the less said the better. If one is a specialist in some area of ancient philosophy, or if one is interested in any of the subject matters discussed by the authors and arguments in this book, and especially if one is interested in self-refutation arguments, the nature of philosophical argumentation and the history and nature of transcendental (-like) arguments, this is a book to read. There will be moments where one disagrees with some of the details, but at no point will one walk away without thinking that she has been part of a fruitful and high-level philosophical exchange. To repeat: this is an outstanding study.

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This volume owes its origins to a 2007 conference at Berkeley in honour of Professor A.A. Long. It is comprised of an introduction and twelve essays written mostly by former students of Professor Long who are now, as the volume notes (3), respected scholars. The twelve essays are discussed in turn. Due to limitations of space, only some of these receive more than a summary.

In ‘Plato on aporia and self-knowledge’, Andrea Nightingale argues that in the early dialogues, Socrates evinces a special kind of knowledge: a ‘self-reflexive awareness’ of his own epistemic limitations that avoids the moral fault of falsely claiming knowledge. This awareness is ‘completely distinct from propositional knowledge’ (12) and is closely connected to aporia, which ‘is not ignorance pure and simple’ but ‘the awareness of one’s own lack of knowledge’ (15) and ‘a mode of ethical wisdom’ (16). Nightingale sees the middle dialogues as treating aporia more instrumentally: primarily as an impulse towards inquiry and knowledge of the Forms, an area in which another kind of self-knowledge is achieved. Nightingale’s discussion is suggestive, however, something could be said about the characterisation of aporia as an evil in the Cratylus (415c5). In addition, it should not be so readily assumed that aporia is always a mental state, something that Nightingale seems to assume not only for Plato, but also (strangely) for Aristotle (20); aporia can also be the puzzle that is the object of the mental state.¹


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In ‘Cross-examining happiness: reason and community in Plato’s Socratic dialogues’, Sara Ahbel-Rappe challenges the standard view that Socrates’ ethics are a form of ‘egoistic eudaimonism’ (henceforth EE). Rappe argues against the attribution of EE to Socrates by claiming that Socrates does not himself maintain EE, but instead is ‘combating Sophists and Sophistic theses in their own terms’ (32). Thus, Socrates employs EE dialectically: drawing it from the Sophists and using it on their students, but not himself accepting it. Rappe claims that when Socrates is speaking in *propria persona* he does not refer to egoistic motivations but to his service of the gods (e.g., Ap. 23c1) or, using Pythagorean language, to friendship and the search for truth. According to Rappe these motivations arise independently of egoism because Socrates articulates (e.g., Chrm. 166d2-6, Grg. 505e4-6, 507e6-508a2) a ‘valorization of friendship [which] is independent of egoism, to the extent that it is an argument against egoism’ (42) and the *elenchus* is conducted in a manner that is fundamentally other-regarding and incompatible with egoism. Finally, Rappe finds traces of this view in the *Republic*’s discussion of the common good ‘in which the terms “me” and “mine” are radically altered denotativelly; the outcome is a community’ (43).

Rappe’s paper is provocative, but raises certain concerns. Although Rappe mentions psychological egoism (27), she does not entirely clearly distinguish between rational egoism and psychological egoism, or indeed, sufficiently clearly characterise these. For instance, her characterisation of the latter: ‘it is impossible for agents to be motivated to do anything other than what is in their own interest’ (27), is incautious. While Socrates often says things of this nature, what Socrates, and Rappe, surely mean is that it is impossible for agents to be motivated to do anything other than what they believe is their own interest; it might help to characterise rational egoistic eudaimonism, e.g., $S$ rationally desires to $\phi$ iff $S$ believes that $\phi$-ing will contribute to $S$’s happiness. Rappe’s attempt to cast Socrates’ own pronouncements of EE as merely dialectical requires further evidence. It is not clear to this reader that EE is a thesis closely associated only with the Sophists: it seems to have had wider acceptance (witness Aristotle). Rappe seems to assume that if Socrates does not explicitly refer to EE in certain contexts (e.g., when discussing friends) then he does not maintain EE in those contexts; this is a dubious principle. In order to support the thesis that Socrates’ pronouncements of EE are merely dialectical, Rappe also focuses on the value placed on friendship. However, the value of friendship is not a problem for egoism, what must be shown is that the concern for friends arises independently of self-concern. Finally, Rappe would have to match the explanatory power of EE if her reading is to become attractive. Such a task would demand a book-length treatment and would have to address, among other issues, the common tendency in ancient ethics to explain concern for others in terms of enlightened self-interest.

In ‘Inspiration, recollection, and *mimēsis* in Plato’s *Phaedrus*’, Kathryn Morgan offers a reading of the *Phaedrus* that differentiates the *enthousiasmos* of the philosopher from that of the poet or prophet of traditional religion: ‘rather than
being invaded by an outside force, the mind of the philosopher leaves the mortal world’ (54). On this picture the gods are not senders of inspiration and the philosophers passive recipients; rather the gods are paradigms to be imitated by the philosopher who achieves this through *mimēsis* (here emulation rather than mimicry), recollection of the Forms, and reflection.

In ‘Plato’s *Theaetetus* as an ethical dialogue’, David Sedley appeals to the distinction drawn in the *Timaeus* (29b3-d3) between two types of *logos*: discourse about the unstable sensible world (physics), and discourse about the Forms. Sedley argues that this suggests ‘a bipartition of philosophy into (a) physics and (b) the study of stable being, the latter including ethics’ (65), and detects something similar in the *Cratylus*, where the discussion turns from physics to various virtues: ‘Hence Plato’s bipartition of philosophy proves to be into (a) physics and (b) ethics’ (65). What was later to become logic in the traditional Hellenistic tripartition of philosophy (into physics, ethics, and logic) was still, at this point, ethics (66). Noting that piety, courage, moderation, and justice are addressed in the *Euthyphro*, *Laches*, *Charmides*, and *Republic* respectively, Sedley sees the *Theaetetus* as filling the gap and providing an account of the fifth cardinal virtue: wisdom (*phronēsis* or *sophia*). Locating the *Theaetetus* within this scheme, Sedley draws attention to Plato’s intellectualist conception of the virtues and his moralistic conception of knowledge. Within this framework, Sedley makes a claim that he has argued more fully elsewhere:2 that the digression (172a1-177c2) should be read at face value. Justice and other ethical virtues are perfected by assimilation to god through intellectual contemplation and withdrawal, ‘raising the philosopher above interpersonal morality’ (70).

In contrast to Sedley, in ‘Contemplating divine mind’, Allan Silverman sees the *Republic*’s stipulation that philosophers in training be engaged in political activity as an indication that political activity ‘is in some way conducive to coming to, if not part of, knowledge of the Good’ (82). Silverman argues that for Plato, knowledge of the Good entails a god-like complete happiness: ‘No additional acts, and hence no additional time spent in contemplation, will augment [this] happiness’ (83). The philosopher’s descent is motivated by a desire to spread the good, much like the Demiurge of the *Timaeus*. Since the philosopher’s happiness is complete, and cannot be increased or prolonged by further contemplation, an active life and the limits upon contemplation that it imposes requires no sacrifice on the philosopher’s part. By contrast, it is Aristotle’s account of the final good, where theoretical contemplation is modelled on the activity of Aristotle’s divine, that Silverman sees as entailing flight from the world.

In ‘Aristotle and the history of skepticism’, Alan Code rehearses some of the themes covered in Tony Long’s similarly named 1981 article.3 Echoing Long, Code sees Aristotle as showing familiarity with the Agrippan ‘modes’ in his "

arguments against those who appeal to circular demonstration and those who complain that one cannot know indemonstrable first principles. Code also discusses the positive role that aporiai play in Aristotle’s philosophical inquiry.

A central puzzle of Stoic ethics regards the role of ‘indifferents’ (ἀδιάφορα) e.g., health, wealth, etc. These may have ‘value’ (ἀξία), but are not ‘to be chosen’ (ἀληθέτον), they are merely ‘to be taken’ (ἐλπίδον); they are not the objects of ‘choice’ (ἐπιλοχος), but of ‘selection’ (ἐλκυστήρη). In ‘Stoic selection: Objects, actions, and agents’, Stephen White argues that ‘the proper objects of “selection” are not actions, as specified by verbs (or verbal nouns) but bodies or bodily states, as specified by substantives (or substantival phrases) […] What we select, then, are exclusively corporeal items; bodily states either of our own souls or bodies, or of other bodies “external” to our own’ (113-114). However, impulse and choice ‘have twin objects: not only bodies that figure as direct objects or “targets” of an action but also incorporeal “predicates” that represent the action (or emotional reaction) itself’ (115). It turns out then, that ‘what we choose are actions (and reactions), and what we select are bodily objects, namely, those with or for or on which we act (or react)’ (115). White proposes that instead of first selecting which things to avoid or pursue and then choosing a corresponding action, ‘the correct approach is typically first to determine what we need to do or accomplish and only then to select objects that warrant our attention’ (117). Thus, ‘choice’ might take being courageous as its object, while ‘selection’, conceived here as typically posterior to ‘choice’, might take a sword as its object. Our ‘choices’ reflect our ‘duties’ (καθήκοντα) and our ‘roles’ (πρόσωπα) (118-119). The rest of the paper (119-129) is dedicated to a rehearsal of Epictetus i 2 in light of these considerations.

Sometimes it seems that White wishes to say that in ‘choice’, S desires to φ, while in ‘selection’, S desires x. This is infelicitous: surely the latter is elliptical for, e.g., S desires to have x.4 We might, then, reformulate what White says as: in ‘choice’, S desires to φ (possibly in regard to x), and determination of φ-ing takes priority; in ‘selection’, S desires to φ in regard to x, and determination of x takes priority. If this, or something like it, is a correct understanding of White’s account (clearer presentation would have helped here, and throughout), then ‘selection’ and its mechanism require careful explication. This was not apparent in the long rehearsal of Epictetus and was not elsewhere provided. Furthermore, it is puzzling that White does not make more of the usual distinctions observed in discussion of these issues: those between the σκοπός (‘target’) and τέλος (‘end’), προκείμενον (objective) and τέλος, or between stochastic and non-stochastic crafts.5 Finally, it is not clear how White’s account is meant to fit in

4 White seems to recognise something akin to this: ‘if all we select are objects to pursue (or avoid), then how do we tell what to do with them or how to get them in the first place?’ (117).

5 White could have mentioned that one of his fundamental points had already been observed in an influential work. Julia Annas, in describing the Stoics, notes that the σκοπός as the agent’s ‘doing or obtaining something, expressed by verbs’ and the τέλος, is ‘the thing done or obtained, expressed by nouns’ (see J. Annas, The Morality of Happiness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, 35).
with the detailed discussions of these issues we find elsewhere in the sources (e.g., Cicero De Finibus iii).

In ‘Beauty and its relation to goodness in Stoicism’, Richard Bett explores the relation between (physical) beauty (κάλλος), a preferred indifferent for the Stoics, and ‘the ethically admirable quality designated by the neuter adjective with the definite article, to kalon, which qualifies as good, and indeed is virtually indistinguishable from the good itself’ (135). Beauty, conceived of primarily in terms of symmetry and order among constituent parts, is discussed in relation to the body (physical beauty) and to the soul (ethical virtue). The puzzle concerns what the precise connection is between the two and whether for the Stoics, as sometimes for Plato, physical beauty can be a stepping-stone (or more) to ethical virtue. Bett notes that the Stoics think that in the young, ‘there is a connection between physical beauty…and an inner potential for developing the beauty of soul’ (145). This provides a rationale of sorts for the sage’s positive response to the beauty of the young in an erotic relationship and Bett explores the similarities to and possible inspiration from Plato (149-152). However, in the final analysis, Bett admits that the connection between physical beauty and beauty of the soul is unclear (148).

In a substantial paper: ‘How dialectical was Stoic dialectic?’, Luca Castagnoli examines the extent to which Stoic διάλεξτητική was dialogical: rooted in dialogue and argued by means of question and answer. While, from Chrysippus onwards, Stoic διάλεξτητική is more often defined as the science of ‘signifiers and things signified’, or ‘the science of what is true and false and neither’ (e.g., DL vii 62), Castagnoli argues that the dialogical nature of Stoic dialectic and the value placed by even later Stoics on conversation has been neglected due a tendency among scholars to see the Stoics ‘through the lenses (sometimes distorting) of our “classical” propositional logic, [thus] largely confining their attention to those sections which correspond to the most formal chapters of that logic, and are thereby less dialectical’ (163). In a valuable discussion, Castagnoli rehearses how the διάλεξτητική of the Dialecticians was rooted in conversing (διαλέγεσθαι) and shows how this applies also to the διάλεξτητική of the early Stoics (156-160); he then produces evidence that dialogue continued to be important to Stoic διάλεξτητική (164-169). Finally (169-179), Castagnoli turns to the Stoic response to the sceptic’s claim that there is no sound demonstrative proof (ἀπόδειξις) (Sextus M viii 465-467) which culminates in: ‘the argument against proof either is a proof or is not a proof; and if it is not a proof, it is not credible, but if it is a proof, proof exists’. The Stoic arguments here are based on self-refutation (περιτροπή), and one might see them as formal deductions that employ the so-called Consequentia Mirabilis (according to which any proposition implying its own contradictory is false, and any proposition implied by its own contradictory is true). Thus, the argument to the conclusion that proof exists would be as follows: (1*) \( p \lor \neg p \), (2*) \( p \implies p \), (3*) \( \neg p \implies p \), therefore (4*) \( p \). Instead, Castagnoli

6 I am paraphrasing Castagnoli here, changing the order and numbering of the premises for
argues that the argument is better understood, not as an argument to the conclusion that \( p \), but as a dialogical argument: ‘(1) Do you say that proof exists or that it does not exist? (2) If you answer that it exists, you are already on my side, admitting that proof exists; (3) if you answer that it does not exist, you’d better produce at least one argument, and a demonstrative one, if you hope to persuade me; but once you have agreed to advance a proof of your view, you have thereby admitted that some proof does exist; (4) in any case, therefore, you are bound to agree with me that proof exists’ (174-175). Rather than (e.g.) falsifying the proposition in question, one interlocutor ‘overturns’ the other, winning the dialogical contest. Castagnoli argues that this is a better exegesis of the text. The avoidance of the *Consequentia Mirabilis* is a virtue because the Stoics, Castagnoli holds (176), maintain ‘Aristotle’s Thesis’ (AT): no proposition implies its own negation, nor is any proposition implied by its own negation. Thus they could not accept (3*).

This paper serves as a useful companion to Castagnoli’s important monograph on self-refutation.\(^7\) It provides insight into a neglected aspect of ancient philosophical argument and Castagnoli is right to focus his attention on the peculiarity of (3*). However, while Castagnoli’s general argument is persuasive, this reader was not entirely convinced concerning (a): the Stoics acceptance of AT, and (b): their resulting rejection of the *Consequentia Mirabilis*. In support of the Stoic rejection of AT, Castagnoli appeals to other scholarly literature (176n84), but his argument would benefit from laying out the evidence or summarising it (rather than merely providing a reference).\(^8\) In particular, if we follow Castagnoli, it seems the Stoics are completely deprived of what this reader takes to be a very common argumentative device: the *reductio ad absurdum* (even the kind of *reductio* that an intuitionist would accept). This is striking and merits discussion.

In ‘Socrates speaks in Seneca, *De vita beata* 24-28’, James Ker provides a literary reading of the passage in question investigating Seneca’s characterisation and evocation of Socrates as a *sapiens*, Seneca’s recounting of Socrates going through a *meditatio* (188-190), and the manner in which Socrates is fitted to Roman times and assumes a ‘transhistorical perspective’ (190-194).

In ‘Seneca’s Platonism: the soul and its divine origin’, Gretchen Reydams-Schils examines Seneca’s relation to Platonism and argues that Seneca ‘use[s] Plato as a kind of propaedeutic device to underscore an essentially Stoic scale of values’ (201). Reydams-Schils argues that despite using highly Platonic language and expounding Platonic clichés in places, e.g., *ep.* 79.12 (which reads like a deleted scene from the *Phaedrus*), Seneca does not go beyond the bounds of Stoic orthodoxy and, on the issue of body and soul, similar sentiments can be found both in earlier and later Stoics. Similarly, talk of ‘returning to a higher


\(^8\) This last point assumes importance because it was a point in regard to which this reader still required some convincing while reading *Ancient Self-Refutation*. 
realm’ does not commit Seneca to anything as heretical as Platonic Ideas. Other allusions to Platonic motifs can also be seen as falling within the bounds of Stoic orthodoxy. There is ever increasing attention to Stoic readings of Plato, and scholars will find Reydams-Schils’s reading, which is informed by a wide-ranging knowledge of Seneca, helpful. In addition, Reydams-Schils’s discussion of passages from the *Naturales Quaestiones* will be of interest to those interested in the puzzles posed by *epistles* 58 and 65, often deemed crucial to the understanding of Stoic metaphysics.

In the final paper, ‘The status of the individual in Plotinus’, Kenneth Wolfe offers a discussion of Plotinus’ doctrine that there are Forms of individuals (*Ennead* v 7). Wolfe claims: ‘Socrates is a Socratic human being, and Alcibiades is an “Alcibiadic” human being… Since “Socraticity” or the intelligible form of Socrates exists in the intelligible world, it must, like all other forms, be definable and knowable by the Intellect’ (219). Wolfe shows how, in accounting for ascent to the intelligible world, Plotinus might make the move from descended soul to undescended soul to Forms of individuals (220-222). Every intellect turns out to be a form (v 9.8.1-4). Wolfe notes the possible problem posed by the transmigration of souls: the soul in Cleopatra can become the soul of Elizabeth Taylor, and Plotinus’ answer to this objection (v 7.1.6-10): ‘every soul is capable is capable of participating in more than one, perhaps in every, intelligible form’ (222). Wolfe explores a confusing aspect of Plotinus and provides some insight into Plotinus’ possible motivations. However, while Wolfe seems to take Plotinus’ talk in his stride, to many the talk of ‘defining’ individuals will seem unintuitive (to say the least). More could be done to make clear the *philosophical* motivations (if there are such) for this view (e.g., could accounting for identity over time be invoked?) and Wolfe should also mention some of the *philosophical* problems of this doctrine. A final remark: it does not seem clear that Socrates and his twin would share in ‘Socracity’ as Wolfe seems to think (219-220).

There is great diversity here: in the topics covered, approaches adopted, and, as is common with such volumes, in the stage of development of some of the papers. The diversity of topics is testament to Long’s influence and, fittingly, many of the essays touch upon ethical themes. One gripe: insofar as this volume possesses a thematic unity, ‘Ancient Models of Mind’ does not reflect it. Despite the wealth of topics covered here, the philosophy of mind is not among them, nor are we given any insight at all into some of the questions posed by the back-cover: ‘How does god think?’ while the link to others: ‘How, ideally, does a human mind function?’ is tenuous at best. Nonetheless, the range of topics covered is impressive and a number of the papers make provocative and valuable contributions to the study of ancient philosophy.

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9 Wolfe may mean to say “‘Socratic’” rather than ‘Socratic’ in this quotation.