The Structure of Nothingness

A Prelude to a Theory of the Absolute

by

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Abstract

Among the possible options for the origin of the universe the most sensible one is nothingness, because it is without a need for any other beginning. It must be possible for nothingness to have a structure so that we can speak about it. The structure of nothingness can be constructed by using inward-outward vanishing points, with a guiding principle of conservation of nothingness. When taken all at once, the inward-outward vanishing points remain as they are—nothing; but when they are taken step-by-step, they become something. The idea of a step-by-step move introduces the idea of time. So time is the first one to emerge as a real-worldly concept from the reading of the structure of nothingness. The Emergence of time gives rise to other real-worldly concepts. What we consider as inward-outward vanishing in the realm of nothingness can now be taken as a turn-by-turn state of expansion and contraction in terms of real world perspectives. And what makes such dynamics possible can be considered as energy. And what has been labelled as conservation of nothingness can now be taken as conservation of energy. And the span of events that emerge due to the introduction of time gives us space. And in space matter is produced. The emergence of matter has only been alluded in the paper, but the possible ingredients and their possible combinations are partially manifested in the field diagrams that are integral parts of the paper, and are also thought to be suitable to the task of mathematization of the metaphysical ideas of the work.

Let’s begin at the beginning: What would there be if there was nothing at all? Traditionally, there are different options to take for this question. Some might say that there would still be God if there was nothing at all, because He is the one who brought forth the world, or any existence whatsoever. Or some others might hold that there would still be some pre-existing laws, because anything in the world or the world itself cannot be thought to exist without such laws or forms of things. Or still some others might hold that the world had no beginning and will have no end, because it cannot be thought not to exist; so the question of non-existence, for them, is meaningless.

What else do we have? We have the most straightforward option of all: If there was nothing at all, there would be nothingness. For its straightforwardness, let’s consider this last option first before we deal with the others.
But what can we say about nothingness? It seems a forbidding concept. Even before we set out to say something about it, we feel that it is bound for failure. But we can try. For example, we can say, nothingness is something that does not have inside and outside. Well, to begin with, we have used the word something to say something about nothingness. Is that a problem? What if we said, nothingness has neither inside nor outside? Let’s assume this was what we intended to say and proceed by disregarding the problem posed by something as a mere problem of sentence composition.

But, before we proceed, there might be some who still insist that there can be nothing at all that can be attributed to nothingness without corrupting its essence; so the best we can do, for them, is stay silent. But, on the other hand, some of us would like to continue in our attempt stubbornly. So a term of negotiation is at place here. In other words, we can make a guiding principle: We may do attributions, but whatever attribute we assign to nothingness must not corrupt it; it must leave it as it is. We should also give it a name and call it the principle of conservation of nothingness.

Very well. Now, what do we mean by no inside and outside? Why this particular description? Maybe it is because one of the first things that confront us when we think about nothingness is the question of the boundary of emptiness. We might be able to imagine some kind of emptiness, but we will be helpless when it comes to the question of its boundaries. We assume that nothingness doesn’t have any boundary as a centre and periphery; it must not start and end anywhere. It must qualify a criterion of not being there, and not being here; and not then and now. And so when we take nothingness as having neither inside nor outside, it is to imply that it has neither a centre nor a periphery.

So let’s start with this concept. But how is it possible to have a mental image of it? It seems to be a figureless figure. We must figure out a way to see the figureless, if we are to continue. But mere words do not seem adequate for this purpose; ironically, we need to speak a graphic language additionally. So not only words but also diagrams are going to be our mode of discussion.

And now what should our diagram look like? In our diagram, we are trying to represent nothingness as a state of no inside and no outside so that it cannot have any specific middle and periphery as a boundary condition. How should we do that? Let’s pick the simplest thing we can have: a point. We are talking about nothingness; that means we don’t have space. So for our diagram we have to pick a raw material that doesn’t need a place to stand on. Now let’s assume a point is an entity that doesn’t need a place to take; so it is suitable for our purpose.
Next, to denote that there is no inside and outside of the point, we think of inward-outward vanishings of it; and we represent that by lines. But, as the vanishings are thought to happen from both *sides* at once, a line is also assumed to be an entity that doesn't need a place to rust upon or a space to fill in. Therefore, we will take a line as the next simplest thing born of a vanishing point.

So these are our raw materials: points and lines, and also arrow-heads to denote states of vanishing. And let’s call our diagram a *field*, because we are trying to draw the *landscape* of nothingness. Here it goes.

![Diagram of a field](image)

*FIELD 1 - Nothingness represented as a state of inward-outward vanishing both at once, so that there is no inside and outside.*

We have just tried to represent a point vanished in every aspect of it, but are we doing well with our guiding principle that whatever we attribute to nothingness must not corrupt it? There seems to be a problem, because our point has become the centre of the vanishing lines; but nothingness must not have a centre. By being a centre, the point has become a particularity; it has become a one; it has appeared as a unique entity.

But we don't want all of these, because particularity, singularity, uniqueness, we assume, clash with our principle of conservation of nothingness. We don’t assume nothingness to be a particularity, so does it have to be a universality? Yes, a universal nothing. And if it doesn’t have to be *comprised* of a single point, then how many does it need? Is it a many point composition? No, it doesn’t seem so. We don’t need one, we don’t need many, is it then a zero we are looking for? Yes, but not one zero, not many zeroes. So, how many zeroes? An infinity of zeroes. And we don’t also want nothingness to be unique; so what should it be like? It must be the same in every aspect of it.

Therefore, to universality, infinity, and sameness goes our field of nothingness. How should we represent that? Maybe like this.
The solution we give to the problem of a particular, singular, and unique centre is developing the structure to embrace infinite centres. And we have to compose the structure in such a way that every point of nothingness does the same thing as the original one.

Let’s take a third glimpse.
Now we assume that we have the basic structural configuration of nothingness; and as we can’t represent it in its entirety for the obvious reasons, we will just go on to speak about it based on what we have. Some steps back, we assumed the structure of nothingness needs not one zero but an infinite number of zeroes. But what is the difference? Taken all at once, the infinity of the zeroes is zero. But we don’t suppose it to be a particular, single, unique zero. It is a zero which is infinitely tangled up and become a one whole being of an absolute zero.

So any point of the structure of nothingness is a zero, and any zero of the structure gives us something to count; in a sense, we get a one of nothingness. Infinite zeroes, therefore, give us infinite ones of nothingness. But how many is an infinity of such ones? Or, rather, how much is it when taken all at once? It must be zero because of the inward-outward vanishing condition of conservation of nothingness. But, again, it can’t be a single zero; it must be a completed zero. Or, maybe, whatever it is, let’s just be contented that we have something to count coming from the structure of nothingness.

We get, therefore, our first number-concept. It is a kind of number that we derive from counting points which are identical and infinite—one point, two point, three point, ad infinitum. Or one zero, two zero, three zero, ad infinitum.

We can further observe that there must be a certain kind of relationship among the points of the structure. It is a relationship of inward-outward vanishing. We need another number-concept to accommodate this relationship in such a way that nothingness is conserved. It must give us a way of handling the chaos of the infinite inward-outward vanishing points of the structure of nothingness. Because of this, we may call it an apeiron number system.

How does a point meet another point which is absolutely identical with itself? Here is where we need a concept of a one, a jump so that there is a way for two identical points to communicate as two entities. So the relationship between two points in the structure of nothingness is given by: Any two points are related in such a way that there is a unit, a quantum, of the structure vanishing toward each other of the points in negation so that comprehended both at once the value is zero. Let’s call this quantization of vanishing points. We further assume that any line joining two points is a quantized form of a set of infinite points in a state of annihilation.

We have now clues to two number-concepts, and we hope that there are also others to emerge which we may or may not take notice of in our discourse. But, in the meantime, we see that we can have shapes, too. In our previous field diagrams, we have only been tracing out limited tracks
of points; but now if we allow all the points at peripheries to be visible, we will observe that shapes are embedded in the structure of nothingness.

Let’s see the first construct. But as usual, we will take flat views, not spherical ones; and for the sake of simplicity of visibility, we will remove the arrow-heads.

Here emerges the first shape—a circle, isn’t it? For our purpose at hand, we are not going to take a keen interest in the kinds of shapes we are getting from the structure; we will just see the appearance of figures emerging from what is essentially figureless. But, whatever we do, we have to be guided by the principle of conservation of nothingness. So we will let the structure go to the same development we saw in the previous diagrams; that is, it now goes to universality, infinity, and sameness as it takes every point as a centre. Here it is.

And now we get squares, triangles, etcetera in different sorts of arrangements when every point of the structure goes on to do the same thing as the original one. But, again, why do shapes emerge? Because of an inward-outward vanishing point. Why do we have to have a vanishing point? Because that is how we conceived nothingness. Why did we conceive nothingness like that? Because, let’s just say, that seems the most sensible way of conceiving it.

Fair enough, let’s do the next level.
We can see a whole lot of shapes exploding. We are not going to continue the development, but we can assume that we have a clue to the question what the origin of shapes is and how they are formed. We can also observe that every shape is to be considered not as an independent figure, but rather as a construct which resides in a surrounding with an infinite affiliates. A shape is not its own beginning and end. We may even say a shape is part of a point’s history in its quest for infinite unity through a complete annihilation.

We can, therefore, suppose that the structure of nothingness can be thought of as the origin of different kinds of numbers and shapes. We further suppose that the rules and laws by which we make sense of numbers and shapes are to be derived from the pattern-reading of the structure of nothingness.

We should now move on to the third level of our discussion. But before that let’s summarize and characterize what we have said so far. We wonder how the world is possible, and we ask what would there be if there was nothing. Our reply is a simple one: nothingness. And next we would like to see nothingness, and we try to build a structure for it. For such a structure to be possible a point has to come into play. With a point and the idea of inward-outward vanishing, lines emerge. We represent the lines as going outward and coming toward the point all at once. And then, the structure will have to be let into a development due to the principle of conservation of nothingness which we introduce because of the need to keep the essence of it. The principle guides us in solving the problem we encounter due to single-centeredness of our field. Single-centeredness poses three problems—particularity, singularity, and uniqueness—which do not go along with the idea of nothingness. And then we give solutions: universality, infinity, and sameness.
Speaking of sameness of points, we may say that every point has *equal rights* in the structure of nothingness; that is, what one point can do others also can. For example, if one of them can be the centre of all the others, all the others also can be centres of every other in their own respect. But how does this work? Are the points going to be centres turn-by-turn or all of them at once? And how can there be such a thing as turn-by-turn in the structure of nothingness, when everything is supposed to be there (or not there) all at once, even by definition?

Well, we may do other characterizations as we move on, now to the next question: We have the structure of nothingness; but is it possible for the real world to emerge from it? After all, our intention of building the structure of nothingness was not only for the pleasure of doing so, but also, if possible, to find out how the real world could emerge from it.

How should we proceed? The natural assumption here is to start with a point, so let’s assume that is also how the world begins. And we pick any point from the structure of nothingness, and see if the real world could emerge from it. But we can’t just wait, we need to have a certain perspective. And that perspective must in some way be different from what we had in the case of nothingness, otherwise we will end up building the same nothingness we already have. That is not what we want to have now. We would like to see the real world coming, but sure it has to come from nothingness; and for that we need a clue.

What could that clue be? Previously, when we raised the issue of equal rights of points in the structure of nothingness, we questioned ourselves if points are going to be centres turn-by-turn or all at once. This must be one good clue to what we are heading for. When we talk about nothingness, we have to assume and try to comprehend all points at once; but when we talk about real world we have to go step-by-step.

So let’s go step-by-step. What happens after we pick a point? The point vanishes outward. And then it vanishes inward. But when it vanishes inward, it does so by *invoking* all the surrounding points to do the same thing as it does. But when they do so, they lag one step behind, because the initial point we picked has already taken the step what they are taking now.

Incidentally, we seem to be talking about what we in the real world call *time*—order of events. So let’s bravely assume that we have grabbed the tail of time and see as it takes its steps. In this respect, a single step going ahead, we assume, will give us a tick of time.

As usual, we will have diagrammatic representations. We are now going to take a step-by-step move, and to denote that we will use single-arrow lines, rather than the double ones. Let time tick *time-one*.
We have just witnessed the first tick of time. What has it done? A point has vanished outwards; and by doing so it has turned itself into radiating lines, out of which, as usual, we only selected eight arrows as representatives. We may also say that a point has just gone there, which is something not comprehensible in the realm of nothingness; and by doing so, it has found its own fellow-selves in a circle over there. But not exactly, because it hasn’t yet found its stations there. Maybe time-two will make that happen.

Here we can’t help remarking about the relationship between the point and the lines. For example, are the lines segments? There is a point in the middle outwards of which lines radiate; so maybe we can say the lines are half-segmented, because at the periphery they still are not punctuated. So far our structure comprises only half-segmented lines. At this level we can identify two properties: discreteness and continuity—discreteness at the initial point where the lines are punctuated, and continuity at the peripheries where the lines are led to infinity.

In any case, in the previous diagram, we had a going there which isn’t yet realized. We expect a realization of that at the next tick of time. Let time tick time-two.
We seem to get what we wanted. We have now a here and there, a there and here. By going outwards we realize a here; by coming inwards we realize a there. But the phenomena happen due to the same process—radiation of points. At the first radiation, we had half-segmented lines; at the second radiations of the encircling points, we get fully segmented lines. But there is also extra phenomena: while the radiating lines concentrate back to the origin, giving us fully segmented lines (which we represented by broken lines), they do also give us other goings out there, other half-segmented lines. So we presume that as this process goes on further we get different sorts of things in different levels of complexity. We further presume that we need this for the development of the real world which we are initiating.

We still are at time-two of our initiation of the real world, but we seem to be at the right place to observe and introduce other concepts. What we have called inward-outward vanishing in terms of the realm of nothingness can now be called expansion and contraction; the one that makes the dynamics of expanding and contracting possible we may call energy; and what embraces all these states and what shall come out of them we may call space. So we now have time, movements, energy, space; and hopefully much more is to come.

Let time tick time-three.

Time-three has just ticked; are we getting more remarkable phenomena? What has happened to the first point is continually happening to other points; while a certain point expands,
it makes more points possible; while contraction phenomena bring back expansions to their initiation points, a multitude of others keep on expanding and multiplying. But we will have to make a note of those lines that go back to their origin while completing their vanishing duties. Do they just vanish doing it a single time or keep on oscillating forth and back? They don’t seem to have any reason to keep on oscillating. So what role are they going to play on the stage? They must serve some purpose. We have a clue: an increasing number of arrows are lurking around them; so we may conjecture that they may serve as matter-making sites at some level of duration. But we are not going to continue constructing such a site now; we have yet a foundation to strengthen.

Previously, we agreed that every point is supposed to be a centre to all others; and because of this, everything that happens from the point of view of our centre of arbitrary choice must also happen from the point of view of every other point. For this to be possible in the real world, there must be a certain kind of configuration of time; that is, while events from every other point are assumed to lag behind relative to a given centre in proportion to their duration of communication, it is also to be assumed that from the perspective of another given point as a centre events from the first point lag behind by the same measure. We further observe that this is a necessary condition for conservation of nothingness, or now we should say conservation of energy.

But the world starting from a point—how are we going to interpret this? Does it mean that the whole world was inside a point and now it is blooming outwards? Or a point is just a point in an infinite wholeness of points, so the world begins from all the points, but we have to select a point so that we can have a track record of its ongoing manifestation? The second one seems to be a better perspective. So out of timelessness of nothingness, we pick a point and set it at time-zero. When we do initiation time-one ticks. What do we have at time-one? Our initial point radiates in all directions (kindly let’s not bother about the word direction). We chose eight arrows to represent our intention (or maybe the point’s intention). Then, due to quantization of the radiating lines, we get eight points to stand on. Now we assume the point possesses eight identities (it could be more; we chose eight, as we said, for the sake of easiness of representation). And in the next move those eight points do the same thing as the initial point did. Actually, what all points do every time is the same thing: expanding and contracting. So expansions and contractions of points are, in a sense, the heartbeats of the real world. But they beat while radiating, so they replicate and multiply their beats changing locations. What is different now from the realm of nothingness is a change of order of symmetry of communication due to the advent of time.

But keeping our perspective at our centre of choice, we observe that at time-two all of them with one of their arms reach the first point and with the other seven reach other points by a unit of
expansion. And then we seem to be in trouble here; we may be in good terms with the eight-times-seven arms which are doing the expansions they are supposed to do, but the eight-times-one arms that go back to the original position seem to be playing the double agent—they are doing expansion and contraction at the same time; contraction for the original point and expansion for the latter ones. But, in retrospect, we assume that such asymmetries might be good for the realization of something as important as the real world itself. And also there is, as we observed a little while ago, this question: What is to become of those mysterious ones that seem to vanish completely? We will just have to be consoled by what we have already said: There is going to be some purpose they will be serving.

In any case, we are now in a position to remark that time is the primary agency of the real world. Initially we are to define it as a step-by-step view of nothingness. In other words, timed-nothingness is the real world. Together with quantization of lines of communication, we now have quantization of time. If nothingness does mean all lines of communication all at once, real world is a set of lines of communication at a time.

Time is also the cause of emergence of the concepts of energy and space together with the concept of motion (communication) among point-entities. At this point we may inquire: are we going to have two kinds of communication among point-entities which are packed with time, that is, short-range and long-range communications? In our field diagrams, we see communications that just hang around some points while other lines of communication spread out. So we should take notice of this difference if we are going to formulate further characteristics of time, and also space. In this regard, time through short-range communications seems to be a maker of concentrations of sorts, while it does expand horizons through long-range ones. This distinction seems to be important for the structure of space and formation and distribution of matter (surely, we haven’t still encountered matter, but we assume that all the ingredients are piling up from time to time; and we are yet at time-three).

We have been concerned about the issue of centres of points of the world we are making, and we gave a solution: From the perspective of a point that just started counting time, all other upcoming points are supposed to lag behind in appropriate measure, therefore it can take its place as the centre of all the other points; and also from the perspective of all other points, every other point is supposed to lag behind in appropriate measure. This must be how we configure a world of which every point can be a centre of all others. We can make a principle of this and call it the principle of equal rights to centrality.
Surely, this principle will have a consequence on the issue of horizon; that is, if every point is a centre of all others, for all those it considers as at the periphery, it must also be at the periphery for all those that it considers as such. For example, let’s take three points—centre-A, centre-B, and centre-C. If centre-A considers centre-B and centre-C as its peripheries in opposite sides, and then centre-B and centre-C, according to their equal rights to centrality, will consider centre-A as their periphery at one end. Well, what about the other ends of centre-B and centre-C? We have to stick to the argument and conclude that centre-C will be the other end of centre-B, while centre-B will be the other end of centre-C. So we should augment the above principle in accordance with this condition and call it the principle of equal rights to centrality and peripherality.

That is not the end of the story; we should also add that this centre according to the perspective of that centre should stand as the edge of the reverse process of communication between the two centres. So can we say that what lays beyond the horizon of any centre is its own view from the opposite side? Put in other words, is one centre’s expansion another’s contraction in space as viewed in terms of the concept of time? It must be, because nothingness, or now energy, has to be conserved. So is that how a given centre experiences its contraction, that is, while expansion is going on visibly, contraction happens behind, darkly? We are just getting around the case. Let’s try to have a clear picture. How should we put it? By default, there is expansion and contraction, and one centre’s outside is another one’s inside. What happens at one centre also happens at another. What is going on now and here at a certain centre is what happened there a certain time ago; and what is going on now and there at the other centre is what has happened here a certain time ago. Therefore, the view this centre see coming from that centre over the horizon is what happened here a certain time ago; and the view that centre see coming from this centre over the horizon is what happened there a certain time ago.

Time makes variation possible in what is otherwise the same thing. The real world and change in the real world is possible because of time. Emergence of entities and changes of interpretation of concepts occur due to time through the transition from pure-nothingness to timed-nothingness. We have already noted that the concept of outward-inward vanishings could now be interpreted as expansion and contraction of space; and the principle of conservation of nothingness could now be called by a real-worldly name of conservation of energy. And also the unpicturable picture of absolute unity of points in infinity and infinity in unity can now be viewed as points in motion. We may also extrapolate that quantization of time means quantization of space and quantization of matter-makers. In this sense, we may speak of the arena of the real world as timed-space and timed-matter. But, without the introduction of time, both space and matter seem to be phantoms of nothingness.
And let this be an incomplete list of observations. It is incomplete in two senses. First, by itself every item in the list needs to be restated more rigorously; second, there could be other concepts, entities, principles, laws, etc. we have overlooked or yet to emerge from those that have already emerged. And also, if we are to continue, it seems that we need to incorporate a third type of language besides that of the languages of words and diagrams. Otherwise the course of our discourse might get tougher, if not impossible. This language is what might be called the language of equations. We need this language for several purposes; as for example, if we are going to see what happens to our field at time-ten or time-twenty or \( t \times 10^6 \) or whatever you have in mind, we must begin speaking this third language, because the others become less and less helpful after a certain point. But we are not going to do that right now; we hope that we have already undertaken a tiresome but fruitful journey through the wilderness of nothingness to the first three sparks of the real world. So let this be only a prelude. A prelude to what? A prelude to the totality of whatever is the case or not the case; and let’s call that by a rather abstract name the Absolute.

But, as an addendum, let’s say that the study of reality, at least within the sphere of our discussion, seems to have three interconnected branches. The first starts from the study of nothingness and proceeds forward until it finds its culmination somewhere a complete understanding and meaning of what is there or not there is attained. The second branch studies patterns of what can be logically deduced from the structure of nothingness with or without due regard to the question of what is there or not there. The third one starts its study from the face of what is there and goes on to the very beginning until it meets the structure of nothingness and then join the first branch in the search for a complete understanding in which meta-phenomenal truths might be discovered. We can call these three branches by the old names metaphysics, mathematics, and physics respectively.

However, before we end our prelude, we should do some philosophising at least on the other options we mentioned at the beginning of our discussion. We mentioned God, pre-existing laws or forms, and eternity of the world as candidates to the question of the very possibility of the world. But leaving aside these options for future discussion, we begun the course of nothingness as the sensible beginning to our question. Now, assuming that we are on the right track of argument, what can we say about the other options that historically had been considered more sensible than the one we have so far been dealing with? If it is possible (and even a necessary case) for the real world to come from nothingness, what is the consequence on the other options?

Let’s first take God. Are we going to argue that if a world is possible from nothingness, then there is no need for God to create it, and, therefore, there is no God?
One may reply: “How else are we going to argue, then!”

Good point; how else are we supposed to argue? Let’s take an agnostic stand to roam into the realm of uncertainties.

If we are going to argue the obvious way, surely, we will not be without good reason not to believe in God. So atheism could be a logical conclusion here. But it is a very linear kind of argument. What if someone would like to identify nothingness with God? After all, haven’t we been trying to see if the world emerges from nothingness? So what is the problem with nothingness being synonymous with God—of course, disregarding the usual connotation of the word? Still there seems to be a problem, because God in this respect is going to emerge as the real world. But still for someone to whom God is not alienated from the world, it is not a problem. Surely, the belief that the world itself as a whole is God and that every particular entity in the world is part of God can be taken as another line of argument with a possibility of logical soundness.

There are, however, different conceptions of God. The idea of the world emerging from nothingness might not necessarily clash with the idea of God we have just seen; but how about the more familiar idea of divinity as a personal God? The idea of God as the creator of the world, benefactor of the life of man the fragile, and lord of judgment at the end, but who resides separated from the world, seems to go into a necessary head-on collision with the idea of the world arising from nothingness without the need of anyone’s intention to incite it. But there still remains some subtle way for the existence of the personal God be a logical possibility, without a necessity for Him to appear at the beginning of the world. How?

We shall not go through the idea of God as the patron of human life and lord of judgment at the end for the good and bad deeds of man the sinner; let’s just be contented with the question of the personal God as the creator of the world. The usual argument for the existence of the personal God states that for the world to exist there must first exist a creator who doesn’t need any other existence to precede him. But if we can now prove that the world necessarily emerges from nothingness, what are we really proving? We are just proving that it doesn’t need any other existence than nothingness for its possibility, and any other conclusion that we might deduce is insufficiently substantiated. The question is: what if the personal God can exist without the need to create the world? Why should His existence necessarily be attached to creating the world? But one may argue: how is it possible for a being to be God without necessarily being the creator of the world? If there is God, one may continue, He must be the creator of the world; otherwise He doesn’t exist. Let’s make a counter argument: So far we have only been considering the beginning; but what if God is to be found at the end?
It might be the case that knowing the beginning is a necessary condition to know the end; but is it a sufficient condition? And what if God is the end of the absolute truth? Surely, we will have to know the end of the complexity that issues from the simplicity of nothingness to assert the existence or non-existence of whatever being is there. One can make an argument from an idea of simple-complexity. Nothingness begins with a very simple idea and continue to more and more complex structure that ultimately becomes the real world; what if that complexity can have another layer which can exist independent of the layer of worldly existence?

When we talk about the disconnectedness between the personal God and the real world, we are accustomed to imagine a God out of space and time and the fleshiness of the world. And what if there is some way in which we can attain the knowledge of that in accordance with the idea of emergent truths? That is, what if God is the highest truth in the algorithm of understanding the order of reality? We must have a complete knowledge of the Absolute to assert any such conjectures, but until then, we can safely conclude that this is a puzzling world in which believers and non-believers in God, and also agnostics, all alike can have metaphysical rights to believe, not believe, or suspend judgment—and still be considered logical, even if temporarily.

Now to the second option. Could there be pre-existing laws or forms? And how do they stand in regard to the theory of the world from nothingness? This one seems easier than the former. We can think of the structure of nothingness as a structure of laws and ideas, without, of course, forgetting the guiding principle of conservation of nothingness. But, in this regard, before we can think of laws, forms, ideas, or any other such option we may include in this group, we still have to begin with the idea of nothingness.

Some laws and forms of things seem to precede the real world, because we can find some laws emerging already in the realm of nothingness. But it is an ongoing process; even after the emergence (the word emergence, in a sense, and with precaution, seems to be able take the place of creation) of the real world, laws continue emerging as new phenomena continue to emerge.

And also, some forms of things seem to precede the things of the real world, but not necessarily the real world itself. Those laws or forms that precede the emergence of the concept of time can be thought as preceding the real world, and we may call them pre-world laws or metaworld forms; and those that come after the emergence of time should be classified as co-emergent laws or mondial forms. In any case, even pre-world laws are emergent from the idea of nothingness, so they cannot be the purest beginning of all; there must be a supposition of nothingness before we take any laws or forms.
And there is the third option we will have to take a look at—the idea of eternal world. Let’s make a proposition: *If there was nothing at all, there would be the world, because the world is eternal.* This seem to be an obvious contradiction, but we are now in a better position to tackle the problem. If the world comes from nothingness in which there is no absolute beginning and absolute end, then the idea of eternal world doesn’t remain an irreconcilable antinomy to our reasoning; all we have to think of is time: if it is eternal, then there must be a world that is eternal.

So, considering the above attempts of reconciliation of what is seemingly the irreconcilable, does it mean that we could have started our discussion with any one of them? It doesn’t seem so. Because, when we start with the other options, there is always some discontentment. The advantage (and what is more, the logic) of beginning at nothingness is that we are left with no more pre-existing entity to appeal to. In such a situation, even if the going forward might be more difficult, there is no problem of first-cause that we leave behind and be teased by it every time we look back.

Above all, there is the question of logical order: which one is that we first encounter conceptually? Which one is at the lowest foundation of conceptual layers? For example, to start from the idea of eternal world is unorderly; when we deal with the real world we proceed in terms of such concepts as time, change, and etcetera, so we have to reach at the level where we can encounter such concepts before we take the real world as an eternal entity.

Things need something to emerge from. To be emergent, in this sense, is to be explicable. Even nothingness as a concept can be thought to have emerged from the question: what would be there if there was nothing at all? The same is true with the other options; we must have order of explanation.

We are in the real world; we wonder how it is the case that there is this thing we call the real world; we would like to find out the purest starting point of all. And that, we assume, is nothingness. Every foundational theory of reality should be based on the study of nothingness. And, of course, as we said, the idea of nothingness itself emerges from a seizure of wonder in the real world. So it is from wonder to nothingness, and from nothingness to the real world. Maybe for some, that is all there is; but for others, there must be a crown, a supreme truth, above all that exists. And for others, it is not impossible for such a supreme being to exist, but, if it has to exist, it has to be conceptually an emergent one; and that should happen at the level of completion than origin. And that has to come after the wonder one goes through the complexity, majesty, sublimity, beauty, absurdity, unhappiness, easiness, dreadfulness, meaninglessness, and several other dry and wet sensibility of life in the world. But it is just a possibility, because it doesn’t seem to be a logical
necessity for the understanding of reality at fundamental level, even if it may be different at the level of completion. So, shall we say: *if nothingness is about the beginning, God is about the end?*