On the Rational Basis of Revelation
in Rosenzweig’s *Star of Redemption*

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1. The Association between Faith and Reason

This issue represents one of Rosenzweig’s central teachings in *The Star of Redemption*. What we are concerned with here is his suggestion for the definition of a personality that accords with the teachings of his absolute empiricism.\(^1\) The basic teaching of merging

\(^1\) Emil Fackenheim argues that Rosenzweig’s absolute empiricism goes much further than the faith-related or religious level and also encompasses the rational aspect of Rosenzweig’s philosophy. See Emil
a philosopher and a saint within the same personality is meant, according to Rosenzweig, for the establishment of a “new notion of philosophy”: a philosophy that requires theology, and a new theologian that strives toward philosophy (Star of Redemption, 115). In other words, what we are concerned with here is the reunion of theology and philosophy (ibid., 112-13).

Rosenzweig expresses his affinity with Cohen’s aforementioned approach as follows: Ein gesunder Mensch braucht beides, Glauben und Denken. Wo sich der Glaube behaupten zu können meint, ohne das Denken von sich wissen zu machen, da muß auf die Dauer entweder der Glaube erstarren oder das Denken verkümmern [a healthy person needs both faith and thought. Whenever faith pretends it can focus on itself without requiring thought, faith is bound to become frozen or thought is bound to waste away] (Zweistromland 188, taken from the essay entitled “Einleitung in die Akademieausgabe der Jüdischen Schriften Hermann Cohens” [Introduction to the Academic Edition of the Jewish Writings of Hermann Cohen]). The spirit of these words was embedded deeply within the Star of Redemption.

In the spirit of the approach adopted by Rosenzweig’s revered mentor Hermann Cohen, this teaching constitutes a point of departure for raising the foundations of Cohen’s philosophical method in Religion of Reason: Out of the Sources of Judaism. This title bears a substantial character with a clearly defined meaning in and of itself and manifests the logical, ethical, aesthetical, and religious domains of human thought.

through Cohen’s notion of “pouring.” Indeed, Cohen explains the logical unfolding of his method in the book’s introduction. He begins by explaining the concept of reason, which acts as the first source of a religion, proceeds to a discussion of the concept of religion, and concludes his discussion with the sources of Judaism. Cohen exhibits a basic affiliation with his early writings in this late book and distills the aforementioned domains such that they are closer to each other: the roots of logic in human awareness are nourished by the natural sciences (the exact sciences). The roots of ethics are nourished by theories of society and state, ethical literature, and ethical philosophy. The roots of aesthetics are nourished from the reason which underpins works of art. The *posteriori* nature of these domains should nonetheless be emphasized since all three domains constitute clear expressions of reason yet are not dependent on pure reason but are rather grounded in the empirical soil which nourishes them.

How do these domains shape the sources of religion? Cohen perceives the addition of reason as a spiritual motive of humanity and perceives the literary expressions this spirit has conveyed through the scriptures as a manifestation of a religious thinking that is made up of emotions, beliefs, values and actions. This merging of reason and religion proposed by Cohen is thus used by Rosenzweig as a basic model for his heart’s desire in the *Star of Redemption*: the equal and mutual dependency of philosophy on religion and vice versa.

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3 The three domains of Cohen’s method and their association with their respective sources accord with three of Cohen’s essays: *The Logic of Pure Knowledge* (1902), *The Ethics of Pure Will* (1904), and *The Aesthetics of Pure Feeling* (1912). While an interpretation of the relation between the late book and those which preceded it is quite problematic – even for a reader capable of encompassing the large amount of material required to this end – it is possible, without entering into too much detail, to determine that Cohen’s early writings are concerned with the same matters he discusses in the aforementioned late book.

4 In his review of the reasons for the contradicting opinions pertaining to the interpretation of Rosenzweig’s method, Fisher (2016) believes that the idea of “common sense” encapsulates Rosenzweig’s philosophical method and can be used for explaining Rosenzweig’s work in *The Star of*
2. **On the Position of the Subject in Rosenzweig’s Method**

The concept of a ‘new philosopher’ was born at the time Rosenzweig discovered Schelling’s “systemic method” which later crystallized in accordance with the revelation system’s internal logic. In revelation, a person discovers her or himself in relation to things outside her or himself – God and the world. In other words, the fact of a person’s existence as an individual – methodically speaking - comes before any discussion of content. This is clearly manifested in the great importance Rosenzweig accords to a person’s proper name as a symbol of the subject’s most intimate meaning. This, in turn, can be learned from Rosenzweig’s citation of the dialogue between Moses and God. Indeed, it is in the midst of the most intimate instance of revelation between God and humanity in the scriptures that Moses tells God “…Yet thou hast said, I know thee by name, and thou hast also found grace in my sight…” (Exodus 33:12 [KJV]), and God replies “…for thou hast found grace in my sight, and I know thee by name” (Exodus 33:18 [KJV]). It should be stressed that knowledge is the bible’s strongest expression indicating intimacy. **Unlike Western languages, the Hebrew verb ‘yada’ does not belong to the domain of sight, but to the domain of touch.** The closeness between God and human beings is the closeness of subjects whose subjective uniqueness lies in their names. A person’s proper name represents the deepest meaning

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*See Wilhelm Windelband (1901 [1892]), *A History of Philosophy* (Trans. James H. Tufts), New York: Macmillan, pp. 596-600, as well as in light of Moshe Schwartz, who argued that Rosenzweig’s interpretation of Schelling shaped the philosophical approach adopted in *The Star of Redemption.* See M. Schwartz (1978), *From Myth to Revelation* [Mi’Mitos Le’Hitgalut], Tel Aviv: Ha’Kibbutz Ha’Meuchad [In Hebrew].

*See Martin Buber (1978), *The Way of the Bible* [Darko Shel Mikra], Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik [In Hebrew], pp. 143. As is well known, Rosenzweig and Buber worked together on a German translation of the Pentateuch, the Former Prophets and parts of the book of Isaiah. This translation was intended as an exegetical translation - an übersetzen.*
of relations between distinct individuals – relations that arise from their individual liberty. Indeed, Rosenzweig based the principle of the relations between the intimate and the distant in the *Star of Redemption* on the irreversible position of the subject. In his own words: “But of course for that, the infinite God would have to become so finitely near to man, so face to face, a named person to a named person, that no reason of the rational ones, no wisdom of the wise ones could ever admit” (*The Star of Redemption*, 47-8). For the central importance of the proper name also see *The Star of Redemption*, pp. 189-190, 201-202, 317-357. Thus composed, the image of reality transforms the individual into a highly perfected being, a reflective person. A person’s subjective position as an individual rests on the orientation of revelation – the capacity to establish her or his position in relation to any ‘what’ that is not her or himself, and this forms the bedrock of existential certainty in the *Star of Redemption*. Only a person as an individual possesses a concrete above and below in nature (*The New Thinking*, p. 206) and it is through revelation, therefore, that a person can govern her or his own addiction to ideals (ibid. 214). A person’s unique position as a named entity is thus the pivot of the empirical orientation that integrates well with reflective thought and critical faculties which both advance a person toward a better capacity for ontological permanence. Rosenzweig therefore identifies with Cohen’s position with respect to the central position of a philosopher as a distinct individual. In this respect, he cites from the letter Cohen sent to Stadler on the 17th of July, 1890 after Godfried Keller passed away: “wenn man von dem Gelehrten-Bourgeois-Gedanken sich befreit hat, den Denker in der Seele zu ehren und demgemäß den intellektuellen Transport auf die Ewigkeit der Kultur für die Hauptkraft und den eigentlichen Wert des armen menschlichen Individuums anzusehen, dann bleibt doch vielmehr das Unsägliche und Vorübergehende in der Laune, und wenns hoch
kommt, der Gesinnung der Mitmenschen das eigentlich Beständige was als Menschenwert und als das Ewige im Irdischen zu taxieren bleibt” [When you liberate yourself from the bourgeois-scholarly notion suggesting that the power of the thinker of the mind should be respected and – accordingly – that the actual power and value of a poor human individual should be viewed in this, then it is actually the thing which is transient in the workings of others’ mind or thought that is existent and stable in actual fact] (Zweistromland 205, taken from the essay entitled “Einleitung in die Akademieausgabe der Jüdischen Schriften Hermann Cohens” [Introduction to the Academic Edition of the Jewish Writings of Hermann Cohen]). Rosenzweig later notes Cohen’s words as the founding idea that preceded the appearance of his philosophy of religion by twenty-three years and praises him on abandoning a bourgeois-scholarly narrow-minded conception of ethics based on the perpetuity of culture and laws of morality and on coming to fight the individual’s fight, at whatever cost (ibid.)

3. Revelation: A Subject’s Heritage

Rosenzweig’s chapter on revelation leads the discussion from a preliminary stage where God loves and a person is loved, to the next stage – that of a loving person. It is at this stage that an individual’s position is actual established as an I, a loved one, and a lover, that is to say, her or his position in the relations between her or himself and that which she or he is not, and this by way of dialogue (Star of Redemption, 188-189).

Rosenzweig stresses discourse – the universe was created in words, viz. “And God said, `Let there be light’” (and heaven, etc.) (Genesis 1 [KJV]). Revelation is also realized in the conversation between subject and subject, such as between God and
humanity: “Where art thou?” (Genesis 3:9 [KJV]) and “I am” (Exodus 20:2 [KJV]) – the opening statement of the Ten Commandments (see Star of Redemption, 152). It should be noted that the discourse of creation and the discourse of revelation to an individual (which enfolds the discourse of revelation to many), as well as the Ten Commandments are all phrased as addressing the individual which Rosenzweig is always careful about positioning at the center of the discussion, which is possibly why he preferred the literary-biblical narrative for conceptualizing his ideas in The Star of Redemption. Rosenzweig rules out any possibility of a discourse between objects or between subject and object, and argues that discourse can only take place between subjects. Therefore, and unlike the meta-ethical person who lacks the power of speech, the person as a loving subject is engaged in a dialogue with others – with god and the world – as subjects. Such a discourse is referred to a discourse from real word to real word (ibid., 188). According to Rosenzweig, there is nothing real between objects. The object is a frozen thing that does not create relations and which is not capable of being related to – any speech that does not exist between subjects is no speech at all. And in this respect he notes: And so let us not continue, like with Creation, to proceed from linguistic category to linguistic category, but in accordance with the entirely real linguistic expression of language where, because for us it is the central part of this whole work, we are going to stay, we shall proceed from real word to real word. Only reflectively – it is only through reflection that we shall be able – and that we shall, of course, be compelled – to recognize also in the real word the representative of its linguistic category. But as such, we do not discover a representative of a category: we discover it directly as word and answer. (ibid., 188). This statement seeks to fix the irreversible position of the subject in Rosenzweig’s method – the subject that the critique of idealism and the theory of the non-reductive
individual has extracted from the pantheist totality. A reflection on discourse allows and is even compelled to noticing the position and value of the singular individual as a preface to a significant discourse between subjects who are named, defined and unexchangeable or unblurrrable within the types, nations and other totalities (ibid. 188-190). Apparently, what we are concerned with here is a kind of radical subjectivism as a prerequisite for revelation – to the subject’s orientation in space, in time, and in relations with those around her or him.

Schematically speaking, this identification is based in the equivalence of three factors: revelation, orientation, and reflection.

4. Revelation = Knowledge: Rational Aspects in Rosenzweig’s Concept of “Revelation”

In the section entitled Reason’s Grounds Rosenzweig states that the loving god’s response to a person …does not have the I for its subject; as such, it is more than the mere word of one’s own heart, and even if in the narrowest, most intimate circle it sets a relation into the world of things. (ibid., 197) He later proceeds to state that …For, although it now remains entirely in the present, Revelation remembers its past and recognizes its past as a part of a past world [reflection]; but along with this, it also gives to its present actuality the status of a reality in the world. (ibid., 198). In other words, Rosenzweig is stating that realization becomes an existential certainty which crystallizes into evident knowledge even as its reality is recognized. Put differently, that means that present evidence receives reflexive reinforcement of its reality from the past. In the words of the text, in its absorption in the present it saw nothing outside of itself. Now it can open its eyes with full serenity and look around
itself in the world of things… (ibid., 198). What we concerned with here is with revelation as an act of breaking through humans’ circle of closed-mindedness, imperviousness, and metaethical disconnectedness and toward openness-love. Revelation must open its eyes to see the world – to becomes familiar with the world of things – the present orientation from which it becomes familiar with its past – an inquisitive and critical reflection as an a posteriori basis for options and certainty.7

A further reinforcement in this spirit can be found in Rosenzweig’s statements in the section entitled Logic of Revelation: Revelation is in the present, and indeed it is the present par excellence. It looks back to the past in the moment where it would like to give its present actuality the form of the statement, but it sees this past only by shining into it the light of the present; it is only in this backward glance that the past reveals itself to be the foundation and portent of the presently lived experience housed in the I (ibid., 200). The grammatical terminology that accompanies the discussion in the present section (indicative, imperative) is meant for expressing the experience of the present – the present reality. Rosenzweig’s statements clearly reveal that we are concerned with a reflective view derived from the bifurcated (experience and understanding) nature of revelation.

The orientational fixing of the individual and her or his position in Rosenzweig’s method as described above lays the foundation for the relations that form the core of Rosenzweig’s radical empiricism – the real dialogue. Thus, it is its own genus unto itself. It no longer has its place in the world, or its moment in the becoming; rather,

7 It should be noted that Jacobi is the spiritual father of this idea despite the fact that Rosenzweig does not mention this. Jacobi makes a distinction between reason and intellect. Jacobi states that - unlike traditional philosophy, which sought to employ discursive intellect to attain anything which could be attained by reason - reason is the capacity for direct perception and intellect is the capacity for reflection. This distinction leads to a conclusion that reflection is more perfect and that it is reflection that distinguishes between humans and other animals. See S.H. Bergman, History of Modern Philosophy [Toldot Ha’Filosofia Ha’Chadashah], Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 1977, p. 23 [In Hebrew].
it carries with it its here and its now; the place where it is a center, and the moment where it opens its mouth is a beginning... (ibid., 201). From this point forward, Rosenzweig leads this progression to the next stage – emphasizing the experiencer’s essential need to know. An experience that does not know is nothing but a delusion or a dream. This, first and foremost, raises the need for a clearly defined point of self amounting to a certainty which determines the individual’s non-reductive world. In this respect Rosenzweig states that **the I with its proper name is in itself at once center and beginning, in accordance with its creation simultaneously as man and as “Adam”: it now brings these concepts of center and beginning into the world; for the I demands, as center of its lived experience, a center, and as beginning of its lived reality, a beginning. It aspires after an orientation...** (ibid., 201). While this statement is clear, Rosenzweig is not satisfied, and he proceeds to explain the nature of this orientation as follows: ... **Because it is in the world, this foundation must be spatial and temporal, just so that it can give a foundation to the absolute certitude of its lived reality of having its own space and time....** (ibid., 202). This orientation does not take place in a dream, in a play, or in the imagination, but – as a baseline for certainty – revolves around the self in its relations as receiver and giver, and must possess a spatial and temporal character. The ...[orientational] **foundation must bring to the lived reality [must reveal itself as love and knowledge] in the world a center and a beginning in one, the center in space, the beginning in time.... There must be a where, a place still visible in the world, from where Revelation radiates,**

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8 Parenthetically speaking, in a manner akin to the present-day GPS mechanism. In this respect, I agree with Schwartz’s approach, viz. that Rosenzweig does not assume the “factuality of revelation from the subject’s personal conception of subjectivity.” However, I disagree with him on experience as being of the greatest importance – if only due to the fact that only humans can experience, not delusional and dreaming humans, but knowing humans. The knowledge of reality and its experiential significance is the knowledge of the self and others in a validation of truth, which is what Rosenzweig means in all the statements presented above and which shall be presented below.
and a when, a moment where it opens its mouth, a continuously re-echoing moment…. (ibid., 202). These words thus emphasize the mutual dependence existing between the two components of the concept of revelation. These two join each other, but we are not concerned with their synthesis. Parenthetically, I will also note that the rule of joining applies to all of the components included in Rosenzweig’s method and accompanies all the stages in its discussion: affirmative and negative, liberty and necessity, near and far, etc. All of these become relevant to each other through the linguistic symbol of mechanical revelation: the “and” which fundamentally leaves the full extent of its self-identity in each of these components.

The revelation = knowledge identification attains its final crystallization toward the end of *The Star of Redemption*. This is manifested as follows in the third book of the third part entitled *The Star or Eternal Truth*: …But just because he pours forth upon us in Revelation… he puts our free reason, irresistible to all that is stagnant, into the chains of love, and, bound by such bond, summoned by such a calling by name, we move in the circle in which we found ourselves, and on the path upon which we are placed …. (ibid., 404, my emphasis). A little further along in the book, when he discusses those who are devoid of revelation – the people of the possible – the “maybe” – the speculative philosophers, Rosenzweig states that: …They lack the skeleton of reality, the clear direction, the solid place, the knowledge of right and left, of up and down, which enters the world only with Revelation…. (ibid., 405, my emphasis), or – in the original German – das Wissen um Rechts und Links, Oben und Unten, das erst mit der Offenbarung in die Welt kommt…. (p. 480 in the original German text of *The Star of Redemption*). I made these emphases in order to focus our discussion on the contextual dependence which exists between the experience of love and knowing the self as knowing reality. However, the somewhat ambiguous phrasing used in the
translation leaves us with a certain degree of doubt: only with Revelation can be understood in English as meaning ‘alongside Revelation’ or ‘only after Revelation.’ The original German does not give rise to such doubt, since erst mit means ‘together with, alongside’.

These words are reaffirmed in Rosenzweig’s late May 1917 letter to Gertrud Oppenheim: since, on the one hand, Revelation determines up and down, one Europe and one Asia, etc., and on the other hand, it distinguishes between early and late, past and future. The infinite (‘the ultimate’) descends to the Earth, and this is where – from the place of its descent – it delimits borders in the ocean of space and in the flow of time. These words clearly reveal that the element of knowledge constitutes an integral part of the act of revelation alongside the element of experience. Additional support for the rational mechanism which joins the concept of revelation in the Star can be found in The ‘Germ Cell’ of The Star of Redemption where Rosenzweig asks Rosenstock what he understood by revelation, and cites the latter’s response alongside some words about its adoption: …‘Revelation is orientation.’ After revelation there is an Above and Below in nature – Heaven and Earth – which is real, and can no longer be relativized…. Rosenzweig fully supports this response and interprets it as follows: …and a real firm Earlier and Later in time. Thus: in “natural” space and in natural time, the center is always the point where I happen to be; in the revealed Space-Time, the center is an immovable fixed point that I do not displace whenever I myself change or move away….¹⁰

¹ Letters, my translation into English from Horowitz’s translation of the German original into Hebrew (Letter no. 125 to Gertrud Oppenheim, 30.5.17), p. 108 [in Horowitz’s translation into Hebrew].
¹⁰ Franz Rosenzweig’s The New Thinking (1998), A. Udoff and B.E. Galli, eds. Syracuse University Press, pp. 47, 48. Also see The Star of Redemption, pp.13-14, and compare with A.E. Simon who says “the same orientation was identified by his friend [who was in the process of converting to Christianity]… Eugen Rosenstock, with the revelation itself. This was an issue they did not dispute” (Letters, 64) [my translation from Hebrew] and with “…revelation directs and guides, provides
Rosenzweig defines revelation as the orientational act by which a person discovers god and her or himself in relation to god in experience and in relation to the world in space and time. In this respect, it is worth noting that we are not concerned with self-awareness as a precondition for knowledge, as is the case with Descartes. This also follows from a later part of Rosenzweig’s letter to Gertrud Oppenheim, where he explains the intellectual and practical meaning of revelation in the sense of self-orientation as a clearly defined point – as a non-reductive center which has its own methodological standing – that is not embedded in the totality. In his opinion, the lack of such a clearly defined point expresses loss.

The justification for identifying revelation with reflection necessarily follows from this identification’s cumulative logic, and this may be schematically represented as follows:

1) revelation is orientation: revelation = orientation; 2) orientation = above and below, early and late, that is to say true knowledge of the (non-relative) coordinates of the frozen point where I am. And cumulatively, a view from the present to the past, or in Rosenzweig’s terms: Revelation – looks back to the past when it wishes it presence to assume an indicative form… while it illuminates it with the light of the present = reflection; 3) conclusion: revelation = orientation = reflection, or revelation = reflection. We are not concerned with mysticism or with an ecstatic and irrational kind of revelation.

In a break from his narrative style, and specifically here, Rosenzweig defines argument 1 via definitional language that states equivalence: revelation is orientation, pure and simple. The second stage of the argument states equivalence between orientation and reflection. The justification for equivalence between orientation and reflection is based

orientation…” (in Discussions of the House of Hillel, Jerusalem: Magnes, 5716 [1955-56], p. 17) [my translation from Hebrew].
on the aforementioned things, on Rosenzweig’s description of orientation, and on his explanations identifying it with reflection on a practical level.

An analysis of Rosenzweig’s reasoning for Rosenstock’s definition reflects a combined definitional and interpretive explanation that forms a logical connection between its constitutive parts.

It is based on the applied nature of orientation as it is understood from Rosenzweig’s explanation that we can determine the presence of reflection as a knowable part of the experience of revelation that reveals the self in relation to space and time. Without reflection, after all, no person can find her or himself as a defined central point. The conclusion that follows from the identification states the existence of a knowable dimension of revelation, or – in Rosenzweig’s words: …Only reflectively—it is only through reflection that we shall be able—and that we shall, of course, be compelled to recognize also in the real word…. (Star of Redemption, 188). We are concerned with actual knowledge. In Rosenzweig’s opinion, the real word is the creation of the world in speaking of everything that arose, arises, and will arise from it in the universe, including – primarily and among other things – the dialogue of creation, revelation, redemption and choral singing as the complete redemption. Rosenzweig is concerned with the fact that the knowledge of all these is acquired as a result of reflexive reflection.

Here we should note that we are not concerned with theological creation, but with creation as a relation between two complements (person and world) who have been broken away from the totality. Rosenzweig’s use of speech – ‘the creation of the world in speech’ may misdirect us. This statement does not seek to express religious motivation, but rather to stress the momentum of relations between subjects that primarily take place in the linguistic-spoken dimension.
The above cannot but lead me to conclude that the concept of revelation – as a mainstay of Rosenzweig’s system – manifests the inter-domain principle as follows: 1) domain of knowledge = philosophy = time and space = shape of the method; 2) domain of faith = the constant experience = the love = the method’s contents.

The centrality of this principle in the Star’s methodical fabric arises from its conjunctive capacity. The joining of the two above domains situates it as a modal nucleus that validates the ‘and’. All the contrasting concepts that express the Star’s contents, such as liberty and necessity, affirmative and negative, will and rebellion, commandment and law, near and far, revealed and hidden, reason and faith, subject and object, individual and collective, etc. can – as a result of the presence of this fundamental principle – co-exist and produce their meaning cumulatively without being subsumed into each other in a theory of identity, or in dialectical synthesis, or in a relation of reason and consequence. The principle of inter-domain affiliation validates the existence of many different individuals within a method of relations between subjects that are free from their bondage to objects and totalities and without requiring the principle of ‘multiple is’ in its unity in order to shape a method.

It is natural for the domain of knowledge in an empirical system to rely on reflection rather than on the initial thought act. Such a method presents the individual with the option of examining her or himself, her or his place, and her or his actions. The orientational capacity in Rosenzweigian thought thus represents the domain of human knowledge and all of its various branches, despite not being explicitly presented as such by Rosenzweig himself. It should be stressed that Rosenzweig does not make a distinction between intellect [Verstand] and reason [Vernunft]¹¹, a fact which imbues

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orientation with sweeping significance. After all, orientation in the peripheral sense of the word requires scientific, physical (biological), psychological, astronomical, mathematical, geometrical and other kinds of knowledge, without which the knowledge of the self in relation to what is outside it shall remain incomplete. Orientation as a basis for reflection reflects a self-examination of a person’s place in the context of giving and receiving relations such that it projects from the subject to others and vice versa. In other words, it expresses two tests – empathy and analogy. Empathy is more apparent in the experiential-emotional domain, while analogy is more apparent in the rational domain. The analogy, or the derivation of the equivalent conclusion, is the logical fulcrum of the ethical principles in Rosenzweig’s thought. In what follows, we shall show how the principle of inter-domain affiliation underpins the moral motivation which shall lead the individual – lost in the totality – to her or his redemption.

5. **The Person who is Present in Front of Me (the Neighbor) as a Subject is the World Around Me**

In describing a person’s orientation in the world, Rosenzweig is not referring to a world of wood and stone in which a person can orient her or himself in the geographical sense. What he means is relations between people. A person must orient her or himself among subjects rather than objects. When Rosenzweig speaks of the world, he means humanity. A person’s orientation in a human environment she or he is in contact with, whether

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12 Rosenzweig often employs the trait of equivalent derivation. See, for example, *The Star of Redemption*, p.19. Where Rosenzweig’s critique is derived from reason’s tendency toward generalizations – assimilating being and identifying it with itself and with its determination of being as unity despite its infinite plurality.
distant or close, whether expected or coincidental or unexpected. The world = people.

By relating to people, a person realizes god’s love of him, which is revelation.

5.1 On Intersubjective Revelation as Redemption: A Few Words on the Star of Redemption’s Moral Core

Most Rosenzweig scholars agree that his outlook as expressed in The Star of Redemption is humanist in character.\(^\text{13}\) We are concerned with a kind of humanist thought where the love of people comes as a response to god (or divine benevolence)’s love of people. As a whole, it may be assumed that humanism constitutes an ethical-idealist expression of inter-personal relations between a person and others at the normative level. What Rosenzweig is attempting to do in The Star of Redemption is to realize the applied aspect of humanism and establish it in practice on the basis of accepting divine love as a model for love between one person and another. Ethicality is the applied expression of humanism and the neighborly love that is predicated on the double basis of belief and reason, and as such constitutes the concretization of this idea. Inter-domain affiliation thus constitutes a principle that applies humanism in practice from the ideal domain to the empirical domain. The main role of reason, in turn, is to

\(^{13}\) cf., for example, Levi “Franz Rosenzweig and his Treatment of Judaism” [F]ranz Rosenzweig Ve’Yachaso La’Yahadut], Da’at [Knowledge] 6, Bar-Ilan University Press, p. 58 [in Hebrew]. Pollock expands in Chapter 4 on the concept of the world. The transition from world negation to the redeemed world goes through the connection between the individual and the whole. The world as a denied philosophical assemblage receives renewed design through the individual, who is aware of himself through the fear of death. The inner strengths of the individual in revelation led Rosenzweig to realize that God not only revealed but also created the element called “world.” Pollock, Benjamin (2014), Franz Rosenzweig’s Conversion, World Denial and World Redemption, Indiana University Indianapolis.
establish individual autonomy when an individual set out to adopt a position as moral actor.\textsuperscript{14}

The moral aspect of \textit{The Star of Redemption} is not an ethical theory in the traditional sense of the word. We are not concerned with behavioral teachings which describe how, when, and what to do, but with the constitution of a guiding principled core (in a manner akin to Kant in the theoretical sense). The \textit{Star of Redemption}'s moral core is manifested in the principle of inter-domain affiliation in revelation where the dimensions of knowledge and experience are jointly employed as methodological strata. In other words, Rosenzweig argues that the source of every moral value is present in the connection between the knowledge of self as experiencing in space and time and the experience of love. The aforementioned affiliation is a kind of model of the ability to give rise to relations which are directed outwards from the closed and defined self (such as dialogue, neighborly love, the conjunction ‘and’ etc.). According to Rosenzweig, love is not a blind emotional mechanism, but an activity that is accompanied by awareness – by knowledge of the self and the state of affairs outside the self, for which the self is capable of accounting for and even compelled to account for. We are not concerned with an act of first innocence which, according to Rosenzweig, had become obsolete once humans had been banished from the Garden of Eden. A person cannot escape the historical fact of eating from the tree of knowledge and thus transforming any innocence to one associated with inevitable knowledge. The scientific person, the logician or the rationalist philosopher devoid of naïveté must

\textsuperscript{14} Leo Strauss is emphatic about ruling out the possibility of combining philosophy and theology. According to Strauss, any philosophical writing which is religious in nature is nothing but esoteric writing meant to conceal the non-religious philosophical trends. See Leo Strauss, \textit{Jerusalem and Athens} [Yerushalayim Ve’Atunah], Ehud Luz, ed. Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik and the Leo Baeck Institute, pp. 142-282 [In Hebrew]. Strauss also noted that Rosenzweig’s approach is diametrically opposed to Jewish orthodoxy: “Rosenzweig does not act by virtue of divine law, the Torah, and not from within the Jewish people… Rosenzweig acts in the opposite manner: Rosenzweig acts, as he phrases it, ‘sociologically.’ His method is philosophy from experience.” (ibid., p. 350, my translation from Hebrew).
therefore aspire to returning innocence to inevitable knowledge’s side since the latter is within her or his reach. According to Rosenzweig, this is an innocence that establishes spontaneous faith alongside intellectual knowledge – a second innocence.¹⁵

Revelation is not an isolated and direct atomic certainty enjoyed by a hedonist subject who drinks deeply from the springs of salvation, i.e. the love of god, but the subject’s knowledge of her or himself and her or his environment – others around her or him as subjects and the world within an empirical method that provides her or him with meanings on the connections between her or himself and other subjects. This is where we find the point of origin for any ethical discussion of Rosenzweig’s method – inter-domain affiliation contains the practical core of human existence.

¹⁵ A.E. Simon, who coined this term, associated it with Rosenzweig (see 1.2 above and note). This concept challenges the orthodox approach which entirely rules out any scientific knowledge accompanying the believer. See “Franz Rosenzweig and the Problem of Jewish Education” [Franz Rosenzweig U’Be’ayat Ha’Chinuch Ha’Yehudi] in Gesharim [Bridges], 393-406 [in Hebrew]. The issue is also discussed extensively in Ehud Luz “The Second Innocence: On A.E. Simon’s Jewish Humanism” [Ha’Temimut Ha’Sheniya: ‘Al Ha’Humanizm Ha’Yehudi Shel A.E. Simon] in Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Philosophy [Mechkarey Yerushalayim Be’Machshevet Yisra’el], Volume II, Issue IV, 5743 [1983], pp. 613-643. In interpreting Simon’s article “The Second Innocence,” Luz argues that Simon follows West in viewing faith as based on the effect of awe, and philosophy as based on the effect of wonder that gives rise to scholarly discernment, with both being derived from the same root. In this respect, Luz determines three stages: 1) childhood, which is characterized as innocent faith; 2) education, which destroys innocence in its skepticism and in its critical approach; 3) the reunification of faith and knowledge. Luz notes that the path to this reunification is found by Simon (and by Bergman too) in the teachings of Cusanus, Hermann Cohen and Franz Rosenzweig (p. 620). Simon states that the second innocence is stronger than the first since it recognizes reality with all its faults. In his article “The Second Innocence,” Simon argues “we are not permitted to rid ourselves of the duty of reflection, and the issue of second innocence at hand is also subordinated to it to the full extent of its perception and applicability.” (Are We Still Jews? [Ha’Im ‘Od Yehudim Anachnu], Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Ha’Poalim, 1982, p. 141) [In Hebrew, my translation]. Yehoyada Amir too argues that Rosenzweig does not alienate himself from the modern secular position he came from and abandoned, and that he wishes to contain it in his method through a framework of combining faith and reason (Y. Amir, Eretz-Yisra’el Responses to the Works of F. Rosenzweig [Teguvot Eretz-Yisra’el’iyot Le’Haguto Shel Franz Rosenzweig], Ph.D. Dissertation, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 5754 [1994], pp. 44-47; hereafter referred to as Amir, Responses). Given the aforementioned interpretations, I believe Rosenzweig was not entitled to rid himself of reflection either. Despite aspiring toward innocence – a second innocence which certainly awards reflection a central place as an equal partner to faith. In other words, the second innocence – unlike the first, which lacked reflection, manifests reflection within itself. Rosenzweig, who was aware of these insights, proceeded to included them in the fundamental concept of his method – revelation.
6. The Two Dimensions: A Philosophical Foundation for a Theory of Ethics

Many philosophical systems of thought have attempted to resolve the problem of the subject-object gap insofar as ethics are concerned. Such attempts as theories of identification, pantheism, delegation, dialectics, etc. – as discussed in the introduction to the present article – were all ruled out by Rosenzweig.

The manifestation of a fundamental moral principle in the context of revelation can be reconciled with the fact that humans alone among the totality of creation are gifted with the capacity for reflection in general, and normative and value-laden reflection in particular. It is only a human being that can observe reflectively and examine ethical significances in an analogous fashion. According to Rosenzweig, a philosopher or scientist’s rational capacity to recognize the chain of causes and corollaries that constitute the object she or he is aiming for does not make either of them a moral person. A moral person – as the object and subject of revelation – can and even must observe her or himself as a primary cause – liberty, center – the medium and point of origin for her or his relations with the world. As such, she or he would be able to see others as she or he sees her or himself – as a subject, and to realize the commandment of …For man must love his neighbor as himself…. he is like you. “Like you,” hence not “you.” You remain You and you will remain You. But he will not remain a He for you and hence only a This for your You… no, he is like you, like your You, a You like you, an I—a soul…. (The Star of Redemption, p. 257). Only a world of subjects is
a redeemed world. However, seeing her or his neighbor as her or himself is not a general statement, nor is it a mere analogical statement. Insofar as *The Star of Redemption* is concerned, there is an unambiguous demand to transform him from an object – a This – to a subject – a You. And in order to sharpen this emphasis on the other as subject, I will stress that, unlike Kant, whose practical rule considers others as an end in itself, Rosenzweig perceives others as a subject like myself rather than an end. This is the intention of the stressing-repetition of the word you; this is the uncompromising ethical yardstick – the moral directive that stands at the core of the discussion and constitutes its final objective – the redemption of humankind. Indeed, the system could not fulfill its stated goal without this requirement. Put differently, revelation, and certainly not redemption – neighborly love – do not have any meaning without subject-to-subject relations. What we shall see in what follows is how this transformation is also manifested in the concept of revelation.

7. **On Controlled Ecstasy**

Before I proceed, I will note that when we are concerned with Rosenzweig’s concept of revelation, we are not concerned with ecstasy as a psychological state of self-transference from everyday reality to another contextual apparatus, nor are we concerned with an internal transformation of our awareness, senses, imagination and memory. Rosenzweig was intimately familiar with Max Weber’s sociological approach

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16 Levi argues that Rosenzweig was influenced by the atheist Feuerbach and that revelation and redemption should not be considered as activities in the religious domain, but rather manifestly humanist in nature. See Levi, *Coping with the Hegelian Legacy* [Hitmodedut ‘Im Ha’Moreshet Ha’Hegeliyanit], p. 29 Wiener, Dow Leon (2017). In your *Walking on the Way: A Theory of Halakha Based on the Thought of Franz Rosenzweig*, Bar -Ilan University Press, Ramat-Gan. I also find there to be some theoretical proximity to Schleiermacher.
to religion, as well as with William James’ teachings, which classify all religious experiences according to psychological strata. James associated the sense of joy that accompanies religious ecstasy with a psychological-religious process arising from a crisis caused by a change of heart.\textsuperscript{17} I will now present James’ description of St. Teresa’s Ecstasy: … In the orison of union...the soul is fully awake as regards God, but wholly asleep as regards things of this world and in respect of herself.... During the short time the union lasts, she is as it were deprived of every feeling, and even if she would, she could not think of any single thing.... So a person who falls into a deep faint appears as if dead....\textsuperscript{18} Rosenzweig is not concerned with this kind of ecstasy, and even opposes any indications of renouncing self-awareness with respect to anything, including god. After all, such self-renunciation is nothing but a psycho-religious transformation which cannot be restrained methodologically and which is diametrically opposed to orientation as the central motif of the moral actor in \textit{The Star of Redemption}. As a stated opponent of mysticism (see \textit{The Star of Redemption}, Part III, Introduction pp. 283-322).\textsuperscript{19} Rosenzweig does not accept the self’s transference from its coordinate juncture to another contextual apparatus. The orientation test is what determines the self’s contextual apparatus in relation to whatever and whomever is outside it, and any indication of a senseless disconnection increases the distance

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Letters}, tr. [into Hebrew] Horowitz, p. 335 [Letter 341]. Rosenzweig’s words suggest his extensive familiarity with the works of Weber and James.


\textsuperscript{19} Also see Rosenzweig’s letter to his parents dated 12.4.17 in \textit{Letters}, p. 189 [tr. Horowitz (into Hebrew)].
between the *you* component and the *love thy neighbor* context: according to Rosenzweig, the *you* leaves the self in its place, which is what stresses the subject’s central position. Love thus stands at the core of the present discussion, since it is the action taking place between the moral actor and her or his object in a triangular manner with *I-you* at the base and the verb ‘love’ at its vertex. Love for a neighbor but not the neighbor, which is the love of god – revelation.\(^\text{20}\) It therefore follows that ecstasy is nothing but the analogous projection of the emotion of self-love to an object but not to the object while existing in a reflection-controlled and intellectual state of sensual awareness. Rosenzweig’s realist perception of ecstasy can also be understood from Levinas’ position – as Levinas was deeply influenced by Rosenzweig, and especially with regard to ethics. Thus, and in following Rosenzweig, Levinas observes divine revelation in the act of affiliating with a neighbor. Levinas even intensifies Rosenzweig’s approach by considering the neighbor as something that pertains to me to the point of obsession, so much so that her or his [the neighbor’s] distress leaves me restless, which is the moral of *love thy neighbor as thyself*, i.e. that the other’s right to existence precedes mine.\(^\text{21}\) Not and you have become another person – another entity, but you have transformed your love for yourself as a subject who loves her or himself by nature to loving thy neighbor as thyself – as a subject. Not [love] the other, since as such the latter is an object, but love an indirect object that symbolizes the recipient subject. It should be stressed that - despite the subject’s central place in his method – Rosenzweig takes care not to be dragged into subjectivism. This care is manifested in the sociological character of religion as a backdrop to ethics in his

\(^{20}\) cf. Martin Buber, *The Way of the Bible* [Darko Shel Mikra], pp. 103-105 [In Hebrew]. Buber considers neighborly love to be a rare and one-time biblical connection between the verb and an indirect object, which means the commanding of a relation to a recipient but not to the recipient.

teachings. After all, Rosenzweig suggests that the inevitable social projection of the act of love is nothing but a prologue to the sociology of sharing: …There is no sublimer purpose for religion than to eventually void itself in pure ethics… (Zweistromland 134 – taken from the essay “Hermann Cohen and his Teachings in Judaism” [my translation]), and we are concerned with religion as a collective field of action. In this respect, Rosenzweig’s approach resembles Weber’s, who – unlike Eastern religions, which he defined as lacking social affiliation – classified monotheistic religions as socially shaping religions. According to Rosenzweig, the methodological necessity of ecstasy encompasses the intensification of loving others. In other words, the analogous ecstasy is nothing but an expression of the intensification of the moral principle – from the weakness of relating to others to the increased intensity of the self. This, in turn, is realized in Judaism and Christianity as a social space for action that is best suited for the implementation of the “love thy neighbor” principle.

This joining of the principle of inter-domain affiliation and absolute empiricism provides a logical stratum for the methodical requirement of transforming a subject to an object and an object to a subject as follows: 1) within the framework of the domain of knowledge: by reflecting on myself, I become an object of myself. As a result, a person as subject is aware of the reality of her or himself as a central point and origin of a meaningful world, and as an object she or he is a This – an object outside her or his selfhood; 2) in the experiential domain: in love that makes the distant closer and which anticipates the future into the present (pre-flection), I transform others from object to subject.

22 For more on the issue of subjectivism and subjectivity, see Levinas, “F. Rosenzweig, a Model of Jewish Thought” [F. Rosenzweig, Degem Shel Machshava Yehudit], Da’at [Knowledge] 6, p. 65 [In Hebrew].
23 The meaning of this terms in the present study: the opposite of re-observation – anticipatory observation. Rosenzweig often uses the concept of anticipation, especially on the issues of inviting the proximity of god, human beings, and redemption. The issue of anticipation will be discussed extensively in a chapter that will be entirely dedicated to the domain of morals in Rosenzweig’s system.
(religion and reason or priest and philosopher) is that the person who has experienced revelation is an ecstatic being. These words are supported textually as follows: …and just as creation as subject matter for revelation has been transformed from the world to an eventuality, to ‘has already eventuated,’ so is redemption transformed from a supreme world to an eventuation, to ‘what shall be eventuated.’ It is thus that revelation converges all things into its presence; it knows not itself alone but is ‘entirely within it’… even redemption, however it may appear, is necessary subject matter for revelation… since redemption does nothing but present all living things with what preceded and occurred in the very same revelation as an experience concealed within the mind…” (The Star of Redemption, 278, my translation and emphasis from Hebrew).

In a manner akin to the definition suggesting that revelation is orientation, this is another case where Rosenzweig - employing a definitional utterance and a present-tense

24 While writing The Star of Redemption, Rosenzweig was familiar with Schelling’s later teachings and considered the latter’s concept of ecstasy as an important fundament of the liberty principle. Schelling explicitly establishes the concept of ‘ecstasy’ as an ‘I’ that is established outside itself, that is, outside its place (Sämtliche Werke, Part I, Volume X, p. 229), by which he means the transformation of the self into a more real entity through reflexive though. What joins both thinkers is that their conception of ecstasy transforms the thinking self that is unaware of itself as a thinker, to the object of knowledge. A certain proximity to the later Schelling’s idea of ecstasy is present in Rosenzweig due to both thinkers’ moral context; in this respect, Schelling’s teachings manifest ecstasy as the cancellation of the subject’s selfishness which morally signifies a shift from evil to good (Sämtliche Werke, Part II, Volume XIII, p. 202). Other than this, I cannot find any parallels between Schelling’s concept of ecstasy and the action of ecstasy in our present discussion. After all, Schelling ascribes the rational subject’s capacity for ecstasy to the absolute subject – divine reason and liberty (ibid., Part II, Volume XIII, p. 202). Schwartz also devotes an extensive discussion to the meaning of ecstasy in Schelling’s teachings (From Myth to Revelation [Mi’Mitos Le’Hitgalut], pp. 48-65 [In Hebrew]). In this respect Schwartz finds that Schelling influenced Rosenzweig and ascribes the position suggesting that thought acts ecstatically to the former’s influence. According to Schwartz “…[In] philosophy, thought attains its specific contents (…) while affirming its own negation, since the void or [the state of] null knowledge is [one of thought’s] hypothetical assumptions….”(loc. cit. [my translation from Hebrew]). In other words, thought is capable of negating itself – negating its non-knowledge (negating negation). Schwartz considers such negation as Rosenzweig’s manifestation of the freedom of the elements: god, world, and human – each in its own way – and suggests this position as influenced by Schelling. Rosenzweig builds his method from within itself – from actual real experience, and not by virtue of ex-systematic rational speculations. In other words, Rosenzweig sought to attain a system whose cohesion relies on an empirical grounding and which does not rely on anything other than its own internal arguments.
outlook - identifies revelation with **the anticipation of that which shall eventuate - redemption**. If redemption, as something that shall eventuate, constitutes - as does the past - **part of the necessary content of the revelation** in the present, then it becomes possible to establish the following equation: if creation = revelation, and redemption = revelation, then reflection = revelation and pre-flection (anticipation) = revelation.

I shall now address the corroboration of the aforementioned identification through an analysis of the god - human dialog as revelation, and the human - neighbor (world) as redemption.

We are concerned with what is discussed under the heading **the Form of Dialog** (ibid., 188). Rosenzweig establishes god's subjective position in his method by employing the double negation instrument in the service of grammatically parsing the sentence **so and not otherwise**; the passage begins by presenting the individual as a defined subject whose lobar presence is equivalent to the totality. According to Rosenzweig, **when you mark something as 'so and not otherwise' you simply delimit it against the 'whole'**. He then explains this as **unlike the whole**, that is, it was **already established** as a non-reductive subject at 'so,' **while the added 'and not otherwise' specifically means that despite being 'otherwise' it is not an other in relation to the whole, meaning that it can be ascribed to the whole... only 'thinking,' which is identical to 'being' the totality and every individual-thing within it, but nonetheless opposed to it - is the self** ((ibid.,188-189.).

Despite it being a negation of god's concealment as a reason for creation and a negation of humans' rebellion as a reason for their creation, what Rosenzweig presents here is - in principle - a model of equivalent derivation with respect to the issue of humans' ecstatic standing. If a thing can be a subject at 'so' and

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25 In this spirit, also see *The Star of Redemption*, p. 18.
an object at 'not otherwise', then humans - even as reflective beings as discussed above - can - as subjects responding to the question of 'where art thou' in revelation - observe it temporarily, if only for the purpose of answering this orientational question about the self as an object of reflection.

On the other hand, the anticipation of revelation as pre-flection transforms the This from an object to a subject – makes the distant closer in Rosenzweig’s terms; not physically, but cognitively closer. Rosenzweig concludes this discussion by stating that it is only through reflection that we recognize the real world as speech and its response. These two (speech and its response) are found first and foremost within the individual, who learned the meaning of each of the concepts from itself – from recognizing itself simultaneously as both subject and object; as a moral person aware of meanings, the individual will prefer others as itself – as a subject and not an object (others). It is only when the individual moves from discoursing with her or himself to the true dialog that she or he becomes that same self that we have just now established as the primordial no which had disassembled and become everything.

There is a world of objects, there is also an enclosed selfhood; and yet where art thou? Indeed, where art though? This is also a question posed by god (160-161). And insofar as Rosenzweig’s method is concerned, these words apply to any subject, whether divine or human. It all depends on correcting the human viewpoint. An enclosed selfhood exists alongside a world of objects; however, once a response to the question of where art thou has been provided, then the partition is removed, self-enclosedness is gone, and a world of relations – and meanings – is opened. It is around the question of where art thou that Rosenzweig embroiders his methodological fabric. The question itself reflects the revelation of the asker as an experience on the one hand and indicates the orientation requirement (the need to define the self in relation to...
of the respondent on the other hand. This, in turn, is the sum total of the possibility of establishing a principled basis for a theory of ethics.

This question, whose validity relies the empirical basis of Rosenzweig’s method, derives an equivalent derivation in two domains: 1) revelation = reflection; 2) revelation = pre-flection. By virtue of being empirical, both arise from the entity associated with the revelation – a human, that is to say, from the human ability to be both subject and object at the same time and infer a self-delimitation of itself in relation to a delimitation of others. After establishing revelation as a focus of his method, Rosenzweig derives an equivalent derivation from the relation between revelation and creation and the relation between revelation and redemption. As noted above, the manifestation of this derivation relies on a human’s natural cognitive capacity for reflection and anticipation.

A shift in the focus of the discussion from the ontological problem to the question of ethics is manifested in the reflection test, where a person establishes her or himself as the point of origin for her or his relations with god and other humans. On the ethical level, this test is meant for establishing a person’s place in relation to others as non-reductive subjects. In other words, it is concerned with intersubjective relations as a necessary precondition for a theory of ethics. Put differently, this means that the ecstatic capacity for self-orientation that arises by virtue of the gaze existing outside the self, which, in turn, means observing the self as object from another’s place. This, in turn, is the selfsame capacity to observe what is outside the self as a subject from within the self as a subject. The alternating capacity of the self’s subject-object awareness, can be used for deriving an equivalent derivation pertaining to the object’s capacity to convert This – an object, into a subject – You. This, in turn, establishes ecstasy as a methodological tool which manifests relations at the ethical level of thy neighbor rather than the neighbor as object.
The fact that Rosenzweig establishes the aforementioned inter-domain principle at the center of his method and utterly identifies with it illuminates his ethical outlook as the latter has been presented in the present article. According to Rosenzweig, it is impossible to establish ethically-meaningful human relations between objects, as well as between subject and object, since – after all – objects belong to the ontological domain, while relations, which are not ‘is’s but meanings, belong in the ethical domain. It therefore follows that the love of god and the love of a neighbor can only be established between subjects.

The Star of Redemption appears to indicate the connection between the inter-domain affiliation principles and the ecstatic capacity to consciously receive revelation as a methodical point of origin for suitable behavior. Conscious ecstasy is thus nothing more than a concrete (experiential) reflection manifested in the dimension of understanding and orientation even as it is also a methodical infrastructure for loving the neighbor within the framework of the experiential (religious) dimension. As noted above, both dimensions form the concrete foundation for the ethical principles of Rosenzweig’s method and constitute central components of the humanist meaning of his teachings. All in all, it may be stated that Rosenzweig establishes the methodological basis of the ethical meaning of intersubjective relations in relation to humankind’s natural reflexive capabilities – their ability to thoughtfully observe the self, the world, and the relation between them. It is from this point forward that a person can follow the path toward transforming the neighbor from an object – a This, to a You – a subject. All of these, in turn, arise from the principle of inter-domain affiliation discussed in the present article.
In other words, they are inherent to Rosenzweig’s method in terms of their two-dimensionality of faith-reason rather than being external one-dimensional rational or faith-related auxiliaries. Moreover, Rosenzweig extracts the maximum degree of utility from this methodical datum – which relies on human cognitive capacities - in order to support his method’s radical empirical tendencies.

In addition, exposing the methodological tools humans use to recognize and define themselves imbibes them with the capacity of recognizing others as themselves – a recognition which is meaningful at both the personal and social levels. Intellectually speaking, these tools are combined with what takes place in the experiential-spontaneous-innocent aspect of the experience of revelation and jointly shape the content of the discussions in The Star of Redemption. The events and their meaning, even if they may not always be explained rationally and crystallized into a philosophical method, may still be realized methodologically as ethical objectives: the love of a neighbor and human redemption. According to The Star of Redemption, others should not be recognized as subjects by rational means alone, nor by faith alone, but only within the framework of applying the principle of inter-domain affiliation which itself accords with the cognitive structure of the entity which possesses a second innocence – humans who have eaten from the tree of knowledge.

In closing, I shall note that what we have done in the present article is to address the basic two-dimensional structure of revelation and its meaning as a key concept in Rosenzweig’s method, and from this and within this to address The Star of Redemption’s rational-reflexive mode of thought as a philosophical method and system.