
This important collection of essays stems from a 2011 conference held in honor of Rolf-Peter Horstmann. The list of contributing authors and the range of topics testify to the depth of Horstmann’s contributions to our understandings of Kant and the German idealists. I will summarize the central theme from each essay, adding an occasional critical remark. My discussion will, at the most, provide hints of how much can be gained from a careful study of these 14 essays.

Rolf-Peter Horstmann’s own contribution, “Propositional Activity in Kant and Hegel,” deals with what is perhaps the most philosophically subtle issue discussed in the volume. The essay concerns Kant’s and Hegel’s views on the relationship between the self-conscious I and the ability to have thoughts with propositional content. Horstmann argues that Kant takes the I, via ‘propositional activity,’ to be a radically subjective source and center of the unity of propositional content. This is also the source of objects, making the world and the I both ideal entities, produced by the relevant activity. This activity, for Kant, is based in judgment, and Horstmann explains how this judgment-centric view ultimately limits Kant’s ontology. By contrast, Hegel’s broader, developmental views of conceptual and propositional representation are not limited to judgment. This allows Hegel to admit a broader ontology than Kant. Horstmann notes some reasons to favor Hegel’s approach to this topic to Kant’s.

Barry Stroud’s paper, “Judgment, Self-Consciousness, Idealism,” addresses one of the issues from Horstmann’s essay. Stroud argues that the most plausible sense in which a self-conscious I is necessary for propositional thought is that thinking of things being objectively thus-and-so requires being able to grasp a contrast between one’s thought of things being thus-and-so and the truth of that thought. Stroud also claims, more surprisingly, that propositional thought is necessary for self-consciousness. This claim rests on Stroud’s view that there is no perceivable inner self to perceive, only the possibility of grasping the fact that I am thinking or perceiving. None of this, Stroud holds, carries any idealist implications.

Dina Emundts’ contribution, “Kant über Selbstbewusstsein,” serves as something of a counterpoint to Stroud’s essay. Emundts argues that, for Kant, the self-consciousness that is presupposed in cognition (and in propositional thought) is not a mere capacity, but rather some sort of standing awareness of a foundational activity of thought that is made explicit in “I am thinking” judgments. This standing awareness is meant to be the sort of thing that Stroud (following Hume) denies exists, and its relation to inner sense is problematic. Emundts takes the foundational activity in question to be radically subjective, and based on Kant’s idealism. I found many of Emundts’ claims persuasive, but was not sure why she thought that radical subjectivity required idealism.

In “The Copernican Turn and Stroud’s Argument from Indispensability,” Wolfgang Carl argues against several common interpretations of Kant’s Copernican turn, including one defended by Stroud in earlier work. Carl argues that Kant’s turn must be understood in terms of a subtle notion of a priori determination, as opposed to being understood in terms of an anti-skeptical idealism. Carl explains the relevant type of determination in terms of form, drawing on Kant’s scattered discussions of form-less intellectual intuition, and on Kant’s relatively neglected discussion in “On a recent prominent tone of superiority in philosophy.” In the latter, Kant puts form at the center of philosophy, and connects it with the essence of objects. I completely agree with Carl about the importance of form in understanding Kant’s philosophy. Carl’s discussion stopped, however, before explaining exactly how the fact that form is constitutive for our
knowledge entails that these forms are also forms of the objects of knowledge, and one
wonders whether some form of idealism is needed for that entailment.

Béatrice Longuenesse, in “Kant and Hegel on the Moral Self,” identifies five
tenets of Kant’s theory of the moral self (the referent of “I” in “I ought”), and discusses
how those fare once taken up into Hegel’s metaphysics. She claims that Hegel picks up
where Kant left off in appealing to the intuitive intellect’s grasp of the complete good,
since Hegel thinks that each individual has some part of intellectual intuition.
Longuenesse also argues that Hegel partially accepts Kant’s characterization of the
individual moral self, but only as a limited stage in the development of spirit.
Longuenesse notes that one might try to find metaphysically-deflationary readings of
Kant and Hegel on these points but claims, plausibly to my mind, that such readings are
not exegetically plausible.

Hannah Ginsborg’s essay, “The Appearance of Spontaneity,” argues that an
understanding of judgment can help us see how a unified self is formed out of the
spontaneous self and the embodied, sensing self. The core idea, which draws on
Ginsborg’s earlier work, is that judgment is an exercise of spontaneity that involves
the subject taking certain sensations to be appropriate. Judgment, Ginsborg claims, is the
‘phenomenal correlate’ of spontaneity. Ginsborg’s discussion is philosophically
fascinating, though I found it difficult to see how her view of judgment didn’t ultimately
presuppose a unified self in some way. It is also difficult to see how a textual case could
be made that Kant regarded judgments as phenomenal entities.

Stephanie Grüne’s “Kant and the Spontaneity of the Understanding” is an
exceptionally well-argued discussion of whether Kant thinks we are spontaneous in
theoretical cognition. Grüne makes a case for thinking that the first Critique remains
neutral on whether the understanding is absolutely spontaneous. Her discussion
concerns spontaneity generally, though, and draws on the Third Antinomy and the
Religion. Perhaps the only assumption of Grüne’s I found questionable was the view that
knowledge of ourselves being absolutely spontaneous would count as cognition of how
we are in ourselves. Provided we do not know the law governing that spontaneity, it
seems that such knowledge might be too indeterminate to count as cognition.

In “Concept Formation, Synthesis and Judgment,” Ulrich Schlösser discusses the
relationship between synthesis and judgment in Kant, especially as concerns concept
formation. Schlösser argues for a relatively straightforward picture of this relationship:
synthesis can precede judgment, and the activity of the understanding itself is enough to
produce general representations from particular ones. The initial synthesis is guided by
the categories, especially with respect to features of mental economy (e.g. appropriate
levels of generality). This picture fits the text well, though I found it harder to see how
the categories could play the economically-oriented role Schlösser described.

Eckart Förster, in “Grenzen der Erkenntnis?”, describes how, near the end of his
career, Kant came to think that experience of other objects requires positing oneself as
an organic body. This in effect brings Kant closer to Fichte’s view of the I as self-positing,
since in the Transcendental Deduction Kant claims that object-consciousness is
necessary for subject consciousness. Förster’s discussion focuses on the development of
Kant’s views of space, and challenges Kant’s claims in the Critique to have found a better
explanation of incongruent counterparts than Newtonian or Leibnizian space provided.

Tobias Rosefeldt, in “Dinge an sich und der Außenweltskeptizismus,” argues that
the A edition of the Critique suggested an indirect perceptual realism and conception of
things in themselves that legitimately gave rise to the concerns of Kant’s early critics, and
which made a turn to Fichte’s radicalized idealism sensible. Rosefeldt argues, though,
that already in the Prolegomena Kant came to a different view, holding that what we
immediately perceive are the mind-dependent dispositional properties of objects that
also have mind-independent properties. It is a conceptual truth, Rosefeldt claims, that such dispositional properties presuppose mind-independent properties. Rosefeldt argues that this view does not violate Kant’s epistemological strictures against cognizing things in themselves and that, while it does not provide an answer to all forms of skepticism, we should not assume that answering all skeptics was Kant’s aim. Rosefeldt’s arguments are thorough, clear, and compelling, I think, though I suspect that the difference between the A edition and the B edition are not as clean-cut as his discussion suggests.

In “Ogilby, Milton, Canary Wine, and the Red Scorpion,” Andrew Chignell aims to make sense of Kant’s explanation of the intersubjectivity of aesthetic judgments. Chignell’s proposal is that the intersubjectivity hinges on the fact that beautiful things are symbolic expressions of the (presumably, uncontroversially intersubjective) ideas of reason. One particularly important idea of reason that can be symbolically expressed is that of the systematicity of nature. Only half-jokingly, Chignell also makes an entertaining case, contra Kant, for thinking that beverages can have aesthetic value.

The only essay fully devoted to Hegel in the volume is Paul Guyer’s “The End of Art and the Interpretation of Geist.” Guyer argues for the traditional, semi-theological, metaphysical reading of Hegel defended by Horstmann and others against the metaphysically-innocuous ‘immanent’ reading defended by Terry Pinkard and others, who take Geist to be just human mental life. The argument hinges on Hegel’s claims about the limitations of art. As Guyer reads Hegel, Hegel takes art to be incapable of adequately representing Geist because art essentially involves sensory media. If Geist is human mental life, then, it must be something metaphysically special (because it is beyond the reach of sensible representations). This in effect turns the immanent reading into a form of the metaphysical reading. It seemed to me, though, that Guyer’s argument more suggested an intermediate reading, for the claim that human mental life is metaphysically special is several steps removed from the metaphysical claims attributed to Hegel by some of his readers.

Anton Friedrich Koch, in “Metaphysik bei Hegel oder analytische, synthetische and hermeneutische Philosophie,” locates Hegel’s thought with respect to the issue of the knowability of the real (which Koch describes as the idea that reality is ‘transparent’). Koch focuses on the role that contradiction and radical subjectivity can play in a philosophical system. He notes in particular the role that radical subjectivity can play in making sense of distinct but qualitatively identical objects, and how this suggests a form of radical subject-dependence that was not fully recognized under Heidegger.

The final essay of the volume, Gary Hatfield’s “Russell’s Progress,” concerns Russell’s engagement with an issue central to Kant and the idealists: the relationship between spatial perception and the intersubjective spatial world of science. Hatfield describes some intriguing tensions between Russell’s stated views concerning sense data and some late-19th century discoveries about vision science. He concludes with a brief comparison to Kant, maintaining that for Russell, unlike Kant, individually-experienced space plays a crucial role our understanding of the public space studied by physics. This comparison will doubtless strike some readers as too simple, but it in effect directs us back to the themes of the first four essays of the volume concerning the relationship between the self-conscious I and our grasp of publically-accessible objects.

I do not claim to have done justice to any of the essays in this volume. They offer rich food for thought for anyone interested in Kant, German idealism, or the nature of the self.