

1. Introduction

The concept of twofoldness plays an important role in understanding the aesthetic appreciation of pictures. The general idea is that when we appreciate pictures aesthetically, we simultaneously attend to both the depicted object and the way it is depicted in the picture’s surface. Given the centrality of this concept in the depiction literature, a tempting thought is that the aesthetic appreciation of music may also have a similar twofold character.

Although this thought may be tempting, it is important to note that while in the case of the aesthetic appreciation of pictures, the two folds of our experience are what is represented in the picture and the way it is represented in the picture, the same distinction is somewhat difficult to make in the case of the experience of music as it is not clear whether and in what sense music is representational. Although there have been some recent attempts to argue that at least Western tonal music since 1650 is in fact representational (see esp. Nussbaum 2005), the mainstream view is that musical works in general do not represent anything.

My claim is that in spite of this important asymmetry between pictures and music, the concept of twofoldness does play a crucial role in understanding the experience of musical performances: when we aesthetically appreciate a musical performance, we simultaneously attend to both the features of the performed musical work and the features of the token performance we are listening to. This experience is twofold in the same sense as the aesthetic appreciation of pictures is supposed to be twofold, where we simultaneously attend to both the depicted object and the way it is depicted in the surface. Note that the claim is not about the aesthetic appreciation of music per se, but about the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances (more about this distinction in Section III). Note also that this concept of the musical twofoldness does not take it for granted that music is representational.

An important clarification about the scope of the claim I am defending here: I am interested in the aesthetic appreciation of performances of musical works. Some musical performances are not performances of musical works—for example, the long saxophone improvisation in “Odwalla theme” (Art Ensemble of Chicago: *Coming Home Jamaica*) is not the performance of any (pre-existing) musical work (see Davies 2001, 16–19; Young-Matheson 2000; Alperson 1984 on the ontology of jazz improvisation). Hence, my account of the aesthetic appreciation of the performance of musical works does not say anything about the aesthetic appreciation of jazz improvisations. Further, some musical works cannot be performed in a way that would count as a ‘genuine’ performance. One famous example is Conlon Nancarrow’s *Studies for Player Piano*, where the pieces are too difficult to play for even the most technically skilled pianists—they can only be played by a player piano—which, arguably, does not count as a genuine performance of the musical work. Again, my account says nothing about the aesthetic appreciation of musical works of this kind. My claim is restricted to the aesthetic appreciation of genuine performances of musical works.

The plan is the following: in Section II, I briefly explain the concept of twofoldness as it is used in the depiction literature. In Section III, I outline my account of the twofold experience of musical performances. Section IV gives an overview of the explanatory force of this concept in terms of accounting for some salient features of our experience of musical performances, including the multimodality of this experience and the importance of instrumentality. The final Section V is a tentative conclusion about how the twofold experience of musical performance may contribute to the debate about the authenticity of musical performances.

2. Twofoldness and Pictures

Confusingly enough, the concept of twofoldness is used to elucidate two very different aspects of our engagement with pictures. It is used both as a necessary feature of ‘seeing-in’: our experience of seeing something in a picture and as a necessary feature of our aesthetic appreciation of pictures. As not all instances of seeing-in would count as aesthetic appreciation (in fact, the vast majority of such instances wouldn’t), these two questions, and the corresponding two concepts of twofoldness need to be clearly distinguished.
The first question is this: what experience are we supposed to go through when we see a picture of an object? What happens in our mind when we see a depicted object in a picture? Ernst Gombrich claims that what is constitutive of this experience is that our attention alternates between the two dimensional surface and the three dimensional represented object (Gombrich 1960). Richard Wollheim, in contrast, argues that the experience we are supposed to go through when seeing pictures is a twofold one: we are simultaneously aware of the picture surface and the represented object (Wollheim 1980, 1987, 1998; Nanay 2004, 2005, 2008, 2011; see also Lopes 1996, 2005). As Wollheim puts it, “The spectator is, and remains, visually aware not only of what is represented but also of the surface qualities of the representation” (Wollheim 1980, 214–15). This feature of our experience of pictures is called ‘twofoldness’ and in some form or other, many philosophical accounts of seeing-in endorsed it as a necessary feature of our experience of pictures.

The second, very different, question about our engagement with pictures that invokes the concept of twofoldness is about the aesthetic appreciation of pictures. As Wollheim says:

[In Titian, in Vermeer, in Manet we are led to marvel endlessly at the way in which line or brushstroke or expanse of colour is exploited to render effects or establish analogies that can only be identified representationally. (Wollheim 1980, 216)]

This ‘marvelling endlessly’ at a Vermeer is, according to Wollheim, a twofold experience: we are simultaneously attending to both the “line or brushstroke or expanse of colour” and to the “analogies that can only be identified representationally.” But this line of argument is supposed to answer a very different question from the one about ‘seeing-in’. This question is about the aesthetic appreciation of pictures and not about picture perception in general. Very few instances of picture perception count as aesthetic appreciation—in the case of the vast majority of our encounter with pictures, we do not appreciate them aesthetically.

Wollheim tries to answer both of these questions (the one about picture perception and the one about aesthetic appreciation) at the same time and this led to a considerable amount of confusion. In fact, one of the recurring criticisms of Wollheim’s account in general and his concept of twofoldness in particular is that he wanted to posit twofoldness, some-
thing that characterizes only our aesthetic appreciation of pictures, as a necessary condition for picture perception in general (Levinson 1998, esp. p. 229; Lopes 1996, esp. pp. 37–51; Lopes 2005, 28, 35). These criticisms may have been uncharitable (Nanay 2005, 2010, 2011): a more charitable interpretation would be that Wollheim held two different claims, one about picture perception and one about the aesthetic appreciation of pictures, and used two different concepts of twofoldness to characterize these two different experiences.

Wollheim talks about simultaneous awareness of surface and scene, not just in the definition quoted above but also in Wollheim (1998, 221) and Wollheim (1987, 46). But the notion of awareness he uses is ambiguous and as a result Wollheim’s notion of twofoldness itself is also ambiguous. Here are two possible interpretations of twofoldness (both of which we have good reasons to attribute to Wollheim):

(i) We consciously attend both to the depicted object and to some properties of the surface.3

(ii) We represent both the depicted object and some of the properties of the picture surface (while we may or may not attend to the surface).

It has been argued that Wollheim took (ii) to be a necessary condition for picture perception in general (Nanay 2005, 2010, 2011) and he took (i) to be an important, maybe even necessary, feature of the aesthetic appreciation of pictures. I do not want to say more about (ii) and picture perception as the notion of twofoldness I want to use in the context of our experience of musical performances is (i). The important point is that twofoldness in sense (i) is easy to confuse with twofoldness in sense (ii) and the question about picture perception is also easy to confuse with the question about aesthetic appreciation (and Wollheim didn’t do much to dispel these potential confusions). I want to leave behind (ii) and the question of picture perception and focus on (i) and the aesthetic appreciation of pictures.

When Wollheim says that

in Titian, in Vermeer, in Manet we are led to marvel endlessly at the way in which line or brushstroke or expanse of colour is exploited to render effects or establish analogies that can only be identified representationally
he clearly talks about twofoldness in sense (i) as a crucial feature of the aesthetic appreciation of these paintings. Thus, the concept of twofoldness I will talk about in the rest of the paper is twofoldness in sense (i): conscious simultaneous attention both to the depicted object and to some properties of the surface. And it is this concept of twofoldness that I take Wollheim to hold to be a crucial aspect of our aesthetic appreciation of pictures. The question is whether we can find a similar kind of twofold experience when it comes to the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances.

3. Twofoldness and Musical Performances

The claim I will defend here is that when we appreciate a musical performance aesthetically, we simultaneously attend to both the features of the performed musical work and the features of the token performance we are listening to. First, some clarifications: what counts as the ‘musical work’ here? And what counts as the ‘performance’? The short response is that one can plug in any concept of ‘musical work’ in this account of the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances—be it ‘action-types’, ‘eternal types’, ‘action tokens’, etc. (see Davies 2004; Dodd 2000, 2002, 2007; Currie 1989; Kivy 1983; Davies 2001; Levinson 1980; Rohrbaugh 2007; Howell 2002; Caplan-Matheson 2004, 2006). And we can also plug in any concept of musical performance (Levinson 1990; Davies 2001, 151–97; Thom 1992; Godlovitch 1998; Benson 2003). The claim I am making is about the experience of musical performances and not about their ontology—it is consistent with any of the most widespread theories of the ontology of music.

But some ontological frameworks are easier to use than others. For the sake of simplicity, I will assume in the rest of the paper that musical works are types. But with little modifications, the argument can be extended to different ontological frameworks. Take nominalism, for example. Nelson Goodman famously argued that musical work is “the class of performances compliant with a character” (Goodman 1968, 210). If one accepts this nominalist ontological framework, then the main claim of the paper can be rephrased in the following way: when we appreciate a musical performance aesthetically, we simultaneously attend to both the features of the token performance we are listening to and to the features of “the class of performances compliant with a character.” Similar considerations apply in the case of other ontological frameworks.
Second, it is important to emphasize that the simultaneous attention to the features of the musical performance and to the musical work do not need to be taken to be perceptual attention. Our attention to the features of the token performance is likely to be perceptual (and I will say more about the nature of this attention in Section IV below). But our attention to the features of the musical work does not need to be, and in some ontological frameworks cannot be, perceptual attention. Note that this difference between the nature of attention in the two ‘folds’ is also present in many accounts of pictorial twofoldness. Kendall Walton, for example, explicitly takes our attention to the depicted object to be nonperceptual (Walton 1998; see also Nanay 2004 on his concept of twofoldness).

Third, my claim is about the aesthetic appreciation of the performance of a musical work, not about the aesthetic appreciation of the musical work itself. The musical work can, in principle, be appreciated aesthetically without listening to any of its performances. For example, some people can sight-read scores and have real-time auditory experiences of the musical work. As this is not an instance of appreciating the performance of a musical work, I leave these cases aside. (Some might argue that these people do in fact imagine performances of the musical works and they appreciate these imagined performances. If this is so, then the argument I will present below applies to the appreciation of these imagined performances.) I will focus on the aesthetic appreciation of the performance of musical works, but return to the question of the aesthetic appreciation of musical works themselves as well as the connection between these two kinds of aesthetic appreciations in the next section.

Third, what does it mean to attend to the features of the musical work? The musical work, according to most accounts, is a type. But how can we attend to the features of a type (as opposed to one of the tokens of this type)? Note that this is a potential problem only if attention is interpreted as perceptual attention and, as we have seen above, I do not take our attention to the features of the musical work to be perceptual.

Further, can we attend to the features of the musical work that we hear for the first time? In this case, after all, we encounter the musical work itself and the performance of this musical work at the same time. How can we be in the position to attend to the features of both of these simultaneously?

We can indeed appreciate the performance of a musical work aesthetically even if we hear this musical work for the first time. When listening
to the performance of a newly rediscovered Vivaldi opera (say, of *Motezuma*, which was considered lost until 2002 and first performed in modern times in 2005), I can attend to the features of this musical work—features I attribute to Vivaldi’s works in general, features I attribute to Vivaldi’s operas, to early eighteenth Century Italian operas in general, etc. These are all features one can and does attribute to the musical work itself and not the performance thereof. Hence, having listened to different performances of a musical work previously is not necessary for the aesthetic appreciation of the musical performance of this piece, but such previous exposure is likely to enhance our ability to appreciate the performance of this musical work aesthetically.

The substantial part of my main claim is about the simultaneous nature of our attention: when we appreciate the performance of a musical work aesthetically, we attend to both the features of the musical work and those of the performance and we do so simultaneously. But what other options are there? It seems that there are four possible options:

(i) We attend to the musical work only and not to the performance.

(ii) We attend to the performance only and not to the musical work.

(iii) We attend to both the performance and the musical work, but not simultaneously.

(iv) We attend to both the performance and the musical work simultaneously.

I argue that (i), (ii) and (iii) are implausible.

Take (i) first. The suggestion is an odd one: that we would appreciate the performance of a musical work by *ignoring* this performance. This is, no doubt, the way at least some people listen to at least some musical performances (really bad ones, for example), but it would be a mistake to characterize the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances accordingly. Even more importantly, in order to attend to the features of the musical work while listening to a performance of this musical work presupposes that one actively *ignores* the features of the performance itself—if the performer hits the wrong key, we actively disregard it in favour of the correct key in the musical work itself. But this way of actively ignoring the performance we are listening to presupposes that we
attend to the performance itself—otherwise we could not disregard its objectionable features.

According to (ii), when we appreciate the performance of the musical work, we attend to the performance only and not to the musical work itself. But this also sounds odd: it would imply ignoring the musical work the performance of which we are supposed to be appreciating aesthetically. But then this would not constitute aesthetic appreciation of this musical work. One can, of course, appreciate some aspects of the performance while ignoring what musical work is being performed: one potential example is the aesthetic appreciation of the performer’s technical skills. But one cannot appreciate the performance of a given musical work while ignoring this musical work. The features of a performance that are desirable in performing a Bruckner symphony may not be so desirable when it comes to the performance of a Haydn string quartet.

Proposal (iii) is a bit more complicated. The suggestion is that our attention, when aesthetically appreciating the performance of a musical work, is alternating between features of the performance and features of the musical work itself. But we do not attend to them simultaneously. One way of thinking about this alternating attention is to think of it on the analogy of our alternating attention to the duck and the rabbit in the duck/rabbit illusion. One can attend to one, but then one cannot attend to the other and vice versa. Although we can attend to both aspects in turn, we cannot attend to them at the same time.

A useful way of keeping (iii) and (iv) apart is to ask whether our aesthetic appreciation of musical performances is one single experience with two aspects (one representing the features of the performance, the other representing the features of the musical work), or it is the alternation of two different experiences (one representing the features of the performance, the other representing the features of the musical work). The problem with this latter proposal, that is, proposal (iii), is that if our attention alternates between the features of the performance and the features of the musical work, then it is not possible to attend to the relation between the features of the performance and the features of the musical work. By supposition, (iii) entails that one can attend to either the features of the performance or the features of the musical work at any one time—it is not possible to attend to both, hence, it is not possible to attend to the relation between the two. But then it is not possible to attend to how any given ele-
ment of the musical work is being performed because attending to this would entail attending to the relation between the features of the performance and those of the musical work.

One may have the following worry about this argument. It is possible to attend to the relation of two things while alternating our attention between the two. I can alternate my attention between a red patch and an orange patch that are a meter apart and nonetheless attend to the relation between them: to the similarities and differences between them: that the orange one is like the red but mixed with yellow. It is true that we can attend to the similarities and differences between the colour of the two patches while alternating our attention between the patches themselves, but note that this case is very different from (iii) above. In (iii), the claim is that our attention alternates between the features of the musical performance and the features of the musical work. And the equivalent of this claim would be to say that we can attend to the relation between the colour of the two patches while alternating our attention between the colour of the first patch (red) and the colour of the second patch (orange). This, in turn, would imply that our attention alternates between a fully red colour experience that does not in any way involve the colour orange and a fully orange colour experience that does not in any way involve the colour red. But if this were the case, then we could not attend to the relation between the two colours: we could not attend to how the second colour is like the first but with more yellow. While it may be possible to alternate our attention between two entities and also attend to the relation between their properties, it is not possible to alternate our attention between two properties and also attend to the relation between these two properties.

Thus, the only remaining option is (iv): when we appreciate the performance of a musical work aesthetically, we simultaneously attend to the features of both the musical work itself and its performance. I argue in the next section that this twofold experience helps us to understand a number of important and salient features of our experience of musical performances.

A final objection: it has been argued that our aesthetic appreciation of pictures is a heterogeneous process. Sometimes it does involve simultaneous attention to the surface and the depicted scene, but some other times it involves alternating attention or even ‘seeing through’ the canvas (see Lopes 2005, Chapter 1; Nanay 2012). How can then we maintain musical twofoldness as a fully general feature of the appreciation of musi-
cal performances? Shouldn’t we expect as much variation in the musical case as there seems to be in the pictorial case? The short answer is that the claim I have been arguing for is about the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances—not of music in general (but see Section IV below). The equivalent of this claim in the pictorial case would be about the aesthetic appreciation of the picture surface. But note that the disagreements about the generality of twofoldness in the pictorial case is about the aesthetic appreciation of pictures per se (and not of the picture surface). And, as I said at the very beginning, the twofoldness claim I am defending here is not about the aesthetic appreciation of music in general, but about the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances.

4. Aesthetic Appreciation of Musical Performances
   Versus Aesthetic Appreciation of Music

In this section, I examine some important consequences of the claim I argued for in the previous section and point out that my account can elucidate some salient aspects of our experience of musical performances. I will mention two such aspects: instrumentality and multimodality. These two aspects of our experience of musical performances can help us to fill in the details of what ‘attention to the features of the musical performance’ is supposed to mean. Further, my account of the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances has implications for our aesthetic appreciation of the musical work itself, as well as the complex connection between the two.

4. a. Instrumentality

Philip Alperson pointed out the importance of attention to features of the musical instruments in the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances (see esp. Alperson 2008, 47–48). He writes:

French horn players are in a better position to understand the level of achievement of French horn playing than nonmusicians or even than musicians who do not play the French horn. Indeed, very good French horn players are likely to be in a better position to understand the level of achievement of very good French horn players than mediocre French horn players. (Alperson 2008, 48.)

It is part of our aesthetic appreciation of the performance of a musical work to appreciate the musicians’ use of their instruments. And those who
are familiar with these instruments will be in a better position to appreciate this performance aesthetically. This is not to say that we can only appreciate the musical performance of a symphony if we can play on all the instruments involved. But familiarity with the musical instruments enhances our aesthetic appreciation.

This is especially relevant in the cases of musical works the performance of which involve sophisticated technical skills, such as Paganini’s 24 Caprices. But, as Alperson points out, it is also true of works that do not involve any technical skills: Alfred Brendel’s performance of Mozart’s Sonata in F major (K. 222-494) “conveys a shimmering, graceful, singing quality in the Andante movement of the work [and] produces fluid, melodic, voicelike music from what is, after all, a percussion instrument” (Alperson 2008, 47). The aesthetic appreciation of Brendel’s performance involves some kind of awareness of this apparent conflict between the ‘fluid, melodic, voicelike’ nature of the performed music and the general features of the instrument.

The instrumentality of musical performances is important in its own right and it helps us to fill in the details of my general account of the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances: one important feature of the performance that we attend to when appreciating musical performances is the instrumentality of this performance. But there is another reason why we should take the instrumentality of musical performances seriously: attending to the instrumentality of musical performances while appreciating musical performances can influence our aesthetic appreciation of the musical work itself.

Remember: the main claim of this paper is about the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances. But there is an intricate relation between the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances and of the musical works themselves. Importantly, the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances can influence the aesthetic appreciation of the musical works. And the hope is that if we think of the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances as a twofold experience, then we can understand how the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances can influence the aesthetic appreciation of the musical works.

Take instrumentality again. If we listen to a performance of a musical work and attend simultaneously to both the features of the musical work and the features of the performance, say, the use of the instruments,
then this experience can influence our aesthetic appreciation of the musical work itself—for example, it can make us appreciate the composer’s orchestration better. But this influence can only be explained if the experience of listening to the performance of this work is a twofold experience—otherwise it is difficult to see how our attention to the instrumentality of the performance (or to any other features of the performance) could influence our aesthetic appreciation of the musical work itself.

4. b. Multimodality

The second important aspect of our aesthetic appreciation of musical performances is multimodality. There is a lot of recent empirical evidence that multimodal perception is the norm and not the exception—our sense modalities interact in a variety of ways (see Spence-Driver 2004; Bertelson-Gelder 2004 for summaries; and O’Callaghan 2008, forthcoming for philosophical overviews). Information in one sense modality can influence the information processing in another sense modality at a very early stage of perceptual processing (often in the primary visual cortex in the case of vision, for example, [Watkins et al. 2006]). A simple example for this is ventriloquism, where vision influences our audition: we experience the voices as coming from the dummy and not from the ventriloquist (see Bertelson 1999). But there are more surprising examples: if there is a flash in your visual scene and you hear two beeps while the flash lasts, you experience it as two flashes (Shams et al. 2000).

The experience of musical performances is also known to be multimodal: more specifically, visual stimuli play an important role in our aesthetic appreciation of the expressiveness of musical performances (Bergeron-Lopes 2009; Davidson 1993; Vines 2005, 2006). One important consequence of these findings is that what I described above as ‘attention to the features of the musical performance’, that is, one fold of the twofold experience of the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances, is not a merely auditory affair—the attention to the features of the musical performance is not necessarily and not exclusively auditory attention: it can and often does involve visual attention.

Take the famous performance of Rameau’s *Les Indes Galantes* by Les Arts Florissants, conducted by William Christie and choreographed by Blanca Li and Andrei Serban (2004, Opera National de Paris). The choreography of the duet ‘Forêts plaisibles’ in the last act between Zima
and Adario involves very pointed visual gestures against the beat, which makes our multimodal experience of this performance of the duet shift time signature. We hear it as having the time signature of 4/4 instead of the original alla breve time signature (2/2) as prescribed in Rameau’s score.

An important consequence of this is that it is very difficult to listen to any other performance of the same opera without hearing this duet in 4/4. Again, this is an important instance of how the twofold experience of a musical performance can influence our aesthetic appreciation of the musical work itself. Again, this influence can only be explained if the experience of listening to the performance of this work is a twofold experience—otherwise it is difficult to see how our visual attention to the choreography of the performance could influence our aesthetic appreciation of the musical work itself.

5. Conclusion: Framing the Authenticity Debate

An important debate in contemporary philosophy of music is about the authenticity of musical performances: about how musical works should be performed (Kivy 1995; Levinson 1990, 313–408; Davies 2001; Young 1988; Dodd 2007, 201–39). Do we have to perform the musical work as it was intended to be performed by the composer? Do we have to perform it in such a way that the experience of the performance is comparable with the experience of the original performance?

This debate is especially heated when it comes to contemporary performances of early music. Do we have to perform early music with original instruments? Can we use piano instead of harpsichord? Can we use an early eighteenth-century violin from Cremona when performing the Brandenburg Concertos (which were originally performed far away from Cremona, and, presumably, on violins very different from the ones made in Cremona)?

I argued in the last section that our twofold experience of the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances can and does influence our aesthetic appreciation of the musical work itself. But if this is true then this puts the authenticity debate in new light. If our experience of musical performances influences our aesthetic appreciation of the musical work itself, then we can make an interesting connection between one’s position in the authenticity debate and one’s general attitude towards the respective importance of the two folds of the twofold experience of the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances.
According to a conservative view, only authentic performances are acceptable and a musical performance is authentic if it entails as exact a replication of the original performance as possible. Those who hold such a conservative view will consider the ‘performance’ fold of this twofold experience to be inferior to the ‘musical work’ fold. The general idea is that the performance can help us appreciate the musical work, but its features should be dictated by the features of the musical work. In this case, the twofold musical experience is an experience of how and whether the features of the musical performance are appropriate to the features of the musical work. When listening to most performances of a musical work, one needs to actively ignore the features of the musical performance—this act of ignoring the features of the musical performances, as we have seen, is itself only possible if one has a twofold experience.

Those, however, who hold a less conservative position, according to which even the experience of a nonauthentic musical performance can add to our aesthetic appreciation of the musical work itself, are likely to attribute different importance to the two ‘folds’. The ‘performance’ fold is at least as important as the ‘musical work’ fold as it can and often does influence our aesthetic appreciation of the musical work itself. The features of the performance can elucidate features of the musical work itself—so much so that we may never be able to listen to future performances of the same musical work in the same way again. In this case, the twofold musical experience is an experience of how and whether features of the musical performance differ from, and, if we are lucky, surpass, the features we attribute to the musical work on the basis of previous performances.

To use the Rameau example from the last section, those who are on the more conservative side in the authenticity debate will try to filter out the visual and auditory stimuli that get us to experience the duet in 4/4—as the authentic performance can only be in the time signature that appears in Rameau’s original score. They may even fail to show up to this performance (although Les Arts Florissants is one of the most influential early music group that self-identifies as ‘authentic’). Those, on the other hand, who are on the less conservative side in the authenticity debate will be likely to let the experience of the duet in 4/4 when listening to this performance influence their aesthetic appreciation of the musical work itself—it may enrich their appreciation of the piece as more dynamic and energetic than they previously supposed.
In short, depending on how conservative a position one holds in the authenticity debate, the twofold experience of the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances will seem very different. By understanding these different versions of the twofold experience of the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances, we may be able to understand some of the underlying motivations behind the authenticity debate.7

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NOTES

1. I am not committed to the claim that the player piano playing Nancarrow’s Studies for Player Piano does not count as a genuine performance—if it does, then my account applies to the aesthetic appreciation of these performances as well.

2. Walton (1990, 300–301; 2002, 33; 1991, 423). See Nanay (2004) on the differences between Walton’s and Wollheim’s concept of twofoldness and also Hopkins (1998, esp. pp. 15–17), Maynard (1994, esp. pp. 158–59). See also Lopes (2005, chapter 1) and Kulwicki (2006, 172–73) for moderately critical overviews. Gombrich’s account of our experience of pictures is inconsistent with the idea of twofoldness. As he said: “is it possible to ‘see’ both the plane surface and the battle horse at the same time? If we have been right so far, the demand is for the impossible. To understand the battle horse is for a moment to disregard the plane surface. We cannot have it both ways…” (Gombrich 1961, 279).

3. One important consideration in favour of (i) is the following quote: “The seeing appropriate to representations permits simultaneous attention to what is represented and to the representation” (Wollheim 1980, 213). But it is not clear whether seeing-in only needs to “permit” simultaneous attention or it is constituted by it.

4. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this objection.

5. The analogy from pictorial twofoldness may again be helpful here to elucidate the importance of (iv). It has been suggested recently that sometimes, but not always, our experience of pictures is inflected (Lopes 2005, 123–124; Hopkins 2010; Nanay 2010; Podro 1991, 1998). As Hopkins says: “inflection [. . .] offers us the opportunity better to appreciate how the [depicted scene] emerges from the [picture’s design]” (Hopkins 2010, 165). In other words, when we have inflected pictorial experiences, we are aware of a relational property (labelled as a ‘design-scene property’ by Nanay [2010]). And in the case of the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances, we get something structurally similar to inflection. When we have an inflected pictorial experience we are attending to the relation between the depicted scene and the way it is depicted. And when we appreciate musical performances aesthetically, we are also attending to a relation: the relation between features of the musical performance and those of the musical work. We can import the metaphors that are used to described inflection to the musical case: we appre-
ciate how the features of the musical work ‘emerge from’ the features of the performance, etc. As inflection involves the twofold experience of the depicted scene and the way it is depicted, the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances involves the twofold experience of the features of the performance and the features of the musical work.

6. Note that Alperson comes close to endorsing a claim that could be considered to be a special case of the main claim defended in this paper. He argues that when we appreciate a musical performance, we have a ‘double consciousness’ (Alperson 2008, 47) of the instrumentality of music and the performed musical work itself. He even uses the term ‘twofoldness’ to characterize this ‘double consciousness’ (ibid).

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