 2007b, p. 206).

\(^{71}\) For a dissimilar view see: (Modak-Truran, 2007b, pp. 182,220).

\(^{72}\) For this view see: (Maclure & Taylor, 2011 [1399]).

\(^{73}\) For a similar view see: (Winch, 1997, p. 109).

\(^{74}\) For a dissimilar view see: (Modak-Truran, 2007b).

\(^{75}\) For this view see: (Nasr, 1967, pp. 12,26-34), (Nasr, 2000, pp. 85-113), (Swaine L. A., 2003, pp. 94-5).
• Second of all, no legal system is permitted to contravene jus cogens from the international law perspective,\textsuperscript{76} and this shows moral standards are prior to religious and/or theocratic law, it is not vice versa.\textsuperscript{77} Also, if a theocracy persecutes its citizens immorally and unreasonably, there is no doubt that international law shall response the theocracy gravely and practically, not only because they have a moral obligation to response to those persecutions, but also, it is possible the theocracy violates the international law standards, for example, it could violate fundamental rights of foreigners and citizens of other countries and/or circumscribe the rights of them.

• Also, there is no doubt that one could not ascertain a religion that could cover all aspects of an inclusive legal system without any fault since that religion and its religious language not only has to extend beyond its non-descriptive linguistic domain and becomes a descriptive language as the \textit{Legal Stammer Argument} indicated necessity of descriptive language to a legal system, but also, it shall include all of required true contents of the legal system.

The Religious Ethics of Theocratic Law Objection: Another objection is based on some religious ethics that they could prepare ultimate aim of a system of law,\textsuperscript{78} and so this ultimate aim could target secular law and its descriptiveness and be in favor of a theocracy.

• First of all, that religious ethics as an ultimate aim of a system of law shall include descriptiveness as the argument.

• Second of all, if the argument proves it has to be descriptive it is thisworldly, and so it does not matter what is its name or whether a religion could introduce otherworldly worldview or not.

• Also, in one label the religious ethics as an ultimate aim of a system of religious law, it needs to provide required functions of a secular law, and then it be enforced to transfer to a secular law.

• Moreover, there are serious competitors i.e. Kantian Ethics, Rule Consequentialism, or Golden Rule that have prevailed this nomination.

\textsuperscript{76} For this view see: (Tasioulas & Verdirame, 2022 ).

\textsuperscript{77} For a dissimilar view see: (Backer, 2006, pp. 115-6).

\textsuperscript{78} For this view see: (Stumpf, 1953, pp. 909-10).
The Theocratic Discrepancy Objection: One may argue in favor of theocratic law that is based on discrepancy of theocratic and secular law.\textsuperscript{79}

- The writer cautious this objection could be similar with The Uninterested Theocrats on Covid-19 Sample Objection of the first chapter since one may shrug the \textit{Legal Stammer Argument} off. The main character of this argument includes both moral and non-moral aspects of descriptiveness, thus one could not object to the argument based on valued aspect of it solely.

- What's more, the argument's moral aspect targets this objection, there is a lack of moral descriptiveness of theocratic law as the writer presents the argument as the second face.

\textsuperscript{79} For this view see: (Backer, 2006, pp. 122-4).
Chapter 3
Be a Good Person, Not That Theocratic Way

Humanist Objection
To begin with, the writer concurs a humanist version of counterexample objection against theological voluntarism and supernaturalism in life's meaning (hereafter: Humanist Objection). The writer has chosen divine command theory (hereafter: DCT) as a version of the theological volunteerism and the writer knows the other types of it as replaceable with DCT for the writer's purpose.

A version of this objection has been similar to this: Recall this note that X as a new humanist ought to satisfy ethical life, since, to fulfilling a new humanist life or to be a new humanist, X has to follow ethical life, to begin with, imagine the arguments of Y as a religious person to \( \Psi \) as meaningful and moral life is that Y requires theistic arguments

80 The writer’s footnote: The writer has written this work as a Ph.D. semester requirement in spring 2021. The thought of the argument came to the writer’s mind from a real example and its available explanation, the writer has striven to find the main problem of the example and then has exhausted the whole of causes and properties of this phenomenon as will be mentioned in this chapter, also the writer has written on some aspects of this phenomenon in some non-academic works.


and beliefs to have $\Psi$ or to defeat death's meaningless as the enemy of immortality or to defeat the devil as the enemy of morality, but, conversely, $X$ has some arguments and beliefs in favor of $\Psi$, since, first of all, if one has a life, it includes moral values and meaning of life in the life and they are not outside of the life, also, you could fulfill your life and has $\Psi$, even though, you know that you will die forever, and vice versa, these notes indicate that those arguments and beliefs in favor of $\Psi$ could be independent of $Y$'s arguments and beliefs, one may object that $\Psi$ naturally belongs (and/or identical with) $Y$ and $\Phi$ as meaningless and immoral life naturally belongs (and/or identical with) $X$, although, a reply would arise that $\Psi$ includes some subjective meaningful phenomena such as hobbies or fine arts or it also could obtain objective meaningful phenomena such as moral values, thus, you ought to make and/or grasp $\Psi$ and avoid to $\Phi$, $Y$'s life is something and $\Psi$ is something else ontologically, altogether, everyone has to fulfill one's life in which one has to follow meaningful hobbies, create the fine arts, make a relationship with others, do non-profit and voluntary services, protect the environment, go sightseeing, make a love, obey moral laws and be a good person and so many others, and all of these are inherently and significantly independent from (and prior to) religious arguments and beliefs, and so, we could make and/or grasp the meaningful and moral life here and now, for instance, if you love your child because you ought to do your duties or you have to follow your instinct toward the child and you have passed the special way for him/her, this is naturally different from the point that life is meaningless or death disappears everything.

**Inapplicability Problem Argument**

The proportion of the writer to the debate is this argument – the *Inapplicability Problem Argument* - and so, let's reject the concurrent claim – the Humanist Objection - and presuppose that DCT is true. There could be a relation between DCT and political authority, and the writer would argue that precisely Divine Command Theory in Theocracy (hereafter: DCTT) is not only suffering from the main mistakes of DCTT in the individual moral sense but also, DCTT violates another mainstream that this argument is in favor of secular ethics in the public sphere, as the writer has named it as the *Inapplicability Problem Argument* (hereafter: IPA).

**A. The Argument: It is the IPA:**

$Z= A$ theocracy that spins DCTT,
$Ys=$ Citizens of $Z$,

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85 For this view see: (Dagger & Lefkowitz, 2021).

\( \Phi = \text{Participating in DCTT,} \)
\( \Psi = \text{Believing in DCTT.} \)

- **Presupposition A:**
  In this situation, there is a Z that would spin DCTT, and there are also Ys who in participate DCT in their individual moral sense, and they also participate in DCT in the individual moral sense in the public sphere. What's more, it is clear that Ys do not need to believe in DCT, though, they only need to participate in DCT practically. Standardly, another note for this situation is that if Z as a theocracy spins another moral doctrine such as Kantian Ethics or Rule Consequentialism or Golden Rule, it will remain independent of IPA in favor of secular ethics and/or other theories of normative ethics and it will also remain independent of IPA in disfavor of DCT.

This presupposition means that imagine this by borrowing some symbols:
1. DCTT,
2. Z spins DCTT,
3. Ys \( \Phi \)-ing in DCTT,
4. If Ys \( \Phi \)-ing in DCTT \( \equiv \neg \Box \) Ys \( \Psi \)-ing in DCTT (assumption).

- **Presupposition B:**
  In this situation, once more there is a theocracy such as Z that has had Ys they not only participate in DCT as moral doctrine in their private and public life in an individual sense but also believe that DCT is true and/or have this trustworthy moral doctrine in the individual sense. Additionally, the writer thinks A is prior to B since one could participate in DCT without believing that DCT is true. And the writer set aside this standard note that Ys believe in DCT but may do not act to DCT correspondingly such as amoral citizens.

This presupposition means that Imagine:
1. DCTT,
2. Z spins DCTT,
3. Ys \( \Phi \)-ing in DCTT,
4. Ys \( \Psi \)-ing in DCTT,
5. Ys \( \Phi \)-ing in DCTT & Ys \( \Psi \)-ing in DCTT,
6. \( \neg \) (if \( \Diamond \) Ys \( \Psi \)-ing in DCTT & \( \Diamond \) Ys does not \( \Phi \)-ing in DCTT) (assumption).

- **Presupposition C:**
  In the last situation, we suppose presupposition B, although, the writer thinks presupposition C has struggled in IPA in favor of secular ethics and/or other theories of normative ethics and it will be faced with IPA in disfavor of DCT. Moreover, as a standard idea that normative ethics is only on individual morality and if it would include societal and political norms and values it will transform into social and political norms and values such as freedom, equality, justice, and rights that are based on moral norms and values principally. However, the writer has to
mention that \textit{IPA} has to affect and/or relate to Ys’ the public sphere, even though, it also is clear that they have to remain individual.
This presupposition means that Imagine:
1. DCTT,
2. Z spins DCTT,
3. Ys \(\Phi\)-ing in DCTT,
4. Ys \(\Psi\)-ing in DCTT,
5. Ys \(\Phi\)-ing in DCTT & Ys \(\Psi\)-ing in DCTT,
6. If Ys \(\Phi\)-ing in DCTT & Ys \(\Psi\)-ing in DCTT, even though, Z struggles in \textit{IPA},
7. \textit{IPA} does not \(\in\) social and political norms and values (assumption).

Let the writer works on Part 6. of this presupposition that needs to be explained and the writer argues the last claim contains a cluster of reciprocal explanations in favor of \textit{IPA}. All of the foregoing conditions of \textit{IPA} are owing to the fact that DCTT and theocracy itself have the same religious and theocratic authority, the writer will indicate this same authority to morality and politics eradicates morality as these conditions:

\begin{itemize}
  \item The first condition is that if a theocracy very strongly and successfully enrolls DCTT, then it appears that Ys will be grateful for Z, and in this case, no one will claim C. However, if Z do not and/or could not enroll A \& B strongly and successfully because there could be many explanations for this presupposition i.e. pointless functions or bad politicians, then it seems that C will be presented. As a consequence, Ys could be doubtful whether they have to do A \& B or not. It is due to the fact that Ys believes if \(\Phi\) and \(\Psi\) and \textit{IPA} arises, then C will be detrimental to DCT. Ys may think it would be better if Ys placed and draw DCT individualistically. In other words:
    1. If Z has done DCT in an effective & grateful way functionally,
    2. Ys also thinks of DCTT as an effective & grateful way functionally,
    3. However, If Z vitiates DCT functionally,
    4. Ys also do not think of DCTT as an effective & grateful way functionally,
    5. Therefore, Ys would be doubtful whether they have to do these presuppositions: A \& B, and this skepticism targets morality,
    6. It is owing to the fact that if Ys do \(\Phi\)-ing \& \(\Psi\)-ing \& C arises: \textit{IPA}, and then it will be pernicious to DCT \& morality,
    7. It \(\Diamond\) Ys mull DCT over as an individual moral doctrine \& Ys may contemplate replacing DCTT.
  \item The second condition would be that Ys mull over another DCTT has to be applied to avoid \textit{IPA}. Although, the reply of this solution is what if the new DCTT transfer to \textit{IPA} as mentioned before, or what would be if one asks why we need to enforce DCT to DCTT when we know it is possible we face \textit{IPA} and one may also add this will waste DCT unnecessarily.
\end{itemize}
1. If Ys do Φ-ing & Ψ-ing & C arises IPA, and then it will be pernicious to DCT and morality,
2. Then, ◇ Ys do Φ-ing & Ψ-ing, but Ys do it with DCTT',
3. But, ◇ DCTT' leads to another IPA: IPA',
4. Or, ◇ one requires that is it feasible that DCT to DCTT in the condition that ◇ or not IPA' & it dissipates DCT, and one also asks whether it is necessary to do it.
   ▪ The next condition is that imagine Ys ignorantly choose misguided DCT and after a while, they come up with this idea that they have to select another DCT or third DCT, etc., and run it in DCTT. Once more, they wasted DCT and morality, since, they expand the wrongful DCT to DCTT publically.
   1. If Ys select inaccurate DCT & then Ys need to select DCT' as DCTT,
   2. It dissipates DCT and morality because Ys did inaccurate Φ-ing & inaccurate Ψ-ing in Z.
   ▪ The last condition is that imagines Ys follow the true DCT, but, they have applied the wrongful DCTT. Undeniably, they will be struggling with nonconsistency and wasting DCT as DCTT.
   1. If Ys select accurate DCT,
   2. However, Ys choose misleading DCTT,
   3. There will be a ⊥ & it dissipates DCT and morality.

There could be myriad examples of IPA, an example would be that Z proclaims if Ys offer and take bribes, it will be a crime since it is a command -by God and/or a religion- do to not break this command and statute, and so Z declares this law and Ys shall obey this statute. However, as the first condition what if Z does not and/or could not reach this statute and DCTT functionally. We know that this condition leads to doubt on Φ-ing & Ψ-ing and it could be detrimental to DCT and morality because of the doubtfulness of this DCTT. In addition, as a second condition, if Z enacts another DCTT of the bribe and/or enacts another DCTT, it is feasible that it gets to be another IPA, and this also arises that DCTT and the bribe as DCTT are not necessary because of IPA. As a next condition, what if Z proposes a misguided DCT and/or misguided DCT of the bribe and this may point that Z needs to declare another DCT and/or another DCT of the bribe and these acts of Z to change DCT will dissipate DCT owing to inaccurate Φ-ing & inaccurate Ψ-ing. The last condition is that there would be a gap between DCT of the bribe and DCTT of the bribe, and this gap will prepare a nonconsistency, and a nonconsistency will dissipate DCT and morality.

B. The Objections: There could be some potential objections against the argument:

The Theocratic Perfectionist Objection: The first objection would be that IPA could arise in disfavor of all or most other normative ethical theories and it is not only on DCT. Said differently, IPA could be in disfavor of perfectionism and in favor of neutralism, and this could target IPA.
First of all, this work is neither on other normative ethical theories, nor it is on perfectionism and neutralism. This work is only on DCTT.

Second of all, set aside the first reply, it is clear that DCTT will be detrimental to DCT in the four conditions because DCT is identical or has overlapped with DCTT and Ys know that DCTT is enormously same as DCT and they will be incredulous to commands of God and/or religion and this will dissipate the whole of morality and eradicate it.

The Differential Theocratic Theological Volouterism Objection: The other objection toward IPA could be this thought that the writer has chosen the wrong version of Theological Volouterism, and if the writer chooses the true version of Theological Volouterism the other versions could apply as DCTT and DCTT remains a defensible version toward IPA in a theocracy.

- The first reply to this objection is that as mentioned before IPA is neither on the falsehood of DCT nor it is on the falsehood of religious beliefs.
- Second of all, the writer propounds the idea that DCT is true, and other versions of Theological Volouterism have the same truthiness value. So, if one set the other versions there is no doubt DCTT and IPA will remain the neutral.

The Theocratic Non-Religious Ethical Objection: One may insist that secular ethical theories could be better candidates for a theocracy and/or toward a God, and this will waste IPA.

- The first reply of the writer is that as the writer mentioned before IPA is in disfavor of religious ethics or a version of Theological Volouterism e.g. DCT and it is in favor of secular ethics, thus, it is not against those secular ethical theories.
- Another note is that if one selects a secular normative theory in favor of the divine or God, then one calls it religious ethics. It seems that one only articulates a secular ethical theory to a supernatural, and if the content of that theory remains non-religious, one only labels secular ethics as religious ethics.
- The third reply is based on the pivotal part of IPA. Once More, IPA is on DCTT, and it is not on DCT wholly, hence if a religious ethical theory is as similar to DCT, that theory will play the same properties of DCTT toward IPA.

The Theocratic Practical Expediency Objection: A final, real, and practical ethics among some theocracies is its tendency, strategy, willingness, and ultimate aim to practical

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87 For this view see: (Kant, 1999b), (Kant, 1999d), (Kant, 1999a), (Kant, 2001).
expediency of preservation of the theocracies.\textsuperscript{88} As a result, DCT, the other versions of theological voluntarism, or ethics ultimately could reduce this aim and/or be eliminated by it. If it is an ultimate aim of theocracies it seems IPA is not an argument in favor of secular ethics and government.

- First of all, this expediency is not a moral theory since clearly all inhumane beliefs and actions could be used as a pretext practically. Let the writer give a list of those inhumanities i.e. Massacre and genocide, torture and raping of children, nuclear warfare and Armageddon, slavery and genetic engineering in favor of slavery and Human extinction, and so forth.\textsuperscript{89}

- In addition, the writer is very doubtful that a moral theory or theorist could defend this objection and aim, since a moral theory could not refuse some standards i.e. moral universalizability and respect, although, this objection eradicates these standards.

- Besides that, if an ethicist rejects the last reply and selects the objection, it is extremely strange that DCT could fit as DCTT as the expediency morally and religiously. Otherwise, if one could find a religion that promotes DCT and DCTT as this expediency, there is no doubt that it could not be applied morally owing to the fact that you could not only find a moral theory similar to the expediency but also, arising of the expediency from religion could be inconsistent with the normativity of morality which means a jurisdiction of religion in favor of the expediency could contrast with some bases of morality.

- Also, imagine citizens of country Ys would follow the expediency, there could not be moral rules and principles and reasons in favor of it, since the outcome of the expediency means everything is possible as it tracks this expediency. The citizens could not practice this expediency because of social and political chaos.

- What’s more, it is extremely doubtful that rational and moral agents intend to follow the expediency.

- A pretext for expediency among proponents of theocracies is that they would design a moral system that includes moral norms and standards, but the final aim of this system is this expediency.\textsuperscript{90} The writer believes the system will be collapsed as soon as this expediency runs since the aforementioned replies indicate the expediency is false. Also, once more, there is clear contrast, contradiction, and inconsistency in the system that could not be solved.

\textsuperscript{88} For similar views see: (Swaine L., 2003, pp. 375-6), (Kazemipur, 2022, p. 20).

\textsuperscript{89} For a similar non-philosophical view see: (Swaine L., 2003, p. 375).

\textsuperscript{90} For a similar view see:
The Theocratic Political Realist Objection: Another objection toward IPA comes from political realism. It is claimed that there is no necessary connection between politics and DCTT because of political realism, and so, IPA will be rejected by this objection.

- The first reply is that all versions of political realism suffer from this objection that they target the heart of political values i.e. freedom, equality, justice, and rights. It seems it eradicates all of those political aims, and nothing remains. This position leads to this note that DCTT loses its connection to those political aims and there would be a gap between DCTT and IPA and the aims, although, for instance, we as same as this standard idea of philosophers generally confirm that our personal attitudes toward ethics of family have to be consistent with politics of family. So, it is a wrong objection.

- Another reply is that it is very doubtful this position could be counterfactually applicable to DCTT, as a result, if it could not be applicable it could not refuse IPA.

The Theocratic Anarchist Objection: The next objection is that we have to extend DCT to include all interpretations of possible normative moral theories which means there are no real differences among current normative moral theories, and this position has been recognized as anarchism among philosophers, thus, if DCT could embrace all of the secular moral theories it will preclude IPA.

- The first reply is that we have assumed DCT is true and so, other secular normative moral theories are false, as an outcome, we could not presume this objection.

- Another reply is that if we could assume DCT encompasses the other secular normative theories and there are possible interpretations of DCT as secular normative theories, it seems that it is really doubtful whether DCT is DCT or not in this objection.

- The next reply is that IPA is not on the other secular normative theories as DCT, even though, it is on DCTT and reasonably those other interpretations have the same evaluation.

The Theocratic Anti-Theory Objection: Another antipathy to IPA is this radical view all normative moral theories have the same epistemic value. Philosophers have called this position as Anti-Theory, and that leads us to recognize DCT and other normative moral

91 For a similar view see:

92 For a similar view see:
theories have the same epistemic value and/or are pointless, so it will be in favor of a theocracy.

- There could be vis-à-vis the first reply to the last objection, we presume DCT is true and other normative moral theories are false which means anti-theory is also false.

- Second of all, once more, *IPA* is on DCTT and it is not on DCT and/or other normative moral theories, so, we could not assume anti-theory since it assumes there is no true normative moral theory at all.

The Theocratic Relativist Objection: This objection claims if moral relativism is true, *IPA* is false. It is owing to the fact that all morality gets involved from relativism, and so, it is beyond dispute DCT, DCTT, and *IPA* are out of concern.

- The first reply of the writer is repetitive. We assume DCT is true, and then moral relativism is false.

- In addition, it is not possible to consider moral relativism as a metaethical theory, and DCT as a version of theological voluntarism as a moral normative theory, and so, we have to maintain consistency in our selections.

- Imagine we could choose metaethical relativism and DCT together, the writer thinks it leads to an arbitrary and chaotic interpretation of DCT and then DCTT. The main reason is that if moral norms and values are normatively relativist, DCT is not only in degree relativist, but also it adds another argument in favor of *IPA* that commands of religion, the divine, or God, etc. metaethically relativist which means a religion, the divine, or God could not determine what is true moral norms and values and/or there are no moral norms and values, though, a religion, the divine, or God does command moral beliefs and actions, and it is clear that those commands of moral beliefs and actions come from relativist view and so, they are relativist commands. Arbitrariness and chaos in DCTT arise.

The Irrelevant Theocratic Identity Objection: The writer mentioned that DCTT and theocracy have a same basis identically in which both of them have a root in religious and/or theocratic authority, but if one could deny this same root one could also reject *IPA*.

- The first reply is political institutions have a normative perspective primarily,\(^93\) and one could not reject this underlying root in both of them, one has to confirm

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\(^93\) For similar views see: (Searle, 1995, pp. 4,94,146-7), (Miller S., 2019).
main and basic root of DCTT and theocracy in public domains are their religious and/or theocratic authority normatively.

- Also, if one denies one of these two parts, undoubtedly this chapter will not be on that debate.

- Once more, if one replaces a secular ethical theory instead of DCT and/or DCTT, repeatedly this work would be outside of this situation since theocracy loses this sameness and will retreat backward as a more secular position.

The Non-Theocratic Inhumane Feasibility Objection: One may agree that DCTT leads to IPA, but it is the only solution to prevent humankind to do inhumane actions. It is because DCT is the only true moral theory and if one dismisses DCT those precious actions would arise, and it could support theocracy.

- First of all, the writer inherently disagrees with this idea that we have to reduce morality to DCT since it will unfairly dismiss many developed moral theories that have to promote valuable moral beliefs and actions i.e. Rule Consequentialism, Kantian Ethics, or Golden Rule.

- Also, if one compares DCT and its outcomes with Rule Consequentialism, Kantian Ethics, or Golden Rule and their outcomes, it is clear that both practically and theoretically, DCT will be lost to the other moral theories.

- Also, IPA presupposes that if DCT is true, DCTT dissolves DCT because of IPA.

- It is also untrue if one assumes other humankind fall down and become non-human if they do not ensue DCT.

The Semi-Theocratic Moral Theory Objection: Another feasible objection to the argument explains a secular moral theory could be dubbed DCT, thus DCTT is a secular moral theory in a theocracy. This objection only intends to name a secular moral theory as DCT and targets IPA.

- The writer guesses this movement of this objection scuttles down in a weaker position. It is because of the powerfulness of secular moral theories.

- Although one reasonably demands this position comes from a true interpretation of a secular moral theory in favor of DCTT, one may also add that this interpretation has abided by the religious authority which leads to preventing IPA,

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94 For this view see: (Nasr, 2000, p. 110).
even though, the writer thinks one has misunderstood the same authority to morality and politics in DCTT.

- Also, if those proponents could respond to the last reply, it seems they are only involved in a linguistic hobby.

The Life's Theocratic Meaningfulness Objection: Another opposition to IPA would be it is true DCT leads to IPA, but if we reject DCT and DCTT, then life becomes meaningless and absurd since meaning in life hinges on God and/or the supernatural, and supernatural position is the only true theory on the meaning in life,\textsuperscript{95} hence it could eradicate IPA.

- First of all, we have shown that Humanist Objection targets the heart of this objection.

- Also, if one put the Humanist Objection aside, it seems strange why one singles this objection out as a candidate instead of IPA since one has applied DCTT, and this position reasonably faces IPA, IPA indicates DCTT eradicates the whole of morality, even though one ridiculously would choose DCT to prevent meaningless of life, and we are beaten by the significant portion of the meaning in life to earn the remaining portion.

- Third of all, the writer believes morality is the objective portion of the meaning in life, thus it has more valuable weight than the non-moral portion, it is owing to the fact that the non-moral is subjective and/or constructive.

- Moreover, IPA is not only on individual morality as mentioned before many times, but also it has been on individual morality in public spheres, and DCTT dissipates in-depth portions of morality.

The Non-Theocratic Religious Establishment Objection: Another objection to IPA claims DCT as a religious establishment could free DCTT from IPA.

- To begin, there are some sorts of objections to the religious establishment,\textsuperscript{96} it seems they could also target DCTT.

- It is hard to confirm DCT in a theocracy is the same as DCT in a government with a religious establishment since the former is on DCTT and the latter is on DCT in a secular government with a religious establishment completely or partially.

\textsuperscript{95} For a similar view see: (Ahmed, 2022, p. 831), (Swaine, 2001, pp. 309-11).

\textsuperscript{96} For this view see: (Ahmed, 2022, p. 831), (Swaine, 2001, pp. 309-11).
• Once more, DCT in a government with religious establishment could probably function as DCTT, hence it is true this application of DCT does not have theocratic authority similar to DCTT, even though, this DCT has a religious authority in a secular government similar to DCTT, and so all of those four conditions could chase this DCT same as IPA.

The Theocratic First Condition Objection: The writer has mentioned if Z successfully performs some functions of DCT as DCTT towards Ys in the first condition, it is possible Ys becomes grateful for DCTT, and this possibility could target IPA.

• First of all, the writer has also referred it is possible the C assumption arises, and then it could squander DCT and morality.

• In addition, if one set aside the first reply, and argues in favor of Z could fully perform some functions of DCT as DCTT towards Ys in the first condition. It seems the Humanist Objection targets the heart of the possibility of The Immoral Grateful Function Objection.

• It is also unfair to consider DCT to Z, it is owing to the fact that DCT could not be a moral theory for all of Ys since DCT and/or DCTT may exclude atheists and other non-believers.97

The Theocratic Natural Law Theory Objection: There could be a similarity and/or relation between DCT and the Natural Law Theory of Ethics,98 and DCT may be recognized as the Natural Law Theory which means DCT’s requirements could overlap with the Natural Law Theory, hence DCTT could be replaceable with the Natural Law Theory in a theocracy.

• The writer would straightforwardly ask whether the Natural Law Theory could split the same religious and/or theocratic authority of Z and DCTT into two differential authorities or not. If the Natural Law Theory could split this sameness into two differential authorities, IPA will not target the Natural Law Theory in a theocracy. Although, if the Natural Law Theory could not break the same authority down, IPA could target the Natural Law Theory and the Natural Law Theory in a theocracy, and so, the Natural Law Theory in a theocracy will suffer from the same weaknesses and once more it is possible the Natural Law Theory in a theocracy eradicate morality.

97 For this view see: (Wielenberg, 2005, pp. 61-7).

98 For this view see: (Murphy M., 2019), (Boyd & VanArragon, 2005, p. 306), (Boyd & VanArragon, 2004, p. 313)
• What's more, it is true that the Natural Law Theory is much more secular compared with DCT, but the former theory and all feasible moral theories that incline to a divine teleology as an ultimate of morality have a fundamental potential to be recognized as DCT and then IPA criticizes those theories as soon as they have been applied in a theocracy.

• We should not forget that the Humanist Objection also attacks the Natural Law Theory same as DCT.

The Good Theocratic Politician Objection: Some would purport this idea theocratic politicians are truly differential from other kinds of politicians since they confirm politics could be turpitude.99 If this claim is true it seems DCTT could abandon IPA because DCTT does not include bad politicians and/or less ones and/or those bad politicians could not pay off.

• There is no doubt that principally a theocratic politician could infringe basic human rights of Ys in favor of a DCT and DCTT.

• Also, the writer insists on this note that those religious evidences in favor of theocratic politicians are neither on religious politicians nor they are on irreligious politicians, even though, they are on this worldly role of religious politicians, hence, reasonably an irreligious politician may promote a rational irreligious politics in favor of Ys and/or implement a complete moral doctrine.

• Here, it is not only an option to restate the replies to The Immoral Grateful Function Objection, but also one may doubts feasibility of theocratic politics fundamentally which equal to irrationality of theocratic politics since there could not be possibility of an accomplished DCTT and theocratic politics. Because of IPA.

The Anti-Theocratic Theocrats Objection: Another objection toward IPA is that it is feasible theocrats admit both democratic authority and law, but they may maintain their theocratic initiative and norms solitarily.100

• First of all, if theocrats rebuff both democratic authority and law, this objection will not be on this position.

• Also, noticeably they do not need local theocratic authority for their community, and so, if they veto democratic authority, they need to response to the replies of

99 For this view see: (Palmquist S., 1993).

100 For this view see: (Swaine L., 2007, p. 571).
The Autonomous Theocratic Community Objection, and it seems they could not retort it.

- Imagine, a crowded theocratic community in a democracy admits truthiness of the *Legal Stammer Argument* and the *Covid-19 Sample Argument*, even though, theocrats would propose DCT in a democracy as DCTT which means they intend propose DCT in public spheres in a democracy. The writer considers this situation as continuing of *IPA*. This situation provides dissolution of morality of theocrats since in this situation *IPA* is connected to the leaders of the theocrats and/or societal morality of their community and this perspective may waist morality of democracy's citizens.

- One may respond to the last reply that it is also could be on democrats who propose DCT in a democracy. The writer thinks it is a misunderstanding hence there is no the same basis identically between democrats and DCT and democracy, though there is the same basis between theocrats and theocratic community, and this tempers with democracy.
PART TWO: Applications
Chapter 4

The Slap Argument Inclines the Freedom of Religion

Freedom and Alternative Concepts of God
Different varieties of the concepts of God or deity or other maximally great beings or other ultimates or the divine (hereafter: God) have been manifested and opened up new lifestyles and religious worldviews for their followers and legion who are thirsty for new religious beliefs and practices, also there are some traditional theisms that many of them have been promoting this idea that there is a distinction between God and the universe, even though, there are some others that they refuse or eradicate the distinctness wholly. The writer’s concern is whether religious worldview or theologies that reject the distinction affect standards of the freedom of religion (hereafter: SFR) as absolute freedom or not, the writer will present the Slap Argument (hereafter: SA) to indicate that not only SFR remain unchanged, but also the argument admits that theocracy wastes this striking feature of SFR.

Slap Argument
It is rational to mention that SFR in a theocracy is far away from SFR, the writer will undermine the proportion of religion in the whole of our life by drawing on a Kantian term of thisworldly and otherworldly distinction which shows SFR as absolute freedom.

101 The writer’s footnote: The writer has written this work as a Ph.D. semester requirement in spring 2021. I’ve dedicated this chapter to Prof. Mehdi Aminrazavi who voluntarily recommends supervising this work as a Ph.D. dissertation, the writer is greatly thankful to him.

102 For different and alternative concepts of God see: (Buckareff & Nagasawa, 2016), (Diller, 2021).


104 For a similar non-philosophical view see: (Kymlicka, 1989, pp. 195-6).

A. The Argument: It is the SA:

- The Slap on the Back:
  - Let the writer begins with the positive face of SR. It is positive because SA indicates SFR is a symbol of absolute freedom, and this claim has been motivated by the otherworldly aspect of SFR.
  - For instance, imagine Niki is driving on a highway to reach a saint temple, there is a theurgy in the temple that is once in her lifetime, but there is also a volcanic eruption close to the temple and so, local Police block the crossroads because of the eruption. It is clear that no one could move off the crossroads, and the police do not permit anyone to go there. Niki prefers to be there and she is ready to face the danger. She does not think that it is pulling a stunt and believes if she does not attend the ceremony, then she abjures her religion. We observe a conflict between a case for banning between freedom of participating in an important religious ceremony and willing of the police officers to save lives. The positive side of SA argues that you have absolute SFR when you apply it only as otherworldly and if there is a conflict between the otherworldly and thisworldly beliefs and actions, the former is the last priority and so, Nike ought to obey the Police officers.
  - The first constraint of SFR: Religious beliefs and practices have absolute SFR iff it remains wholly to otherworldly beliefs and practices which means if you involve in a thisworldly problem you have to apply the thisworldly concepts and entities and avoid otherworldly concepts and entities. Otherwise, there will be a conflict between the former and the latter, and then, you defeat this criterion if you choose the latter.
  - Altogether, first of all, you have an absolute SFR, though there is a severe constraint on SFR that is SFR has to remain only as an otherworldly phenomenon. Also, this criterion shows if SFR would participate in politics, law, and public social institutions, clearly, there is the constraint that principally the constraint has to be prior to the SFR. Besides that, differential theories of freedom could not refuse SA, because SA is based on some sort of otherworldly beliefs and practices that all of the related theories could be free from the related obstacles. Last but not least, no one could stop you to have SFR unless it does not remain religious since in condition SFR follows SA, it seems that politically there would not be a conflict. The writer calls this positive side of SA the Slap on the Back.

- The Slap in the Face:
  - Let the writer mention another aspect of the argument that is opted to the Slap on the Back which means if one would intend to reject the distinctnessness, then one will face the Slap in the Face:
Let once more, the writer adds the negative face of SFR. It is negative because SA vetoes SFR could be affected by differential concepts of God, and this claim has been motivated by the thisworldly aspect of SFR.

Niki as a pantheist believes God is identical to the world, and due to the reason that SFR is absolute, Niki may wrongfully claim that she could participate in the ceremony, also, she may argue that she is not obligated to obey the police officer's order and it is because the eruption is identical to God and so, there is no conflict between the theurgy for God and the eruption, then, the police shall not issue an order on the moving off and Niki could also disobey the order. Although undeniably this case is the Slap in the Face to Niki, since she may die as soon as an active volcano erupts, she will die and rescuers and firefighters may die because of her. Altogether, it does not matter how you place your faith in God as a pantheist or theist, there will be a death toll rise. She is free to believe in pantheism on the condition that it ensues the first constraint in which Pantheism has to remain otherworldly. Another example will be the same as the abovementioned example, Niki, as a panentheist believes the world is a part of God, and due to the reason that SFR is absolute, Niki may wrongfully claim that she ought to participate in the ceremony, also, she may argue that she is not obligated to obey the police officer's order and it is because the eruption is a part of God and repeat rest of the same story of the last example. She is free to believe in Panentheism on the condition that it follows the first constraint in which Panentheism has to remain otherworldly.

The second constraint of SFR: Religion includes religious beliefs and practices that the adjective of -religious- could be identified iff exclusively it precludes the religious from non-religious one, and it does not occur unless we grasp the religious as an otherworldly concept and/or entity and know the non-religious one as thisworldly.

This new criterion shows that first of all, different concepts of God do not affect the SFR, due to the fact that different concepts of God lead to traditional theism and God by acknowledging them to be added to profane or would be thisworldly which means religion includes only otherworldly concept and/or entities in which other types of concepts of God that would transfer God to profane or thisworldly they only need to add otherworldly phenomena e.g. God to profane or thisworldly, though thisworldly remains unchanging. Second of all, you could replace Pantheism or Panentheism with other differential modern theologies or other religious worldviews, but the outcome will remain the same to SFR. The writer calls this negative side of SA the Slap in the Face.

B. The Application: The writer's point in this section is that theocracy lacks both faces of SFR in which it has neither SFR as the Slap on the Back, nor it has SFR as the Slap in the Face. The writer's argument on the SA in theocracy (hereafter: SAT) is this:
• SAT suffers from the Slap on the Back: Theocracy could not enjoy the attractive positive aspect of SFR. Because, inherently, theocracy manipulates the otherworldly identity of religions as mentioned earlier to become in favor of theocratic political authority legally and politically, and then, it restricts the positive side of SFR as an absolute freedom.

• SAT suffers from the Slap in the Face: Theocracy also could not enjoy the attractive negative aspect of SFR. Theocracy rejects the veto of SFR to differential concepts of God, it is owing to the fact that theocracy applies each change of alternative concepts of God in favor of theocratic political authority legally and politically, and then, it neglects the negative side of SFR as an absolute freedom.

The writer also finds out there is another challenge of theocracies toward SFR, that is to say, third part of SA’s application is not only theocracies could not satisfy SAT as mentioned before and SA targets theocracies functionally, but also:

• It seems SFR directly challenges theocracies. If it is true that SFR relates to SA, and SA could provide truthiness of SFR, and then SFR directly and SA indirectly target theocracies, since theocracies directly by their undemocratic nature target SFR. Besides that, they could not attend SFR, and it is owing to this note that if they let SFR happens then SFR probably provides democratic facilities on democratic political authority that contrast with theocratic political authority, hence, direct problem of SFR in theocracies is its functional facilities that will provide an inconsistency between theocratic political authority and possibility of potential democratic political authority.

C. The Objections: There could be some potential objections against the argument:

The Imperialist SA Objection: First of all, one may object that SA could enroll as a negative actor in international debates, delighted features of the argument could be a disadvantage to the third world, developing, and powerless countries. It means that superpower countries could persuade and/or target citizens of those powerless countries to proselytize their religion. Therefore, it could transform all or most religions to only a few ones in favor of superpower countries.

• The first reply of the writer is that we need to recall the core idea of the argument that SFR only includes otherworldly entities and concepts, and so, it could not include thiswordly entities and concepts such as festivals, ceremonies, law, politics, and many others. There is a serious constraint on SFR as mentioned before. The former countries could apply those constraints to their citizens.

• Second of all, it seems some traditional or modern theologies and religious worldviews are more rational compared to the other ones. For instance, there is a consensus that monotheism is much more coherent compared to polytheism, as a

106 For a dissimilar view see: (Swaine L., 2007, p. 569).
result, this concern could not be a restraint to the irrational traditional or modern theologies and religious worldviews. The countries that insist on those irrational traditional or modern theologies or religious worldviews seem that they could not isolate their citizens to believe or practice the rational one.

The Cultural Eradication SA Objection: Another objection would be that SFR and SA could be harmful to diversity in pluralistic countries and/or moral indigenous cultures owing to the fact that they could transfer all of those diversities and cultures to homogenous and/or immoral ones or eradicate all of them.

- It seems that first of all, we have to recall the former objection's replies to this objection.

- Also, we have to remember that both SA and SFR belong to the private sphere because of the constraints. As a result, a legitimate government could recognize the diversities and the cultures officially, it shall impose provisions to present the indigenous diversity and the indigenous cultures as the official ones. For instance, the government could declare that a language is the only official language and the others could be practiced as non-official ones or it could impose some festivals and ceremonies as official ones and others as private ones. This trend toward diversities and the moral indigenous cultures will make the others as private ones and it could preserve them practically.

The Differential Constraint of SA Objection: Another objection would come from freedom in general sense in which there is a question that how we could determine differential constraint of SFR through SA, and it seems SFR is interestingly different from other types of freedom, and so it is very tough to determine SFR's constraint.

- First of all, this problem is not jejune owing to this fact that other types of freedom and freedom in general do not involve the above-mentioned constraint except SFR which means they have to be evaluated from different perspectives, but the SFR's constraint is based on the thisworldly and otherworldly distinction. For instance, one may argue against freedom of speech, since, there is a serious constraint on it which famously is hate speech. But, look both of them are involved with thisworldly issues, thus It is an attractive aspect of SFR and is not a problem to SFR and SA.

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107 For a similar view see: (Wainwright, 2021).

108 For a similar view see: (Horwitz, 1996, p. 25).

109 For a dissimilar view see: (Horwitz, 1996, p. 26).
• One may rationally question this note that SFR and other freedoms have to have a same constraint or one may question it is not a defect to have a complicated constraint.

The Untrue SA Objection: One objection towards SA is that SA and its constraints provide an untrue approach toward SFR which means this approach dismantles some thisworldly aspects of SFR and it would eliminate some of those significant aspects of SFR, thus it is not only untrue, but also it is unfair.¹¹⁰

• The first reply is it is true some religions may have had those aspects, but the note is metaphysics of religions includes only otherworldly perspectives. If they would reject this perspective, they face the first constraint, besides that, the writer has shown it is the true nature of religions from other phenomena.

• Also, it is not unfair, hence SFR has normative and valued content, and this lead to arguments in favor of the more fundamental moral norms that are prior to SFA.¹¹¹ For instance, those are connected to the first constraint i.e. the Police's living.

The Paradoxical SFR Objection: If SFR is absolute, it may have non-absolute consequences e.g. relativist consequences since the SFR's absoluteness facilitates the epistemic aspect of religions as relativist, and then it provides a paradoxical view, on the one side SFR forms religions with relativist outcomes, and on the other side SA promotes SFR's absoluteness, and this paradox of SFR paradox targets SA.¹¹²

• The first reply is SFR is only on a political value, thus it has to be neutral on the truthiness of religions.

• Another reply would be that SFR's absoluteness could not create relativism due to the fact that it does not determine which religion is true. It solely insists the first constraint provides this opportunity that SFR is absolute and it doesn’t refer to the truthiness of religions.

• Thirdly, if one calls this paradox as a conflict, hence we've indicated in the other replies that there is no such objection, although, there could be a conflict for a religious believer that the first constraint could blur the conflict.

¹¹⁰ For a similar view see: (Horwitz, 1996, pp. 23-4).

¹¹¹ For a similar view see: (Horwitz, 1996, p. 25).

¹¹² For a similar view see: (Horwitz, 1996, p. 27).
The Non-Real SAT objection: It is feasible one could not devise a fair relation between SFR and a government, and this could eliminate SFR. One may also object that SAT is not a real case of SA since you could not really hold SA to a theocracy and recognize it as SAT, theocracy has been a thisworldly government, but SA and SFR are otherworldly concepts.

- To begin, it is the first constraint that does not let SFR transfers to thisworldly manners, thus SFR without the first constraint could issue any problems in all differential governments.

- What's more, the bearer of SFR is humankind and humankind principally has been living under differential governments. As a result, there could be a relation between them, and SA could be transferred to SAT.

The Superfluous SA Objection: One note on SA is that this argument includes the first constraint that proves SFR is absolute. Although it seems SA could be superfluous since if one could choose any religion and/or religious worldview then it indicates SA is superfluous.

- The first reply is that SFR without SA could be identified via other mindsets, it may be conceded through enforcement of laws and politics, and if it is true it seems SA is the same as those laws and politics are not superfluous.

- Second of all, SA not only blurs the first constraint epistemically, but also, SA ontologically is on some properties of SFR which is differential from bearers of SFR in law and politics, and so SA elaborates on this differentiation and makes sense why those properties of SFR includes significantly the bearer that inclines SFR.

- It is also true SFR somehow could be self-evident in the condition that it becomes recognized as an absolute freedom, even though, the practical normativity of SFR is one debate, and the theoretical normativity of SFR is another thing. SA would put pressure on this note that why SFR normatively is absolute. If one denies this note, then SFR exclusively becomes a legal authority. Besides that, SFR is not inherently a legal authority as a legal norm. but it is a kind of political freedom as a political value, it shall be the legal authority additionally.

The Irrelevant SA Objection: The other objection to SA would come from religious discourse directly, and it is argued SFR is false, it is because one directly perceives a

\[ \text{\footnotesize 113 For a similar view see: (Horwitz, 1996, pp. 27-8).} \]

\[ \text{\footnotesize 114 For a dissimilar view see: (Horwitz, 1996, p. 26).} \]
religious experience i.e. mystical experience, religious feeling, or revelation, etc. or there is a relation between SFR and religious experience, and that indicates SFR is false.\textsuperscript{115}

- First of all, the writer believes that religious experiences do not have a direct relation to SFR and SA which means religious experiences have nothing in common with the morality of SFR,\textsuperscript{116} because imagine a religious experience that prescribes SFR is not true, then a question would arise whether the religious experience could identify itself to deny SFR, and if it is possible a religious experience violates SFR and we could judge the experience morally, thus it is undoubtedly true that there is a distinction between the experience and SFR, and it seems SFR is independent of religious experience semantically, epistemologically, and metaphysically.

- In the same case, one may argue that a real religious experience could track moral principles and norms, and this leads us to know that religious experience could track SA. The writer's reply would be that it is true that this religious experience is the same as morality of SFR epistemologically, but it continually remains morality of SFR is independent from religious experience semantically and metaphysically, since the religious experience does not present SA, but it only prescribes justification of SA epistemologically.

- One more time, one may argue that it is not only true that the religious experience could track moral principles and norms epistemologically, and this leads us to know that religious experience could track SA, but also the religious experience really presents SA as an argument, and one could perceive SA through the experience. The writer's reply would be that it is true this religious experience is the same as morality of SFR epistemologically as the first reply, but also SA is perceived by the religious experience meaningfully as the second reply. However, it remains that SFR is independent of religious experience metaphysically, due to the fact that religious experience, both parts of the religious experience, the religious or the experience, are one thing and valuable aspect of SFR is another thing. The former perceives an experience as the religious one, and the latter grasps values of SA or SFR that are the non-religious one.

The Descriptiveness SFR Objection: Some may object SA is not about normativity and/or value of SFR since SFR is on descriptive phenomenon from semantic to epistemic and ontic point of view are descriptive i.e. "there is a God" or "the way of salvation is Thao", thus SA could not be related to SFR.

\textsuperscript{115} For a similar view see: (Horwitz, 1996, pp. 24-5).

\textsuperscript{116} For a dissimilar view see: (Horwitz, 1996, p. 24).
To begin, it is true religions' nature are exclusively descriptive, though their functions in political systems could be related to political values e.g. freedom, and so SFR becomes a political value.

Also, imagine this objection is true, although aforementioned constraints of SA strictly enforce SFR to become normative.

One may argue in favor of normativity of religions ontologically, e.g. normativity of séance or incarnation, even thought, the writer disagrees with this reply due to the fact that religions' concept are prudentially normative.

The Theodemocratic SFR Objection: One may propose this idea that religious democracies and/or theodemocracies do not suffer from SAT which means SA only targets theocracies.

The first reply is that if those governments are a subgenre of theocracies, then SA targets them. aid differently, religious and/or theocratic authority of the governments lead them to the same channel.

Second of all, if they do not include religious and/or theocratic authority, and they belong to democracies, there is no doubt that those governments ought to respect SA and avoid SAT practically.

Also, any religious mechanism id differential governments may clause and threat SFR, because it may provide manipulating of the positive side of SFR, or it may neglect negative side of SFR to thiswordly manners.

For a dissimilar view see: (Backer, 2006, p. 115).

For a similar view see: (Backer, 2006, p. 115).
Chapter 5

What Is Wrong with Secession?119

Multilateralism and Heterogeneous Nationalism
The first note of this section is on secession and territorial debates that claim the right to secede is the right to secede as a right to territory multilaterally120121 since there is a relation that secessionists, remainders, and a government comprises the segments of the relation.122123

119 The writer’s footnote: The writer finished this work in 2019 and uploaded it somewhere at the same time, and then the writer continually has been updating references of this work. In addition, the writer would like to thank some activists who have been providing critiques of the writer’s thoughts during these years. Also, the writer has to thank some notes journals prohibit to consider this work in peer review process in an atrocious way, though, a philosophical website spreads the news of this banning, and these manners lead the writer to write on application of the argument of this chapter in theocracy and so, this chapter appended to this work, besides that, there was another same painful experience that those political-economic sanctions ban the writer to open bank account when the writer was a PhD. Student of Philosophy in Europe.


The writer’s footnote: The writer is an anti-secessionist and the writer’s theory (hereafter: the theory) is anti-model of secession.


122 For institutional multilateral secession see: (Perez-Lozano, 2022, pp. 13-4).

123 For secession and other political debates see: A. Secession and/or intervention (Roth, 2015), (Fabry, 2013, pp. 94-100), B. And/or revolution (Buchanan, 1991a, pp. 326-7), (Buchanan, 1991b, p. 10), (Buchanan, 2017b), their similarity (Buchanan, 1991a, pp. 326-7), (Buchanan, 1991b, p. 10), C. And/or civil disobedience (Buchanan, 1991b, p. 10), D. And/or immigration (Buchanan, 1991b, pp. 10-2), (Weltman, 2021), (Beran, 1977, p. 266), E. And/or referendum (Pavkovic, 2004, pp. 702-4), (Jovanovic, 2007, pp. 171,184-94), (Kymlicka, 2000, pp. 221-2), (Perez-Lozano, 2022, pp. 8-12), F. And/or exclusion or inclusion (Weltman, 2021), (Buchanan, 1993), G. And/or federalism (Norman, 2006, pp. 77-173), (Jovanovic, 2007, pp. 64-79), (Kymlicka, 1998, pp. 135-8), (Kymlicka, 2000, pp. 213-6), (Kymlicka, 2007, pp. 45-6), (Jewkes, 2014, p. 149), (Bauböck, 1997, pp. 20-32), (Pérez, 2017, pp. 60-5), (Follesdal, 2022), (Selassie, 2003, pp. 60
Imagine a territory without a state that straddles the borders between the lands institutionally,\textsuperscript{124} individuals who inhabit the territory ought to contribute to the territory as a whole, and every particular citizen of the country possesses the same right as the other citizens of the country where each centimeter does not belong to private ownership,\textsuperscript{125} the state does not permit to exchange those public places to the private one as they belong to all citizens of the country, therefore, territory as equity sharing is a public right.

In addition, there is another note that is related to national debates of secession, it is claimed that we have to pursue these policies to avoid secession: 1. Recognizing differential countries and recognizing their differential challenges not as global


\textsuperscript{125} For secession and privatizing of territory see: (Rothbard, 1998, p. 84).
struggles.\textsuperscript{126} 2. Recognizing heterogeneous nationalism\textsuperscript{127} since it is a tremendous description of some nationalities and their people, and we have to discern this non-hegemonic policy to this type of nationalism due to the fact that the heterogeneous is meticulously much more parallel with the human values esp. an unplanned heterogeneous one.

**Martyr Argument**

First groups of the theories of secession are the Primary Right theories\textsuperscript{128} infringes reminders' rights that have two types:

- Ascriptivist Right Theories\textsuperscript{129} i.e.:

\textsuperscript{126} For a similar non-philosophical view see: (Chandhoke, 2014b, p. 51).

The writer's footnote: The writer's country is an exceptionally suitable example to know how a country has been devastated by all of the permanent secessionist temptations of some countries.


Communitarian Right Theories\textsuperscript{130}.

- Plebiscitarian Right Theories\textsuperscript{131} i.e.:

\textsuperscript{130} For the Communitarian Right Theories as the Ascriptivist Right Theories see: (Pavkovic, 2003, pp. 79-80), (Gilbert, 1998).

Nonetheless, there are some objections against all of the Primary Right Theories i.e. the Martyr Argument.

For the Republican Right Theories as the Plebiscitarian Right Theories see: (Pérez Lozano, 2021), (Pérez, 2017), (Perez-Lozano, 2022).

For the Libertarian Right Theories as the Plebiscitarian Right Theories see: (Kreptul, 2003), (Rothbard, 1998), (McGee, 1994).

For the Realist Right Theories as the Plebiscitarian Right Theories see: (Sanjaume-Calvet, 2020).

For the Cosmopolitan Right Theories see:


The writer's footnote: First of all, the thought of the Martyr Argument came to the writer's mind in a discussion more than ten years ago, and the writer had to present a pure ethical argument without referring to culture, history, and heritage. In addition, the writer has studied Hirschman's definition very recently and the writer thinks that Hirschman would claim that there is a similarity between martyrdom and secession and both of them are remorseless. Although, the writer believes that secession is based on the Martyr Argument morally.
The second group of theories of secession is the Remedial Right Theories\textsuperscript{137} that are considered the well-settled theories or somehow as a standard theory.\textsuperscript{138}

A. The Argument: It is the \textit{Martyr Argument}:

The writer has presented the \textit{Martyr Argument} as a noninstitutional deontological argument, since, it is a mere fact that one cannot compensate for the grievous harms of reminders and the infringement's basic rights of them, then, there could not be utilities and consequences of those immoral acts, but they are about ignoring the transgression of reminder's moral properties. As a result, the right to secede as a right is based on moral property which is a remedial cure for remedial situations of unilateral or consensual cases, as a Kantian term it is about the mere ends of human beings and their respectful personhood and so, consequentialist argument on the right to secede is not cogent. The \textit{Martyr Argument} which is the pivotal part of the theory is constructed as follows: One cannot redress for the value of a young martyr who was murdered while defending a non-colonizer country. Imagine a person who lived in a village located on the borderline that was assailed by another country. He passed away not only for defending his village and its people in an unjust war but also for defending the whole of the country, his blood has made the boundaries morally valuable and each inch of the country is painted by the blood of this innocent martyr owing to this fact that the innocent martyr died for moral values.


\textsuperscript{138} For similar views see: (Wellman, 2006), (Norman, 2003, p. 198).
and a non-colonizer country's defending, he did not die for immoral purposes and attacking in favor of a colonizer country. As a result, unilateral secession is considered a transgressor of other people's rights. The important points of this argument are mentioned below:

A is a non-colonizer country that is forced to enter an unjust war started by B,

B represents an offensive country,

X is an innocent young person who lives in A, and his village is near the borderline where the war takes place.

Z is a secessionist part of A.

- B attacks A,
- X passed away while defending A that including Z,
- After his death, Z would secede from A,
- But X passed away as a result of defending A,
- Defending A as a whole territory is contrary to withdrawing of a part of that territory,
- Because unilateral withdrawing of Z from A is destroying A as a whole country where defended by X,
- The above-mentioned destroying is come from defending a non-colonizer country by an innocent martyr that is moral contrary to incentives of Z to be an independent territory,
- Then, how Z could compensate and solve this contrary?
- It is undeniably true that it is morally impossible. Owing to the fact that there is nothing one can do about compensating for the life of an innocent martyr as it is about the moral property of the martyrdom and transgressing of martyr's blood,
- Then, it is not morally possible to redress the life of that martyr,
- As a consequence, unilateral secession is morally unpermitted, except as the theory.

As a result of the Martyr Argument, we ought to persuade everyone and every group to follow the theory: remedial cure for remedial situations of unilateral or consensual cases of secession (hereafter: RCRSUCCS), and foil acts of those who do not account for this moral defense.

B. The Application: First of all, the Martyr Argument shows only RCRSUCCS is permissible. Hence, imagine A as the richest and democratic country that democratically joins B as the poorest and undemocratic country, and B welcomes A, although, the Martyr Argument is morally sufficient to avert A's secession from B, since, we have to acknowledge B as a present-day country that secession of every part of B is permitted only as these two ways:

- The remedial cure for remedial situations of unilateral cases (hereafter: RCRSUC):
  1. Self-defense: There are persistent serious and horrendous injustices and/or grave violations of basic human rights such as genocide against huge numbers of people that could not be rectified by other political or legal solutions and escaping
ways for those people are unfeasible and unreasonable, 2. Unjust seizure: The unjust seizure of a sovereign territory i.e. usurpation by foreigners and colonization, annexation, and occupation.\textsuperscript{139}

- The remedial cure for remedial situations of consensual cases (hereafter: RCRSCC) is a multilateral, negotiated, conservative and democratic procedure with a supermajority vote of all citizens.

If a group of people secede from a country or conjoin another country as an irredentist without these two permissible political models of secession, those political acts violate the other populace's rights atrociously.

Moreover, the writer thinks legalization of secession remains a futile striving since it is not only true that barbaric governments do not obey the moral norms and they breach the law as RCRSUC, but also, it requires to codify numerous provisions in constitutional and/or international law as RCRSUCCS. Besides that, legalization of secession also may lead to arbitrary legal interpretation in favor of some countries. Altogether, we only require a supreme international court to obey the extreme moral codes and has generated those codes through well-entrenched provisions in exceptional cases when we shall hold the court and shall declare and impose them as RCRSUC.

In addition, the \textit{Martyr Argument} proves an anti-model of secession. Although, it is a normative and moral argument. A theocracy principally enrolls and applies as an immoral government and it could not be a reasonable government owing to fact that theocracy principally prioritize immorality to morality and it considers unreasonableness instead of reasonableness.

It is argued that the argument as a moral argument is based on martyrdom, although, theocracy as a government abuses moral value of aforementioned martyrdom, thus, morality and reasonableness could be misused in favor of a theocracy and its immoral and unreasonable features. All of those features of a theocracy inherently could promote an unreasonable and immoral argument in favor of immoral secession,\textsuperscript{140} hence the writer has presented the \textit{Legal Stammer Argument}, the \textit{Covid-19 Sample Argument}, and the IPA in favor of this claim, also it is argued in disfavor of the RCRSUCCS and it is due to the fact that theocracy principally holds as mentioned before an unreasonable and immoral view on secession.

Let the writer presents this application of secession in theocracy differently:

X\textsubscript{1} to X\textsubscript{n} are moral and reasonable perspectives,

Z\textsubscript{1} to Z\textsubscript{n} are all differential theocracies,

Y\textsubscript{1} to Y\textsubscript{n} are immoral and unreasonable perspectives,

\textsuperscript{139} For a similar view see: (Buchanan & Golove, 2004, p. 910).

\textsuperscript{140} For a similar view see: (Swaine, 2001, p. 324).
So, straightforwardly, the writer throw theocracy away in favor of the RCRSUCCS and the Martyr Argument. A theocracy suffers from these strong commitments of the RCRSUCCS and the Martyr Argument in favor of a true moral position on secession.

The writer thinks that multilateralism, heterogeneous nationalism, and the Martyr Argument and its notes are a panacea for questions, troubles, and debates of secession philosophically. The writer believes no philosophical theory could escape from RCRSUCCS, and it appears that the theory has discovered "what is wrong with secession?" morally.

C. The Objections: There could be some potential objections against the argument.

The Institutional Democratic Right of Secession Objection: Some Remedial Right Theories argue in favor of the right to secede in the case of lack of democracy and human rights in a state, besides that they argue in the other cases of secessionist incentives have to be banned the incentives from leading secessionist movements,\(^1\) or have to regain the territory in the case of illegitimate secession.\(^2\) So, it seems they target the argument.

- The writer's reply has three parts, first of all, there is no doubt that democracy is the most high-quality political system among current political systems, even though, lack of democracy and human rights does not contain inherently a permission to withdraw a territory unilaterally, it means that we have to strive for a democratic government that includes human rights. Needless to say, there is a connection between the right to secede as a right to territory and a right to democracy, because a right to secede includes a right to territory and a right to a new independent democratic or non-democratic state, and conversely, there is a partial-overlapping between a right to secede and a right to democracy. For instance, imagine that A is a territory that includes three parts: J, K, and L, and the political system of A is a dictatorship which infringes human rights. Every act of people of K who are fascinated by the undeniable democratic values to overthrow the dictator state and replace A with a democratic system means their striving that A becomes a democratic government and this does not mean an independent state and does not equal having a right to A's territory and this violates the J and L's moral rights.

\(^1\) For a similar view see: (Buchanan, 1998a, pp. 29-30).

\(^2\) For similar views see: (Kant, 1999c, pp. 349-50), (Margalit & Raz, 1990, p. 442).
• Moreover, the second part is that imagine A is an ancient country with primary
democratic values in the past or now, this situation never means that K is allowed
to secede, since, it is unfair to abandon those past or present strivings or become
hopeless to endeavor for democratic values or as mentioned in the first part of the
reply.

• The Last part is that the Institutional Democratic Right Argument could be in favor
of democratic countries and be in disfavor of nondemocratic counties arbitrarily,
and so, it could not be nominated candidate as an argument to right to secede.
Altogether, this reply is against both Remedial Right and Primary Right arguments
that desire to create a right to secede upon democratic values.

The Secession's Improbable Ban of Ancient Country Objection: One may object there is
no difference between new-established or fake countries on the one side and ancient
countries on the other side in favor of the argument.

• In the disfavor of RCRSCC, the writer would insist that the heterogeneous ancient
countries as antiquity are normatively heritages of humankind, and encouraging
the citizens of those countries to stay together is a criterion, and we have to
preventing secession in those countries.

• Also, there are past and future generations that get involved with the timeless
ancient countries, and so, next generations who will live in the hypothetical
secessionist region will prefer antiquity to the newly-established country, also the
remainders of the former territory will suffer from the political acts of their
descendants. Moreover, those who lived in the past had spent their lives in the
country in different ways before we could reach their success, thus we have to
retain their accomplishments culturally and morally.

The No Real Borders for Anti-Secession Objection: One may object the argument that
there are no real borders, but there are many borders and countries which have been
forcibly involved in wars, those have been changed during hundreds or thousands of
years, and those have not been same as the past. As a result, it seems the writer has put
the Martyr Argument on ice until it could be replaced with other arguments.

• Nevertheless, the writer thinks that this note reinforces the Martyr Argument and
does not undermine it, because one has to distinguish between legitimacy and
illegitimacy of those cases to apply the Martyr Argument e.g. the question that
whether they are non-colonizer countries or not.

The Secessionist Regaining Objection: One may truly criticize that the writer has not
mentioned some illegitimate secessions, hence justified response to those illegitimate
secessions ought to be prepared.

• The Martyr Argument and the theory of it –RCRSUCCS- bans violence and permit
states and remainders to regain their lost territories legally and morally in the
condition of immoral secession or irredentism,\textsuperscript{143} however, first of all, we have to avoid adding more transgression of basic human rights and violence, moreover, we ought to start a morally justifiable negotiation on the regaining of the lost territories with those colonizers or secessionists, also we need to present all-things-considered arguments and evidence that could prove our claim, it is also necessary to involve a supreme international court to assess the process.

The Secessionist Double Remedialism Objection: One may rightfully object there could be impeccable and dissatisfied reminders in hard cases due to the fact that multilateral territorial rights of them are contravened by secessionists in RCRSUC and the secessionists also circumscribe the other rights. However, secessionists may dwell on secession and argue they are entitled to the secession.

- Although, it is presumed that humanitarian intervention, nonviolent revolution,\textsuperscript{144} civil disobedience, and referendum of constitutional law are superior to secession owing to fact that these solutions do not involve bloodshed of victims or transgression of blameless remainders' rights. This attitude shows RCRSUCCS is a last remedial cure of remedial situations in which other political tools do not work at all. For instance, imagine that a supreme international court condemns governments' inhumanity and imposes punishment and dispense justice, there would be the de facto condition of recurring felonies, no other political tools are accessible, and so, secession could be on the table to escape from recurring ferocities.

The Animal Husbandry for Anti-Secession Objection: One may insist to avoid secession it has been advised that if a state would triumph over secessionist incentives, it has to immediately transplant or deport minorities nationally, ethnically, or religiously, etc. Let the world becomes more tribalistic if the state would preserve the state's sovereignty, territory, and nationhood and let it foils secession stereotypically,

- By contrast, it is shocking a country may urge and/or compel other countries to apply this political method, the writer avoids creating this tribalistic animal husbandry.

- Also, the writer strives to propound moral advocacy of secession as anti-secessionist view and the others ought to forswear this proposal.

The Secessionist Supervenience Objection: One may argue that there is a relation between victims and tyrants into those savageries in RCRSUC, and victims as potential secessionists could blame others as potential reminders for those savageries and forthcoming secession.

\textsuperscript{143} For a similar view see: (Margalit & Raz, 1990, p. 442).

\textsuperscript{144} For a similar view see: (Sunstein, 1991, p. 635).
• If victims are victimized by a government and are not victimized by other compatriots, then it appears that those remainders are profoundly unhappy with cruelties, are powerlessly rescue targets from oppression, and are motivationally restrain persecutors from accomplishing persecution. In those atrocities, moral wrongness supervenes upon tyrants and does not upon the remainders, especially in undemocratic governments since those governments are undemocratic and the citizens are not a part of the state's decisions and acts.

The Temporary-Permanent Secession Objection: As RCRSUCCS, it seems true that temporary secession is an antidote, but one may claim there have to be arbitrarily permanent secessions.

• Although imagine R is a country in which three groups live there as X (has 80% of the territory and population), Y (has 15% of the territory and population), and Z (has 5% of the territory and population), a disagreement strikes, thus Xs attacks Zs unjustifiably, strategically and timely. This turpitude makes Xs commit an infringement of basic human rights of Zs, 88% of Ys approve the strike and only 12% of Ys disagree with the strike. If it is not clear whether the prior political tools e.g. humanitarian intervention is adequate or not, Z ought to secede from R at once permanently. There are no arguments to prohibit this Z's right, since respecting and rescuing Zs as human beings are the first-order obligations.

The Majority Secession Objection: One may criticize whether there is no difference between minority secession and majority secession in case of RCRSUCCS. As a result, a majority could apply RCRSUCCS unfairly in disfavor of a minority.

• To reply this objection, another hypothetical case is that imagine G is a country includes M, N, and L that have a supermajority of G, and they would intend to separate from a minority part of G that is identified as U, and it is exactly the same as minority's secession. In this case, M, N, and L are not permitted to secede from U, unless they are allowed through RCRSUCCS.

The Secessionist Self-Defeating Objection: Some proponents of secession would anticipate secession in advance as rescue from conflicts of secessionists on the one side and reminders and states on the other side, thus secession could be astute, and aforementioned secessionist acts err on the side of caution.

• To response this objection, imagine L is a country that includes F as an absolute majority of L, M as a minority of L, M unjustifiably and unilaterally would secede from F, it is not as RCRSUCCS, then F Attacks M, but the attack is the outcome of this illegitimate secession and it is not because of RCRSUC, and so, RCRSUC is

145 For a similar view see: (Chandhoke, 2014a, p. 6).

146 For a similar view see: (Lincoln, 2001, pp. 436-7).
self-defeating here. Therefore, the writer bans secession and recommends other political solutions.

The Secessionist Disgrace Objection: Some may pretext RCRSCC which means if there could be a multilateral, negotiated, conservative and democratic procedure with a supermajority vote of all citizens to secede a part or some parts of a country from the country as RCRSCC, thus they probably claim it is a legitimate secession. It seems RCRSCC makes secession same as a piece of cake.

- However, the Martyr Argument brings disgrace to secessionists, reminders and the state since they waste sacrifices of past martyrs as the argument, and RCRSCC could not redress the life of martyrs. Therefore, RCRSCC with the aforementioned notes could be a case of secession legally, though it could not be a case of secession morally and everyone could strive to revise the law to block RCRSCC.

The No Reasons Matters Objection: Another objection would be that one may accept secessionist theories are false, but one may also reject the Martyr Argument because only theocratic approaches towards RCRSUCCS could defend anti-secessionist approach, and religious arguments could reinforce RCRSUCCS, and secular arguments e.g. the Martyr Argument could not play for this serious aim. They may propose some sort of evidence to promote successful achievements of theocracies to undermine secessionist theories. However, the writer’s reply is that:

- First of all, there are too many arguments against theocracies that have made theocracies undeniably illegitimate, and so theocracies have much more fundamental problems to propose RCRSUCCS.

- Next, a theocratic government that is defending RCRSUCCS in a theocratic way, or it may apply religious arguments towards secessionist theories, undeniably it sacrifices morality for religions and/or theocratic governments. It devalues human beings and morality, and it wastes the only objective valued aspect of humankind, morality. The writer thinks it makes a double the Martyr Argument that will waste RCRSUCCS. It is double the Martyr Argument since first of all, it is possible that a theocratic government denies RCRSUCCS and the Martyr Argument because of a scripture or religious doctrine, and so both truthiness of the Martyr Argument and morality are valueless and nothing, second of all, if a theocracy admits RCRSUCCS, it is not as a result of the Martyr Argument and RCRSUCCS, but it is because the scripture or the religious doctrine, and so not only truthiness of the Martyr Argument and RCRSUCCS are rejected, but also they are sacrificed to the scripture or the religious doctrine.
Last but not least, if there are some sorts of conservative and/or perfectionist parties in a country,147 also there have to be constant moral tendencies among many social and political groups in the public spheres of the country, and all of these will remain the country as an advocate of RCRSUCCS and the Martyr Argument, thus we do not need a theocracy.

147 For a similar view see: (Scruton, 1980, pp. 65-6).
Conclusion

Theocracies fragment civilizations and countries, there is no need more words to this fact, and undeniably there is no solution to alleviate this fact for theocrats.

The writer has strived to prepare three arguments against theocracies directly, and two other arguments against theocracy indirectly. The writer's journey for this book has been struggling with many torturous years.
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