
Emotions, Values and Agency provides a skillful defence of the view that emotions constitute a kind of perceptual experience and forges a number of interesting connections between this view and several central debates in metaethics. The author’s aim conforms to the current trend to revalorize the emotions as epistemologically and ethically significant. At the same time, the account she puts forward is a nuanced one, which is sensitive to many of their characteristic subtleties.

In her first chapter, Tappolet motivates and defends the perceptual account of emotion. This view is introduced following a critical survey of well-known rivals (cognitive views, conative views, and feeling theories). Tappolet mainly advocates her preferred alternative on the basis of an argument from analogy which highlights several alleged similarities between sensory experiences and emotions. For example, both phenomena appear to be phenomenally conscious and involuntary and arguably possess non-conceptual representational content. In attributing representational content to emotions, Tappolet is guided by the observation that emotions can be assessed for correctness. Thus, admiring something is correct or fitting if and only if it instantiates a particular value property (admirability). This feature is crucial to her later account of their significance and likens her proposal to cognitive views, albeit without assimilating emotions to intellectual phenomena. The largest part of the chapter is devoted to Tappolet’s critics. Here, she considers a number of putative disanalogies between emotion and perception, some of which she also acknowledges as genuine. For example, unlike sensory experiences, emotions are based on prior cognitive states and can be assessed for rationality. As Tappolet argues at some length, though, such differences do not impugn her core proposal that emotions afford awareness of value.

The second chapter thoroughly examines the link between emotion and motivation. Tappolet’s goal is both to defend her account in light of the observation that emotions, but not sensory experiences, have motivational force, as well as to assess their role as springs of action more generally. As she argues, emotions are often, but not essentially, motivationally efficacious. Opposing a popular view, she moreover shows that their motivational impact allows for considerable modulation and is not confined to the motivation of self-interested behaviours. Tappolet thereby removes an obstacle to their recognition as possible causes of prudentially rational and moral appropriate actions.

The remainder of the book addresses metaethical concerns. Tappolet’s third chapter proposes a novel version of neo-sentimentalism, which concerns concepts that are lexically connected to emotions (so called ‘affective concepts’), such as admirability and fearsomeness. Tappolet proposes that something is admirable (fearsome) if and only if admiration (fear) towards it is fitting in the sense of being representationally accurate. This view is entailed by her perceptual account of emotion. At the same time, it is taken to confer additional support on the latter in virtue of being independently plausible. Tappolet thoroughly contrasts this representationalist variant of neo-sentimentalism with its competitors, which analyze affective concepts in terms of requirements to feel the corresponding emotion. As she argues, her view accounts better for the action-guiding character of evaluative judgments. Moreover, it does not fall prey to the wrong kind of reason objection since, as she maintains, representational accuracy is not a normative property. There is no risk of conflating the reasons to believe that an emotion is representationally accurate with moral or prudential reasons for feeling it: that some remark is cruel and therefore being amused at it morally inappropriate is irrelevant to whether such amusement is fitting, i.e. to whether the remark is genuinely amusing. Tappolet also replies to a number of possible objections, including the charge that her view is uninformatively circular. She finally extends the proposal to evaluative concepts more generally and sketches a congenial account of evaluative properties. Interestingly, this account
recognizes many of the properties corresponding to affective concepts as monadic rather than response-dependent.

The fourth chapter draws an illuminating connection between neo-sentimentalism and Strawsonian theories of responsibility by inquiring whether being responsible for something (or the corresponding concept) can likewise be analyzed in terms of fitting emotions. Tappolet reaches a negative conclusion by canvassing various dissimilarities between values and responsibility and exposing two difficulties for this approach that she deems insuperable. Acknowledging that there is yet a grain of truth to the Strawsonian picture, she finally argues that emotions and responsibility attributions are intimately, albeit indirectly, related via the value properties of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness.

The final chapter turns to agency. Tappolet’s main concern is to show that emotions can be conducive to autonomous action since they apprehend reasons for action. More specifically, she argues that in acting from an emotion one can be responsive to a normative reason which is constituted by the corresponding evaluative property. In this way, the emotions are integrated into a (broadly) rationalist account of autonomy as tied to reason-responsiveness.

Tappolet’s contributions to this impressive range of topics are well-informed and thoroughly argued for. It goes without saying that there is a lot to discuss in a book as rich as this one. Since reasons of space require me to be selective, I shall, in the remainder of this review, confine myself to Tappolet’s take on the ontology of emotion and briefly assess her defence of her perceptual view.

Tappolet clearly does an impressive job in dealing with a large array of important objections. Yet one may wonder whether she does proper justice to her opponents. For example, it is controversial to suppose that emotions have evaluative representational content despite them having correctness conditions involving evaluative properties (cf. e.g. Mulligan, K. 2010. “Emotions and Values”. In: P. Goldie (ed.). Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 475–500; Deonna, J. & Teroni, F. 2012. The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction. New York: Routledge, chapter 7.). To be fair, Tappolet has very recently engaged with two important critics of this claim (cf. Rossi, M. & Tappolet, C. 2019. “What Kind of Evaluative States are Emotions? The Attitudinal Theory vs. the Perceptual Theory of Emotion”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4), 544-563). However, given its centrality to her overall project, one would have expected some defence already in this volume. Also, Tappolet pays no attention to a further noteworthy competing view, on which emotions are responses to already apprehended evaluative properties rather than making us aware of them (cf. e.g. Kenny, A. (1963). Action, Emotion and Will. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; Mulligan, op. cit.). Correspondingly, she fails to consider an additional important criticism of her view.

Since Tappolet’s defence ignores these issues, it is not going to convince all of her readers. However, these reservations hardly undermine the impression that her volume is a highly competent state-of-the-art addition to the philosophy of emotion. It is worth noting also that, despite the connections between her metaphysical view of emotion and the issues taken up in subsequent chapters, a lot of what Tappolet has to say on motivation, neo-sentimentalism and responsibility can be accepted also by those who favour a different ontology of emotion. I thus highly recommend this monograph to anyone working in emotion theory or metaethics.

Jean Moritz Müller
University of Bonn

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