Almost any mainstream reading about the nature of Kant’s ‘content of cognition’ in both non-conceptualist and conceptualist camps agree that ‘singular representations’ (sensible intuitions) are, at least in some weak sense, object-dependent because they supervene on a manifold of sensations that are given through the disposition of our sensibility and parallel thus the real and physical components of the world (cf. McDowell 1996, Allison 1983, Ginsborg 2008, Allais 2009). The relevant class of sensible intuitions should refer, as they argue, only to empirical and not to pure ones. Kant’s transcendental argument creates, however, no implications as to the metaphysics of properties. Neither does he consider the world to be consisted of sensory content simpliciter nor do sensations refer to objects per se. Instead, he provides an all-encompassing pattern for sensible intuitions of any kind through the representation of space as a cognitive map in that an object can be represented if spatial properties are attributed to it. Sensible intuitions of any kind could be referring, that is to say, and can be conceptualized if they are spatial. Consequently and unlike the contemporary philosophy of perception, Kant contrasts sensible intuitions and pure concepts of understanding ‘altogether’ against one single experience, from which the justification of objects should proceed. In other words, what stands at the core of exposing the content of cognition concerns not the phenomenological status and actuality of sensible intuitions in the sense of ‘bits of experiential intake’, but the logical structure of possibility of sensible intuitions of any (external or internal) causal background.

The aim of this discussion is to clarify that Kant’s transcendental idealism mutatis mutandis reviews multiple and diverse kinds of ‘data of mind’ and cognition in the background, without reducing the content of cognition to metaphysically determined referents as ‘matters of fact’ and to pure concepts of understanding. Sensible intuitions in the sense of content of cognition vary, most importantly, from unstructured and unjustifiable data of mind including (physical) contents of perception and stuff of mind and also from reflective and intellectual intuitions that are the cognates of the structured complex singular representations. Put it in simple terms, Kant advocates the thesis that ‘facts’ are objects for concepts if they are already well-founded trough the cognitive map of the representation of space.
Challenging Concepts

Debating Conceptualism and Non-Conceptualism in Epistemology and Metaphysics

February, 20-21-22, 2024
University of Padua, Italy
Palazzo del Capitanio, Palazzo Liviano
Piazza Capitaniato 3 and 7

Keynote speakers

Bill Brewer
Walter Hopp
Bruno Leclercq
Denis McManus
Felice Masi
Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl
Elisabetta Sacchi
Hao Tang

Selected speakers


Organizer
Giulia Lanzirotti.

Scientific committee
Andrea Altobrando, Simone Aurora, Luca Corti, Vittorio Morato.

Participants
Massimiliano Carrara, Claudia Cavaliere, Antonio M. Nunziante, Eugenia Stefanello.

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20 FEBRUARY 2024

CHALLENGING CONCEPTS
DEBATING CONCEPTUALISM AND NON-CONCEPTUALISM
IN EPISTEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS

Sala delle Edicole (Palazzo del Capitanio)

9:00 - 10:00 – Registration
10:00 - 10:15 - Opening Words

10:15 - 11:15 - Sala delle Edicole (Palazzo del Capitanio)
Denis McManus - University of Southampton
Categorial Intuition and Being-in-the-world

11:15 - 11:30 - Coffee break

11:30 - 12:30 - Sala delle Edicole (Palazzo del Capitanio)
Felice Masi - University of Federico II, Naples
A Kind of Blue. The Role of Example (and of Exemplification) in Neo-Husserlian Theory of Concepts

12:30 - 15:00 - Lunch and Visiting of Palazzo BO

15.00-16.00 - Sala delle Edicole (Palazzo del Capitanio)
Elisabetta Sacchi - University Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan
Is High-Level Perception Conceptual?

16.00-16.15 Coffee Break

16.15-17.30 - Sala delle Edicole (Palazzo del Capitanio)
Walter Hopp - Boston University
Knowledge, Constitution, and Perception

17.30- 17.45 Coffee Break

17.45-19.00 - Sala delle Edicole (Palazzo del Capitanio)
Bill Brewer - King’s College of London
The Role of Concepts in Perceptual Objectivity
21 FEBRUARY 2024

Sala Diano, Palazzo Liviano
9:45 - 10:30
Luca Zanetti
University of Bologna
The Epistemology of Existence

10:30 - 11:15
Bruno Cortesi
IUSS of Pavia
Transparent Phenomenal Concepts

11:15-11:30 Coffee Break

11:30 - 12:30 - AIS 2 (Palazzo del Capitanio)
Hao Tang - Tsinghua University
Attention and Practical Knowledge

12:30-14:00 Lunch

15:30-15:45 Coffee Break

15:45-16:30
Giuseppe Maria Pascoletti
University of Padua
Are Religious Experiences Conceptual? The Conceptuality Debate in Phenomenology of Religion

16:30-17:15
Adrián Solís
University of Barcelona
Concepts and Intentions of Artifacts’ Essence: The Production of Negative and Queer Objects

17:15-17:30 Coffee Break

17:30-18:30 - AIS 2 (Palazzo del Capitanio)
Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl - University of Graz
Multiple Context-Dependency and Evaluative Experience
9.15-11.00 Scrovegni Chapel

Sala Diano, Palazzo Liviano

11.30-12.15
Pierre Prodromides
Sorbonne University, Paris
Sortal Concepts, what for? Delineation, Counting, and Epistemic Individuation

12.15-13.00
Davide Dalla Rosa
Goethe University Frankfurt
On Property- and Object-Dependent Theories of Perceptual Demonstrative Thoughts

13.00-14.30 Lunch

Sala Diano, Palazzo Liviano

14.30-15.15
Antonio Lizzadri
Catholic University of Milan
A Non-Conceptualistic Account of Conceptualism

15.15-16.00
Juliette Courtillé
Sorbonne University, Paris
Does Perception have Non-conceptual Content? About Putnam’s Latest Philosophy on This Problem

16.00-16.45
Sofia Pedrini
Ruhr University Bochum
The Conceptual Content of Imagination

16.45-17.00 Coffee Break

17.00-18.00 - AIS 2 (Palazzo del Capitanio)

Bruno Leclercq - University of Liège
Semantic Externalism, Semantic Deference and Transparency of Concepts
CONFERENCE VENUES

The Conference will be held in two buildings: Palazzo del Capitanio, and Palazzo Liviano (Piazza Capitaniato 3 and 7).
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