CHRISTY MAG UIDHIR

Introduction

Printmaking as a skilled trade has been practiced for centuries, and for much of its history artists have employed printmaking practices (along with printmakers themselves, in many cases) to create print artworks (fine art prints). From its early beginnings (for example, nineteenth-century Chinese woodcuts), through the Renaissance (for example, Albrecht Dürer's engravings) and baroque era (for example, Jacques Callot's etchings), to the contemporary period (for example, Berenice Abbott's photographs, Andy Warhol's silk screens, Kiki Smith's lithographs), the history of printmaking intersects both frequently and substantively with the history of art.

Rather surprisingly, despite this historical intimacy, printmaking has been given short shrift in contemporary philosophy of art. Other than brief treatment in such seminal philosophical works as Nelson Goodman's *Languages of Art* and Nicholas Wolterstorff's *Works and Worlds of Art*, printmaking has received little attention in the philosophical literature.[1] This neglect looks especially egregious when one considers that philosophical aesthetics has paid far more attention not just to other visual arts (for example, architecture, film, and furniture design) but also to fields putatively well outside the arts, visual or otherwise (for example, wine, food, video games, chess, and gardening). In the rare instances in which philosophical inquiry has been directed at traditionally print-based media (for example, photography and comics), facts about printmaking or its processes and or products remain conspicuously absent.

Such neglect looks all the more troubling when one considers both printmaking's rich and storied history as a practice employed by artists both East and West (for example, Suzuki Harunobu, Hiroshige, Katsushika Hokusai, Rembrandt,

Albrecht Dürer, Edvard Munch). Printmaking also has a pervasive presence within the contemporary artworld, where the list of notable contemporary visual artists with substantial bodies of print work is nothing short of a Murderers' Row of the contemporary artworld (including ones as diverse as Joseph Beuys, Louise Bourgeois, Alexander Calder, Chuck Close, Jim Dine, Lucian Freud, Keith Haring, David Hockney, Robert Indiana, Jasper Johns, Donald Judd, Alex Katz, Jeff Koons, Sol LeWitt, Roy Lichtenstein, Agnes Martin, Robert Motherwell, Claes Oldenberg, Robert Rauschenberg, Ed Ruscha, Sean Scully, Kiki Smith, Frank Stella, Elaine Sturtevant, Cy Twombly, and Andy Warhol). What, other than apparent unfamiliarity, explains contemporary philosophy of art's neglect of printmaking and contemporary fine art prints? Are there any art-theoretical reasons behind printmaking's effective exclusion from the philosophical literature? What sort of reasons might they be (for example, conceptual, historical, institutional, and so on)? Do they sufficiently warrant such exclusion?

The reasons that may lie behind the philosophical neglect of printmaking are probably one of the two following broad sorts: *historical/procedural* or *ontological/relational*. Ironically, these are the very reasons why philosophers of art ought to be paying attention to the medium. It is no surprise, then, to find that the written contributions to this volume can be grouped within one of the above two categories. The contributions from Catharine Abell, Robert Hopkins, and Peg Zeglin Brand belong to the historical/procedural group, and those from K.E. Gover, David Davies, and Roy T. Cook and Aaron Meskin belong to the ontological/relational.

One conjecture about the reason for philosophy's
neglect of the field is the fact that printmaking, by
both historical tradition and procedures of prac-
tice, does not fit easily within the sphere of the
so-called Visual Arts. This is especially true by
comparison to other forms standardly grouped
under this heading such as painting, drawing, or
sculpture. In comparison with the traditional vi-
sual arts, printmaking seems less like an organic
form of its own and more like one pressed into
service of the other forms. Printmaking as a form
seems uniquely divided in both its resistance and
receptivity to philosophical inquiry into the nature
of art.

To see this more clearly, consider that print-
making's history is not that of an aesthetically
driven fine art practice but instead that of a
commercially driven skilled trade. That is, print-
making historically was an apprenticed rather
than a schooled trade in which the aesthetic and
artistic were subordinated to the commercial. It
intersected with the artworld only by means of
indirect, commission-based production relation-
ships with artists (or "Artists") who directed and
oversaw the production of fine art prints by the
master printmakers in their employ. This meant
that printmaking's place within the artworld
historically was at the periphery.

Printmaking, like many other commercial
skilled trades, did not really begin to move away
from the traditional apprentice-model to one of
formal instruction until the latter part of the twen-
tieth century. Indeed, its regular inclusion within
art school curricula has been a development only
of the last few decades. Similarly, the exhibition of
prints alongside paintings, sculpture, and drawings
in art museums and galleries is largely a twentieth-
century phenomenon—as is the very notion of
the fine art print itself. More generally, while one
could make a prima facie plausible case that all
paintings or all sculpture are artworks, no such
case could plausibly be made for prints (that is,
unless one wants to populate the artworld with os-
tensible nonart detritus such as T-shirts, posters,
wedding invitations, vacation photos, newspapers,
beer koozies, and so on). Most people regard art-
works and their surrounding practices and con-
ventions as being sufficiently distinct from their
more mundane and ordinary nonart brethren to

warrant not only their own distinct historical nar-
rative (the history of *art*) but also a distinct dis-
cipline (the discipline of *art history*). Despite its
occasional artworld foray, printmaking's principal
status as a skilled commercial trade has put it be-
yond the art-historical pale—it is something that
may occasionally intersect with, but never truly be
a constitutive part of, art history. Naturally, any-
one inclined to give printmaking an art-historical
short shrift would be likewise inclined to neglect
printmaking philosophically. Printmaking and its
products, historically speaking, just seem too quo-
tidian to be worth more than a passing glance from
the philosopher of art.

I.A. *Robert Hopkins*

Perhaps the most prevalent reason for dismissing
printmaking has to do with its being seen, both
now and historically, as an essentially (or merely)
reproductive enterprise. That is, historically
the (mistaken) belief arose that prints are and
always have been merely reproductive—with the
difference between fine art prints and gift shop
lithographs being nothing more than a signature
and limited edition. Even were this the case
(which it most certainly is not), Robert Hopkins's
contribution, "Reproductive Prints as Aesthetic
Surrogates," shows that the notion of a purely re-
productive print is itself intriguing and rewarding.

As Hopkins notes, the reproductive print plays
an important part of art history in the Western
world. The label "reproductive print" designates
a work that has its depictive source in some
other work in some other medium—typically
from famous paintings or drawings.[2] In virtue of
printmaking's capacity for producing multiples,
the reproductive print was for several hundred
years (and perhaps still is) for countless hundreds
of thousands, if not millions, the sole connection
to works in other media that were otherwise
not accessible. We could even say that from the
sixteenth until the nineteenth century, the repro-
ductive print was the only thing that facilitated
existence of a comparatively well-populated and
informed artworld public—which would other-
wise have fallen into receivership with the church
and a handful of wealthy patrons as custodians.[3]

The role of reproductive prints, Hopkins claims,
seems naturally to be one of aesthetic surrogacy.
More precisely, a reproductive print as such acts

as a surrogate by allowing audiences to engage artistically and aesthetically with the (otherwise inaccessible) work in another medium (for example, painting) that is its source. Hopkins takes this to prompt two questions, one of *articulation* and the other of *explanation*. The articulation question concerns what form(s) of engagement with the aesthetic and artistic character of the source are available to the reproductive print as such. The explanation question concerns how reproductive prints as such facilitate such audience engagement(s).

Hopkins begins with the simple view that reproductive prints act as aesthetic surrogates by sharing the aesthetic properties of their sources. He then discusses the various options one might take so as to head off the generalist commitments this simple view looks to entail. The two antigeneralist principles Hopkins examines are proposals by Mary Mothersill and Frank Sibley. Sharing all aesthetic properties entails, on the former's view, sharing all *perceptual* nonaesthetic properties while, on the latter's view, it entails sharing all *determinate* nonaesthetic properties. Hopkins explores alternative explanations of reproductive prints by appeal to various operative notions (with varying degrees of success) such as aesthetic transparency, prop-fueled imagination, aesthetic testimony, and pictorial variations. But he finds them all wanting. Answering the *articulation* question with the simple view of aesthetic surrogacy, Hopkins concludes, means that one must choose a (compatible) antigeneralist answer to the not so simple *explanatory* question as to how a reproductive print (or any similar aesthetic surrogate) is effective. How, in other words, can a print fail to share all of its perceptual or determinate nonaesthetic properties with its source, yet nevertheless share aesthetic character with that source?

I.B. *Catharine Abell*

In addition to (and perhaps part and parcel of) the potentially problematic historical aspects of printmaking examined above, one might also find printmaking *procedurally* suspect. There are only five principal printmaking techniques (intaglio, relief, lithography, silkscreen, and monotype), but even so, there is tremendous variation among and within these five, both procedurally and commercially. This has meant that there has also been tremendous variation in how they are understood within the broader Visual Arts. Printmaking processes can be characterized as falling anywhere along two poles, from the rigidly mechanical (for example, photo-lithography or silkscreen) on the one hand, to the sui juris manual (for example, relief printing or etching) on the other. As a result, philosophers of art have the tendency to address printmaking in terms of one or the other of these extremes: by grouping it with the more resolutely mechanical forms (for example, photography), which have traditionally met with some measure of philosophical suspicion, or by haphazardly lumping it together with predominantly manual visual-media processes, which are in fact only peripherally related to printmaking (for example, painting or drawing).[4]

Even were we to suppose that the treatment of (attention to, engagement with) the plate and the images etched therein can be adequately viewed as broadly in the manner of drawing, it obviously does not follow that the print products of the intaglio process operating over that plate can be adequately treated (attended to, engaged with) in a similar manner. For example, one cannot properly engage with Sean Scully's *Coloured Wall* (2003) as a painting precisely because *Coloured Wall*, despite its painterly qualities, is not a painting but a lithograph. To attend to Chuck Close's *John* (1998) as a painting rather than a 126-color screenprint is to wholesale ignore the prodigious technical achievement that work represents. Likewise, to treat Close's *Keith/Mezzotint* (1972) as anything other than a mezzotint is to both deeply misapprehend and radically misunderstand the work. To be sure, printmaking may share a variety of elements in common with painting, drawing, or both (and some printmaking forms may even do so essentially). However, no screenprint or lithograph is a painting, no aquatint or mezzotint is a drawing, and despite for all the world seeming so, monotypes are neither paintings nor drawings—all are prints, and prints are neither paintings nor drawings.

Catharine Abell's contribution, "Printmaking as an Art," cleverly redirects skepticism about printmaking's artistic significance in comparison to its more prestigious Visual Art kin. While Abell does mention reproductive prints, her focus lies not with any reproductive relation between a print and a painting or drawing. Instead, Abell targets the print matrix and its construction, examining

what relation (including dependence) the matrix and its treatment might bear to painting or drawing. Abell is particularly interested in whether the fact of printmaking being either drawing- or painting-dependent would itself be sufficient to warrant skepticism about printmaking's claim to artistic significance, To this end, Abell first considers a skeptical claim motivated by reasons parallel to those that prompted Scruton's skepticism about the artistic significance of photography (as a representational form) and its independence.[5] For Scruton, an independent representational art form must have the capacity to express thoughts about what it represents and do so in a way that does not depend upon some other art form. In parallel, if the only way in which a (figurative) stone-lithograph can express thoughts about its depictive subject just is the way in which the figurative drawing on the litho-stone can, then that lithograph as such has no independent artistic significance. Abell also discusses skepticism motivated by more general arguments and intuitions about mechanicity as anathema to the exercise of independent intentional control—as this concern applies not just to photography but also to traditional printmaking techniques (for example, monochromatic lithographs, intaglio, and relief prints). Ultimately, Abell shows that such skepticism can survive only at the surface level. Any exploration beyond that quickly reveals not that printmaking techniques are somehow less mechanical than we had thought, but rather, that printmakers employ these resolutely mechanical techniques in ways not just consistent with but exemplary of the exercise of independent intentional control.

I.C. *Peg Zeglin Brand*

A consequence of printmaking's history as a skilled commercial trade was that institutional hierarchies located those who worked within this trade beneath the artists who typically employed them. But in fact the collaboration between artists and printmakers has allowed for numerous possibilities and very diverse divisions of labor. When printmaking began to be recognized as a fine art form in its own right at a certain point in the twentieth century, the role of the fine art print changed from being a "mere" reproductive aid of the sort Hopkins discusses to being an object of aesthetic appreciation in itself. Along with these reassessments came shifts in the artworld's evaluation of the status of printmakers. The classification of certain fine art prints as "original" was largely affected by print dealers' associations and accompanied by changes in marketing and pricing structures. To some extent, such changes reflected new kinds of collaboration like those between artists like Josef Albers or Robert Rauschenberg with so-called "master printers" like Kenneth Tyler. These large shifts meant that the printmakers themselves both achieved a new status and faced distinct expectations. As they began to be credited alongside "artists" in museum exhibitions, printmakers were also expected to contribute to the creative process by facilitating artists' aims in order to realize their visions. However, these externally applied pressures did not always reflect printmakers' own assessments of their challenges and aims.

In her essay "The Role of Luck in Originality and Creativity," Peg Zeglin Brand traces changes in the status of the fine art print with a particular focus on events of the mid-twentieth century. She examines the evolution of particular definitions of "original print" in this period. Brand's essay reveals that market-driven classifications of prints and printmakers had interesting parallels with shifting estimations of the value of other traditionally "lower" forms of art production such as women's handiwork and the so-called "crafts" of indigenous peoples. As the art market grew to accommodate such products, an associated ideology was developed within which to single out "originals" and "geniuses" in mediums for which such terms were fundamentally alien. Similarly, the market-driven emphasis on originality as defined by print dealers in the artworld highlighted values that did not reflect printmakers' own interests in experimenting with specific mediums and techniques.

As part of her critical examination of how the notion of originality has been applied to prints, Brand traces the term's connection with two associated notions also borrowed from the fine arts, creativity and genius. As historically developed, these notions all reflect cultural biases favoring particular sorts of people, primarily males and people of upper-class European heritage. Such bias, whether implicit or otherwise, has affected both the market for prints made by women and the critical assessment of print works, like those of Judy Chicago, that would otherwise be recognized

as exemplars of originality in terms of both content and processing. Since the notion of originality is sometimes cashed out in terms of creativity, Brand also examines accounts of this ideal, including one recently advanced by Bence Nanay (who has built upon relevant and proliferating work in psychology). Unfortunately, as Brand shows, new studies of creativity perpetuate the gender and economic biases present in standard art evaluative labels such as "genius," disadvantaging artists with restricted social opportunities. Nanay's account of creativity turns on a central notion of how an artist or inventor exploits luck. But luck is a notion that also (perhaps not surprisingly—think of the song about "Lady Luck") reflects gendered norms. Brand's conclusion is that the employment of a more balanced notion of the key concepts of originality, luck, and creativity would help reinforce a fuller and more open conception of the nature of originality within historically devalued forms of art production like printmaking.

II. ONTOLOGICAL/RELATIONAL ISSUES ABOUT PRINTMAKING

A standard art-ontological position is to construe repeatable artworks (for example, poems, novels, plays, and symphonies) as abstract objects (that is, objects necessarily lacking both extension in space-time and causal efficacy) that admit multiple concrete instances (for example, the original manuscript or score and its subsequent copies or performances). On this standard account, our interaction with such art-abstracta (for example, *Moby Dick* or the *Eroica Symphony*) not only must be mediated by their associated concrete instances (such as copies of *Moby Dick* on library shelves or performances of the *Eroica* in symphony halls), but this interaction must itself be one-way. That is, raging library fires and termite infestations threatening to destroy copies of *Moby Dick* pose no such threat to Moby Dick itself, nor would inept flautists and poor acoustics rendering performances of the *Eroica* aesthetically defective thereby impugn the aesthetic character of the *Eroica Symphony* itself.

The problem is that printmaking products can be properly classified neither as mere multiples (like copies of *Moby Dick*) nor as distinctly singular (like the *Mona Lisa*). Instead, prints appear to be located somewhere nebulously in between. Printmaking, along with cast sculpture, is what

Goodman referred to as a two-stage autographic art—first stage: matrix (mold), second stage: print (statue).[6] Unless you are a set nominalist with a penchant for restricting composition to mereological sums, nothing particularly ontological need follow from this stage distinction or from even multiplicity itself.

II.A. *Roy T. Cook and Aaron Meskin*

In their contribution "Comics, Prints, and Multiplicity," Roy T. Cook and Aaron Meskin investigate the role of multiplicity in comics as compared to printmaking generally. The idea behind such inquiry is that despite recent departures, comics has for the vast majority of its history been a print-based medium. Though seeing comics as essentially print-based gets comics multiplicity for free, what is required to get this looks like a hard pill to swallow. At the very least, insofar as comics is not an actual (let alone essential) part of printmaking (but instead some hybrid form), we should still expect comparative inquiry between comics and prints to yield informative and productive results in the form of some notable similarities or some equally notable departures. What concerns Cook and Meskin most is this: assuming comics can be artworks, should we count the individual and distinct print comic (for example, the one that sold off the rack for ten cents in 1960 now encased in Lucite selling for $10,000) as itself an individual and distinct artwork?

Cook and Meskin's aim is not to get at some art-theoretic truth about comics or prints. Rather, their aim is to use comparisons between comics and prints both to help illuminate not just comics' own history but, mutatis mutandis, that of any directly or indirectly print-related media, and to do so in a way that is revelatory with respect to how hybridity itself might function more generally in art form development.

II.B. *K.E. Gover*

Of course, the notion of multiplicity carries with it substantial metaphysical baggage. Since traditional printmaking techniques aim at the production of multiples, then insofar as one takes multiplicity to track repeatability, print ontology looks by default to be modeled after standard

repeatable-work ontology. For example, just as *Moby Dick* and the *Eroica* each name an abstract entity able to admit of multiple (concrete) instances, so too then must Andy Warhol's *Flowers* (1964) name an abstract entity of which multiple (nonart) concreta (screenprints) may be proper instances—250 of which are within the Warhol sanctioned edition. *Moby Dick* and not any copy of it as such is the artwork (novel). The *Eroica* and not any performance of it as such is the artwork (symphony). So too it would follow then for the fine art print *Flowers* (1964): *Flowers* and not any printing of it as such is the artwork.[7]

As I have argued elsewhere, the problem is that a conclusion like this one fits printmaking rather poorly.[8] Though standard for other more attended to artforms such as novels, poems, symphonies, and so on, when applied to printmaking, such construals end up running roughshod over established and pervasive art practice and convention surrounding the production, sale, appreciation, evaluation, exhibition, and collection of fine art prints. The fact that we may well have recourse to posit multiply instantiable art-abstracta in order to make sense of the practices and conventions surrounding novels and symphonies does not suggest we ought to expect the same for printmaking. In fact, importing standard repeatable-work ontology does not so much make sense of how we talk about prints as it commits immediate and terrible violence against the very same. This ought not be terribly surprising, since printmaking's ontological commitments prima facie look to be comparatively quite tame. Basic print ontology, I have argued, just need be one according to which fine art prints—for example, Kiki Smith's *Litter* (1999) 19/50 or Ed Ruscha's *Here and Now* (2009) 48/75—are each individual and distinct (concrete) artworks to which multiple other individual and distinct (concrete) artworks may be relevantly similar—for example, Kiki Smith's *Litter* (1999) 49/50, Ed Ruscha's *Here and Now* (2009) 03/75.[9]

In her contribution "Are All Multiples the Same? The Problematic Nature of the Limited Edition," K.E. Gover explores whether the foundational work-performance relation operative within the ontic model for printmaking's two-stage allographic counterpart (music) is productive when imported to do similar work for print ontology, considering what might follow for the scope and limits of artist's intentions (sanctions, authorizations, authentication, and so

on). To this end, she discusses the advantages and disadvantages of views offered by Nelson Goodman, Nigel Warburton, and myself, and finds each wanting in its own way. Given her interest in authenticity, Gover unsurprisingly takes issue with the view I have defended.[10] According to this view, basic print ontology requires only what I call the 'relevant similarity' such that for any pairwise comparison of relevantly similar prints, one print being an artwork is both necessary and sufficient for the other print being an artwork. Whether or not those prints might or might not share any certain further intentional relations—sanctions, authorizations, permissions, and so on—matters only insofar as such bears directly on the relevant similarity relation. If an authorized, sanctioned print in the limited edition is an artwork, then so too must be any print relevantly similar to that—whether the print be another sanctioned member of the print edition, a stage proof (artist, printer's, trial, and so on), or the unsanctioned, unauthorized print illicitly pulled from a stolen matrix long after the artist has died. Gover brings up several challenges to the notion of relevant similarity I employ and provides cases that show that the relevantly similarity relation is productive only when given further specification.

II.c. *David Davies*

For those less than enamored with needlessly jumping into the ontological deep end, David Davies conducts a metaphysics-free (or metaphysics-lite) inquiry into the multiplicity of prints. His contribution, "Varying Impressions," considers how prints might compare more generally to other putatively multiple works with respect to factors such as work-repeatability and work-variability. Davies's account of 'instancing' across various mediums is ontologically neutral; it should not be seen as invoking the standard metaphysical relation (instantiation) holding between abstract types and the concrete things thought to be their instances, tokens, or copies.[11] Likewise, when Davies speaks of 'types' he is not appealing to some abstract ontic kind but instead to a Wollheimian notion of a norm kind—a relatively ontic-neutral way for us to ground particulars (regardless of ontic stripe) in terms of their relationship to activities of creation.[12]

Davies not only inquires after multiplicity for printmaking generally but also discusses nonphotographic prints, for which multiplicity looks less than settled (monotypes, monoprints). Perhaps most importantly, Davies explores the issues of multiplicity of strict instances for certain nonphotographic printmaking techniques as well as their the variability—that is, how much if any variation might be permitted within the strict instances, along with why variability might be a problem for prints but not other obviously multiple works. This issue arises for prints and other multiple works produced from what he refers to as production-artifacts (templates, matrices, and so on). Davies argues that adequately addressing the problem of variability requires a systematic way to determine when the strict instances of any such multiple (print or otherwise) are themselves artworks in their own right. His article illustrates yet another way in which philosophical inquiry into printmaking promises substantial philosophical returns for related issues elsewhere.

III. CONCLUSION

The aim of this special issue is to demonstrate that the attitude of philosophical indifference (if not suspicion) toward printmaking and fine art prints is both unwarranted and unjustified. The works in this issue clearly show how philosophical inquiry into printmaking can yield productive and informative philosophical returns, not just concerning an unduly neglected art form, but also for more general philosophical inquiries into the nature of art and its history, practice, forms, ontology, and critical appreciation. The special issue should convince readers that philosophy of art cannot afford to adopt even a casual indifference toward printmaking and print-related areas. To the extent that philosophy of art neglects printmaking, fine art prints, and print-related forms (for example, photography and comics), it also neglects a significant, pervasive, and philosophically rich and robust part of the world of art.[13]

CHRISTY MAG UIDHIR
Department of Philosophy
University of Houston
Houston, Texas 77204

INTERNET: cmaguidhir@gmail.com

1. Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968); Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Works and Worlds of Art* (Oxford University Press, 1980). For a clever nod to Goodman's work on this subject, see Jere Williams's visual contribution to this volume.

2. Famous examples include Cornelis Galle the Elder's 1637 engraving of *Procne Showing Tereus the Head of His Child* (after Peter Paul Rubens 1636 oil painting) and Hendrik Goudt's 1610 engraving of *The Mocking of Ceres* (after Adam Elsheimer's 1608 oil painting).

3. In this respect, the reproductive print should be considered no less important during this time than was Gutenberg's movable type.

4. On the former strategy, perhaps the most famous example of this suspicion is Roger Scruton, "Photography and Representation," in *The Aesthetic Understanding: Essays in the Philosophy of Art and Culture* (South Bend, Indiana: St Augustine's Press, 1983), pp. 102–106. On the latter strategy, screenprinting, to take one example, is often treated as a subspecies of painting. However, though Warhol's *Campbell's Soup Cans* (1962) may often be referred to as paintings, that which could plausibly ground this obviously cannot be facts about the process by which they were produced (silkscreening) but instead must be nothing other than facts about their materiality (synthetic polymer paint on canvas). As such, seeing *Campbell's Soup Cans* as paintings requires being blind to essential and fundamentally critical facts about their production. This likewise holds for certain printmaking forms (for example, intaglio) being viewed in terms of drawing.

5. Scruton, "Photography and Representation."

6. The two-stage allographic counterpart being musical art: first stage: composition, second stage: performance.

7. Similarly, the matrix for *Flowers* as such is no more the artwork than would either the screening of *Casablanca* or the reel from which that screening was shown.

8. See Christy Mag Uidhir, "Unlimited Additions to Limited Editions," *Contemporary Aesthetics* 7 (2009), http://www.contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=527; "Photographic Art: An Ontology Fit to Print," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 70 (2012): 31–42; and *Art and Art-Attempts* (Oxford University Press, 2013), chap. 5.

9. In "Photographic Art," I argue that photographic art resists the standard repeatable-work model because the putative repeatability of photographic artworks is upon closer inspection nothing more than the *relevant similarity* relation between individual and distinct photographic prints.

10. Gover focuses mainly on the account offered in Mag Uidhir, "Unlimited Additions to Limited Editions."

11. I take it that Davies's position is at least prima facie consistent with a variety of ontological views: for example, Platonist, nominalist, or fictionalist.

12. Richard Wollheim, *Art and Its Objects,* 2nd edition (Cambridge University Press, 1980).

13. The genesis for this special issue of *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* was a workshop on printmaking and philosophy of art organized by Cynthia Freeland and myself and held at the University of Houston, February 21–23, 2013. The workshop was made possible through generous support of the following sponsors: American Society for Aesthetics (Major Initiative Grant), The John and Rebecca Moores Distinguished Professorship, Nancy Luton,