Schleiermacher on the Philosopher’s Stone: The Shaping of Schleiermacher’s Early Ethics by the Kantian Legacy

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This article considers how some of Schleiermacher’s most important early ideas on ethics were shaped by his attempt to deal with the problems raised by Kant’s understanding of transcendental freedom. In his ethics Kant distinguishes between the moral principle of discrimination (principium diiudicationis) and the moral principle of execution (principium executionis). The former has to do with ethical judgment—how we decide that an action is right or wrong—and the latter with what moves us to do the right thing. It is a fundamental feature of Kant’s critical ethics that he considered the two to be intrinsically intertwined: the moral principle of discrimination—that is, the categorical imperative—can only be valid if we are transcendentally free. As a rational and thereby a universal and a priori practical principle, its bindingness cannot depend on any empirically given desires. This, however, implies that a purely rational principle can be an incentive for the will. Kant himself was deeply perplexed about how this could be possible, calling the difficulties occasioned by such an idea “the philosopher’s stone.”

The early Schleiermacher, however, while sympathetic to Kant’s project, became increasingly dissatisfied with some of the deep philosophical problems posed by the notion of transcendental freedom. How do we connect a transcendentally free act with the nature of the subject? Insofar as the act is transcendentally free, it cannot be understood in terms of causes, and this means that it cannot be connected with the previous state of the individual before he or she engaged in the act. Insofar as this is the case, the act is given ex nihilo and cannot be connected with an agent’s character. Given the intractability of this problem, Schleiermacher wanted to preserve Kant’s understanding of the moral principle of discrimination as a rational principle (and this he does in the later Christian Faith as well) while denying that the moral principle of execution is not
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connected with feeling and with the character of the agent. Hence the ground of an action must be found in the totality of an agent's representations, that is, how a person understands a situation is a crucial factor in the determination of how that person will act. Since a person's character is intricately involved with how a person assesses a situation, this move allows Schleiermacher to connect the ground of an action with character.

The article works through these ideas by taking a thorough look at some of Schleiermacher's early essays and reviews. My main focus will be Schleiermacher's early essay On Freedom, written between 1790–92. I will, however, also be taking a look at Schleiermacher's notes on Kant's second Critique (1789), the third of his Dialogues on Freedom (1789), and his critical review of Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1799). While other treatments have detailed Schleiermacher's arguments and disagreements with Kant as set out in these works, they have not paid sufficient attention to the development of Schleiermacher's views regarding these questions. Whereas many of Schleiermacher's contemporary commentators understand On Freedom as standing in fundamental continuity with his earlier treatments of Kant's moral philosophy,1 I will argue that Schleiermacher's On Freedom is not only the most mature but also the most Kantian of Schleiermacher's early ethical writings. Reflection on many of the issues regarding freedom and morality led him to reject empiricism as a foundation for morals, thereby bringing him closer to Kant. It is no doubt true that significant differences between Kant's theory and his own still remained. However, it is important to locate precisely at what point it is that Schleiermacher disagreed with Kant in On Freedom. His disagreement with Kant at this point is a different and more subtle one than that

1 In his book Deterministische Ethik und kritische Theologie (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), Günter Meckenstock notes that Schleiermacher's intention is to make Kant's practical philosophy more consistent (p. 50). However, after detailing the deep differences between Kant's practical philosophy and the variety of moral sense philosophy espoused by Schleiermacher in the Freiheitsgespräch (1789), he goes on to note that Schleiermacher's task in On Freedom is to fill out the outlines of the theory sketched in the "Notes on Kant" and in the Freiheitsgespräch (p. 51). In her article "The Early Philosophical Roots of Schleiermacher's Notion of Gefühl, 1788–1794" (Harvard Theological Review 87, no. 1 [1994]: 67–105), Julia A. Lamm reads On Freedom as continuing the "trajectory begun in On the Highest Good" (p. 82), interpreting it as developing an understanding of Gefühl in which it is presented as "the faculty that not only harmonizes the moral sentiments but also enables us to transcend certain sentiments in order to attain higher ones" (p. 89); I have not found evidence for this reading in the text. Albert Blackwell's book Schleiermacher's Early Philosophy of Life: Determinism, Freedom and Phantasy (Chico, Calif.: Scholars, 1982) presents Schleiermacher as denying the possibility of the direct influence of reason on the will in On Freedom (p. 44), thereby understanding the essay as standing in direct continuity with his earlier works. Another fine essay in which On Freedom is discussed at some length is John P. Crossley's "The Ethical Impulse in Schleiermacher's Early Ethics" (Journal of Religious Ethics 17, no. 2 [1989]: 5–24), although the specific issue with which I am concerned is not addressed in it.
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expressed in his earlier writings; for one, by this time the philosophy of moral sense no longer had the same influence that it once had on Schleiermacher’s thought. Rather, here we find Schleiermacher performing a subtle about-face concerning the issue of whether reason can influence the will, one that will lead him notably closer to Kant’s views.

This article is divided into three parts. In the first part, I discuss why Kant asserts that reason can, in fact, pose as an incentive to the will as well as the nature of the deep philosophical problems that this idea has posed. In the second part I discuss Schleiermacher’s attempt to circumvent some of these difficulties. Here I discuss both of his earlier, more naive treatments of the problem dating from 1789, as well as his rather sophisticated attempt to provide us with what seems, at first blush, to be a more palatable, compatibilist account of freedom, one that nonetheless seems to cohere with the main outlines of a Kantian ethic found in his more mature treatise On Freedom. The third section provides a philosophical assessment of Kant’s and Schleiermacher’s respective positions, analyzing both their strengths and weaknesses.

I. THE STUMBLING BLOCK (Stein des Anstosses) OF ALL EMPIRICISTS

It is a well known fact that in his fully critical ethics Kant came to the conclusion that a moral law binding all rational agents implies transcendental freedom. This is a “thick” concept of freedom that must be understood in a strictly incompatibilist or indeterminist sense. It implies “a power of absolutely beginning a state, and therefore also of absolutely beginning a series of consequences of that state.” An “absolute beginning” is one that is not preceded by another temporal state that determines it and is as such independent from all determining causes. Kant himself was aware of many of the difficulties that such a conception posed and called it “the stumbling block [Stein des Anstosses] of all empiricists but the

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2 It is significant that, as pointed out by John Wallhauser in his article “Schleiermachers’ Critique of Ethical Reason: Toward a Systematic Ethic” (Journal of Religious Ethics 17, no. 2 [1989]: 25–39), by the time Schleiermacher writes his Outlines of a Critique of Previous Ethical Theories (1803), he clearly rejects the more recent English and French moral philosophy as belonging to traditions of feeling (p. 29). The problem with this tradition, as with other eudaimonistic theories, is “its failure to draw a clear line between the ethical and the natural (reason and nature); it tends to collapse the ethical into a description of natural impulses rather than positing a distinct sphere and power of its own (reason/spirit)” (p. 30).

3 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). References to the Critique of Pure Reason are to the standard A and B paginations of the first and second editions and will henceforth be included in the text preceded by the letters KRV. In this case the reference would appear as KRV A445/B473.
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key to the most sublime practical principles for critical moralists.” ⁴ In his notes on Kant’s second Critique as well as in his essay On Freedom, Schleiermacher details many of these difficulties and tries to offer an alternative account of how a rationalistic ethic can coexist with a compatibilist account of freedom. Before we can understand both the difficulties and the ingenuity of Schleiermacher’s attempts at a solution, however, it is important to understand the depth of the problem as Kant himself did.

While the semicritical Kant believed that the principle of discrimination through which the moral law is determined is purely intellectual and a priori, at this stage he did not think that such an intellectual principle could pose as a moral incentive [Triebfeder] to the will. In his Lectures on Ethics, dating from 1775 to 1780, Kant noted that “moral feeling is the capacity to be affected by a moral judgment. My understanding may judge that an action is morally good, but it need not follow that I shall do that action which I judge morally good: from understanding to performance is still a far cry. . . . The understanding, obviously, can judge, but to give to this judgment of the understanding a compelling force, to make it an incentive that can move the will to perform the action—this is the philosopher’s stone.” ⁵ A little later Kant notes that “Man is not so delicately made that he can be moved by objective grounds.” ⁶

In his critical ethics, however, Kant came to the conclusion that the possibility of being moved by objective grounds (the moral law) carries with it the implication of transcendental freedom. The critical Kant came to this conclusion because the very idea of a moral principle that is necessarily binding implies that its bindingness cannot depend on any empirically given desires. The validity of a hypothetical imperative lies in a preceding desire for an object; that is, only given a particular desire to achieve a certain goal is the will necessitated to perform certain actions in order to accomplish it. The rule given through such an imperative is only hypothetically necessary, and this implies that any kind of rule for the will based on a preceding desire cannot necessitate the will categorically. This means, however, that the bindingness of a categorical imperative cannot depend on any empirically given desires. According to Kant, this in turn implies transcendental freedom, for the moral law can only be binding on us if it can move us to action, but insofar as it is categorical it can bind us only insofar as a previously existing desire is not the ground of the

⁴ Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Louis White Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1993), p. 8. All future references to Kant’s second Critique will be cited in the text itself. They will be indicated by KprV followed by the Berlin Academy edition volume and pagination; reference to Beck’s English translation will follow a semicolon. In this case the references would appear as KprV 5:7: 8.


⁶ Ibid., p. 68.
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incentive. The incentive must, rather, be grounded in reason, and insofar as reason is itself a product of our spontaneity, such an incentive is intricately involved with the power of absolutely beginning a series of actions and, hence, with transcendental freedom.

The two most profound difficulties raised by Kant’s scheme have to do with (a) how a purely intellectual principle can motivate the will and with (b) the problem of transcendental freedom. Kant recognized both the intractable nature of the two problems as well as their intrinsic connection when he noted that “how a law in itself can be the direct motive of the will (which is the essence of morality) is an insoluble problem for the human reason. It is identical with the problem of how a free will is possible” (KprV 5:72; 75). Schleiermacher’s notes on Kant’s second Critique are principally directed to coming to terms with precisely these two difficulties. We should keep in mind that these notes are Schleiermacher’s earliest attempt to come to grips with these issues and are subsequently beset with incongruities overcome in his later reflections.

In his notes on Kant’s second Critique, Schleiermacher expresses dissatisfaction with Kant’s account of respect for the moral law, the locus of Kant’s discussion of how a purely intellectual principle can motivate the will. In his second Critique Kant had explained that the moral law checks self love and strikes down self conceit (KprV 5:73; 76); furthermore, respect “weakens the hindering influence of the inclinations through humiliating self-conceit; consequently, we must see it as a subjective ground of activity, as an incentive for obedience to the law” (KprV 5:38; 40). Schleiermacher complains that Kant’s account still fails to provide an explanation for the genesis of the feeling connected to the influence of the moral law: “Only a negative feeling originates directly from the relation of practical reason to self-conceit, and if one says everything that one possibly can about an inhibition of the causality of a pathologically driven feeling . . . it is still, however, not an incentive.”

Furthermore, Schleiermacher adds that “it seems to me that he [Kant] did not achieve this either [clarifying the genesis of a feeling a priori], for even if I understand that practical reason must occasion an effect on feeling, all that I can understand by this ‘a priori’ . . . is first only an indirect effect in that certain ideas, which would otherwise encourage the feeling, are de-
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stroyed; second, only negative in that what was otherwise present in feeling through those ideas is annulled; third, no particular distinct feeling. . . . How the positive can be understood a priori is still left as empty as before, as is the claim that this feeling distinguishes itself from all others."8 Schleiermacher is correct to note that Kant’s account provides for only an indirect influence of the moral law on feeling: in checking self-love and striking down self-conceit it blocks the effect of these pathologically motivated feelings and thereby strengthens the moral incentive. These are, however, already effects of the moral law on previously existing feelings, and while an explanation of these effects on these preexisting feelings may help to illuminate certain psychological processes, it still affords us insight neither into the nature of the incentive directly connected with the moral law nor into how such an incentive is possible. In other words, while Kant may have provided us with an account of the effect that the moral law has on an individual when she or he recognizes its absolute worth, he still has not explained how a person can recognize such absolute worth in the moral law to begin with. The explanation of how practical reason occasions an effect on feeling is left just as obscure as before, and no real explanation is given as to how we can understand the genesis of a feeling a priori.

It is important to grasp the deep structure of the difficulty concerning how a purely intellectual principle can become a motivating ground of the will. In order for the moral law to motivate us, it must affect the faculty of desire in some way, and this involves feeling.9 The problem becomes particularly acute since feeling has to do with our sensuous na-

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8 Schleiermacher, “Notizen zu Kant: KpV,” p. 133.
9 In Schleiermacher’s Early Philosophy of Life, Blackwell represents Kant’s understanding of the moral incentive as follows: “Incentives involve feelings, and yet, if moral obligation is not to be undermined, the means of influence of the moral law cannot involve feeling ‘of any kind whatsoever’” (p. 29). Later on he notes that “unlike Kant and Reinhold, Schleiermacher never speaks of the influence of reason on the will as being ‘direct.’ The influence of reason upon our intentions is by means of incentives, and the incentives of reason, like all other incentives, involve feelings” (p. 44). This is a somewhat misleading presentation, both of Kant and of Schleiermacher’s understanding of him, since Kant never asserts that reason cannot influence feeling; in fact, the whole section entitled “On the Drives of Pure Practical Reason” in the second Critique concerns precisely how reason does influence feeling. For instance, Kant notes that “whatever checks all inclinations in self-love necessarily has, by that fact, an influence on feeling. Thus we conceive how it is possible to understand a priori that the moral law can exercise an effect on feeling since it blocks the inclinations” (KpV 5:75; 78). When Kant speaks of the influence of reason on the will as being direct, he does not mean that it does not have an influence on our affective nature; in fact, it must, if reason is to be an incentive. What Kant does mean is that no preexisting feeling can be the ground or the basis of the validity of the moral law; if it were, the law would be reduced to a hypothetical imperative. As can be seen from my discussion of Schleiermacher’s On Freedom below, by the time that Schleiermacher writes this treatise he is fully in agreement with Kant’s reasoning regarding this issue.
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ture and thereby with our receptivity, that is, our capacity for being affected from without. The understanding, however, is spontaneous. Spontaneity and receptivity are, according to Kant, two distinct faculties of human nature. How can feeling be affected by the moral law (a purely intellectual principle)? In order for it to be so affected there must be some capacity in our very faculty of receptivity that already allows that faculty to recognize the unconditioned worth of the moral law, but this already involves a judgment of the understanding. This would imply that the faculty of receptivity is itself somehow capable of true judgment, which is impossible. The problem thereby seems to be intractable. It can be understood from yet another angle. The judgment of the unconditioned worth of the moral law that such an incentive presupposes has two components. Insofar as we stress the absolute and unconditioned worth of the moral law, we must rely on reason for the judgment of its unconditioned character. However, insofar as we stress the worth of the moral law, we are concerned with a question of value and, hence, with the subject and his or her attitudes or feelings since the assignment of worth cannot be defined in purely logical or rational terms. Hence the question becomes, How can the rational principle itself be the ground of the absolute worth that the moral subject must assign to it? \(^1\)

In the “Notes” (“Notizen zu Kant”) we find Schleiermacher attempting to come to grips with this problem. While he agrees with Kant that the moral law cannot be empirically grounded, he questions whether making feeling indispensable to the determination of the faculty of desire necessarily results in an empirically grounded practical principle. He believes that he can show that the implication is not an inevitable one, arguing that the ethical principle of discrimination (principium diiudicationis) can be separated from the ground of moral motivation (principium executionis). The key here, according to Schleiermacher, is not to equate the determination of the faculty of desire with the giving of rules for the will, two elements closely connected in Kant’s practical philosophy. Schleiermacher does not consider Kant justified in having linked the two: he complains that Kant has not shown that they are either analytically or synthetically combined.

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It is here that Schleiermacher's analysis of the inadequacy of Kant's theory of nonmoral motivation comes in. This theory specifies that the faculty of desire is empirically determined when pleasure is what marks an object as worthy of desire. Yet if pleasure is that which marks an object as worthy of desire, the pleasure gotten from the realization of the object, and not the object itself, is the final goal of nonmorally motivated action. But Schleiermacher remarks that there is something wrong in thinking that pleasure, rather than the realization of a desired object, is the goal of nonmoral motivation. The correct understanding of the relation between satisfaction and desire is that the realization of an object brings satisfaction because it is desired.

Schleiermacher thereby argues that Kant could only have shown that the determination of the faculty of desire was synthetically combined with the giving of rules for the will on the presupposition that “the feeling, which is necessary in order to set the faculty of desire in motion is also the only possible end to which the desire itself could be directed.”11 He reasons that, if the feeling of pleasure is not the end to which an empirically given desire is directed, then feeling can motivate without at the same time determining the rules of action for the will. At this point it is important to recall the Kantian analysis of the lower faculty of desire and its relation to heteronomous action. An object is desired because its realization will bring pleasure, and reason figures out the means for the realization of the object. However, because it is desire that marks out the object to be realized in the first place, desire is the ground of the rule for the will; reason is only instrumental in providing the rule through which the object of desire can be achieved. Schleiermacher concludes that, if pleasure is not the final goal of nonmoral action, the lower faculty of desire cannot be the ground of any rules for the will. Kant's linkage between the principle of execution and that of discrimination has been thereby effectively severed.

What Schleiermacher has accomplished here, however, remains rather questionable. Given this account, Schleiermacher is still faced with the task of providing an account of how an object of desire relates to the emotional character of the agent, that is, how it is that the object of desire comes to be desired. More important, his argument here seems to be at cross-purposes with his initial goal, which was to ground the moral incentive in feeling or moral sense. Such a theory holds that the worth that the moral law has for us is based on the satisfaction that is associated with acting on it, on the one hand, and the pangs of conscience linked with failing to live up to it, on the other. But if, as Schleiermacher seems to

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want to be arguing here, an object is not desired in virtue of the pleasure it will bring, presumably then acting morally cannot be attractive to us because of the satisfaction that is associated with acting on the moral law, either.

II. SCHLEIERMACHER’S COMPATIBILIST PROPOSAL

In the third of his Dialogues on Freedom (1789) Schleiermacher attempts to forge a middle position between Kant’s understanding of respect for the moral law and a theory of moral sensibility. The dialogue involves three friends, the Kantian Kritias, Sophron, whose position represents Schleiermacher’s, and Kleon. Toward the latter part of the dialogue Sophron reminds Kleon that their intention in discussing these matters was to determine the extent to which reason influences our actions and concludes that “we have found nothing but that such an influence can nowhere take place, and that moreover all our actions flow from the feeling of pleasure and the attempt to get it.”12 He proceeds to outline a theory of moral sensibility where experience is a key component in allowing us to determine which actions will bring us pleasure and which will bring us pain. It is experience that “acquaints us with the different powers of our soul; it is that which informs us of the nature of our pleasure and that it is only harmony and perfection that can delight us” (F 155). The imagination works with these data, thereby giving us a foretaste of virtue.

Sophron later qualifies his original statement that the influence of reason on our actions can nowhere take place: insofar as we find pleasure in virtue, reason can influence the will. Hence he notes that “the capacity to act according to rational grounds means nothing other than the capacity to be determined by a feeling of pleasure that works through the moral ideas of reason” (F 160). He continues by noting that this “pleasure is completely sensory; it has a sensory magnitude and a sensory effectiveness, although it is caused by an object in which nothing sensory is to be found, namely the eternal and unchangeable laws of reason” (F 160). Despite the fact that Schleiermacher here concedes that reason can have an influence on the will, the crux of the matter is that it can have such an influence in virtue of a preexisting disposition to find pleasure in the moral law. At this point Schleiermacher has not grasped the intrinsic interconnections between the principle of discrimination and that of execution discovered by the critical Kant: if the latter is empirically

12 Schleiermacher, Freiheitsgespräch, in Meckenstock, ed., p. 153; future references to the text will be included in the text, indicated by an F followed by the German edition pagination. All excerpts are my own translations.
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grounded—that is, it is dependent on a given condition or susceptibility of the subject—then so is the former. It is impossible to be moved by a practical principle in virtue of preexisting susceptibilities to find pleasure in such a principle and to at one and the same time identify the underlying maxim on which one is acting with eternal and unchanging laws of reason. This is because, if one is moved to act in accordance with a practical principle because it brings one pleasure, the maxim underlying one’s action to act on the practical principle is that of maximizing one’s own happiness or pleasure, a merely subjective principle that could never qualify as a universal law.

Another significant feature of Schleiermacher’s account in the third of the dialogues is his attempt to provide a detailed analysis of the psychological conditions of the possibility of moral motivation. Thus he makes the observation that, while reason does play a role in moral motivation, it is not the only factor involved. He notes that “we therefore cannot maintain that this feeling is determined by pure reason alone (which indeed is always unaltered and the same) but must affirm rather that it is determined by the receptivity of the faculty of sensation [des Empfindungsvermögens] to being affected by the representation of the moral law. This receptivity is dependent upon other conditions each time” (F 163).13 Insofar as feeling is involved, it depends on the receptivity of the faculty of sensation. This receptivity is not, however, a given constant, and it is not always affected in the same way by the moral law. How it is affected by the moral law depends on at least two factors: (1) the strength with which the moral law is represented and (2) other factors, such as previously existing emotions, wants, wishes, and desires, which may interfere with or enhance the effect that the moral law has on the faculty of sensation. For example, if an individual is overly preoccupied with professional advancement and is considering acting on an immoral maxim, this preoccupation may be so strong that it overpowers the effect that the moral law has on feeling. The effect of his or her prior preoccupation on feeling may be so strong that it overtakes that faculty altogether, leaving little possibility for it to be affected by the moral law. The moral law may thereby fail to be an incentive for the will.

The story Schleiermacher offers here has some similarities to the one he will offer in his longer treatise *On Freedom*. Both are intended to show how an account of moral motivation can be fully integrated with an account of a person’s character. There are, however, some significant differences between the story offered in the third dialogue and the one offered in *On Freedom*; the former seems almost primitive compared to the more

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robust theory offered in the latter treatise. The Freiheitsgespräch portrays an individual’s desires as having an effect on his or her total emotive constitution; this prior determination of feeling limits the effect that a given representation can have on feeling and thereby serves to determine the person’s future desires. For example, my desire for more money may be connected with a particular dissatisfaction concerning my present state as well as with a feeling of heady excitement given the prospect of a viable get-rich-quick scheme. These preexisting feelings may in turn determine how much I will dwell on other representations, for instance, the idea of enjoying my present situation and time with my husband. I may be so overwhelmed with dissatisfaction that I am not a millionaire, and so dizzy with the emotion that the idea of the future possibility of wealth evokes in me, that I cannot dwell on the idea of enjoying what is presently within my grasp. Given my prior emotional state, the representation of what is presently enjoyable cannot make a deep enough impression on me, for it simply cannot hold my interest, nor can it change my present feelings. Note that this amounts to a strict determination of action by desire or of a strict determination of future desires by past desires.

In contrast, Schleiermacher’s account of moral motivation in On Freedom is much more sophisticated. In fact, a reader of the first part of the treatise would be struck by its almost thoroughly Kantian character. How far Schleiermacher’s views have swung in a Kantian direction in the first section of On Freedom, particularly as compared with the position espoused in the notes on Kant’s second Critique as well as in the Freiheitsgespräch, can be gauged by his avowal that the principle of discrimination cannot be effectively separated from the principle of execution. He notes that “reason becomes practical only through the idea of obligation to its laws”;¹⁴ that is, “reason’s dictums must be able to become objects of an impulse” (UF 233; 18). He reasons further that

this must be true not simply to the extent that what reason commands happens to be in accord with some inclination, that is insofar as reason’s dictums relate mediatly to a sensible object, but rather precisely insofar as the dictums relate immediately to the law. That is, even if in some particular case the law’s will should become actual through an accidental relation, the law has no influence on the faculty of desire, and so this relation cannot establish the idea that it is possible in every case to realize the command of reason. This involves a feeling, and thereby an impulse, which relates immediately and exclusively to practical

¹⁴ On Freedom, trans. Blackwell. The German can be found in Meckenstock, KGA, jüngsteschriften, 1787–1796, pp. 219–356. Future references to the text will be included in the text, indicated by UF followed by a reference to the KGA pagination; reference to Blackwell’s English translation will follow a semicolon. In this case the reference would appear as UF 232; 17.
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reason and at the same time represents practical reason in the faculty of desire. [UF 233; 18]

In other words, the moral law must itself be a motive for the will.\(^{15}\) His argument for the claim accords with Kant’s: if the moral law were not able to pose as an incentive to the will, the coincidence of one’s maxims with the moral law would be merely accidental. Furthermore, under such a scenario, whatever one’s practical principle, it cannot be a categorical imperative. What would really be driving an action would be some presupposed end, and this means that moral requirements would be treated as hypothetical imperatives instead of as intrinsically obligatory.\(^{16}\) In such a situation a categorical imperative as such would have no influence on the will, and while one’s maxims might accord with legality, they would not be moral. In order for the categorical imperative to be the principle that is in fact guiding one’s will it must in fact be chosen as such. In order for it to be chosen, however, it must be able to be deemed a principle worth acting on, and as such it must be able to pose as an incentive to the will.

What makes this work more sophisticated than the third of his Dialogues on Freedom, however, is Schleiermacher’s distinction between choice and instinct and what he does with it. In the first part of the treatise Schleiermacher tells us that “insofar as impulse to some particular activity can be determined by a single object alone, the faculty of desire is called instinct, but insofar as it arrives at some particular activity solely by comparing several objects it is called choice” (UF 224; 8). Key here is the idea that in instinct a being’s desire is “hard-wired” to a particular object or group of objects. There is no complex mechanism internal to the subject that allows for variation in desire. Thus Schleiermacher lists the following two characteristics of instinct: (1) “an action persists only until the determining object itself ceases,” and (2) “where instinct is present, desire follows immediately upon the appearance of the object, and the tendency toward action follows immediately upon desire” (UF 224; 9). In such a case the organism is so constituted that the very appearance of the object elicits desire. Later on he notes that, if external objects “were to include not only the basis for our being affected . . . but also the basis for the prepon-

\(^{15}\) Note that Schleiermacher’s claim regarding the need for the immediacy of the relation of practical principles or “dictums” to the moral law is in principle equivalent to Kant’s claim that “what is essential in the moral worth of actions is that the moral law should determine the will directly” (KprV 5:71; 75). This is in fact the opposite of the position he espoused in On the Highest Good, where he noted that “the law of reason can never determine our will immediately” (Über das Höchste Gut, in Meckesstock, ed., p. 123). Blackwell is mistaken when he claims that one of Schleiermacher’s main points in On Freedom is to criticize Kant’s idea that an a priori practical principle can directly influence the will. See Blackwell (n. 1 above), pp. 29 ff.

\(^{16}\) Henry Allison provides an insightful analysis of Kant’s arguments regarding the issue in his Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 99 ff.

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derance necessary to every act of choice, then with every external object there would have to be given not only a general influence on the faculty of desire but also a determinate quality and quantity of this influence, not alterable by any inner characteristic of the subject” (UF 235; 20). In contrast, choice involves a complexity of processes internal to the subject. The individual that has choice is not hard-wired to desire any given thing; further, such a being can find value in several different things and compare their relative strengths. As such, the attraction that any given object effects on the faculty of desire does not immediately occasion desire per se, but, rather, “the object appears and the faculty of desire craves. . . . The complete determination of impulse still remains suspended by consciousness of the necessity to take into account several determining grounds, and only when this has occurred does it desire” (UF 226; 10). Hence the determinative feature of choice is the ability of the individual to postpone action and to weigh alternative options. This ability is possible because, while an object may no doubt affect the will, it is yet not, of itself, sufficient to determine the will to action.17

The idea of choice, involving as it does several possible objects of desire, naturally elicits the question of what is going to ground the final determination of the faculty of desire one way or another. Schleiermacher carefully distinguishes the idea of choice from the idea that, given several objects of choice, the will is determined to act through the outcome of the balance of attractive and repulsive forces elicited by these objects. He notes that “if several simultaneously affecting objects partially annul their influence reciprocally, we could regard what remains as itself an object (since with respect to its influence it would be determined in only one way). This object’s impression would be unalterable, and the faculty of desire would be absolutely determined to it” (UF 235–36; 20). It is important to note that the “balance of forces” view that Schleiermacher rejects is more sophisticated than the naive notion that an agent simply acts on its strongest desire since, if action on one’s strongest desire precludes a whole host of other options, the cumulative attraction of these other options may serve to outweigh the strength of one’s strongest desire. Schleiermacher rejects this more sophisticated view because it presents the subject as simply being affected from without. In it external influences, whether they be the influence of a single object or the influence of a balance of attractive and repulsive forces elicited by several objects, are represented as the ultimate determining ground of an individual’s choice.

Given his observations on choice and instinct, Schleiermacher con-

17 So Schleiermacher notes, “Whenever our faculty of desire is affected from without, we are conscious that this is not yet sufficient to determine it, and every determination of impulse appears to us within the realm between craving and desiring” (UF 227; 11).
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cludes that, while the moral law can motivate, it cannot of itself be sufficient to determine the will. He arrives at this conclusion by first noting that a “natural undeterminedness of the will is necessary if that relation of the law to the faculty of desire entailed by the idea of obligation is to be possible” (UF 233; 17); in other words, the idea of obligation is inapplicable to a will that necessarily acts in accordance to the moral law. Moreover, if acting in accordance with the moral law is to truly involve choice, the law cannot be sufficient to determine the will to action. The impulse or incentive provided by the moral law “must have exactly the same relation to the faculty of desire as every other” (UF 233; 18), and this means that, just as other objects can be viewed as desirable without their desirability being a sufficient condition of their initiating action, so it is the same with the moral law. We must, in fact, hold this to be the case in order to make sense of how it is possible that persons can stand under an intrinsic moral obligation and yet fail to meet its demands.

Schleiermacher concludes that “no single object of our faculty of desire, whether internal or external . . . has a determinative influence, invariable in all cases, either upon the faculty of desire in general or upon its particulars, so that the preponderance of impression requisite for any complete action of the faculty of desire cannot be grounded in such objects” (UF 236; 21). If this is true, we are still confronted with Schleiermacher’s question, “Wherein must the origination of the preponderance of one portion of the determining ground of choice over other portions be grounded in each case?” (UF 234; 19). In other words, Schleiermacher asks, if the attraction or repulsion that an object or its realization holds for us is not of itself sufficient to determine the will, then what, ultimately, is the ground of the will’s acting on one desire rather than another? Schleiermacher answers that this ground must be found in our subjectivity; more precisely, the effect that an object of desire can have on the

18 On this point Schleiermacher stands in fundamental agreement with Kant; see Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), where Kant notes that, “if reason solely by itself is not sufficient to determine the will . . . then actions which are recognized to be objectively necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determining of such a will in accordance with objective laws is necessitation. . . . The conception of an objective principle so far as this principle is necessitating for a will is called a command (of reason), and the formula of this command is called an Imperative” (pp. 80–81; *Kants gesammelte Schriften* (KGS), Berlin Academy ed. [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902], 4:413).

19 My interpretation of what is going on is fundamentally at odds with that of Lamm, who argues that this idea “marks Schleiermacher’s most rebellious stance against Kant” (Julia Lamm, *The Living God: Schleiermacher’s Theological Appropriation of Spinoza* [University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996], p. 45). To the contrary, as my discussion below of Kant’s incorporation thesis demonstrates, Schleiermacher is at this point in his argument still in fundamental agreement with Kant. It is only much later in his argument that the two positions diverge.
will is determined by the way in which that object is represented. Hence Schleiermacher notes that “even if in some particular case the preponderance of one impulse over others is based in such accidental determinations of the faculty of desire as have been produced through its preceding activities, these in turn have their first ground in the state of the faculty of representation” (UF 237; 22). Note that this position is the exact opposite of the one espoused by Schleiermacher in his earlier third Dialogue on Freedom; there the impact made by a representation was limited and determined by preceding activities of the faculty of desire. Here the reverse is true; just how attractive a course of action is depends on how it is represented: “The preponderance in which every comparison of choice must end in order to pass over into a complete action of the faculty of desire must in every case be grounded in the totality of present representations and in the state and interrelations of all the soul's faculties that have been produced in the progression of representations in our soul” (UF 237–38; 22). Which ideas will be associated with an external object and which desires, in turn, will be connected with these ideas depends on our faculty of representation. For instance, our desire for an object may vary with what we know of it. Put before a hungry individual a sumptuous feast and she will of course desire it, but let her find out that it is poisoned and her desire will surely wane. Further, the desirability of an object is tied with how prominently it stands before consciousness. In some cases an individual may enable himself to forgo a temptation by putting the offending object out of mind and concerning himself with other things. In contrast, it is no doubt true that desire is often heightened by dwelling on a coveted thing.

These and other related examples lead Schleiermacher to conclude that no object is itself the ground of its desirability or attractiveness to the will; rather, it is desirable only insofar as it is represented as such, and this means that desire is always intrinsically connected with the representing activity of the subject. Because it is, there is “no degree of impulse, however great [that] can be conceived to which an impulse of higher degree cannot be juxtaposed” (UF 239; 25). This is what Schleiermacher calls “the boundlessness of impulse” (ibid.). By this he means that, since the attraction an option holds for us is always a function of how it is represented, no matter how great the inducement to do one thing, it is still possible to be moved to do the opposite. This is because the degree of attraction of the opposite course of action also rests on how it is represented. Hence it is always in principle possible to follow the dictates of morality, no matter how great the temptation to do otherwise: even if some “sensible feeling is unduly elevated by my representations” yet “a series of representations is possible through which the feeling representing practical reason might be affected more strongly” (UF 240; 25).
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The similarities of Schleiermacher’s argument to that of Kant’s are deep and surprising. An important feature of Kant’s practical philosophy is his claim that “an incentive can determine the will to action only insofar as the individual has incorporated it into his maxim”; that is, human freedom involves an activity of the subject through which an inclination or desire is deemed *worth* acting on or taken as a fitting ground of action. Henry Allison has dubbed this Kant’s “Incorporation Thesis” and has rightly pointed to its pivotal place at the core of Kant’s practical philosophy. A central implication of this claim is that an incentive or desire of itself is not a reason for action, and this means further that the adoption of a practical principle or a maxim is never a causal consequence of a person’s being in a state of desire. Schleiermacher’s understanding of choice, involving as it does the assertion that, while objects of desire may affect the will, they are not sufficient grounds for the determination of action, carries with it the same of the same implications.

There are, however, some significant differences between Schleiermacher’s position and Kant’s. While Schleiermacher grounds the ultimate worth that a subject assigns to a particular course of action in the activity of the subject and not in the causal consequences of one’s being in a state of desire, he still wants to be able to link the subject’s activity with its prior states. Noteworthy is the fact that Schleiermacher grounds the ultimate worth that a subject will assign to an object of desire in the faculty of representation, the present state of which can be connected with a subject’s preceding states in a lawlike manner. The weight of the whole of Kant’s incorporation thesis, however, rests on the *spontaneity* of the subject. Because a spontaneous action cannot be subjected to the principles of causal determination, the action cannot be grounded in the agent’s prior states.

It is at this point, then, that Kant and Schleiermacher part company. In positioning the sufficient ground of an action in a subject’s representations, Schleiermacher has, through one and the same argument, come as close as he possibly could to Kant’s practical philosophy while at the same time having laid the groundwork for his own psychological determinism.

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21 On this aspect of Kant’s practical philosophy, see Allison, in particular pp. 39–40, although the whole book is an extended argument concerning the importance of the incorporation thesis for Kant’s theory of freedom.
22 It is, however, significant that, according to Kant in *Religion*, the ground of an agent’s actions can be traced to the fundamental disposition. We can thus connect the agent’s action with his or her character, but *which* fundamental disposition the agent has chosen is still a matter of transcendental freedom.
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He thereby seems to have provided a “compatibilist” version of a Kantian practical philosophy and overcome the stumbling block of all empiricists.

III. KANT OR SCHLEIERMACHER?

Schleiermacher’s compatibilist account of freedom and moral motivation has much to recommend it. For one, it allows us to understand our psychological processes in such a way that we can learn to steer the course of our desires. He notes that, “if we must seek the basis for particular activities of the faculty of desire elsewhere than in the state and other activities of the soul, then the inquiries concerning our soul so natural to each of us are cut off at the root—inquiries concerning laws of the soul’s various faculties . . . premises that would have been requisite to come to some certain result, and the result that certain premises would have produced” (UF 240; 24–25). Later on he notes that “without this idea we could in no way justify our efforts to affect wills” (UF 242; 28). The validity of the idea that our present state is connected in a lawlike manner with what precedes it and that, further, it is the ground of our future states is connected with a certain practical interest: it allows for the care of the soul, that is, the nurturing of dispositions that in the future will bear moral fruit. In contrast, the doctrine of the freedom of the will, through which one comes to think of oneself as instantly capable of realizing a moral goal without this involving a long and arduous training of one’s character and dispositions is, according to Schleiermacher, self-deceptive. The feeling of freedom hides from us the fact that “everything that yet lies between the present moment and the anticipated one, as a means or preceding links in the chain, really belongs to the attainment of that state” (UF 294; 79). The idea that there is no ground determining our ability to reach a moral goal other than our very intention of realizing it (transcendental freedom) only lulls us into unconcern through the false certainty that such an intention is all that is required to achieve the proposed end. Such a certainty “always does its utmost to make us miss our goal” (UF 294; 79). But the doctrine of necessity, through which we can connect previous states of the soul with future ones, allows us to understand how we may affect ourselves and others in such a way as to bring us closer to moral perfection; it allows for us to undertake a “therapy of desire.” Key to such self-affection is the strengthening of the ethical impulse: whether it will be strong enough to overcome the opposing inclinations all depends on the preceding period in which it was forged. Schleiermacher asks: “Will the ethical impulse . . . be strong enough to prevail over opposing inclinations?” and he answers that necessity presents this as “depending upon the content of the intervening period—upon the strength-
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The increasing or weakening of ethical feeling contained therein, upon the increasing or diminishing power therein of ethical impulse through action, both generally and in the particular respect under consideration” (UF 295; 80). Necessity teaches that, because prior moral states affect future ones, “you would have become so less (morally good) than perhaps you will, had you not so vitally desired it in advance” (UF 295; 80).

Note all of this stands in agreement with a compatibilist understanding of freedom, according to which a person could have done otherwise, and is hence free, provided that he or she had had different sorts of desires. This understanding allows Schleiermacher to distinguish his own brand of determinism from fatalism. The idea behind the fatalism of Greek tragedy, on the one hand, is that a given result will necessarily occur regardless of causal antecedents; Schleiermacher’s determinism, on the other hand, propounds that, given certain causal antecedents, a given result will necessarily follow. While the former principle is of no use to an investigation of the mechanism of desire and its consequences, the latter is indispensable to any kind of psychological insight and, hence, to a therapy of desire.

Connected with Schleiermacher’s practical criticisms of the idea of transcendental freedom is the fact that the conditions under which an act may be attributed to an agent give rise to a certain “antinomy of agency.” This antinomy is closely related to Kant’s third antinomy, developed in the first Critique. Recall that the third antinomy concerns the possibility of appealing to another mode of causality beside that developed in the second analogy (causality in accordance with the laws of nature). The kind of causality in question is transcendental freedom, understood as “the power [Vermögen] of beginning a state spontaneously [von Selbst]” (KRV A533/B561). Since Schleiermacher’s arguments take the side of the antithesis of this antinomy, let me begin with a short exposition of it as it is presented by Kant in the first Critique and then discuss its relevance to an understanding of the antinomy of agency.

The antithesis of the third antinomy is relatively straightforward. According to it, if we assume transcendental freedom (defined as “a power of absolutely beginning a state, and therefore absolutely beginning a series of the consequences of that state” [KRV A445/B473]), then the unity of experience would be rendered impossible. This is because every action “presupposes a state of the not-yet acting cause” (KRV A445/B473), that is, we must assume the existence of an agent before it initiates an action, and furthermore this agent must exist in some given state. However, insofar as an action is transcendentally free, it would be an absolute beginning

23 The connection of the antinomy of agency with the cosmological conflict is noted by Allison, p. 28.

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and as such in no wise grounded in the prior state of the agent. This means that the two states, that of an agent before the initiation of an action and that of the agent initiating the action, could not be connected in a lawlike manner.

As Allison notes, while the recognizably Leibnizian argument of the antithesis concludes that if transcendental freedom were to be assumed the unity of experience would be annulled, it also supports the familiar compatibilist account of freedom also connected with Leibniz. Leibniz had argued that an action must have a sufficient reason grounded in the prior states of an agent; to deny this is to deny the conditions under which the act could intelligibly be attributed to that agent. The same point had already been made by Hume and other compatibilists, and Schleiermacher argues along the same lines in On Freedom. A condition of act attribution is that we should be able to relate an action to an agent and his or her character; that is, we must be able to understand how it flows from that character. If transcendental freedom is assumed, however, no such connection between the action and the character of the agent is possible. Schleiermacher asks, “How can I be accountable for an action when we cannot determine the extent to which it belongs to my soul?” (UF 316; 100–101). Our ability to attribute the motive for an action to an agent depends on that actions’ being explicable in terms of an agent’s character. Failing such a condition, the actions “have no ground at all, not even immediately, and are based on chance” (UF 316; 101), which means they have nothing to do with the condition of the agent, that is, his or her psychological states and disposition. Schleiermacher concludes that this idea of “complete chance . . . certainly annuls morality more than anything else” (UF 317; 101).

The thesis of the third antinomy is also significant in that it relates in important ways to the conditions of the possibility of act attribution. The thesis of the antinomy stipulates that it is necessary to appeal to transcendental freedom since without it mere causality in accordance with the laws of nature would be subject to two contradictory demands. These are, first, the principle that every event must have a cause and, second, the principle of sufficient reason. The latter requirement is understood in the manner developed by Leibniz in his polemic with Samuel Clarke:24 every occurrence must have a sufficient reason both in the sense that it have antecedent causal conditions and in the sense that it have a complete explanation. As Allison puts it, it is understood as both a “logical principle requiring adequate grounds for any conclusion and as a real or causal

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principle requiring sufficient preconditions for every occurrence.”25 According to Kant, the law of nature itself demands that “nothing takes place without a cause sufficiently determined a priori” (KRV A446/B474). If, however, this very same law of nature requires us to understand every event as itself having a cause, then the requirement that a cause be sufficiently determined a priori cannot be met. Since each event will have its ground in a cause preceding it that is also an event and that is, as such, subject to the same requirement that it also be grounded in a preceding event, completeness in the series of grounds determining an event can never be given.

Now the problem encountered in the thesis of the third antinomy becomes relevant to the question of act attribution in that, if the causality of nature is universally applied to actions, we would be unable to find a sufficiently determined ground of an action that is attributable to an agent per se. Instead, the grounds for each action can eventually be traced to events preexisting the agent and so having nothing to do with him or her. Schleiermacher is at the very least aware of these difficulties when he puts the following argument in the mouth of the opponents of his doctrine of necessity: “This resonance of the soul is in turn a product of preceding and occasioning impressions, and so, resist as we may, all is at last dissolved in external impressions. So, of all that belongs to the action, what can we then assign to the agent? Do we see the agent in some way? We can think of the agent only as suffering! Or where is the power that is active? It dissolves into infinitely many infinitesimally small external forces that leave us with nothing to think of as firmly active in the subject” (UF 257; 42–43). The difficulty is a profound one: if we assume that all events are subject to causal law, it becomes hard to distinguish actions from events. Committing suicide by jumping out a ten-story window would be little different from being pushed by someone from behind in the significant sense that in both cases a preexisting chain of events led to the disaster with inexorable necessity; in both cases the individual simply suffers what occurs to her. As Schleiermacher acutely notes, in such a scheme the individual functions as a mere placeholder for a given causal chain: she or he flashes “all the colors, but merely according to the laws of refraction. Of all that you see in the person’s actions, nothing belongs to the person” (UF 257; 43). Since the person does not initiate any action but is merely the locus in which a certain causal chain occurs, we cannot attribute the actions to her.

To summarize: the antinomy of agency suggests that act attribution is subject to two conflicting requirements. The first is that an act be explic-
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able in terms of an agent’s character; the second is that an agent should be the initiator of an act if it is to be attributed to him or her. While Schleiermacher obviously tries to meet the first requirement, it is unlikely that he succeeds in meeting the second. A simplistic understanding of the differences between Kant and Schleiermacher might suggest that, while Schleiermacher decided to go with the first requirement and to accept his losses regarding the second, Kant did just the opposite. Kant’s position is, however, much more complicated than this. He wants to hold that both the thesis and antithesis of the third antinomy are compatible since transcendental idealism creates a logical space for the idea of transcendental freedom. It is important to realize that Kant’s transcendental idealism is a way of—as Allan Wood puts it—demonstrating the “compatibility of compatibilism and incompatibilism.” 26 Kant finds his way around this seemingly intractable antinomy through his affirmation that both points of view—that is, the transcendental standpoint (corresponding to freedom) and the empirical standpoint (corresponding to determinism)—are legitimate. Both freedom and determinism, however, can be attributed to the same subject only when in each case the attribution is made from a different standpoint. 27 Insofar as the subject is considered as appearance, determinism applies; insofar as the subject is considered in itself, freedom applies.

In his review of Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Schleiermacher raised serious questions about the viability of such an option, especially as regards the possibility of a pragmatic anthropology. How is one to affect oneself, to engage in any kind of therapy of desire or care of the soul if transcendental freedom is presupposed? If we speak of that which affects the mind, in the way that Kant does in his Anthropology, do we not then begin to treat the self as an appearance? 28 What then of freedom? From a practical perspective, Kant’s two points of view are


27 In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant notes: “The union of causality as freedom with causality as the mechanism of nature, the first being given through the moral law and the latter through natural law, and both as related to the same subject, man, is impossible unless man is conceived by pure consciousness as a being in itself in relation to the former, but by empirical reason as appearance in relation to the latter. Otherwise the self contradiction of reason is unavoidable” (p. 6; KGS 5:6).

28 In his review of Kant’s Anthropology, Schleiermacher notes: “This gives rise to the question: Where do the ‘observations about what hinders or promotes a mental faculty’ come from, and how are these observations to be used for the mind’s expansion, if there are not physical ways to consider and treat this expansion in terms of the idea that all free choice is at the same time nature?” (Kritische Gesamtausgabe 1/2 [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984], pp. 365–69). Here he has in mind Kant’s assertion in the Anthropology that so long as observations respecting that which hinders or stimulates a faculty such as memory are used practically, they belong in a pragmatic anthropology, one that presupposes freedom.
very difficult to keep separate. We often assume freedom when we think
ourselves as resolving to make a radical change in our lives, but it is often
the case that in order for such a change to become a reality we must nurse
our subsequent desires in certain directions, we must be equipped with
certain psychological insights about ourselves that will facilitate change
in these desires, and we must suffer through all the stages that are in-
volved in such a change. All of this involves some form of determinism.
The question then remains whether Kant was justified in requiring tran-
scendental freedom from a moral point of view. Cannot the concept be
dispatched with altogether in the way that Schleiermacher does? Does
Schleiermacher succeed in showing that the reality of the moral law as
a motivating principle is consistent with a strictly compatibilist account
of freedom?

Despite the ingenuity of Schleiermacher’s discussion, I believe the an-
swer to the question whether the concept of transcendental freedom can
be dispatched with is no on two counts. First, Schleiermacher ultimately
fails to show how, assuming determinism, an action can be understood as
having been initiated by an agent, rather than the agent being a mere
locus wherein a predetermined event takes place. There are hints in parts
of On Freedom regarding how this implication might be avoided, but they
are undeveloped. Were they developed, however, I believe they would
ultimately imply transcendental freedom at some level.29

Second, and more important, Schleiermacher’s account of moral moti-
vation ultimately fails to satisfy important conditions that are necessary if
the moral law is to be conceived as a rational practical principle obligating
all rational agents. The problem in Schleiermacher’s analysis is the follow-
ing. If we can provide a deterministic account concerning why an individ-
ual chooses to do x, while we may have provided an exhaustive causal ac-
count regarding why x was chosen, we still would not have shown that the
agent had sufficient reasons for doing x; that is, we would not have shown
why the agent ought to have done x. An agent who does x because she or
he was causally necessitated to do so cannot rationally justify her actions
on these grounds. We need to carefully distinguish rational necessity
grounded in objective laws of reason from causal necessity stemming
from antecedent conditions, a distinction that Schleiermacher fails to

29 For instance, in the middle of On Freedom (n. 13 above), Schleiermacher notes: “We do
not want to feel a freeing from all necessity, because this exhibits itself in no case whatsoever,
and our pretense would also be a vain attempt, but only a freeing from the compulsion of
the object, and this will occur whenever we determine our faculty of desire through an idea
that relates to pure self-consciousness” (p. 72). As Crossley (n. 1 above) notes, “This view of
accountability must mean, however, that a person has the power to alter his or her charac-
ter, even if particular actions are determined by the state of a person’s character at any
particular time” (p. 14).
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make. While the incentive of the moral law is not sufficient to determine the will to action from a causal standpoint, the objective validity of the moral law itself provides sufficient reasons for action in accordance with it, and in this sense the moral law is rationally necessary. While Schleiermacher ultimately recognizes that, if reason is to be the source of moral laws, it must be possible that pure practical principles can have an influence on feeling, he yet wants to give an account of how the extent of this influence is determined by antecedent conditions in the subject, thereby once more reducing his account to deterministic principles.

However, Schleiermacher’s move, as ingenious as it is, only pushes the problem he recognized in On Freedom one step further back. There, it will be recalled, he noted that there must be an “impulse” that relates exclusively to practical reason, otherwise actions could only accidentally be in accordance with the moral law. However, in order for an agent to have sufficient reasons for action it is not enough to say that the moral law provides an incentive for action in the same way that other empirically conditioned desires have an influence on the will. The agent must also in principle be able to provide an account of why all these impulses are not on par with one another; for instance, we must be able to give an account of why the impulse to be moral is superior to, or has more value than, the desire to kill when one feels like it. Unless the agent acts in accordance with the moral law because she recognizes that her impulse to be moral has more worth than her other nonmoral desires, such action would be in accordance with the moral law only accidentally. The recognition of such a worth, required in order for her action not to be merely accidentally in accordance with the moral law would, however, imply transcendental freedom. Were the recognition of the worth of such a principle to be grounded in preexisting susceptibilities of the agent, the principle could not be one that is universally and categorically binding since the ability to act in accordance with it would thereby depend on the existing conditions of the agent.