ŚRĪ HARṢA CONTRA HEGEL: MONISM, SKEPTICAL METHOD, AND THE LIMITS OF REASON

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Śrī Harṣa’s Khāṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya (The sweets of refutation) (ca. 1170), Citsukha’s Tattvapradīpikā (Elucidation of the supreme reality) (ca. 1220), and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s Advaitasiddhi (Attainment of Advaita) (ca. 1550) are generally thought to comprise the trio of masterpieces in post-Śaṅkara Advaita dialectics. Each of these forbiddingly complex works defends the Advaita (“Non-dual”) doctrine of the Upaniṣads—which declare Brahman to be the sole reality—against major objections from rival philosophical schools, especially Nyāya and (in the case of Citsukha and Madhusūdana) Nyāya-Nyāya. However, as the titles of the three works suggest, there is a crucial difference between the aims of Śrī Harṣa on the one hand and Citsukha and Madhusūdana on the other. Both Citsukha and Madhusūdana not only refute opposing philosophical positions but also provide rational arguments for adopting the Advaita standpoint and detailed elucidations of key tenets of Advaita. Śrī Harṣa, by contrast, insists that the methodology of Khāṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya is strictly negative: he is content with savoring the “sweets of refutation,” arguing against non-monistic views without advancing any positive doctrines of his own and without proffering any positive arguments that his opponents themselves would not accept.

A number of scholars have fruitfully compared Śrī Harṣa’s negative methodology to skeptical and self-critical strains in the work of Western philosophers such as Sextus Empiricus, David Hume, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. As far as I am aware, however, no one has done a comparative study of Śrī Harṣa and G.W.F. Hegel, despite remarkable affinities both in their skeptical methodologies and in their monistic philosophical views. In the Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), Hegel attempts what might be called a “negative justification” of a monistic ontology through an immanent critique of a variety of non-monistic views. This essay brings Śrī Harṣa’s Khāṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya into dialogue with Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes, identifying salient points of affinity and divergence in the philosophical projects of two monistic thinkers working in radically different traditions and separated by over six hundred years.

Hegel had no knowledge of Sanskrit and his acquaintance with Indian philosophy was profoundly limited, so it is highly unlikely that he was even aware of the existence of Śrī Harṣa’s Khāṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya. However, Hegel’s inadequate understanding of Indian thought did not deter him from passing sweeping verdicts on Indian culture and philosophy. In lectures delivered between 1829 and 1830, Hegel went so far as to banish Indian philosophy from the “history of philosophy” proper, which he claimed originated in Greece. As Helmuth Glasenapp has observed, what
Hegel dismissed is not so much Indian philosophy as his own hopeless caricature of it. Indeed, one central aim of this essay is to demonstrate that Śri Harṣa’s Khandanakhandakhādyā at once anticipated and challenged certain fundamental aspects of Hegel’s philosophical project.

Śri Harṣa’s Khandanakhandakhādyā, not Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes, deserves to be recognized as the first attempt in the history of world philosophy to defend a monistic standpoint exclusively by means of a sustained critique of non-monistic philosophical positions. I will argue, however, that while there are striking affinities in their overall philosophical projects, Śri Harṣa and Hegel diverge sharply in their specific views on the powers and limits of philosophy and on the precise nature of monistic reality.

Section I outlines the basic tenets of Hegel’s monistic metaphysics. Hegel conceives monistic reality as “absolute Spirit” (der absolute Geist), an internally differentiated totality that incorporates an array of non-monistic epistemic standpoints as necessary moments in its own progressive self-unfolding. For Hegel, philosophy alone is equipped to articulate and justify the monistic reality of absolute Spirit. In section II, I specify some of the salient differences between Hegel’s monistic metaphysics and the monistic doctrine of Advaita Vedānta to which Śri Harṣa subscribes. For Śri Harṣa, non-dual Brahman does not admit internal differentiation and lies altogether beyond the reach of thought. However, Brahman can be realized directly by one who has undergone a rigorous course of ethical and yogic practices (sādhanā) sanctioned by the Upaniṣads.

In sections III and IV, I compare the skeptical methodologies of Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes and Śri Harṣa’s Khandanakhandakhādyā. Section III discusses Hegel’s unique method of “self-completing skepticism,” by means of which he attempts to demonstrate that self-contradictions at the heart of various non-monistic standpoints provide a cumulative justification of his own monistic conception of the “Absolute.” In section IV, I suggest that Śri Harṣa’s skeptical method of vītanḍā—a mode of sheer refutation—shares a number of features with Hegel’s skeptical method, but Śri Harṣa departs fundamentally from Hegel in rejecting the very possibility of a philosophical justification of monism. For Śri Harṣa, rational reflection—when pushed to its limits—gives way to suprarational “faith” (śraddhā) in the non-dual teachings of the Upaniṣads. Section V then compares Hegel’s and Śri Harṣa’s competing conceptions of both the scope of reason and the relation between thought and praxis.

J. N. Mohanty has identified a long-standing “asymmetry” in comparative discussions of Indian and Western philosophy. It is a sign of the “cultural hegemony of the West,” he points out, that recent comparativists have tended to interpret Indian philosophy “from the point of view of Western thought” while “Western philosophy is not studied, expounded, and critiqued from the point of view of Oriental thought.” The present comparative study of Śri Harṣa and Hegel takes a modest step toward correcting this asymmetry in comparative scholarship—an asymmetry that Hegel’s Eurocentric biases and brusque dismissal of Indian philosophy played no small role in fostering.
I. Hegel’s Monistic Metaphysics of Absolute Spirit

As pointed out above, a striking similarity between Hegel’s Phänomenologie and Śrī Harṣa’s Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya is their strictly negative philosophical methodology: both Hegel and Śrī Harṣa defend their respective monistic views not through positive theses and arguments but exclusively through a sustained refutation of non-monistic views. Nonetheless, we will see that Hegel and Śrī Harṣa do voice positive views about the monistic reality at various points in their work. How are we to reconcile their positive theses about the monistic reality with their strictly negative methodology? Both Hegel and Śrī Harṣa, as we will see, avoid the charge of self-contradiction by carefully bracketing their positive monistic views from their philosophical project proper. Sections I and II briefly outline the respective monistic views of Hegel and Śrī Harṣa, while sections III and IV go on to provide a comparative examination of their negative philosophical projects, which are exclusively concerned with refuting non-monistic positions.

A number of Western thinkers prior to Hegel—including Parmenides, Plotinus, Spinoza, Fichte, and Schelling—espoused forms of monism. However, the monistic doctrine Hegel elaborates in the Preface (“Vorrede”) to the Phänomenologie is highly idiosyncratic. The monistic metaphysics of Hegel’s Phänomenologie involves three fundamental theses, which I will designate below as HM1, HM2, and HM3.6 Crucially, Hegel stresses that his positive articulation of these theses in the Preface constitutes “nothing more than an anticipatory assurance,” a kind of extra-philosophical promissory note for the negative philosophical justification of his monistic position developed subsequently in the body of the Phänomenologie (p. 55/35).7

**HM1. The monistic reality is a highly complex, internally differentiated totality.**

The monistic totality—which Hegel variously refers to as the “True,” the “Whole,” “absolute Spirit,” or simply the “Absolute”—is not some kind of homogeneous super-entity but a variegated whole that encompasses all that is. This monistic totality is internally differentiated in that it is comprised of various elements or “moments” that play an essential role in the constitution of the totality. Instead of conceiving the whole in additive terms as the sum of its parts, Hegel conceives the monistic totality as an “organic Whole” that is ontologically prior to the elements that constitute it (p. 38/20). For Hegel, in other words, the various elements of the whole depend for their existence on the whole in which they participate. Taken in isolation, HM1 is probably too abstract to grasp with any precision, but the thesis becomes considerably clearer when placed in the context of HM2 and HM3.

**HM2. The monistic reality must be conceived both synchronically and diachronically.**

One of the most striking and original aspects of the Phänomenologie is Hegel’s repeated insistence that to grasp the monistic totality as it truly is, it must be conceived not only synchronically as a “simple Whole” but also diachronically as a dynamic, self-developing totality (p. 19/7). As Hegel puts it, “The True is the Whole. The Whole, however, is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its
development. It must be said of the Absolute that it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it is in truth” (p. 24/11). A diachronic understanding of the Whole as a “result” requires devoting careful attention to the complex internal structure of the Whole.

In particular, one must grasp the precise nature of all the “moments” that comprise the monistic Whole, how each of these moments develops, and how each moment both relates to all the other moments and contributes to the Whole. Since “each moment is necessary,” Hegel observes, “each moment has to be lingered over” in order to appreciate the Whole as “uniquely qualified” by that particular moment (p. 33/17). In an especially vivid passage from the Preface, Hegel observes, “The True is thus the Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk; yet because each member collapses as soon as he drops out, the revel is just as much transparent and simple repose” (p. 47/27). If HM1 involves a synchronic emphasis on the Whole as “simple repose,” HM2 counterbalances HM1 with a diachronic emphasis on the need to conceive the moments of the monistic Whole as active, indispensable participants in the Whole—as “positive necessary moments” rather than as “negative and ephemeral” ones (p. 47/28).

HM3. Philosophy alone is able to articulate, justify, and actualize the reality of the monistic totality.

In the Phänomenologie, Hegel argues that the common task of art, religion, and philosophy is to convey the monistic reality of absolute Spirit. However, he goes on to insist that the epistemic limitations of art and religion render them inferior to philosophy in their capacity to depict absolute Spirit in its essence. According to Hegel, while art depicts absolute Spirit in sensuous form and religion represents absolute Spirit through faith and belief, philosophy gives full-blown conceptual articulation to absolute Spirit. HM2, as we have seen, entails that a comprehensive understanding of the monistic totality requires a precise articulation of its dynamic internal structure. For Hegel, it follows from HM2 that only the conceptual medium of philosophy is equipped to convey the reality of the monistic totality in a full and undistorted manner. As Hegel puts it, philosophy alone is able to achieve the “articulation of form whereby distinctions are securely defined and stand arrayed in their fixed relations” (p. 19/7). Philosophical “Science” (Wissenschaft) achieves “universal intelligibility” through its rigorous conceptual articulation of absolute Spirit, which makes it “at once exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and possessed by all” (p. 20/7).

Indeed, Hegel hazards the even stronger claim that the complete philosophical articulation of the monistic totality serves ipso facto as full-blown justification and actualization of the reality of the monistic totality. As Hegel puts it, “Spirit that knows itself as Spirit, is Science. Science is its actuality [Wirklichkeit] and the realm which it builds for itself in its own element” (p. 29/14). This opaque and extravagant claim stems from the distinctive ontological status Hegel ascribes to absolute Spirit. For Hegel, absolute Spirit is not something “out there” in the spatiotemporal world but a dynamic reality that exists most fully at the level of universal thought. Hence, Hegel
conceives the philosophical edifice of the Phänomenologie as nothing less than the “realm” that Spirit “builds for itself in its own element.” At the end of the Phänomenologie, Hegel triumphantly declares that the very philosophical exposition of absolute Spirit he has just completed constitutes the “actuality, truth, and certainty” of the “throne” of absolute Spirit, without which absolute Spirit would be “lifeless and alone” (p. 591/493). The Phänomenologie enacts the long, arduous journey of Spirit as it encounters an array of alien forms until it finally returns to itself and achieves “absolute knowledge”—an unmistakable knowledge of itself as the monistic totality.

II. Śrī Harṣa’s Vedāntic Metaphysics of Non-dual Brahman

Like Hegel, Śrī Harṣa accepts a monistic view of reality and defends it indirectly through the refutation of non-monistic views. In the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā, Śrī Harṣa defends “advaitaśruti,” the non-dual teachings of the Upaniṣads. Śrī Harṣa belongs to the school of Advaita Vedānta, which is based on the philosophy of non-dualism propounded by Śaṅkara in his commentaries on the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā, and the Brahmasūtras. The Vedāntic doctrine of non-dualism to which Śrī Harṣa subscribes can be expressed in four fundamental theses, which are designated below as SM1, SM2, SM3, and SM4. In the course of elaborating these four theses, I will signal major doctrinal divergences between Śrī Harṣa and Hegel.

SM1. Brahman, the non-dual reality, is indescribable and lies beyond thought. Although I have been attributing a “monistic” position to Śrī Harṣa, it would be more accurate to describe his Vedāntic position as “non-dual.” The Chāndogya Upaniṣad declares Brahman to be “one only, without a second” (ekamevādvitiyām).9 From the standpoint of Advaita Vedānta, even describing Brahman as the “monistic reality” falsifies Brahman, since nothing positive can be predicated of it—not even that it is “one” or “Brahman.” Since Brahman lies beyond words and thought, the scriptures resort to describing Brahman using negative predicates such as “non-dual” or “one without a second.”10 As the Taṭṭṭitiya Upaniṣad puts it, Brahman is “that from which speech, along with mind, turn back, having failed to reach it.”11

Accordingly, in the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā, Śrī Harṣa echoes the negative language of the Upaniṣads in his succinct declaration that “only Brahman, without a second, is real from the absolute standpoint.”12 In stark contrast to Hegel’s view that thought alone is capable of articulating the monistic reality, Śrī Harṣa subscribes to the Vedāntic view that thought is capable only of negative predication with respect to the absolute reality: thought can determine what Brahman is not, but it is constitutionally incapable of grasping what Brahman is. Hence, from the Vedāntic standpoint, any positive characterization of the Absolute—including Hegel’s elaborate account of monistic reality as an internally differentiated, self-developing totality—radically falsifies the non-dual reality. The very notions of “self-development” and “internal differentiation” only obtain at the level of thought, while non-dual Brahman lies beyond thought. It also follows from SM1 that Hegel’s attempt at robust philosophical justification of his monistic view is doomed to fail. Śrī Harṣa would accuse
Hegel of burdening philosophy with a positive explanatory and justificatory role that it simply cannot fulfill.

SM2. *We perceive the apparent world of diversity due to ignorance.*

If Brahman is the sole reality, why do we take the pluralistic universe of our empirical experience, rather than Brahman, to be real? From the standpoint of Advaita Vedânta, we take the phenomenal universe to be real as a result of ignorance (avidyā), which prevents us from recognizing the absolute reality of Brahman. Although the phenomenal universe is not ultimately real, we do nonetheless perceive it in empirical experience, so it cannot be said to be unreal in the sense that, say, unicorns are unreal. Hence, the phenomenal universe has a peculiar ontological status: it is neither real nor unreal. Śaṅkara draws an important consequence from its liminal ontological status: the phenomenal universe eludes definition or description. As Śaṅkara puts it in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, the world of diversity is “imagined by ignorance” and “cannot be described either as real or unreal” (*tattvānyatvābhyaṃ anirvacaniya*). A number of later Advaitins, including Śri Harṣa, accorded a prominent role to the *anirvacanīyavāda* in their philosophical exposition and defense of the doctrine of Advaita Vedânta. As we will see in the following section, Śri Harṣa’s fundamental strategy in the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* is to demonstrate the indefinability of everything in the phenomenal universe.

SM3. *Brahman is identical with Ātman, our true nature.*

Brahman is not some kind of Beyond but our own essential nature. In our ignorance, we identify ourselves with the body-mind complex, but our true nature is Ātman, which is none other than the absolute reality itself: “This Ātman is Brahman” (*ayam ātmā brahma*), the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* declares. According to Śaṅkara, our empirical identity as a particular individual is a mere “limiting adjunct” (*upādhi*) that obscures our true identity as Ātman. Knowledge of the absolute reality, hence, requires the removal of the various *upādhis* created by ignorance that prevent us from recognizing ourselves as Ātman.

Taken together, SM1 through SM3 could have a disturbing consequence: it is conceivable that ignorance and finitude are simply constitutive features of existence, which would entail that Brahman or Ātman remains permanently inaccessible to us. If this were the case, knowledge of Ātman would be similar in status to Kant’s regulative ideas, which can be postulated intellectually but never achieved in actuality. SM4, however, denies this possibility by insisting that ignorance can in fact be removed through practices prescribed by the scriptures.

SM4. *Through certain ethical and spiritual disciplines we can eradicate our ignorance and attain direct, suprarational knowledge of Ātman.*

As a result of our mistaken identification with the body-mind complex, we desire sense objects that bring enjoyment to the body and mind. These desires, along with their occasional fulfillment, in turn strengthen our identification with the body-mind complex, thereby perpetuating our ignorance. In order to break out of this cycle of
ignorance and to realize our true nature as Ātman, we must first attain perfection in the “fourfold practice” (sādhanacatusṭaya), a preliminary set of disciplines for purifying and concentrating the mind. According to Śaṅkara, this fourfold practice involves (1) discrimination (viveka) between the eternal and the non-eternal; (2) dispassion (vairāgya) toward enjoyments; (3) cultivation of the six cardinal virtues (ṣaśsampat), which include control of the mind (śama), restraint of the sense organs (dama), withdrawal of the mind from sense objects (uparati), forbearance (tiitkṣā), faith (śraddhā) in the guru and the scriptures, and concentration of the mind (samādhāna); and (4) intense longing for liberation from the state of ignorance (mumukṣutva).

Having attained perfection in the sādhanacatusṭaya, the spiritual aspirant is qualified to engage in the threefold Vedāntic sādhanā of śravaṇa (hearing), manana (reflection), and nididhyāsana (meditation). The aspirant first hears the scriptural statements on the identity of Brahman and Ātman. He then reflects on these statements from all standpoints so as to strengthen his conviction regarding their truth. Finally, the aspirant meditates deeply on the identity of Brahman and Ātman. When done properly and with adequate preparation, the performance of the threefold Vedāntic sādhanā culminates in the knowledge of Ātman and the consequent eradication of ignorance.

For Hegel, as we have seen, knowledge of absolute Spirit is achieved in and by thought alone: the reality of absolute Spirit consists in nothing more than comprehensive philosophical insight into its nature and structure. In Advaita Vedānta, by contrast, knowledge of the non-dual reality is suprarational and, hence, beyond the reach of the intellect. Even with a clear intellectual grasp of Vedāntic doctrine, genuine knowledge of Ātman is impossible so long as one’s mind is restless and full of desire for sense pleasures. Hence, one of the primary aims of Vedāntic sādhanā is the gradual reconfiguration of the entire psychic apparatus. The philosophy of Advaita Vedānta, in other words, has an ineliminable element of praxis: the eradication of ignorance requires not merely intellectual understanding but full-blown psychological and existential transformation.

With this background in place, we are now in a position to establish precise points of affinity and divergence in the respective philosophical projects of Hegel and Śrī Harṣa. Despite fundamental differences in their conceptions of monistic reality, Hegel and Śrī Harṣa share a similar methodological orientation: both thinkers are convinced that the best way to defend a monistic standpoint is through an exhaustive refutation of non-monistic standpoints.

III. Hegel’s Dialectical Method of “Self-Completing Skepticism”

The formidable challenge Hegel sets himself in the Phänomenologie is to provide a non-dogmatic defense of his monistic metaphysics of absolute Spirit that is convincing to all. Hegel’s ingenious strategy is to restrict himself to a strictly negative methodology: he attempts an indirect justification of his monistic position through the refutation of all possible non-monistic standpoints.17 Hegel is fully aware that his monistic metaphysics is counterintuitive in the extreme not least because it flies in
the face of the commonsense view that we inhabit a world characterized by a diversity of phenomena, people, and objects. Hegel characterizes this prevailing commonsense view of subject-object dualism as the standpoint of “natural consciousness” (natürliche Bewußtsein), which “knows objects in antithesis to itself and knows itself in antithesis to them” (p. 30/15). For Hegel, the standpoint of natural consciousness does not embody a single determinate epistemic position but in fact encompasses a wide variety of dualistic positions, each of which construes “subject” and “object” in a different way.

We might expect Hegel to attempt to refute the various dualistic views of natural consciousness from his monistic standpoint. In fact, however, Hegel rejects such an external procedure of criticizing rival standpoints from the perspective of one’s own position. An external approach, Hegel argues, remains so “preoccupied with itself” that it fails to do justice to the rival views it considers (p. 13/3). In the Phänomenologie, Hegel instead adopts a methodology of radical immanence: he seeks to “tarry with” the dualistic epistemic positions of natural consciousness to the point where he “loses himself” in them (p. 13/3). The Phänomenologie is the “science of the experience of consciousness” in that it inhabits the first-person standpoint of natural consciousness itself (p. 80/56). The role of the philosopher, as Hegel puts it, is “simply to look on” as natural consciousness strives to articulate and justify its own claims to knowledge (p. 77/54).

Each chapter of the Phänomenologie addresses a particular knowledge-claim of natural consciousness. Hegel begins by addressing the epistemic standpoint of sense-certainty (sinnliche Gewißheit): natural consciousness, at this primitive stage, claims to know only what is given immediately through the senses prior to the intervention of conceptual understanding. Accordingly, natural consciousness claims to be certain not of a determinate object with specific properties—like a tree or a chair—but of a brute sense-datum that can only be referred to as “This.” However, as Hegel goes on to demonstrate at length in the first chapter, natural consciousness falls repeatedly into self-contradiction in its efforts to specify the precise nature of the “This” of which it claims to be certain. Natural consciousness is finally compelled to admit that even the indexical gesture of picking out a particular sense-datum presupposes prior conceptual framing of that sense-datum’s context: by pointing to X and not Y, it is already committed to a minimal conceptual distinction between what X and Y are and how they differ from one another. In other words, the sense-datum—the bare “This”—that was supposed to be immediately given to natural consciousness turns out to be mediated by the subject’s conceptual scheme.

As soon as natural consciousness realizes that its purportedly immediate certainty of the “This” is inescapably mediated by concepts, it feels compelled to revise its understanding of what it claims to know. Natural consciousness now admits that what it picks out is not an unconceptualized sense-datum but a determinate object of sense-perception with various properties. Natural consciousness, however, once again falls into contradictions in its attempt to justify what it claims to know in sense-perception. These contradictions plaguing the standpoint of sense-perception, in turn, compel natural consciousness to ascend to an epistemically superior dualistic
standpoint—addressed in the third chapter of the Phänomenologie—that conceives the object of knowledge not as an object with properties but as a “force” (Kraft). This intricate process continues for hundreds of pages, as natural consciousness rises to increasingly sophisticated dualistic standpoints in its ongoing struggle to articulate and justify its knowledge claims. At the end of its journey, natural consciousness attains the true standpoint of absolute knowledge, at which point it realizes that it is not a subject standing over against an object but none other than the all-encompassing monistic totality of absolute Spirit in which subject and object prove to be identical.

Crucially, Hegel’s immanent methodological procedure remains constant throughout the Phänomenologie: instead of refuting a given dualistic position of natural consciousness from an external standpoint, Hegel plays the role of an attentive philosophical observer who simply “looks on” as natural consciousness refutes itself. Each chapter of the Phänomenologie dramatizes how the immanent self-contradictions of natural consciousness result in a “reversal of consciousness,” which compels natural consciousness to proceed to a higher epistemic standpoint (p. 79/55). In particular, this reversal consists in the recognition that the object “in-itself” that natural consciousness claimed to know turns out to be an object “only for consciousness” (p. 79/55). In the first chapter, for instance, natural consciousness ascends from the standpoint of sense-certainty to that of sense-perception at the precise moment that it realizes that the purportedly immediate sense-datum it claimed to know was in fact mediated by its own conceptual scheme.

In contrast to a purely destructive skepticism that “only ever sees pure nothingness in its result,” Hegel’s skeptical method is constructive and dialectical in that it conceives nothingness specifically as “the nothingness from which it results” (p. 74/51). From Hegel’s perspective, if we conceive the “result” of skepticism not as an “empty abyss” but as a “determinate negation,” then “a new form has thereby immediately arisen, and in the negation the transition is made through which the progress through the complete series of forms comes about of itself” (p. 74/51). In Hegel’s hands, skeptical negation of a given epistemic position is at the same time a positive dialectical transition to a higher epistemic standpoint. Moreover, this higher standpoint invariably “sublates” (aufhebt)—that is, at once preserves and cancels—the negated standpoint by incorporating it as a subordinate moment.

Accordingly, Hegel characterizes the method of the Phänomenologie as a “self-completing skepticism” (sich vollbringende Skeptizismus) since it culminates in a monistic standpoint of absolute knowledge that cannot be negated (p. 72/50). In a dramatic passage, Hegel characterizes the “path of natural consciousness” as “the way of the Soul which journeys through the series of its own configurations as though they were the stations appointed to it by its own nature, so that it may purify itself for the life of the Spirit, and achieve finally, through the completed experience of itself [die vollständige Erfahrung ihrer selbst], the awareness of what it really is in itself” (p. 72/49). It should be clear at this point that Hegel’s unique skeptical method is pivotal to establishing HM2: it is precisely by means of the dialectical operation of determinate negation that absolute Spirit ultimately recognizes itself in its truth as the
self-developing monistic totality that integrates all possible dualistic standpoints as “positive necessary moments” within its internal dynamics (p. 47/28).

At a general level, we can identify two fundamental features of Hegel’s dialectical method. First, Hegel’s skeptical method is teleologically driven: by means of determinate negation, each succeeding chapter of the Phänomenologie brings natural consciousness one step closer to the telos of Hegel’s own monistic metaphysics of absolute Spirit. From a diachronic perspective, the Phänomenologie charts the journey of natural consciousness from ignorance to true knowledge. From a synchronic perspective, the various stages in the journey of natural consciousness constitute essential moments or nodes within the monistic totality of absolute Spirit. In other words, Hegel attempts to substantiate HM2 and HM3 at a stroke by providing a comprehensive philosophical articulation of the dynamic internal structure of absolute Spirit solely on the basis of the immanent self-critique of natural consciousness itself.

Second, Hegel makes the very strong claim that his negative justification of the reality of absolute Spirit, in all its details, is the only justification possible. As he puts it, the “completeness of the forms of unreal consciousness is established through the necessity of the progression and the interconnection” of the forms themselves (p. 73/50). That is, Hegel maintains that natural consciousness must entertain only those dualistic standpoints outlined in the Phänomenologie and in the exact order in which these standpoints are presented in the Phänomenologie. Naturally, this assumption places an enormous burden on every detail and transitional link in Hegel’s complex and lengthy exposition. If even a single link in the philosophical chain proves to be faulty, then Hegel’s entire justificatory project—embodied in HM3—collapses.

IV. Śrī Harṣa’s Destructive Method of Vītarāṇā

It should be clear by now that Hegel’s conception of the task of philosophy in the Phänomenologie flows from his idiosyncratic monistic metaphysics, outlined in section I. In particular, HM2 and HM3 collectively entail that the role of philosophy is to justify and actualize the monistic totality of absolute Spirit through its comprehensive conceptual articulation. As we will see in this section, Śrī Harṣa’s Advaita doctrine necessitates a rather different conception of the scope and method of philosophy. According to SM1, non-dual Brahman is indescribable and lies beyond thought. Since philosophy lies within the realm of thought, philosophy is incapable of articulating or justifying the non-dual reality of Brahman. Hence, Śrī Harṣa’s philosophical aims prove to be relatively modest: if Hegel attempts a full-blown philosophical justification of monistic reality, Śrī Harṣa seeks only to establish the possibility that reality is in fact non-dual. Śrī Harṣa’s strictly negative philosophical project exhausts itself in a demonstration of the incoherence of a variety of realist positions, especially those espoused by the Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṁsakas, and Jainas. This section will focus on the introduction to the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā, where Śrī Harṣa elaborates his methodological approach and his broader argumentative aims.
The sole weapon in Śrī Harṣa’s philosophical arsenal is *vītanḍā*, a special sceptical mode of argumentation that is concerned exclusively with refutation. As Śrī Harṣa puts it, since “I employ refutations in the form of debate known as *vītanḍā*, there is thus no occasion for the criticism that I must then turn around and establish my own doctrine.”¹⁸ Gautama’s *Nyāyasūtras*, the foundational text of the Nyāya school, distinguishes three types of debate: *vāda, jalpa*, and *vītanḍā*. *Vāda* is a type of debate in which discussants defend differing points of view with the aim of ascertaining the truth. *Jalpa* is a type of debate in which discussants are interested not so much in truth as in victory, so they resort to numerous argumentative tricks and sophistries in order to force the opponent to accept the opposing view. *Vītanḍā* is a unique type of debate in which one seeks to refute the opponent’s view without presenting or defending an alternative view of any kind. As stated in *Nyāyasūtras* I.ii.3, *vītanḍā* (often translated as “wrangling”) is a mode of sheer refutation that “does not establish any thesis of its own.”¹⁹

In a striking move, Śrī Harṣa strategically appropriates the negative argumentative mode of *vītanḍā* defined in the *Nyāyasūtras*, making it the governing philosophical methodology of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*. From Śrī Harṣa’s perspective, since non-dual Brahman lies beyond thought, philosophy can play at best a negative role in clearing a space for the possibility of the truth of the Advaita standpoint. Hence, the destructive method of *vītanḍā* proves to be the ideal methodology for an Advaitin eager to refute competing realist positions without attempting the impossible task of a positive justification of the Advaita standpoint.²⁰

In adapting the method of *vītanḍā* for his own purposes, Śrī Harṣa makes two important modifications to it that make it particularly suited to the philosophical aims of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*. First, Śrī Harṣa conceives *vītanḍā* as an immanent philosophical methodology: he isolates fatal problems in his opponent’s doctrines not by arguing from his standpoint of Advaita but by arguing “in accordance with his opponent’s tenets.”²¹ By pursuing the immanent logic of his opponents’ own positions, Śrī Harṣa seeks to demonstrate that their positions are incoherent or self-contradictory. Indeed, Phyllis Granoff aptly notes that Śrī Harṣa’s rigorously immanent methodology is the “essence of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* and . . . the secret to its brilliance.”²²

Addressing his opponents, Śrī Harṣa specifies the unique terms of debate entailed by his immanent procedure of *vītanḍā*: “if you contradict an objection of ours which is phrased in accordance with your own admissions, you will only be contradicting your own statements.”²³ Since Śrī Harṣa interrogates and refutes the positions of his opponents *from within*, any attempt by his opponents to refute Śrī Harṣa’s objections would be self-defeating: refuting Śrī Harṣa’s immanent objection would be tantamount to refuting one’s own position. Śrī Harṣa goes on to point out to his opponents that “in a debate where you are to prove a given point and we are to refute you, the only way for you to win is actually to prove that point.”²⁴ The ground rules for Śrī Harṣa’s immanent procedure of *vītanḍā* are clear. The burden is on Śrī Harṣa’s opponents to defend their own positions, since Śrī Harṣa is not obliged to defend an alternative position of his own. The only way for an opponent to win a debate against

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Śrī Harṣa is to articulate a coherent position that remains invulnerable to Śrī Harṣa’s immanent refutations.

The second important modification Śrī Harṣa makes to the method of vīṇḍā is to expand its scope of applicability. For many Naiyāyikas, vīṇḍā is thought to be mutually exclusive with either vāda or jālpa: the aim of vīṇḍā is refutation for its own sake, while the aim of vāda is the ascertainment of truth and the aim of jālpa is victory. Militating against this widely held view, Śrī Harṣa argues that vīṇḍā is by no means mutually exclusive with vāda or jālpa, since one can employ principles of refutation (khaṇḍanayuktis) with the aim of ascertaining the truth or achieving victory, or both. As we will see, Śrī Harṣa himself employs vīṇḍā in order both to gain victory over his realist opponents and to clear the way for the acceptance of the truth of the standpoint of Advaita. Śrī Harṣa’s positive use of vīṇḍā clearly distinguishes his philosophical project from that of a radical skeptic such as Jayarāśi, the author of the Tattvopaplavasimha, who employs the negative method of vīṇḍā without attempting to vindicate or motivate any positive standpoint of his own.²⁵

Śrī Harṣa then makes the bold and somewhat surprising claim that if his realist opponents are unable to defend their positions successfully, then “it is established that the phenomenal world of difference is indefinable and Brahman alone without a second is real from the absolute standpoint.”²⁶ Remarkably, Śrī Harṣa seems to claim here that his critique of realist positions, if successful, is sufficient to “establish” — or somehow tantamount to establishing — some of the core doctrines of Advaita Vedānta discussed in section II, particularly SM1 and SM2. However, this is puzzling for two reasons. First, it is by no means clear why the defeat of certain realist opponents necessarily entails the acceptance of the Advaita standpoint in particular and not, say, the non-realist school of Vijñānavāda Buddhism. Second, and more fundamentally, Śrī Harṣa’s apparently positive claims about Advaita seem to violate his own strictures concerning the strictly negative framework of vīṇḍā. Is it not a blatant self-contradiction for Śrī Harṣa to attempt to establish the positive standpoint of Advaita in the context of a debate in which he is only supposed to refute realist positions without establishing a position of his own?

In fact, Śrī Harṣa himself anticipates both of these objections. At several points in the introduction, he clarifies that his first claim — that the “phenomenal world of difference is indefinable” — amounts to the claim that “this phenomenal universe is neither existent nor non-existent.”²⁷ Śrī Harṣa is fully aware that this claim closely resembles the corollary of SM2, embodied in Śaṅkara’s claim that the phenomenal world “cannot be described either as real or unreal.” Accordingly, Śrī Harṣa goes on to voice the natural objection of an opponent who interprets Śrī Harṣa’s claim as a positive thesis — akin to Śaṅkara’s — about the nature of the world. This opponent objects that since Śrī Harṣa denies both existence and non-existence to the phenomenal world, Śrī Harṣa is forced to ascribe to the world a mysterious ontological status — somewhere between existence and non-existence — that cannot withstand logical scrutiny. As the opponent puts it, “When two things are mutually opposing, there is no third possibility.”²⁸
In his telling response to his opponent, Śrī Harṣa specifies the precise nature of his claim about the indefinability of the phenomenal world and argues that it is entirely compatible with his negative method of *vitanḍā*:

All of this is the objection of one who has not understood his adversary’s intentions. For how is he, who maintains that nothing can be defined as existent or non-existent, to be criticized as if he had asserted the existence of this very indefinability? Indefinability is included within the word “all” which refers to anything and everything in the phenomenal world. It is only in accordance with what the opponent admits that this results: definability being refuted, indefinability remains, for it is he who claims that of a negation and its counterpart the denial of the one is the assertion of the other. And so, it is only in accordance with our opponent’s conceptions that this is said: “Everything turns out to be indefinable.” In reality, we avoid categorizing the phenomenal world as existent or non-existent; placing our all on self-established consciousness, the real Brahman alone, we rest in peace, our purpose accomplished. But those who undertake debate by means of a set of proofs and refutations which they themselves design, and hope thereby to establish the truth, to them we say, “These arguments of yours are not correct, for they are contradicted by the very principles which you admit.” And for this reason, all objections to the faults which we adduce are without occasion, for we do no more than to point out that your principles are contradicted by your own admissions.29

According to Śrī Harṣa, his opponent’s fundamental mistake is to assume that Śrī Harṣa is making a positive claim about the indefinability of the world that requires justification in its own right. In fact, however, Śrī Harṣa’s claim is a strictly negative one: the phenomenal world cannot be defined either as existent or non-existent. Since this negative claim does not commit Śrī Harṣa to any positive ontological thesis about the indefinability of the world, the opponent’s interrogation of the ontological status of “indefinability” proves to be irrelevant.30 Śrī Harṣa goes on to specify that his negative claim about the indefinability of the world stems exclusively from his immanent critique of realist attempts to define the phenomenal world and is, hence, consistent with his destructive method of *vitanḍā*. If Śrī Harṣa’s critique of realist positions is indeed strictly immanent, then he is perfectly justified in claiming that “it is only in accordance with our opponent’s conceptions that this is said: ‘Everything turns out to be indefinable.’” As Śrī Harṣa succinctly puts it, “definability being refuted, indefinability remains.”

Several pages earlier in the introduction, Śrī Harṣa indicates briefly how his central claim about the indefinability of the world results from his immanent refutation of his realist opponents. The phenomenal universe, Śrī Harṣa claims, “cannot be existent, as it is caught in the faults which will be detailed in what follows. Nor can it be non-existent, as then all activity of both the common man and the learned would fail.”31 Śrī Harṣa here presupposes familiarity with the broader argumentative arc of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* as a whole. Śrī Harṣa’s reason for denying the non-existence of the world—namely that “all activity of both the common man and the learned would fail”—refers to the beginning of the introduction, where he refutes the claims of his realist opponents regarding the prerequisites for debate. In opposition to non-realist philosophical schools, the Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas, and Jainas
argue that debate becomes impossible if the existence of the means of knowledge (prāmāṇas)—such as sense-perception and inference—is denied, since no debate is possible without appealing minimally to these means of knowledge. Hence, the realists claim that all parties in a debate must accept the existence of the means of knowledge.

Śrī Harṣa’s key move is to argue that denial of the non-existence of the prāmāṇas does not necessarily entail straightforward acceptance of their ontological reality. Against the realists, Śrī Harṣa makes the case that only the cognition of the existence of the means of knowledge is necessary for debate, not their actual existence. Śrī Harṣa’s carefully qualified stance regarding the status of the means of knowledge leaves open the possibility that this provisional cognition of the prāmāṇas could be contradicted by subsequent knowledge, such as the knowledge derived from the non-dual scriptures.

Now we can make sense of Śrī Harṣa’s claim cited above that the phenomenal world cannot be non-existent since, in that case, “all activity of both the common man and the learned would fail.” It should be clear that his justification for denying the non-existence of the phenomenal world simply echoes the claim made by his realist opponents in the earlier debate about the status of the prāmāṇas. Śrī Harṣa rightly points out that his realist opponents themselves deny the non-existence of the phenomenal world, so they cannot possibly take issue with his own restatement of their claim. Hence, Śrī Harṣa’s claim that the phenomenal world cannot be non-existent lies strictly within the parameters of vītaṇḍā, which disallow Śrī Harṣa’s holding a position of his own.

How are we to reconcile Śrī Harṣa’s method of vītaṇḍā with his other major claim that the phenomenal world “cannot be existent”? Śrī Harṣa, we should recall, claims that the phenomenal world “cannot be existent, as it is caught in the faults which will be detailed in what follows.” Here again, Śrī Harṣa emphasizes that the claim is a strictly negative one that results from “faults” in the arguments of his realist opponents. In particular, he devotes the body of the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya to a sustained refutation of realist attempts to provide coherent definitions of phenomena in the world. While he sometimes addresses the realist arguments of the Mīmāṃsakas and Jainas, Śrī Harṣa focuses his critical energies on the definitions of the Naiyāyikas—especially Udayana, Vācaspati Miśra, and Bhāsarvajña—since he believes that the Naiyāyikas have developed the most sophisticated realist position available. However, at many points throughout the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya, Śrī Harṣa is careful to point out how his refutations of the arguments of the Naiyāyikas can be generalized and extended to apply to the arguments of other realist schools as well.

In accordance with his immanent method of vītaṇḍā, Śrī Harṣa points out fatal problems and self-contradictions in the Naiyāyikas’ definitions of phenomena in the world, the means of cognizing them, correct and faulty modes of reasoning, and a variety of central concepts in their realist epistemology. In the course of his refutations, Śrī Harṣa demolishes the Naiyāyikas’ definitions of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), the various prāmāṇas—including sense-perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāṇa),

Ayon Maharaj 95
comparison (upamāna), verbal testimony (śabda), and presumption (arthāpatti)—and such concepts as the object of knowledge (prameya), subject-object relation (visayavisayabhāva), cause (hetu), and difference (bheda). In addressing the definitions of the Naiyāyikas, Śri Harṣa’s favored strategy is to show how the Naiyāyikas’ own assumptions result in an infinite regress (anavasthā), a vicious circle (cakrakā), or a reductio ad absurdum (tarka).

A fundamental assumption of the Nyāya school is that whatever is real is definable. Hence, on strictly immanent grounds, if Śri Harṣa is successful in refuting the definitions of the Naiyāyikas, then he ipso facto refutes their metaphysical claim that the things defined are in fact real. Śri Harṣa’s claim that the phenomenal world “cannot be existent,” then, proves to be compatible with the destructive method of vitanḍā since the claim stems from his immanent refutation of the attempts of the Naiyāyikas to define the world as existent.

One might reasonably object, however, that Śri Harṣa’s central claim that the phenomenal world is neither existent nor non-existent loses much of its force if it is framed only as a response to the Naiyāyikas. After all, there are a variety of realist positions other than that of the Naiyāyikas that might not be vulnerable to Śri Harṣa’s refutations. Anticipating this objection, Śri Harṣa argues that the “methods of refutation” (khanḍanayuktis) employed primarily against the Naiyāyikas are of universal applicability, so they can be used—with appropriate modifications—to refute all possible non-Advaita standpoints. As Śri Harṣa puts it, “our methods of refutation freely and fully operate with regard to philosophical tenets of any kind.” If Śri Harṣa is correct, then any philosophical account of the nature of reality must be invalid. Hence, he feels justified in making the general assertion that “all definitions are invalid.”

All of this reconstruction has been necessary to demonstrate how Śri Harṣa’s immanent method of vitanḍā can accommodate his claim that the “phenomenal world of difference is indefinable.” As we have seen, Śri Harṣa’s claim—which amounts to the strictly negative assertion that the phenomenal world is neither existent nor non-existent—results from his immanent refutations of the realist arguments of the Naiyāyikas.

Evidently, Śri Harṣa’s philosophical ambitions are decidedly more modest than Hegel’s. Hegel’s dialectical critique of various dualistic views, I suggested in section III, not only is teleologically driven but also aspires to be both necessary and complete. Each succeeding dualistic standpoint that Hegel refutes is richer and more capacious than the previous standpoint, thus bringing natural consciousness one step closer to the telos of Hegel’s own maximally inclusive monistic standpoint. Moreover, Hegel insists that the dualistic views he addresses are the only ones possible and that natural consciousness must entertain these dualistic views in the precise order in which he presents them in the Phänomenologie. Accordingly, since all of Hegel’s refutations are interlinked, each step in Hegel’s complex, book-length argument must be unimpeachable in order for his philosophical project to succeed.

Unlike Hegel, Śri Harṣa does not claim that he has refuted all possible non-monistic positions. Rather, Śri Harṣa focuses on refuting the realist arguments of the
Naiyāyikas and simply assures the reader that his methods of refutation are universally applicable. Crucially, however, Śrī Harṣa leaves it up to the reader to decide whether his refutations of the definitions of the Naiyāyikas can in fact be applied to “all definitions.” Śrī Harṣa also departs from Hegel in refraining from placing too much weight on any one of his particular arguments against the Naiyāyikas. In fact, he often presents several independent arguments against a single Naiyāyika doctrine so that the invalidity of one of his arguments does not jeopardize his broader philosophical project.

Now we can return to Śrī Harṣa’s second major claim that “Brahman alone without a second is real from the absolute standpoint.” How are we to reconcile this explicit avowal of the Advaita standpoint with Śrī Harṣa’s negative method of vītaṇḍā, which forbids him to hold a positive position of his own? In the remainder of this section, I will attempt to reconstruct Śrī Harṣa’s complex answer to this question. Śrī Harṣa himself has his opponent ask, “But what is the proof that Brahman is without a second?”35 Śrī Harṣa’s fundamental answer to this question is that “scripture is the means of knowing non-duality” (śrutirevaādvaite pramāṇam) (p. 80/147). In support of this claim, he cites passages from the Chāndogya and the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads: “There is only the one, without a second; there is no multiplicity here whatsoever.”36 By itself, however, Śrī Harṣa’s appeal to advaitāśruti hardly allays our worry about the compatibility of Śrī Harṣa’s espousal of Advaita with his negative method of vītaṇḍā. After all, the question still remains how his very appeal to the authority of the non-dual scriptures can be accommodated within the negative parameters of vītaṇḍā.

The first step in answering this question is to recognize that the Naiyāyikas themselves accept śabda (verbal testimony)—defined in Nyayasutras 1.1.7 as “the assertion of a reliable person” (āptopadesāḥ)—as a pramāṇa, a valid means of knowledge.37 For the Naiyāyikas, śabda includes the words of the Vedas. Hence, Śrī Harṣa’s appeal to scripture is in itself unobjectionable, since the Naiyāyikas accept the authority of the scriptures. What the Naiyāyikas object to is Śrī Harṣa’s specifically Advaitic interpretation of the Upaniṣads. Non-duality, the Naiyāyikas argue, is flagrantly contradicted by the perception of difference. Śrī Harṣa formulates their objection as follows: “But the scriptures enjoining non-duality cannot be valid in their obvious sense, for they are contradicted by perception. Thus some other significance for them is to be imagined.”38 Śrī Harṣa’s complex response to this objection hinges on the fact that the cognition of, say, the difference between a pot and a cloth is a highly delimited cognition of difference that cannot possibly contradict the universal declaration of the Upaniṣads that all is non-dual. In particular, Śrī Harṣa points out that the cognition of the difference between a pot and a cloth cannot rule out the possibility that that very cognition is non-different from its own objects.

Śrī Harṣa exploits precisely this lacuna in his opponent’s appeal to the knowledge of the difference between a pot and a cloth. For, it is this lacuna that allows advaitāśruti to “gain a foothold” (labdhapadā) and thereby demonstrate the non-duality of everything.39 Śrī Harṣa’s carefully qualified language of “gaining a foothold” indicates that his appeal to advaitāśruti remains within the bounds of vītaṇḍā. He simply refutes his opponent’s claim that advaitāśruti is contradicted by the

Ayon Maharaj

97
perception of difference. Śrī Harṣa demonstrates that the first-order cognition of, say, a pot and a cloth cannot contradict the scripture’s second-order assertion of the non-duality of everything. Crucially, however, Śrī Harṣa nowhere attempts to convince his opponent of the truth of advaitaśrutि. As a vītaṇḍotre, Śrī Harṣa contents himself with the more modest task of demonstrating that the perception of difference cannot rule out the possibility that the non-dual scriptures may be true. Śrī Harṣa does not attempt a full-blown justification of advaitaśrutि both because, as we have seen from section II, rational justification of the standpoint of Advaita is impossible and because the negative parameters of vītaṇḍa forbid him to venture any such positive justification.

Śrī Harṣa’s philosophical project exhausts itself in the careful demonstration that advaitaśrutि does not contradict reason. In the body of the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya, he shows that the phenomenal world cannot be proved to be real. In the section of the introduction just discussed, he further demonstrates that the non-dual scriptures are not contradicted by the perception of difference. From this perspective, we can inquire into Śrī Harṣa’s deepest motivations for adopting the negative method of vītaṇḍa. I would suggest that Śrī Harṣa’s unusual use of vītaṇḍa, far from being a mere methodological contrivance, reflects a searching effort to establish both the powers and limits of reason. In particular, Śrī Harṣa avails himself of the method of vītaṇḍa in order to demonstrate that reason can only be legitimately employed in a negative manner. Since “all definitions are invalid,” philosophy oversteps its limits whenever it embarks on the positive project of determining what is real or unreal. While reason can neither demonstrate the reality of the world nor disprove the validity of the non-dual scriptures, reason is capable of both determining its own constitutive limitations and refuting all philosophical positions that seek to provide a rational account of reality. Accordingly, the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya can be read as a startlingly modern attempt to curb the pretensions of reason by means of reason itself.

In a remarkable passage toward the end of the introduction, Śrī Harṣa provides a succinct summary of the negative result of his philosophical project and then, somewhat surprisingly, breaks into a verse paean to non-dual knowledge:

This cognition of non-duality is not to be removed by the wise men, adducing even a hundred reasons. Thus the scripture itself declares, “This knowledge is not to be removed by reasoning.”

Therefore:

Those rich in knowledge, turn your wit to the refutation of this, if you would cast a wishing jewel already in your hand into the ocean depths!

And this knowledge of non-duality has immediate and undoubted results as well. As it is said, “Even a little of this truth saves from great fear.”

Therefore:

The desire for non-dual knowledge is obtained by men by the grace of God; It saves from great misfortunes, for those two or three in whom it is born.
Therefore:

Non-duality, which has been gleaned as the meaning of the scriptures denying multiplicity, becomes itself pure consciousness and wondrously does it recede from all intricate examination.40

Śrī Harṣa begins with the declaration that no amount of rational argumentation can ever refute the non-dual scriptures, which lie beyond the ken of reason. He then cites a corroborating passage from the Kaṭha Upaniṣad: “This knowledge is not to be removed by reasoning.” At this point, Śrī Harṣa’s argument takes a startling turn, marked by his sudden shift from prose to verse. Citing verse 2.39 of the Bhagavadgītā, Śrī Harṣa points out that non-dual knowledge has “immediate and undoubted results,” since it liberates one from transmigratory existence and all its attendant suffering. Śrī Harṣa then adds that the innate desire for non-dual knowledge is an exceedingly rare and precious gift of God, so it should not be suppressed or ignored.

Śrī Harṣa’s repeated use of “therefore” (tasmā) may lead one to read these claims about the soteriological promise of Advaita as a continuation of his philosophical argument. The trouble with this reading, however, is that it would commit Śrī Harṣa to the obvious self-contradiction of advocating the positive standpoint of Advaita within the strictly negative framework of vītaṇḍā. In fact, as I have argued, Śrī Harṣa would have been the first to admit that the philosophical argument of the Kaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya in no way necessitates the acceptance of the positive standpoint of Advaita. Śrī Harṣa’s refutations of his opponents, if successful, would force them to repudiate their own realist position but would still leave them free to choose whether to accept the Advaita standpoint.

However, the fact remains that Śrī Harṣa’s paeans to non-dual knowledge clearly go further than his negative philosophical conclusions. If these positive claims about Advaita are not part of his philosophical argument, then how are we to understand them? I would argue that the first “therefore” in the passage cited above in fact marks a drastic shift in register from the philosophical dimension of the Kaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya to what I call its “soteriological dimension,” which is motivated by—but not part of—Śrī Harṣa’s philosophical argument proper.

Śrī Harṣa’s telling invocation of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad in the passage above—“This knowledge is not to be removed by reasoning”—signals nothing less than the end of his philosophical program. This moment in the Kaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya marks the precise point at which philosophical reason humbly acknowledges its own limits, thereby opening itself to redemptive possibilities lying beyond the reach of reason. Śrī Harṣa now steps out of his role as a polemical vītaṇḍin to assume the role of a compassionate brahmajīnānī, an enlightened knower of Brahman, eager to share the priceless “jewel” of non-dual knowledge with his readers.

To appreciate precisely how Śrī Harṣa’s philosophical refutations of his realist opponents motivate his soteriological claims about Advaita, we should remind ourselves of what his philosophical argument has established. The philosophical dimension of the Kaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya, I have suggested, consists primarily of two negative claims arrived at through the destructive method of vītaṇḍā. First, Śrī Harṣa...
argues in the introduction to the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* that the non-dual scriptures are not contradicted by any other means of knowledge, particularly the perception of difference. Second, in the body of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, Śrī Harṣa seeks to establish that the phenomenal world cannot be defined as either real or unreal.

From Śrī Harṣa’s perspective, the former claim clears a space for the *possibility* of the truth of the Advaita standpoint by establishing that the non-dual scriptures in no way contradict reason. The latter claim goes still further: while it falls short of justifying the standpoint of Advaita, it does lend prima facie plausibility to the Advaita standpoint by confirming the *anirvacāniyavāda*, a major plank of Advaita doctrine that follows from SM2. Moreover, if Śrī Harṣa’s realist opponents have admitted defeat at the hands of an Advaitin, then it is reasonable for them to entertain provisionally the standpoint of Advaita unless they are able to find a plausible reason for Śrī Harṣa to deceive them. Since the non-dual scriptures declare that the knowledge of Brahman puts an end to all suffering, it surely behooves his opponents at least to test the large soteriological claims of the Advaitins before considering alternative non-realist positions.

These considerations, I would argue, collectively suggest how Śrī Harṣa’s negative philosophical conclusions are able to motivate his positive soteriological claims about Advaita, which are themselves not part of his philosophical project. It is worth reiterating that Śrī Harṣa nowhere attempts anything like a full-blown philosophical justification of the Advaita standpoint. After all, any attempt to justify the standpoint of Advaita would violate the parameters of *vitanḍā*, which forbid him to endorse a positive position of his own. More fundamentally, since non-dual Brahman lies beyond words and thought, no rational justification of Advaita is even possible. In light of these methodological constraints, Śrī Harṣa restricts himself to working within the parameters of *vitanḍā* by carefully drawing out the implications of his philosophical refutations. He simply shows how the results of his philosophical refutations motivate Advaita doctrine in the weak sense of making it a plausible candidate for adoption. Since motivation falls short of philosophical justification or proof, it does not commit Śrī Harṣa to endorsing the positive standpoint of Advaita.

I would suggest, then, that Śrī Harṣa’s soteriological claims about the “jewel” of non-dual knowledge are best understood not as philosophical claims but as *post*-philosophical assertions that are motivated—but not justified—by his refutations of his realist opponents. In the soteriological dimension of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, Śrī Harṣa steps out of his role as a *vitanḍin* and explicitly urges his opponents to adopt the standpoint of Advaita, yet without coming into conflict with his skeptical philosophical program. Although he is fully aware that his claims about the soteriological promise of Advaita cannot be defended on a philosophical level, Śrī Harṣa wishes to impart the “jewel” of non-dual knowledge to his readers for the sake of their own salvation.

The soteriological dimension of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* culminates in Śrī Harṣa’s entreaty to his readers to have “faith” (*śraddhā*) in the non-dual scriptures: “Therefore, however much you are absorbed in the play of your ignorance, you
should have faith [śraddhātu tāvadbhavān] in this doctrine of non-duality, which has been brought near [upaniyāmanam] to you by means of arguments which have the defining characteristics of valid reasoning that you yourself have proposed.”

I would suggest that Śrī Harṣa’s call for faith in the non-dual scriptures is not part of his philosophical program and, hence, does not come into conflict with his skeptical method of vītaṇḍā. Crucially, Śrī Harṣa claims that the “doctrine of non-duality” has been “brought near” (upaniyāmanam) to his opponents by means of his strictly immanent refutation of their realist arguments. The word upaniyāmanam is most plausibly interpreted in the weak sense of philosophical motivation rather than in the strong sense of full-blown rational justification or proof. Śrī Harṣa’s philosophical refutations of his realist opponents have “brought” them “near” the doctrine of Advaita not by forcing or compelling them to accept it on rational grounds but by clearing a space for, and lending prima facie plausibility to, Advaita doctrine.

We are finally in a position to reconcile Śrī Harṣa’s negative method of vītaṇḍā with his central Advaitic claim—mentioned earlier in this section—that “Brahman alone without a second is real from the absolute standpoint.” On my reading, this claim has both a negative philosophical dimension and a positive soteriological dimension. Read as a philosophical assertion, it only commits Śrī Harṣa to the strictly negative claim that the scriptural teachings about non-dual Brahman are not contradicted by any other pramāṇa—a claim that, as we have seen, in no way exceeds the parameters of vītaṇḍā. From a soteriological standpoint, however, Śrī Harṣa’s assertion should be read as a post-philosophical call for his opponents to adopt the standpoint of Advaita for the sake of their own salvation. As I have argued, it is perfectly legitimate for Śrī Harṣa to step out of his role as a vītaṇḍin and endorse the positive standpoint of Advaita, since his positive endorsement of Advaita is only motivated by—but not itself part of—his skeptical philosophical program.

V. The Scope of Reason in Hegel and Śrī Harṣa

While the monistic doctrines of Hegel and Śrī Harṣa diverge considerably, their respective philosophical methodologies bear remarkable affinities. Both thinkers defend a monistic standpoint indirectly by means of an immanent refutation of non-monistic standpoints. Hegel, as we have seen, points out fatal self-contradictions in an array of dualistic views of “natural consciousness” not by criticizing them from his own monistic standpoint but by inhabiting the first-person standpoint of natural consciousness itself. Anticipating Hegel by over half a millennium, Śrī Harṣa refutes a variety of realist arguments by means of the immanent skeptical methodology of vītaṇḍā. Arguing strictly “in accordance with his opponent’s tenets,” Śrī Harṣa points out absurdities and self-contradictions in his opponent’s views without endorsing a positive standpoint of his own.

Despite this fundamental affinity in the philosophical projects of Hegel and Śrī Harṣa, I argued in the previous two sections that the details of their respective methodologies differ in subtle but important ways. These methodological differences can

Ayon Maharaj   101
be traced to their fundamentally competing conceptions of both the scope of reason and the relation between thought and praxis. Hegel’s extravagant claims about the necessity and completeness of his critical examination of dualistic positions stem from his idiosyncratic monistic metaphysics of absolute Spirit. According to Hegel, philosophy alone can give precise conceptual articulation to the dynamic internal structure of the monistic totality of absolute Spirit. Each dualistic position Hegel refutes turns out to be a necessary “moment” within the internally differentiated monistic totality of absolute Spirit. Hence, the entire course of his dialectical refutations of non-monistic standpoints itself—culminating in his own monistic metaphysics—serves as a massive cumulative account of the dynamic internal structure of absolute Spirit. Indeed, as we have seen, Hegel makes the even stronger claim that his comprehensive philosophical account of absolute Spirit doubles as its full-blown justification and actualization. For Hegel, the monistic reality of absolute Spirit is most fully realized in the pure ether of universal thought, which is the domain of philosophical science alone.

Śrī Harṣa, by contrast, argues that his refutations of the realist arguments of the Naiyāyikas motivate—but do not justify—the standpoint of Advaita Vedānta. Since non-dual Brahman lies beyond thought, Śrī Harṣa rejects the very possibility of a philosophical justification of the reality of Brahman. In fact, he goes even further and claims that “all definitions are invalid,” since all attempts to define the nature of reality—realist or otherwise—are plagued with self-contradictions and thus prove to be incoherent. Accordingly, Śrī Harṣa would agree with many recent commentators on Hegel that Hegel’s massive book-length attempt to define and justify the monistic totality of absolute Spirit is doomed to fail. For Śrī Harṣa, philosophy is capable only of making negative claims, so it oversteps its limits whenever it attempts to make any positive assertions about the nature of reality. The Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya, as Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan archly observes, “is one long dissertation on the vanity of philosophy, setting forth the inability of the human mind to compass those exalted objects which its speculative ingenuity suggests as worthy of its pursuit.”

In the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya, Śrī Harṣa employs the destructive method of vitandā in order to establish both that the non-dual scriptures are not contradicted by any of the other pramanās and that the phenomenal world cannot be defined as either real or unreal. These two negative claims clear the way for “faith” in the non-dual scriptures, which declare the reality of Brahman. Hence, for Śrī Harṣa, philosophical reason negates itself at the precise moment that it acknowledges its own limits and defers to the authority of the non-dual scriptures.

Śrī Harṣa’s careful delimitation of the scope of philosophy contrasts sharply with Hegel’s elevation of philosophical reason to the highest mode of grasping monistic reality. Hegel’s philosophical ambition is nothing less than to vindicate his own monistic metaphysics of absolute Spirit through an exhaustive critique of all possible non-monistic standpoints. Śrī Harṣa’s more modest philosophical aim is to bring his realist opponents to the point where they are compelled to repudiate their positive accounts of the nature of reality and to admit that the non-dual scriptures do not contradict reason. Once Śrī Harṣa’s aim is accomplished, the philosophical dimen-
sion of the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhaḍya accedes to what I have been calling its “soteriological dimension,” which calls for faith in the non-dual scriptures.

Another fundamental difference between Hegel and Śrī Harṣa concerns the relation between thought and empirical life. For Hegel, grasping the monistic totality of absolute Spirit requires nothing more than the cultivation and refinement of thought. Natural consciousness, according to Hegel, is unable to conceive of absolute Spirit because it is trapped in the one-sided, undialectical standpoint of “Understanding” (Verstand), the ordinary analytic type of thinking that always operates in terms of binaries and dualisms. Hegel’s project in the Phänomenologie is to bring natural consciousness gradually from the limited standpoint of Understanding to the higher standpoint of “Reason” (Vernunft), which alone is capable of transcending the binary thinking of Verstand and grasping absolute Spirit in all its dialectical complexity. “Absolute knowledge,” accordingly, consists in nothing other than the full conceptual comprehension of the monistic totality of absolute Spirit through the faculty of Vernunft.

At the base of Hegel’s entire philosophical project lies the fundamental assumption that thought is independent of the vicissitudes of empirical life. Although Hegel does not explicitly articulate this assumption in the Phänomenologie, he does so in his later Enzyklopädie Logik, where he tellingly declares that “the principle of the independence of Reason [die Unabhängigkeit der Vernunft], of its absolute inward autonomy, has to be regarded as the universal principle of philosophy.”\(^{46}\) It follows from this assumption that in order to grasp absolute Spirit, one need only change one’s way of thinking, not one’s way of living. Hegel thereby drives a wedge between thought and empirical praxis: in the act of thinking, we abstract away from all our empirical contingencies, so what we do in empirical life has no bearing on what and how we think.

In stark contrast to Hegel, Śrī Harṣa insists that how we think and reason depends on the nature of our mind, which is itself conditioned by how we live. According to Advaita Vedānta, philosophical reasoning is intimately connected to both ethics and psychology: a restless and undisciplined mind full of desires for sense pleasures is unfit to reflect on the teachings of the non-dual scriptures. Hence, Śrī Harṣa calls on the reader to “withdraw” the mind “from all its outgoing functions” and stresses that the preliminary ethical and psychological disciplines of the sādhanacatuṣṭaya are indispensable for the suraprational realization of non-dual Brahman.\(^{47}\) For Śrī Harṣa, philosophical reflection gives way ultimately to a knowledge beyond reason about which reason must remain silent.

Notes

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7 – Throughout this essay, whenever I refer to passages from Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes, I make parenthetical citations in the body of the text, giving first the page number of the German text (G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, vol. 3 of Werke [Frankfurt am Main: Surhkamp, 1970]) and then the page number of the English translation (Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller [New York: Oxford University Press, 1977]). It should be noted, however, that I sometimes emend Miller’s translations.

8 – As P. T. Raju notes, “the infinite or the Absolute Idea, according to Hegel, is of the nature of thought” (P. T. Raju, Thought and Reality: Hegelianism and Advaita [London: George Allen and Unwin, 1937]), p. 35.


10 – To avoid misunderstanding, it should be noted that from the standpoint of Advaita, the scriptures do not assign negative predicates to Brahman in order to convey the reality of Brahman. In other words, predicating not-४ of Brahman...
does not amount to the positive thesis that Brahman is qualified by not-p. Rather, predicated not-p of Brahman only amounts to the strictly negative claim that nothing positive can be predicated of Brahman without falsifying its reality.


15 – See, for instance, Śaṅkara’s commentary on Brahmasūtras III.i.11.

16 – See Śaṅkara’s commentary on Brahmasūtras I.i.1.

17 – Horstmann makes a convincing case that Hegel’s primary aim in the Phänomenologie is the indirect demonstration of the monistic standpoint by refuting all alternatives to the monistic thesis. See esp. “Hegel’s Ordnung der Dinge,” p. 46.

18 – vītaṇḍākathāmālambya khaṇḍanānāṃ vaktavyatvāt, tatra ca vyāvṛtya svapakṣa-hirvāham prati paryānyugāvanavakāśāt (Kh. 127; PA 203).


20 – For an insightful discussion of vītaṇḍā in the context of Advaita, see pp. 16–24 of Bimal Krishna Matilal’s The Logical Illumination of Indian Mysticism (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1977).

21 – vāḍidasānamāśritāyāpi (Kh. 128; PA 204).

22 – Granoff, Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedānta, p. 141.

23 – yādi ca tvaddarśanarityābhidhiyāmānamasmābhīrbdham bādhase tadā svābhypagatibādhābhīdhāyitaiva te syāt (Kh. 74–75; PA 144).

24 – tvayā nirvāhyamasmābhistu khaṇḍanīyamiitṛdyāmeva paraṃ kathāyāṃ tvanni-rvāhyanirvāhe tava jayo nāyathethi (Kh. 75; PA 144).

25 – For a comparison of Jayarāśi and Śrī Harṣa, see Esther Solomon’s “Scepticism or Faith and Mysticism—A Comparative Study of Tattvopaplavasimha and

26 – bhedaprapaṇca nirvacaniyāḥ brahmaiva tu paramārthasadadvitiyamiti sthitam (Kh. 75; PA 144).

27 – idam viśvam sadasadbhyāṃ vilakṣanam (Kh. 68; PA 137).

28 – parasparavirodhe hi na prakāraṁantarasthitah (Kh. 70; PA 140).

29 – tadetadanākalitaparābhisandheḥ prayavasthāham. yo hi sarvamanirvacaniyasya- 

dasattvam brūte sa kathamanirvacaniyatatāsvattvavasthitau paryanuyuyeta,
sāpi hi kṛtsnapraṇapcparasvarasābdābhidheymadhyaniṣṭavai. parasyaiva 

vyavasthayaivaṃ paryavasyati—nirvacanaprakṣepādaniirvacaniyatvam, vidhi-

śedhayorekataranirāsasyetaparavasāyāyāstānābhypamagāt. tataḥ pragī-

yāryedumucaye, —anirvacanīyatavāṃ viśvasya paryavasyati iti. vastutastu, 

vayaṃ sarvaṇapraṇapcasattvā “svattvavasthāpanavinvṛttāḥ svatāḥ siddhe cidāt-

manī brahmātattve kevale bharamavalambya caritārthaḥ sukhamāsahe. ye tu 

svaparikālpisādhanadūṣanavyavasthayā vicārāmavatārya tattvaṃ nirnetumic-

chanti tāṃ prati brūmaḥ—nā sādvīyāṃ bhavatāṃ vicārāvavasthā, bhavkal-

pitavatvavasthayaiva vyāhatavä. at eva ‘smadupanyasyamānādūṣanasthitivī-

ṣāyāḥ paryanuyogā nirvakāśāḥ, tvadvavavasthayaiva tvadvavasthāyā 

vyāhātyupanyāsāt (Kh. 71; PA 141).

30 – Granoff convincingly demonstrates that Śrī Harṣa’s conception of sadasadvilak-

esanatva does not ascribe any positive ontological status to the phenomenal uni-

verse (Granoff, Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedānta, pp. 53–56).

31 – tathāhi—nedaṃ sadbhavitumarhati, vakṣyamānābhunagnaratvatāt. nāpyasa-

deva, tathā sati laukikavicārakāṇāṃ sarvavyahāravyāhatyāpatteḥ (Kh. 68; PA 

137).

32 – Śrī Harṣa’s critique of bheda is a fundamental aspect of his negative argument, 

since it is Śrī Harṣa’s contention that his realist opponents’ failure to prove the 

reality of the difference between spatiotemporal objects indirectly confirms the 

truth of the standpoint of Advaita. Unfortunately, I do not have the space here 

to discuss Śrī Harṣa’s critique of bheda in more detail. For an excellent and 

very thorough discussion of Śrī Harṣa’s critique of bheda and its role in motivat-

ing the standpoint of Advaita, see Granoff, Philosophy and Argument in Late 


33 – tadetāḍṛśīṣu sarvāsvapi darśanasthitisu kāmamāṃśākīnāḥ khaṇḍanayuktayāḥ 

pragalbhante (Kh. 126; PA 202).

34 – lakṣanāni cā ‘nupapannāni (Kh. 130).

35 – nanvadvaita kim pramāṇam (Kh. 76; PA 145).

36 – ekamevādvitiyāṃ neha nānātī kiṃcana (Kh. 81; PA 147–148).

37 – Nyāyadarśaṇa of Gotama, p. 16.
38 – nā 'dvaitesrutiṃāṃjāvartheprāmāṇyam sāṁbhavati, prayakṣādībādhāt, tatasānyatraiva kvacittātparyam kālyam (Kh. 81; PA 148).

39 – Kh. 88; PA 153.

40 – seyamadvaitabuddhirna tarkaṣatamavatārya prājñairapanyā, yad āha śrutih—'naiṣa tarkena matirāpaneye tis tasmāt—dhideha badhanāyā 'śyastadā praṇāṃ pravaccatha / kṣeptum cintāmanim pāṇilabdhambdhaḥ yadīcchathā //'. seyamadvaitaśrīdṛṣṭaṁśrītāpi, yādāhūḥ—'svapamapasya dharmasya trāyate mahato bhavat.' tasmāt—'śvarānugrahādesā pūṃsāmadvaitavāsanā / mahābhaya kṛtatrasā dvitrānāṃ yadi jāyate //'. tasmāt—'āpātato yaddamadvayavā-dinānām advaitamākalitamarathayā śrutinām / tatsvapakāśa paramārthacideva bhūtvā niśpiṇḍitādahaha nirvahate vicārāt //’ (Kh. 123–125; PA 200–201).

41 – tadidametābhītmatamsadasiddhānyuktākṣanopapannābhīryuktibhir-ūpānīya-mānamadvaitamavidvīvālāsālāsopī śraddhātū tāvadbhāvān (Kh. 125; PA 201).

42 – In contrast to my reading, Stephen Phillips argues that this passage indicates Śrī Harṣa’s “explicit endorsement” of a “positive” philosophical program (Stephen H. Phillips, Classical Indian Metaphysics: Refutations of Realism and the Emergence of “New Logic” [Chicago: Open Court, 1995], p. 76). My disagreement with Phillips is not as stark as it may seem. I agree with Phillips that Śrī Harṣa has a “positive program,” but I argue that this positive program belongs to the soteriological dimension of the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā and hence should be not taken as an attempt at full-blown rational proof or justification.

43 – Granoff’s reading of this passage seems to me to be unacceptably strong. She claims that the “opponent is forced to accept the doctrine of non-duality” (Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedānta, p. 202). Ironically, Granoff’s reading here conflicts with her own repeated insistence that Śrī Harṣa’s philosophical project is strictly negative. In contrast to Granoff, I do not think Śrī Harṣa anywhere suggests that his opponent isrationally constrained to accept the standpoint of Advaita.


45 – Of course, Hegel would have rebutted Śrī Harṣa on this point by arguing that Śrī Harṣa’s purportedly suprarational Brahman is devoid of content. In fact, in his 1812 Wissenschaft der Logik, Hegel lodges precisely this objection against the Upaniṣadic conception of Brahman. Hegel alludes disparagingly to the Indian yogi’s “dull, empty consciousness” (dumpf, leere Bewußtsein) of “Brahma” and dismisses it as vacuous “being” (das Sein). The Indian yogi, according to Hegel, stares “for years on end . . . only at the tip of his nose” and “says inwardly Om, Om, Om, or else nothing at all” (G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, vol. 5 of Werke [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969], p. 101. Unfortunately, I do not have the space here to provide a full discussion of how Śrī Harṣa might have
responded to Hegel’s colorful objection. I can, however, briefly suggest what I take to be the main thrust of a Śrī Harṣa response to Hegel’s critique of Brahmān. The Advaitin would point out that Brahmān, of course, appears to be a mere void or blank to Hegel because Hegel commits the mistake of attempting to grasp suprarational Brahmān by means of reason (what Hegel calls Vernunft). From Śrī Harṣa’s perspective, Hegel falsifies Brahmān by trying to conceive it through reason, and then—ironically—turns around and criticizes his own hopeless caricature of Brahmān. In short, Hegel mistakes his rationalized falsification of Brahmān for suprarational Brahmān itself. The Advaitin would further point out that Hegel is not even in a position to grasp the reality of Brahmān because he is not equipped with the sādhanacatuṣṭaya, the preliminary disciplines of mental purification and concentration necessary for the suprarational realization of Brahmān.


47 – *Kh.* 125; *PA* 201.