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1. Introduction

In his account of Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus talks about the disturbance (ταραχή) concerning matters of opinion that afflicts his dogmatic rivals and that he himself was afflicted by before his conversion to Pyrrhonism. What is the cause of such a disturbance? That is the question I intend to answer in this paper. More precisely, my purpose is to identify the distinct sources of doxastic disturbance that can be found in Sextus’ account of Pyrrhonism, and to determine whether and, if so, how they are related. I will begin by briefly presenting Sextus’ description of the Pyrrhonist’s pursuit and attainment of undisturbedness (ἀταραξία) in matters of opinion. This will provide the textual material for the subsequent analyses. I will next examine the distinct causes of disturbance regarding such matters that seem to coexist in that description. Then, after considering and rejecting two interpretations of the possible relationship between some of those causes found in the literature, I will propose a way in which all of them can be taken to be connected. I will conclude by summarizing the benefits of that proposal and by examining whether it entails that there is no reason for the Pyrrhonist to suspend judgment across the board.1

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1 Henceforth, whenever I talk about disturbance or undisturbedness tout court, I will be specifically referring to disturbance or undisturbedness in matters of opinion as opposed to disturbance or undisturbedness in matters that are unavoidable. (I will say a little more about this distinction in Section 4.) Also, following Sextus, I will employ ‘Pyrrhonist’ and ‘sceptic’ interchangeably, and ‘dogmatist’ to refer to anyone who makes assertions about how things really are on the basis of what they regard as objective evidence and sound arguments.
Diego E. Machuca

2. The pursuit and attainment of undisturbedness

At the beginning of the Pyrrhonian Outlines (PH), Sextus points out that the search for undisturbedness explains why the prospective sceptic engages in philosophical investigation:

Ἀρχὴν δὲ τῆς σκεπτικῆς αἰτιώδη μὲν φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ ἀταρακτῆσειν· οἵ γὰρ μεγαλοφυεῖς τῶν ἄνθρωπων ταρασσόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀνωμαλίαν, καὶ ἀποροῦντες τίνα αὐτῶν χρὴ μᾶλλον συγκαταθέσθαι, ἢλθον ἐπὶ τὸ ἐρῆμον, τί τε ἀληθεῖς ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τί ψεύδοις, ὡς ἐκ τῆς ἐπικρίσεως τούτων ἀταρακτήσοντες. (PH 1. 12)

We say that the causal principle of the sceptical [way] is the hope of becoming undisturbed. For men of talent, disturbed by the variation in things and being in aporia as to which of them they should rather assent to, came to investigate what is true in things and what is false, so as to become undisturbed as a result of this distinction.

The prospective sceptic's search for undisturbedness is again referred to at PH 1. 25–6, where Sextus describes the unexpected way in which that state of mind was attained:

φαμὲν δὲ ἄχρι νῦν τέλος εἶναι τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ τὴν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν ἀταραξίαν καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπάθειαν. ἀρξάμενος γὰρ ὕποι θείας φαντασίας ἐπικρίναι καὶ καταλαβεῖν, τίνες μὲν εἶναι ἀληθεῖς τίνες δὲ ψευδεῖς, ὡστε ἀταρακτῆσαι, ἐνέπεσεν εἰς τὴν ἴσοτονή διαφωνίαν, ἢν ἐπικρίναι μὴ...
We say up to now that the sceptic’s aim is undisturbedness in matters of opinion and moderation of affection in things unavoidable. For having begun to philosophize with the aim of deciding among the appearances and apprehending which are true and which false, so as to become undisturbed, he encountered an equipollent disagreement; being unable to decide it, he suspended judgment. And while he was suspending judgment, undisturbedness in matters of opinion closely followed him by chance.

According to this passage, not only is undisturbedness an aim sought by the prospective Pyrrhonist, but it is also a state of mind desired by the full-blown Pyrrhonist, since it is presented as part of the twofold aim of scepticism. To the Pyrrhonist’s surprise, he achieved undisturbedness after having adopted the doxastic attitude of suspension of judgment (ἐποχή) and not because he was able to decide the conflict of appearances. At PH 1. 29, we find the same contrast between the way in which undisturbedness was initially expected to be attained and the way in which it finally happened to be attained:

cαὶ οἱ σκεπτικοὶ οὖν ἦλπιζον μὲν τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἀναλήψεσθαι διὰ τοῦ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῶν φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων ἐπικρίναι, μὴ δυνηθέντες δὲ ποιῆσαι τοῦτο ἐπέσχον· ἐπισχόντι δὲ αὐτῷ τυχικῶς ἡ ἀταραξία παρηκολούθησεν ὡς σκιὰ σώματι.

So, too, the sceptics hoped to acquire undisturbedness by deciding the variation in the things that appear and that are thought, but being unable to do this, they suspended judgment. And while they were suspending judgment, undisturbedness closely followed them by chance, as it were, as a shadow [closely follows] a body.

Sextus does not limit himself to reporting the de facto result that, by suspending judgment, the Pyrrhonist unexpectedly attained the goal of undisturbedness—which at the beginning of his philosophical journey he thought he would reach by the contrary attitude, that is, by assenting to the claims he would discover to be true, and hence by holding the correct beliefs. In PH 1 and 3, and above all in Against the Ethicists (=Adversus mathematicos (M) 11), Sextus also explains why the holding of beliefs about how things objectively are prevents one from attaining a state of peace of mind, offering at the same time an account of how suspension leads to
undisturbedness and happiness.\footnote{Only in M 11 does Sextus remark that suspension makes it possible to achieve happiness (see e.g. M 11. 111, 144, 160).} It is notable that he conducts his exposition specifically with reference to value beliefs. He observes that the presence of the things one believes to be good and of those one believes to be bad produces disturbance. For when a person lacks that which he regards as good, he intensely desires to obtain it, and he thinks that he is persecuted (ποινηλατεῖσθαι) by things naturally bad and restlessly tries to escape from them. He then pursues what he considers to be good, but he is troubled if he acquires it, not only because he is irrationally and immoderately elated, but also because he is afraid of losing it.\footnote{PH 1. 27; 3. 237, 277; M 11. 116–7, 146.} For this reason, even when he is not directly disturbed by the presence of those things he deems to be bad, he continues to be troubled by the disturbance resulting from his constant guarding against them (M 11. 117, 129). Sextus also observes that those who believe that things are by nature good or bad are unhappy or can never attain happiness.\footnote{M 11. 111, 113, 118, 130, 144.} The reason is that ‘all unhappiness occurs because of some disturbance’ (πᾶσα κακοδαιμονία γίνεται διά τινα ταραχήν, M 11. 112, cf. 141), which in turn comes about because of the intense pursuit of the things one considers to be good and the intense avoidance of those one considers to be bad (M 11. 112–13, 116).

Sextus thinks neither that the sceptic is free from all disturbance nor that all disturbance is due to the intense pursuit and avoidance of the things considered to be good and bad, respectively. For he points out that the sceptic is disturbed by certain things that impose themselves upon him, such as thirst and hunger.\footnote{PH 1. 29; M 11. 143, 148–50, 156–8; cf. PH 1. 13, 24; Diogenes Laertius [DL] 9. 108.} Yet the sceptic is better off with regard to these unpleasant affections (pathē)\footnote{A pathos is that which happens to someone or something as a result of being affected by an agent in the broad sense of this term. It refers to the physical and/or psychological state or condition in which the affected person or thing is. Even though in modern ordinary English ‘affection’ does not have that meaning anymore, I choose that term to render pathos for two reasons: not only has ‘affection’ become in the specialist literature a technical term to translate pathos, but it also has the advantage of making clear the connection between pathos and its cognate verb paschein (‘to be affected’).} than the dogmatist, since he lacks the additional disturbance induced by the belief that such affections are by nature bad,
and it is precisely the absence of that belief that makes them moderate and more easily borne.\textsuperscript{10}

3. Sources of doxastic disturbance

Any attentive reader of the texts quoted or referred to in the previous section will probably get the feeling that something odd is going on in Sextus’ account of the cause of the sceptic’s disturbance regarding matters of opinion and of the way in which he got rid of this disturbance. For although those texts might give the \textit{prima facie} impression that Sextus is talking about a single source of disturbance both in the case of matters that are unavoidable and in the case of matters of opinion, in the latter case the texts in fact mention apparently distinct and unrelated sources.

First, in some passages we are told that what produced distress in the prospective sceptic was the variation or \textit{anomalia} he found in things. Judging by \textit{PH} 1. 12, it seems that it is the very existence of an \textit{anomalia} that was the cause of disturbance, since it is first said that the prospective sceptic was disturbed by the \textit{anomalia} in things and it is then remarked that he was unable to determine which of the conflicting appearances exhibited by things he should assent to. However, at \textit{PH} 1. 12 itself, and also at \textit{PH} 1. 26 and 29, we are told that the prospective sceptic thought that he could become undisturbed by resolving the \textit{anomalia}, or by deciding among the appearances, or by distinguishing what is true in things and what is false. This means that he took disturbance to be caused by the existence of \textit{unresolved} conflicts of appearances, that is, by the fact of being in a state of \textit{aporia} as to how to settle them. Hence, it is not the

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{PH} 1. 30; 3. 235–6; \textit{M} 11. 118, 150–5, 161; see also \textit{M} 11. 128–9, 145, 156–60. The texts that have been quoted or summarized might give rise to the objection that, despite his professed scepticism, Sextus makes assertions about the means for, and the hindrance of, the attainment of undisturbedness and happiness, as well as about the nature and connection of certain states of mind. Sextus asserts, the objection goes, that the holding of (value) beliefs directly or indirectly brings about disturbance and unhappiness and must, therefore, be considered objectively bad; that the core component of human happiness is undisturbedness, a state of mind that is therefore objectively good or to be pursued; and that there exists a causal link between undisturbedness and suspension, which makes the latter a desirable state. This is not the place to address this general objection, but I have replied to it in D. Machuca, ‘The Pyrrhonist’s \textit{átaraxia} and \textit{philiathetaia}’ [‘The Pyrrhonist’s \textit{átaraxia}’], \textit{Ancient Philosophy}, 26 (2006), 111–39 at 116–24.
existence of a conflict of appearances *per se* but the inability thus far to resolve it that brings about distress or anxiety.\(^\text{11}\) Even if the prospective sceptic could resolve the conflicts he has encountered, the object would still appear to him in conflicting ways—think of the oar that looks straight in the air, but bent in water, or of the tower that appears small and round from a distance, but larger and square from close up—but this would not make him feel distress. Now, what is striking is that the conflicts of appearances remain unresolved once the prospective sceptic becomes a full-blown sceptic—such a lack of resolution is precisely what makes him suspend his judgment—but nowhere does Sextus explain why the unresolved conflicts do not cause disturbance anymore.\(^\text{12}\)

Second, in other passages we are told that what produces disturbance (and unhappiness) is holding the belief that something is good or bad.\(^\text{13}\) This is not to be understood exclusively in a moral sense, since Sextus also talks more generally about what is to be pursued and what is to be avoided. I take this to include anything that is deemed to be of objective value of any kind, not only moral and pragmatic value, but also epistemic value. If this is correct,

\(^{11}\) The reason for talking about inability here is that the Pyrrhonist does not know what \(x\) is because the *anomalia* is *unresolvable* in the sense that he is *unable* to resolve it. Indeed, an *anomalia* can be characterized as unresolvable either because it in itself is not susceptible of resolution or because one is incapable of finding a way to resolve it. The Pyrrhonist suspends his judgment about whether a given *anomalia* is unresolvable in the first sense, and it strikes him as unresolved because it is unresolvable in the second sense. Whereas I have elsewhere favoured the use of ‘unresolvable’ or ‘undecidable’, in the present paper I prefer to employ ‘unresolved’ or ‘undecided’—but bear in mind that, as just stated, conflicts of appearances (or disagreements or disputes) appear to the Pyrrhonist to be unresolved or undecided owing to his inability thus far to settle them, as *PH* 1.26 and 29 make clear. Cf. D. Machuca, ‘The Pyrrhonian Argument from Possible Disagreement’, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 93 (2011), 148–61 at 151 n. 9.

\(^{12}\) Cf. Machuca, ‘The Pyrrhonian *ἀταραξία*’, 115. It may be worth noting that, whereas the term *anomalia* refers to the conflicting appearances that an object exhibits (e.g., \(x\) appears to be \(F\) in circumstance \(C_1\), not-\(F\) in \(C_2\), both \(F\) and not-\(F\) in \(C_3\), and neither \(F\) nor not-\(F\) in \(C_4\)), the term *diaphōnia* (disagreement) refers to the conflicting views about what an object is (e.g., some affirm that \(x\) is \(F\), some that it is not-\(F\), some that it is both \(F\) and not-\(F\), some that it is neither \(F\) nor not-\(F\)). Of course, disagreements arise because of the conflicting ways in which the object appears—or, if one wants to be more cautious, because of the conflicting ways in which one is appeared to. That *diaphōnia* differs from *anomalia* in the suggested way seems to be confirmed by *PH* 1.26, where we are told that the prospective sceptic ‘encountered an equipollent disagreement’ after ‘having begun to philosophize with the aim of deciding among the appearances’.

\(^{13}\) *PH* 1.27; 3.237, 277; *M* 11.111–13, 116–18, 130, 144, 146.
then what produces disturbance is holding any kind of evaluative belief. Thus, whereas in some passages we are told that what produces distress is the fact that one does not know whether x is good or bad because of the unresolved conflict concerning x, in other passages we are told that what produces distress is having the belief that x is good or bad.14 Also, in the former case, disturbance is the result of one’s ignorance caused by one’s inability to resolve any kind of conflict of appearances; in the latter case, it is the result of holding the belief that one of the conflicting value appearances is true. Hence, there is both a difference in the cognitive state involved (ignorance versus belief) and a difference in the object of the cognitive state (all matters versus evaluative matters).

Third, at PH 1. 26 and 29, Sextus tells us that undisturbedness followed suspension tout court, which suggests that the suspended beliefs were not exclusively evaluative beliefs. This is confirmed by the fact that in one of the passages referred to in the previous section and in two others, Sextus says that undisturbedness supervenes upon suspension of judgment about all matters.15 I take this to mean that the attainment of undisturbedness has at least so far occurred only when the sceptic has achieved complete suspension, i.e. suspension regarding all the issues he has so far investigated. Of course, the sceptic cannot rule out the possibility that others will attain undisturbedness by suspending judgment only about some issues, but given his past experience, it appears to him that undisturbedness will be attained only when complete suspension is adopted. Note also that, at PH 1. 18, Sextus tells us the following:

ένεκα μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μετὰ βεβαίου πείσματος ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τινος τῶν κατὰ τὴν φυσιολογίαν δογματιζόμενων οὐ φυσιολογούμεν, ἐνεκα δὲ τοῦ παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἵναν ἐχειν ἀντιτιθέναι καὶ τῆς ἀταραξίας ἀπότεθαι ὑπὸ τῆς φυσιολογίας. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ λογικὸν μέρος καὶ τὸ ἦθικὸν τῆς λεγομένης φιλοσοφίας ἐπερχόμεθα.

14 In my view, what produces distress in the case of evaluative matters is the belief that a specific x is objectively good or bad—morally, instrumentally, or epistemically. Hence, the general belief that some things are good or bad cannot be a source of disturbance. The reason is that it seems that only the first kind of belief has an object that one can either (i) intensely pursue, be excited to have gotten hold of, and be afraid of losing, if one believes it to be good, or (ii) intensely avoid and be tormented to have gotten hold of, if one believes it to be bad. Thanks to Victor Caston for pressing me on this issue.

15 PH 1. 31, 205; M 11. 144; cf. M 11. 160, 168.
For we do not inquire into natural phenomena in order to make assertions with secure confidence about any of the matters dogmatically treated in relation to the inquiry into natural phenomena. But we do touch on this inquiry in order to be able to oppose to every argument an equal argument and for the sake of undisturbedness. In this way, too, we approach the logical and ethical parts of so-called philosophy.

This text makes it clear that the sceptic has not attained undisturbedness by suspending judgment only about evaluative matters. Moreover, Sextus puts on a par all three parts into which post-Aristotelian philosophy was commonly divided, and hence investigating ethical matters is not more relevant to the pursuit and attainment of undisturbedness than investigating logical or physical matters. As I interpret the passage, the sceptic engages with the inquiry into natural phenomena (ϕυσιολογία), as well as with logic and ethics, for two reasons. The first is to oppose to every argument concerning natural phenomena a rival argument that prima facie strikes him as equally persuasive, because by doing so in the course of his inquiry, he assesses the epistemic credentials of the rival arguments. He cannot rule out that, after the inquiry is for the time being completed, one of the arguments might appear to him to be more persuasive than its rival. The second reason is that, given his past experience, it appears to the sceptic that, if after the inquiry is for the time being completed the rival arguments strike him as equipollent and he is therefore forced to suspend

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16 Pace C. Perin, The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism [Demands] (Oxford, 2010), 118 n. 6, nothing said at PH 1. 18 justifies the claim that in this passage ‘Sextus denies that the Sceptic is engaged in philosophical investigation of the natural world’ or the claim that Sextus remarks that ‘the Sceptic is not engaged in philosophy at all’. For Sextus explicitly points out that the sceptic engages in the inquiry into natural phenomena, and qua sceptic he cannot carry out his inquiry by making assertions (otherwise, he would be a dogmatist), but by producing oppositions among arguments so as to evaluate their soundness.

17 It might be objected that the first sentence of the quoted text makes it clear that the sceptic does not leave open the possibility of eventually arriving at a justified view as a result of his examination of the epistemic standing of the rival arguments. (Thanks to Victor Caston for raising this objection.) However, I interpret the sentence as saying that the sceptic’s aim in engaging with the inquiry into natural phenomena is not to make assertions in the manner of the dogmatists, that is, without first pondering the competing views on the issue under inquiry. Note that Sextus describes as arrogance, rashness, and self-satisfaction the attitudes of the dogmatists (e.g. PH 1. 20, 90, 177; 3. 235, 280–1) inasmuch as they hold fast to their views on p without taking careful account of rival views on p or even acknowledging the existence of widespread and entrenched disagreement over p.
judgment, he will preserve his state of undisturbedness. Although
the sceptic has the non-doxastic expectation that undisturbedness
will be maintained by producing oppositions among arguments
that appear to him to be equally strong, *PH* 1. 18 presents, in my
view, the two reasons as independent from each other: if one of
them were abandoned, the sceptic would still engage with the
inquiry into natural phenomena (or logic or ethics) because of the
other. Now, even though Sextus never explicitly remarks that people
seem to be disturbed on account of their holding any kind of belief,
this follows from what is said in the passages under consideration.
For if undisturbedness was attained only after the sceptic sus-
pended judgment across the board, then it appears to him that dis-
turbance is produced not only by valuing things or by believing
that things have value, but by holding any belief whatsoever.

It might be argued that the role played by across-the-board sus-
pension in Sextus’ texts is to be explained by the influence of dif-
ferent varieties of scepticism. Consider three passages, the first two
found in Sextus and the third in Diogenes Laertius. At *PH* 1. 30,
Sextus remarks that ‘some among the eminent sceptics have added
to them [i.e. to undisturbedness and moderation of affection] also
suspension of judgment in investigations’ (τινὲς δὲ τῶν δοκίμων
σκεπτικῶν προσέθηκαν τούτοις καὶ τὴν ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν ἐποχὴν). At
*PH* 1. 232, when explaining why the sceptic’s and Arcesilaus’
stances are almost identical, Sextus tells us that for Arcesilaus ‘the
aim is suspension of judgment, which we said is accompanied by
undisturbedness’ (τέλος μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐποχὴν, ἣ συνεισέρχεσθαι τὴν
ἀταραξίαν ἡμεῖς ἐϕάσκομεν). At DL 9. 107, Diogenes points out that,
according to Timon and Aenesidemus, the sceptic’s aim ‘is suspen-
sion of judgment, which undisturbedness follows as a shadow’
(τέλος . . . τὴν ἐποχὴν, ἣ σκιῶς τρόπον ἑπακολουθεῖ ἡ ἀταραξία). Although
these passages do not explicitly talk about across-the-board sus-
pension, they do refer to suspension in general and not about a
specific domain of inquiry. Now, one could think that across-the-
board suspension in fact has nothing to do with undisturbedness:
suspension about the different matters under investigation is for
some sceptics an aim in itself, and so it is different from the suspen-
sion about evaluative matters that has made it possible to attain
undisturbedness. It is however obvious that this explanation does
not constitute a solution to our problem because the passages
referred to above explicitly report that undisturbedness has been
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attained only once the sceptic suspended judgment about all the matters he had investigated. Hence, suspension was regarded by some sceptics as an aim independently of its connection with undisturbedness, but it is also something that, when induced across the board, has so far been accompanied by undisturbedness. Still, it is notable that whereas Sextus does offer an explanation of why the holding of evaluative beliefs causes disturbance, he never does so in the case of the holding of beliefs in general; to be more precise, he does not report on the way in which, it appears to him, the holding of any kind of belief has hitherto brought about disturbance in him and others.

It thus seems that Sextus’ account of Pyrrhonism presents three causes of doxastic disturbance: (i) the existence of unresolved conflicts of appearances; (ii) the holding of evaluative beliefs in particular; and (iii) the holding of beliefs in general. I will refer to these three apparent sources of doxastic disturbance as Unresolved Conflict, Value Belief, and General Belief, respectively. Whereas Value Belief concerns a specific domain, both Unresolved Conflict and General Belief are domain-neutral: while Unresolved Conflict refers to any kind of unsettled conflict of appearances, General Belief refers to any kind of belief. I talk about ‘doxastic’ disturbance because it is a disturbance that is caused either by the holding of beliefs (in general or about value) or by the inability to determine which of the conflicting beliefs about a given issue should be held. Let me also note that, while the texts present three apparent sources of doxastic disturbance, they present two ways of removing such disturbance, namely, suspension of judgment about evaluative matters and suspension of judgment about all matters. Now, the crucial question is whether Unresolved Conflict, Value Belief, and General Belief are related and, if so, what their relationship is. Answering this question will also help us understand the way in which partial or across-the-board suspension can or cannot allow us to eradicate the doxastic disturbance apparently caused by those three sources.

4. In search of a connection

The coexistence of apparently distinct and unrelated sources of doxastic disturbance in Sextus’ account of Pyrrhonism has received
some attention in the specialist literature. However, interpreters have not (clearly) distinguished between the three sources that were identified in the previous section, and only two of them (as far as I know) have offered solutions to the exegetical problem that the plurality of sources generates. In what follows, I will examine those solutions and explain why I find them wanting, before turning to my own proposal.

Svavar Svavarsson (‘Two Kinds’, 23–9) maintains that Sextus works with two distinct notions of undisturbedness, corresponding to two distinct kinds of anxiety, one epistemic and the other non-epistemic. Epistemic anxiety is caused by conflicts of beliefs and does not concern a specific subject matter, but is general in scope.

18 Casey Perin distinguishes between Unresolved Conflict and Value Belief, but says nothing about General Belief (see Perin, Demands, ch. 1; and ‘Scepticism et détachement de soi’, in D. Machuca and S. Marchand (eds.), Les raisons du doute: études sur le scepticisme antique [Les raisons] (Paris, 2019), 127–52 at 131 n. 9). Filip Grgić claims that the two sources of doxastic disturbance that can be discerned in Sextus’ writings are Unresolved Conflict and Value Belief (see Grgić, ‘Sextus Empiricus on the Goal of Skepticism’ [‘Goal’], Ancient Philosophy, 26 (2006), 141–60 at 148; ‘Investigative and Suspensive Scepticism’ [‘Investigative’], European Journal of Philosophy, 22 (2012), 653–73 at 658–60). But at one point Grgić also distinguishes Value Belief and General Belief and wonders what their connection might be (‘Goal’, 157–60). Richard Bett and Svavar Svavarsson distinguish between Value Belief, on the one hand, and Unresolved Conflict and General Belief, on the other, conflating the latter two as though they were the same source of doxastic disturbance (see Bett, Against the Ethicists, 46–7, 131–2; ‘How Ethical Can an Ancient Skeptic Be?’, in D. Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy [Pyrrhonism] (Dordrecht, 2011), 3–17 at 7–9; ‘Le scepticisme antique est-il viable aujourd’hui?’, in Machuca and Marchand, Les raisons, 153–77 at 156–7; Svavarsson, ‘Two Kinds of Tranquillity: Sextus Empiricus on Ataraxia’ [‘Two Kinds’], in Machuca, Pyrrhonism, 19–31 at 22–9). However, Unresolved Conflict and General Belief are unmistakably different. For, as I tried to show in the previous section, whereas in the case of Unresolved Conflict the cause of disturbance is the ignorance that results from one’s inability to decide which of the conflicting appearances is true, in the case of General Belief it is the belief that results from one’s coming to decide that one of the conflicting appearances is true.

19 I should note that in ‘The Pyrrhonist’s àrpaçía’, 115, I limited myself to distinguishing between Unresolved Conflict and Value Belief; in ‘Ancient Skepticism: Pyrrhonism’ [‘Ancient Skepticism’], Philosophy Compass, 6 (2011), 246–58 at 253, and in ‘Pyrrhonism, Inquiry, and Rationality’ [‘Inquiry’], Elenchos, 34 (2013), 201–28 at 209, I briefly examined the connection between Unresolved Conflict and Value Belief; and in ‘Pyrrhonian Argumentation: Therapy, Dialectic, and Inquiry’ [‘Argumentation’], Apeiron, 52 (2019), 199–221 at 216 n. 17, I explained in passing the connection between General Belief and Value Belief. Hence, it is only in the present paper that I distinguish between the three sources of doxastic disturbance and explore in detail the possible connection between all of them.
Non-epistemic anxiety, by contrast, is caused by the content of evaluative beliefs and hence is not topic-neutral. Svavarsson thinks that, by introducing such a topic-dependent undisturbedness, Sextus compromises his scepticism, given that this kind of undisturbedness depends on the stipulation that holding positive beliefs about value produces anxiety. In Svavarsson’s view, Sextus pays that price because he wants ‘more than a vague . . . promise of unexpected tranquility attending suspension of belief’ so as to ‘both advertise the benefits of Pyrrhonism and unmask the allegedly inherent anxiety of dogmatism (although only ethical dogmatism)’ (‘Two Kinds’, 29). Thus, Svavarsson’s solution does not consist in finding a connection between the two sources of doxastic disturbance he identifies so as to reduce their number, but rather in keeping them apart and splitting the notion of undisturbedness into two, each resulting from the eradication of one of those sources. The problem with this solution is that Sextus never distinguishes, either explicitly or implicitly, between two types of undisturbedness. To be precise, he never explicitly or implicitly distinguishes between two types of undisturbedness in matters of opinion, since he does implicitly distinguish between undisturbedness in all matters and undisturbedness in matters of opinion. Indeed, when saying at PH 1.25 that the sceptic’s aim is undisturbedness in matters of opinion and moderation of affection in things that are unavoidable, he is recognizing that there are disturbances of which the sceptic has not been able to get rid. In order to try to solve the interpretive problem caused by the coexistence of three sources of doxastic disturbance in the Sextan texts, I think that the most economic way to proceed is to look for a connection between them. Before doing so, let me consider another solution found in the literature.

Richard Bett (Against the Ethicists, 131) thinks that the reason why suspending judgment across the board leads to undisturbedness is that ‘beliefs in logic and physics are frequently not independent of beliefs about ethics; dogmatic philosophy tends to be

20 Perin (Demands, 13) dubs Sextus’ remarks about Value Belief being a source of doxastic disturbance ‘the value argument’, and maintains that it ‘is very much like a piece of dogmatism’. Pace Svavarsson and Perin, I think that when Sextus says that those who hold the opinion that anything is good or bad by nature are perpetually disturbed, he should be understood as arguing dialectically when he is engaging the dogmatists in debate, and as reporting the way things appear to him when he is describing his own past experience (cf. Machuca, ‘Inquiry’, 210; ‘Argumentation’, 216).
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systematic, and anyone who has the former type of belief is liable to have the latter type as well’. This means that non-evaluative beliefs cause doxastic disturbance because they are intimately connected with evaluative beliefs. This proposal is, in my view, on the right track insofar as it explains General Belief by reference to Value Belief. However, it faces the problem that, even though there may be non-evaluative beliefs that are related to evaluative beliefs, it does not seem that all or even most non-evaluative beliefs bear some connection with evaluative beliefs. It could be objected that at least some of Sextus’ dogmatic rivals, such as the Stoics, did claim there to be a systematic connection between the two types of beliefs. In reply, it should be noted that what matters for the purpose of the present article is Sextus’ own discussion of the issue, and that he himself does not establish any such connection when examining and attacking the dogmatic views in the three fields of logic, physics, and ethics.

In my view, any satisfactory solution to the interpretive problem posed by the coexistence of three apparently distinct sources of doxastic disturbance in Sextus’ texts should attempt to show that there is only one real source and, at the same time, make clear how the two apparent sources are connected to the real one. The reason for my view is that, when Sextus explains why dogmatism causes doxastic disturbance, the explanation is exclusively in terms of one of those sources. My own proposal consists in explaining why Sextus says that the Pyrrhonist is disturbed by Unresolved Conflict and by General Belief by linking them to Value Belief; that is, it consists in taking Value Belief to be the real source of doxastic disturbance.

As regards Unresolved Conflict, one may hypothesize that the prospective sceptic was distressed because he believed that the existence of unsettled conflicts of appearances is something objectively bad, the reason being that he took the discovery of truth to be something objectively valuable, for moral, pragmatic, or epistemic reasons. Indeed, insofar as he believed that not all conflicting appearances can be true and insofar as he wanted to know the truth because he took this to be of objective value, the fact that the conflicts remained undecided was a source of disturbance (cf. Machuca, ‘Ancient Skepticism’, 253; ‘Inquiry’, 209). This allows us to explain why unsettled conflicts of appearances, despite not having disappeared, are not a source of doxastic disturbance for the full-blown sceptic as they were for the prospective sceptic.
Casey Perin has claimed that the reason why the sceptic was disturbed by unresolved conflicts of appearances is to be found in his interest in the discovery of truth for its own sake: the sceptic has the desire to know which appearance is true, but given that he has failed to acquire such a knowledge, that desire remains unsatisfied, and an unsatisfied desire is a source of disturbance. This interpretation faces the problem that, after the sceptic becomes undisturbed, he is still engaged in searching for truth independently of whether or not discovering the truth, if there is any, is a means to the attainment of undisturbedness (PH 1. 1–3, 2. 10). There are two key differences between the prospective and the full-fledged sceptic, though. The first is that, unlike the prospective sceptic, the full-fledged sceptic does not keep on investigating with the conviction or the belief that there certainly is a truth to be found. The second difference, which is the relevant one here, is that the full-fledged sceptic no longer holds the belief that discovering the truth (if any there is) is objectively valuable. Rather, on account of such factors as his natural capacity for thinking (PH 1. 24) and the influence of the cultural and philosophical milieu in which he was raised, the full-fledged sceptic happens to have an inquisitive temperament that makes him experience the activity of investigation as pleasant. If the interpretation about the relationship between Unresolved Conflict and Value Belief proposed here is correct, then the sceptic has been able to eliminate the distress or anxiety caused by the existence of unresolved conflicts of appearances by withholding the belief that certain things, such as the discovery of truth, are objectively good or bad, morally, instrumentally, or epistemically. Sextus himself explicitly links Unresolved Conflict and Value Belief at PH 1. 26–7:

\[\text{ἀρξάμενος γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν τὰς φαντασίας ἐπικρῖναι καὶ καταλαβεῖν, τίνες μὲν εἰσὶν ἀληθεῖς τίνες δὲ πειθεῖς, ὡστε ἀταρακτήσαι, ἐνέπεσεν εἰς τὴν ἱσοθενὴ διαφωνίαν, ἣν ἐπικρῖναι μὴ δυνάμενος ἐπέσχεν ἐπισχόντι δὲ αὐτῷ τυχικῶς παρηκολούθησεν ἡ ἐν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀταραξία. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοξάζων τι καλὸν τῇ φύσει ἢ κακὸν εἶναι ταράσσεται διὰ παντὸς.}\]

For having begun to philosophize with the aim of deciding among the appearances and apprehending which are true and which false, so as to become undisturbed, he encountered an equipollent disagreement; being unable to decide it, he suspended judgment. And while he was suspending judgment, undisturbedness in matters of opinion closely followed him by chance. For the person who holds the opinion that something is good or bad by nature is forever disturbed.

As Grgić (‘Goal’, 148 n. 11) notes, the use of γάρ at the beginning of PH 1. 27 can be taken to indicate that this section offers an explanation of why the prospective sceptic was disturbed by the conflict of appearances. As far as I can see, PH 1. 27 can explain what is said at PH 1. 26 only if the above interpretation of the relationship between Unresolved Conflict and Value Belief is on the right track.

With regard to General Belief, it could be argued that holding beliefs causes perturbation because dogmatists take having true beliefs and avoiding false ones to be something objectively valuable: once again, approaching the truth about the matters under investigation is an aim that is taken to be of intrinsic and objective value (cf. Machuca, ‘Argumentation’, 216 n. 17). Thus, dogmatists may regard having true beliefs (or justified beliefs or justified true beliefs) as being of epistemic value, but they may also deem having such beliefs as being, in certain cases, of moral or instrumental value. If this is correct, then the holding of any kind of belief is a source of distress only insofar as one deems having true beliefs to be something intrinsically and objectively good, in which case if one withholds all evaluative beliefs, one can still hold other kinds of belief without being disturbed. Even so, it should be emphasized that the sceptic qua sceptic holds no beliefs whatsoever because the conflicting views on the topics into which he has so far inquired have struck him as equipollent: his suspension is independent of whether or not it allows him to become undisturbed. The desire to maintain the state of undisturbedness may function as a pragmatic motivation to suspend judgment, but suspension regarding either evaluative or non-evaluative matters is not induced because of that desire, but, once again, because of the apparently equal persuasiveness of the conflicting views whose epistemic credentials the sceptic assesses.23

23 Perin sees an ineliminable tension between the norm of truth for belief and the norm of utility for belief, both of which he thinks the sceptic accepts (Demands, 24–5;
If, in order to attain undisturbedness, it suffices to suspend judgment about all matters concerning moral, instrumental, or epistemic value, why does Sextus say in several passages that suspending judgment across the board is what makes it possible to attain that state of mind? In this respect, it is worth quoting a passage referred to above:

\[ \pi\epsilon\rho\iota \; \mu\epsilon\nu\; \tauο\iota\; \mu\acute{o}n\; \alpha\tauα\acute{r}\acute{a}\chi\omega\varsigma\; \deltaι\varepsilon\zeta\acute{a}\gamma\epsilon\varsigma\; \epsilon\nu\; \tauο\varsigma\; \kappa\alpha\tau\acute{a}\delta\acute{a}\varsigma\; \acute{a}\gamma\acute{a}\theta\omega\varsigma\; \kappa\iota\; \kappaακ\kappa\iota\; \tauο\varsigma. \] (M 11. 144)

We have already established the fact that only the person who suspends judgment about everything conducts himself without disturbance with regard to the things that according to opinion are good or bad, both before, when we discussed the sceptical aim, and now, when we showed that it is not possible to be happy if one supposes that anything is good or bad by nature.

Here Sextus relates disturbance and unhappiness specifically with the holding of evaluative beliefs, but he also presents across-the-board suspension as the means to avoid those states: the person who is undisturbed regarding evaluative matters is the one who suspends judgment about all matters. Perhaps his point is simply that the person who suspends judgment about everything is thereby the person who suspends judgment about whether anything is objectively good or bad, and hence the person who attains and maintains the state of undisturbedness. But this does not explain why Sextus says, for example, that the sceptic deals with the physical and the logical parts of philosophy for the sake of undisturbedness (PH 1. 18).

Thus, if one accepts my interpretation of the connection between Value Belief and General Belief as sources of doxastic disturbance, one can understand why holding beliefs that are not about the objective value of things causes distress in the non-sceptic: those beliefs are supplemented by beliefs concerning the epistemic,

pragmatic, or moral value of acquiring truth and avoiding falsehood. If so, however, one should also say that, up to this point, the sceptic only had to suspend all his evaluative beliefs in order to attain undisturbedness, in which case it might be argued that Sextus’ report on his past experience in certain passages (esp. *PH* 1. 31, 205; *M* 11. 144) is inaccurate insofar as he did not realize that undisturbedness did not follow across-the-board suspension, but only suspension of judgment about the objective value of things. By contrast, if one rejects my interpretation of the connection between Value Belief and General Belief, one has to accept that General Belief causes disturbance in a way that is different from the way in which Value Belief does. The problem is that, as already noted, Sextus nowhere provides any hint of why he thinks that General Belief is a source of distress. Of course, as a sceptic he may feel no need to look for a tentative explanation and may limit himself to reporting on something that has so far occurred to him and others like him. Note that, in that case, he may not have realized the connection between Value Belief and General Belief, and hence that up to this point undisturbedness has accompanied suspension of judgment about all matters because these matters include those concerning value.

If my interpretation is correct, a related question arises: why does Sextus talk about undisturbedness in matters of opinion *tout court* instead of undisturbedness in matters of opinion about value? Perhaps for the same reason he did not see the connection between General Belief and Value Belief: just as he did not realize that holding non-evaluative beliefs produces disturbance only insofar as one also holds the belief that knowing the truth is of objective value, so too did he not realize that undisturbedness can be attained by suspending judgment solely about all evaluative matters. Or perhaps Sextus talks about undisturbedness in matters of opinion because, in talking about the sceptic’s aim, the emphasis is on the distinction between what the sceptic can and cannot get rid of: he can get rid of opinions or beliefs, but he cannot get rid of the affections that are unavoidable inasmuch as they impose themselves on him. Note that Sextus remarks that the state of lack of disturbance or affection specifically concerns matters of opinion in four passages: in three places he speaks of ‘undisturbedness in matters of opinion’ (ἡ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν ἀταραξία, *PH* 1. 25; ἡ ἐν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀταραξία, *PH* 1. 26 and 30) and in another he says that the sceptic
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‘remains unaffected in matters of opinion’ (ἐν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀπαθῆς μένει, PH 3. 235). At PH 1. 25 and 30, he mentions undisturbedness in matters of opinion together with moderation of affection in matters that are unavoidable (ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπάθεια). At PH 3. 235, he says that the sceptic remains without affection in matters of opinion and that he is moderately affected in matters that are unavoidable (ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπαθεῖ). And at PH 1. 26 he refers only to undisturbedness in matters of opinion because, as we saw, he is there talking about the kind of disturbance he was hoping to remove by engaging in philosophical inquiry, and the reason why he specifies the kind of undisturbedness reached by suspending judgment is that at PH 1. 25 he refers also to the moderation of affection in matters that are unavoidable.24

5. Conclusion

If the interpretation that has been put forth in the present paper is on the right track, then Value Belief is the only and ultimate source of doxastic disturbance. Viewing Value Belief in this way helps us account for the distress caused in the prospective sceptic by the existence of conflicts he was unable to resolve, and provides us with an explanation of why Sextus says that holding any kind of belief is a cause of distress. It is also the only way to find a plausible connection between the three sources of doxastic disturbance that can be identified in his texts, for it does not seem possible to explain Value Belief and General Belief by reference to Unresolved Conflict, nor Unresolved Conflict and Value Belief by reference to General Belief. Indeed, Value Belief and General Belief cannot be explained in terms of Unresolved Conflict because, whereas in the

24 Why is moderation of affection in matters that are unavoidable not mentioned as part of the causal principle of scepticism in the story that explains why the prospective sceptic approached philosophy at PH 1. 12, even though it is presented as part of his twofold aim at PH 1. 25? One may assume that the prospective sceptic was concerned to eradicate the kind of disturbance that seemed to be within his power, and that, when he eventually suspended judgment, he discovered not only that he was no longer affected by doxastic disturbance, but also that physical and emotional disturbances were mitigated. One may also assume that Sextus adds moderation of affection in matters that are unavoidable as part of the sceptical aim to show that sceptics are modest and down-to-earth inasmuch as they do not purport to have attained complete undisturbedness.
former two cases disturbance is supposed to be caused by the holding of a belief (either about an evaluative matter or about any matter), in the latter case it is supposed to be caused by the inability to determine which of the conflicting beliefs about a given matter is to be held. With regard to General Belief being taken as the only real source of doxastic disturbance, it could first be thought that Unresolved Conflict is said to cause disturbance because the inability to settle conflicts of appearances is accompanied by the belief that there is an objective truth that can be discovered or by the belief that one of the conflicting appearances must be true, and holding any belief brings about disturbance. However, this does not explain why holding either of those beliefs (or any other non-evaluative belief) causes distress or anxiety. Secondly, it could be thought that Value Belief is said to be a source of doxastic disturbance because holding an evaluative belief causes that kind of disturbance for the simple reason that holding any belief has such an effect. However, this does not explain why Sextus focuses so much on Value Belief instead of telling us why the holding of any kind of belief is a source of doxastic disturbance. In this regard, the interpretation that I have proposed has the advantage of squaring well with the fact that, when Sextus offers a non-committed but detailed account of why dogmatism produces doxastic disturbance, the explanation is exclusively in terms of the holding of evaluative beliefs.²⁵

²⁵ While the present article was undergoing blind review, I found a reference to D. Taylor, ‘Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Value Nihilism, and the Good of Knowledge’, Ancient Philosophy, 34 (2014), 317–39. When I read it, I discovered that Taylor too proposes to explain Unresolved Conflict and General Belief—which he conflates, as do Bett and Svavarsson (see n. 18 above)—by reference to Value Belief. Given this, I should note that the interpretation according to which the inability to resolve conflicts caused disturbance in the prospective sceptic because he valued knowledge had already been proposed in Machuca, ‘Ancient Skepticism’, 253, and ‘Inquiry’, 209—as is attested by J. W. Wieland, ‘Can Pyrrhonists Act Normally?’, Philosophical Explorations, 15 (2012), 277–89 at 288 n. 8, and by L. Castagnoli, ‘Aporia and Enquiry in Ancient Pyrrhonism’, in G. Karamanolis and V. Politis (eds.), The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy (Cambridge, 2018), 205–27 at 219 n. 64. However, Taylor does not cite either of those articles, which accords well with the fact that he cites only a small part of the specialist literature and with the fact that the most recent work he refers to is from 2006. It is notable, though, that quite a number of the remarks and analyses made in his paper can also be found in the works of other interpreters, such as Grgić’s ‘Goal’ and ‘Investigative’, and Svavarsson’s ‘Two Kinds’, none of which Taylor cites.
Judging from *PH* 1. 26–7, Sextus recognizes that there is a connection between Unresolved Conflict and Value Belief—given that the use of γάρ to connect the two sections implies that the former source of doxastic disturbance is to be explained by reference to the latter—even though he does not specify what that connection is. As regards the relationship between General Belief and Value Belief, not only does he not explain what it is, but he does not even give a hint that he recognizes that they are connected. Nevertheless, as was just pointed out, positing such a relationship is what allows us to understand why Sextus could have thought that undisturbedness supervened only once the Pyrrhonist suspended judgment about all the matters he had investigated.

It could be argued that, once the Pyrrhonist realizes that holding non-evaluative beliefs causes doxastic disturbance only insofar as one takes the holding of true beliefs to be of objective value, he should not bother anymore with suspending non-evaluative beliefs, contenting himself instead with suspending that second-order evaluative belief. This line of thought is correct only if one focuses exclusively on the Pyrrhonist’s practical aim: given his past experience, he has the non-doxastic expectation that undisturbedness will be attained by suspending judgment about evaluative matters only, without it being necessary to suspend judgment also about non-evaluative matters. However, that line of thought overlooks the fact that, insofar as the Pyrrhonist also has an epistemic aim motivated by his inquisitive temperament, he will examine both evaluative and non-evaluative matters in order to assess the epistemic standing of the rival views on those matters; and he will suspend his judgment if—and only if—the conflicting assertions, arguments, or doctrines under investigation strike him as equipollent. It should be borne in mind that Sextan Pyrrhonism is not exhausted by the pursuit and attainment of undisturbedness. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, neither the pursuit nor the attainment of undisturbedness should be deemed to be essential to Sextus’ Pyrrhonism. This is not to say, though, that Pyrrhonism as a philosophy has no practical implications. Rather, my point is that we should not lose sight of the fact that there are central aspects of Sextan Pyrrhonism that are closely intertwined and that are independent of the pursuit and

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attainment of undisturbedness, namely, the systematic exercise of the ability to set up oppositions among views on a given issue, the continuing engagement in open-minded and truth-directed inquiry, the across-the-board suspension of judgment resulting from the equipollence of the opposed views, and the adoption of what appears as the Pyrrhonist’s criterion of action.

CONICET (Argentina)

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