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This is dedicated to Charlene.
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ABSTRACT

I analyze Deleuze’s concept of temporality in terms of its ontology and axiological (political and aesthetic) aspects. For Deleuze, the concept of temporality is non-monolithic, in the senses that it is modified throughout his works — the monographs, lectures, and those works that were co-authored with Félix Guattari — and that it is developed through reference to a dizzying array of concepts, thinkers, artistic works, and social phenomena.

I observe that Deleuze’s concept of temporality involves a complex ontology of difference, which I elaborate through reference to Deleuze’s analyses of Ancient Greek and Stoic conceptualizations of time. From Plato through to Chrysippus, temporality gradually comes to be identified as a form that comprehends the variation of particulars. Deleuze modifies the ancients’ concept of time to suggest that time obtains as a form of ceaseless ontological variation. Through reference to Deleuze’s reading of Gilbert Simondon, I further suggest that Deleuze tends to conceive of temporality as an ontogenetic force which participates in the complex process of individuation.

A standout feature of this dissertation involves an analysis of how Deleuze’s concept of temporality is modified in his works on cinema. In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image, temporality comes to be characterized as something other than the measure of the movement of existents. In his detailed analyses of Bergson — in Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, and Bergsonism — Deleuze suggests that time involves an actualization of aspects of a virtual past as contemporaneous with the lived present. While not an outright denial of the relation of temporal succession, Deleuze’s claim implies a
diminishment of this relation’s significance in an adequate elaboration of the nature of
temporality.

Further, I observe — through reference to Deleuze’s readings of Marx, Kierkegaard, and
Spinoza — that (the explicitly temporal) change of societal forms of economic organization is
non-reducible to that suggested by linear evolution. The claim is that putatively discrete modes
of economic organization do not enjoy temporal displacement with respect to one another. This
suggests that linear evolutionary models of societal development are inadequate. This further
implies that temporality is non-reducible to the relation of temporal succession. In concrete
terms, societal change is characterized as immanent temporal variation.

Taken together, these analyses yield the conclusion that Deleuze tends to conceive of the
nature of temporality as involving the ongoing realization of multiple — non-identical,
sometimes contrary — aspects of a stochastic process of creation that is expressed in ontogenetic
circumstances, social evolution, literary works, and filmic works.
INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW OF DELEUZE’S PHILOSOPHY OF TIME

Perhaps there is no aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy as important as his nuanced thought on the nature of temporality. For Deleuze, the concept of temporality is non-monolithic, in the senses that throughout his works — the monographs, lectures, and those works that were co-authored with Félix Guattari — he ceaselessly returns to elaborations on the nature of time. It is as though temporality is the thematic refrain of Deleuze’s philosophy. Throughout his published works and lectures, Deleuze draws on a dizzying array of philosophers, occult philosophers (i.e., mystics), novelists, filmmakers, poets, anthropologists, ethnologists, and political revolutionaries to develop a philosophy of time that is utterly without precedent in the Western philosophical tradition. From Plato to the Stoics, from Aristotle through to Kant, Husserl, and Bergson, from Marx and Stalin alike, Deleuze traces a remarkable path from the lost time of Proust through to the divergent temporal series illustrated in the fiction of Borges. There is the suggestion — hinted at in the fiction of F. Scott Fitzgerald and further developed in Deleuze’s reading of Marx — that time involves a stochastic progression. Through reference to Kierkegaard and Riemann alike, Deleuze develops the claim that time involves the repetition of axiological and ontological singularities (i.e., moments of creation). Deleuze’s elaborations on the nature of temporal expression in film reveal time to be of a wholly different nature than that suggested by the those who would claim that art tends to mimic reality. From his nuanced analysis of the Marxist prehistory of capitalism, Deleuze develops the claim that temporality is involved in the stochastic creation of the State, as well as associated modes of economic production. Taken together, Deleuze’s variegated analyses yield a concept of time that is not easily reducible to a single unifying feature, totalizing aspect, idea, or expressive trait — i.e., it is no more reducible to
hylomorphism than it is identical to a Kantian transcendental condition of reality; time is no more a pure ideation than it is merely a subsistent attribute of material existents; though time may enjoy expression as the linear succession of quanta, it also enjoys expression as immanent qualitative variation. For these reasons, there is no singular time of Deleuze. The aim of this dissertation is to elaborate on Deleuze’s multiple, sometimes competing, more often than not affirmative claims about the ontological, aesthetic, and political aspects of temporality.

There are six chapters of argumentation. Each chapter elaborates on a crucial development of Deleuze’s thought about the nature of temporality or an aspect associated with the expression or realization of a particular concept of time. It should be observed that Deleuze produced no single great book on time, in the sense that there is no one text devoted exclusively to temporality among Deleuze’s numerous monographs and co-authored works. Rather than implying a paucity of substantive analysis, this illustrates a super-abundance of analyses — a philosophy of time is woven throughout virtually all of Deleuze’s publications; in both the monographs and co-authored texts, stunning insights about the nature of temporality abound. In this sense, the philosophy of time is the ambient theme of Deleuze’s philosophical career. Though the order of presentation of concepts in this dissertation roughly corresponds to the order of the publication of Deleuze’s major texts, conceptual coherence is also a substantive factor in the organization of the following chapters. Taken together, these arguments yield the claim that Deleuze conceived of time as a nuanced ontogenetic process that gains expression in aesthetics (of cinema and literature), and Marxian approaches to the evolution of modes of economic production.
The first chapter may be read as an extended analysis of the theory of time first hinted at in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*¹ and further developed in *Difference and Repetition*.² Here, I observe that Deleuze conceives of time as a heteronymous formation involving analytically discrete syntheses. I suggest that just as the syntheses of time are discrete from each other, temporality — conceived of as a whole — is independent to the temporal serialization evidenced in the lived experience of psycho-social entities. I present this argument by specifying that this non-successive concept of time involves a modification of Ancient Greek theorizations of the nature of temporality. I observe that though the elaboration of the passage of time may enjoy measurement, the changes associated with temporal progression are not indexed on the putatively invariant cycles associated with the movements of celestial bodies. I further suggest that time is the expression of an ontogenetic process (i.e., the “contemplations” of a universal soul). These elaborations yield three substantive claims: (1) Deleuze tends to conceive of temporality as an ontogenetic process, which is non-identical to the thought processes of psycho-social entities — an adequate account of temporality does not involve psychologism; (2) I suggest that Deleuze tends to conceive of time as a creative process, in the sense that temporality is not *merely* the measure of the movement of physical entities; (3) I further observe that the temporal present can be characterized as a non-decomposable moment (i.e., a continuum) involved in the production of the new.

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In my second and third chapters, I develop the claim —first touched upon in Deleuze’s 1966 review of Gilbert Simondon’s *Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information* and further elaborated in *The Logic of Sense* — that temporality is involved in the ontogenetic process of individuation. Simondon stipulates ontogenetic processes enjoy expression as magic, in the sense that individuation involves the inter-relation of ill-defined, transformational, pre-personal forces. I suggest that temporality obtains as one of these forces — time is involved in the formation of individuated entities. In concrete terms, I suggest that temporality and magic are analogues. The analogy between temporality and magic is demonstrated by shared aspects: (1) each of temporality and magic share the qualitative aspect of productive dynamism; (2) both tend to involve aesthetic representation — i.e., each analogue enjoys an expressive aspect, in the sense that each is involved in the expression of aesthetic values. I further observe that the ontogenetic field may be identified with a continuous multiplicity. One of the primary implications of this argument is that temporality may be expressed through differential equations.

I continue my analysis of the *Logic of Sense* with the third chapter’s discussion of Stoic and Ancient Hellenistic concepts of time. I elaborate on the complex nature of time through reference to the Stoic’s and Gnostic’s concepts of *Aion* (i.e., eternity; the pagan God that comprehended the entirety of the Greek and Roman pantheons; that from which the discrete temporal moments represented by the various figures of the Western zodiac subsist). Here, I develop themes introduced in the second chapter, with the suggestion that temporality is an ontogenetic production of discrete entities. I observe that Deleuze characterizes temporality as an

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“empty form” that comprehends the ongoing production of variable particulars. In the third chapter, I also make the substantive claim that Deleuze’s philosophy of temporality involves repetition of moments of profound ontological and axiological variation. I further observe that time enjoys literary expression in the works of both Borges and F. Scott Fitzgerald. Finally, I end the third chapter by further developing the claim — first hinted at in the second chapter — that time (characterized as an ontogenetic field involved in the creation of reality) can be represented through reference to differential equations.

In the fourth chapter, I elaborate on Deleuze’s reading of Kierkegaard’s identification of repetition as a tumultuous circumstance. I critically assess Kierkegaard’s beguiling concept of repetition to demonstrate that it enjoys qualitative identity with Deleuze’s concept of repetition. The claim is that both Kierkegaard’s and Deleuze’s concepts of repetition share an axiological aspect. For both thinkers, the temporal process of repetition involves value. I further demonstrate the axiological component of temporality by elaborating on Marx’s gut-wrenching description of the revolutionary horror that swept through Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century. These analyses of Kierkegaard and Marx yield claim the Deleuze’s concept of temporality implies an axiological prioritization of the creation of unique social institutions, persons, and groups — the very entities involved in the political circumstance. In concrete terms, temporal moments are saturated with value — in this sense, history’s repetitions involve tragic or farcical elements. Taken together, these analyses suggest that time obtains as a process of ongoing axiological creation.
In the penultimate chapter of argument (chapter five), I turn to Deleuze’s two volumes about cinema — *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*⁵ and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*.⁶ Deleuze radically modifies his thought on the nature of temporality through reference to film. I observe that Deleuze elaborates on filmic expressions of temporality through reference to Bergson’s concept of virtual forces gaining expression as images. Perhaps the most interesting outcome of these analyses is the claim that putatively discontinuous dimensions of time — i.e., the past and the present — are co-extensively emerging, utterly contemporaneous actualities. In this sense, film presents the memorial past and the vital present as coextensive elements that enjoy simultaneous actualization. I further observe that Deleuze’s analyses imply a diminishment of priority of the relation of temporal succession \( (t_1, t_2, \ldots t_n) \) in an adequate elaboration of the nature of temporality. In concrete terms, this implies that the time of cinema obtains as ongoing qualitative variation, which does not correlate with the temporal succession illustrated by clocks and calendars in the real world.

In the ultimate chapter of argument, I elucidate the concept of time developed in the two *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* volumes.⁷ In these volumes, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that temporality involves the immanent variation of co-existing entities — time is characterized as involving the instantaneous change of spatiotemporally compresent social formations. They present their argument through reference to Marx’s and Jane Jacobs’s elucidations of the nature

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⁵ Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (tr.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).


of the evolution of urban modes of socio-economic organization, the ethnological investigations of Clastres, as well as Spinoza’s notion of immanent causality. I observe that Deleuze’s and Guattari’s analyses yield the complex claim that temporality gains expression as variation within a single unified duration. This amounts to a substantial modification to Marxian claims about the origins of the State. Deleuze and Guattari borrow from Jacobs’ critical reassessment of Marxian evolutionism to suggest that the relation among social formations be radically re-conceptualized. I observe that Deleuze and Guattari echo Clastres’s revolutionary thesis that the State and primitive forms of social organization obtain as temporally co-existing entities that participate in relations of immanent modification. Here, Deleuze and Guattari apply Spinoza’s notion of immanent causality — i.e., the sort of causal relation in which both cause and effect are implicated as expressive aspects of the same ontologically-unified substance — to yield the suggestion that temporally co-existing social formations are involved in temporally immanent variation. The claim is that analytically discrete aspects of the same social substance modify one another within the same duration. These suggest that evolution — characterized as the serial progression of durations expressed as grand movements along the ever more nuanced arch of history — does not obtain in a linear fashion. This further implies that the relation of temporal succession \((t_1, t_2 \ldots t_n)\) is not adequate to represent variation of temporally co-existing social forms. Society changes in an instant.

Taken together, these analyses suggest that Deleuze conceives of temporality as a (continuous) multiplicity of irreducible, implicated aspects involved in the ongoing process of axiological creation. The principal claim is that the times of Deleuze involve relatively autonomous durations participating in the formation of that which is without ontological precedent or correlate.
CHAPTER 1: THE BEGINNING OF TIME

Gilles Deleuze conceives of time as a multiplicity involved with analytically discrete ontological processes (i.e., “syntheses”). None of the syntheses are reducible to any other, thus implying the relative identity of each as a discrete process. I suggest that just as the syntheses of time are discrete from each other, time as a whole—as a unified entity or form—is autonomous with respect to the temporal serialization evidenced in the lived experience of psycho-social entities. The claim is that time begins independently of the experience of any psycho-social entity. This further implies that though the lived experience of time seems to involve temporal succession (or temporal series), time is fundamentally constituted as a pre-individual transcendental entity, which becomes actualized as temporal succession only secondarily.

I begin by elucidating Deleuze’s concept of the first synthesis of time through reference to his early work on David Hume, Kant, and his—perhaps all too often overlooked—

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1 The suggestion that Deleuze has an ontology of time might seem vexing to those who are familiar with François Zourabichveli’s reading of Deleuze. In an otherwise superb reading of Deleuze, Zourabichveli starkly declares that “there is no ontology of Deleuze” (François Zourabichveli, Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event Together with The Vocabulary of Deleuze, Kieran Aarons [tr.], Gregg Lambert and Daniel W. Smith [eds.], [Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2012], 36). The basis of this claim is the observation that Deleuze’s metaphysics neither tends toward the production of, nor presupposes the existence of a single unified entity (i.e., the “one” of monist ontological systems). This observation is most certainly an accurate assessment of Deleuze’s philosophy. The validity of the claim that Deleuze’s is a metaphysics of multiplicities does not imply that it is not an ontology. Further, it does not imply that he has no ontology of time. There may be ontologies which involve multiplicities. One can be a champion of differential ontologies and still be an ontologist, in the strict sense of the term. That Deleuze’s philosophy favours concepts of flows, folds, multiplicity, nomadism, etc. to identity claims does not make him less of an ontologist, it makes him an ontologist of difference. One of the assumptions in all that follows is that Deleuze presents a rigorously detailed, highly variegated ontology of difference that is reflected in his theory of time. Any discussion of the various processes which constitute, participate in, comprehend, or otherwise involve a metaphysically loaded term like time, is necessarily ontological. Any ontology of time that involves three non-reducible, non-identical “syntheses” is a differential ontology of time.
appropriation of aspects of Husserl’s rejection of psychologism. Deleuze accepts Hume’s claim that time is constituted by a mind, but modifies this claim to excise Hume’s psychologicist premise.  

Psychologism is identified as the group of theories which attempts to assign properties of a mind to non-mental phenomena. One is guilty of psychologicist reasoning when they claim that something is reducible to psychological phenomena, when, in fact, it is not. Hume’s assertion that time is a conjured by the mind is (literally) a text-book example of psychologism. Both Kant and Husserl tirelessly rail against Hume’s psychologistic account of time.  

In the first *Critique*, Kant explicitly notes that the ontologically primary synthesis of a time is primary to the experience of temporal succession — i.e., the synthesis of time is the ontological pre-condition of the ontic experience of temporal organization; the experience of a realized temporal series is ontologically dependent on the transcendental synthesis of time. Husserl — in his *Lectures on Transcendental Logic*, as well *Experience and Judgement* — suggests that time is an aspect of the non-decomposable (ontologically primary) hyletic data of transcendental apperception. (I.e., Husserl suggests that temporal succession obtains as the content of a passive synthesis which does not rely on the participation of any psycho-social entity). Deleuze draws from both Kant and Husserl to suggest that time, though it is the content of a mind, this mind is non-identical to a

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3 Immanuel Kant was among the first to level this charge against Hume. In the first *Critique*, Kant suggests that Hume is a “geographer of thought” who systematically tried to sensualize reason — i.e., reduce reason to cognitive processes of psycho-social, spatio-temporally extended entities. (cf. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A760-B794, Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood W. [tr.], [Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press: 1998], 653-656).


human mind. The claim here seems to be that temporality is the consequence of an ontological synthesis that is autonomous to the actions and processes involved in the mental function of psycho-social entities. Though it might be the case that temporal order may come to be perceived by psycho-social entities — as the experience of temporal series; as the awareness of temporal succession; as the felt rhythm of one’s cardiovascular system; as the experience of days passing into weeks, passing into months, passing into years— these concretizations of time in one’s lived experience are ontologically dependent on the transcendental realization of time. Deleuze further suggests that the passive synthesis of time is characterized as “originary”, in the sense that it is through the passive synthesis that temporal order — e.g., the order evidenced by the sound of three notes played in quick succession— obtains. Deleuze suggests that the emergence of temporal order, though involving a mind, is non-reducible to the cognitive functions of spatio-temporally localized, psycho-social individuals. Recently, scholars have begun to explore the systematic relation between Deleuze’s thought and the work of various phenomenologists.6 Nicholas de Warren has suggested that Deleuze’s thought on the nature of time is “entangled” with that of Husserl.7 Husserl’s and Deleuze’s elaborations of the passive synthesis of time can be cited as evidence of this entanglement. I suggest Deleuze’s elucidation of the passive synthesis is analogous to Husserl’s account, in the sense that both identify an ontologically “empty” form of temporality as subsisting from the present.

6 Perhaps the most notable (and most recent) among these is Judith Wambacq’s detailed elaboration of the “resonances” of Deleuze’s and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies. (Judith Wambacq, Thinking Between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty, [Athens: Ohio University Press, 2017]).
In the second and third sections of the present chapter, I elaborate on Deleuze’s peculiar characterization of the first synthesis of time as involving both “contemplations” and “habits.” This discussion is informed by Deleuze’s elaboration of concepts of time in the Ancient world. I suggest that the immanent expression of time in the present involves the habitual — i.e., unthought — actions of material entities. The term “contemplation” — when associated with time — is a bit more fraught, in the sense that the term tends to be associated with the cognitive processes of humans (or other so-called higher mammals). Deleuze’s elaboration of the concepts of time in the Ancient world clarifies these terminological ambiguities. Deleuze suggests that from Plato, to Aristotle, to Plotinus the concept of time undergoes substantial modification, in the sense that time comes to be identified as a contemplation of the soul of the universe.

The characterization of time — as involving the soul of the universe — suggests a liberation of time from both the cognitive processes of psycho-social entities and quantitative determination. The complex claim is that temporality enjoys autonomy from the mental processes of humans and quantitative determination — time is irreducible to the conscious awareness of the passage of moments in a temporal series; time involves something more than temporal succession. These imply that time is liberated, in the sense that it comes to be characterized as pre-individual force which allows for the emergence of the new. In the fourth section, I turn to Deleuze’s (odd) suggestion that his concept of time involves a series of paradoxical relationships between the past and the present. Through reference to Bergson, I suggest that the passive synthesis of time can be characterized as the creation of the new that is actualized in the present. The production of the new involves a sort of differentiation at the pre-individual level (i.e., a level that is ontologically prior to any experienced by an individuated entity). One might think this implies paradoxical self-causation — i.e., in which an entity seems
to cause itself. I suggest that the new produced in the passive synthesis does involve does not imply a paradoxical self-causation.

Taken together, these elaborations yield the three-fold conclusion that: (1) Deleuze’s account of the passive synthesis involves a modification of Hume’s psychologistic account of temporal series; (2) the passive synthesis of time is creative, in the sense that time is elucidated as not merely the measure of the movement of physical entities; (3) the present can be characterized as the production of the new.

The Transcendental Aspect of Time: Deleuze’s Husserlian Modification of Hume

Time begins in the present, in the sense that the “originary synthesis of time” is evidenced in the habitual behaviours of entities that populate the living present, which draws together (i.e., synthesizes) analytically discrete events. Deleuze’s characterization of time as emerging from habitual processes in the present is derived from his reading of Hume. Constantin V. Boundas observes that Hume categorized time as a structure of the human mind that plays an essential role in forming subjectivity. For Hume, time is an abstract idea that is conjured in the human mind, in the sense that perceptual data are the basis of our idea of time.

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8 Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 80.
10 In his introduction to the English edition of Deleuze’s text on Hume, Boundas writes: “Time was initially introduced by Hume as the structure of the mind; but the subject, formed by the habit inside the mind, is the synthesis of time. The mind was succession; the subject is now durée and anticipation. The anticipating and inventing subject constitutes the past which weighs on the present, making it pass, while positing the past as the rule for the future. Time as the constitutive force of subjectivity, responsible for the bending and folding of the given and the formation of interiority, is indeed intensive.” (Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 16).
11 Hume writes: “The idea of time, being derived from the succession of our perceptions of every kind, ideas as well as impressions, and impressions of reflection as well as of sensations
Hume elaborates his concept of time through reference to the example of five notes played in succession on a flute, which produces an abstract idea of succession in the mind. Hume’s claim is that one’s most basic sense of time — temporal succession; $t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_n$ — is an abstract idea conjured by the cognitive organ of a psycho-social entity as a means by which to order the chaotic influx of sensory data. For Hume, the idea of time is abstract, in the sense that it produces other ideas. Negatively, the abstract idea of temporal succession produces neither emotional responses nor affections; positively, abstract ideas produce ideas that function in our reflections on — contemplations of — ideas.\(^{12}\)

For Hume, time is a relation between successive temporal instants which “resemble” each other, in the minimal sense that they appear as proximate sensations. In the *Treatise*, Hume explicitly notes that all relations of resemblance are entirely the province of the human mind.\(^{13}\) Deleuze accepts the characterization of time as a “contraction” of successive temporal moments, but deprioritizes the human-centeredness of Hume’s account. Though Deleuze — in *Empiricism and Subjectivity* — suggests that the mind may be characterized as a series of temporal

\(^{12}\) Hume writes: “Five notes played on a flute give us the impression and idea of time; though time be not a sixth impression, which presents itself to the hearing or any other of the senses. Nor is it a sixth impression, which the mind by reflection finds in itself. These five sounds making their appearance in this particular manner, excite no emotion in the mind, nor produce an affection of any kind, which being observed by it can give rise to a new idea. For that is necessary to produce a new idea of reflection, nor can the mind, by revolving over a thousand times all its ideas of sensation, ever extract from them any new original idea, unless nature has so framed its faculties, that it feels some new original impression arise from such a contemplation” (ibid., 43).

\(^{13}\) Hume writes: “Resembling ideas are not only related together, but the actions of a mind we employ in considering them, are so little different, that we are not able to distinguish them.” (ibid., 65).
successions,\textsuperscript{14} in *Difference and Repetition*, this mind is clearly not to be identified with the cognitive organ of a spatio-temporally extended, psycho-social human being. Elaborating on the nature of the repetition of the same term in a series, Deleuze explicitly characterizes this repetition as non-reducible to any of memory, reflection, or content of understanding of a human mind.\textsuperscript{15} Deleuze’s modification of Hume involves the following inferential progression: (1) acceptance of Hume’s suggestion that time may be characterized as a succession of temporally discrete instants; (2) stipulation that a group of temporally proximate instants may be represented by the series of $AB, AB, AB$; (3) acceptance of Hume’s suggestion that this series is synthesized by a mind, and; (4) rejection of any identification of synthesis with any cognitive process of the human mind. Deleuze’s first claim — that temporally proximate instants can be represented as terms in a series — is not contentious. That the progression of time may be characterized as the progression from one term to another in a series is non-problematic. Hume’s suggestion that the operation of synthesis needs to be performed by a human mind is dubious, in the sense that it might be an ontological process — i.e., not merely a cognitive process. It would be more apt to suggest that the mind may represent the synthesis as the content of cogitation, or that the mind participates with the synthesis, than to argue that the mind performs a temporal synthesis. Hume’s psychologistic account seems to come uncomfortably close to suggesting that time is conjured by the finicky function of the human cognitive organ. It is for this reason that Deleuze rejects Hume’s dubious assumption. Though the first synthesis of time is indeed a synthesis of

\textsuperscript{14} Deleuze summarizes Hume’s account of the human mind’s understanding of time: “The mind, considered from the viewpoint of the appearance of its perceptions, was essentially succession, time.” (Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 92).

\textsuperscript{15} Deleuze writes: “When A appears, we expect B with a force corresponding to the qualitative impression of all the contracted ABs. This is by no means a memory, nor indeed an operation of the understanding: contraction is not a matter of reflection. Properly speaking, it forms a synthesis of time.” (Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 70).
temporal instants — represented by one musical beat to another, one electrical pulse to another, etc. — these do not need to be synthesized by a human mind for there to be time. Instants need to be synthesized in order for there to be time; the synthesis of time, however, does not need a human mind.

Deleuze’s modification of Hume’s account of time amounts to a rejection of Hume’s psychologism. Roundly criticized by many early phenomenologists and early twentieth century psychologists — e.g., Stumpf, Husserl, Ingarden, and Koffka —, psychologism is the spurious pseudo-philosophical doctrine that attempts to reduce all philosophical phenomena (i.e., the entirety of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, logic, and all sub-divisions within these) to psychological phenomena. Characterized through reference to logic (as a field of study), psychologism is the view that “psychology is the necessary and sufficient foundation of logic.” Kurt Koffka elucidates psychologism as “the view that all logical, subsistent relations can be explained by psychological or even physiological existing relations.” Ingarden elaborates on the perils of psychologism when he defines it as the “untenable” position that

16 Roman Ingarden elaborates on the unsatisfying nature of the psychologist position: “Psychologism, that is, the treatment as mental facts (or as conscious experiences) of objects that in their nature are not mental, finds support most readily among people without philosophical understanding who, nevertheless, think they need to proclaim philosophical views in order to impress others with their learning.” (Roman Ingarden, The Musical Work and the Problem of its Identity, Adam Czemiawski [tr.], Jean G. Harrell [ed.], [Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and London: Macmillan Press, 1986], 24 fn. 1).
17 Herbert Spiegelberg provides an excellent — if brief — elucidation of psychologism as well as a detailed account of Stumpf’s anti-psychologism. Spiegelberg highlights that – much like Deleuze’s – Stumpf’s anti-psychologistic stance was motivated by a desire to modify Hume’s empiricism. (Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction I, [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff ,1965], 94).
attempts to treat existent entities — like paintings, literary works, and musical works of art — as mere facts or experiences of a transcendental ego.19

Nicholas de Warren presents a succinct definition of psychologism when he observes that the concept involves “the obfuscation of a distinction between ‘sense’ and ‘object’.”20 In the context of Husserl’s phenomenology, all objects of meaning (all thoughts, experiences, cognitive processes, intentional objects, etc.) are real, unique, and unrepeatable, in the sense that they occur in space-time — i.e., they occur in a here and now. (It is worth pointing out that Deleuze and Guattari echo the first aspect of these metaphysical assumptions when they observe that logical distinctions, categorical determinations, genera of being, words, and spiritual beings enjoy as much reality as physical entities).21 The sense of an object (i.e., its meaning) is identified as an intentional entity — i.e., an entity that enjoys an intentional mode of being— that subsists from the here and now enjoyed by any particular object. However, the meaning or sense of an object is also the same for all objects that are of the same type. (E.g., The term “city” — defined as a large urban centre — remains constant, no matter if you are talking about Paris, Rome, Brussels, or the entire class of cities). Though the meaning of something is non-reducible to a given object, in the sense that the meaning of a term applies both to the general class of objects as well as any particular in that class, this does not imply that the meaning of the any given object is pure — i.e., utterly divested from — its object. Indeed, without reference to both its particularity and its generality, the term loses an aspect of its meaning. Psychologism tends to collapse the meaning of a term to either the particularity of an object (i.e., the psychological

20 Nicholas de Warren, “The Anarchy of Sense: Husserl in Deleuze, Deleuze in Husserl”, 54.
processes of an individual) or “elevate” meaning to the generality of a transcendental ego. As Krzysztof Michalski elaborates: “psychologism denies that which makes its own claims understandable: namely, their independence from time and space, thus the situation from which they arose and were promulgated.” Psychologism is an absurdity, in the sense that it tends to elevate meanings to a realm of abstraction that has no clear tether to the partiality of particular individual experience of a given object.

A clue to Deleuze's critique of psychologism can be found in his elucidation of a clear distinction between the transcendental field and the domain of psychological phenomena (i.e., the personal consciousness or subjective identity). For Deleuze, both the transcendental and the particular exist, and meaning subsists from the interaction of these. The transcendental field serves as the “foundation” of things, in the sense that it provides the conditions for the givenness of an object. Subjective consciousness “founds” things, in the sense that it constitutes (i.e., realizes) objects of cognition. These are constituted on the basis of transcendental existents. The claim here is that the transcendental entities (i.e., existents which enjoy the transcendental mode of being) are the ontological basis of an object of cognition — i.e., objects of cognition subsist from transcendental entities; the content of thought enjoys a relation of ontological dependency with respect to transcendental existents. The temporal implication of these ontological suggestions is that any particular moment of time — though realized (or actualized) as a lived experience or conscious thought of a psycho-social entity — is ontologically dependent on a

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23 Krzysztof Michalski summarizes: “Meaning is an inseparable quality of experience itself: it is an intention, and with that, a characteristic of every experience as such; it is not an addendum tacked on from the outside. The independence of meaning from a situation in which it reveals itself is not the presence of an essence from another planet.” (ibid., 27).
transcendental form of time. Deleuze further elaborates on this form of ontological dependency when — in the fourteenth series (of Double Causality) in the *The Logic of Sense* — he characterizes the processes of consciousness constituting representations of transcendental entities as processes of unification. Throughout *Difference and Repetition* — which was written one year earlier — Deleuze elaborates these processes of cognition as types of “contractions.” Throughout these two texts, transcendental conditions are non-reducible to the psychological processes of consciousness. Though Deleuze cautiously acknowledges that an ego may “unify” metaphysical phenomena like time, he also pointedly notes that these are founded in “an impersonal transcendental field,” and that “the foundation can never resemble what it founds.” Here, Deleuze’s claim is that the time synthesis is primarily ontological, and it gains expression as something psychological only secondarily; awareness of time is a consequence of a synthesis, which is independent of any psychological awareness, or even the existence of psycho-social entities.

Deleuze’s elaboration of an impersonal transcendental field that functions as the primordial (i.e., ontologically primary) foundation of time is indebted to both Kant and Husserl. Though all of Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger elaborate on the nature of temporal synthesis, the profoundly poor quality of the philosophical analyses of the Nazi does nothing but confound any serious discussion of the nature of temporality. Heidegger’s lugubrious, ontologically tortured thought has received far too much critical attention. For this reason, I focus on Kant’s and Husserl’s challenge to Hume’s psychologistic account of temporal synthesis. To clarify

25 Ibid., 99.
26 Heidegger is of little importance, in the sense that his discussion — in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* — is a reformulation of Kant that (in addition to being written in the opaque
Deleuze’s nuanced conceptualization of the past, I will: (1) specify Deleuze’s modification of Kant’s identification of the synthesis of memory; (2) elucidate Deleuze’s modification of Husserl’s characterization of this synthesis as passive. Kant and Husserl: these are the two figures to which Deleuze’s concept of the passive synthesis of the past is most indebted. Deleuze elaborations of these thinkers suggest that the past is the content of a synthetic operation that is ontologically primary to the level of cognition enjoyed by consciousness — i.e., primary to the use of the faculties.

A clue to Kant’s influence on Deleuze’s conceptualization of the types of relations involved among the present and past is found in the observation that the synthesis of the past involves memory. In the first Critique, Kant explicitly points out that the synthesis of time

linguistic style that is unique to Heidegger) substantially misinterprets Kant. The main problem with Heidegger’s position is that he makes the dubious assertion that Kant identifies the “transcendental imagination” with the formation of time. Heidegger writes: “If the transcendental imagination as the pure formative faculty in itself forms time, i.e., lets it spring forth, then the thesis stated above, that transcendental imagination is primordial time, can no longer be avoided.” (Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, James S. Churchill [tr.], [Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1965], 192). Makkreel demonstrates that Heidegger’s interpretive claim lacks merit in the sense that Kant stipulates that temporality — i.e., the common root of all experience — is “in principle unknowable and … cannot be identified with the imagination or any other faculty.” (Rudolf A. Makkreel, Interpretation and Imagination in Kant; the Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgement, [Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1990], 21).

One might think that since Heidegger worked as Husserl’s assistant from 1919 to 1922, he might have something useful to say about Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of temporality. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Roman Ingarden observes that Heidegger was among Husserl’s Frieberg students, who “had been educated in a quite different philosophy and at first had rather little understanding of phenomenological analyses.” (Jeff Mitscherling, Roman Ingarden’s Ontology and Aesthetics, [Canada: University of Ottawa Press, 1997], 15). Ingarden further observes that Heidegger’s analyses of temporality in Being and Time have little relation to Husserl’s phenomenology. (ibid., 29, ft. 52).

27 Take, for example, Deleuze’s summary observation that “the second synthesis, that of memory, constituted time as a pure past, from the point of view of a ground which causes the passing of one present and the arrival of another.” (Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 94).
involves the mnemonic function of reproducing present moments arrayed in the whole of the past. Makkreel observes that, for Kant, representations of the sensory manifold are “not presumed to persist through time and therefore must be…produced from one moment to the next.” In this respect, memory has a two-fold function: (1) to associate representations derived from circumstances that obtain as part of the sensory manifold; (2) to file these away in a storehouse of recollections. The first of these operations poses the most conceptual difficulty, in the sense there is some dispute about whether the synthetic process of combining recollections produces (constitutes) the past, or merely records a pre-existing temporal ordering. Though one might be tempted to assign a productive role to memory with the suggestion that the synthesis of “recollection forms the past as such,” this would evidence a misreading of Kant. Makkreel observes, that — for Kant — all representations of the sensory manifold are given in succession. The implication here is that the past (as the element of temporality implied by the

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28 Kant elaborates on the synthesis (of reproduction in the imagination) in the second section of the transcendental analytic: “Now it is obvious that if I draw a line in thought, or think of the time from one moment to the next, or even want to represent a certain number to myself, I must necessarily first grasp one of these manifold representations after another in my thoughts. But if I were always to lose the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the preceding parts, of time, or the successively represented units) from my thoughts and not reproduce them when I proceed to the following ones, then no whole representation and none of the previously mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most fundamental representations of space and time, could ever arise.” (Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A102, 230).
29 Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Interpretation and Imagination in Kant; the Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgement*, 24.
31 Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Interpretation and Imagination in Kant; the Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgement*, 23. Makkreel is not exactly a voice in the wilderness. Béatrice Longuenesse makes a similar point when she notes that temporal succession obtains prior to its expression in the sensory manifold. Longuenesse writes: “Kant wants to show that for conjunction or succession to be present in appearances, an act of combination is necessary prior to the associative combinations made possible by repeatedly perceived conjunctions or successions.” (Béatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason*, Charles T. Wolfe [Tr.], [Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000], 41).
succession of temporal moments) is evidenced in the sensory manifold. This suggests that though memory is involved in representing the past, its role is not that of creating the past. The temporal ordering of successive temporal events — e.g., the appearance of a chunk of red cinnabar, the duration of the longest day of the year, the progression of linguistic terms arrayed in a sentence, etc. — is a given aspect of the sensory manifold, not something conjured by memory. Kant explicitly claims that the temporal ordering of events is ontologically prior to any experience of temporal order as an aspect of the sensory manifold. This implies that the relation of temporal succession obtains as an aspect of the transcendental field — i.e., as a relation ontologically prior to experience; as an a priori relation. The proof of the validity of this deduction can be found in the demonstration of the absurdity of the counter-positive. Were it the case that this ordering was not already present as a precondition of experience, the imagination would have no occasion to combine the discrete representations into a temporal order. This implies that the temporal order of reality is the ontic precondition of the presence of a temporal ordering of reminiscences. At least, this is what Deleuze suggests with his observation that the succession of appearances of A is not a consequent of the processes of memory or understanding. Deleuze borrows the Kantian

33 Kant observes: “Now if we can demonstrate that even our purest a priori intuitions provide no cognition except insofar as they contain the sort of combination of the manifold that makes possible a thoroughgoing synthesis of reproduction, then this synthesis of the imagination would be grounded even prior to all experience on a priori principles, and one must assume a pure transcendental synthesis of this power, which grounds even the possibility of all experience (as that which the reproducibility of the appearances necessarily presupposes)” (ibid., A102, 230). Deleuze explicitly makes this claim with the observation that the experience of the present is ontologically dependent on a general domain of the past: “It is with respect to the pure element of the past, understood as the past in general, as an a priori past, that a given former present is reproducible and the present [sic.] is able to reflect itself.” (Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 81).
34 Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 70.
suggestion that the synthesis of recollection involves the past as the content of the synthesis —
that which is combined — not that which is produced by the action of memory.

Deleuze observes that a passive synthesis “is not carried out by the mind, but in the
mind.” The claim here is that the passive synthesis is a preconscious ontological event. In this
sense, the passive synthesis operates is ontologically primary to (the activity) of conscious
thought. Husserl echoes the Kantian suggestion that time is an aspect of an ontological
organization that is prior to cognition, when he observes that temporality is an aspect of hyletic
data. The material synthesized by the passive synthesis is the hyletic data that are the ontological
precondition of the presentation of intentional objects, states of affairs, and events. Husserl
explicitly identifies colours and sounds as types of hyletic data. It is important to note that
hyletic data present as “immanent objectlike formations,” in the sense that they are ontologically
primary to all of intentional objects, attributes, and properties. In this sense, hyletic data are the
primordial givens of all sense-perception. Herbert Spiegelberg elaborates on the primordial
nature of hyletic data when he notes that these are the “raw material” of all cogitations (i.e.,
doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, refusing, etc.). Notice how all of these,

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35 Ibid., 71
36 Joe Hughes illustrates the nature of the passive synthesis — as distinguished from the active
synthesis — with the example of a drunk person trying to count: “If you hold your index finger a
short distance in front of your face and focus on it, there is only one finger. If you look past it
into the distance, it becomes two fingers. When you refocus your attention, it becomes one finger
again without you ever doing anything. That is a passive synthesis. If you were drunk, however,
and still saw two fingers, you could tell yourself, ‘even though I see two, I know there is only
one’. Such purely intellectual act would constitute an active synthesis” (Joe Hughes, Deleuze’s
Difference and Repetition: A Reader’s Guide [London and New York: Continuum, 2009], 197,
fn. 99).
37 Edmund Husserl, Edmund Husserl Collected Works LX: Analyses Concerning Active and
Passive Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic, Anthony J. Steinbock (tr.), Rudolf Bernet
38 Ibid., 55.
all the constituent elements of thought, involve temporal organization. In concrete terms, the content of thought is given to perception as something which is already temporally organized. The implication here is that temporal elements are among the hyletic (i.e., the ontologically primary) data synthesized at a level that is primary to the active (conscious) involvement of the minds of psycho-social entities.

Claire Colebrook notes the similarity between Deleuze’s and Husserl’s methodological approaches when she notes that “Deleuze’s work can also be seen as a radicalisation of phenomenology.” Joe Hughes has elaborated extensively on the similarity of Deleuze’s account of the first synthesis of time to Husserl’s identification of the transcendental form of time. Though Boundas implies that this comparison is illegitimate when he suggests that Deleuze chooses “empiricism over phenomenology,” his remark seems altogether too hasty, if for no other reason than Deleuze identifies his philosophy as a “transcendental empiricism,” the very phrase that Paul Ricoeur uses to characterize Husserl’s phenomenology.

The overall structure of Deleuze’s elaboration of time’s first synthesis — the movement from observation of an empirical phenomenon (the repetition of a series of $AB, AB, AB$) to a transcendental field that is non-identical to a subjective ego (or any of its cognitive processes) — bears more than a passing resemblance to Husserl’s analysis of time’s “constitution.” Robert Sokolowski highlights that the problem of constitution of various metaphysical entities is a

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42 Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 5.
43 Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 56-57.
central concern of Husserl’s phenomenology.\textsuperscript{45} Ingarden suggests that by the time of \textit{Ideas I} and Husserl’s \textit{Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness}, Husserl seems to have accepted the claim that time’s primary ontological foundation — its primordial origin, the domain of its constitution — is transcendental.\textsuperscript{46} For Husserl, the transcendental nature of time “is unique in every respect” in comparison to the “sensuous time” of a temporal series apprehended by a human subject.\textsuperscript{47} Husserl’s claim seems to rest on the observation that a temporal series has a particular spatio-temporal locale (i.e., the locale occupied by the apprehending subject); the transcendental field of time is not constrained in such a manner. Husserl’s identification of the uniqueness of time’s transcendental basis is echoed in Deleuze’s suggestion that the foundation of time is an “empty form of time.”\textsuperscript{48} It is empty in the sense that it is a pure form — i.e., bereft of particular temporal content — that does not resemble the actualization of time in (content-rich, empirically encountered) temporal series. Husserl’s argument for the uniqueness of the transcendental time seems to be based on the observation that any given temporal series has a \textit{determinate temporal position} in two senses: (1) as an intentional object of a spatio-temporally localized individual, the series is spatio-temporally determined as occurring at a particular here and now; (2) time is also determined as a \textit{form of sensibility} which is common to all perceiving beings in “every possible world of objective experience.”\textsuperscript{49} The second claim relies on the

\textsuperscript{48} Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition}, 110.
\textsuperscript{49} Husserl writes: “We now have the inner truth of the Kantian thesis: \textit{time is the form of sensibility}, and thus it is the form of every possible world of objective experience. Prior to all questions about objective reality — prior to the question concerning what gives priority to certain ‘appearances’ to intentional objects which are self-giving in intuitive experiences by
stipulation that in order for there to be any time at all, all of time cannot be localized to one particular time. For Husserl, this determination of time is properly characterized as transcendental, in the sense that it transcends the experiences of any individual. Elaborating on the transcendental nature of time, Husserl notes that it is ontologically prior to any lived experience of time, in the sense that it is the presupposition of any experience of a connection among temporal instants (i.e., the analytically discrete instants of a series). Deleuze echoes Husserl’s elaboration of the ontological primacy of transcendental time when he identifies the first synthesis as operating on the succession of temporally discrete instants to constitute any repetition of a series. Deleuze’s and Husserl’s elaborations of the nature of a temporal series yield the characterization of transcendental time as the ontologically fundamental form of time — i.e., the “empty form of time” — that allows for disparate temporal moments to be unified into a series. One implication of the empty form of time is that the temporal connections it makes are always experienced as fleeting, passing — i.e., not enjoying eternality. The predicate of eternality implies a sense of invariability (i.e., stability) that is not an aspect of the empty form of time. The claim that the empty form of time generates a series of successions that are always passing, implies that the empty form of time is precisely not eternal, but the form of the constantly changing, ceaselessly varying manifold of non-identical temporal series. Stated reason of which bestow on them the predicate ‘true’ or ‘real object’ — is the fact of the essential characteristic of all ‘appearances,’ of the true as well as those shown to be null, namely that they are time-giving, and this is in such a way that all given times become part of one time.” (Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgement, 164).

50 Husserl writes: “Thus, all perceived, all perceptible, individuals have the common form of time. It is the first and fundamental form, the form of all forms, the presupposition of all other connections capable of establishing unity” (ibid.).

51 Deleuze writes: “Time is constituted only in the originary synthesis which operates on the repetition of instants.” (Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 70).

52 Daniel W. Smith elaborates on changing nature of Deleuze’s concept of the “empty form of time” : “This is what Deleuze means, then, when he says that Kant reconceived time as a pure
positively, there is a transcendental time which is not constrained to any here and now, so that any variable succession of instants may be constituted as a series occurring here and now.

**The Habits of Time**

At key points in his elaboration of the first synthesis of time, Deleuze refers to time’s contraction as involving “habit.” In addition to characterizing the first synthesis as the “contemplation” of a soul, Deleuze explicitly identifies time’s contraction as habit. What accounts for this terminological shift? Not merely a linguistic contrivance, the change from contemplation to habit designates a difference in two aspects of the same synthesis effected on different ontological registers. When Deleuze is referring to abstract temporal synthesis, he tends to use the term “contemplation.” Deleuze tends to use the term “habit” to designate when the contraction of instants involves material entities. While contractions of the soul define the transcendental aspect (i.e., an abstract, purely formal aspect) of time, these contractions are habitual when they involve physical bodies (i.e., when they involve anything which enjoys material existence).

This terminological distinction invites misunderstanding, in the sense that in our all too ego-centric Western world view, we tend to think of habits as types of behaviours that we have some sort of control over. (I.e., we tend to identify habits with behaviours we can learn and unlearn, as though habits are answerable to some sort of human will). Deleuze characterizes and empty form: time is an empty form that is no longer dependent on either extensive or intensive movement; instead, time has become the pure and immutable form of everything that moves and changes — not an eternal form, but precisely the form of what is not eternal.” (Daniel W. Smith, Daniel W. Essay on Deleuze [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012], 133). 53 Deleuze writes: “In essence: habit is contraction.” (Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 73).
habits as impersonal (i.e., “passive”) drives that are ontologically primary to the formations of human consciousness. The reasons for identifying habit with pre-conscious drives are stark. Were it the case that habits are subject to the human will, and that time is identifiable with habit, then we would be left with the absurd conclusion that the progression of time is subject to control by the ego. Deleuze attributes the false claim that we have control over our habits to one of the illusions of psychology.54 (Foucault illustrates this illusion when he notes that early psychologists tended to cast mentally ill people as morally blameworthy, because they lacked the wherewithal to learn good habits).55 The habits of time are impersonal, in the sense that they participate in the formation of consciousness. Habits are constitutive of consciousness, not the other way around. Elaborating on the relation between habit and consciousness, Deleuze writes: “Although it [habit] is constitutive it is not, for all that, active. It is not carried out by the mind, but occurs in the mind which contemplates, prior to all memory and all reflection.”56 Glossing on a remark he attributes to Bergson, Deleuze identifies the “habit of acquiring habits (the whole of obligation)”57 as the ephemeral, mercurial, often nameless, unconscious drives from which

54 Ibid., 73.
55 Foucault illustrates this by citing Philippe Pinel’s early nineteenth century diagnosis of “mania” as a habit that could be corrected by cold baths, confinement, and a stern talking to: “One maniac was in the habit of tearing at her clothes and breaking any object within her reach. She was given the cold-water treatment, and then tied up in a straitjacket, and appeared at last ‘humiliated and deeply concerned’; but fearing that her feelings of shame were merely transitory and her remorse too superficial, ‘the director spoke to her in the strongest terms to ensure that she experienced a feeling of real terror; he did not show anger, but he informed her that henceforth she would always be treated as severely as possible’. The expected result was not long in coming: ‘Her repentance began in a torrent of tears, which she shed for nearly two hours.’” (Michel Foucault, History of Madness, Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa [tr.], Jean Khalfa [ed.], [London and New York: Routledge, 502).
56 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 71.
57 Ibid., 4.
consciousness emerges. Henri Bergson characterizes habit as “a dynamic series of states” from which consciousness drops “like an over-ripe fruit.” Human consciousness subsists from our habits. Our conscious adoption of what we deem to be a “good” or a “bad” habit is, in fact, us merely elaborating on the primordial forces which precede any conscious cognition. Though Deleuze cautiously notes that assigning ontological priority to habit runs the risk of implying a “mystical and barbaric hypothesis,” in the sense that it seems to generalize the meaning of “habit” so that it can account for all manner of unconscious actions performed by material entities, it seems that Deleuze’s characterization of habit as a passive drive that affects all material entities is perfectly adequate. Deleuze’s characterization of habit accurately elaborates a series of phenomena (e.g., the tics, taps, tumbles, contractions, and countless unthought gestures and actions that we — along with all other material entities — tend to perform or undergo), and it does not imply an account of time that is wildly egocentric.

In one of the most elegant passages of *Difference and Repetition* — which begins with an (obscure) reference to a text of Samuel Butler and concludes with an elegant summary of Plotinus — Deleuze elaborates on how contractions and contemplations form habits, which, in turn, designate our sense of continuity. Temporality is the outcome of various contemplations. It is essential to point out that Deleuze uses the term “contemplation” to imply a certain disposition

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59 Ibid., 176.
60 Deleuze writes: “This is no mystical or barbarous hypothesis. On the contrary, habit here manifests its full generality: it concerns not only the sensory-motor habits that we have (psychologically), but also, before these, the primary habits that we are; the thousands of passive syntheses of which we are organically composed. It is simultaneously through contraction that we are habits, but through contemplation that we contract. We are contemplations, we are imaginations, we are generalities, claims and satisfactions.” (Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 74.)
or tendency of a given system to produce certain outcomes. The contemplating aspect of a system is that a reason — a principle — for various outcomes can be deduced. Borrowing Plotinus’ terminology, Deleuze refers to this process as the contemplation of a soul of nature. From Butler, Deleuze identifies a three-stage inferential progression: (1) the stipulation that there are various types of contractions; (2) the claim that contractions imply contemplation; (3) the observation that contemplations imply a sense of continuity. Taken together, the separate events and processes of contraction and contemplation suggest a temporally continuous “habit.” Butler suggests that everything in existence emerges from various types of contractions. That these contractions don’t yield the utter chaos of the world bereft of any sense of order implies that they are expressions of a contemplating soul that is disposed to produce certain outcomes. The observed order of the world is adduced to demonstrate a sense of continuity. Butler draws his ontological hypothesis from observations about the growth of plants: the growth of corn produces a relatively higher degree of humidity in its local surroundings, which allows for more moisture in the soil, which creates the optimal conditions for the germination of formerly dormant wheat seeds. For Deleuze, the production of more moisture in the air is a “contraction”

\[61\] Plotinus writes: “But now that, in our discussion of nature, we have said in what way generation is contemplation, let us go to the soul before this and say how its contemplation, its love of learning, its inquisitive nature, the birth pangs from the things it recognized and its completeness have produced it, so that when it has become entirely an object of contemplation, it produces another object of contemplation.” (Plotinus, The Enneads, George Boys-Stones, John M. Dillon, Lloyd Gerson, R.A.H. King, Andrew Smith, James Wilberding [tr.], Lloyd Gerson [ed.], [Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018], 3.8.5. 1-6).

\[62\] Butler writes: “for even the corn in the fields grows upon a superstitious basis as to its own existence, and only turns the earth and moisture into wheat through the conceit of its own ability to do so, without which faith it were powerless; and the lichen only grows upon the granite rock by first saying to itself, ‘I think I can do it;’ so that it would not be able to grow unless it thought it could grow, and would not think it could grow unless it found itself able to grow, and thus spends its life arguing in a most vicious circle, basing its action upon a hypothesis, which hypothesis is in turn based upon its action)” (Samuel Butler, Life and Habit, [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, digital edition, 2009], 82).
of air and water, in the sense that each comes into a relation with (becomes a *relata* of) the other. The process of *contraction* involves two distinct steps: (1) the combination of two formerly discrete entities; (2) this combination initiating a process that yields the emergence of a new particular. The first of these is deduced through the observation that wheat tends to germinate when there is sufficient water content in the soil to penetrate the husk of the seed. The second stage of the contraction is suggested by observing the existence of a plant, where once there was only moist soil and seed. *Contemplation* is suggested by the fact that the wheat is an element in a cycle of repetitions. (I.e., the wheat seems to grow and grow again from year to year, in this field, during these months, provided that certain conditions are met). Butler generalizes his claim to suggest that social structures — i.e., laws, language, and commerce — are expressions of various contractions. That these seem to maintain implies that they reflect a principle or reason for their existence (i.e., they are not merely matters of happenstance, blind luck, or chance). The identification of a principle of reason implies that that these phenomena are dispositions realized from a field of possibilities — i.e., that they are immanent material expressions of the transcendental contemplations of contemplations of a soul, in Plotinus’ sense of the term.

**Measures of Time in the Ancient World**

To understand Deleuze’s reference to Plotinus, it is necessary to take a brief detour through Deleuze’s elucidation of concepts of time in the Ancient world — specifically those of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. For the Ancient Greeks (Plato and Aristotle), time is identified as the measure of movement, though the nature of what is measured varies dramatically. For Plotinus (who was a Roman that spoke Greek),\(^63\) time is derived from the “movements” of the

\(^63\) Porphyry of Tyre claims that the year of Plotinus’ “birth falls in the thirteenth year of the
soul. Deleuze notes that “every notion of Plotinus is already found in Plato,” but in *The Enneads*, Plato’s characterizations of time “undergo a displacement, a transformation, a radical change.” In the *Timaeus*, Plato identifies time as that which reflects the order of the “moving image of eternity.” Reflecting on the movement of celestial bodies — the moon, the sun, and the “wanderers” — Plato observes that these have the dual function of “begetting” and standing guard over time. In his February 28, 1984 seminar on Ancient Greek concepts of time and truth, Deleuze notes that Plato conceived of time as being determined by privileged points on “a planisphere.” Time, as it is elaborated in Plato’s astronomy, is the measure of the movement of the planets, in the sense that were these to not exist (or — strangely — neglect their guard duties) time would cease to be. The circular movement of the celestial bodies was seen as the immutable, unchanging, temporal order that provided a sense of meaning to the various movements of “sublunar” (i.e., terrestrial) life. Plato characterizes the demiurge (δημιουργός) as creating the invariant circular movements of the celestial bodies which supply order to the very

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66 Plato uses the term “wanderers” to refer to the five planets that were known to the Ancient Greeks (i.e., Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn). (ibid., 1240, fn. 15).

67 Plato writes: “For the model is something that has being for all eternity, while it, on the other hand, has been, is, and shall be for all time, forevermore. Such was the reason, then, such the god’s design for the coming to be of time, that he brought into being the Sun, the Moon and five other stars, for the begetting of time. These are called ‘wanderers,’ and they came to be in order to set limits to and stand guard over the numbers of time” (ibid., 38c-38d).

various movements of all those which enjoy material existence (i.e., life enjoyed by citizens as they go about their activities in the marketplaces, on seas, and in fields of the Ancient world). Deleuze notes that the Platonic conception of time undergoes radical revision in Aristotle. In Aristotle, time becomes “undomesticated,” in the sense that time is no longer simply characterized as that which was created to measure movement. In Physics IV, Aristotle famously identifies time’s involvement with change. Aristotle observes that time does not condition — i.e., “work” — the creation and destruction of physical entities, even though creation and destruction are clearly events which happen in time. (E.g., the destruction of a ship in a sea battle happens at a particular temporal moment). Deleuze notes that, for Aristotle, “the closer we get to the earth, the more the circular movement presents aberrations, and the more these aberrations

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69 Plato writes: “Next, he sliced this entire compound in two along its length, joined the two halves together center to center like an X, and bent them back in a circle, attaching each half to itself end to end and to the ends of the other half at the point opposite to the one where they had been joined together. He then included them in that motion which revolves in the same place without variation, and began to make the one the outer, and the other the inner circle. And he decreed that the outer movement should be the movement of the Same, while the inner one should be that of the Different. He made the movement of the Same revolve toward the right by way of the side, and that of the Different toward the left by way of the diagonal, and he made the revolution of the Same, i.e., the uniform, the dominant one in that he left this one alone undivided, while he divided the inner one six times, to make seven unequal circles. His divisions corresponded to the several double and triple intervals, of which there were three each. He set the circles to go in contrary directions: three to go at the same speed, and the other four to go at speeds different from both each other’s and that of the other three. Their speeds, however, were all proportionate to each other.” (Plato, Timaeus, 36c-d).


71 Aristotle writes: “A sufficient evidence of this is that nothing comes into being without itself moving somehow and acting, but a thing can be destroyed even if it does not move at all. And this is what, as a rule, we chiefly mean by a thing’s being destroyed by time. Still, time does not work even this change; but this sort of change too happens to occur in time.” (Aristotle, Physics, 222b26).
give us an untamed time, or worse we deliver ourselves to a non-domesticated time.”

Elaborating on the nature of change and its relation to time, Aristotle notes that change involves three aspects: (1) there is the thing that changes; (2) there is something in which the change occurs, and; (3) there is that to which something changes. Taken in isolation, none of these aspects provide a comprehensive account of change or time. (I.e., one can no more give a complete elaboration of the nature of change or time by simply focusing on the human who changes, than one can aspire to a comprehensive account of time by only specifying all the minutes that relentlessly mark the passage of temporal moments of a life or by simply presenting an elaboration of the withered corpse that one will become). A comprehensive Aristotelian elaboration of the nature of time necessarily involves these three aspects. A comprehensive account of time yields the conclusion that time is a multiplicity which involves measurement as one of its aspects.

In his February 28, 1984 seminar on Ancient concepts of time, Deleuze observes that Plotinus modifies Plato’s and Aristotle’s characterizations of time as the measure of movement. Gordon H. Clark observes that — for Plotinus — motion is what determines time, in the sense that time is a reflection of motion (and not the other way around). Clark writes: “time's existence does not await our counting; and, instead of time's being a measure or unit of motion, it is more

73 Aristotle writes: “With regard, however, to the actual subject of change—that is to say that in respect of which a thing changes—there is a difference to be observed. For in a process of change we may distinguish three terms—that which changes, that in which it changes, and that to which it changes,” Aristotle, *Physics*, 236a36-236b18
74 Deleuze writes: “First point is the cry of Plotinus: no, time cannot be defined as the number or measure of the movement of the world.” (Gilles Deleuze, *Truth and Time*, seminar 56, dated February 28, 1984, Transcription, Alain Guilmot, my translation, [http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php?id_article=331](http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php?id_article=331) [Date Accessed: July 3, 2018].)
true to say that motion measures time.” Plotinus observes that any and all measure of the motion of physical entities — the chase of the charioteer, the flowing of wine, the rhythm of the undulations of the wheat crowns outside the walls of the city-state, etc. — is an accidental property of motion, in the sense that any measure “will provide an indication of the quantity of the motion.” Elaborating on the measure of the universe itself, Plotinus cautiously suggests that observations of circuit of celestial bodies will reveal a sense of time. The key point that Deleuze develops is that time is not produced by the circuit of celestial bodies. The measure of time is an indirect image of time, which reveals time’s quantitative aspect, but is insufficient to the task of providing a comprehensive account of time’s nature.

A Liberation from Putative Temporal Paradoxes

Perhaps the most flummoxing aspect of Deleuze’s account of time is that it seems to involve the identification of various types of paradoxes — i.e., the contemporaneousness of past and present; the implied co-existence of past and present; the implied pre-existence of past to present; and the suggestion that there are multiple levels to the past. To these, we may add the paradox of self-causation — one might suggest that the Deleuze’s concept of time seems to

75 Gordon H. Clark, “The Theory of Time in Plotinus” The Philosophical Review 53, no. 4 (Jul., 1944), pp. 337-358, 355. Plotinus explicitly notes: “Next, when they took the quantity from one rising of the sun to the next, it was possible to work out the length of the interval of time since the type of motion on which we depend is uniform, and we make use of that sort of interval as a measure, a measure of time, since time itself is not a measure.” (Plotinus, The Enneads, 3.7.12, 33-36).
76 Ibid., 3.7.12, 43-44.
77 Plotinus writes: “And so, it would not be absurd to clarify the nature of time by saying that the motion, that is, the circuit of heaven in a way measures time, as far as is possible, by indicating in its own length the amount of time, since it is not possible to grasp or understand the amount of time in any other way. What is, then, measured by the circuit of heaven — that is, what is indicated — will be time, which is not produced, but revealed, by the circuit.” (Ibid., 3.7.12, 46-52).
imply that an entity obtains (in the same sense) as both the cause and effect of variation. Here, I argue that Deleuze’s concept of temporality does not yield a series of paradoxes.

It must be observed that the suggestion of the contemporaneous existence of past and present is not paradoxical, in the strict sense of the term. (E.g., Bergson claims that analytically discrete temporal periods can obtain at the same temporal moment, only to validate this claim with the situation that each of the various moments constitute different aspects of the present).  

Hughes suggests that one way to make sense of this difficulty is to recognize that Deleuze’s use of the term “paradox” implies an indebtedness to Bergson. In *Matter and Memory*, Bergson characterizes memory as any of an illusion derived from a metaphysical error, a mental phenomenon bearing no relation to our perceptions of the world, and the result of the indeterminant character of a transcendental will. One implication of such a proliferation of competing identifications is the observation that the only clarity enjoyed by the concept is that it is clearly fraught. Deleuze’s elaboration of the various paradoxes associated with memory may be interpreted as a way of working out the nuanced relations of past, present, and memory.

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81 Ibid., 50; 61.

82 Ibid., 65.
Deleuze begins his elaboration of the nature of the past by asking how it is possible “to constitute time while passing in the time constituted.” The formulation of the question raises logical and ontological red flags, in the sense that it seems to imply a contradiction, and the resolution of the contradiction seems to yield the absurd claim that the past does not exist. Each of these difficulties must be addressed. The suggestion that Deleuze’s question involves a contradiction is altogether too quick, in the sense that it fails to acknowledge that the constituting and constituted aspects of time might represent different senses of time. Deleuze resolves this implied contradiction by demonstrating that the relation of past to present involves multiple senses. Essentially, the temporal duration of the past — which is created by the regressive temporal movement of the present— is logically distinct from that present. Though the general category of time may comprehend both the past and the present — i.e., the constituted and the constituting — this does not imply that these are conceived in the same sense. That past and present are not thought of in the same sense, diminishes the concern that these enjoy a paradoxical relation to one another. The ontological difficulty associated with the putative paradox results from a vague sense of the nature of contradiction. Were it the case that there was a contradiction, one means of resolving it would be to modify the relation of one of its terms. (I.e., a denial of the claim that the present moves into the past; an assertion of the existence of temporal void or vacuum in place of the immediate past. Were it the case that the relation or one of the terms were changed, the contradiction would not obtain). The possible existence of a temporal vacuum is based on the observation that memories seem to become less vivid if they exist further in the past. Proponents of the existence of a temporal void claim that the

83 Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 79.
diminishment of memories implies the existence of a period in which there is no time (i.e., a zero-point at which there is no temporal change).\textsuperscript{84}

The stakes involved in the stipulation of a temporal vacuum are profound. Le Poidvin points out that proponents of a temporal vacuum tend to suppose that it involves not just the mere rejection of the possibility of temporal change of physical entities (i.e., first order change), but also a denial of existence of logically secondary changes that temporal “events suffer...as they cease to be present and slip into the ever more distant past.”\textsuperscript{85} The claim of those who assert the existence of a temporal vacuum is that the passage of time itself does not occur — i.e., any temporal moment would diminish into non-temporal nothingness, thus precluding the possibility of any temporal progression. Were a temporal vacuum to exist, the emergence of a temporal moment that is dependent on the movement of present into past — would not. Instead of embracing this absurd conclusion, Deleuze argues for the view that the present moves into the past. Deleuze explicitly notes that the past, in this sense, “gives us a reason for the passing of the present.”\textsuperscript{86} The enthymematic stipulation here is that the past exists as an entity that is analytically discrete from (enjoying existence in a different sense than) the present. Thus, the contradiction implied by the formulation of the paradox is resolved by the assertion of the claim that temporality involves at least two domains, conceived of as different aspects comprehended by the same category. It is for this reason that Deleuze’s observation that time moves from


\textsuperscript{85} Robin Le Poidvin, \textit{Travels in Four Dimensions}, 17.

\textsuperscript{86} Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition}, 81.
present to past does not imply a contradiction — i.e., it does not yield the absurdity of denying the existence of the past.

There is an ambiguity in the concept of ontological comprehensiveness that is resolved with Deleuze’s formulation of the second paradox — that the past and present obtain as discrete co-existent entities. In his formulation of the second paradox, Deleuze explicitly suggests that the present enjoys a co-existence with the past.\(^{87}\) Elaborating on the ontological pre-suppositions of this paradox, Henry Somers-Hall observes that the present (characterized as the duration which enjoys the content of all the particulars that obtain in the present circumstance) is of a different kind than the past (characterized as a generality of all temporal instants that have come to pass; every particular obtained as an aspect or element of a lived duration that is no more; any temporal duration or period which is prior to the present; the totality of all that once was).\(^{88}\) The stipulation that particulars are non-identical to generalities suggests a problem with the claim that the past comprehends the present. If an entity comprehends another, and both entities are granted to be complex unities of analytically discrete elements, this implies that either of two possible forms of ontological comprehension could be actualized in the relation: (1) a comprehension involving a correspondence of each element in the comprehensive entity to each element in the comprehended entity (i.e., a comprehension involving a series of one-to-one relations among the elements); (2) a comprehension involving a relation of all elements of the comprehensive group to be comprehended by each element of the comprehended group. The first form of the comprehensive relation would amount to a variation to the outcome of the first paradox — i.e.,

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\(^{87}\) Deleuze elaborates: “A second paradox emerges: the paradox of coexistence. If each past is contemporaneous with the present that it was, then all of the past coexists with the new present in relation to which it is now past.” (ibid., 81-82).

each temporal present would be comprehended by each past moment that it was.\textsuperscript{89} Deleuze’s claim that the present and the general past are co-existent implies a second outcome: \textit{all} of the past co-exists with the present. The implication here is that a profound comprehension exists in which all of the past (i.e., each and every past moment; the totality of moments that have come before; the entirety of temporally prior moments) is involved in each moment of the present. Deleuze explicitly notes that the relation of the past to the present involves the second form of comprehension, with his echo of the “Bergsonian idea that each present [\textit{sic.}.] is only the entire past in its most contracted state.”\textsuperscript{90} Lampert suggests this form of comprehension is more readily understood as a type of temporal compression, in which the “past will be contemporaneous with everything past and present.”\textsuperscript{91} Deleuze elaborates on the mercurial nature of this co-existence, when he notes that “the present designates the most contracted degree of an entire past, which is itself like a coexisting totality.”\textsuperscript{92} The suggestion here is that the entirety of the past — i.e., the set of all previous temporal moments — is conserved as a highly contracted aspect that is ontologically concomitant with each instant of the temporal present.

One implication of this type of comprehensive relation — of all elements of the past to each element of the present — is that no temporal moment entirely disappears as an existent that is potentially accessible as the content of a reminiscence. It is difficult to overstate the ontological weight this claim lends to the observation that the content of the past — which, though it may fade, seemingly now diminished, only to soon seem readily accessible and almost actual — never fully disappears. For Deleuze, the past survives the putative diminishment

\textsuperscript{89} Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition}, 81.  
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 82.  
\textsuperscript{91} Jay Lampert, \textit{Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History} (London and New York: Continuum, 2006), 47.  
\textsuperscript{92} Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition}, 82.
wrought by temporal distance, because the entirety of the past is ontologically involved in each moment of the present. Deleuze explicitly validates the claim that all of the past exists in each temporal moment with the summary observation that the past “insists with the former present, it consists with the new or present [sic.].”93 The weight of this observation is staggering: aspects of disparate temporal moments arrayed throughout the past — the moment of one’s birth, the birth of one’s parents, the birth of one’s ancestors, the birth of a species, the birth of the spatio-temporally extended universe that one inhabits, the death of one’s mother — inhere as aspects of the present. This seems to be akin to the type of memory Bergson attributes to the “dreamer” who keeps before “his eyes at each moment the infinite multitude of the details of his past history.”94 Somers-Hall points out that such a memory is “a pure memory” that “contains a complete record of the past.”95 Deleuze adduces the existence of this type of memory with his observation that at certain privileged instants — i.e., moments of profound psychological stress; moments so called heightened-awareness, etc. — human memory accesses the “whole of life.”96 The claim here is that human memory involves a continuing regress through all of historical time. The suggestion is that this process first draws upon one’s own temporally prior lived experience, and then — having exhausted these — draws on the details of the general experience of materially instantiated entities. The accuracy of the claim that human memory can grasp (as its

93 Ibid.
94 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, 155.
96 (Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 83). Bergson illustrates through reference to cases of near-death experience: “But there is nothing more instructive in this regard than what happens in cases of sudden suffocation, in men drowned or hanged. Such a man, when brought to life again, states that he saw, in a very short time, all the forgotten events of his life passing before him with great rapidity, with their smallest circumstances and in the very order in which they occurred.” (Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, 155).
content) the experiences of other entities is adduced from Bergson’s explicit observation that human memory is capable “of moving in the universal” — i.e., apprehending the generalities (habits) that are distinct from the experience of any particular material entity.  

Though Deleuze explicitly distinguishes between the third and fourth paradoxes of time, Lampert cautiously observes that the fourth paradox (of different levels of temporal contraction) is a property of the third paradox (of the pre-existence of the past to the present). The suggestion that the past pre-exists the present is adduced from the observation that there is a general domain of the past (i.e., the domain represented by the volume of Bergson’s time cone) which is partitioned into different levels of temporal contraction. A hint of Bergson’s influence is found in Deleuze’s passing observation that the general past exists as a supplemental dimension. The enthymematic implication here is that this dimension involves the immediate past and the present moment. Bergson elaborates on the natures of these through reference to the process of trying to recall the details of a nearly forgotten experience. This process involves four discrete moments: (1) a moment “by which we detach ourselves from the present” — a disengagement with from the sensory data provided by our immanent lived experience; (2) a moment of placing ourselves in the totality of the past — i.e., “in the past in general”; (3) a moment of placing ourselves in some more particular region of the past, and; (4) performing a psychic operation that is an analogue of the physical action of focussing a camera — i.e., a process of rendering

97 Ibid.
98 Jay Lampert, Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History, 49.
99 Deleuze elaborates on the complex dependency relation of the involved in the relation among the general past, the immediate past, and the present: “if the new present is always endowed with a supplementary dimension, this is because it is reflected in the element of the pure past in general, whereas it is only through this element that we focus upon the former present as a particular.” (Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 82).
100 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, 134.
101 Ibid.
particular intentional objects clear to the mind’s eye.\textsuperscript{102} Ignoring the decidedly psychological tenor of Bergson’s observations, Deleuze derives the general claim that the past is constituted of analytically discrete (but ontologically implicated) levels — the immanent duration of present; the localized past; the more general temporal level in which all of the past is “preserved in itself.”\textsuperscript{103}

One implication of the suggestion that the different aspects of time obtain as implicated aspects of the same duration is that there is no quantitative temporal distinction among these aspects. This amounts to a denial of the claim that the relation of temporal succession obtains between the past and the present. Stated again, there is no quantitative difference among what occurs as temporally prior and the present circumstance. This generalizes to the claim that temporality is non-reducible to numerical determination. Daniel W. Smith characterizes the separation of time from number as a “liberation” of time, in the senses that: (1) time is not conceived of as something that is subordinated to — dependent on — the movement of physical bodies, and; (2) time is no longer conceived of as ordered by — i.e., determined by — any system of enumeration (which would apply to the movement of physical bodies).\textsuperscript{104} Deleuze suggests a positive formulation of this liberated aspect of time when he identifies it as “a movement of the soul” that gives rise to the new.\textsuperscript{105} Deleuze tends to define the “new” in

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Deleuze — in his discussion of the ontological implications involved in Proust’s concept of time — identifies this as the primary function of the pure (non-personal; virtual) past. (Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Proust and Signs}, 59).
\textsuperscript{104} Smith writes: “Time ceases to be the number of movement, and no longer depends on anything but itself; time no longer measures movement, but movement itself (whether originary or derived, anomalous or aberrant) now takes places within time.” (Daniel W. Smith, \textit{Essays on Deleuze} [Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2012], 133).
\textsuperscript{105} Deleuze writes: “Time is the expression of the movement of the soul, that is to say, it is the rhythm of the figures of light. How can we define this movement of the soul which gives rise to time and, moreover, which constitutes time? It is the movement of the soul that gives birth to
reference to the “singular” and singularities.106 To understand the nature of the new, the nuanced meanings Deleuze assigns to each of these terms must be clarified.

Smith elaborates on the nature of the new by specifying that the singular point (or “singularity”) is the temporal instance at which something novel happens.107 Zourabichvili clarifies the “liberated” aspect of temporal habits when he identifies the field of singularities as explicitly pre-individual — i.e., ontologically primary to the formation of any concept of person, self, or discrete identity.108 For Deleuze, the singular (or singularity, or singular point) is one of the “little selves” that function both in bearing witness to the various processes involved with the formation of individual entities, and participating in determination of the conditions which

106 An example of this is found in Deleuze’s elaboration of the nature of philosophy: “Philosophy creates concepts, which are neither generalities nor truths. They are more along the lines of the Singular, the Important, the New.” (Gilles Deleuze, Truth and Time, February 28, 1984, Transcription, Alain Guilmot, my translation, http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=331 [Date Accessed: July 3, 2018]).

107 Smith writes: “The singularities are precisely those points where something ‘happens’ within the multiplicity (an event), or in relation to another multiplicity, causing it to change nature and produce something new. For instance, to take the example of a physical system, the water in my kettle is a multiplicity, and a singularity in the system occurs when the water boils or freezes, thereby changing the nature of the physical multiplicity (its phase space). Similarly, the point where a person breaks down in tears, or boils over in anger, is a singular point in their psychic multiplicity, surrounded by a swarm of ordinary points” (Daniel W. Smith, Essays on Deleuze, 247).

108 François Zourabichveli, Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event together with The Vocabulary of Deleuze, 199-200.
render these processes possible. While it might seem that this dual function suggests a causal paradox with respect to the nature of singularities’ capacity to determine the new — i.e., it seems that singularities function as both the cause and the effect — this paradox only obtains if one accepts a strictly linear concept of causality (i.e., the type of causality illustrated in Hume’s example of the “conjunction” of the billiard balls, or that specified by Aristotle’s efficient cause). It is worth pointing out that the linear conception of causality ranks among the most emaciated in the history of Western philosophy, and that there are other modes of determination that need not be causal, in the sense indicated by concepts of linear causality. Singularities may involve all sorts of modes of determination that need not involve any sort of causal relation, linear or otherwise. Deleuze explicitly notes that determinations of the passive synthesis form the “conditions” for causal relations. Addressing the problem of how singularities may avoid the causal paradox of self-determination, Smith observes that there are forms of determination which are non-causal — i.e., reciprocal interactions, mechanical determinations, dialectical determinations, statistical determinations, etc.

109 Deleuze writes: “Underneath the self which acts are little selves which contemplate and which render possible both the action and the active subject. We speak of our ‘self only in virtue of these thousands of little witnesses which contemplate within us: it is always a third party who says 'me'.” (Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 76).

110 Deleuze explains in his (approving) discussion of Husserl’s claims about the nature of the problematic present: “The synthesis of the problem with its own conditions constitutes something ideational or unconditioned, determining at once the condition and the conditioned, that is, the domain of resolvability and solutions present in this domain, the form of the propositions and their determination in this form, signification as the condition of truth and proposition as the condition of truth.” (Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 122).

111 Smith elucidates: “Causality, in other words, must be distinguished from the more general question of determination, since determination can be not only causal, but also statistical or probabilistic (determination of a result by the joint action of independent entities), structural or wholistic (determination of parts by the whole), teleological (determination by ends or goals), dialectical (determination by internal strife or synthesis of opposites), as well as dynamic or causal.” (Daniel W. Smith, Essays on Deleuze, 236). Reciprocal interactions tend to apply to the determination of the qualitative identities of any two — or more — entities are the consequent of
Determinations such as these tend to apply to the formation of individuals at a level that is ontologically primary to causality. (Causality tends to apply to individuated entities). Also, causal relations are regarded as one class, within the more general category of determinations. In *The Logic of Sense* — the second Appendix, *Phantasm and Modern Literature* — Deleuze explicitly notes that singularities are pre-personal (i.e., not yet individuated) “dissolved selves” whose determinations tend to be ontologically primary to those effected by causality. The determination of any given singularity is not yet causal, provided that we recognize that this “not yet” is used in its non-temporal, strictly ontological sense. Deleuze writes:

The dissolved self opens up to a series of roles, since it gives rise to an intensity, which already comprehends difference in itself, the unequal in itself, and which penetrates all others, across and within multiple bodies. There is always another breath in my breath, always another thought in my thought, another possession in mutual action (e.g., the function of each gland in the human body being determined by the function of other glands). *Mechanical determinations* are seen in cases in which the consequent of an action is determined by the antecedent and additional — not directly linked — forces (e.g., the forces of a power-plant on the production of a car in a factory linked to the power grid). *Statistical determination* occurs following the end of any series of the discrete actions of entities that enjoy a relative independence from one another. (E.g., the tendency of about fifty percent of the live births of humans in a developed nation to be biologically sexed as female). A *wholistic determination* obtains in any situation in which the range of possibilities enjoyed by a particular is limited by the group of which it is a part (i.e., the determination of an individual in a social group). An entity undergoes a *teleological determination* when its behaviours or actions are said to be motivated by the attempt to achieve some not yet realized end. (E.g., a cat’s behaviour of hiding in a dark cupboard in order to get over a case of feline conjunctivitis). A *dialectical determination* obtains when two (or more) entities of group are in some sort of opposition that affects the nature of a group. (E.g., when the competing interests of the petite bourgeoisie and the proletariat of a given country affect the nature of that country’s economy). (Cf. Mario Bung, *Causality and Modern Science*, 4th Edition [New Brunswick and London: Transaction, 2009], 17-19).
which I possess, a thousand things and a thousand beings implicated in my complications, every true thought is an aggression.\textsuperscript{112}

Though Deleuze seems to suggest that singularities may favour determination through strife — i.e., a dialectical determination — this mode of determination might only apply to this particular elaboration. That is, there is nothing in the rest of the passage that implies that singularities only enjoy aggressive modes of determining the new. What is key is that (1) the singular enjoys a means of determination; (2) because these determinations occur on a level that is ontologically primary to that of individuated entities — at the level of conditions of individuation — these are not subject to the paradoxical self-causation.

\textbf{Concluding Remarks: The Passive Creation of the Present}

The passive synthesis of the present is the origin of temporality. Entities in the present actualize time through their habitual — i.e., unthinking, pre-individuated — actions in the world. The temporal series of notes played on a recorder are habitual, as are the undulations of crops in the field. Though Hume tends to conceive of temporal progressions (all these moments in time), in essentially psychologistic terms, Deleuze denies Hume’s suggestion that temporality is reducible to the cognitive processes of psycho-social entities. Deleuze’s elaboration of the first synthesis of time is analogous to Husserl’s, in the sense that both suggest that an ontologically primordial empty (i.e., transcendental) form of time allows for time’s actualization in the present. The passive synthesis of time — for both Deleuze and Husserl — occurs on an ontological level that is antecedent to the formation of individuals, thus precluding any reduction to the cognitive processes of individuals (i.e., psychologism).

\textsuperscript{112} Gilles Deleuze, \textit{The Logic of Sense}, 298.
Deleuze observes that Plotinus modifies Plato’s concept of time. The Platonic cosmology yields the observation that time is fixed to the movement of the celestial bodies. That time is identified as fixed by the constant — i.e., invariant — movement of the heavenly spheres suggests that temporality is ontologically dependent on the heavens. For Plotinus, time becomes liberated (i.e., it is conceptualized as ontologically autonomous, not ontologically derived). The contemplations involved in the formation of time are the contemplations of a universal soul. Deleuze observes that, in the context of Plotinus’s theory of temporality, if we must accede to the Ancients’ claims that time is a measurement of movement, we should do so only with the recognition that these measurements are but one aspect of time — i.e., an expression of the movements of the ontologically primordial soul of the universe.

Further, I observed that though time is involved in the process of individuation, this does not imply that creation in (and by) time is paradoxical. The particular concern here is the paradox of self-causation — which suggests that an existent cannot cause itself. Through reference to Bergson, I suggested that time enjoys determination as an ontogenetic force. This identification of time — as an element that obtains at a pre-personal ontological level — yields the claim that the paradoxical creation of autonomous creation of an entity from itself, does not apply to temporal ontogenesis of existents.

Taken together, these suggest that Deleuze characterizes temporality as an ontological process that is free from subordination to any of the cognitive operations of psychosocial entities or quantitative determination of the types illustrated by the relation of temporal succession. Arguing from the observation that the present involves the production of the new, the unique, the different, etc., Deleuze suggests that the passive synthesis of time operates on an ontologically
primordial level of pre-individuated singularities to produce changes in the lived present. In these senses, the lived present is the ontic expression of the ontologically primary empty form of time.
CHAPTER 2: TIME AND INDIVIDUATION — SIMONDON AND DELEUZE ON TEMPORAL ONTOGENESIS

Gilbert Simondon’s complex thought on the nature of magic and the role of temporality in relation to the processes involved with individuation is a significant (if often overlooked) influence on Deleuze’s thought on the nature of time. Though Deleuze wrote little on Simondon — the number references to Simondon in Deleuze’s published works amount to a surprisingly brief review of *L’Individu et sa gènse physico-biologique*,¹ two comments in *The Logic of Sense*,² a two-page analysis in the second volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*,³ and a footnote on the nature of “modulation” in *Cinema 1*⁴ — Deleuze seems to have intertwined Simondon’s thought on time with his own.⁵ Deleuze echoes Simondon’s suggestion that

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4 Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, Hugh Thomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (tr.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
temporality is an ontologically primary force that participates in the formation (and modification) of individuated entities.

For Simondon, individual entities are ontologically dependent on — i.e., derived, subsistent from — a metastable process of individuation. Simondon further observes that the process of individuation involves an assemblage of productive forces undergoing modification. Temporality is among these, in the sense that it is one of the pre-individuated forces involved in the creation of entities.6 It is perhaps important to note that the relata involved in the process of individuation are ontogenetic, immaterial forces, which have not yet obtained as individuated substance; these are “energetic conditions” and the ontological pre-conditions of physical matter; the qualitative aspects that participate in the formation of entities, not the quantified aspects typically associated with realized physical entities. Simondon’s identification of individuation as a metastable process suggests that it involves temporality in the form of a unified duration involving irregular or regular temporal intervals, or as a unified non-decomposable duration such as a continuum without internal temporal division. Either state of affairs implies that time is ontologically primary to entities — time is a pre-personal force that is involved in the creation of discrete particulars, genera, and species (in the senses that these may be thought of as analytically distinguishable entities).7 Taken together, these suggest that temporality obtains as a

6 Simondon specifies the temporal aspects of individuation, when he observes: “Thus, there is a historical aspect to the manifestation of a structure in a substance, insofar as the structural germ must appear. Pure energetic determinism does not suffice for a substance to attain its state of stability. The beginning of structuring individuation is an event for the system in a metastable state. Thus, in general, even in the simplest process of individuation, a relation takes place between the body under consideration and the temporal existence of beings external to it that intervene as the evental conditions of its structuration.” (Gilbert Simondon, Individuation in Light of Notions of Forms and Information, 70.)

7 Simondon explicitly notes that the process of individuation is primary to form, and functions to comprehensively modify all of particular, species, and general milieu (i.e., genera). Simondon writes: “There is a genesis of forms when the relation of a living ensemble to its milieu and to
force that is ontologically prior to — and participates in — the formation of individuated entities.

In concrete terms, this implies that temporality, though it may be analytically distinguishable from magic, enjoys an analogical relation to ontologically primary processes of modification. In this sense, time and magic are correctly identified as ontogenetic forces which participate in the process of individuation.

In the present chapter, I suggest that Deleuze echoes Simondon’s identification of temporality as an ontologically primary force involved in the formation of individuated entities. I argue that Simondon’s elaboration of the nature of magic — characterized as an ontogenetic force that participates in the formation of existents — enjoys a complex analogous relation to temporality. The analogy between temporality and magic is demonstrated by shared aspects: (1) each of the analogues tends to be identified as dynamic processes involved in ontological production of the new — i.e., temporality and magic share the qualitative aspect of productive dynamism; (2) both temporality and magic tend to be the subject matter (i.e., content) of art — i.e., each analogue enjoys an expressive aspect, in the sense that each is involved in the expression of aesthetic values — which further implies that each is involved in the production of aesthetic objects of various kinds.

**The Mercurial Natures of Magic and Time**

Itself passes through a critical phase rich in tensions and virtuality, a phase that ends with the disappearance of the species or the appearance of a new life form. The situation in its entirety is constituted not only by the species and its milieu, but also by the tension of the ensemble formed by the relation of the species to its milieu wherein the relations of incompatibility become increasingly strong. Moreover, the species isn’t the only thing that is modified, for the entire ensemble of the vital complex formed by the species and its milieu also discovers a new structure.” (ibid., 259)
In the opening pages of a text published in 1895, the disgraced seminary student, shoemaker, and radical French socialist Éliphas Lévi claims that magic is real and a potent force of ontological modification. Lévi justifies his claim by citing the evidence provided by works of aesthetic and archaeological significance, ancient religious and scientific practices, and the behaviour of mystics (i.e., “occult philosophers”). Lévi observes that the archaeological record suggests a cultural awareness that magic functioned as a pre-personal force of modification. Lévi specifies that inscriptions on the walls of ancient temples — those which can be found in the ruins of “Nineveh or Thebes” — and the paintings that inspired the creation of the Vedas contain inscriptions that describe the creation of unique entities. Lévi further specifies that the music of the lyre of Orpheus is identified as comprehending magical properties. In concrete terms, the notes plucked on the lyre yield a qualitative transformation that is illustrated in myth and legend. Further, magical transformation is identified as a represented objectivity, as well as a concrete effect of the lyric poetry of Ancient Greece. Throughout Lévi’s elucidations, magic is

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9 Lévi writes: “Behind the veil of all the hieratic and mystical allegories of ancient doctrines, behind the darkness and strange ordeals of all initiations, under the seal of all sacred writings, in the ruins of Nineveh or Thebes, on the crumbling stones of old temples and on the blackened visage of the Assyrian or Egyptian sphinx, in the monstrous or marvelous paintings which interpret to the faithful of India the inspired pages of the Vedas, in the cryptic emblems of our old books on alchemy, in the ceremonies practiced at reception by all secret societies, there are found indications of a doctrine which is everywhere the same and everywhere carefully concealed. Occult philosophy seems to have been the nurse or godmother of all intellectual forces, the key of all divine obscurities and the absolute queen of society in those ages — when it was reserved exclusively for the education of priests and of kings (Éliphas Lévi, *The Doctrine of Transcendental Magic*, 1).

10 Lévi writes: “It [magic] reigned in Persia with the Magi, who perished in the end, as perish all masters of the world, because they abused their power; it endowed India with the most wonderful traditions and with an incredible wealth of poesy, grace and terror in its emblems; it civilized Greece to the music of the lyre of Orpheus; it concealed the principles of all sciences, all progress of the human mind, in the daring calculations of Pythagoras; fable abounded in its miracles, and history, attempting to estimate this unknown power, became confused with fable; it

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characterized variously as a secret that gives the magician the power to affect great political and personal change, as a criminal activity, and (perhaps most strangely) as the universal answer to all problems.\footnote{In a specification of his reasons for publishing the text, Lévi elaborates seemingly limitless potential benefits of studying magic: “No less is proposed, therefore, than a universal solution of all problems?” The answer is yes, unquestionably, since we are concerned with explaining the Philosophical Stone, perpetual motion, the secret of the Great Work and of the Universal Medicine. We shall be accused of insanity, like the divine Paracelsus, or of charlatanism, like the great and unfortunate Agrippa. If the pyre of Urban Grandier be extinguished, the sullen proscriptions of silence and of calumny remain. We do not defy but are resigned to them. We have not sought the publication of this book of our own will, and we believe that if the time be come to bear witness, it will be borne by us or by others” (ibid., 14).} Taken together, these suggest that magic may be identified as process of antiquity that yields modification or creation — i.e., individuation, ontogenesis — of existents, and which enjoys a plurality of expressions.

Further evidence that magic functions as an ontologically primary mode of variation is provided by the observation that it is the basis of the discrete social phenomena of art, science, and religion. Though it has been taken as a given that magic might have been the nascent form involved in all of the science of antiquity, primitive art, and tribal religion, the precise nature of the involvement tends to elude critical consensus, in the sense that identifications of the nature of magic vary wildly in the writings of philosophers and anthropologists. In an overlooked section of \textit{On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects},\footnote{Gilbert Simondon, \textit{On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects}, Cécile Malaspina and John Rogrove(tr.), (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2017).} Gilbert Simondon suggests that magic is both a “primitive unity” and a “phase” that marks the transition into religious, scientific, and aesthetic modes of thought. Henri Bergson seems to echo the first part of Simondon’s claim, while rejecting any connection between science and religion, only to then begrudgingly accept
that there is a relation between religion and magic. Both Mircea Eliade and Susan Langer highlight the religious and aesthetic aspects of magic, as well as highlight its status as an ontogenetic process when they identify its involvement in artistic practices of antiquity (i.e., dances or myths that are related as oral or written literary works of art, etc.) that illustrate the birth of the cosmos. Elaborating on the practices of hunters, contemporary Philippe Descola highlights the binding aspect of magical practices, in which two (or more) ontologically discrete forces to enter into a state of fusion that produces a distinct entity (i.e., a hybrid that is non-reducible to either of the constituents). Perhaps motivated by a sense of frustration at the proliferation of competing views on the nature of magic, Peel has suggested that magic simply be regarded as a “catch-all” concept that is hopelessly over-determined.

13 Bergson writes: “This brings us to an essential point. It has been asserted that religion began as magic. Magic has also been considered as a forerunner of science. If we confine ourselves to psychology, as we have done, if we reconstitute, by an effort of introspection, the natural reaction of man to his perception of things, we find that, while magic and religion are akin, there is nothing in common between magic and science” (Henri Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion, R. Ashley Audra, Cloudesley Brereton, and W. Horsfall Carter [tr.], [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977], 163). David Scott elaborates on the “complicated and ambiguous” relation that obtained among Bergson’s and Simondon’s thought. (David Scott, Gilbert Simondon’s Psychic and Collective Individuation: A Critical Introduction and Guide, 56).


15 Descola writes: “A hunter’s relationship with animals may take other forms over and above these marks of consideration: seduction, for example, in which the prey is seen as a lover, or magic coercion that annihilates the animal’s willpower and forces it to approach the hunter. But the most common of such relationships and the one that best emphasizes the parity between humans and animals is the bond of friendship that the hunter establishes over time with one particular member of the species” (Philippe Descola, Beyond Nature and Culture, Janet Lloyd [tr.], [Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2013], 20).

The saturation of philosophical and anthropological reflection on the nature of magic and the difficulty in conceptualizing magic as an ontologically unified entity, imply that magic is a pre-personal process of creation — i.e., an ontogenetic multiplicity (or assemblage) — in Gilles Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s sense of the terms. Here, I suggest that both time and magic are aspects of an ontogenetic circumstance. My argument involves two complex claims: (1) I critically assess Gilbert Simondon’s elaborations of magic and its relation to aesthetic practices, in order to suggest that Simondon’s analyses demonstrate that though the phenomenon of magic is vague, it is not hopelessly indeterminable; (2) I specify the natures of temporality and magic through reference to Deleuze’s and Guattari’s elaboration of the nature of multiplicities. It should be observed that though multiplicities vary in type, (e.g., in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari identify numeric, literary, political, economic multiplicities), this does not imply that a multiplicity lacks formal determination. Multiplicities tend to fulfil three conditions: (1) they tend to involve ontogenetic processes; (2) their elements are mutually implicated; (3) these variations tend to gain expression through differential equations. I further observe that both magic and temporality fulfil these conditions. This implies that magic and time are analogues — they obtain as *relata* in an analogy of shared aspects. An analysis of literature will demonstrate satisfaction of the first condition — i.e., both magic and time are presented in fiction as involving a plurality of non-reducible, non-identical aspects. The satisfaction of the second condition is elucidated through reference to the transformations of one seemingly discrete entity into another (e.g., the transformation of hunter to prey). The fulfilment of the third condition is adduced through reference to the use of quantitative variables in magical practices as well as in the expression of temporal variation — i.e., through clock time, calendar time, or the
formalization of a series of temporal succession \((t_1, t_2...t_n)\). Taken together, these suggest that time and magic are analogous compresent elements of an ontogenetic multiplicity.

**Aesthetic Representations of “Key-points” as Nexuses of Time and Change**

In the beginning, there was magic. Perhaps the most interesting claim of *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects* is that the ontologically primary state of the universe involved magic. Simondon observes that the most fundamental relation among forces is identified as a “primitive magical unity,” in the sense that it “corresponds to a primitive union, prior to any split, of subjectivity and objectivity.”\(^{17}\) The claim is that magic is involved with creation at the of the most basic ontological level —i.e., it obtains as an attribute of a relation that is ontologically antecedent to the emergence of any sort of concretized distinction among entities. Simondon — in *Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information* — explicitly observes that the process of individuation involves relations among noumena that are akin to “exchanges of energy or passages of structures from one domain of reality to another domain of reality.”\(^ {18}\) Deleuze aptly identifies this dynamic interaction of pre-personal forces as the expression of difference in the relation of “noumena [sic.] closest to the phenomenon.\(^ {19}\) In concrete terms, these suggest that the ontogenetic circumstance involves a relation of analytically discrete pre-personal forces, which participate with one another to yield a variegated sensible world populated by a vast menagerie of different modes of thought, temporal displacements, different orders and scales of time, as well as discrete thought objects, unique social structures,


\(^{18}\) Gilbert Simondon, *Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information*, 75.

\(^{19}\) Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 222.
individuals, species, and substance. Simondon — in *Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information* — explicitly observes that there is an implicit organization to the constellation of pre-personal forces involved in the ontogenetic circumstance — i.e., they obtain as reticulated aspects of a network that is ontologically prior to the distinction among form and matter. Simondon further suggests that this ontogenetic organization transduces into a real order predicated of entities arrayed in actuality. Perhaps the most striking implication associated with this claim is the observation that all of past, present, and future (characterized as discrete durations comprehended by eternity) enjoy realization as elements of the reticulated order of actuality. This implies that temporal duration is one of the plurality of ontogenetic forces involved in the creation of individuated entities. Taken together, these suggest that the ontogenetic circumstance is a reticulated unity — a unified network — which involves temporal duration; time is among the differentiating forces from which actuality is born.

Once the fundamental ontogenetic circumstance (i.e., the ontologically primordial unity) has been actualized as various individuals and forms of mediation that obtain between individuals and their localized circumstances — “associated milieus” — both time and magic

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20 Simondon writes: “In the magical universe, the figure was the figure of a ground and the ground, ground of a figure; the real, the unity of the real, was at once figure and ground; the question of a possible lack of the figure’s efficacy on the ground of the ground’s influence on the figure could not arise, since ground and figure merely constituted a single unity of being.” (Gilbert Simondon, *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, 183-184).
22 Ibid., 324.
23 Simondon writes: “The magical mode of relation with the world is not devoid of all organization: on the contrary: it is rich in implicit organization, attached to the world and to man; in the magical mode the mediation between man and the world is not yet concretized and constituted as standing apart, by means of specialized objects or human beings, but this mediation does exist functionally in the most elementary of all structurations, which is also the first: that from which erupts the distinction between figure and ground in the universe” (Simondon, Gilbert. *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, 169).
subsist as aspects of this reality. Simondon stipulates that these aspects enjoy heightened expressivity at particular spatio-temporally extended “key-points.” The suggestion is that time and magic are more substantive agents of change at particular privileged moments in space-time. While the particular nature of any of these key-points is acknowledged to vary in comparison with any other key-point, the identity of key-points seems to be reducible to the possession of three fundamental attributes: (1) they are spatio-temporally located sites of mixture of entities; (2) they are singularities that are “exceptional in character”; (3) they form networks with other key-points, which emulate the unity that defined the ontogenetic circumstance. Simondon characterizes key-points as concentrations that maintain an axiological privilege when compared to objects in their immediate vicinity.

That there are certain geographic places of great magical significance has been well documented by anthropologists, poets, and philosophers. Georges Dumézil notes that the citizens Kay Kaūs (i.e., Iran) built a magical castle for their king, upon his return from the conquest of the demonic Māzandarān. Arthur Rimbaud observes the magical qualities of numerous natural and fabricated physical structures in his poem “vigils.” Georges Bataille identifies the caves at Lascaux as the sites of magical operations. Jean-Hugues Barthélémy has noted that Simondon

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24 Ibid., 180.
25 Simondon writes: “These places [i.e., key-points] and these moments keep hold of, concentrate, and express the forces contained in the ground [fond] of reality that supports them. These points, and these moments are not separate realities; they draw their force from the ground they dominate; but they localize and focalize the attitude of the living vis-à-vis its milieu. (ibid., 178).
28 Georges Bataille, Prehistoric Painting: Lascaux or the Birth of Art, Austryn Wainhouse (tr.), (Switzerland, Skira, 1955), 129.
tends to identify magical key-points with natural objects, and that this seems to suggest that artifacts cannot function as key-points. While it is the case that Simondon does typically identify natural geographic formations (e.g., mountaintops, summits, entrances to gorges, etc.) as key-points, he also suggests that human-constructed objects (i.e., artifacts) like watchtowers — if they are unusual, in the sense that they stand apart from their immediate natural environment and form a node in a network of unique places — can be identified as key-points.

Simondon further identifies key-points as a type of singularity — i.e., a spatio-temporal location at which something transformative happens. It might also be observed that, in addition to involving physical instantiation, magical key-points involve temporality. (One of the positivities of key-points is that they enjoy at least one kind of duration — in my ultimate chapter, I reference Marx to develop the claim that key-points may involve multiple durations.

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30 Simondon writes: “Technical thought retains only the schematism of structures, of that which makes up the efficacy of action on the singular points; these singular points detached from the world whose figure they were, also detached from one another, losing their immobilizing reticular concatenation, become capable of being fragmented and available, as well as reproducible and constructible. The elevated place becomes an observation post, a watchtower built on a plain, or a tower placed are the entrance to a gorge” (Gilbert Simondon, *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, 182).

31 Though he uses the term “singularity” at essential moments of his elucidation of the nature of key-points, Simondon leaves the term (surprisingly) under-determined. Singularities are essential to Deleuze’s ontology of multiplicities which I elaborate below. Perhaps the clearest concise specification of the nature of a singularity comes from Daniel W. Smith: “The singularities are precisely those points where something ‘happens’ within the multiplicity (an event), or in relation to another multiplicity, causing it to change nature and produce something new. For instance, to take the example of a physical system, the water in my kettle is a multiplicity, and a singularity in the system occurs when the water boils or freezes, thereby changing the nature of the physical multiplicity (its phase space). Similarly, the point where a person breaks down in tears, or boils over in anger, is a singular point in their psychic multiplicity, surrounded by a swarm of ordinary points” (Daniel W. Smith, *Essays on Deleuze* [Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2012], 247).
The negative implication of this claim is that there is no realized phenomenon of timeless change; further, the concept of atemporal modification is incoherent, in the sense that modification involves time as one of its essential aspects; there cannot obtain a variation which involves none of duration, modification over the course of irregular temporal intervals, immanent variation at a temporal instant, or differentiation correlated with temporal succession).

The claim here is that key-points are explicitly spatio-temporal locales associated with modification with any (or all) of the qualitative and quantitative aspects associated with individuated entities. In concrete terms, this implies that key-points are sites of variation which are associated with ontological variation that transpires over the course of one or many durations. The comprehensive and radical nature of the variations that obtain at these sites supports the identification of these as magical.

Perhaps because of the profound nature of the changes that tend to obtain at key-points, these tend to enjoy frequent elaboration in literary works of art. Referencing E.T.A. Hoffmann’s *Mines of Falun*, Simondon elaborates on the descent into a mine as an illustration of a not entirely formalizable, “co-natural” relation with one’s surroundings that tends to result in a fundamental “phase change” in one’s mode of existence — i.e., the acquisition of knowledge, death, or obtaining some vague sense of control over the seemingly chaotic aspects of one’s existence in relation to the world.32 A brief exegesis of the plot of Hoffmann’s tale is

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32 (Gilbert Simondon, *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, 109). This is illustrated in Elis’s encounter with the old man in Hoffman’s tale: “The old man's strange way of speaking of all these subterranean marvels as if he were standing in the midst of them impressed him deeply. His breast felt stifled; it seemed to him as if he were already down in these depths with the old man and would never look upon the friendly light of day again. And yet it seemed as though the old man were opening to him a new and unknown world, to which he really properly belonged, and that he had somehow felt all the magic of that world in mystic forebodings since his boyhood” (E.T A. Hoffmann, “The Mines of Falun” in *The Best Tales of Hoffmann*, E.F. Bleiler [ed.], [New York: Dover, 1967], 292).
illuminating: a young man, who is bereaved by the death of his mother, follows the advice of an old man, and sets about to become a miner. After experiencing terrifying hallucinations (e.g., the images of “a thousand red-hot irons tearing at his heart”\(^{33}\)), the boy becomes engaged, only to die in the mines on the day of his wedding. Upon his encounter with the mine, the boy undergoes a series of physical, social, and psychological changes that are as comprehensive as they are unexpected. The magical key-point of the mine is characterized as a nexus of discrete realities (along with their associated durations) — the domain of the living and the explicitly temporal eternal realm of the dead — that, when encountered, causes profound transformation. Simondon further illustrates the transformative aspect of key-points when he likens the encounter with a key point as the encounter with a new continent.\(^{34}\)

In literature, it is quite often the case that profound magical transformations tend to involve the use of a potent artifact (i.e., physical ointment, potion, gem, imbued with unique powers). This is particularly evident in the literature of antiquity. Sophocles’ Deianira slays her husband by smearing a magical ointment on his robe.\(^{35}\) Homer’s Nestor relates the tale of how Juno procured the magic girdle of Venus in order to enchant Jupiter.\(^{36}\) Perhaps one of the most remarkable aspects of Simondon’s theory is that while he recognizes that there is a relation

\(^{33}\) Ibid., 301.
\(^{34}\) Simondon writes: “An expedition or a navigation allowing one to reach a continent by a definite route do not conquer anything; and yet they are valid according to magical thought, because they allow one to make contact with this continent in a privileged place that is a key-point. The magical universe is made of a network of access points to each domain of reality: thresholds, summits, limits, and crossing points, attached to one another through their singularity and exceptional character” (Gilbert Simondon, *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, 180).


between potent objects and variation of actualized existents, he deprioritizes the role of the potent objects with the suggestion that potent objects only enjoy their special powers in a derivative fashion. For Simondon, while there are such things as aesthetic objects that are involved in magic, these seem to only enjoy their magical status due to the fact that they are participating in an actualized network of reticulated key-points. In concrete terms, the powers of potent objects are derived from their circumstance; magical objects are non-autonomous, in the sense that the ontological source of their transformational powers is dependent on both the circumstance in which they are actualized as well as the ontogenetic process from which they are derived. This complex relation of potent objects to space-time and transformation may be expressed in two claims: (1) potent objects are identifiable with magical objects, in the sense that these are concrete actualizations of the virtual forces of a primitive unity;\(^{37}\) (2) a potent object is magical, in the sense that it participates in transformative relations between two or more entities that were discrete at some prior duration. The first of these is uncontroversial, in the sense that there is a wealth of anthropological data that evidences that primitive religion — taken as the first social fragmentation (i.e., the “fall”) from the magical unity — involves aesthetic elements that are identical to those of magical rituals. For example, Susan K. Langer observes that the Christian ritual of Eucharist (i.e., the Roman Catholic Holy Communion, the Greek rite (circa. 100 C.E.) of the Lord’s Supper (Κυριακὸν δεῖπνον) — is a magical transmutation of form that has its basis in non-formalizable animistic processes of individuation.\(^{38}\) The second claim requires further development.

\(^{37}\) Simondon writes: “Aesthetic thought appears at the primitive magical unity; it is not a phase, but rather a permanent reminder of the rupture of the unity of the magical mode of being, as well as a reminder of the search for its future unity” (Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, 174).

\(^{38}\) Susan K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 131.
In his close reading of Simondon’s aesthetics, Yves Michaud suggests that Simondon seems to treat aesthetic objects as subsistent entities that emerge from (i.e., are ontologically dependent on) their integration with a system of magical key-points.\(^\text{39}\) The magical object is a subsistent object, in the sense that its existence is ontologically dependent on its function within a network. The aesthetic object is the end result of a series of “integrations” that imbue it with aesthetic values. Simondon cautiously notes that though the aesthetic object may be construed as involving mimesis (i.e., imitation) of aspects of various natural and human-created objects, the mimetic qualities of a work of art are not among its essential ontological features.\(^\text{40}\) (I.e., though the shape of Picasso’s \textit{Baboon and Young} (1951) may seem to hearken back to statuettes used in Ancient Egyptian fertility rites, and seem to symbolize actual baboons, these are inessential qualities of the object, in the sense that were they non-existent, the object would still be considered a work of art).

The suggestion here is that the essential quality that makes a potent object an aesthetic object is its aesthetic values (i.e., beauty, ugliness, sublimity, etc.). Simondon suggests that all of these values emerge from an object’s active integration (i.e., participation) in a network of key-

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\(^{39}\) Michaud writes: “Simondon thereby defends an aesthetics of the local and the \textit{in situ}, an aesthetics of sensitivity to places and moments, an aesthetics of structures grafted on to reality to give it form and signification; the aesthetic object depends on the gesture of placing, inscribing, inserting a mark in the natural or technical or religious world” (Yves Michaud, “The Aesthetics of Gilbert Simondon: Anticipation of the Contemporary Aesthetic Experience”, Justin Clemens [tr.], \textit{Gilbert Simondon: Being and Technology}, 125).

\(^{40}\) Simondon illustrates this point through a comparison of aesthetic objects and tools: “It is indeed this integration that defines the aesthetic object, and not imitation: a piece of music that imitates noise cannot become integrated into the world, because it replaces certain elements of the universe (for instance the noise of the sea) rather than completing them. A statue, in a certain sense, imitates man and replaces him, but this is not why it is an aesthetic work; it is an aesthetic work because it becomes integrated into the architecture of a town, marks the highest point of a promontory forms the endpoint of a wall, or sits atop a tower” (Gilbert Simondon, \textit{On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects}, 195).
points. An aesthetic object exists (as an object that is different in kind from technical objects) is dependent on its possession of aesthetic values. An object only has aesthetic value, in the sense that it is involved in a dynamic network of other objects. Were this system to cease functioning, then any object in the system would no longer be an aesthetic object — e.g., Simondon characterizes a tractor in a garage as a technical object, whereas a tractor ploughing a field is a dynamic object of beauty; aesthetic values subsist from participation in a reticulated system.

In his elaboration of the function of the magic of the Aguaruna, Michel Taussig characterizes the spatio-temporal transformations associated with magic as a temporally extended process (i.e., a continuum) that “takes language, symbols, and intelligibility to their outermost limits, to explore life and thereby to change its destination.” It should be further observed that these types of variation enjoy aesthetic expression in Ancient Greek elaborations of mystically tinged circumstances of murder and seduction. These have been adduced to illustrate that profound transformation that takes place at precise spatio-temporal locations, which are reticulated nodes comprehended by actuality. Simondon’s analyses diminish much of the ambiguity associated with these transformational circumstances, in the sense that he suggests...

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41 Simondon illustrates: “The telephone call center is beautiful in action, because at every instant it is the expression and realization of an aspect of the life of a city and of a region; a light is someone waiting, an intention, a desire, immanent news, a ringing telephone that one won’t hear but that will resound far away in another house. Here we witness the beauty found within the action; it is not simply instantaneous, but it is also made up of the rhythms of use in peak hours and evening hours. The telephone call center is beautiful not because of its characteristics as an object, but because it is a key-point in collective and individual life. In the same vein, a traffic light on a train platform is not beautiful in itself, but is beautiful by way of its functioning as a traffic light, which is to say through its power to indicate, to signify a stop or a track to be left free” (ibid., 197).

42 Ibid. 197.

specifies the contours of a conceptual apparatus that involves an account of ontogenetic processes of variation. Simondon’s identifications of the primary magical unity of the universe, the priority of realized magical key-points, and the production of aesthetically represented potent objects in reference to the network of these key-points, all serve to clarify the nature and the function of magic in the process of individuation: it is a transformation that happens at unique moments, over a single duration or throughout many varying durations, which obtain at privileged locales.

**Time as an Element of a Continuous Multiplicity**

Grasping the nature of a multiplicity in relation to oncogenic variation is as crucial as it is complex. A multiplicity functions to group together a series of disparate circumstances without arraying them into a hierarchical order of ontological dependency. A dubious reductionist strategy might yield the suggestion that multiplicities obtain as a species of any of hierarchical, organic, or dialectical organization. It should be observed that (both) hierarchical and organic modes of organization tend to involve elements which lend themselves to designation as qualitative or quantitative aspects, arrayed in a —spatio-temporally or conceptually — contiguous fashion.\(^{44}\) Manuel DeLanda elaborates on the non-contiguity of multiplicities when

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he observes that the elements of multiplicities tend to be arrayed in a manner akin to terms in a disparate series. The suggestion that the elements of a multiplicity tend to be non-adjacent might cause one to posit that multiplicities enjoy dialectical organization — i.e., a relation of contraries, in which the \textit{relata} might not enjoy conceptual proximity, in the sense that they may be oppositions of any of a secondary, tertiary, quaternary, (etc.) order. Deleuze explicitly denies the identification of dialectic and multiplicity when he starkly notes that multiplicities are non-identical to “the overly loose mesh of a distorted dialectic that proceeds by opposition.”

Taken together, these observations suggest that a multiplicity is conceptually distinct from all of hierarchy, organic organization, and dialectic.

In one of the most conceptually dense passages of \textit{Difference and Repetition}, Deleuze specifies three conditions associated with multiplicities: (1) they are ontogenetic, in the sense that their pre-individuated elements “have neither sensible form nor conceptual signification”; (2) their elements tend to enjoy reciprocal determination; (3) multiplicities involve differential relations that tend toward actualization — i.e., the sort of relation that gains expression as a differential equation; the peculiar sort of diffuse ordering that attains actuality as a plurality of disparate spatio-temporal locales conjoined in a reticulated network of physical places that tend

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46 (Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition}, 182). Brian Massumi elaborates on the non-dialectical character of multiplicities through reference to their mode of organization. Massumi writes: “Rather than analyzing the world into discrete components, reducing their manyness to the One of identity, and ordering them by rank, it sums up a set of disparate circumstances in a shattering blow. It synthesizes a multiplicity of elements without effacing their heterogeneity or hindering their potential for future rearranging (to the contrary)” (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, \textit{A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia}, xiii).
47 Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition}, 183.
to be associated with the production of the ontologically new.\textsuperscript{48} Both time and magic — characterized as forces involved the processes of creation or modification of individuated entities — satisfy the first condition. Time and magic: these are among the forces that are involved in the ontogenetic modification of entities. The correlate of the observation that there is no ontological dependency among these forces — i.e., they obtain as non-reducible, analytically distinguishable forces that enjoy mutual implication — suggests that time and magic satisfy the second condition. It might be further observed that time and magic enjoy reciprocal determination, in the sense that the magical transformation of entities tends to correlate with the progression of time, as is illustrated in the correlation of the temporal moment of lunar perigee with lycanthropy.

Satisfaction of the third condition — that multiplicities involve differential relations, which tend toward actualization — is more complex, if for no other reason than the condition involves claims about the nature of the expression of a differential equation, as well as observations about the outcomes of ontogenetic circumstances. These may be elaborated through reference to Riemann’s distinction between discrete and continuous multiplicities. Simon Duffy characterizes Deleuze’s theory of multiplicities as an attempt to resolve the ontological problem of one and many by stipulating the existence of a field of interrelated forces. Duffy further suggests that Deleuze developed his theory “by clarifying and drawing upon the full potential of Riemann’s mathematical developments.”\textsuperscript{49} Indeed, Riemann — in \textit{On the Hypotheses which Lay

\textsuperscript{48} Deleuze summarizes: “A multiple ideal connection, a differential relation, must be actualised in diverse spatio-temporal relationships, at the same time as its elements are actually incarnated in a variety of terms and forms. The Idea is thus defined as a structure. A structure or an Idea is a 'complex theme', an internal multiplicity - in other words, a system of multiple, non-localisable connections between differential elements which is incarnated in real relations and actual terms” (ibid.).

at the Bases of Geometry — explicitly claims that his aim is to elaborate on conditions at work in the creation of measurable physical space.\(^{50}\) This suggests that the object of Reimann’s analysis is the ontogenetic process involved in the formation of physical domains and the individual entities that populate these. In this sense, Reimann was doing ontology under the guise of geometry, as is apparent in the implied identification of an ontogenetic field with a continuous multiplicity (i.e., a continuous manifold, a continuous magnitude). Here, it is important to elucidate the distinction among a discrete manifold, and a continuous multiplicity. There are two important differentia involved: (1) each of discrete manifolds and continuous multiplicities tend to comprehend different sorts of elements; (2) this implies that distinct modes of determination are involved in the identification of each type of array. José Ferreirós observes that a discrete multiplicity involves numerals — i.e., any element comprehended by the set of natural numbers \(\mathbb{N}\) — as the content of their determination.\(^{51}\) Both the elements of discrete multiplicities and discrete multiplicities (when they are characterized as individuated entities) are countable. The claim here is that discrete multiplicities may be ascribed specific quantitative values of the type used in arithmetic calculation. In concrete terms, a discrete magnitude is illustrated by the totality of votes cast in a general election, in the sense that the quantitative values associated with the ballots is determined through correlation to a set of extrinsic values (i.e., the elements of the set \(\mathbb{N}\)). Daniel W. Smith observes that Deleuze’s concept of a continuous multiplicity involves the relation of a “variable number of dimensions (its \(n\)-dimensionality), and the absence of any


supplementary dimension which would impose on it extrinsically defined coordinates or unity.”

The suggestion here is that continuous multiplicities enjoy no recourse to an external set of values with which to correlate in the determination of their value or identity. Echoing Aristotle, Ferreirós observes that continuous multiplicities tend to involve “line,” “surface,” and “body” as their content. The further implication is that the value of a continuous multiplicity is determined through measurement of this content — e.g., the length of a line is determined in relation to another line that obtains as an element of the same (numerically and qualitatively identical) continuous multiplicity. The claim is that determinations of the value of the elements comprehended by continuous multiplicities tend to rely on measurement, not ordinal (or serial) numeration. In this sense, a continuous multiplicity is akin to a gamut of hues of a particular colour, in which the values of the various hues are relatively determined through comparison to other hues comprehended by the same colour tone. Stated again: discrete multiplicities derive their quantitative value (i.e., their quantitative magnitude) through reference to a series of magnitudes conceptually discrete from the ontological domain in which they obtain; elements of a continuous magnitude derive their relative value through reference to other values with which they are implicated (as elements of the same ontological domain); the relativity of the criteria of measurement implies the potential for radical transformation (ontogenesis) of elements; in terms of their identity and value, the elements of a continuous multiplicity enjoy ongoing determination


53 It would not be misguided to credit the identification of discrete and continuous multiplicities to Aristotle. In *Categories*, Aristotle distinguishes among distinct and continuous magnitudes. Aristotle writes: “Of quantities some are discrete, others continuous; and some are composed of parts which have position in relation to one another, others are not composed of parts which have position. Discrete are number and language; continuous are lines, surfaces, bodies, and also, besides these, time and place.” (Aristotle, *Categories*, 4b20-24, J. L. Ackrill [tr.], *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Jonathan Barnes [ed.], [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991], 8).
by variable criteria; because the criteria involved these determinations obtain as aspects of an set of elements undergoing dynamic transformation, the variations associated with continuous multiplicities are properly characterized as intrinsic ontogenetic variations which are expressible as differential equations (e.g., $\frac{dy}{dx}$). Taken together, these observations have been adduced to suggest that the forces — i.e., time and magic — involved in an ontogenetic circumstance are elements of a continuous multiplicity.

Perhaps it should be further observed that literary works of art can be identified as actualizations of an ontogenetic multiplicity. The claim is that books illustrate the ontogenetic process of individuation involving temporality and magic. The validity of the suggestion that literary works involve magic is implied by the number of authors that have been practitioners of magic. Further support for the identification of magic as an element of literary texts may be adduced by the Frazer’s observation that there are certain Chinese texts that, when read, cause trees to come to life, bleed, and cry out in indignation. Deleuze and Guattari augment the claim that books are magical with their suggestion — in A Thousand Plateaus — that books are multiplicities. Within the context of the co-authored text, the implication is that the book is a multiplicity simply because it is non-reducible to the thought of one person. Elsewhere, Deleuze and Guattari highlight the metaphysical stakes of their claim, when they note that in order for an entity to be a multiplicity there must be (at least) two other entities that constitute it. But what

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54 Mircea Eliade notes that, among others, Stanislas de Guaita, William Butler Yeats, S. L. Mathews, and Aleister Crowley were members of magical societies (cf. Mircea Eliade, Occultism, Witchcraft, and Cultural Fashions: Essays in Comparative Religion [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976], 51).


57 Deleuze and Guattari write: “There must be at least two multiplicities, two types, from the outset. This is not because dualism is better than unity but because the multiplicity is precisely
is the guarantee that what is constituted will obtain as a multiplicity? (I.e., why don’t two multiplicities simply produce a unity that, though non-reducible to either of its constituent elements, still may be characterized as a one that is explicitly not a multiplicity?) Deleuze and Guattari assuage these concerns by suggesting that the formed multiplicity is a highly variable (i.e., “metastable”), non-individuated, schematized organizational structure that is formed from the series of relations among the ontological constituents (i.e., the multiple possible relations that could occur between any two or more elements that participate with one another).

In his analysis of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s aesthetics, Daniel W. Smith suggests that works of art are akin to continuous multiplicities when he observes they involve a relative variation of mutually implicated elements. Deleuze and Guattari — in Anti-Oedipus — observe what happens between the two. Hence, the two types will certainly not be one above the other but rather one beside the other, against the other, face to face, or back to back.” (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. What is Philosophy?, Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell [tr.], [New York, Columbia University Press, 1994], 152).

Deleuze characterizes metastability as a mode of being that is ontologically prior to any sense of individuation, but nonetheless identifiable as a system: “But what essentially defines a metastable system is the existence of a ‘disparation,’ the existence of at least two different dimensions, two disparate levels of reality, between which there is not yet any interactive communication. A metastable system thus implies a fundamental difference, like a state of dissymmetry. It is nonetheless a system insofar as the difference therein is like potential energy, like a difference of potential distributed within certain limits. Simondon’s conception, it seems to me, can in this respect be assimilated to a theory of intensive quanta, since each intensive quantum in itself is difference” (Gilles Deleuze, “On Gilbert Simondon”, Desert Islands and other texts: 1953-1974, David Lapoujade[ed.], Michael Taormina [tr.], [Los Angeles and New York: Semiotext[e], 2002], 87).

Smith elaborates: “The elements brought together by the work of art cannot be said to be fragments of a lost unity or shattered totality; nor can the parts be said to form or prefigure the unity of the work through the course of a logical or dialectical development or an organic evolution. Rather than functioning as their totalizing or unifying principle, the work of art can only be understood as the effect of the multiplicity of the disconnected parts. The work of art produces a unity, but this product is simply a new part that is added alongside the other parts. The artwork neither unifies nor totalizes these parts, but it has an effect on them because it establishes syntheses between elements that in themselves do not communicate, and that retain all their difference in their own dimensions” (Daniel W. Smith, Essays on Deleuze, 104).
that a literary work of art is akin to a continuous multiplicity, in the sense that it is a “non-
totalized” unity composed of discrete transformational parts.\textsuperscript{60} To get a concrete sense of the
nature of the book as a non-totalized unity, it’s helpful to borrow the terminology of Roman
Ingarden (who also characterizes a book as a multiplicity — i.e., an ontologically heteronomous
formation), which has many actual and potential aspects, and involves discrete ontogenetic parts
and processes.\textsuperscript{61} The distinct aspects of a book are non-reducible to a numeric or qualitative one,
in the sense that though any given aspect may be drawn in relation to something else (e.g., a
physical text that forms a relation to a reader); one person’s act of reading of a given book does
not allow any authoritative stipulation of the story’s identity (i.e., the reader could be profoundly
wrong in his reading of the text, or simply not form any conclusions about it). The observation
that the book was written by someone or some group of people, and is made up of material parts
(i.e., pages and a cover), immaterial parts (i.e., the meanings of the words written on its pages)
can be adduced to yield the claim that a book is non-reducible to a simple unity. In addition, the
fact that the book obtains as a concretized entity in the ongoing and open-ended social
elaborations of its meaning can be adduced to support the claim that the book is a multiplicity, in
the senses that its meanings are (1) never fully elaborated, and (2) undergoing continual revision,
for the duration of the book’s existence. Deleuze and Guattari cautiously note that though a book
is a type of multiplicity that defies all attempts to reduce it to an ontological one, this does not

\textsuperscript{60} Deleuze and Guattari write: “[the book] is a whole of these particular parts but does not
totalize them; it is a unity of all of these particular parts but does not unify them; rather, it is
added to them as a new part fabricated separately” (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, \textit{Anti-
Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia}, Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane [tr.],
[Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983], 42).

\textsuperscript{61} Ingarden elucidates the formal conditions (i.e., heteronomy, multiple aspects, and involvement
of discrete ontological parts and processes) of the literary work of art in his magnum opus, \textit{The
Literary Work of Art}. (cf. Roman Ingarden, \textit{The Literary Work of Art}, George Grabowicz[tr].
preclude the possibility of discussing it as an organization of elements that affects its readers (i.e., it changes both their emotional comportment to the world, as well as values that they ascribe to objects in the world). In this sense, the book is a multiplicity that is involved in a modification of the affections of those who read it. Brian Massumi notes that Deleuze borrows his sense of the term from Spinoza’s affectus, which is “a pre-personal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act.”

This modification of an entity’s capacities to act (and be acted upon) is perhaps the most mysterious aspect of an ontogenetic multiplicity. Descola identifies the ontologies of the Aschur and the Mukama, in which the categorical distinctions among human, animal, and plant are blurred by a magical power of metamorphosis. Dumézil relates the tale of the demon Ilvala, who turned his brother Vātāpi into a goat so that Vātāpi could get revenge on his enemies. Rimbaud summarizes these magical transformations in the poetic formula “I is someone else,” in which neither the poetic narrator nor the entity referred to in the grammatical predicate are characterized as possessing discrete, rigorously distinct identities. These have been adduced to suggest that one might recognize the validity of the claims that an ontogenetic circumstance is primary to any ontological system involving identity claims of a categorial nature, and that this

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63 Ibid., xvi.
66 Rimbaud writes: “For I is someone else. If the brass awakes as horn, it can't be to blame. This much is clear: I'm around for the hatching of my thought: I watch it, I listen to it: I release a stroke from the bow: the symphony makes its rumblings in the depths, or leaps fully formed onto the stage” (Arthur Rimbaud, “Battle Song of Paris” *Rimbaud Complete*, 366).
circumstance enjoys expression as the subject matter or implied substratum of literature, philosophy, and anthropological investigation.

Deleuze and Guattari elucidate the nature of these magical transformations in reference to the becomings involved in the wasp’s and orchid’s reproductive cycles — i.e., “The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the orchid's reproductive apparatus.” The suggestion that the transformation takes place at the level of “images” is revealing, if for no other reason than all visual images are schematized, in the sense that all images are a structure, awaiting completion by a viewer. The images that Deleuze and Guattari elaborate are ontological analogues of visual images. The respective images formed by the wasp and the orchid are schematic (i.e., non-material, virtual) organizations that are ontologically prior to any realization as material (i.e., individuated) entities. Though Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge that the reciprocal processes of “deterritorialization” and “reterritorialization” may be characterized as mimetic, they caution that the various processes involved with imitation are ultimately inadequate to describe the radical nature of transformation, in the sense that imitation

67 Deleuze and Guattari write: The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the orchid's reproductive apparatus. But it reterritorializes the orchid by transporting its pollen. Wasp and orchid, as heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome. “It could be said that the orchid imitates the wasp, reproducing its image in a signifying fashion (mimesis, mimicry, lure, etc.). But this is true only on the level of the strata—a parallelism between two strata such that a plant organization on one imitates an animal organization on the other. At the same time, something else entirely is going on: not imitation at all but a capture of code, surplus value of code, an increase in valence, a veritable becoming, a becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp. Each of these becomings brings about the deterritorialization of one term and the reterritorialization of the other; the two becomings interlink and form relays in a circulation of intensities pushing the deterritorialization ever further. There is neither imitation nor resemblance, only an exploding of two heterogeneous series on the line of flight composed by a common rhizome that can no longer be attributed to or subjugated by anything signifying (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 10).
operates at the level of already formed individuals, and the transformation of becoming occurs at
the schematic level of “ontogenetic” (i.e., not yet individuated, ontologically prior) forces.\textsuperscript{68}

Perhaps it is worthwhile to observe that while the ontogenetic transformations of
multiplicities may involve numeric expression, these numerations tend to be intrinsic values (i.e.,
values derived from mutual implication; relatively corelated values which need not correspond to
any extrinsic series). Mauss highlights the importance of the magical numbers (i.e., 3, 4, 5, 7, 9,
11, 13, 20) in the rhythmic patterns of non-verbal magical rituals.\textsuperscript{69} It should be further observed
that temporality is explicitly involved with these transformations, as can be adduced from
Frazer’s remarks about the importance of the ages of the young maidens that the Algonquin and
Huron tribes married to fishing nets in the third month of the year.\textsuperscript{70} While sometimes number is
merely used to count the number of elements that should be used in a specific ritual, or to denote
the number of times a specific practice should be performed, Lévi points out that in some forms
of magic (i.e., the Kabala), number plays an altogether different role.\textsuperscript{71} Rather than merely
having a fixed value in relation to the set of natural numbers (\( \mathbb{N} \)), the magic numbers of Kabala
and tarot have no fixed role in ordering any set of elements, but rather their values emerge from
the complex set of relations in which they are involved. In concrete terms, the quantitative values
associated with magic are the solutions to problems posed immanent to ontogenetic creation and
modification of existents.

\textsuperscript{68} In chapter five, I further elaborate on Deleuze’s nuanced thought on the function of mimesis
and art through particular reference to Alain Robbe-Grillet’s theory of how time is expressed in
novels and the cinematic artform.
\textsuperscript{69} Marcel Mauss, \textit{A General Theory of Magic}, Robert Brain (tr.), (New York and London:
Routledge, 2001), 72.
\textsuperscript{70} James Frazer, \textit{The Golden Bough}, 117-119.
\textsuperscript{71} Éliphas Lévi, \textit{The Doctrine of Transcendental Magic}, 62-65.
Concluding Remarks: Time is Involved in the Ontogenetic Circumstance

Today, in this perhaps too wearied age, in which notions of ontological transformation and difference seem to have become anathema, we have lost the magic which once unified the world. Now, if we think of magic at all, we are most likely to think of it as a fraud; as some more or less clever illusion, that — perhaps performed on the poorly constructed stages of some less than fashionable vaudevillian show; perhaps performed under all the brilliant the lights and bombastic music that a major media company can muster for an hour’s enjoyment — transfixes us, who, too tired from the search for an ontology of difference, seek nothing more than an amusement. This is a profound disservice to the nature of ontogenesis.

In the foregoing, I suggested that Simondon stipulate that the ontogenetic circumstance involves the inter-relation of pre-personal, transformative forces. The concrete claim is that temporality is among these. Simondon claims that magical transformation and temporality are elements of an ontogenetic circumstance. Here the suggestion is that magic and time are among the forces involved in the formation of discrete entities — they are the ontologically primitive elements from which substance, species, and particular subsist. Simondon further observes that aspects of both magic and time enjoy actualization in reality as spatio-temporally extended features of a landscape. The validity of these observations may be demonstrated by the reality of the phenomenon of change over a duration. Simondon further suggests that locales in which transformative aspects enjoy actualization tend to be linked in network. Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of this network is that it tends to be productive of aesthetic values, in the sense that all aesthetic values are a species of qualitative value, and the modifications associated with this network tend to be qualitative in nature.
Deleuze develops Simondon’s observation about the nature of individuation with the claim that the ontogenetic circumstance is akin to a continuous multiplicity. Here, one might also observe that ontologically implicated qualitative values tend to enjoy relative determination, in the sense that they tend to be mutually implicated. The negative claim is that qualitative values need not be correlated with an extrinsic series of values — i.e., values of a transcendental sort. This yields the suggestion that the sort of modification over a duration associated with ontogenesis shares a formal attribute — reciprocal determination — with a continuous multiplicity. The transformational capacities and tendencies toward mutual implication of elements satisfy the other to formal conditions associated with continuous multiplicities. Whereas a discrete multiplicity enjoys correlation with an extrinsic set of values (i.e., the set of natural numbers \( \mathbb{N} \)), continuous multiplicities tend to involve intrinsic values (i.e., relatively derived values). Deleuze explicitly claims that multiplicities enjoy a plurality of expressions — in all of literary artform, myth, philosophy, folklore, anthropology. In addition to providing further elucidations of the natures of magical transformations and ontogenesis, this plurality of expressions functions to further demonstrate the validity of the identification of time, magic, and ontogenesis.
CHAPTER 3: TIME IN THE LOGIC OF SENSE

Perhaps the most fascinating of the multitude of nuanced — logical, ontological, and axiological — distinctions that Deleuze makes in *The Logic of Sense* involves Aion and Chronos. Deleuze explicitly identifies Aion as a type of eternity that has two senses: (1) it is the ontologically “complete” entity that is coextensive with the entirety of time — the memorial past, the lived present, and the undisclosed future;¹ (2) it subdivides any temporal series into both a proximate past and an immanent future state of affairs.² In the latter sense, Aion is a complex multiplicity that has aspects of the eternality (i.e., timelessness) and is involved in the production of indeterminate future states of affairs. Chronos, on the other hand, tends to be characterized as the “living present,” in which everything is a temporally simultaneous “blended mixture” of physical bodies and (immaterial) causes.³ Though Deleuze cautiously notes that these are analytically distinct, there appears to be some sort of involvement among these two “readings” of time. The concise nature of Deleuze’s elucidations tends to suggest a potential problem

¹ Elaborating on the natures of both Aion and Chronos, Deleuze pointedly observes that each is ontologically complete and non-reducible to the other: “We have seen that past present, and future were not all three parts of a single temporality but that they formed two readings of time, each one of which is complete and excludes the other: on one hand, the always limited present, which measures the action of bodies as causes and the state of their mixtures in depth (Chronos); on the other, the essentially unlimited past and future, which gather incorporeal events, at the surface, as effects (Aion).” (Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, Mark Lester [tr.], [London and New York: Continuum, 1990], 72).

² Deleuze writes: “The Aion endlessly subdivides the event and pushes away past as well as future, without ever rendering them less urgent. The event is that no-one ever dies, but has always just died or is always going to die, in the empty present of the Aion, that is, in eternity.” (ibid., 74).

³ Deleuze writes: “Inside Chronos, the present is in some manner corporeal. It is the time of mixtures or blendings, the very process of blending: to temper or to temporalize is to mix. The present measures out the action of bodies and causes.” (ibid., 184)
concerning the nature of Aion: what exactly does it mean to be an empty form that — despite its putative emptiness — still involves time?

Though explicit discussion of the term “Aion” is mainly confined to the elaborations given in *The Logic of Sense*, this does not imply that the term is without significance in Deleuze’s philosophy, as is demonstrated with the observation that Aion’s various aspects are touched upon in many of Deleuze’s other texts. (E.g., the identification of Aion with Borges’ formulation of time as “one Greek labyrinth which is a single straight line”⁴ that (strangely) involves both previous temporal events and future states of affairs is mentioned again in Deleuze’s preface to *Kant’s Critical Philosophy: the Doctrine of the Faculties*,⁵ *Cinema 2: the Time-Image*,⁶ and *A Thousand Plateaus*.⁷) While Deleuze seems to maintain that at least one type of distinction obtains among Aion and Chronos, the precise nature of Aion remains tantalizingly ambiguous. Deleuze’s further identification of Aion with a temporal future conceptualized as the “pure empty form of time”⁸ (in *The Logic of Sense*) or the “form of empty time”⁹ (in *Difference and Repetition*) does little to alleviate the difficulties that plague the concept. As Lampert points out, each of these formulations has quite different entailments.¹⁰ The claim that the form is something empty is not equivalent to a stipulation about the ontological status of those entities

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⁸ Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 189.
which putatively populate the form, in the sense that each proposition identifies attributes
(predicates) of different types of entities. (I.e., just as it would be a category mistake to suggest
that a species has the same attributes as an individual, there seems to be some ontological funny
business in an identification of emptiness as an attribute of both the form of time and a temporal
entity — like a moment of time.) The claim that Aion is an empty form implies that time is a
structuring process that is bereft of ontological content. In this sense, Aion is akin to a Platonic
“moving image of eternity”\textsuperscript{11} that has not participated with — brought order to — any of the
existents that populate the universe. The characterization of Aion as the shape of empty time is
amounts to a stipulation of the existence of a temporal vacuum — i.e., a temporal zero-point; a
necessarily vague entity which enjoys none of temporal value, participation in temporal
succession, or any sort of temporal change or modification; an ontological space which defies the
predication of any sort of “when.”\textsuperscript{12} Each of these characterizations of Aion — as the generality
which comprehends nothing in particular; as the non-temporal particular — implies a difficulty;
the inexorable vagueness of a general category bereft of content, or the stipulation of the
existence of an explicitly temporal entity that is strangely excised from any temporal continuum.
Aion is fraught.

\textsuperscript{11} Plato, \textit{Timeaus}, 37d, Donald J. Zeyl (tr.), \textit{Plato: Complete Works}, John M. Cooper and D.S.
\textsuperscript{12} As I observed in the first chapter, Robin Le Poidvin defines a temporal vacuum as “a period of
time in which nothing happens.” (Robin Le Poidvin, \textit{Travels in Four Dimensions: The Enigmas
proposes — and quickly rejects — the existence of a temporal vacuum in his argument for the
dependency of time on the change and movement of physical, sub-lunar, terrestrial entities.
The complex nature of Aion is reflected in the literature elaborating on the concept. Perhaps drawing on Blanchot’s suggestion that time is the mercurial, “scarcely human force”\textsuperscript{13} that compels one to write fiction, Flaxman characterizes Aion as an ontological process that seems to transcend the lived experience of individuals.\textsuperscript{14} Though Reynolds seems to amplify Flaxman’s suggestion that Aion is ontologically transcendent to chronometric time, he complicates the relation by pointing out that Deleuze also identifies Aion as a “wound” that punctuates the flow of linear (chronometric) time by forming a “cut” between temporal instants — i.e., Aion is that which separates any two instances in a relation of temporal succession \((t_1, t_2 \ldots t_n)\).\textsuperscript{15} Taken together, these suggest that Aion is ontologically transcendent and immanent; both removed from empirically measurable temporal progression (i.e., the kind that can be adduced from the observation of change in physical entities) and that which marks a temporal gap between two durations. François Dosse characterizes the Aion as a “paradoxical eternity where something incorporeal and ineffectual exceeds and opens onto the indefinite time of the

\textsuperscript{13} Blanchot writes: “The hand moves in a tempo which is scarcely human: not that of viable action, not that of hope either, but rather the shadow of time, the hand being itself the shadow of a hand slipping ghostlike toward an object that has become its own shadow. This hand experiences, at certain moments, a very great need to seize: it must grasp the pencil, it has to.” (Maurice Blanchot. \textit{The Space of Literature}, Ann Smock [tr.], [Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982], 19).

\textsuperscript{14} Flaxman writes: “While the family triangle draws together on the basis of the aura of death, the impersonal line of life (Aion) unfolds beyond the organization of the subject and object, in the passage between “the livable and the lived” — the passage of writing itself.” (Gregory Flaxman, \textit{Gilles Deleuze the Fabulation of Philosophy: Powers of the False 1}, [Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2012], 224).

\textsuperscript{15} Reynolds writes: “In Logic of Sense, the incorporeal wound is the wound of time, but not of all time understood as some kind of whole; rather, it is the wound of a particular disjunctive aspect of time – Aion rather than Chronos.” (Jack Reynolds, “Wounds and Scars: Deleuze on the Time and Ethics of the Event”, \textit{Deleuze and Guattari Studies} 1, no. 2 [2007], pp. 144-166, 157).
While this elucidation of the empty form of time is helpful, in the sense that it highlights that Aion is indefinite and involves some sort of relation to the event, it does little to clarify the nature of the relation — what exactly does the stipulation that eternity is both “excessive” to and “open” to another sort of time (i.e., the temporally non-decomposable moment of the living present; the event) actually mean, and what sort of relation does this imply with the sort of temporal successions that define the empirically measurable time denoted by Chronos (i.e., chronometric time)? Elaborating on Deleuze’s first “poetic” characterization of time as “out of joint,” Zourabichvili attempts to shed some light fraught ontology of Aion, when he suggests that both Chronos and Aion are to be regarded as ontologically complete (i.e., analytically discrete ontological wholes), that can each be correlated with a different temporal modality: Aion is the eternal that is associated with incorporeal entities; Chronos is the present associated with the chronometric time that pertains physical existents —marking their change, etc. Zourabichvili further suggests that Aion is to be identified as the time of the event, whereas chronometric time is to be identified as that in which the event is effectuated (i.e., actualized). Though these characterizations of Aion and Chronos enjoy copious textual support, there is the

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lingering difficulty that Aion — a metaphysical entity that seems to be readily identifiable as a being somehow involved with time — is now characterized as enjoying no relation to temporality (i.e., something a-temporal). How can something be both temporal and a-temporal (or nontemporal)? — this is the question.

In the present chapter, I thread a path through the ontologically fraught elaborations of the nature of Aion (i.e., eternity; Eion; an indeterminate length of time). My aim is to demonstrate that Deleuze’s identification of Aion as an empty form (of time) offers a fascinating model of temporality that prioritizes variation. First, I suggest that Deleuze’s identification of time as an empty form is supported by Ancient Greek and Gnostic concepts of the relation of Aion and Chronos. From Plato, through Aristotle, to Plotinus, the concept of time undergoes substantive revision, in the sense that temporal measurement becomes removed from the measurement of movement of physically instantiated entities. This gradual untethering of time from movement gives rise to the development of the concept of eternity as an ontologically comprehensive mode of time that is devoid of content (i.e., a progression or variation not indexed to the movement of cosmic or sublunar entities). Eternity is characterized as: (1) a temporal “all” (i.e., generality) that is non-reducible to the determinacy implied by any particular temporally localized existent or temporal series (i.e., a succession relation of temporally discrete moments); (2) that which tends toward a diversity of possible states of affairs. Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects in the long history of Aion is that — in the Ancient world — it was used in magical incantations. For the Gnostics and Oracles, Aion was a deity, and a potent one at that. From the gnostic papyri, we get a vision of Aion as an eternal being, in many senses of this term. I suggest that the papyri conjure an image of Aion as a deity that is liberated from time, in the sense that it enjoys a neutrality with respect to the movements of any particular entity or group of
entities — a form, in the most general sense of the term. In the second stage of argument, I clarify the nature of an empty form of time through reference to a complex analogy among Aion and Deleuze’s concept of an “ideal game” — an analogy that Deleuze specifies through reference to Fitzgerald and Borges. The claim here is that Aion is an analogue of an ideal game in the (limited) sense that both share essential properties. Both Aion and the ideal game involve the multiplication of chance. Finally, I suggest that the differential aspects of Aion (i.e., its capacities to comprehend any future contingency; to multiply chance) imply that it is pure variability, something which can be illustrated by means of differential equations.

**Stoic Concepts of Time**

The Stoics develop the concept of the empty form of time. Arius Didymus observes that Chrysippus suggests that “time is the interval of motion according to which the measure of speed and slowness is spoken of; or, time is the interval which accompanies the motion of the cosmos.”\(^{19}\) Strobas elaborates that Chrysippus conceived of time as involving four senses: (1) a “dimension” which “accompanies” the universe’s motion;\(^{20}\) (2) that which comprehends all that moves; (3) a time that is non-reducible to the present — i.e., not “wholly present”\(^{21}\) — and; (4) the identification of a type of time in which a past and future subsist from the present. Sean Bowden observes that Chrysippus’ position seems to involve a tension, in the sense that the stipulation that time is never wholly present seems to contradict the suggestion that the past and

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21 Ibid.
future subsist from an existent present. Deleuze resolves this apparent contradiction by identifying two discrete temporal aspects — Chronos (i.e., the lived present) and Aion (i.e., eternity). Deleuze explicitly identifies Chronos as the “vast present which…is an encasement, a coiling up of relative presents,” from which the analytically discrete temporal domains (the limitless past and the infinite future) are excluded. Deleuze cautiously notes that both these domains are comprehended by a separate aspect of temporality (Aion), which is illustrated with the geometric image of a straight line progressing toward both the past and the future — the very image used by Arius Didymus to characterize Chrysippus’ elaboration of the nature of the infinite.

The complex nature of Aion (and its relation to Chronos) is reflected in the Ancient Greek and Hellenistic world’s representations of the deities. The difficulties involved in discerning the differences between Aion and Chronos involve two aspects: (1) ontological priority; (2) ontological role. The ancient world offers various — often competing — suggestions about which, if either, of Aion and Chronos is ontologically dependent on the other, and which sense of temporality is to be associated with each. Darby Nock observes that the oracles from Claros identify the “chief deity is Aion, the various gods of cults [sic.] being a small part of him and his angels.” Aion’s putative ontological priority is up-ended when we consult the Orphic cosmology, which casts Chronos as the “original god” and identifies Aion with Baal Shamin, a

24 Arius Didymus writes: “And just as void as a whole is infinite in every direction, so too time as a whole is infinite in both directions; for both the past and the future are infinite.” (Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson (eds.), *Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings*, 167).
subordinate deity whose name “means in the first instance ‘lord of eternity’ and in the second ‘lord of the world’.” The implied confusion of which deity (or modality of time) begat the other is also reflected in the archaeological record. Doro Levi mentions the Column of Antonius Pius, which depicts Aion as a naked angel (winged-youth) who lifts the divine couple to Olympus. The physical position and relative age of the represented deities suggest that Aion is ontologically subordinate to other gods. The suggestion that Aion is ontologically secondary is reversed in Mithraic depictions of the god as an old man to which all other deities are subordinated. The ambivalence of the Ancient world to Aion’s ontological priority in reference to other magical entities is also evidenced in the Greek magical papyri. In these, Aion is variously addressed as “you who are master above the earth and below the earth; the ruler of the universe, Ra, Pan”; “Lord of [the] Aion, all things, only god, unutterable”; and the one “deathless god” who is the “begetter of all, and assigns[sic.] souls to all and all control, king of all the Aions and lord.” The apparent lack of coherence of the these leads Levi to suggest that conceptualizations of Aion in the ancient world were quite fluid.

The situation does not get much better when we turn to elaborations of the role of Aion relative to the temporal cycles involved with birth and death and other natural phenomena. The figure of Aion — represented as a mythical Phoenix — adorns the face of an Alexandrian coin (minted around 138-139 CE). The coin’s iconography suggests that Aion presides over the cycles

26 Ibid., 86.
28 Ibid., 307.
30 Ibid., 194.
31 Ibid., 163.
32 Ibid.
of and renewal of human life. In magical papyri from around the same historical period, Aion is often characterized as “the god of the four winds.” Other magical texts characterize Aion as variously the bringer of light; a daemonic spirit that which separates what is from what is not, and “that which gives wealth.” The variety of Ancient accounts may support the claim that each entity is ontologically complete (i.e., irreducible), in the sense that a possible implication of the Ancient world’s vacillation about the priority and attributes of Aion and Chronos suggests that no dependency relation obtains between them. Indeed, Deleuze seems to assent to this claim when he observes that the putatively different modalities of time — past, present, and future — belong to a complex multiplicity involving at least two discrete sorts of temporality. It should be pointed out that of the plurality of attributes predicated of Aion, none of these involve corporeality (i.e., they are incorporeal, in the sense that they involve immaterial entities — light waves, daemons; abstract phenomena — cycles; and abstract values — wealth. Deleuze generalizes this plurality of attributes to suggest that Aion involves all incorporeal events (i.e., anything that is divisible into a temporally prior or temporally future state of affairs). Taken together, these yield a staggering vision of an empty form that is ontologically discrete from the entirety of the universe of physical entities, and (at the same time) comprehensive of — or coextensive with — all that has been or could come to be.

**The Empty Form of Time in Games, Literature, and Mathematics**

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33 Ibid., 294.
34 Ibid., 296.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 99.
Deleuze’s elaborations of Aion demand an assessment of the explanatory value of conceptualizing time as an empty form. Drawing on the narratives of Fitzgerald and Borges, Deleuze suggests that the concept of an empty from of time yields a concept of the future as something completely indeterminate, to which one proceeds only by virtue of experiencing a rupture (i.e., a “crack-up”) with one’s lived present. Fitzgerald observes that future states of affairs only come about through a series of “blows that come or seem to come from the outside”\(^{38}\) of one’s lived experience. Elsewhere, Fitzgerald elaborates on the nature of this movement toward the undisclosed future by characterizing it as a sudden “self-immolation”; a “jail-break…a clean break…something you cannot come back from.”\(^{39}\) Borges echoes these sentiments when he characterizes the present as a “point of departure” toward “diverse times which themselves also proliferate and fork.”\(^{40}\) The model presented here seems to involve a three stage inferential progression: (1) the lived present is posited to be ontologically distinct from the other temporal durations, which implies; (2) progression to a new duration involves a radical break from the content of the lived present, and; (3) this break suggests the emergence of divergent temporal series that enjoy none of a necessary tether to each other or temporally prior states. Deleuze cautiously notes that such a model of discrete temporalities yields a sort of idealized concept of an empty form of time, which embraces “all possible combinations”\(^{41}\) while not prioritizing the emergence of any particular state of affairs. The substantive implication here


\(^{41}\)Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 116.
is that time is characterized as an infinite, expanding entity that has the characteristics of (1) being able to comprehend any emergent particular, and; (2) not being wholly actualized at any given temporal instant or temporal continuum.

Deleuze elucidates the complex nature of Aion by proposing a complex analogy among Aion and the concept of an ideal game. An ideal game is stipulated as one which tends toward the multiplication of chance. Deleuze illustrates this concept through reference to a few concepts from Borges — the Babylonian lottery and the labyrinth of a Chinese philosopher’s (Ts’ui Pên’s) book. Each of these must be elucidated. The terrible thing about the lottery is that chance intervenes at all stages of the game — in the drawing of lots; in the assigning of values to that which is drawn; in deciding the outcomes of each drawing, etc. — all of which amounts to a horrific game in which “the number of drawings is infinite. No decision is final, each moment of putative choice merges into others.”42 The non-deterministic aspects of the ideal game are also illustrated in “The Garden of Forking Paths.”43 In both these illustrations, chance — far from being attenuated — is amplified. In this sense, Deleuze’s concept of an ideal game is analytically distinct from the games with which we are all familiar — Monopoly, chess, Russian roulette, etc. Though Deleuze cautiously notes the limit of his game metaphor when he observes that “in the games in which we are familiar, chance is fixed at certain points” — i.e., a roulette ball landing

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43 Borges writes: “In all fiction, when a man is faced with alternatives, he chooses one at the expense of others. In the almost unfathomable Ts’ui Pên, he chooses—simultaneously—all of them . . . Fang, let us say, has a secret. A stranger knocks at the door. Naturally there are various outcomes. Fang can kill the intruder, the intruder can kill Fang, both can be saved, both can die, etc. In Ts’ui Pên’s work, all the possible solutions occur, each one being the point of departure for other bifurcations . . . You have come to my house, but in one of our possible pasts you are my enemy, in another, my friend.” (Jorge Luis Borges, “The Garden of Forking Paths,” Ficciones [New York: Grove, 1962], 98).
on a certain colour and no other — he sharply notes that ideal games enjoy none of this limitation of chance. This amplification of diversity is also evident in Fang’s tragic tale. Perhaps one might observe the plurality of possible outcomes explicitly mentioned in Borges’s story: Fang committing murder; Fang being the one who is slayed; both Fang and his victim being saved; both perishing. What is perhaps more astounding is that Borges suggests all these outcomes enjoy simultaneous actualization as contemporaneous, non-identical durations. Each possible outcome, in this sense, enjoys no temporal sequence in relation to another. The temporal simultaneity is the second property that strengthens the analogy among Aion and ideal games.

The claim here is that the ideal game and Aion are analogues of one another, in the sense that they; (1) both multiply chance; (2) both involve a timeless quality — i.e., lack of identity among discrete durations. That both Aion and the ideal game involve temporally simultaneous — yet analytically discrete — events (that multiple things happen in them at the same time), and that these multiply chance are adduced to validate the analogy.

Deleuze further elaborates on these aspects of Aion (and the ideal game) in an essay published three years after The Logic of Sense. The implicit claim is that Aion characterizes that which differentiates itself. Deleuze suggests that this can be expressed through reference to mathematical relations. In “How do we Recognize Structuralism?” Deleuze identifies three types of relations: (1) real; (2) imaginary; and (3) differential. In a real relation (e.g., 3+2 or 2/3), the elements of the relation (i.e., the integers) have a fixed numeric value; their values are “autonomous,” in the sense that the values are not dependent on the relation. In an imaginary relation (e.g., \(x^2 + y^2 - r^2 = 0\)), it is the case that the values of none of the relata are specified,

\[ \text{Deleuze, “How do we Recognize Structuralism?” Desert Islands and other texts: 1953-1974, 176.} \]
and also that each of the *relata* must have a determinate value (i.e., any solution of the equation is predicated on each of its terms having a determinate value). In a *differential relation* (e.g., 
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\frac{dy}{dx} = -\frac{x}{y}
\], the elements of the relation are undetermined, in the senses that (1) they have no real numeric value that is autonomous of — independent of — the relation, and; (2) a determinate value is not demanded to “solve” the relation. (I.e., \(dy\) has no determinate value in relation to \(y\); \(dx\) has a completely undermined value in relation to \(x\)). To borrow a phrase from Husserl, the elements of a differential relation are in an inexact but rigorous relation, in the sense that the relation \(\frac{dy}{dx}\) is rigorously determined (i.e., it is this relation, and no other), but the values of the terms in the relation are indeterminate (i.e., the values of the terms can only be determined reciprocally). Elucidating the nature of the values in a differential relation, Daniel W. Smith notes that though “they are perfectly determinable in the differential relation; the terms themselves do not exist apart from the differential relation into which they enter and by which they are reciprocally determined.”

Here we have the substantive aspects of Aion: Aion is self-subsistent (ontologically independent); and Aion is rigorously determinable as that which is productive of the unique — i.e., productive of difference.

**Concluding Remarks: Aion’s Identification with Difference**

Aion is fraught, but perhaps not quite as fraught as when we began. Perhaps now we can get an appreciation for this complex entity. It is what, then? Aion is a deity of many names and multiple representations; it is a form of the cosmos itself; it is something involved with time — specifically with the future’s infinite capacities to differentiate itself; it is a game, but a game like

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45 Daniel W. Smith, *Essays on Deleuze*, 322, fn. 16.
no other; it is a book which comprehends all variation; it is that which changes. While these are compelling illustrations of Aion that consistently emphasize its differential capacity — illustrations which hang together as a multiplicity — we must note that the very capacity of Aion to change suggests that its reality as an existent is fragile. The suggestion that Aion can comprehend any change — that it is pure difference — while consistent with the capacity to ontologically envelop any future contingency, does not imply that Aion enjoys or is able to maintain existence as an entity with which duration may be associated. That is, the claim that Aion is an empty form suggests that it may tend toward independence from time. (Potential involvement does not imply ontological dependency any more than it implies identity). The analogy of Aion and the ideal clarifies the nature of change associated in the concept. To be clear, the ideal game involves a type of change that is complete indeterminacy; variation most profound; a variation that is akin to an ontological jail-break. This form of variation can be illustrated by a differential equation. The differential equation, in this sense, is the empty form which can comprehend any value and is productive of difference. Aion then, is far more than mere temporal difference. In this sense, Aion participates in the formation of difference itself.
CHAPTER 4: THE REPETITION OF DIFFERENCE —KIERKEGAARD AND DELEUZE ON TEMPORAL VARIATION

Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition is complex. Walter Lowrie highlights the difficulties associated with the concept when he notes that of all topics of Kierkegaard’s analyses, “none is so baffling” as that of repetition.\(^1\) Part of the problem posed by Kierkegaard’s elucidation of repetition is that his analyses move between the domains of ethics, (phenomenological) metaphysics, and epistemology. The multiple aspects of repetition are demonstrated in Kierkegaard’s explicit identification of the concept with “earnestness”\(^2\) (an axiologically loaded term, if ever there was one), an object of understanding and belief (i.e., an intentional object),\(^3\) and a phenomenon of “metaphysical interest.”\(^4\)

Much of the critical vexation with Kierkegaard’s text seems to focus on the ambiguity of repetition. This is reflected in the lack of critical consensus about the meaning of the term. Perhaps inspired by the explicitly religious themes present in Kierkegaard’s works — e.g., the

\(^3\) Ibid.,136.  
\(^4\) Kierkegaard writes: “Recollection is the ethical [ethniske] view of life, repetition the modern; repetition is the interest [Interesse] of metaphysics, and also the interest upon which metaphysics comes to grief; repetition is the watchword [Løsnet] in every ethical view; repetition is *conditio sine qua non* [the indispensable condition] for every issue of dogmatics.” (ibid., 149).
analysis of the Biblical story of Abraham and Isaac in *Fear and Trembling*; the elaboration the story of Job in *Repetition* — Brita K. Stendahl characterizes repetition as akin to “a burning bush that is not consumed.”

Paul S. Minear reports the odd conclusions of a lax ontology with his suggestion that repetition is the synthesis of incommensurables — temporality and (non-temporal) eternity — that yields a kind of “divine madness” in which one “gives thanks, always.”

John W. Elrod suggests that the term has existential importance, in the sense that repetition is involved with a person’s quest to authentically exist as a psycho-social being.

Elaborating on this suggestion, David J. Kangas briefly considers the possibility that Kierkegaard regards repetition as an existential category, which is (oddly) identified as a type of “relation…that freedom has with itself.” There are at least two problems with this elaboration of an existential category: (1) while relation might be a category (at least in the Aristotelian sense), it seems oddly specific to assert that freedom’s relation of self-identity is a category; (2) there is some problem with the elaboration of the category as an existential category. While the claim that repetition is categorical enjoys textual support, it is also observed that were this category to exist, it would be “absolutely transcendent.”

That a category might enjoy the status of a transcendent entity is not outside the realm of ontological possibility. (Any of the categories that apply to ideal entities — i.e., mathematical objects, Husserlian ideal-meaning units, etc. —

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8 David J. Elrod, *Kierkegaard’s Instant; On Beginnings*, (Indianapolis and Bloomington; University of Indiana Press, 2007), 103.
would be strictly transcendent, in the sense that they might not apply to materially instantiated entities). That an absolutely transcendent category still might be said to be an existential category is an ontological bridge too far, in the sense that (at minimum) existential categories must involve the immanent conditions — the lived experiences — of psycho-social entities. These various critical suggestions have been adduced to support the claim that there is little critical consensus on the nature of Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition. One of the implications of this lack of critical consensus is that the only clarity enjoyed by Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition is that it is clearly vague.

The aim of the present chapter is to elaborate on the mercurial nature of repetition. I suggest that Kierkegaard conceives of repetition as a particular ontological entity (i.e., process; phenomenon) that involves axiological aspects. I claim that the temporal process of repetition involves axiological value, in an essential sense. This is demonstrated with the observation that were one to try to excise value from repetition, the concept would be unfairly restricted. With Deleuze’s elaboration of Kierkegaard, I identify repetition as the sort of phenomenon that tends to resist generalization. Taken together, these analyses yield the conclusion that repetition is an axiologically valent entity that enjoys the ontological status of a particular.

First, I identify a similarity between Kierkegaard’s characterizations of repetition and those specified by Marx in the first chapter The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. I observe that Kierkegaard tends to emphasize the axiological aspects of repetition in the report of pseudonymous Constantin Constantius. Here, repetition is elaborated in explicitly axiological terms — a worthwhile trip to Berlin, an upheaval, a comedic farce, etc. For both Kierkegaard and

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Marx, repetition is axiologically valent, in the sense that values (like good bad, tragic, comic, etc.) are involved with the recurrence of circumstances. A return trip to a city, the re-emergence of the revolutionary conditions of 1789 in the political situation of France in 1848-1852 — these temporal repetitions have axiological significance.

Second, I suggest that Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition pre-figures that which is elaborated by Gilles Deleuze. For both Kierkegaard and Deleuze, temporal repetition involves the emergence of difference — that which is repeated is the circumstance which yields the creation of non-identical entities. Though Deleuze explicitly cites Kierkegaard in his elaboration of the nature of repetition, Deleuze’s indebtedness to Kierkegaard on the subject of temporality has — for the most part — been ignored, in the sense that the critical literature addressing Kierkegaard’s influence on Deleuze tends to focus on other aspects of Deleuze’s thought. In an admirable recent article, Arjen Kleinherenbrink identifies Kierkegaard as influential to Deleuze’s ethics of immanence, through reference to the knight of faith and Deleuze’s critique of normative ethical systems in both volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Marc Katz has written a recent piece that elucidates Kierkegaard’s influence on Deleuze’s and Guattari’s thought on the nature of a conceptual limit, but does not analyse what the implications of this has for temporal repetition. This is a missed opportunity, in the sense that both Kierkegaard and Deleuze sometimes refer to repetition as a limit (i.e., *caesura*) to the progression of linear time. Though Lisa Trahair has recently written a detailed elaboration of the nature of Kierkegaard’s knight of

faith through reference to what Deleuze refers to as the “belief in this world,”14 afforded by the filmic art form, the temporal aspects of cinema — in particular, the detailed analyses of the recurrence of duration in Cinema 2: The Time-Image — are quickly passed over.15 Sophie Wennerscheid follows a similar track in her elaboration of the Deleuze’s and Kierkegaard’s similar thoughts on artistic creation.16 Though temporal repetitions certainly involve a type of ontological creation, it is overly restrictive to characterize these merely in terms of artistic creation. I suggest that the creation of a unique circumstance (i.e., a temporal moment that is discrete from all other temporal moments) is reflected in Kierkegaard’s and Deleuze’s identification of repetition as a phenomenon which tends to resist generalization, in multiple senses of the term.

Taken together, these analyses yield the conclusion that repetition is properly conceived of an axiologically valent entity that tends to obtain as an ontologically unique (i.e., particular) entity.

Two Elaborations of the Axiological Aspect of Temporal Repetition

For Kierkegaard, time is experienced as though it progresses linearly through a unified continuum of temporal instances \((t_1, t_2... t_n)\). Perhaps what is most interesting is the supposition that from the temporal moment of the present, one can either move forward through time (toward the future), or backward through time to the remembered past. Kierkegaard explicitly identifies recollection and repetition as similar temporal movements, though in obverse temporal

directions.\textsuperscript{17} The claim here is that recollections are just like repetitions, save for the fact that repetitions actualize an undisclosed future, while recollections actualize a previously actualized temporal event. Though Roger Poole starkly dismisses Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition (i.e., recollection forward) as incoherent, with his summary remark that “one cannot, of course, recollect forward,”\textsuperscript{18} this seems altogether too quick, in the sense that it does not adequately reflect the psychological reality of one who attempts to discern the meaning of present temporal events or future contingencies through reference to the past. Kierkegaard carefully notes that his concept of recollection is borrowed from the Greeks. The Kierkegaardian concept of recollection is informed by Plato’s claim that the way to make sense of the present events —like the impending execution of Socrates (in \textit{Phaedo}) — involves a recollection of events which had occurred on a previous day (i.e., the day the Athenians had put garlands on the ship that had set sail to Delos).\textsuperscript{19} That \textit{Phaedo}’s remarks are of a temporally prior event is adduced to specify that they are the content of memory. That \textit{Phaedo}’s recollections are used to convey the diegetic meaning of the dialogue from the present of its telling until its future conclusion (which, at least for the dialogue’s participants, is many hours later) demonstrates how a retelling (i.e., repetition) of remembered events may be characterized as recollections forward — toward a narrative future.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{17} Kierkegaard writes: “Repetition and recollection are the same movement, except in opposite directions, for what is recollected has been, is repeated backward, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forward.” (Søren Kierkegaard, \textit{Fear and Trembling: Repetition}, 210).

\textsuperscript{18} Roger Poole, \textit{Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication}, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1993), 63.


\textsuperscript{20} Edward F. Mooney makes a similar point against Poole with his suggestion that “forward facing recollections” (in Plato and Kierkegaard) involve a “reception of meaning that is radiating not from one's past but from one's future.” The crucial difference here is that Mooney seems to imply that the future is already existent — as that from which meanings can radiate. This claim seems
Kierkegaard hints at the axiological aspects of repetition when he elucidates comedy as involving temporality.²¹ The suggestion here is that comedy is an aspect of temporal progression. Stated in more stark terms, were there no such thing as temporal progression (i.e., repetition of discrete temporal instants), then comedy would be non-existent.²² Kierkegaard’s inferential progression is quite subtle: (1) it is stipulated that comic phenomena are dependent on contradictory situations (i.e., situations in which the expected outcomes are not realized); (2) the enthymematic observation is that temporal progression is the necessary ontological pre-condition for the emergence of contradiction — in the Kierkegaardian sense; (3) Kierkegaard observes that comedy would not obtain in any non-temporal (i.e., eternal) circumstance. The ontological dependency relation of comedy to temporality is established as the positive correlate of the third claim. Perhaps it should be noted that Kierkegaard tends to use the term “contradiction” in a slightly different sense than that demanded by Aristotelian logic — i.e., a contradiction obtains when a property (or attribute) is asserted to both belong and not belong to an existent.²³

Kierkegaard tends to use refer to the opposition of social forces, or the tendency of existents to be contrary to one another (i.e., dialectical contradiction) as contradictories. It could be objected that — even with this modified notion of contradiction — there is something a bit off about

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²¹ Kierkegaard writes: “The comic is a category that belongs specifically to the temporal.” (Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, 327).

²² Kierkegaard elaborates on dependency relation the through reference to the possibility of contradiction: “The comic always lies in contradiction (Widerspruch). But in eternity all contradictions are canceled, and the comic is consequently excluded.” (ibid.).

Kierkegaard’s suggestion that (dialectical) contradiction yields comedy. It seems that the expression of a dialectical contradiction could yield any number of different outcomes, to which any number of value predicates could apply. (I.e., one could imagine that a tension of contraries — like those elaborated in the Biblical story of Job; those evident the harrowing tales of children taken from their families at the southern United States border, etc. — might not prove to be a source of comic amusement). In this sense, Kierkegaard’s concept of comedy seems more akin to Aristotle’s concept of a reversal of fortune (περιπέτεια) in which a person’s fate is dramatically reversed. Kierkegaard alleviates this critical concern by cautiously noting that the dialectical contradictions made possible by temporal progression could yield tragic or comic outcomes. Kierkegaard generalizes the observation that repetition produces contradictions, which yield tragic or comic outcomes to a claim about repetition’s nature: repetition involves an axiological aspect.

The axiological aspects of Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition are demonstrated in similarities among thematic content of Constantius’s narrative and that of Kierkegaard’s essay “The Unhappiest One.” In the essay, Kierkegaard identifies unhappiness as involving a sense of temporal dislocation from the present. Constantius suggests that temporal repetition partially

25 Kierkegaard notes this ambiguity with his elaboration of the development of a human personality over time: “As yet the personality is not discerned, and its energy is betokened only in the passion of possibility, for the same thing happens in the spiritual life as with many plants—the main shoot comes last. But this shadow-existence also demands satisfaction, and it is never beneficial to a person if this does not have time to live out its life, whereas on the other hand it is tragic or comic if the individual makes the mistake of living out his life in it.” (Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, 327)
26 Steven Crites elaborates this comparison when he notes that “Repetition appears to be an extended illustration of a predicament sketched in a little essay in volume 1 of Either/Or, ‘The Unhappiest.’” (Steven Crites, “‘The Blissful Security of the Moment’ Recollection, Repetition, and Eternal Recurrence”, 229).
alleviates this sense of unhappiness. A brief exegesis of the salient points of the essay illustrates the nature of the peculiar type of unhappiness that Kierkegaard has in mind. The essay has been written from the perspective of an immiserated individual, who has been cast out of society. The narrative voice of the essay explicitly identifies himself as among “we who live ἀφοισιμένοι and segregati” (i.e., cut off, removed from society).27 After positing various possible causes for unhappiness — immortality;28 languishing in the strange state of having a bifurcated, self-destructive ego;29 the social and religious exclusion endured by an anathematized person,30 etc. — Kierkegaard elucidates the most profound unhappiness as the feeling of being separated from the temporal domain of the present.31 In this sense, the most immiserated of individuals is one for whom it is impossible to find fulfilment in the temporal present. Though the kind of happiness brought on by the sense of being displaced from the present is devastating, Kierkegaard suggests that it is not comprehensive, in the sense that one may find a diminished measure of happiness in the experience of repetition. This is the principal outcome of Constantius’s observation that repetition is analytically distinct from the feeling of hope.32 The key difference between the two

27 Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or Part 1, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (trs.), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 182. The Latin term segregati is identified as a translation of the Greek ἀφοισιμένοι, which is identified as meaning “social exclusion.” (ibid., 521, fn.5).
28 Kierkegaard rejects the suggestion that the: “the unhappiest one was the person who could not die, who could not slip down into a grave.” (ibid., 182).
29 Kierkegaard identifies this as the Hegelian unhappy consciousness: “The unhappy one is the person who in one way or another has his ideal, the substance of his life, the plenitude of his consciousness, his essential nature, outside himself. The unhappy one is the person who is always absent from himself, never present to himself.” (ibid.,184).
30 Kierkegaard observes that the unhappiest one might be thought of as akin to a “wandering Jew.” (ibid., 182).
31 Kierkegaard elaborates: “So, then, the unhappy one is absent. But one is absent when one is in either past or future time.” (ibid., 184)
32 Kierkegaard illustrates a three-fold distinction among hope, recollection, and repetition through metaphor: “Hope is a new garment, stiff and starched and lustrous, but it has never been tried on, and therefore one does not know how becoming it will be or how it will fit. Recollection is a discarded garment that does not fit, however beautiful it is, for one has outgrown it.
is an analogue to the difference between actual and potential. Hope is identified as enjoying a potential mode of existence that never becomes realized. The claim here is that one never gets what one hopes for. (I.e., hope is characterized “as the maiden that slips away through one’s figures”). Repetitions, on the other hand, enjoy an actual mode of existence, in the sense that they are realized. (I.e., recollections are characterized as “beloved wife of whom one never wearies.”) The axiological implication of the distinction is that repetition partially alleviates the unhappiness of those who have lost a sense of the inhabiting the present — because it is actualized, repetition brings a modicum of happiness to those miserable people who feel no relation to their present circumstance.

An analogue to Kierkegaard’s ambivalence to the particular axiological value of a repetition (an ambivalence that is based on the existence of axiological aspects of repetition in general) is found in Marx’s elaboration of the revolutionary tumult that swept through France from 1848 to 1852. A clue to the importance of axiological aspects of repetition — elaborated in terms of the recurrence of revolutionary conditions — is found in Marx’s observation that history repeats itself, first as tragedy, then as farce. Derrida elaborates on the connection of value and repetition with his observation that Marx derives joy from “taking the pulse” of the rhythmic

Repetition is an indestructible garment that fits closely and tenderly, neither binds nor sags.” (Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, 132).

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Marx writes: “Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: The first time as tragedy, the second as farce.” (Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 15). Marx seems to be referring to Hegel’s remarks on the numerous political revolutions of Ancient Rome: “By repetition that which at first appeared merely a matter of chance and contingency becomes a real and ratified existence.” (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, J. Sibree [tr.], [Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001], 342).
repetitions of history. This is not to say that Marx saw the revolutionary tumult of his age through rose-coloured lenses. Marx explicitly notes the negative axiological values of the recollections of the past glories of the 1789 revolt in his characterization of these as the “tradition of all the dead generations that weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.” In a particularly rhetorically loaded passage, Marx cautiously warns against the dangers of celebrating the memory of an overly-romanticized vision of the “defunct epoch” of a revolutionary past. Marx identifies two problems involved with the recollection past revolutionary glories: (1) the tendency to give rise to an unwarranted sense of revolutionary hope (i.e., an “imagined acceleration of motion”)39, and; (2) the tendency to give rise to a mass sense of confused of temporal dis-location (i.e., the lived experience of the population of a “nation [which] feels like that mad Englishman in Bedlam who fancies that he lives in the times of the ancient Pharaohs”).40 Marx’s ambivalence to the revolutionary potential heralded by temporal

36 Derrida writes: “Marx then accumulates the examples of this rhythmic anachrony. He analyses its pulses and impulsions. He takes pleasure in it, the pleasure of repetition; on seeing him so sensitive to these compulsive waves, one gets the impression that he is not just pointing his finger: he is taking the pulse of history.” (Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International, Peggy Kaumf [tr.], [New York and London: Routledge, 1994], 139-140).
37 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 10.
38 Marx writes, “An entire people, which had imagined that by means of a revolution it had imparted to itself an accelerated power of motion, suddenly finds itself set back into a defunct epoch and, in order that no doubt as to the relapse may be possible, the old dates arise again, the old chronology, the old names, the old edicts, which had long become a subject of antiquarian erudition, and the old minions of the law, who had seemed long decayed. The nation feels like that mad Englishman in Bedlam who fancies that he lives in the times of the ancient Pharaohs and daily bemoans the hard labour that he must perform in the Ethiopian mines as a gold digger, immured in this subterranean prison, a dimly burning lamp fastened to his head, the overseer of the slaves behind him with a long whip, and at the exits a confused welter of barbarian mercenaries, who understand neither the forced labourers in the mines nor one another, since they speak no common language.” (ibid., 12).
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
revolution are implied in the enticing observation that repetitions can be temporal re-instantiations of the “poetry of the past.”41 Despite the failures of past revolutions — dangers that Marx elaborates in sometimes excruciating detail — Marx cautiously observes that revolutionary failures are the dialectical preconditions necessary to liberate the French peasantry from their immiserating social conditions.42 This is the expression of a revolutionary hope. William Lyon McBride identifies Marx’s expression of feeling of the immanent possibility of positive social and political change as one of the most substantive indicators of Marx’s optimistic comportment to the future of Europe.43 This is further observed in Engels’ characterization of Marx as a “revolutionist” who — well aware of the immanent possibility of the repetition of negative values — was always firmly on the side of the poor made miserable by capitalism.44 This is the expression of a revolutionary hope for the possibility of a successful revolution. Such a hope can only operate when one grants that repetitions involve axiological aspects.

An Ontological Aspect of Temporal Repetition

41 Ibid.
42 Marx writes: “But the parody of the empire…was necessary to free the mass of the French nation from the weight of tradition and to work out in pure form the opposition between the state power and society. With the progressive undermining of smallholding property, the state structure erected upon it collapses.” (ibid., 112)
44 Engels writes: “For Marx was before all else a revolutionist. His real mission in life was to contribute, in one way or another, to the overthrow of capitalist society and of the state institutions which it had brought into being, to contribute to the liberation of the modern proletariat, which he was first to make conscious of its own position and needs, conscious of the conditions of its emancipation. Fighting was his element. And he fought with a passion few could rival.” (Friedrich Engels, Speech at the Graveside of Marx, in The Marx-Engels Reader, Robert C. Tucker [ed.], [New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1978], 682).
“Repetition is not generality”; with this enticing first line to *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze hints at the kinship of his concept of repetition with that elaborated by Kierkegaard. Though the connection between Kierkegaard and Deleuze enjoys demonstrable textual support with Kierkegaard’s explicit claim that repetition is not “ideality” (i.e., generality), the content of the claim invites question. While the logical operation of negation is easily understandable, the suggestion that repetition is not generality demands clarification, in the sense that Deleuze’s characterization of the term “generality” is quite nuanced.

Deleuze tends to elucidate “generality” as involving an appeal to various transcendent criteria. (E.g., the generality of a natural law which is comprehensible to any psycho-social entity; the generality of a moral law that could serve as normative constraint; the generality of a habit evidenced by a group of people). Repetition involves oppositions to all of these. The claim is that repetition involves none of an appeal to a natural law, an appeal to a moral law, or an appeal to habit. Deleuze specifies that repetition is analytically discrete from generality if it fulfills three conditions: (1) the phenomenon of repetition must involve a “selective test” (i.e., an instant in which a selective determination is made); (2) repetition is characterized as non-identifiable with any of the “laws of nature” or “moral laws”; (3) repetition is non-reducible to the generality of habit. The mercurial nature of each of these conditions invites clarification.

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45 Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 1.
46 Kierkegaard writes: “In ideality alone there is no repetition, for the idea is and remains the same and as such cannot be repeated. When ideality and reality touch each other, then repetition occurs. When, for example, I see something in the moment, ideality enters in and will explain that it is a repetition.” (Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling; Repetition*, 275).
47 Deleuze writes: “Make something new of repetition itself: connect it with a test, with a selection or selective test; make it the supreme object of the will and of freedom.” (Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 6)
48 Deleuze writes: “In consequence, oppose repetition to the laws of nature.” (ibid.)
49 Deleuze writes: “Oppose repetition not only to the generalities of habit but also to the particularities of memory “(ibid.).
For Deleuze, a selective test is the selection of the new (i.e., the unique; that which is without ontological precedent or correlate). Kierkegaard illustrates the selective nature of repetition at key moments in Repetition and Fear and Trembling. The selective nature of repetition is hinted at in the subtitle of Repetition, which identifies the text as a type of “psychological experiment” of a young man to determine whether (or not) repetition is possible. The young man discovers that his attempts to create a temporal repetition are for naught, in the sense that — despite his best efforts — an exact recreation of his previous trip (to Berlin) is impossible. Ultimately, the young man’s investigations yield the observation that the details of his most recent trip to Berlin differ considerably from those of his previous trip — the experiment produces a unique trip, not a repetition of a previous journey. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of a selective test is found in Kierkegaard’s elucidation of the Biblical story of Abraham and Isaac. Kierkegaard cautiously notes that the story is illustrative of two distinct conceptual “movements”: the resignation illustrated by Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac; the acceptance of the “absurd” hypothesis that God will give him a new Isaac.

Taken together, these two movements constitute a selective test that aims at the (perhaps false) belief in the creation of an ontologically unique entity (i.e., the new, unsacrificed son). Both the young man’s psychological experiment and Abraham’s choice to attempt to murder his son illustrate the claim

50 Kierkegaard’s unnamed young man arrives at this conclusion after discovering that the landlord of his lodging house had got married: “But here, alas, again no repetition was possible. My landlord, the druggist…had married.” (Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, 152).

51 Kierkegaard writes: “Abraham makes two movements. He makes the infinite movement of resignation and gives up Isaac, which no one can understand because it is a private venture; but next, at every moment, he makes the movement of faith. This is his consolation. In other words, he is saying: But it will not happen, or if it does, the Lord will give me a new Isaac, that is, by virtue of the absurd.” (Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, 115).
that repetition resists generality, in the sense that the selective test involved in each functions as the ontic pre-condition of the emergence of a non-generalizable entity (i.e., a singularity).

In his elaboration of Deleuze’s analysis of Kierkegaard’s discussion of the tribulations of Job, Henry Somers-Hall observes that natural and moral laws must fulfil a minimal condition of intelligibility. The claim here is that for an entity to be considered a law, it must be comprehended by the category of the thinkable. (I.e., a natural law must figure in the domain of scientific discourse as a subject of analysis, an object to be analysed, a regulative principle, a limit condition, etc.; a moral law must figure in a normative discourse in analogous ways).

Kierkegaard suggests that repetition does not meet this condition, in the narrow sense that repetition seems to involve an ineffable relation with the Divine. Kierkegaard hints at the necessarily vague quality of repetition with the observation that Job’s repeated immiserations are “hard to say in any human language.” Though Kierkegaard cautiously notes that repetition — characterized as the recurring “rebuke of God” — is an existent phenomena, he also observes that repetitions only occur “when every thinkable human certainty and probability were impossible.” The ontological implication is staggering: repetition involves an ineffable aspect that resists generalization into natural or moral law.

The identification of the ineffable aspects of repetition has important implications for Deleuze’s observation that repetition need not be generalized as habit. In his elaboration of the misadventures of Job, Kierkegaard tends to characterize repetition in apocalyptic terms —i.e., as involving any of spiritual, psychological, or physical destruction. John D. Caputo observes that

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53 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, 212.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
Job may be classified as the “teacher of repetition,” in the sense that his repeated immiserations serve as an ominous warning of the negative affect of the repetitive succession of temporal instants. Kierkegaard elaborates on the calamitous nature of repetition through reference to the metaphor of thunderstorm that leaves one shattered, in multiple senses. The characterizations of repetition as involving a radical break imply that habit — typically identified as a type of repetition (i.e., habitual action; any of the unconscious ticks, twitches, spasms, etc. that tend to recurrently affect material entities) — is in fact analytically distinct from repetition. Kierkegaard explicitly draws this distinction when he specifies that repetition (identified with the character trait of earnestness) is ontologically primary to habit. The implication here is that repetition enjoys a relative autonomy, in the sense that it is independent of habit — i.e., habit is dependent on repetition, not the other way around.

When we take the above observations about the nature of repetition together, a striking ontological picture emerges. Repetition is identified as an ontologically primordial process of selection (i.e., test) that seems to resist formalization into general moral or natural law, in the sense that there is an ineffable (i.e., non-linguistic, non-conceptualizable) aspect to the repetitions. In this sense, repetition is a break in the strictly linear concept of temporal flow expressed in the habitual actions of material entities. In every instance, the phenomenon of

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57 Kierkegaard elaborates on the profoundly negative effects associated with the repetition: “I am waiting for the thunderstorm — and for repetition. And yet I would be happy and indescribably blessed if the thunderstorm would only come, even if my sentence were that no repetition is possible… What will be the effect of this thunderstorm? … It will shatter my whole personality— I am prepared. It will render me almost unrecognizable to myself.” (Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling: Repetition, 214)
58 Kierkegaard writes: “Earnestness is acquired originality. Different from habit —which is the disappearance of self-awareness. Therefore, [sic.] genuine repetition is—earnestness.” (ibid., 327).
repetition tends be characterized as the ontologically particular process that is analytically distinct from generality.

Concluding Remarks: Repetition as Actualization of a New Circumstance

In his final letter to Constantias, the nameless young man elaborates on the nature of repetition through reference to Ilithyia (the Greek goddess of childbirth). The reference is apt, in the sense that the text of the metaphorically rich passage illustrates the axiological and ontological significance of repetition. The axiological aspects of repetition are highlighted when the narrative voice characterizes his experience of repetition as akin to that of a skiff adrift on tumultuous seas that “spume with elemental fury.” The ontological particularity of the process of repetition — i.e., its capacities to produce the new; the object without precedent — is elaborated in the identification of repetition as a liberation of temporally prior circumstances.

I adduced the existence of the axiological aspect of repetition through reference to Kierkegaard and Marx. Value — comedy, tragedy, etc. — is involved with the repetition of temporal moments. Any attempt to excise axiological qualities from temporal repetition, i.e., to treat it as something discrete, implies a diminishment of the concept. The intimate relation of repetition and value is illustrated by Marx’s explicit characterizations of the repetition of revolutionary circumstances as involving value.

The ontological particularity of repetition is adduced with Deleuze’s observation that repetition tends to enjoy a non-general ontological status. Deleuze carefully identifies a series of conditions that an existent must meet in order be considered as non-generalizable — the existent must involve a selective test; it tends to be resistant to formalization as a moral or natural law; it

59 Ibid., 221.
enjoys an ontological status that is different from the generality of habit. Kierkegaard’s nuanced elaboration of repetition demonstrates that it tends to satisfy these. The substantive claim is that repetition enjoys an ontological status as a radically particular process that involves the value-laden creation of the new.
CHAPTER 5: THE MEMORY OF CINEMA

Deleuze’s concept of temporality undergoes radical revision with his elaborations of time’s expressions in cinema. In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Deleuze elucidates aspects of Bergson’s thought to present a concept of time that is no longer tethered to the movements of entities. Deleuze — in what is perhaps one of the most odd definitions in the history of Western philosophy — characterizes cinema as attempting to move beyond the representation of the movements of existents to give viewers a “direct presentation of time.” In the present chapter, I elucidate Deleuze’s tantalizing suggestion that cinema, the art form that has moving images as one of its ontic bases, involves a direct representation of a sort of temporality that is conceptually discrete from the movement of existents. I further suggest that filmic expressions of time reveal it to be a singularity that enjoys the attribute of radical indeterminacy. Deleuze further suggests that time — as it is presented in film — obtains as that ongoing continuum of variation.

My argument progresses through four stages: (1) I will critically assess the suggestion of various commentators that the Cinema texts offer a fraught addition to Deleuze’s philosophy of time; (2) I suggest that Deleuze’s innovative reading of Bergson’s concept of duration is key to understanding how time is expressed in cinema; (3) I observe — through reference to Alain Robbe-Grillet’s theory of artistic descriptions — that a direct image of time enjoys nascent expression in the form of “pure optical and

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1 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (tr.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
2 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (tr.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
3 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 38.
“acoustic situations” (i.e., moments of profound change in any of the diegetic elements of a film story); (4) finally — through reference to Deleuze’s nuanced reading of Bergson’s ontology of virtual and actual modes of existence — I suggest that time gains direct cinematic expression in the peculiar “crystal-images” that proliferate in post-World War II cinema. I observe that time’s expression in cinema involves all of diminishment of the relative importance of the relation of temporal succession, prioritization of time’s involvement with fundamental ontological change, and specification of the strictly simultaneous emergence of past and present. Further, I suggest that this temporality forms a continuum of variation without end. Taken together, these yield the claim that the direct presentation of time in cinema involves characterizing temporality as a singularity that is intrinsic to the cinematic mode of artistic expression. Perhaps the most magical of all art forms, cinema continues to delight us in no small measure due to its capacity to express a little morsel of time as pure, unceasing variation.

**Deleuze’s Phenomenology of Cinema?**

The nuanced nature of Deleuze’s identification of cinema as a presentation of time that is somehow removed from the movements of photographically represented objectivities (i.e., all of the characters, elements of setting, material entities, etc.) has produced some critical befuddlement, in the sense that analyses of Deleuze’s claims on the nature of cinema and its expression of temporality tend to be divided. Commentators seem oddly flummoxed when it comes to Deleuze’s analyses of film. This consternation is evidenced variously as hesitancy in addressing the substantive philosophical claims about the nature of temporality elaborated in *Cinema 2*, mischaracterization of the relative importance of Deleuze’s re-evaluation of time
through reference to cinema, and a strange ambivalence evident in competing identifications of what Deleuze is up to with his striking analyses of film.

In an otherwise superlative elaboration of Deleuze’s philosophy of time, James Williams suggests that though the *Cinema* texts stand as remarkable contributions to the philosophy of film, one should be wary of approaching the texts as though they develop a substantive contribution to Deleuze’s thought on the nature of temporality.⁴ Williams identifies three reasons for being wary of both *Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2*: (1) he observes an apparent ambiguity in Deleuze’s use of the term “image”;⁵ (2) he suggests that the analyses of all of artists, works of art, and the ontological concepts expressed by these tend to be inadequate, in the sense that these are “descriptive and restricted”⁶ in comparison to more lengthy treatments offered in other of Deleuze’s works — particularly *Logic of Sense* and *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, though one also might mention *Coldness and Cruelty*, *Proust and Signs*, as well as *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*; (3) his claims that the mode of exposition and the development of substantive claims tends to be rather disjointed in comparison to that evidenced in other texts.⁷

Here I should point out that Williams’ reasons for his hesitancy to elaborate on — let alone endorse — the conceptualizations of time developed in the *Cinema* texts are sketchy. Deleuze’s use of the term “image,” as I develop (through particular reference to the “crystalline image of time”) in the penultimate section of this chapter, is consistent with that of Bergson. In the

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⁵ Ibid., 160.
⁶ Ibid.
⁷ Referring to Deleuze’s *Essays Critical and Clinical* and *The Logic of Sense*, Williams observes that in these “concepts and artwork grow inwards and explode outwards together, in a style with more rhythm, texture, complexity of pace, and linguistic invention” than is evident in either of Deleuze’s books on *Cinema*. (ibid., 161).
absence of a clearly stated set of criteria and means of evaluating the merits of one mode of philosophical exegesis relative to another — neither of which Williams gives — one must reject the second and third putative reasons for wariness as akin to an ill-defined axiological complaint.

Though András Bálint Kovács characterizes Deleuze’s as “by far the deepest and most developed theory of modern cinema [that] has been formulated,” he also observes that it “does not fit in with any previous theoretical frameworks.”8 Paul Schrader, on the other hand, starkly identifies Deleuze’s elucidation of the nature and function of cinema as “the phenomenology of perception through time.”9 Vivian Sobchack echoes Schrader’s sentiment with her suggestion

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9 Paul Schrader, Transcendental Style in Film: Ozu, Bresson, and Dreyer, (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018), 3. With his suggestion that Deleuze seems to bear an affinity to various phenomenologists and explicitly phenomenological claims, Schrader is hardly a voice in the wilderness. Particularly interesting recent studies advancing similar theses include: Henry Somers-Hall, “Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of Difference: Difference and Repetition, Chapter One” Deleuze and Guattari Studies 13, no. 3 (2019), pp. 401-415; Judith Wambacq, Thinking Between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty, (Athens: University of Ohio Press, 2017); Jay Lampert, “Deleuze’s ‘Power of Decision,’ in Kant’s =X and Husserl’s Noema”, At the Edges of Thought: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy, Craig Lundy and Daniela Voss (ed.), (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 272-292); Levi R. Bryant, “Transcendental Empiricism: The Image of Thought and the ‘Phenomenology’ of the Encounter”, Difference and Givenness: Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism, and the Ontology of Difference, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2008) 73-92; Corry Shores “In the Still of the Moment: Deleuze’s Phenomena of Motionless Time” Deleuze Studies 8, no. 2 (2014), pp. 199-229. It should be pointed out that most of these tend to focus on Deleuze’s early work — primarily Difference and Repetition — while leaving aside Deleuze’s critiques of Husserl (and the Husserlian concept of “natural perception”) in The Logic of Sense, Cinema 1: The-Movement Image, and Cinema 2: The Time-Image. François Zourabichvili suggests that when one takes Deleuze’s characterization of “becoming” — particularly, the various cinematic becomings that are evidenced by the changes in the way films are made, as well as the ways cinematic narrative style has altered with the French New Wave — Deleuze’s conceptual distance “from phenomenology and its heirs” becomes apparent. (François Zourabichvili, Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event together with The Vocabulary of Deleuze, Gregg Lambert and Daniel W. Smith [ed.], Kieran Aarons [tr.], [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012], 173).
that Deleuze’s philosophy of film parallels phenomenology in the sense that Deleuze’s key claims about the nature of cinematic movement and image seem to correlate with insights of Merleau-Ponty’s later work.\textsuperscript{10} Julien Guillemet suggests pretty much the exact opposite with his stark claim that “Deleuze’s relation to phenomenology appears as a strict refusal of the traditional phenomenological model.”\textsuperscript{11} As is the case with most stringent interpretive claims, this reading is dubious, in the sense that Deleuze’s relation with phenomenology in the Cinema texts tends to be decidedly more nuanced than partisan readings would care to admit. David Rodowick observes that Deleuze tends to characterize phenomenology as an “ambiguous ally” to the Deleuzian conceptualization of cinema.\textsuperscript{12} Deleuze’s nuanced critique of the suggestion that cinematic expression involves aspects that are akin to substantive claims of various phenomenologists (primarily Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty) involves two observations: (1) it seems that phenomenologists tend to disregard cinematic art as something worthy of analysis; (2) Husserlian phenomenology tends to prioritize a mode of (natural) perception of spatio-temporally extended entities, which is ill-fitting with the experience of viewing a film. Each of these invites elaboration.

Deleuze’s suggestion that phenomenology has an “embarrassed attitude” with respect to cinema has some merit, in the sense that there seems to be a paucity phenomenological analysis of cinematic art relative to the analyses of other art forms.\textsuperscript{13} (Here, one cannot help but think of

\textsuperscript{13} Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1: The Movement-Image}, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (trs.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 57.
the numerous phenomenological analyses of paintings and literary works by Heidegger and
Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, and their followers.) Deleuze’s provocative observation that Husserl
“never mentions cinema at all,” though technically true, is not quite as scandalous as one might
think.14 Though Husserl doesn’t specifically mention the moving images of film (i.e.,
cinematographic images), this shouldn’t come as a terrible shock, if for no other reason than
cinematic art was in its infancy when Husserl was writing. The Lumière Brothers are credited
with presenting the first series of documentary shorts to a paying audience on 28 December 1895
—L’arrivée d’un train en gare de La Ciotat, Déjeuner de Bébé, and L’arroseur arrosé. Georges
Méliès founded the first film studio and in-house film theatre in 1896. Méliès is also credited
with producing and showing the first single reel narrative film — Le Voyage dans la Lune — in
1902.15 During this period, Husserl was busy starting his philosophical career at the University of
Halle before being uprooted to take residence in Göttingen. Husserl published the first edition of
the Logical Investigations one year before Méliès entertained audiences with the images of
magical aliens dancing on the moon. In all likelihood, Husserl was unaware of the evolution of
the magic lantern in France when he published his first major phenomenological text. It should
also be noted that Husserl does discuss the moving image (albeit briefly) during this time.16
Unfortunately, the situation does not improve much with Sartre, who — though he mentions
going to the movies with his mother in The Words and briefly elaborates on the nature of slow

14 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam
(trs.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 56.
15 Cook offers a lovely, condensed history of the art form, including its genesis from the
zoroptrepe (David A. Cook, A History of Narrative Cinema, [London and New York, WW and
Norton Company, 2016], 7-14).
16 Edmund Husserl, Edmund Husserl Collected Works XI: Phantasy, Image, Consciousness, and
Memory (1898-1925), Rudolf Bernet (ed.), John B. Brough (tr.), (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 66,
584n3, 645, and 646.
motion cinema in *The Imaginary* — refrains from offering a systematic analysis of the art form.\(^\text{17}\) Deleuze also suggests that cinema suffers from a cursory treatment by Merleau-Ponty.\(^\text{18}\) Perhaps it is worth noting that Roman Ingarden discusses film in a slightly more substantive way than Merleau-Ponty. Unfortunately, Ingarden’s brief analyses of film have — until quite recently — been unduly neglected by North American and French phenomenologists.\(^\text{19}\) Deleuze’s observation that phenomenologists tend to treat the filmic art form in a manner analogous to how a family might be inclined to treat a bastard cousin is borne out (with some modification) by history.

Deleuze offers a further clue to the fraught relation between phenomenology and cinematic representation with his explicit suggestion that cinema offers an alternative to the model of natural perception offered by Husserlian phenomenology. In a lecture on the topic given during the fall of 1981, Deleuze starkly notes that “cinematic perception is not natural perception. Not at all.”\(^\text{20}\) The difference among cinematic perception and natural perception

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involves the ontic bases of perceived objects. Deleuze suggests that natural perception presents objects in motion — e.g., the object of natural perception might be a bird fluttering its wings, pecking at a worm, prancing along a branch. The object of cinematic perception is explicitly the photographic representation of an entity isolated from motion. Deleuze’s analytic point is based on the observation that we typically perceive physical entities in motion and cinematic perception only affords us the perception of entities for which motion is a second-order property. The claim is that the smallest building block of our natural perception — the ontologically primary base of naturally perceived moments — is composed of entities enjoying inter-related motions. Writing a few scant years after the birth of cinema in 1895, Henri Bergson observed that cinematic perception involves (as its ontic base) “snapshots of a passing reality.” Bergson goes on to suggest that cinematic images are frozen in time, in the sense that they are bereft of any movement. (I.e., the cinematic image involves a negation of the motion of the naturally perceived object). Though it is the case that (when watching a film) we perceive entities that have the semblance of motion — e.g., the grotesque image of the razorblade slicing an eyeball in Luis Buñuel’s Un Chien Andalou; the horrific image of the blood gushing out of the elevator doors in Stanley Kubrick’s The Shining — this is the product of the serial organization and projection of static photographic images. While natural perception involves entities in motion, cinematic perception involves the mere illusion of entities in motion. In this sense, the perceived


22 Luis Buñuel (dir.), Un Chien Andalou, (Les Grands Films, 1929).
23 Stanley Kubrick (dir.), The Shining (The Producer Circle Company, 1980).
motion of cinematic entities is ontologically secondary event; a cinematographic illusion
conjured the projection of still images at very specific temporal rates.\(^{24}\)

In addition to Deleuze’s observations about the ontic base of the cinematographic illusion
of movement, one may observe a further difference among natural perception and cinematic
perception. Deleuze seems to suggest that cinematic perception differs in kind from natural
perception. Here, Deleuze’s critique is directed as much against André Bazin as it is against
Husserl. One of the fundamental observations of Husserlian phenomenology is that “all
consciousness is consciousness of”.\(^{25}\) Natural perception suggests that objects (in the real world)
are presented to consciousness as composites of various schematized aspects. Intentional
consciousness then sets about performing the complex task of fulfilling these aspects through
reference to all of transcendent structures of reality, structures of consciousness, and social
conditions evidenced in the life world (most of which are presented in a schematized fashion), in
the ongoing creation of real objects of consciousness.\(^{26}\) Bazin suggests that perception of cinema

\(^{24}\) Typically, the illusion of perceived motion is achieved by projecting still images at a rate of
rate of twenty-four frames per second. Settling on this frame rate was the result of a fraught
history of technological evolution that spanned almost two-thirds of the Nineteenth century:
beginning with the invention of Plateau’s Phenakistoscope (1832), progressing through Horner’s
Zoetrope (1832), Muybridge’s Zoopraxiscope (1879), and Edison’s Kinetograph (1891), to
finally be perfected with the Lumière brothers’ Cinématographe (1895).

\(^{25}\) Edmund Husserl quoted by Deleuze. (Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Hugh
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam [tr.]. [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997],
56).

\(^{26}\) Spiegelberg observes that Husserlian intentional directedness at an object involves four
discrete characteristics: (1) objectivation; (2) identification; (3) connection; (4) constitution. The
intentional act of fulfilling schematized aspects occurs in the intuitive fulfilment of an entity
which appears as an incomplete — not yet fully determined — form. This tends to be associated
with the intentional process of connection. (Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological
of the complex process of fulfilling schematized aspects that are presented in literary works of
art. The model presented here is analogous to the process of natural perception. Mitscherling
writes: “When consciousness attends to (or ‘intends’) a particular object, it is usually the case
that only some of the ‘aspects’ of that object are presented immediately to consciousness, and
seems to involve a similar process with his observation that the cinematic image reveals the “natural image of a world”;\textsuperscript{27} a flow of image which is “uncompromisingly realistic,” in the sense that it perfectly conveys the aspects of “the natural world.”\textsuperscript{28} Bazin’s claim here is that the camera functions as a prosthesis to the human eye, which assists in the process of perception (presenting aspects of entities in the empirically sensed world and fomenting their fulfillment by intentional consciousness) that is fundamentally analogous to that originally specified by Husserl. Deleuze explicitly denies this analogy when he observes that “the cinema can, with impunity, bring us close to things or take us away from them and revolve around them, it suppresses both the anchoring of the subject and horizon of the world.”\textsuperscript{29} The substantive observation here is that the camera does things which the eye human eye cannot do, in ways that are liberated from the direction of the perceiver’s intentional consciousness. With these analyses, Deleuze appears to be making a complex deduction from premises specified by Walter
Benjamin, Dziga Vertov, and Robert Bresson. Benjamin makes the astute observation that the camera “can bring out those aspects of the original that are unattainable to the naked eye yet accessible to the lens, which is adjustable and chooses its angle at will”;\(^{30}\) Vertov observes that cinema’s “kino-eye lives and moves in time and space; it gathers and records impressions in a manner wholly different from that of the human eye”;\(^ {31}\) Bresson elaborates on the camera’s capacities to record “what no human eye is capable of catching, no pencil, brush, pen of pinning down…without knowing what it is, and pins its down with a machine's scrupulous indifference.”\(^ {32}\) Deleuze observes that Husserlian phenomenology asserts a privilege to the human eye as the means by which to perceive the world. Without hesitation, Bazin accepts this privilege, only to suggest that the camera augments it. Benjamin, Vertov, and Bresson each fundamentally deny the human eye enjoys this privileged status — the movie camera (with its swoops, long tracking shots, radical close-ups, and sweeping panoramas) performs functions to which no human eye could dare aspire. All of these imply that cinematic perception involves an intentionality that is decidedly not human. The profound capacities of the kino-eye are illustrated in the — nearly sublime — opening sequence of *Berlin: Die Sinfonie der Großstadt* (1927): the film begins with the image of the languid ebb of calm waters, only to give way (through an abstract dissolve consisting of the multi-section white planes and a descending circle) to the metallic arms of a railway crossing; then, there is a rapid cut to a speeding train, which dissolves


into a shot of the pistons of an engine.\textsuperscript{33} Here we have the an atypical conjunction of typical geometric forms (the abstract dissolve), as well as images of nature viewed in unnatural ways; things are viewed from angles that are seemingly unattainable by the human eye — i.e., hovering over the unblemished surface of water, which is not disturbed by the ripple caused by the immersion of a physical body. These are illustrative of a mode of perception of that is quite removed from any that we would identify as directed by human intentionality. These observations of poets, filmmakers, and philosophers suggest that cinema affords a mode of perception which is radically distinct from that so rigorously specified in Husserlian phenomenology.

When taken together, these two complex claims — that there is scant substantive discussion of film in the works of Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, and that cinema affords a modality of perception that is distinct from (Husserlian) natural perception — imply that there is a conceptual distance among phenomenological accounts of the cinematic art form and that suggested by Deleuze. One might add to these a further observation, which obliquely challenges the notion that Deleuze’s account of temporal expression in cinema is akin to aspects of Husserlian phenomenology. In an interview with Raymond Bellour, Deleuze starkly observes that “there is no dualism at all” involved in his account of the nature of cinema.\textsuperscript{34} It has been observed that there is a sort of dualism hard baked into Husserl’s phenomenology. This


\textsuperscript{34} Gilles Deleuze, “Interview on \textit{Anti-Oedipus} with Raymond Bellour”, \textit{Gilles Deleuze: Letters and Other Texts}, David Lapoujade (ed.), Ames Hodges (tr.), (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2020), pp. 195-240, 226.
suggestion enjoys ample textual support, in the sense that Husserl explicitly claims that there is a methodological dualism involved in his phenomenology. Husserl stipulates — in *Ideas I* — that the *res cogitans* is separated from the world of physical, material, spatio-temporally extended entities “by a veritable abyss.”\(^{35}\) Husserl tries to diminish dualism by prescribing the application of the phenomenological method, but by limiting the scope of his phenomenology to epistemology, avoids really contradicting ontological dualism. In *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, Husserl suggests that the function of intentional consciousness is to intertwine with the external (physical and ideal) world through various acts of clarification achieved by intentionality fulfilling the schematized aspects of entities presented through perception — i.e., by becoming conscious of entities.\(^{36}\) Were this intertwining achieved (i.e., were the process of fulfillment of schematized aspects ever completely actualized) this would diminish any concerns about an abiding dualism. Unfortunately, the success of Husserl’s efforts is a matter of dispute. Françoise Dastur observes that Husserl’s phenomenology seems to be plagued by an intractable dualism.\(^{37}\) Merleau-Ponty echoes this suggestion with his observation that at “the end of


\(^{36}\) Husserl writes: “to the extent, however, that every-consciousness is ‘consciousness-of,’ the essential study of consciousness also includes that of consciousness-meaning and consciousness-objectivity as such. To study any kind of objectivity whatever according to its general essence (a study that can pursue interests far removed from those of knowledge theory and the investigation of consciousness) means to concern oneself with objectivity’s modes of givenness and to exhaust its essential content with the process of ‘clarification’ proper to it.” (Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, Quentin Lauer [tr.], [New York: Harper and Row, 1965], 90-91).

\(^{37}\) Dastur writes: “because, even if transcendental phenomenology remains dualistic in spite of Husserl's efforts toward monism, its purpose is not to assert dualism dogmatically, but rather to demonstrate, in line with the phenomenological way of thinking, that unity can only be given pretheoretically (*vortheoretisch*): the awakening of thought splits this unity irrevocably into pieces. That is why, for Husserl, dualism never ceases to be a problem — a problem which pointed to itself as the most thought deserving” (Françoise Dastur, “Husserl and the Problem of Dualism,”65-76, *Analecta Husserliana XVI; Soul and Body in Husserlian Phenomenology*, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka [ed.], [Dordrecht, Boston, and Lancaster: D. Reidel, 1983], 65).
Husserl's life there is an unthought-of element in his works which is wholly his and yet opens out on something else."\textsuperscript{38} The existence of this unresolved something else to which consciousness opens toward fulfils the minimal condition of an unresolved species of dualism at work in Husserlian phenomenology. The fact that Deleuze explicitly suggests that his concept of cinema is bereft of dualism implies that it might have less in common with Husserlian phenomenology than one might expect.

\textbf{The Filmic Duration (of Memory and Change)}

Deleuze’s suggestion that temporality is afforded a direct presentation in film involves a Bergsonian concept of temporal duration that is comprehensive of the memorial past (of memory), the lived present, and the creation of the new. The concept of time presented in the \textit{Cinema} texts is substantively different than that elaborated in other texts like \textit{The Logic of Sense} — in which the putatively discrete temporal domains of past, present, and future are explicitly characterized as “readings” of the various types of (logical, ontological, axiological) relations that obtain among Aion and Chronos. Further, though Deleuze quite comfortably elaborates on the ontological primacy of a synthesis among discrete ontological entities as giving rise to a comprehensive time in \textit{Difference and Repetition}, in the \textit{Cinema} texts, this language of syntheses has fallen by the wayside, having been replaced by discussions of tensions among virtual and actual modes of being as they obtain in the lived present that is expressed in cinema. Though Deleuze had written on Bergson prior to the publication of \textit{Difference and Repetition} (both

“Bergson 1859-1941”\textsuperscript{39} and “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”\textsuperscript{40} are significant texts which hint at aspects of a robust concept of temporality, it isn’t until Bergsonism and the commentaries on Bergson in Cinema 1 and Cinema 2 that Deleuze’s Bergsonian account of temporality enjoys thorough elaboration. In the Cinema texts, Deleuze modifies his prior concepts of temporality to offer an account of duration that involves an ontologically comprehensive nature and a radical capacity to modify existents. Deleuze suggests that we experience this sort of duration in the cinematic art form — which presents the viewing audience with a series of visible contractions among the photographically represented past and the present; a “well defined tension”\textsuperscript{41} among the living present and the memorial past that is expressed in filmic sequences, series, and framings of photographically represented events. What this implies about the nature of temporality and the nature of the cinematic expression of time is staggering, if for no other reason than that it involves: (1) a reconceptualization of temporality that establishes an identity relation — i.e., the identity enjoyed by the elements of a multiplicity — among putatively distinct temporal domains; (2) a diminishment of the claim that temporality is reducible to a succession relation of temporal moments — $t_1,t_2…t_n$ — ; (3) a suggestion that cinema can represent these.

\textsuperscript{39} Gilles Deleuze, “Bergson, 1859-1941” Desert Islands and Other Texts: 1953-1974, David Lapoujade (ed.), Michael Taormina (tr.), (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2002), 22-32.

\textsuperscript{40} Gilles Deleuze, “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”, Desert Islands and Other Texts: 1953-1974, David Lapoujade (ed.), Michael Taormina (tr.), (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2002), 32-52.

Bergson seems never to tire of modifying his concept of duration. In a few remarkable pages in the second chapter of *Time and Free Will*, the concept (of duration) is variously characterized as a “multiplicity” of temporal moments, which (strangely) don’t enjoy any correlation with measurable points distributed in physical space — i.e., a multiplicity of “pure number”; the form assumed by the “succession of our conscious states” in moments of recollection; an intensive magnitude; a mercurial ontological process which seems to be like Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the flesh, in the narrow sense that it is primary to substance. In *Matter and Memory* the over-determined concept undergoes further revision. Here, duration is characterized as the continuous flow of mental-states through which psycho-social entities “insensibly” pass in the “really lived” experience of a continuity that strangely conditions experience, without revealing itself in its entirety; the dynamic “tension” that obtains among various putatively discrete mental states. This characterization in particular becomes slightly more fraught when taken in conjunction with Bergson’s careful observation that any supposed division among mental states is “artificial,” in the sense that these are comprehended as inter-related aspects of a unified — non-divisible; non-reducible — lived experience. The situation doesn’t get much better when we come to *Creative Evolution*. Here, Bergson characterizes duration variously as the flow of unceasing change; a flux of putatively discrete mental states.

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43 Ibid., 78; 89.
44 Ibid., 100.
46 Ibid., 111.
48 Ibid., 186.
49 Ibid.
50 Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 1-3.
merging into one another;\textsuperscript{51} the past (characterized as an oddly active and expanding process) which “gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances.”\textsuperscript{52} Taken together, this dizzying array of sometimes competing definitions suggest an over-determined concept that threatens to lose any sense of unity.

The plurality of aspects associated with the concept of duration seems to have led to some confusion about the nature of the concept. Rebecca Hill starkly observes that Bergson’s duration may be identified as a dualistic relation that obtains among tendencies (i.e., proto-entities, transcendental conditions, disparate forces, poorly identified urges, etc. that are involved in multiple processes of transformation).\textsuperscript{53} Hill seems to undermine her initial identification when she suggests that these tendencies are sexed, in the sense that they are inherently expressive of masculine or feminine characteristics.\textsuperscript{54} Though it is the case that Bergson explicitly characterizes durations as involving pre-individuated tendencies (as opposed to clearly defined quantifiable states), it seems odd to identify any particular sexedness — which would be an individuated trait — as an attribute of these. Bergson explicitly notes that the complex concept of duration tends to resist identification as a metaphysical simple (i.e., a state, and entity, something reducible to one aspect) in numerous places. Perhaps the clearest identification of the involvement of tendencies and duration is found in \textit{Creative Evolution}, in a remarkable passage where Bergson characterizes duration as a complex relation of pre-individuated tendencies.\textsuperscript{55} Deleuze suggests that tendency and duration enjoy an ontological identity, in the sense that both

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid. 4.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
involve pure difference: “Duration or tendency is the difference of self with itself; and what differs from itself is, in an unmediated way, the unity of substance and subject.” In a lecture on Leibniz, Deleuze further identifies duration as a process of differentiation that bears a striking conceptual similarity with conatus, in the sense that these involve ontogenetic forces. These two observations — that duration is similar to a tendency and that duration is akin to a pre-individuated force (i.e., conatus) — are sufficient to demonstrate a confusion involved in the suggestion that duration involves individuated traits. Hill attempts to support her argument by pointing to a “hierarchical sexuation” implicit in Bergson’s use of metaphor in elaborating on the nature of duration. This is unfortunate for at least two reasons. Hill does very little to clarify what a “sexuated” hierarchy would look like. Confronted with such a linguistic monstrosity, in the absence of any clear definiens, one is just as apt to produce an accurate identification of Bergsonian duration, as one is to conjure a profound ontological confusion. It might also be observed that a dualistic relation among any of existents or tendencies would tend to be expressed as parallelism — i.e., an ontological relation ill-fitting the sort of formation implied by reference to any sort of hierarchy, regardless of the identity of its relata. Perhaps it should also

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57 Deleuze observes: “In other words, if I want to speak in more scholarly terms, mathematical or physical terms borrowed from Leibniz’s terminology, movement in the process of occurring implies a differential, a differential of movement. The unity of movement in the process of occurring is, in the first place, the differential of movement, that is, the difference between the movement that has just occurred and the one that’s occurring, or between the one that is occurring and the one that is going to occur. We can call this differential effort (or urge); in Latin, we will call it conatus, that is, effort, or urge, or admit that Bergson is not far off when he calls it tendency.” (Gilles Deleuze, “Lecture 16, 5 May 1987: The Theory of Substance in Aristotle, Descartes and Leibniz” Charles J. Stivale [tr.], https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/seminars/leibniz-and-baroque/lecture-16 [Date Accessed: 6 September 2020]).
be observed that Bergson tends to characterize duration in non-hierarchical terms — i.e., as a qualitative multiplicity; an ontological process akin to an organic unity; a psychological “flux” — all of which tend to be analytically, logically, and ontologically discrete to the type of arrangement associated with any form of hierarchy.

Arguing from more stable conceptual ground, Jean Hyppolite suggests that Bergsonian duration is identical to memory, in the sense that it involves an inter-relation of non-discrete moments that are temporally prior to the present.\(^{58}\) Leonard Lawlor echoes this view, when he summarily characterizes Bergson’s concept of duration as akin to memory, albeit in senses that involve subtle modifications of all of its nature, the objects of recollection, and purposiveness implied by various acts of recollecting.\(^{59}\) Indeed, Bergson — in *Creative Evolution* — explicitly identifies memory and duration when he observes that “duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances.”\(^{60}\) Bergson’s choices of metaphor and verb tense suggest a conceptualization of memory as a process that is substantively different from the concept of memory as a mental repository of prior experience — i.e., a “mind palace,” a mental labyrinth that is accessed through the repetition of a mnemonic device (the calming rhythms of “the thread of a tune” that guides one to a “shelter” which contains the memories of their childhood)\(^{61}\) — that is typically used in filmic attempts to visualize memory.

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\(^{58}\) Hyppolite observes: “This [Bergsonian] duration — which is pure succession, the extension of the past into the present, and therefore already memory — is not a series of distinct terms outside of one another, nor a coexistence of past with present.” (Jean Hyppolite, “Various Aspects of Memory in Bergson”, Athena V. Colman [tr.], Appendix II in *The Challenge of Bergson: Phenomenology, Ontology, Ethics*, pp., 112-127, [London and New York: Continuum, 1993], 112).


(This concept of memory as a repository has been referenced so often that it has become a filmic trope. Recent filmic examples include: the “mental map” used by Sherlock Holmes in the television episode The Hounds of Baskerville;\(^\text{62}\) the mesmerizing sequence of Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner, in which Deckard uses the sepia-coloured photographs on his piano to unlock the memories of his childhood — memories which resist washing away into the oblivion “like tears in the rain”;\(^\text{63}\) the hellish industrial furnace where K retreats to the memories of childhood in Denis Villeneuve’s Blade Runner 2049).\(^\text{64}\) The primary difference among Bergson’s concept of duration and the type of memory illustrated in these filmic representations is that though memory palaces tend to be illustrated as domains of relative stasis, duration is dynamic. In Matter and Memory, Bergson elucidates on memory’s activity of “gnawing” into the future through reference to the mental activity of “recording” occurrences in the temporal present, for the purpose of forming habits (which might become involved in shaping a psycho-social entity’s behaviours at a future moment).\(^\text{65}\) The dynamic aspect of memory is further illustrated by Bergson’s careful observation that habit (i.e., all of what is remembered; the constantly expanding content of memory) participates in the formation of moral obligation.\(^\text{66}\) Bergson further elaborates on the aims of memory (i.e., its functional goal or end) when he notes that each of the moments of our lives, “is a kind of creation.”\(^\text{67}\) When taken in conjunction with the stipulation that each temporal moment of existence involves both the content of memory and the ongoing organization of this content, Bergson’s observation yields the implication that memory

\(^{62}\) Paul McGuigan (dir.), The Hounds of Baskerville, BBC: 8 January 2012.  
\(^{64}\) Denis Villeneuve (dir.), Blade Runner 2049, (Columbia Pictures: 2017).  
\(^{65}\) Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, 83.  
\(^{67}\) Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, 7.
is involved in the dynamic creation of the utterly unique. No longer identified as merely the repository of now past, slowly fading moments, Bergson suggests that memory is identical to duration, in the sense that all of its nature, processes, and purpose are involved with the creation of something without ontological correlate or precedent.

Deleuze clarifies the role of duration in the production of difference with his elucidation of Bergson’s “third thesis” (of movement and change) in *Cinema 1*. Though there is no explicit mention of the identity relation among duration and memory in these densely argued passages, one might forgive this apparent oversight, if for no other reason than the identity of these had already been stipulated in *Bergsonism*.68 Deleuze formulates Bergson’s third thesis as the complex claim that suggests, “not only is the instant an immobile section of movement, but movement is a mobile section of duration, that is of the Whole, or of a whole.”69 Bergson explicitly notes—in *Creative Evolution*—that a movement of entities in space involves a transformation of that space.70 Bergson’s complex ontological argument involves: (1) the stipulation of a distinction among the processes of transformation and translation; (2) positing an uncontentious distinction in kind—i.e., a categorical distinction—among qualities and quantities; (3) the observation that the process of translation involves quantitative change—i.e., it is a translation of quantitative values; (4) the inference that transformation involves

68 Here Deleuze observes: “Pure duration offers us a succession that is purely internal, without exteriority; space, an exteriority, without succession (in effect, that is the memory of the past; the recollection of what has happened in space would already imply a mind that endures).” (Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam [tr.], [New York: Zone, 1991], 37).


70 Bergson writes: “The wholly superficial displacements of masses and molecules studied in physics and chemistry would become by relation to that inner vital movement (which is transformation and not translation) what the position of a moving of a moving object is the movement of that object in space.” (Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 37).
modification of particular qualities; (5) the observation of the corollary that movements in space involve qualitative changes, and finally; (6) the assertion that a transformation of a particular quality implies a qualitative change to the generality that comprehends the particular. Taken together, these yield the profound claim that the displacement of spatio-temporally extended entities implies a fundamental change to the nature of space itself. In this sense, the domain (or medium) that comprehends movements of particulars is revealed to be ontologically correlated with a modification of the qualities of any particular. These are the sorts of ontological transformations that have been illustrated to such terrifying effect in both horror literature and film. Robert Wise’s *The Haunting*\(^71\) — which is an adaptation of Shirley Jackson’s *The Haunting of Hill House*\(^72\) — chronicles the anguish of Eleanora as she resides in a gothic mansion that alters all of its physical dimensions, lighting, and interior temperature in response to her memories of childhood trauma. A similar sort of physical change to space brought about by qualitative change is also illustrated in the fiery end of the Overlook Hotel in Steven King’s novel,\(^73\) though the hotel remains standing at the end Stanley Kubrick’s *The Shining*\(^74\) — a film that is vastly superior to King’s derivative novel, because it explicitly correlates the physical changes of the hotel to the mental states of Jack, Wendy, and Danny, as well as the memorial history of the Colorado Rocky Mountains, i.e., the qualitative elements of various domains. Thomas Allen Nelson elaborates on how, in Kubrick’s film, changes to the hotel’s spatiality are directly correlated with — i.e., responses to, expressions of, doublings of — characters’ internal

\(^74\) Stanley Kubrick (dir.), *The Shining*, (The Producer Circle Company: 1980).
One cannot help but think of spatio-temporal discontinuities evident in some of the film’s most memorable scenes: the elevator of blood that erupts when Jack, Wendy, or Danny feel rage or terror; the appearance of the bloated corpse of a nude crone that greets Jack’s aberrant sexual desires in room 237; the ominous appearance of an ancient scrap book next to Jack’s typewriter as he struggles to recall the plot of his horribly repetitive manuscript; the disquieting appearance of the twin girls (the Grady twins) who promise to play with a Danny “forever and ever”; the shifting patterns on both the hallway carpet and the Native American murals in the Colorado Lounge; the population and de-population of the Gold Room; the alteration in lighting of the hotel bar when Jack gets a glass of bourbon; the shifting spatial dimensions of the hedge maze; the strange appearance of a room full of skeletons as Wendy is confronted with the memories of Jack’s abuse to her and Danny; the deeply disturbing appearance of an entity dressed as a bear performing fellatio on a man in 1920’s formal attire as Wendy witnesses a temporally prior event in the hotel (the 1921 New Year’s Eve party). All of these spatio-temporal modifications (modifications to the hotel and its surrounding area) are reflective of qualitative variations of various character’s mental states. Each of these expresses a spatio-temporal translation of particulars (a quantitative translation). All involve a fundamental qualitative transformation of the whole. These moments of horror have been adduced to aptly illustrate the ontological modification suggested by Bergson’s third thesis on the nature of space in relation to qualitative alteration.

Deleuze suggests that filmic duration does something more profound than merely presenting photographic examples of differentiation through photographic and aural means. In

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“Bergson’s Conception of Difference.” Deleuze explicitly identifies duration as the internally differentiated process that involves the capacity to “englobe” (i.e., ontologically comprehend) ontologically distinct entities.\(^\text{76}\) This suggests that the particular filmic species of duration has the capacity to comprehend modifications within entities which are ontologically discrete from filmed persons, settings, and other photographically represented states of affairs. The implication here is that filmic duration involves the capacity to affect — qualitatively modify — the audience. Roland Barthes echoes this suggestion when he observes that some films involve qualitative modifications that will “bruise” the viewer. The claim is that some images, as well as sequences of images (due to their preternatural powers to foment change) will modify the bodily experience of those who behold their spectacle — this is more than the work of a mere example.\(^\text{77}\)

Cinema’s seemingly magical capacities to modify the physical states of those that behold its spectacle hint at a complex analogy between duration and Walter Benjamin’s concept of an aura. Rodowick observes that Benjamin’s historical reflections on the development of photographic art suggests a similarity among what Benjamin characterizes as the photographic aura and the filmic duration.\(^\text{78}\) Though Miriam Bratu Hansen cautiously observes that Benjamin’s identification of the concept of aura is notoriously difficult to isolate, in the sense that Benjamin seems to subtly modify the term throughout his “Little History of Photography,”

\(^{76}\) Gilles Deleuze, “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”, 39.

\(^{77}\) Barthes characterizes this capacity as the punctum of an image. Barthes elaborates: “it is this element which rises from the scene, shoots out of It like an arrow, and pierces me. A Latin word exists to designate this wound, this prick; this mark made by a pointed instrument…punctum; for punctum is also: sting, speck, cut, little hole — and also a cast of the dice. A photograph’s punctum is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me).” (Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, Richard Howard [tr.], [New York: Hill and Wang, 1981], 26-27).

\(^{78}\) D.N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 8.
On Hashish, and the Arcades Project, one might observe that the concept seems to involve two discreet aspects. The strength of the analogy among duration and aura is demonstrated by shared aspects. Benjamin’s first elucidation of the nature of an aura is the consequent of his experimentations with hashish (on 5 March 1930). Here, Benjamin cautiously observes that though it is distinct in kind from the “spruced-up magical rays” that populate the fantastic visions of spiritualists, a “genuine aura” enjoys a similarity with “an ornamental halo [Umzirkung], in which the object or being is enclosed.” The suggestion here is that an aura is a sort of energy field that has the capacity to comprehend existents. The ontologically comprehensive nature of an aura is akin to duration’s capacity to “englobe” entities. In this sense, comprehensiveness is an aspect that is common to Bergsonian duration and Benjamin’s concept of an aura. Elaborating on the sublime nature of Eugène Atget’s surrealist photographs of Paris, Benjamin explicitly characterizes their aura as involving a “strange weave of space and time: the unique appearance or semblance of distance, no matter how close it may be.” Here, one may identify a parallel aspect in duration’s involvement with memory’s ability to qualitatively modify spatio-temporally extended existents and the nature of their circumstances — i.e., all of psycho-social entities and their circumstances; the content of the lived experience of humans and their environment, however broadly construed. Remarking on the sort of auras that accompany represented

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79 Hansen highlights the fraught nature of a hermeneutic investigation of the nature of Benjamin’s concept, when she observes: “Anything but a clearly delimited, stable concept, aura describes a cluster of meanings and relations that appear in Benjamin’s writings in various configurations and not always under its own name; it is this conceptual fluidity that allows aura to become such a productive nodal point in Benjamin’s thinking.” (Miriam Bratu Hansen, “Benjamin’s Aura”, Critical Inquiry 34, [Winter: 2008], pp. 336-375, 339.)


photographic objectivities, Benjamin suggests that photographic auras have the capacity to involve themselves in an intentional relation with the memories of those who behold them — i.e., to “look back” into the minds and prior lived experiences of those who get transfixed by their unblinking gaze.  

82 This observation echoes the suggestion that duration modifies the qualitative aspects of the thought content of people who participate in cinematic duration (through the concrete act of viewing a film).

Nascent Forms of Time’s Direct Expression

Deleuze — in some of the most beautiful passages of Cinema 2 — suggests that filmic art enjoys the power to modify the qualitative experience of viewers, because it has the capacity to present direct images of time. Perhaps the most enigmatic of the concepts Deleuze develops in the Cinema texts, the direct time-image is as mercurial as it is essential to understanding the complex nature of temporality in film. Deleuze starkly identifies the direct time-image as presenting a “little time in its pure state,”  

83 only to clarify that this pure state is “the unchanging form in which the change is produced.”  

84 The suggestion here is that time is the general form of variation that comprehends and is expressed in any particular change. Deleuze further observes

82 Benjamin elaborates on the disquieting experience one might have when viewing the haunting gazes of subjects in Daguerreotype images of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries — i.e., the sorts of images that would have most certainly been familiar to Bergson when he was conceptualizing the nature of duration and the effect of the “cinematographic illusion.” Benjamin writes: “Experience of the aura thus arises from the fact that a response characteristic of human relationships is transposed to the relationship between humans and inanimate or natural objects. The person we look at, or who feels he is being looked at, looks at us in turn. To experience the aura of an object we look at means to invest it with the ability to look back at us.” (Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”, Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings 4, 1938-1940, Rodney Livingstone (tr.), Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland, Gary Smith (eds.), (Cambridge and London: Belknap Press, 2006), 338.

83 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 17.

84 Ibid.
that this form of time is a nascent aspect of filmic motion pictures that has only recently enjoyed a greater tendency to filmic realization with the advancement of cinematic art. Deleuze observes that direct time-images involves a “Proustian dimension where people and things occupy a place in time which is incommensurable with the one they have in space.”\textsuperscript{85} The claim here seems to be that the direct time-image involves aspects of memory, in various senses of the term (i.e., the psychological memories of individuated psycho-social existents, as well as the non-individuated — ontological — memory that comprehends the entirety of the past of all existents). Deleuze illustrates the development of this peculiar concept of time through reference to Robbe-Grillet’s critical remarks about the role of mimesis in artistic representation, as well as the natures of the (oddly named) pure optical and sound situations.

One might observe that the concept of a direct presentation of anything in film seems flummoxing, if for no other reason than that the entities of a film are explicitly visually accessible entities presented as elements of a filmic universe. It might further be observed that the entirety of the filmic universe (i.e., all its constituent elements) are represented by photographic means in service of director’s purposes (which usually amounts to presenting a narrative, but may also involve explorations of the artistic possibilities afforded cinema as an artistic medium).\textsuperscript{86} One could suggest that cinematically represented objects seem to be distinguishable from objects which enjoy direct presentations. It would seem that recognition of the validity of either a metaphysical distinction between original and copy, or an aesthetic

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 37.
\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Avant-garde} films tend to be at the vanguard of these explorations of the possibilities of filmic representation. Though rarely enjoying critical or commercial success these films — which are often rich in symbolic meaning and dream sequences which confound the passive viewer — truly show the way for future cinematic artists. Maya Deren’s and Alexander Hammid’s \textit{Meshes in the Afternoon} is a wonderful example. (Maya Deren and Alexander Hammid, \textit{Meshes in the Afternoon}, 1941).
distinction between object and its representation (by artistic means) would suffice to adduce a critique of the notion that anything is presented directly in filmic art. These would be perhaps even more substantive when they involve something that has non-physical aspects — i.e., any of a species of relation; “ideal” entity; spiritual existent; a process involving non-physical entities; a continuum of abstract terms or relations; in short, many of the sorts of existents we tend to associate or identify with temporality. One could wonder how the immaterial form of time, or any of its (also immaterial) constituent elements could enjoy direct presentation by cinema.

Deleuze addresses these concerns through reference to Robbe-Grillet’s theory of artistic description. The solution here is complex, in the sense that Deleuze invites the reader to have more than a passing understanding of all of Plato’s and Aristotle’s aesthetics — because a hybrid of these functions as the unspecified target of Robbe-Grillet’s critique — as well as the mathematics involved with architectural singularities (which Robbe-Grillet references, but neglects to develop). Deleuze marshals these to suggest that temporality enjoys direct presentation in film as a type of intrinsic singularity that expresses a sort of variation that is non-mimetic. Deleuze stipulates that there is a difference in kind among representations and expressions, in the sense that each is a different kind of aspect of cinematic art. Perhaps one of the most magical qualities of cinema is that it has the capacity to represent entities and processes that enjoy existence in a mode of reality external to that of the filmic universe, as well as the ability to express entities and processes wholly intrinsic to its mode of presentation (i.e., existents that enjoy no correlation with anything outside the film; a spectacle that is entirely new, in the sense that it does not represent anything in the real world). Though each may be an aspect of the same entity, this does not imply that either is reducible to the other. Time enjoys direct

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presentation in film, because film expresses a change relative to the states of affairs in the film. In *Time and Description in Fiction Today*, Robbe-Grillet elucidates an account of descriptions that diminishes the Ancients’ suggestion that art tends to be mimetic (i.e., reducible to the representation of objects, objectivities, or processes). Robbe-Grillet cautiously observes that though it might have been the case that filmic and literary narratives seem to involve duplication (producing a copy or representation) of the real world, in contemporary films and literature the mimetic function seems to only enjoy a diminished role, in the sense that it has been supplanted by a creative function.\(^8\) One might balk at this suggestion, with the observation that mimesis has been taken to be a crucial aspect of art since Plato’s observation — in *Republic*, book X — that it is the artist’s job to produce “multicolored imitations” of various tangible and intangible aspects of reality.\(^9\) It might further be noted that Plato’s entire condemnation of bad artists pre-supposes the validity of the metaphysical claim that there exists a true reality (which good art putatively represents).\(^9\) Robbe-Grillet modifies this characterization of the function of art by radicalizing

\(^8\) Robbe-Grillet writes: “Description once served to situate the chief contours of a setting, then to cast light on some of its particularly revealing elements; it no longer mentions anything except insignificant objects, or objects which it is concerned to make so. It once claimed to reproduce a pre-existing reality; it now asserts its creative function.” (Alain Robbe-Grillet, “Time and Description in Fiction Today”, *For a New Novel: Essays in Fiction* (Richard Howard [tr.], [New York: Grove Press, 1965].


\(^9\) It would be difficult to overstate either the longevity or importance of Plato’s identification of art as mimetic. Charles Sanders Peirce offers only a slight modification of Plato’s suggestion with his observation that visual art tends to represent “iconic signs” of the real (Charles S. Peirce, 1982, *The Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition* 2, M. Fisch, C. Kloesel, E. Moore, N. Houser [ed.], [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982], 53-54). John Hyman develops the epistemological aspects of Plato’s claim by insisting that one can only understand the truth of a painting — i.e., understand its sense — through reference to the immaterial or material objects that it represents. (John Hyman, “Realism”, *A Companion to Aesthetics*, (Stephen Davies, Kathleen Marie Higgins, Robert Hopkins, Robert Stecker, and David E. Cooper [ed.], [Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009], 495–498). This is not to say that that Robbe-Grillet is a voice alone in the wilderness. Echoing John Rushkin, E.H. Gombrich observes that
the artist’s creative capacities. Though it must be noted that theories of imitation do involve aspects of artistic creation, in the sense that they tend to identify the artist as creating an adequate description of a reality that is extrinsic to the work of art’s reality, this is characterized as a secondary, dependent process. Robbe-Gillet radicalizes this creativity, when he suggests that the work of art is akin to an architectural “point” of invention (i.e., a singular point, a singularity, a point of inflection). Bernard Cache carefully observes that architecture involves two analytically discrete kinds of singularities, extrinsic singularities and “points of inflection” (or intrinsic singularities). An extrinsic singularity is a hypothetical point with which the tangent of the physical curve, were it conceived as an ideal curve, would be perpendicular (it is the point of a hypothetical y-axis which is involved in the specification of one part of the curve’s coordinates). An intrinsic singularity is identified as a point along the curve that “designates a pure event of curvature.” Intrinsic singularities are actualized (or at least illustrated) by the ogives that are so often instantiated in the architecture of medieval European churches. Architectural works, it might also be observed, are a particular species of the general class of artwork. Here, it seems that Robbe-Grillet is stipulating that the property of a particular — in this case, the property of having intrinsic singularities as elements of the particular’s formal ontological content — may be generalized as the property of a class. Given that the property of a class may gain expression in any particular species or member that is comprehended by the class,

visual art tends to involve a creation of the “innocence of the eye” (E.H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation*, London: Phaidon, 1960], 296) One implication of Gombrich’s suggestion is that such innocence might not pre-exist the viewer’s participation with the work of art. This further suggests art is non-mimetic, in the sense that it cannot resemble (or copy) that which does not exist.

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this yields the substantive observation that films and novels (because they are also works of art) involve intrinsic singularities. Robbe-Grillet further observes that intrinsic singularities tend to gain artistic expression as diegetic moments of radical upheaval, profound correction, or bifurcation into non-compossible series of events. Robbe-Grillet explicitly notes that his conceptualization of artistic description is distinct from the mimetic relation through direct reference to temporality, when he observes that the types of temporal changes expressed in films need not correlate with the temporality evidenced by the quantitative measurement of physical (as opposed to artistically presented) clocks and calendars.93

It should be observed that Robbe-Grillet’s suggestion implies a subtle reformulation of Aristotle’s observation that art tends to involve moments of great dramatic reversal. In Poetics, Aristotle suggests that lyric poems tend to represent reality adequately, in the sense that they involve περιπέτεια (reversals). Robbe-Grillet seems to suggest that these moments of great reversal in the lives, fates, and fortunes of the characters evidence a rupture from the mimetic order, in the sense that none of these needs to be representative of any circumstance in the world. These profound shifts involve an element of temporality, in the senses that they occur within time, evidence a temporal duration, and express a moment in temporal continuum. This suggests that a direct expression of time involves illustration of these sorts of changes, characterized as any of the properties (or attributes) of the relation that obtains among entities in the artwork; thus it is discrete from the sorts of modification that obtain as a property of the mimetic relation that might or might not obtain between these and entities in the physical world; stated again, the direct expression of temporally saturated change is immanent to the relation among fictive relata, which is different in kind and content from the sort of changes that are involved (as

93 Ibid. 151.
attributes, immanent conditions, or emergent properties) in the relation that obtains among artistically presented objects and their correlates in the universe populated by physical entities and psycho-social entities with physical attributes.

Deleuze observes that analogous disjunctions may be found in pure optical and acoustic situations, which are constituted by “opsigns” and “sonsigns.” In *Cinema 1*, Deleuze carefully observes that these situations (and their correlated signs) are filmic precursors to the direct presentation of time. Properly speaking, each of opsigns and sonsigns are indicative of a breakdown of the sensory motor order (i.e., the sequence of shots, montage) that tends to be identified with realist cinema. Each of these discrete types of sign — though they may be, and often are present in the same shot, sequence, or film — indicates a disjunction among any of the photographically expressed entities relative to one another, as well as any of the narrative, implied character arc, or thematic content attributed to a film or its aspects. In these senses, opsigns and sonsigns are intrinsic singularities that stand apart from (i.e., enjoy a disjunctive relation with) other aspects of the film. Deleuze elucidates the natures of these peculiar

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95 Deleuze continually modifies his concept of singularity. It seems each of the books following *The Logic of Sense* — in which Deleuze first uses the term — witnesses a further evolution to nuanced nature of singularities. Though Manuel DeLanda suggests that singularities may be characterized as “spaciotemporal dynamisms” and “passive selves,” these attempts at definition seem inadequate, in the senses of both these are profoundly opaque, and perhaps even involve definitional aspects that would confound any assertion of identity (Manuel DeLanda, *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy*, [London and New York: Continuum, 2002], 206-207). Steven Shaviro observes that Deleuze tends to identify singularities as “acategorical” entities, in the sense “that they cannot be categorized in any terms broader than their own…they cannot be fitted into a hierarchy of species and genera, of the particular and the general: just as they cannot be derived as instances of any larger, more overarching and predetermining structure” (Steven Shaviro, *Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics*, [USA: MIT Press, 2012], 89, n.11). Daniel W. Smith traces Deleuze’s concept of singularities to a modification of Albert Lautman’s suggestion — in *Essay on the Notions of Structure and Existence in Mathematics* — that points on a geometric curve may be distinguished from one another in terms of whether or not they are involved in a change of direction in the curve: ordinary points do not radically alter
moments of filmic upheaval when he observes that these sorts of purely optical and acoustic situations force any of the characters or spectators of the film to encounter “something intolerable and unbearable… a matter of something too powerful, or too unjust, but sometimes also too beautiful, and which henceforth outstrips our sensory-motor capacities.”

Deleuze further observes that a character immersed in such situations behaves as though they don’t know how to respond to their circumstance, as though they are wandering through a terrain that — for whatever reason or confluence of causes — has diminished their capacities to navigate its labyrinthine contours.

Though Deleuze suggests opsigns and sonsigns emerged with striking prominence in Italian Neo-realist films, it would be a mistake to associate them only with the films of a particular historical period. These signs are evident in films from as diverse a set of

the direction of the curve; singular points (or singularities) are moments on the curve at which the trajectory of the trajectory of the curve alters. (Daniel W. Smith, Essays on Deleuze, [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012], 302). Smith further observes that Deleuze generalizes the variability implied in Lautman’s strictly mathematical definition, to suggest qualitative and affective components. It should be noted that not all of these need be temporal, in the sense that some have suggested that mathematical entities enjoy a-temporal existence. Taken together, these suggest that a singularity may by rigorously characterized as any of a temporal or non-temporal moment of variation or difference (i.e., change). It is conceivable that such moments could be visually or aurally represented in film. This is plainly the case in films involving profound crisis, if it is granted that these are not — and perhaps never aspired to be — copies, imitations, or duplications of a world marked by the striking appearance of continuity, banality, putative normalcy; all of which might be characteristics of a circumstance bereft of profound variation. It might be further observed that all of these apparent traits of normalcy could obtain as representations in film — the typical, even quotidian has often been the subject matter of some of the more fascinating films of the last hundred years of cinema; e.g., the films of Antonioni, but this would not negate (or otherwise diminish) the possibility of singularities being present in these, as long as one acknowledges that the seemingly banal may involve understated crises, which are — for all their subtlety — just as profound as those expressed in the most bombastic Hollywood blockbuster.

Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 18.

Deleuze elaborates: “These are pure optical and sound situations. In which the character does not know how to respond, abandoned spaces, in which he ceases to experience and act so that he enters into flight, goes on a trip, comes and goes, vaguely indifferent to what happens to him, undecided as to what must be done.” (Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The-Time Image, 272).
directors as Roberto Rossellini, Michelangelo Antonioni, Andrei Tarkovsky, and Wim Wenders. To think of a clear expression of a purely optical and acoustic situation, one need only recall any of: the profound alienation (from all her dead son, her overly judgmental mother, her utterly oblivious husband, and the seductive charms of socio-economic privilege) evidenced on Ingrid Bergman’s face as she wanders through monolithic factory in *Europe ’51*;\(^98\) Harry Dean Stanton’s desperate wandering through the nameless — and seemingly limitless — desert during the mesmerizing opening sequence of *Paris, Texas*;\(^99\) the strange industrial wasteland surrounding of the petrol-chemical plant, which causes an existential crisis for Monica Viti’s character in *Red Desert*;\(^100\) Alexander Kaidanovsky’s wandering though the strange wasteland after an accidental alien visitation illustrated in Tarkovsky’s masterpiece.\(^101\) Taken together, these filmic expressions illustrate something more significant than the mere psychological or physical displacement of a character; the travails of each can be adduced as evidence of a comprehensive alienation. It is a profound indeterminacy that is reflected in these cinematic moments of profound upheaval. Here, the claim is that the pure optical and sound situation presents a filmic representation of the crisis of indeterminacy; its purity is a perfection of a world without answer — a perpetual vagueness without temporal cessation; a comprehensive lostness in which characters are separated from the world of which they are putative inhabitants.

**A Direct Presentation of Temporality: Crystals of Time**

\(^98\) Roberto Rossellini (dir.), *Europe ’51*, (Roberto Rossellini, Carlo Ponti, Dino De Laurentiis, 1952).
\(^100\) Michelangelo Antonioni (dir.), *Red Desert*, (Rizolli,1964).
\(^101\) Andrei Tarkovsky (dir.), *Stalker*, (Mosfilm, 1979).
If the pure optical and acoustic situations presented in film offer a disquieting glimpse into the nature of time characterized as a singularity — a moment of change — then film’s various hyalosigns (a linguistic play on the Attic Greek ὑαλός) further develop the claim that time’s direct expression in film amounts to a direct expression of variation. Deleuze carefully elaborates time’s direct expression through identification of the natures of time and its relation to filmic expressions of change through reference to filmic “crystal-images.” It is perhaps important to note that crystal-images are unities of analytically discrete processes. The ontological implication here is that the time crystal (which is a representation of the nature of time itself) is constituted by a series of mutually implicated processes: (1) the continual exchange among the couple of the virtual and actual; (2) the relation among “the limpid and the opaque,”¹⁰² and; (3) the generative relation of “seed and the environment.”¹⁰³ Deleuze further identifies a close conceptual proximity among the exchange of virtual and actual, and the relation of limpid and opaque, in the sense that the terms seem to enjoy transposability: virtuality is akin to opacity; that which is actual (in film) tends to enjoy visibility.¹⁰⁴ It will be further observed that these imply a diminishment of relevance of temporal succession to the nature of time. The third process — involving seed and environment — suggests a temporal continuum of ceaseless variation. Each invites elucidation.

Deleuze elaborates on the nature of each of these processes through reference to Bergson and Proust. The suggestions that film has the capacity to express time directly is hinted at in *Matter and Memory* and “Memory of the Present and False Recognition.”¹⁰⁵ Bergson — in

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¹⁰³ Ibid.
¹⁰⁴ Ibid.
Matter and Memory — explicitly characterizes the act of recollection as akin to the mechanism of a camera focusing on a vaguely determined intentional object.\textsuperscript{106} The metaphoric allusion to filmic (or perhaps, theatrical) art is continued with Bergson’s observation that the process of recollection tends to yield the psychological sensation of neurotic depersonalization — i.e., the disquieting feeling that one is standing apart from oneself; a participant in the life of another; as though they were merely an actor, a sentient simulacra reciting the lines and performing the actions associated with someone else's lived experience.\textsuperscript{107} Bergson further alludes to a relation among film and the virtual when he observes that the recollected past appears to consciousness as the changing image reflected in “a moving-mirror.”\textsuperscript{108} In addition, Bergson observes that the recollected content of the past gradually appears to one as the ill-defined content of dream-states, deliriums, and hallucinations — i.e., as though “they were phantoms superadded to solid perceptions and conceptions of our waking life, will-o-wisps which hover above it.”\textsuperscript{109} Perhaps it is worth observing that the visual image of mirrors as well as the content of their optical reflections have been used throughout the history of cinema to fulfil the diegetic function of revealing something essential about the nature of particular characters. In some of the most

\textsuperscript{106} Bergson writes: “Whenever we are trying to recover a recollection, to call up some period of our history, we become conscious of an act \textit{sui generis} by which we detach ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves, first, in the past — a work of adjustment, something like the framing of a camera.” (Henri Bergson, \textit{Matter and Memory}, 133-134).

\textsuperscript{107} Bergson writes: “The more he analyses his experience, the more he will split into two personages, one of which moves about on the stage while the other sits and looks. On the one hand, he knows that he continues to be what he was, a self who thinks and acts comfortably to what the situation requires, a self-inserted into real life, and adapting itself to it by a free effort of the will; this is what his perception of the present assures him. But the memory of this present, which is equally there, makes him believe that he is repeating what has been said already, seeing again what has been seen already, and so transforms him into an actor reciting his part.” (Henri Bergson, “Memory of the Present and False Recognition”, 169).

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 165.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 154.
profound uses of this visual metaphor of the mirror, these revelations involve a character coming to terms with their past. In film, it tends to be the case that when there is a mirror present, someone is going to undergo profound modification. The presence of mirrors is illustrated in the history of Western cinema, as is evidenced by the prevalence of mirrors in the films of Orson Welles, Robert Clouse, Martin Scorsese, and Wim Wenders. Here, one cannot help but think of Rita Hayward’s riveting elaboration of her past as she stumbles blindly through a hall of mirrors in *The Lady from Shanghai*;\(^{110}\) Bruce Lee’s recollection that “the enemy is only images and illusions” as he battles infinitely recurring images of a phantasmal foe in *Enter the Dragon*;\(^{111}\) Robert De Niro’s psychotic self-examination in *Taxi Driver*;\(^{112}\) Harry Dean Stanton’s heartbreaking elaboration of his past to his ex-wife through a two-way mirror in the penultimate sequence of *Paris, Texas*.\(^{113}\) In each, there is a visual linkage among the mirror, hallucination, and moments of profound modification of at least one character. Though it might be observed that these instances of mirrors in film prioritize visual expressions of change, it should be pointed out that both Bergson and Deleuze explicitly stipulate change is an aspect of temporality. When coupled with the observation that the filmic representation of mirrors tends to be concomitant with change in some sense of the term (any of a modification of a character’s sense of self, a variation of the identities or motives of other characters, or a change to other elements of the filmic universe), this implies an involvement of aspects of temporality, and (thus) is a cinematic representation of time. Bergson’s textual allusions to mirrors and the mercurial elements of the

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\(^{110}\) Orson Welles (dir.), *The Lady from Shanghai*, (Mercury Productions, 1947).


\(^{112}\) Martin Scorsese (dir.), *Taxi Driver*, (Bill/Phillips Productions and Italo/Judeo Productions, 1976).

past expressed in their reflected contents, when coupled with the plurality of filmic representations of mirrors, suggest a conceptual foundation for Deleuze’s elaboration of the nature of time through reference to filmic expression.

Ronald Bogue observes that Deleuze identifies filmic sequences involving mirrors as the most basic expression of virtual and actual exchange involved in crystal-images.\(^{114}\) Deleuze explicitly notes that crystal-images afford a direct presentation of time. What does it mean to suggest that time may be the sort of metaphysical entity that may be presented directly? Deleuze explicitly observes that crystal-images express two claims about the nature of temporality (which he formulates negatively): (1) that temporal ordering is “not made up of succession”;\(^{115}\) (2) time is non-reducible to an isolated temporal instant (i.e., a static moment isolated from a temporal continuum or temporal flow). The suggestion that it would be inaccurate to artificially isolate the object presented as a temporally extended element of a duration is uncontentious on ontological grounds — parts are non-identical to wholes. Deleuze’s suggestion that crystal-images diminish the importance of linear temporal succession (i.e., \(t_1, t_2 \ldots t_n\)) invites explanation. The claim is that temporality is non-reducible to succession. It is important to point out that Deleuze is not denying that linear temporal ordering appears to obtain in film (as it does in the non-filmic world). In this sense, Deleuze’s distinction is analogous to Aristotle’s identification — in *Physics* IV\(^{116}\) — that time may be characterized as something other than either what is measured (i.e., the


\(^{115}\) Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 274.

\(^{116}\) Aristotle, *Physics IV*, 219b2-219b9. It is important to observe the limited scope of this analogy. The conceptual differences among Deleuze’s and Aristotle’s respective philosophies of time are substantive, as are the differences in their metaphysics. Daniel W. Smith elaborates on differences between Deleuze’s and Aristotle’s metaphysics. (Daniel W. Smith, “The Doctrine of Univocity: Deleuze's Ontology of Immanence”, *Deleuze and Religion*, Mary Bryden [ed.], [London: Routledge, 2001], 163-179).
motion of existents) or the linear succession of numbers that one uses when they measure the motion of existents. Deleuze modifies Aristotle’s distinction to suggest that the measure of the movement of existents is ontologically secondary to the form of temporality. Deleuze’s claim here is that linear temporal succession is ontologically dependent on a more fundamental ontological relation. It is this fundamental relation that is directly expressed by the crystal-image. Deleuze is suggesting that there is an ontological process more fundamental to temporality than the succession of temporal moments; though there still may be the succession of scenes in a film (just as the succession of minutes, hours, and years seem to obtain as adequate measures of the moments of the durations enjoyed by the real entities that may or may not be represented in film), there is some ontological process primary to these; it is this process that is presented in the crystal-image; the direct-image of time is a filmic representation of the ontologically primary process of time.

Deleuze’s elaboration of the direct presentation of time through filmic hyalosigns is a Bergsonian film philosophy that Bergson never got around to writing. This philosophical lineage is evidenced by Deleuze’s observation that crystal-images illustrate an ontologically primary “indivisible unity of an actual image and ‘its’ virtual image.”117 Each of these terms and the relation between them cries out for clarification. Bergson elucidates the complex nature of the relation through reference to the metaphor of an object and its reflection in a mirror.118 Bergson makes two stipulations about the natures of the relata: the objects reflected by the mirror enjoy

117 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 79.
118 Bergson writes: “The memory seems to be the perception of what the object in the mirror is to the object in front of it. The object can be touched as well as seen; acts upon us as well as we on it; it is pregnant with possible actions; it is actual. The image is virtual, and though it resembles the object, it is incapable of doing what the object does.” (Henri Bergson, “Memory of the Present and False Recognition” Mind-Energy, Lectures and Essays, H. Wildon Carr (tr.), (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920), 165.
an actual mode of existence; the reflected images are virtual. These two modes of being may be
distinguished from one another by their respective properties (or predicates). Bergson explicitly
identifies materiality and (by implication) material causal efficacy as the relevant predicates. The
claim is that both causal efficacy and materiality may be predicated of actual objects. Virtual
entities enjoy none of the capacities to be influenced by entities that enjoy physical material
existence; virtual entities are immaterial and neutral with respect to material causation. In
contradistinction, an entity is actual if it is causally relevant in a material circumstance. If one
were to characterize materiality and causal efficacy as ontological conditions which must be met
for an object to enjoy actuality, then one must observe that virtual entities do not obtain as actual,
because they fail to fulfil these. Bergson positively identifies the virtual as the ontological
domain which most closely resembles “the plane of a dream”\(^{119}\) (i.e., the domain populated by
phantasmal entities that — for all their reality — lack the capacity to affect actualized entities).
The specification that virtual entities enjoy the predication of immateriality seems to invite a
comparison of virtual entities to either of any of the species of abstract entities (i.e., \textit{abstracta}) or
possibilities. Virtual entities are none of these. Citing Proust’s formulation, Deleuze cautiously
observes that virtuality is “real without being actual, ideal without being abstract.”\(^{120}\) Deleuze
observes that the possible may be conceptualized as that which subsists in opposition to the real,
in the sense that what is possible is not yet realized — the possible does not obtain as something
realized, in the sense it obtains as either that which is ontologically prior to that which is realized
or that which is a potential result of a deduction that has not yet been made. The suggestion here

\(^{119}\) Ibid.
is that possibility enjoys a modality that is categorically distinct from that enjoyed by real entities
— i.e., “the possible has no reality.”\textsuperscript{121} Deleuze further specifies that the virtual may be
identified as a species of ideality, in the sense that it enjoys the property of immateriality — a
property that tends to be associated with ideal objects. Here, it is essential to note that the
property of immateriality does not imply indeterminacy. (The quality of immateriality implies
only that an entity is not subject to quantitative determination; if Ingarden has demonstrated
anything, it is that immaterial entities — like reflections in mirrors, literary characters,
photographically represented objectivities — are subject to rigorous qualitative determination. A
viewer of \textit{Cool Hand Luke}\textsuperscript{122} knows the exact nature of the protagonist, right down to how many
hard-boiled eggs he can eat. Because virtual entities may be qualitatively determined, they enjoy
none of the ontological ambiguity that tends to be associated with abstract entities. It is perhaps
worth noting that the metaphysical conditions implied by the distinction between virtuality and
actuality are adequate, in the sense that were they denied, the result would be an existential terror
of the kind evoked by certain horror movies. Here one cannot help but think of the virtual image
clawing its way out of a television screen in David Cronenberg’s \textit{Videodrome}\textsuperscript{123} and the
terrifying moments of monsters materializing out of the reflective surfaces in the trilogy of
Japanese \textit{Ring} films.\textsuperscript{124} The terror elicited by these scenes of the virtual being actualized as
material is sufficient to demonstrate the metaphysical truth of the complex distinction between
the virtual and actual.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{123} David Cronenberg (dir.), \textit{Videodrome}, (Universal, 1983).
\textsuperscript{124} Hideo Nakata (dir.), \textit{Ring}, (Ringu/Rasen Production Committee, 1998); Hideo Nakata (dir.),
\textit{Ring 2}, (Asmik Ace Entertainment, 1999); Norio Tsuruta (dr.), \textit{Ring 0: Birthday}, (Ring 0
Production Group Production, 2000).
The crystal-image involves a relation of the virtual memory and the actual present. The tension of these is the content of time’s direct expression in cinema. Bergson suggests that the past emerges as a moment of temporal bifurcation; a relation among the virtual and actual that yields a division of the instant into “two jets exactly symmetrical, one of which falls back toward the past, whilst the other springs forward to the future.”\(^\text{125}\) Deleuze explicitly characterizes this relation as the simultaneous creation of two discrete temporal modalities (the memorial past and the fleeting present).\(^\text{126}\) The staggering implication is that the past does not follow after the lived present — one’s memory of an object obtains simultaneously with one’s perception of the object. Proust beautifully illustrates this through reference to the lingering scent of madeleines:

> But let a noise or scent, once heard or once smelt, be heard or smelt again in the present and at the same time in the past, real without being actual, ideal without being abstract, and immediately the permanent and habitually concealed essence of things is liberated and our true self which seemed — perhaps for long years seemed — to be dead but was not altogether dead, is awakened and reanimated as it receives the celestial nourishment that is brought to it. A minute freed from the order of time has re-created in us, to feel it, the man freed from the order of time. And one can understand that this man should have confidence, in his joy, even if the simple taste of a madeleine does not seem logically to contain within it the reasons for this joy, one can understand the word ‘death’ should have no meaning for him; situated outside time, why should he fear the future?

\(^{126}\) Deleuze observes: “What constitutes the crystal-image is the most fundamental operation of time: since past is constituted not after the present that it was but at the same time, it has to split itself in two at each movement as present and past, which differ from each other in nature, or, what amounts to the same thing, it has to split the present in two heterogeneous directions, one of which is launched toward the future while the other falls into the past.” (Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, 81).
But this species of optical illusion, which placed beside me a moment of the past that was incompatible with the present, could not last for long. The images presented to us by the voluntary memory can, it is true, be prolonged at will, for the voluntary memory require no more exertion on our part than the turning over of the pages in a picture book.\(^{127}\)

Perhaps what is most remarkable about this eloquent elaboration of the function of a time-crystal is that it seems to involve a denial of the hypothesis that a dependency relation obtains among the present and the past; the past does not subsist from the present; the two (characterized as any of past and present, virtual and actual, perceived object and content of recollection) emerge in immanent relation to one another as ontological correlates, each designating a discrete temporal modality. Perceptual moments of quantifiable existents are co-created as virtual entities that obtain as qualitative existents. Further, Deleuze carefully notes a crystalline-image never reaches a state of completion — it never obtains as “altogether dead” — in the sense that its process of producing the virtual and actual never ceases. That is, the crystal involves an “indiscernible exchange [that] is always renewed and reproduced.”\(^{128}\) The suggestion here is that time is continually regained in the ongoing process of generating the past and the present simultaneously. This is a regeneration of discrete modes of time, in which each enjoys a temporal difference from what was immediately prior as well as an ontological difference from the other. In this sense, the attribute of finitude cannot be predicated of time. Though the relation among the virtual and the actual is stabilized in the form of a relation, this stability does not imply any of temporal, logical, or ontological cessation. In the most general sense, one cannot


\(^{128}\) Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, 274
predicate an end to time — i.e., temporality is an ongoing relation, a continuum of 
differentiation. Taken together, these elucidations reveal that the direct-image of time involves 
four non-competing aspects: (1) the fundamental indeterminacy of a singularity; (2) virtuality 
and actuality, which enjoy a categorical distinction (as is demonstrated by their non-reducible 
properties); (3) a simultaneous creation of the past and present, each of which is characterized as 
a non-reducible — non-subsistent, relatively autonomous — way of time’s being; (4) its 
expression as an ongoing stable relation (i.e., a continuum) that is akin to the process of a seed 
involved in a germination, in the sense that it produces difference, in multiple senses.

Concluding Remarks: The Time of Cinema

Perhaps there has been no greater change to the visual arts than the tectonic shift of the 
camera recording the movements of the workers leaving the Lumière Brothers’ Factory. No more 
are we condemned to simply viewing the arrested movements of entities in repose. No more was 
all visual art a still life. No more was the realism of art forced to capture entities arrested in time. 
The birth of cinema changed everything for those who were able to apprehend entities expressing 
themselves as singular moments of time.

Deleuze — in his Cinema texts — suggests that the changes heralded by cinema involved 
a change to our conceptions of time. Film reveals temporality to be a singularity. The cinema is a 
temporal art form, in the sense that it conveys the action of entities over a temporal duration, and 
these effect qualitative changes on the lives of the audience for an extended duration of moments 
in time. Deleuze observes that some of cinema’s most sublime moments — the pure optical and 
aoustic situations — suggest a deeper involvement with temporality and cinema. In these, the 
viewer is treated to a glimpse of time’s radical indeterminacy. When a character looks into a
mirror or catches a reflection of themselves in the window of a passing streetcar, this reveals a further aspect of the nature of temporal change. With the proliferation of crystal-images, cinema reveals time to be something other than mere succession of temporal instants. The image in the mirror illustrates an exchange of the virtual and the actual — an occurrence that is ontologically primary to a succession of existents. Further, it is observed that this relation of virtual and actual involves the strictly simultaneous and continual creation of past and present as correlated modalities of time.
CHAPTER 6: TIME AND THE STATE — STOCHASTIC EVOLUTION, CO-EXISTENCE, AND INSTANTANEOUS VARIATION

The two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (which were co-written with Félix Guattari) should be counted among Deleuze’s great books on time. ¹ Though explicit reference to temporality is scarcely present in these texts, it is in these that Deleuze’s philosophy of time gains expression through reference to the changes brought about by variations in the economic modes of production in the social world. It should be observed that the analysis of time contained in the *Cinema* volumes has little in common with the claims about the nature of time developed in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. In the *Cinema* texts, Deleuze used film as a means of expressing the profound nature of time’s direct image as a singularity involving the ontological co-generation of the temporal past and present in a manner that is utterly unique to the filmic universe; a singular time of film that is discrete from any of the calendar time, clock ticks, or other temporal series which putatively obtain in the universe populated by material entities. In the two *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* volumes, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that temporality involves the immanent variation of co-existing entities — time is characterized as involving the instantaneous change of spatio-temporally compresent social formations. They present their argument through reference to all of Marx, Jane Jacobs’s elucidation of the nature of the evolution of urban modes of socio-economic organization, the ethnological investigations of Clastres, as well as Spinoza’s concept of immanent causality. Deleuze’s and Guattari’s analyses yield the claim that temporality gains expression as variation within a single unified duration.

This amounts to a substantial modification to Marxian claims about the origins of the State. Deleuze and Guattari borrow from Jacobs’s critical reassessment of Marxian evolutionism to suggest that the relation among social formations be radically re-conceptualized. I observe that Deleuze and Guattari echo Clastres’ revolutionary thesis that the State and primitive forms of social organization obtain as temporally co-existing, mutually implicated entities that participate relations of immanent modification. Here, Deleuze and Guattari apply Spinoza’s notion of immanent causality — i.e., the sort of causal relation in which both cause and effect are implicated as expressive aspects of the same ontologically unified substance — to yield the suggestion that temporally co-existing social formations are involved in immanent variation. The claim is that analytically discrete aspects of the same social substance modify one another within the same non-decomposable temporal instant. Taken together, these suggest that evolution — characterized as the serial progression of durations expressed as grand movements along the ever more nuanced arch of history — does not obtain in a linear fashion. This further implies that the relation of temporal succession ($t_1, t_2, \ldots t_n$) is not adequate to represent variation of temporally co-existing social forms. Society changes in an instant.

Shortly after the English language publication of *A Thousand Plateaus*, Gilles Deleuze was given the occasion to reflect upon his and Félix Guattari’s enduring commitments to Marxian political thought. While it is heartening that Deleuze’s expression of this sentiment has given rise to a wealth of critical literature that elaborates on the nuances of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s Marxism, much of this commentary appears to have neglected the temporal implications of their modification of Marxian thought. Simon Choat elucidates the hermeneutic

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strategies marshalled in support of the suggestion that Deleuze’s remarks on Nietzsche can find their philosophical “touchstone” in the theorizations of Marx. Aldo Pardi engages in a complementary exercise in exegesis with his identification of socio-political philosophy as akin to a “battlefield of antagonistic productions” in which Deleuze, Spinoza, and Marx are characterized as philosophical brothers-in-arms. In an otherwise admirable text, Eduardo Pelejaro makes the counter-intuitive (and perhaps counter-Marxian) claim that Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization of revolutionary capacities of the nomadic war-machine flummoxes any sense of a revolutionary struggle being expressed in a particular historical situation. The claim here seems to involve the dubious interpretative claim that Deleuze and Guattari elaborate the nomadic war-machine as a strictly transcendent entity which enjoys no tether to existent spatio-temporally localized entities, processes, or circumstances—i.e., the very entities and contexts which are involved in the continual temporal variation that is identified with reality. Arguing from more coherent critical ground, Nicholas Thoburn suggests that Deleuze’s and Guattari’s conceptualization of “the minor” is an analogue of Marx’s concept of the lumpenproletariat. While enjoying some textual support, in the sense that (in their book on Kafka) Deleuze and Guattari cautiously observe that “minor literature” involves a political aspect, Thoburn’s thesis seems vexed, if for no other reason than Deleuze and Guattari consider change as an immanent variation of entities which participate in the same temporal duration.

6 Nicholas Thoburn, Deleuze, Marx, and Politics, (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 49.
Because transcendence is non-identical to immanence, a more adequate account of social evolution might involve an analysis of (the explicitly political) economic modes of production and their mutual implication. I suggest that Deleuze’s modification of Marx’s modes of production reveals them to be co-existing entities, which enjoy immanent causal relation to one another. I further suggest that the mutual involvement of the modes of production implies a denial of the explanatory relevance of the relation of temporal succession.

Perhaps one of Deleuze’s most subtle observations about the nature of temporal modification of putatively distinct modes of production is hinted at — in Difference and Repetition — with the (Spinozistic) observation that the univocity of substance is implicated with a plurality of individuated modes. Deleuze carefully observes that a numeric distinction

7 Deleuze and Guattari specify the political aspects of the minor literature of Kafka in contradistinction with the putatively less revolutionary aspects of “major” literatures. They observe: “the second characteristic of minor literature is that everything in them is political. In major literatures, the individual concern (the familial, marital, and so on) joins with other no less individual concerns, the social milieu serving as a mere environment or a background… Minor literature is completely different; its cramped space forces each individual intrigue to collect immediately to politics. The individual concern thus becomes all the more necessary, indispensable, magnified, because a whole other story is vibrating within it.” (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Dana Polan (tr.), [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986], 17).

8 Deleuze makes this observation in his complex elaboration formal and modal distinctions in reference to the concept of univocity of substance. The essential claim is that an ontologically unified substance enjoys expression among a plurality of implicated modes. Elaborating on Spinoza’s metaphysics, Deleuze writes: “Nevertheless, he was able to define two types of distinction which relate that indifferent, neutral being to difference. Formal distinction is, in effect, a real distinction, since it is grounded in being or in the object; but it is not necessarily a numerical distinction because it is established between essences or senses, between ‘formal reasons’ which may allow the persistence of the unity of the subject to which they are attributed. In this manner, not only is the univocity of being (in relation to God and to creatures) extended in the univocity of its ‘attributes’, but, given his infinity, God can possess his formally distinct univocal attributes without losing anything of his unity. The other type of distinction, modal distinction, is established between being or the attributes on the one hand, and the intensive variations of which these are capable on the other. These variations, like degrees of whiteness, are individuating modalities of which the finite and the infinite constitute precisely singular intensities. From the point of view of its own neutrality, univocal being therefore does not only
need not obtain among aspects of the same form. The ontological point here is that different individuated modes (different aspects) may enjoy numerical identity. Given that temporal succession is a type of quantitative distinction (i.e., a series numeric values associated with the successive occurrences of the term \( t \)), this implies that no temporal succession need obtain among discrete aspects of the same social form. The implications for the putative evolution among individuated modes of economic production (which are comprehended by a unified social substance) are staggering. Deleuze’s ontological reflections suggest that explicitly dynamic, co-existing, implicated modes of production enjoy a type of variation which involves no temporally serialized evolution. The substantive claim here is that co-existing entities enjoy immanent variation. The negative correlate is that immanence does not involve temporal succession. These imply that the variation of co-existing Marxian modes of production is expressed as a temporally instantaneous modification of the plurality aspects of the same unified social form.

In the present chapter, I suggest that Deleuze and Guattari echo (with substantial modification) Marx’s claims about the involvement of modes of economic production in the evolution of society. Though Deleuze and Guattari accept Marx’s suggestion that modes of economic production play a role in the identification of a society as belonging to a particular temporal period or age, they expunge temporal succession from evolutionism. The argument involves three complex stages: (1) a specification of Marx’s claim that social evolution is stochastic variation; (2) the observation that Deleuze and Guattari suggest that social variation involves a temporally instantaneous — non-serialized, non-successive — relation of coexisting implicates distinct attributes or qualitative forms which are themselves univocal, it also relates these and itself to intensive factors or individuating degrees which vary the mode of these attributes or forms without modifying their essence in so far as this is being.” (Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, Paul Patton [tr.], [London and New York: Continuum, 2001], 39).
modes of social organization; (3) the suggestion — derived from Spinoza — that immanent causality is an adequate mechanism to account for social change. Taken together, these yield the suggestion that Deleuze’s and Guattari’s analyses reveal time to comprehend the instantaneous — i.e., non-successive, non-serializable — variation of co-existing, contemporaneous aspects of society.

The Stochastic Evolution of the Economic Modes of Production

Deleuze and Guattari specify their fidelity to the Marxist project of discerning pre-history of the capitalist state formation when they observe — in Anti-Oedipus — that the “rules of Marx are followed exactly.”9 The object of analysis here is the relationship among the modes of production and the (explicitly temporal) process of economic development. Unfortunately, how the Marxian rules apply is not readily apparent, in the sense that Marx, Engels, Stalin, and Plekhanov seemed to never tire of critically reassessing all of the nature, number, and development of the modes of production.10

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9 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 140.
10 The elaboration of the history of capitalism has a long and fraught history as evidenced in all the places it crops up in Marx’s published works, the works Marx co-authored with Engels, and Marx’s personal correspondence. It should be specified that Marx as well as Engels modified both the number and nature of modes of production involved in the development of capital. Marx introduced a schematic of pre-capitalist modes of production in the ultimate paragraph of his Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy. (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, The German Ideology, [Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1998], 23). This schema enjoys significant development in The German Ideology, (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, [Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1998]). Concerns associated with the specification of historical periods of development were the subject of multiple letters between Marx and Engels in 1868, to Zusulich in 1881, and (again between Marx and Engels in 1881-1882. (Letter from Marx to Engels, Dated 14 March 1868, Pre-Economic Formations, Jack Cohen [tr.], E.J. Hobsbawn [ed.], [New York: International Publishers, 1964]; Letter from Marx to Engels, Dated 25, March 1868, Pre-Economic Formations; Letter from Marx to Zusulich, Dated 8 March 1881, Pre-Economic Formations; Letter from Engels to Marx, 15 December 1882, Pre-Economic Formations; Letter from Engels
Marx — in *The German Ideology* — explicitly identifies four discrete modes of production: (1) the communal mode, in “which a people lives by hunting and fishing, by cattle-raising or, at most, by agriculture”;\(^{11}\) (2) the tribal state of antiquity “which proceeds especially from the union of several tribes into a city by agreement or by conquest, and which is still accompanied by slavery”;\(^{12}\) (3) the feudal structure of land ownership in the form of private estates;\(^{13}\) (4) capitalist mode of production, in which the bourgeoisie “splits according to the division of labour into various sections and finally absorbs all propertied classes it finds in existence.”\(^ {14}\) It should be observed that Marx began revising this ontology of the State shortly after he first conjured it. Hobsbawm observes that by the time of the *Communist Manifesto* (which was written a scant year after *The German Ideology*) this list had lost its primary element — i.e., Marx’s and Engels’s discussion in the *Manifesto* only “recognizes three forms of class society: the slave society of antiquity; feudalism, and bourgeois society.”\(^ {15}\) The situation becomes slightly more confounded when — in an 1868 letter to Engels — Marx stipulates that

\(^{11}\) Karl Marx, *The German Ideology*, 38.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 39.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 40.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., 85.

\(^{15}\) E.J. Hobsbawm, “Introduction”, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*, 32.
“Asian or Indian forms of property constitute the initial ones everywhere in Europe.”\textsuperscript{16} This amounts to the claim that the historical evolution of society involves four discrete stages, in which the primary stage bears some semblance to the economic practices found on the Indo-Asian sub-continent. Marx seems to have further modified his position when he suggests — in a letter to Zasulich — that the “archaic” modes of production most closely resemble those of Russian villages.\textsuperscript{17} By the time of the \textit{Grundrisse}, Marx seems to have settled on five modes of production — the archaic form of landed property (which may gain expression as “Asiatic” or “oriental” despotism, but is not limited to these, in the sense that it is also evident in “Slavonic communes,” as well as Mexico and Peru);\textsuperscript{18} a Hellenistic-Roman form of economic production, which involves the prioritization of individual land owners (i.e., slave holders);\textsuperscript{19} “Germanic” feudalism, which tended to involve the emergence of labour guilds;\textsuperscript{20} capitalism, which “stands on its own feet” only once “a complete separation between the workers and the ownership of the conditions for the realization of their labour”\textsuperscript{21} has been actualized. Marx’s nuanced (indeed, sometimes competing) accounts of these various modes of production and their relation to one another — not to mention their participation in the historical evolution of discrete societies, as well as the evolution of social and economic aspects of human society treated as a unified whole (i.e., humanity, in a general sense) — desperately cries out for elaboration.

Marx’s complex identification of the differing modes of production has generated substantial critical reassessment. Engels — writing in \textit{Socialism, Utopian, and Scientific} —

\textsuperscript{16} Karl Marx, Letter to Engels dated 14 March 1868, \textit{Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations}, 139.
\textsuperscript{17} Karl Marx, Letter to Zasulich, dated 8 March 1881, \textit{Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations}, 143.
\textsuperscript{18} Karl Marx, \textit{Grundrisse, Notebook, IV}, 472-474.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 474-475.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 476-479.
explicitly characterizes the various modes of production as historical stages in the evolution of human society.\(^{22}\) It is perhaps worth observing that the three historical stages that Engels identifies are quite different in terms of geographical location from those identified by Marx. Perhaps foremost (in terms of historical significance, at least to Soviets) is Joseph Stalin’s complex modification of Marx’s claims about the nature of the modes of productions. Though Stalin eschews any appeal to geographical criteria, he does seem to share Engels’s sentiment that the Marxian modes of production correlate to specific temporal periods.\(^{23}\) Here, the suggestion is that while any particular mode of production need not correlate with any particular locale, it does correlate with a specific historical period — i.e., feudal modes of production might not have been evident in England, but they did obtain somewhere during the Medieval period. The claim is that though there might have been a feudal order of the Germanic sort during the time period extending from the formation of the Carolingian Empire (800 CE) until the first fires of the Germanic iron works (in the 1780s), and though this might have involved lands in Frank territory, this last aspect is immaterial in the identification of Germanic feudalism. The inferential progression here is subtle: (1) Stalin echoes Marx’s suggestion that modes of production “embrace” both the concrete material forces of production existent in society and the

\(^{22}\) Admittedly, Engels does not offer a not a detailed account in this text. In his “brief sketch of historical evolution,” Engels specifies three periods that would putatively produce the collapse of capitalism — the mediaeval, capitalist, and proletarian revolution. (Friedrich Engels, *Socialism, Utopian, and Scientific*, in *Essential Writings of Friedrich Engels*, [St. Petersburg FL: Red and Black Publishers, 2011], 60).

\(^{23}\) Stalin explicitly intertwines all of social development, material conditions, the values associated with labour and commodities, the means of producing profits and goods, and temporal progress, when he stipulates: “Hence, the history of social development is at the same time the history of the producers of material values themselves, the history of the labouring masses, who are the chief force in the process of production and who carry on the production of material values necessary for the existence of society.” (Joseph Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, [Calcutta: Mass Publications, 1975], 25).
relations of psycho-social individuals to these;\textsuperscript{24} (2) the stipulation that this unity of general tendencies and concrete particulars yields an axiological production — i.e., the production of “material values”;\textsuperscript{25} (3) the stipulation that material values are subject to quantitative determination, in the sense that they are measurable, and; (4) Stalin’s identification of technological change as the proximate cause of modifications to various modes of production.\textsuperscript{26} Taken together, Stalin’s observations yield the suggestion that variations in the concrete modes of production — i.e., the physical tools and machines used in all manner of economic production; the scythe, the loom, the harrow, and Ford assembly line alike — drive the transitions from one temporal age to another.\textsuperscript{27} The stipulation that modes of production yield quantitative values implies that historical evolution is expressed in terms of number (the

\textsuperscript{24} Stalin writes: “the mode of production, embraces both the productive forces of society and men’s relations of production, and is thus the embodiment of their unity in the process of production of material values.” (ibid., 23-24).

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 25.

\textsuperscript{26} Stalin identifies the production of material values as the second feature of variations in modes of production. (The primary feature is a modification of the relation of workers to different ways of producing economic value). Oddly, Stalin suggests that the second feature enjoys the status of an efficient cause. Stalin writes: “The second feature of production is that its changes and development always begin with changes and development of the productive forces, and in the first place, with changes and development of the instruments of production. Productive forces are therefore the most mobile and revolutionary element of production. First the productive forces of society change and develop, and then, depending on these changes and in conformity with them, men’s relations of production, their economic relations, change.” (ibid., 26).

\textsuperscript{27} Stalin writes: “The transition from crude stone tools to the bow and arrow, and the accompanying transition from the life of hunters to the domestication of animals and primitive pasturage; the transition from stone tools to metal tools (the iron axe, the wooden plough fitted with an iron colter, etc.), with a corresponding transition to tillage and agriculture; a further improvement in metal tools for the working up of materials, the introduction of the blacksmith’s bellows, the introduction of pottery, with a corresponding development of handicrafts, the separation of handicrafts from agriculture, the development of an independent handicraft industry and, subsequently, of manufacture; the transition from handicraft tools to machines and the transformation of handicraft and manufacture into machine industry; the transition to the machine system and the rise of modern large-scale machine industry—such is a general and far from complete picture of the development of the productive forces of society in the course of man’s history.” (ibid., 28-29).
quantitative value associated with surplus value) and in the quantitative temporal values — i.e.,
the numbering evident in calendar or clock time. This yields the staggering Stalinist hypothesis
that modification in modes of production creates the measure of time. Were we to accept the
suggestion that the essential aspect of time is a measure of the passing from one moment to
another, the progression from one duration to the next, then this implies that time is the most
profound product of the plurality of forms of industry. According to Stalin’s reading of Marx,
work — characterized as a concrete material expression of the modes of production — creates
time.

Shahrokh Haghighi observes that Georgi Plekhanov seems to share Stalin’s view.28
Plekhanov offers a complex suggestion involving all of: (1) the claim that variation among
different historical ages is expressed as modifications to the societal superstructure; (2) the
observation that modification of the superstructure is determined by changes in the economic
modes of production; (3) the stipulation that the economic base (i.e., the modes of production)
and the superstructure enjoy a linear causal relation. Here, an ideological “superstructure” is
identified as involving all of civil and cultural circumstances and states of affairs that are
analytically discrete from economic processes and the products these yield. The veracity of this
distinction may be adduced from the observation that the superstructure involves immaterial or
ideal aspects, and the economic base tends to involve concrete material entities and material
processes. In this sense, a society’s superstructure comprehends all of the multitude of what
Husserl and Ingarden categorize as “ideal meaning-units” that participate as the epistemic or
axiological content of all manner of artistic expression; civil affairs, ceremony, ritual, social

28 Shahrokh Haghighi, The Role of Historical Determinism in Marx’s Philosophy, (Ann Arbor:
UMI, 1990), 128-164.
practice; the entirety of the State characterized as an abstract entity or immaterial force; indeed, the vast plurality of generalities associated with human social existence as members of a *polis*. An evolution from one historical age to another would most certainly gain expression as a variation in a society’s superstructure — or, perhaps as evolution from one form of superstructure to another (e.g., Antiquity to Mediaeval; the Renaissance to the Post-colonial, etc.). Plekhanov seems to hold that economic modes of production — the physical making of things — and the ideological superstructure enjoy a relation of ontological dependence.

Commenting on the formation of an ideological superstructure, Plekhanov explicitly states that the modes of manufacturing “correspond” to the superstructure in a manner that is entirely “natural” and “essentially obligatory.” Perhaps even more forcefully, Plekhanov claims that particular modes of production “invariably” lead to — are the proximate and direct causes of; the necessary ontic condition which must be realized for there to emerge — a particular superstructural form. Taken together, these imply that a linear progression of time, expressed as a temporal succession of ages, is determined by the modes of production.

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31 Elaborating on Marx’s account of “emergence of ideological categories,” Plekhanov surmises that these seem to be strictly determined by, indeed ontologically dependent on, the modes of production. Plekhanov writes: “Once you recognize that men's own relations in production, existing independently of their will, acting behind their back, are reflected in their heads in the shape of various categories of political economy: in the shape of value, in the shape of money, in the shape of capital, and so forth, you thereby admit that on a certain economic basis there invariably arise certain ideological superstructures which correspond to its character. In that event the cause of your conversion is already three parts won, for all you have to do is to apply...
Marx’s account of the relations that obtain among the modes of production and the superstructure (as well as what these imply about the nature of temporal progression) is more nuanced than what Plekhanov seems willing to acknowledge. Though Marx — in the preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* — observes that “forms of the state” have their “roots in the material conditions of life,” in the sense that modes of production obtain as the “real foundation” to the superstructure, this is far from the unambiguous specification of a linear causal (i.e., ontological dependency) relation among material processes and the generalized modality of social relations.\(^\text{32}\) In a footnote to the first volume of *Capital*, Marx cautiously notes that though economic conditions participate in the formation of the superstructure, it is misguided to suggest — as an unnamed German-American publication does — that these are the only or even the primary factors involved in the determination of the nature of a society.\(^\text{33}\) Here, the argument is that the mere fact that particular economic conditions are realized in a given historical age does not imply that these are the only relevant conditions involved in shaping that age. The claim that feudal Europe and Ancient Athens alike had systems that involved the production and exchange of goods and commodities does not imply that these particular economic modalities — which were relative to particular spatio-temporal locales — were the only aspects involved in the formation of the superstructures associated with these periods. (I.e., as much as there was most certainly an economy present in Medieval Europe, there was also the belief system associated with the Catholic church, as well as the ubiquitous fear of death from your ‘own’ view (i.e., borrowed from Marx) to the analysis of ideological categories of the higher order: law, justice, morality, equality and so forth.” (ibid., 226)


\(^\text{33}\) *Karl Marx, Capital 1*, 175-176, fn. 35.
the Bubonic Plague; Marx implies that these factors might have played a role in the identification of the historical period). At least, this is the suggestion of Engels, who — in a letter to Bloch, dated 21-22 September 1890 — strongly cautions against ascribing a strict dependency relation to the complex association of modes of production and societal superstructure. Though it is certainly the case that the various processes of production of economically valuable entities, as well as the existence of these manufactured or refined entities do participate in the formation of the State, and while it may be observed that — in some cases— these entities and processes have some influence on form of governance (parliamentarian, republican, despotic, theocratic, etc.), it is falsely reductive to suggest that these rigorously determine the superstructure. Stated again, while it is apt to attribute to Marx the claim that some modality of production must obtain as an ontic condition in order for there to emerge a society, it is a mischaracterization of Marx’s position to surmise that the realization of a particular type of production will yield the formation of a certain type of social form; the mode of production is one among many of the ontic conditions involved in the formation of the superstructure.

34 Engels observes that though economic modes of production are involved in the formation of the superstructure, it would be falsely reductive to privilege these with ontological primacy or efficient causal powers. Engels writes: “According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. Other than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure — political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit: constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas — also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form.” (Friedrich Engels, Letter Dated 21-22 September 1890, K. Marx, F. Engels, V. Lenin On Historical Materialism; A Collection, [Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1978], 294).
Marx further complicates matters by observing — in the *Grundrisse* — that in the Ancient Greek world, the arts flowered “out of all proportion to the general development of society, hence also to the material foundation, the skeletal structure as it were, of its organization.”  

Here, the claim seems to be that the Ancient Greeks were more accomplished as poets and vase painters than they were as merchants and manufacturers. We now have two claims — there are a plurality of processes involved in the formation of a societal superstructure, any one of which might enjoy relative priority to any other; these processes express different temporal development relative to one another, in the sense that each enjoys a developmental rate that is relatively autonomous — which, when taken together, imply that a non-linear temporality obtains within the formation of any given historical period. Though this does not imply the non-existence of a relation of temporal succession or sequence within a given historical age, it does suggest that the relation among any temporal moments — i.e., the duration of the interval between \( t_1 \) and \( t_2 \) — is variable; an irregular temporal rhythm tends to characterize the development of different aspects of society. Though Deleuze explicitly identifies this sort of temporal relation through reference to the “barbarian despotic machine” (i.e., the Asiatic mode of production), this does not imply that this form of non-linear succession only obtains within this mode of production. Indeed, it might be observed that such a mode of progression can be associated with the internal development of various aspects of the superstructure of any society.

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36 Deleuze and Guattari make this observation though reference to Nietzsche: “the evolution of a thing is ‘a succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of subduing, plus the resistances they encounter, the attempts at transformation for the purpose of defense and reaction, and the results of successful counteractions.’” (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 197).
When generalized, these observations yield the suggestion that (in terms of their development) societies may not share the same time.

The claim that the world involves multiple discrete temporalities suggests difficulties for the thesis that linear evolution among historical periods obtains, if for no other reason than that the process of linear evolutionary development seems to involve various elements of a unified temporal continuum — the sort of temporal formation that tends to be characterized by a regular duration among the occurrence of events. (I.e., the particular year that is identified as the end of an age co-exists in a unified temporal continuum of years having the same number of days).

Marx — in the *Grundrisse* — is ambivalent about whether social evolutionary processes obtain over the course of history, in the sense that in addition to the difficulties suggested by differential temporalities, he seems to deny the possibility of evolution, only to smuggle it in by formal ontological means. Marx explicitly notes that economic and social production is “always production at a definite stage of social development — production by social individuals.”

The implicit claim is that it is apt to identify society as the sort of thing that involves discrete developmental stages, each of which differs in kind — each of the modes of production is a different kind of way of producing surplus value. The suggestion here is that there are different types of economically productive activity, none of which enjoy a relation of formal identity to any other. In this sense, a comparison of the modes of production that aspires to discern unity among them is an exercise in intellectual folly that is no more successful than Theaetetus’s endeavour to find a common aspect among the five great kinds. Perhaps it should be observed that a process of social evolution is essentially a means of relating discrete historical periods.

37 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, 85.
Evolution is a comprehensive relation among putatively disparate historical periods. The general observation is that evolution is a complex relation that obtains as the comparison of similar things arrayed along a historical continuum. In this sense, one of the minimal conditions of evolution is that there is at least one attribute that is shared among the *relata*. If one is to characterize evolution as a process which yields unity (i.e., the continuum of historical moments; the trajectory of social development which tends toward all of expansion of markets, increased productivity, greater efficiency, an increase of appropriated surplus values, and further immiseration of workers; continuum; the evolutionary history of socio-economic development), then one would need to demonstrate the existence of shared attributes among the various stages of development. Marx specifies two attributes common to any mode of production; (1) the existence of private property or commodities within a society;\(^{39}\) (2) a legal system which determines the nature of property, commodity, and regulates exchange.\(^{40}\) Marx further stipulates that satisfaction of all of these is the minimal precondition for any mode of production — i.e., they are the “divine” presuppositions of any form of production.\(^{41}\) Étienne Balibar observes that by the time Marx wrote *Capital*, this list had become more refined, in the sense that any given mode of production requires the involvement of three primary elements, as well as four subordinate elements. The primary elements are: (1) the labourer whose efforts are treated as a

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\(^{39}\) Marx characterizes the existence of either private or communal property in a society as one the “general preconditions of all production.” (Ibid., 88).

\(^{40}\) Marx observes that the “protection of acquisitions” demands the formation of a legal system and form of government. (Ibid.) In his reading of the third volume of *Capital*, Étienne Balibar observes that the law — characterized as a principle of distribution that functions within the categories of human persons and non-human things — must obtain for there to be any determination of what may be considered a commodity. (Étienne Balibar, “The Elements of Structure and their History”, *Reading Capital: The Complete Edition*, Louis Althusser, Étienne Balibar, Roger Estable, Pierre Macherey, Jacques Rancière, Ben Bruster and David Fernbach (tr.), [London and New York: Verso, 2015], 393).

\(^{41}\) Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, 110.
commodity in the process of production; (2) “the means of production”\textsuperscript{42} — i.e., the physical materials utilized in the creation of surplus value; (3) the plurality of elements that indirectly furnish the conditions involved in the production, procurement, or distribution of commodities. Any of the plurality of the means of production involve the two subordinate elements of (a) a physical means of production, as well as (b) a material or abstract goal to be realized by production — a physical model to be replicated; an ideal thought object of what is to be produced by one’s toil. The subordinate elements involved with the conditions of production involve (c) a distribution of geographic space in terms of legal property; (d) some means of exchange, characterized as the any of the various modalities that regulate the appropriation of commodities by entities not concretely involved in their production. This is the identification of a set of criteria by which one can establish formal identity among the modes of production. The claim is that as long as conditions are satisfied at any moment in chronometric history, then, at that moment in time, a particular mode of production is realized. Here, we have a specification of the conditions by which — if they are realized by the economic processes of production over the course of a particular temporal duration — one may establish formal identity among putatively unrelated modes or production. Indeed, given that these conditions are the minimal necessary conditions for the identification of any mode of production, this suggests evolution. This temporal continuum comprehends a plurality of formally identical modes of production. Though these modes are formally identical does not demand that they are realized at the same temporal instant (i.e., realized as the same — or even a similar — temporal duration). Formal identity among modes requires only that these be realized as moments within a temporal continuum—

\textsuperscript{42} Étienne Balibar, “From Periodization to the Modes of Production”, \textit{Reading Capital: The Complete Edition}, 376.
i.e., as moments of an evolutionary process, as moments in a unified temporal order. Indeed, as soon as one grants that modes of production are realized as different temporal moments, one implies the existence of an evolutionary process. Here, evolution is characterized as the process which unifies temporally discrete entities that enjoy the same form. With his specification of the conditions of formal identity among the modes of production, Marx identifies the nature of the forms which populate evolution as various moments in time.

The take-away from Marx’s modifications of the nature, number, and function of the modes of production, is the suggestion that social and economic development expresses a non-linear evolution. The concept of non-linear evolution is derived from Arthur Iberall’s suggestion that a sequence of events may emerge as an arrhythmic temporal series — i.e., a temporal series characterized by irregular, non-symmetric intervals between the occurrence of events; a series in which temporal durations are non-identical with one another; a temporal series constituted of stochastic moments.\(^43\) There are two complex claims supporting the analytic point that the modes of production participate in a non-linear evolution sequence: (1) a properly Marxist account of the modes of production demonstrates that on a local level — i.e., internal to a society — there could co-exist discrete modes of production, each of which may express a temporality that is incommensurable to any other; (2) formal identity obtains among modes of production, even if these enjoy non-equivalent durations. The first claim suggests a difficulty for an account of evolution as a linear process by introducing the co-existence of different temporal scales. A

\(^{43}\) Analyzing a system of sequences of electrical pulses, Iberall characterizes a linear system as expressing pulses which obtain at regular temporal intervals (i.e., those illustrated by a sinusoidal curve). Pulses in a non-linear sequence occur at intervals — which though not entirely random — range from the very short to the very long, and thus cannot be neatly illustrated by the repetition of regular oscillations (Arthur S. Iberall, *Toward A General Science of Viable Systems* [New York, McGraw-Hill, 1972], 153).
linear temporal ordering would suggest a neat and tidy chronometric unfolding of one mode of production to another. The claim that there are different durations involved with different modes of production suggests the absence of a unified time. In this sense, one of the minimal conditions of linear evolution is denied by Marx’s observation that modes of production involve temporal durations. The claim that different modes of production might obtain as non-identical durations confounds the suggestion that evolution is linear. The second claim — that the modes of production enjoy formal identity — preserves evolution, albeit in a modified sense. A key observation is that formal identity does not imply temporal identity: the same form may obtain at different times; the same form may enjoy different durations. A second key crucial implication is that identical forms may be arrayed as moments of a continuum of irregular intervals. When these moments are identified as temporal moments — i.e., durations — and this continuum is identified as temporal in nature, the ordering (of the forms) yields a series of temporal successions that tends to characterize evolution. From the observation that these forms may enjoy different durations, we may adduce that this evolution enjoys stochastic succession — a repetition of the same form (a mode of production) at irregular intervals. Marx’s nuanced elaboration of the modes of production yields a tepid defense of evolution, in the sense that evolution is preserved as a substantially modified model of variable temporal progression. The evolution of society proceeds by fits and starts. Though it is still apt to characterize the temporal progression of societal change — from one type of production to another — as evolution, it is inadequate to characterize this as linear evolution. From one mode of production to another, society proceeds in a stochastic fashion.

Deleuze’s and Guattari’s Denial of Temporally Serialized Social Evolution
Deleuze and Guattari begin their modification of Marxian accounts of evolution by questioning — in the eleventh proposition of their nomadology — which of the State or primitive social groupings (i.e., tribes of nomads) enjoy temporal priority. Ultimately, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that “economic evolutionism is an impossibility; even a ramified evolution, ‘gatherers — hunters — animal breeders — farmer-industrialists’ is hardly believable.” The claim here could hardly be less ambiguous: evolution does not obtain as an expression of temporal progression; the relation of temporal succession — which is implicit in both linear and stochastic evolutionary models — does not obtain as an aspect of an adequate account of the development of human societies; the State and primitive (i.e., non-State), social formations are temporally co-existent entities; no ontological dependency relation exists among the State and other forms of social organization. It would be difficult to overstate the significance of this claim. Deleuze’s and Guattari’s denial of evolutionism involves a complex inferential progression that draws premises from of Jane Jacobs’s analyses of economies of urban and rural environments and Pierre Clastres’s incisive claims about the nature of the State in primitive society. Jacobs suggests that the State formation enjoys concrete expression as the urban centre — i.e., the State is identified as the city. She further observes that primitive cities gave rise to the rural modes of economic production. The substantive claim here is that though the evolutionary model of economic development obtains, it only does so in a modified manner. Jacobs argues that the developmental line from country to State has been reversed. Clastres radically challenges all of Marxian, linear, and Jacobs’s views of the relation among the State and non-state economic modes of

45 Ibid., 430.
evolutionary development with his suggestion that primitive rural tribes actively resist evolving into States. Clastres further observes that the leader of a tribe is non-identical to a head of State, in the sense that tribal chiefs (or clan leaders) tend to be generous to such an extreme degree that this diminishes any accumulation of surplus wealth. Taken together, these discrete claims suggest it is inaccurate to identify the relation of tribal social organization and the State (or urban) organization as involving any sort of evolution. It would be a misstatement to suggest that any one of these is entirely intuitive or self-evident. Indeed, if each inferential step involved in Deleuze’s and Guattari’s argument is compelling, then their conclusion — that evolution does not obtain — is staggering. Deleuze and Guattari’s complex inference cries out for elaboration, if for no other reason than it seems to deny that the relation of temporal succession obtains, while affirming the contemporaneous actualization of modes of social organization that are typically thought of as temporally discrete.

Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc observes that Deleuze’s and Guattari’s claims about the origins of social organization involve a modification of Jacobs’s denial of the suggestion that primitive agrarian social collectives antedate the State.48 Jacobs observes that the “dogma of agricultural primacy”49 is fallacious, in the sense that it is misguided to suggest that “cities are built upon a rural economic base.”50 Jacobs presents her argument in economic terms. She observes that “rural production is literally the creation of city consumption.”51 This is a reversal of the economic progression elaborated in Marxian evolutionary theory. No longer is the rural society thought of as the cradle of the city. Jacobs suggests “that agriculture itself may have originated in

48 Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc, State and Politics: Deleuze and Guattari on Marx, Ames Hodges (tr.), (South Pasadena: Semiotext[e], 2016), 30.
50 Ibid., 3.
51 Ibid., 41.
the cities.”

Deleuze and Guattari develop Jacob’s claim with the observation the archaeological record demonstrates that the primitive city-state involved “a stock of uncultivated seeds and relatively tame animals from different territories that performs, and makes possible to perform, at first by chance, hybridizations and selections from which agricultural and small-scale animal raising arise.” The State is the temporally primary social experience, from which agrarian economy is produced; large, communal, organized human society, surplus, and affluence — the very features which tend to characterize the State — furnish the conditions for the creation of the farm; primitive urban industry produces the biface, the harrow, and hybrid seeds alike; hunters and gatherers go forth from their urban dwellings to first harvest the crops of the garden in the city, and only when the productive capacities of these urban oases have been maximized, do they go forth to reap the surplus of the wilds; the surfeit of commodities and skills progresses along a complex cycle of accumulation that begins with the city-state, progresses to the country, only to return (as imported wealth) to contribute to the overflowing coffers of the city. From the discovery of seeds and the skeletons of domesticated animals in in the ruins of Çatal Hüyük, one can adduce that the city-state (not rural community; not the farm) is the cradle of human civilization. This implies a reversal of the developmental order suggested by Marxian evolutionism.

Given that this order is explicitly temporal — i.e., the order of temporal

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52 Ibid., 17.
53 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 428.
54 James Mellaart came across the ruins of Çatal Hüyük during an excavation of the Konya Plain during November of 1958. Subsequent investigations revealed that agriculture was practiced throughout the Neolithic urban center. Mellaart observes that of “the animal bones found in the settlements of Çatal Hüyük, the following notes may give some idea of the Early Neolithic economy. Agriculture was practiced, as is clear from the numerous mortars, querns…, ovens and deposits of carbonized wheat…, field peas…and seeds.” (James Mellaart, “Excavations at Çatal Hüyük: First Preliminary Report, 1961” Anatolian Studies 12, (1962), pp. 41-65, 56).
succession — this implies that chronometric evolutionist models of social development should be inverted.

Deleuze and Guattari radically modify this reversal of evolution with their analyses of Pierre Clastres’s ethnological investigations. Clastres suggests that it is misguided to think that social groups of antiquity will evolve into State formations, as though an analogue of the contemporary political arrangement enjoyed by so-called civilized nations may be retrogressively predicated of primitive tribes like some sort of “omega point” toward which their development naturally tends. Clastres starkly observes that “primitive societies are societies without a State, because for them the State is impossible.” Clastres marshals three claims to support the suggestion that evolution (from primitive to society to States) does not obtain: (1) he observes that evolutionist arguments tend to involve (as a presupposition) a wholly unjustified negative axiological judgment about the nature of primitive social groups; (2) he points out that technological evolutionist arguments tend to falsely suggest a comparison of disparate technical objects; (3) he observes that evolutionist arguments tend to involve a confusion about the role of the primitive chief, in the sense that they tend to assign false predicates to the leader of a primitive clan. Clastres observes that evolutionist models tend to involve a mistaken bias that primitive societies — i.e., those portions of the human family which Morgan disparagingly

55 The term “omega point” is borrowed from Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, albeit with modification. Teilhard tends to conceive of an omega point as the maximal level of complexity of any instantiated form; divine perfection made manifest in lived experience. Deleuze and Guattari de-mystify the term when they use it to refer to the temporal endpoint of an evolutionary process (i.e., a “year omega”). Here I adopt Deleuze and Guattari’s sense of the term (Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, [New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959], 257-272; Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 212).

56 Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State, Robert Hurley and Abe Stein (tr.), (New York: Zone Books, 1989), 205.
identifies as “savages” and “barbarians,” the same social groups that were putatively locked in the desperate multi-millennia struggle to acquire a sufficient surplus of goods in order to claw themselves into civilization, all those which existed prior to the Neolithic revolution — were incomplete, in the sense that they lack a State. The suggestion here is that those who advance an evolutionist account of human development tend to conceive of “the State as the destiny of every society.” The negative axiological judgement involved in this claim is that pre-capitalist societies were worse off than those which enjoy political formations like those evidenced in a State, because their members lacked (any or all of mental, physical, or moral) wherewithal to accrue sufficient recourses to create an organized governmental structure. The second claim —

57 Lewis H. Morgan, Ancient Society, or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savage Through Barbarism to Civilization, (Bolton: Pantianos Classics, 2021), 12. Perhaps it is worth noting that Morgan’s categorization of pre-capitalist humans is substantially more nuanced than is typically acknowledged. Morgan’s distinction among savage society, barbarian proto-civilization, and civilization, involves the distribution of six subcategories: both the savage and barbarian periods are divided into lower, middle, and upper stages of development. Morgan stipulates that transition from one level to another is identified with an advance in technology or acquisition of a new mode of production; society attained middle savagery when they began to cook fish over fires; the bow and arrow — and presumably other types of primitive projectile weapons — came to characterize upper savage social groups; pottery and brick are characterized as inventions of lower barbarians; the domestication of animals and animal husbandry were the distinguishing features of middle barbarism; the primitive iron smelter heralded the birth of upper barbarism (ibid., 16-18).

58 Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State, Robert Hurley and Abe Stein (tr.), (New York: Zone Books, 1989), 189.

59 Ibid.

60 Clastres observes that there is a normative approbation implicit the “common idea that the Savage is lazy.” (ibid., 193). Unfortunately, the meritless condemnation of so-called primitive people is not confined to poorly conceived anthropology. Philosophy and literature also express dubious claims about the moral and intellectual capacities of peoples who did not participate in the State. Here, one cannot help but be reminded of Kant’s ignominious observation that “south seas islanders” are immoral, because they let their “natural talents rust” by devoting their efforts to anything other than the actualization of a Eurocentric concept of reason. (Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Mary Gregor [tr.], [New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006], 4:423, 32). It should be also observed that though Marx’s mature work seems to direct its moral outrage toward capitalists, in their early work Marx and Engels seem to have been guilty of a dubious judgement about the nature of “non-historic
that there is no teleology or intentional directionality associated with technological development among different technological forms within a given society — implies that discrete technological artifacts do not enjoy an evolutionary relation with one another. Clastres observes that an assertion of teleological development among different technological artefacts would involve the conjuring of an “abstract standard, in terms of which technological ‘intensities’ can be measured.” Unfortunately, no such general standard exists. The absence of the criteria of comparison suggests that different forms of technology are utterly discrete, in the strict sense that no relation — evolutionary, or otherwise — obtains among them. This yields the tantalizing suggestion that “there is no justification for contrasting the rifle with the bow” in terms of the values associated with all of effectiveness, complexity, or function. When viewed from the perspective of the culture in which the form is instantiated (as a particular technological object), these values are absolute. In concrete terms, an object is seen as being optimally effective, as complex as it can be, and ideally suited to fulfil its function — e.g., the compound bow, arrow, rider, and horse conjoined to create the formal unity of a super-weapon for the nomads of the steppes; the biface was the ideal instrument for Acheulean society during the Lower Paleolithic period. Clastres’s third claim — about the nature of the authority of tribal chiefs — suggests peoples.” For instance, they explicitly categorize Slavonic people as lacking in moral and intellectual capacities, in the sense that they are identified as “nothing more than the national refuse of a thousand years of immensely confused development.” (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “The Magyar Struggle”, The Revolutions of 1848, David Fernbach [ed.], [Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973], 220-221). One would be remiss if one did not also note the presence of this moral condemnation supposedly savage peoples in the ill-conceived verse of Kipling. Taken together, these examples — which are by no means uncommon or confined to the literature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries — demonstrate the ubiquity of the bias against what Deleuze and Guattari categorize as nomadic peoples.

61 Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State, 192.
62 Ibid.
that there is no mechanism within primitive society that would result in a chief assuming the role of political leader. Here, the claim is that a leader of primitive society never becomes the head of a primitive political State. Clastres observes that leaders of tribes tend to enjoy their rank only to the extent that they demonstrate adeptness in a technical skill (i.e., oration, hunting, fishing, honing a biface) of perceived societal importance. The implication is that no chief participates

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64 Clastres writes: “In the estimation of the tribe, what qualifies such a man to be chief? In the end, it is his ‘technical’ competence alone: his oratorical talent, his expertise as a hunter, his ability to coordinate martial activities, both offensive and defensive. And in no circumstance does the tribe allow the chief to go beyond that technical limit: it never allows a technical superiority to change into a political authority. The chief is there to serve society; it is society as such — the real locus of power — that exercises its authority over the chief. That is why it is impossible for the chief to reverse that relationship for his own ends, to put a society in his service, to exercise what is termed power over the tribe: primitive society would never tolerate having a chief transform himself into a despot... In a sense, the tribe keeps the chief under close watch; he is a kind of prisoner in a space that the tribe does not let him leave” (Pierre Clastres, *Society Against the State*, 207). It is perhaps worth noting that Claude Lévi-Strauss observes that Chiefs of the Nambikwara tribe tend to languish under similar social privations. Lévi-Strauss writes: “Although the chief does not seem to be in a privileged position, from the material point of view, he must have under his control surplus quantities of food, tools, weapons, and ornaments which, however trifling in themselves, are nonetheless considerable in relation to the prevailing poverty. When an individual, a family, or the band as a whole, wishes or needs something, it is to the chief that this appeal must be made. Generosity is, therefore, the first attribute to be expected of a new chief... The chiefs were my best informers; and as I knew the difficulties of their position I liked to reward them liberally. Rarely, however did my presents remain in their hands for more than a day or two. And when I moved on, after sharing for several weeks the life of any particular band, its members rejoiced in the acquisition of axes, knives, pearls, and so forth from my stores. The chief, by contrast, was generally as poor, in material terms, as he had been when I arrived. His share, which was very much larger than the average allowance, had all been extorted from him” (Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Tristes Tropiques*, John Russell [tr.], [New York: Criterion Books, 1961], 304). Ian Hogbin observes that a similar circumstance is evident in the New Guinea Busama. Here, the local clubhouse leader — whose role correlates with the rank of a tribal chief — seemed to “work harder than anyone else to keep up his stocks of food. The aspirant for honours cannot rest of his laurels but must go on holding large feasts and piling up credits. It is acknowledged that he has to toil early and late — ‘His hands are never free from earth, and his forehead continually drips with sweat’” (Ian Hogbin, *Transformation Scene: The Changing Culture of a New Guinea Village* [London and New York, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951], 131). The implication of these ethnological investigations is that there are a variety of social mechanisms in place, which function to prevent chiefs from becoming wealthy — all that they so arduously acquire seems to be immediately expended in
in (or facilitates) a putative progression from privative society to form the societal organization that tends to be associated with the political State. The limitations that tribal societies place on their chiefs — the plurality of mechanisms of control, which though perhaps not formalized, are nonetheless present as any of immanent censures, micro-aggressions, ritualized humiliations, or explicit diminishment of social status; any of the aspects of the fabric of society that may be brought to bear against an aspirant to the cult of narcissistic (sometimes deluded, often mendacious) political authority — function to ward off the formation of the political State. The existence of these mechanisms of control, in conjunction with the diminishment of the axiological judgment about the nature of primitive life and the observation that technological forms tend to be non-relational, have been adduced to demonstrate that primitive societies actively resist evolving into political State formations.

The implication of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s analysis of Clastres can be expressed as the satisfaction of a conditional: if primitive societies do not evolve into States, but States exist — which indeed they do — then this implies that the State has always existed. Deleuze and Guattari identify the omnipresent State as the Urstaat. Deleuze and Guattari elucidate their complex views on socio-economic evolutionism and temporal succession through two separate arguments. The suggestion that there is variable evolution within a given society does nothing to diminish the suggestion that an evolutionary pattern might obtain in the historical movement from one age to the next. Were this sort of evolution to obtain (as a hypothesis about the nature of historical progress), it could be expressed as a relation of temporal succession on the grand scale of a temporal movement among historical ages or epochs. Alternatively, this evolutionary hypothesis service of the tribe. In this sense, the tribal chief seems to be little more than a pauper in a palace; bereft of wealth, real power, or the means of advancing their own interests.
could be identified as the sequential prioritization of one mode of production over another, with
the stipulation that this is correlated with the putative progression of historical temporal moments
culminating in the formation of unified urban civilization (i.e., a polis). Deleuze and Guattari
seem to be suggesting something more radical than the implied non-linear evolution of the
society with their observation — in *A Thousand Plateaus* — that “a State comes into the world
fully formed and rises up in a single stroke, [as the] unconditioned Urstaat.” This amounts to a
denial of there being any evolutionary process that leads to the formation of the State. In
concrete terms, Deleuze’s and Guattari’s Urstaat thesis suggests that the polis arises
spontaneously as an ontologically autonomous circumstance that is discrete from both rural life
and temporally graduated evolutionary process of συνοικισμός (synoecism, the incorporation of
discrete rural settlements into a unified cooperative). One might think that the Urstaat thesis
involves an inversion of an ontological dependency relation that seems to obtain among all of
villages, farms, geographical domains that enjoy the agrarian condition in relation to a primordial
urban civilization. Were this the claim, then the process of evolution still would obtain. Perhaps
more precisely, evolution would still be realized in the form of temporal succession \( (t_1, t_2...t_n) \), in
which the formation of the Urstaat is correlated with \( t_1 \) and the ontologically secondary creation
of rural domains is correlated with a temporal moment denoted by any value in the series \( t_2 \)
through \( t_n \). Perhaps it is worth pointing out that this would involve a transposition of the values
of the terms to schematize an evolutionary process, which is the inverse of that specified by
anthropological models that suggest primacy of rural existence. (I.e., models which suggest that
cities came from farms; illustrations of the claim that rural circumstances involve the primitive
accumulation of goods, which ultimately yields the formation of urban environments). This

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would be the inverse of the schema that illustrates how — over the course of arduous millennia plagued by drought, flood, inclement weather, earthquakes, infestation by vermin, the seemingly ubiquitous threat of packs of roving predators, blight, and all other manner of difficulty found in the natural world — rural dirt farmers were (finally) able to cobble together a primitive city like Çatal Hüyük. Deleuze’s and Guattari’s claim is more confounding than this. Theirs is the suggestion that it is false to attribute an ontological dependency relation to the development of urban and rural modes of existence; the city and the country emerge at the same moment; these are ontologically co-given. The temporal implication is that historical evolutionary processes (from farm to village, village to town, town to city, etc.) are not realized. This amounts to denial of the claim that a temporal succession relation obtains among the Urstaat and that which it is not. Stated again, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the ontological difference among the urban and the rural does not imply temporal difference. The city and the country — characterized as different modes of existence involving different concrete material entities and physical processes of the creation of goods — are realized as temporally co-existent entities, i.e., as existents with no temporal duration separating them. With their stipulation of the fundamental existence of the Urstaat, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the history of human social development is bereft of temporal succession.

**Social Change as an Expression of Immanent Causality**

Deleuze’s and Guattari’s identification of the temporally primary actualization of the Urstaat may be characterized as putting the final nail in the lid of a philosophical coffin containing a plurality of related concepts — social evolutionism, linear causality, and temporal succession. Evolutionist accounts of societal change tend to involve at least one of linear
causality or temporal succession. In addition to denying that social evolution obtains in a serialized fashion, the Urstaat thesis implies that if linear causality or temporal succession obtain at all, these are inadequate to account for societal change. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that an adequate account of social variation relies on neither of (1) a regular progression from one mode of social existence to another — i.e., linear causality; (2) a succession of discrete temporal moments. Their positive claim is that multiple analytically discrete modes co-exist in a single duration (i.e., they are realized as different aspects of the same temporal moment; as non-identical modes of the same temporally unified social substance; as contemporaneous, implicated modes). These suggest that the internal variations of the Urstaat involve ontological univocity and immanent causality. Here — in a modification of Spinoza — Deleuze and Guattari suggest that co-existing modes of economic production (i.e., modes of being; social modes of existence) affect each other in the same temporal duration. Deleuze’s careful identification of univocity as the suggestion that being “is said in a single and same sense of all its individuating differences or intrinsic modalities” informs an of the account of causal relations that obtain among the

66 Perhaps it should be observed that though linear causality and the relation temporal succession tend to be conflated, in the sense that they are often put forward as aspects of an adequate account of the mechanism of change, they are different types of relation. Each of temporal succession and linear causality tends to involve different content and explain different aspects of variation. A relation of temporal succession involves temporal moments as its content — the entity which “succeeds” in a relation of temporal succession is any of a moment of time, an interval, a duration, or a quantitative value associated with the variable \( t \). Linear causal relations tend to comprehend a wider array of entities, in the sense that linear causal relations may have as their \textit{relata} all manner of existents — material entities, ideal objects, actualities, potentialities, processes, particulars, generalities of various types; gods and demons, and many other sorts of metaphysical entities or pre-individuated forces that might not involve any aspect of temporality, or which might only enjoy an analogous relation to temporality. It should be further observed that though linear causality and temporal succession tend to be associated with the same event, this is not necessarily the case. For instance, one can imagine a linear causal relation obtaining among two (or more) eternities or a-temporal entities.

different modes of society. The stipulation that social formations are differently individuated aspects which obtain in the same duration (i.e., aspects of the same form of time) implies that modification of these aspects does not involve a relation of temporal succession. This is a unique sort of change indeed: change of an irreducible, non-quantitatively divisible temporal moment; modification which occurs in the midst of a non-denumerable duration; innovation or invention in an instant which defies more fine-tuned numeric division; creation involved in the smallest morsel of time; individuation as an expression of temporal immanence. This plurality of formulations implies that immanent causal relations obtain among mutually implicated social modes. Social change is expressed as temporally instantaneous (i.e., non-successive) modification of co-existing elements.

If variation is explained by temporal succession or linear causality, then what accounts for change among discrete social entities and processes which are localized to the same duration? Craig Lundy suggests that temporally co-existent social forms — i.e., the Urstaat and other forms of social organization — enjoy an immanent causal relation. Deleuze, in Foucault, explicitly identifies an immanent cause as the mercurial sort of force “which is realized, integrated, and distinguished in its effect. Or rather, the immanent cause is realized, integrated, and distinguished by its effect.” Deleuze explicitly notes that his concept of immanent causality is derived from Spinoza. At

69 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, Sean Hand (tr.), (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 37.
70 Deleuze’s concept of immanent causality is involved in his shockingly brief, profoundly dense elaboration of the univocity of difference — i.e., the claim that difference is ontologically primary; the specification of substance as difference in the processes of continual actualization. (Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 35-40). Deleuze specifies that this complex notion of univocity is developed by along a trajectory that extends from Aristotle’s analyses of the relation
E1p18, Spinoza identifies God as the immanent cause of all existent entities.\textsuperscript{71} Spinoza’s demonstration involves two conditions: (1) the stipulation that all existents participate in Divine substance — i.e., “everything that is, is in God”;\textsuperscript{72} (2) the claim that Divine substance is the cause of all that it comprehends — i.e., “God is the cause of all things which are in him.”\textsuperscript{73} At \textit{Ethics} E1P15d, Spinoza clarifies the first condition when he notes that every aspect of reality (i.e., all the modes) are involved with ontologically primary substance.\textsuperscript{74} This ontological involvement seems to admit of the possibility that divine substance is the transitive cause of the

of genus to individual difference, through Duns Scotus’s claim that Divine substance is infinite individuation (i.e., a singular difference that obtains on both the levels of species and genus), to Spinoza’s suggestion that the modes and substance are mutually implicated (i.e., substance can only be elaborated through the modes), only to realize its final articulation Nietzsche’s thesis of eternal return (i.e., the repetition of difference). Nathan Widder does a wonderful job elaborating how Deleuze modifies both Aristotle and Duns Scotus to characterize difference as “an excess that is common to all beings” (Nathan Widder, \textit{John Duns Scotus, in Deleuze’s Philosophical Lineage}, Graham Jones and Jon Roffe [eds.], [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009], 28; Nathan Widder, “The Rights of the Simulacra: Deleuze and the Univocity of Being” \textit{Continental Philosophy Review} 34, no. 4 [2001], pp. 437–453). Daniel W. Smith observes that “for Spinoza, we only know two of God’s infinite attributes, (thought and extension), and attributes are common forms, predictable of univocally of both God and his creatures. Though formally discrete, the attributes are ontologically univocal.” (Daniel W. Smith, \textit{Essays on Deleuze} [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012], 31). Charles Olney observes that Deleuze’s interpretation of the eternal return (as the re-actualization of difference) involves univocity, in the sense that the return yields the emergence of that “which was always already contained within the original, but which can never be expressed in the same way again” (Charles Olney, “A New Metaphysics: Eternal Recurrence and the Univocity of Difference”, \textit{The Journal of Speculative Philosophy} 34, no. 2, [2020], pp. 179-200, 195). The concept of immanent causality comes to the fore in Spinoza’s elaboration of univocity. For this reason, here I focus on the temporal implications of Deleuze’s Spinozistic identification of immanent causality.


\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{74} Spinoza writes: “Except for God, there neither is, nor can be conceived, any substance….i.e., thing that is in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes…can neither be nor be conceived without substance. So they can be in the divine nature alone, and can be conceived through it alone. But except for substances and modes there is nothing. Therefore, nothing can be or be conceived without God, q.e.d.” (Baruch Spinoza, \textit{Ethics}, E1P15d, \textit{The Collected Works of Spinoza I}, 420).
plurality of existents. Were this the claim, then it would be the case the modes subsist from substance, as though these were the outcomes of a relation of strict ontological dependency. Spinoza explicitly denies this possibility with his stark observation — at E1p18 — that Divine substance “is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things.”

Deleuze observes — in *Expressionism and Philosophy* — that in Spinoza’s metaphysics, “attributes are conditions common to substance which possesses them collectively and to modes which imply them distributively.” When coupled with the observation that both causes and effects are types of attributes which enjoy discrete distribution as modes, this lays the conceptual foundation for immanent causality. Taken together, these suggest that (in an immanent causal relation) the analytically discrete moments of “cause” and “effect” are inexorably bound together at the level of substance — i.e., they are common to substance — and expressed as analytically discrete modes of the same unified whole.

In *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, Deleuze explicitly observes that this fundamental unity (i.e., interiority) of cause and effect is what separates an immanent cause from both a transitive cause and causation involving emanation. The claim here seems to be that it is inaccurate to characterize divine substance as a remote causal agent which influences modal variation from a

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77 Deleuze writes: “Thus God is never a remote cause, but is reached from the first term of the regression. And only God is a cause; there is only one sense and one modality for all the figures of causality, although these figures are themselves various (cause of itself, efficient cause of infinite things, efficient cause of finite things in relation to one another). Understood in its one sense and its single modality, the cause is essentially immanent; that is, it remains in itself in order to produce (as against the transitive cause), just as the effect remains in itself (as against the emanative cause).” (Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, Robert Hurley [tr.], [San Francisco: City Lights, 1988], 54).
privileged ontological position. Stated positively, divine substance is implicated in the modal expression of change. Deleuze further stipulates that this divine substance is implicated in the effect modal variation — in this sense, the effect is ontologically involved with the causal agent, and all of these enjoy temporally simultaneous expression; this amounts to modal variation at an instant, in which every aspect of the modification (all of substance, cause, and effect) obtain as compresent. It should be pointed out that both transitive and emanative causal mechanisms involve transcendence, though in different ontological directions. It should be further observed that each of these forms of causality — transitive, emanant, and immanent — explicitly involves temporality, if for no other reason than causal mechanisms elaborate on modifications of entities that exist in time. A transitive cause transcends its effect, in the sense that it is distributed as an attribute of a mode that is anterior to its effect. In transitive causal relations, the cause is temporally prior to and removed from its effect. By contrast, an emanative cause, is one in which the effects transcend the entity as a derivation, or something wholly distinct from the original entity; in this sense, the effect of an emanant cause subsists as the consequent (or product) of a relation of ontological dependency; the effects of an emanative causal relation tend to be temporally posterior to their causes — i.e., these are the results that temporally follow from an action or circumstance.\textsuperscript{78} The key feature of immanent causality — which separates it from

\textsuperscript{78} Daniel W. Smith elaborates on the distinctions among transitive cause, emanation, and immanent cause through reference to Medieval concepts of substance: “Broadly speaking, medieval philosophy distinguished between three types of causes: a transitive cause, an emanative cause, and an immanent cause. A \textit{transitive} cause is a cause that leaves itself in order to produce, and what it produces (its effect) is outside of itself. Christianity held to the idea of a real distinction between God and the world. If God created the world, and the world is exterior to God, then God must come out of himself in order to create the world; it therefore needed to see God as a purely transitive cause (creationism). An \textit{emanative} cause, by contrast, is a cause whose effect is exterior to it, but which none the less remains within itself, in order to produce, its effect. The sun, for example, remains within itself in order to produce, but what it produces (light), comes out of it... An \textit{immanent} cause, finally, is a cause that not only remains within
emanation and transitive causality — is that all aspects of the causal mechanism are interior to the entity undergoing modification. Here, the implication is that an adequate account of change among co-existent modal expressions of the same entity involves the mutual implication of each expressed mode as an aspect of a causal relation — i.e., each mode is implicated as a *relata* in causal relation that obtains as an aspect of temporally unified (undifferentiated) duration; no relation of temporal succession obtains in this causal relation, because the duration which comprehends their relation is fundamentally unified — i.e., non-decomposable into discrete instants. Those united by immanent causality cannot be torn asunder by temporal succession.

**Concluding Remarks: Temporality Involves Instantaneous Change**

The positive claim is that societal change occurs in an instant. The negative correlate is that an adequate account of social variation does not involve any appeal to the relation of temporal succession. If we still must characterize societal variation as evolution, then we must do so only with the acknowledgment that temporal succession plays no part in this evolution. In concrete terms, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that society changes in an instant. Time is instantaneous variation expressed in society. The argument in support of this claim involves four discrete stages.

First, I observed that Deleuze and Guattari elaborate time’s expression in society through reference to the Marxist concept of history and the relation among economic modes of production. In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that “universal history” — i.e., the comprehensive temporal record of all that has been — expresses a “history of contingencies, and

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itself in order to produce, but one whose produced effects also remain within it.” (Daniel W. Smith, *Essays on Deleuze*, 32-33).
not the history of necessity.” Here, they are developing Marx’s claim — from the Grundrisse — that time may be characterized as non-linear development of various modes of economic production. I further observed that Deleuze and Guattari modify Marx’s early claim that history (i.e., the objective record of humanity’s temporal past) expresses a linear progression through various non-contemporaneous epochs. In his early writings, Marx seems oddly conflicted about the nature and number of these, in the sense that the nature and number of ages Marx identifies varies depending on which text one consults. In The German Ideology, for example, Marx and Engels identify four stages of economic development; in the ultimate paragraph of his Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx increases this number by one; by the time of the first volume of Capital and the Grundrisse, Marx seems to have settled on five discrete historical modes of production. One of the primary confusions involves Marx’s waffling about the nature of the Asiatic mode of production, in reference to primitive communism, and Ancient slavery, i.e., the two modes of production with which it seems to bear the closest conceptual proximity. Perhaps flummoxed by these modifications, various commentators — particularly Friedrich Engels, Joseph Stalin, and Georgi Plekhanov — refined Marx’s initial elucidations to suggest that the various modes of production express a stochastic chronometric succession. I observed that Marx’s concept of the prehistory of capital seems to be bereft of teleological progression among the economic modes of production. For Marx, society evolves in a stochastic fashion.

I then elaborated on the analyses of Jacobs’s and Clastres’s anthropological investigations of primitive society. Both Jacobs and Clastres are critical of Marxian claims about social evolution. Jacobs questions the order of the occurrence of discrete social formations

79 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 140.
implied by Marxian evolution. For Jacobs, the Neolithic city-state is temporally prior to primitive agrarian culture. Jacobs’s economic analyses yield the suggestion that roles of position of the terms in the Marxian ontological dependency relation (among primitive modes of accumulation and State modes of organization) be reversed. Though Jacobs cautiously grants that that an ontological dependency relation obtains among rural social forms and the State, she suggests that the State enjoys ontological primacy; in this sense, Jacobs transposes the *relata* of the Marxian dependency relation. In concrete terms, Jacobs suggests that a developmental evolution obtains among temporally and ontologically discrete entities, this evolution begins with the State (and progresses to rural modes of economic production).

It is essential to observe that an evolutionary development of the kind suggested by Jacobs involves temporal succession — modifying the terms of a relation does not imply any modification of the form of the relation; a change of the terms organized in a series does not alter the fact that they are involved in a relation of succession. Appealing to the ethnographic analyses of Clastres, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that one can find the hints of a relation among modes of social organization which does not rely on temporal succession. For Clastres, the State and primitive society emerge at the same time, as strictly contemporaneous — albeit antagonistic — modes of social organization. Clastres analyses imply there is no order to the ontological progression from primitive society to the State, if for no other reason than no ontological dependency relation obtains among these. In concrete terms, the State, farming communities, cadres of hunters, and bands of gatherers emerge as relatively autonomous, utterly contemporaneous social formations. It is from Clastres that Deleuze and Guattari derive their thesis of the *Urstaat* — i.e., that the State and primitive society are born unto human history as fully formed, co-existing entities. The primary implication of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s remarks
about the *Urstaat* is that there is no temporally serialized evolutionary relation among the various modes of social organization. This further implies that no temporal disparity exists among these analytically discrete modes of social substance. The *Urstaat* involves a denial of serialized social evolution and temporal succession alike.

The claim that modes of production enjoy neither ontological dependency nor temporal succession does not imply that the *Urstaat* is bereft of ontological dynamism. Hints of the causal mechanism involved in the internal variations of the society are found in Deleuze’s elaboration of Spinoza’s concept of immanent causality. I suggested that Spinoza’s concept of immanent causality provides the framework for an adequate account of temporally localized change among the aspects of a formal unity (i.e., society). Each of primitive social organization and the State may be characterized as mutually implicated modes of the same ontological substance. The observation that discrete aspects of the same substance participate in the same duration, when coupled with the observation that this substance enjoys variation, yields the suggestion that the State undergoes change at an instant. In concrete terms, the *Urstaat* participates in immanent modification — i.e., modification of aspects which enjoy co-existence in a single duration. Immanent causality implies temporally instantaneous variation — variation of mutually implicated aspects comprehended by the same duration. Society — characterized as the socio-temporal co-existence of analytically discrete ways of economic organization; as co-existing modes that participate in the same geographic and temporal locale; as differing aspects of the same substance — evidences the capacity to change in an instant.

Deleuze and Guattari offer perhaps their most forceful rebuke of linear social evolution in *A Thousand Plateaus*, when they observe that “to become is not to progress or regress along a
The temporal implications of their suggestion can be elaborated by syllogism: given the facticity of the claims that society evidences modification of co-existing — physical, ideational — entities and processes, and that these changes are explicitly temporal (i.e., they involve duration, or modification of duration), the implication is that social variation is the expression of non-serialized temporal change. Deleuze and Guattari could hardly be less ambiguous than their observation that societal “becoming is not an evolution, at least not an evolution by descent and filiation.”

Perhaps it is worth observing that the mercurial relation of “filiation” may be characterized as a provisional relation among ontologically discrete parts. In this sense, a filiative organization is akin to the serial organization of parts — i.e., the type of organization that obtains in evolutionist models that rely on a linear progression of time; the ordering expressed by the serial succession of temporal moments; days turn into weeks, which turn into months, which turn into years, as time progresses in a serial succession of durations. In their denial of a filiative organization, Deleuze and Guattari develop the Spinozistic ontological claim that putatively differing aspects participate in the expression of the same form. What this implies about the natures of social evolution and temporality is staggering. The suggestion is that putatively discrete social modes of production — the serialized content of Marxian evolutionism — are temporally co-existing entities; agrarian and State formations enjoy the same duration; they co-exist as implicated elements of the same form of time. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the claim of formal identity does not preclude the possibility of formal variation. In this sense, identity does not imply that a form is monolithic. The general claim that forms may enjoy internal modification yields the suggestion that any particular social form (any particular

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80 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 238.
81 Ibid.
duration) may vary due to the immanent causal relation of co-existing parts. In concrete terms, time is expressed as variation within the same duration — temporality is instantaneous change.
CONCLUSION: TIME IS CEASELESS CREATION

Though it would be a misstep to suggest that all of temporality is reducible to the present, it is apt to observe that the gamut of temporality — including each of its analytically discrete dimensions of the memorial past and the present — enjoys expression as an aspect of a unified duration. One might also observe that future contingencies — characterized as the repetition of the production of diversity — become actualized in this duration. This is to say that time is a multiplicity consisting of mutually implicated aspects involved in the creation of variegated entities. Time is the production of difference.

The argument of the first chapter demonstrates that individuated entities tend to actualize time through their involuntary actions — mere existence as an entity that enjoys the capacities of being moved or of self-directed movement; existence as a spatially extended object; all of these are sufficient to actualize time. It should be further observed that time tends to get actualized as temporal series. However, Deleuze notes that though temporal succession might be adequate to illustrate an aspect of time, this does not imply that time is reducible to a heuristic explanatory device. Time is not simply the experience of repetition. Deleuze demonstrates this in his critique of Hume’s psychologism. The positive implication of the rejection of psychologism is that time tends to be identified as involving a transcendental aspect (i.e., temporality as empty form). The positive implication Deleuze’s correction of Hume is that time comes to be identified as a form that obtains as ontologically prior to its actualizations in the minds and through the actions of particulars.

The discussion of time as a form invites comparison with the Ancients — primarily Plato and Plotinus. Deleuze observes that temporal progress is not indexed on the invariable rate of movement of celestial bodies. This amounts to a correction of Plato. Plotinus fares a bit better, in
the sense that Deleuze observes that the Ancient Roman philosopher suggested that temporality may be identified with the contemplations of a universal soul. It is important to note that the universal soul enjoys ontological priority to — is autonomous of — the instantiation of measurable physical bodies. Though we still might observe that the relation of temporal succession obtains — as a means of quantifying the undulations of time, as a predicate assigned to temporal substance — this relation is secondary to time. In this sense, Deleuze’s elaboration of Plotinus implies that time involves an ontogenetic aspect from which all of physical bodies, actualized modifications, and quantified variation subsists.

Deleuze further develops the claim that temporality is involved in the ontogenetic circumstance through reference to Gilbert Simondon’s pioneering work on individuation. Simondon suggests that time may be characterized as a pre-personal force — an element which participates in the formation of discrete entities. Further, Simondon identifies the inter-relation of ontogenetic forces as involving magic. In this sense, temporality comes to be identified as a force which participates in the formation (and transformation) of physically instantiated actualities. Though an elaboration of the nature magic invites comparison with shoddy parlour tricks or mystical extravagances, these comparisons are quite misplaced in reference to Simondon’s identification of magic and time as elements of an ontogenetic circumstance. One of the substantive claims that emerges from my analysis of Simondon is that temporality obtains as a virtual aspect involved in the creation of particulars. Simondon further observes that ontogenetic forces do not fully dissipate in transition from virtuality to actuality. Perhaps the most persuasive evidence which can be marshalled in support of this claim is that — in addition to being illustrated in the literature of antiquity, as well as enjoying the support of contemporary anthropological evidence — the capacity to change obtains as an expressive aspect of spatio-
temporal locales. Simondon further observes that existents may be identified as nodes in a reticulated field. This yields the claim that temporal variation obtains as an actualized aspect of physical reality; the magical aspects of time obtain as particular variations in spatio-temporally extended network of real places.

Deleuze develops this claim — that variation is an attribute of a reticulated field of actualities — with the observation that a network is a species of multiplicity (i.e., a manifold, a magnitude). Deleuze further observes that literary works may be characterized as multiplicities, in the sense that they involve the participation of inter-related, changing elements. When this suggestion is generalized, it yields that claim that any existent that involves the variation of mutually implicated elements may be adequately categorized as a continuous multiplicity. In concrete terms, this implies that time is an element involved in both the creation of all existents (i.e., their ontogenesis) and the variation of all actualized existents (i.e., their concrete material change; all the wear and tear endured by physical things as they progresses toward expiration). Time is the ubiquitous expression of virtual and actual change. Elaborating on the theses of Reimann, Deleuze further observes that the variations of continuous multiplicities enjoy expression as differential equations. Taken together, these yield the claim that time is an element of an ontogenetic circumstance, which enjoys artistic and mathematically rigorous expression.

Mathematical representation constitutes part of the subject matter of Deleuze’s elaboration of temporality in The Logic of Sense. In some of this text’s most subtly argued passages, Deleuze elaborates on the complex relation among the temporal progression (i.e., Chronos, temporal succession) and eternity (i.e., Aion, eternity, the form of time). I observe that the archaeological record indicates that eternity is conceived of as an ancient deity that enjoys a plurality of (sometimes competing) attributes: as the form of the cosmos itself; as the motion of
all existents; further, the eternal is characterized as the ontogenetic unity, which comprehends the variation of particulars; as each element of the Western zodiac, and the Western zodiac as a whole. The claim to be derived from this plurality of identifications is that eternity is an ontogenetic form which comprehends discrete and varying temporal series—i.e., Chronos (characterized as a series of variable temporal elements) subsists as an analytically discrete aspect of Aion. Deleuze further observes that the variations of temporal series enjoy realization in both literature and mathematics. Deleuze cites Borges to illustrate than any temporal moment may produce multiple, competing temporal series. Deleuze further suggests that the variability of time may be elaborated as a productive relation of the type that enjoys symbolic representation as a species of differential equation.

Among the multiple aspects of temporality, there obtains aspects of qualitative variation. With this observation, we may (once again) observe the inadequacy of reductive explanations which attempt to specify time as mere quantitative succession. In my fourth chapter, I develop the claim that temporal progression involves the axiologically valent recurrence of variable particulars. Here, the object of analysis is the concept of temporal repetition, elucidated though reference to Deleuze’s readings of Kierkegaard and Marx. In Kierkegaard’s curious text, repetition tends to be identified as a tumultuous affair. In terms of its qualitative content, repetition is not unlike the agonies of Job; it is akin to the lived experience of being trapped in a closed temporal continuum in which one endures the agony of a thousand little cuts inflicted without end; it suggests the ceaselessness of Sisyphean labours. Repetition is the subject of a multitude of Greek myths in which capricious Gods extracted torturous revenge for any perceived sleight. Kierkegaard explicitly associates Ilithyia the — Greek goddess of childbirth — with a cycle of temporal variation. This further implies that the human gestational cycle is to
be associated with repetition. It is important to observe that these types of repetition are not akin to serial recurrence of an invariant term. If we are to characterize the human gestational cycle with repetition, it is only with the acknowledgement that the entity participating in this repetition is undergoing change. Marx further illustrates this type of repetition through reference to the European revolutions of the nineteenth century. Blood flowed through the streets, and the lives of labourers were cheap in Italy, Spain, and Portugal during the summer of 1820; half-way through a decade of immiseration, the Decemberists challenged (and lost their lives) to the armies of an illegitimate Czar; the Greeks sought to gain independence from their Ottoman rulers; in France, the Bourbons tried to return the nation to its former glory; in Brussels, the urban proletariat tried to cast off the yoke of emergent capitalism. These illustrate repetition of the form of revolution involving radically different particular circumstances. Taken together, these suggest the strange sort of repetition associated with a cycle involving the emergence of non-identical terms comprehended by a self-identical form — i.e., the recurrence of the form of time which is populated by variable content; temporal repetition of involving the production of axiologically valent, ontologically unprecedented particulars.

Perhaps no artform is more able to express temporal change than the cinema. In the Cinema texts, Deleuze radically reformulates his concept of time. The influence of Bergsonian theses about the nature of duration, as well as the complex relation of virtuality and actuality can be found on practically every page of the Deleuze’s two-volume analysis of film. Deleuze suggests that when pictures began to move, this changed our conceptualization of the nature of temporality. Some of cinema’s most magical moments — e.g., Rutger Hauer’s observation (in Blade Runner)\(^\text{82}\) that every moment of lived experience becomes lost to time, like tears in the

rain — illustrates the capacities of film to express the qualitative aspects involved with temporal progression. Deleuze further suggests that these filmic moments illustrate points of inflection (i.e., singularities), in which temporality undergoes a metaphysical change from virtuality to actuality. It is here — immediately following his elaboration of the oddly named “pure optical and acoustic situations” — that Deleuze puts forward what is perhaps one of the most fascinating claims in the history of the aesthetics of cinema: the filmic artwork need not involve mimesis, in the sense that none of the film’s expressed realities must correlate to (represent) entities or processes of the physical world. This implies that aspects of filmic temporality — i.e., photographed temporal series; the putatively discrete durations of a character’s (or community’s) memorial past and lived present, all temporal rhythms and temporal continuums presented in any film — are determined through correlation with the relatively autonomous aspects of cinematically presented reality. Deleuze further observes that film illustrates the transformation of virtual entities and processes into actuality. When combined with the stipulations that the past tends to obtain virtually (i.e., as any of the species of immaterial ideations, as any of the plurality abstract entities; the content of memory) and that the present tends to be associated with the actualization of qualitatively valent aspects (i.e., as lived experience), this yields the claim that the cinema illustrates the ongoing inter-relation of these as simultaneously obtaining entities — film shows the past and present to be contemporaneous.

One of the principal implications of the suggestion that putatively discrete dimensions of time — the past and the present — enjoy contemporaneity is that the relation of temporal succession is revealed to be an inadequate means of expressing societal change. I develop Deleuze’s argument for this substantive rejection of the adequacy of temporal succession through
reference to all of Marx, the anthropological investigations of Jacobs and Clastres, as well as Spinoza’s concept of immanent causality. Marx’s elaboration of the development of pre-capitalist economic modes of production is adduced to support the claim that society evolves stochastically. Marx observes that various societal mechanisms of producing commodities do not obtain in a linearly serialized fashion. Further, Marx observes that different modes of production — which very well might enjoy contemporaneous existence as elements of the same duration of the same society — might involve different temporal scales. In concrete terms, two (or more) modes of production in the same society might produce commodities at different temporal rates. Taken together, these observations yield the substantive claim that societal evolution (as measured by the modifications involved with modes of production) tends not to involve determination as a linear temporal series. Each of Jacobs and Clastres are (mildly) critical of Marx. Jacobs suggests that the temporal progression implied by Marxian evolution needs to be inverted. Here, the claim is that instead of the primitive agricultural practices yielding a surplus accumulation, which ultimately gives rise to the city state, the Paleolithic world enjoyed urban accumulations which yielded the emergence of rural farming. Deleuze and Guattari observe that Clastres suggests there is no temporal disparity among putatively discrete forms of social organization. In concrete terms, the State and rural modes of organization obtain as competing aspects of the same duration. No evolutionary progression obtains among discrete modes of social organization; though it is the case that the farm is non-identical to the city, temporal displacement is not one of the differentiae separating these two aspects of the societal form; the rural and the urban are co-existing, contemporaneous aspects. I further observe that temporal co-existence of mutually implicated entities suggests their immanent variation. Through reference to Spinoza, I suggest that Deleuze and Guattari tend to conceive of society as involving
instantaneous variation — society changes in a non-decomposable temporal duration. These yield the observation that it is inadequate to characterize societal change as an expression of temporal succession.

Deleuze’s nuanced thought on the nature of temporality invites a reconceptualization of the concept. Perhaps the most mercurial of philosophical concepts, temporality is implicated in a plurality of aspects of reality. Indeed, the mind staggers to conceive of some aspect of reality that does not involve at least one aspect of temporality. Once identified as among the powers of ancient gods, time came to be thought of as an ontogenetic force. Time is that which participated in — and still is involved with — the creation of the universe. Under the guises of the memorial past, the vibrant present and the burgeoning future not yet realized, time is the content of a multitude of artistic expressions. Further, time is the immanent variation of inter-related aspects of every societal form that ever was or ever will be. Throughout these analyses, I have argued that Deleuze suggests that temporality may be identified as the interaction of these non-reducible aspects. For these reasons, there is no singular philosophy of time which may be associated with the brilliant French thinker. There are only the times of Deleuze.
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