The debate around the idea that films can philosophize is relatively recent. It was first inspired by Gilles Deleuze’s and Stanley Cavell’s writings on the philosophical potential of film. Both philosophers have had significant influence in both analytic and continental philosophy. But it was only in the 2000s that this idea received greater interest as a topic of philosophy of film, becoming one of its most controversial topics.

Thus it was with much excitement that I received news that *Current Controversies in Philosophy of Film* would include one section (Part V) exclusively dedicated to the topic, including two chapters (9 and 10) written by two major figures in the film as philosophy (FAP) debate, namely the advocate, Thomas E. Wartenberg, and the critic, Murray Smith, respectively.

The papers in this section present two opposite answers to the question of whether films can philosophize, which is indicative of the polemical debate surrounding this topic. This contribution is valuable because it delves into the main controversial issues, objections, and positions around the topic, making it a great starting point for anyone interested in the idea of philosophizing film in the Anglo-American context.

Chapter 9, written by Thomas E. Wartenberg, one of the major advocates of FAP, exposes the main objections to it, and gives a moderate defense through the analysis of several films he takes to exemplify cinematic philosophy.

Wartenberg starts the chapter by briefly addressing what is at issue when philosophers and theorists talk about the FAP hypothesis. He clarifies that the topic is designated by different terms, such as, famously, “film as philosophy”, but also “film-philosophy”, “filmosophy” and “cinematic philosophy.” However, although these terms are, in fact, used by different philosophers and theorists to defend the claim that films can philosophize, we should also note that their strength and details vary.

Film-philosophy, for example, is a specific approach coined by Robert Sinnerbrink that defends cinema as a special *medium* to philosophize in specific ways,
which is a stronger position than those defended in mainstream Anglo-American philosophy of film. Sinnerbrink would perhaps be understood as defending an “extreme pro-cinematic philosophy” position. This is the kind of position that Wartenberg argues is defended by Stephen Mulhall in his work *On Film*, insofar as the British philosopher believes that film can philosophize “in just the ways that philosophers do,” including “serious and systematic thinking” about philosophical problems.ii Wartenberg considers himself to defend a moderate pro-position, focusing “upon specific techniques that filmmakers can employ to do philosophy on film, most centrally the thought experiment,” and asserting that the film medium can do philosophy along with other traditional media such as texts and oral discussions. But Wartenberg denies that all media can philosophize in the same ways, hence his moderate stance on the issue.iii

After clarifying what is meant by FAP and his moderate position, Wartenberg starts exposing and responding to four of the main objections to FAP. I will only consider the first objection, since it gets at the core of the issue. The first objection he examines is the “generality objection”. This objection “emphasizes the narrative character of fiction films in contrast to the universalistic aspirations of philosophy.”iv This objection is made, for example, by Bruce Russell in “The Philosophical Limits of Film.”v According to Russell, “no one can establish that something holds in all possible worlds by presenting an example or two of a possible world depicted in film.”vi Wartenberg here counter-argues that thought experiments used in philosophy are particular, non-universalist narratives. As an example of a cinematic thought experiment, Wartenberg refers to Bernardo Bertolucci’s *The Conformist* as a thought experiment to criticize Italian fascism.vii

Indeed, this is the core of the discussion around this objection. If thought experiments are accepted as a common philosophical method, we can see how not all philosophical endeavors aim to establish necessary universal truths. Of course, thought experiments may have different functions, as Wartenberg highlights in *Thinking on Screen* (2007). One function thought experiments may have is to act as a counterexample to some general claim: even Bruce Russell agrees that films can do this, but he does not give enough weight to it.viii Further, we can pose the metaphilosophical question whether thought experiments are even good tools for philosophizing. This is not a question Wartenberg addresses here, but it points to one of the cruxes of the FAP discussion. This metaphilosophical question is pertinent; however, it involves a prescriptive metaphilosophy, i.e. a debate about what we should consider the best
philosophical tools. To defend FAP, I don’t think we need to get into this debate. Rather, we just need a descriptive metaphilosophy, i.e., a clarification of which metaphilosophies are traditionally, even conservatively, accepted. This is what I see as the main confusion that objectors to FAP make: they equate classificatory with qualitative criteria, and descriptive with prescriptive metaphilosophies. Even if we consider thought experiments as bad tools, they are still, in fact, used by contemporary philosophers. Cinematic thought experiments are just an extension of the media through which thought experiments can be conveyed.

After dealing with several objections, Wartenberg explains that proponents of cinematic philosophy have to take a defensive position against all of them. He makes several positive assertions:

1) films that are thought experiments can do philosophy;
2) just because art can seek to entertain its audience doesn’t mean it cannot philosophize;
3) it is not necessary to adopt a strong intentionalist account, just the use of creator-oriented interpretation; and
4) it is possible for film to philosophize even if it is a joint work.

For Wartenberg, the only way of knowing if a film does philosophy is by analyzing it. This is what he calls the “local” strategy. In fact, he has been defending consistently the above mentioned 4 positive assertions, and the “local” strategy in his several papers and books since at least 2003. Wartenberg’s approach to FAP seems to be the right one. He defends against several objections and argues positively for film as philosophy. However, Wartenberg also disagrees with other advocates of cinematic philosophy since, for him, films cannot do everything that traditional means of philosophizing can. Using formal logic as an example of something film cannot do, he argues that “making overly strong claims for cinematic philosophy only renders the case for its existence problematic.” Because the objections seem to fail, Wartenberg states that films can do philosophy via thought experiments and illustrations of philosophical theses, and by offering “novel philosophical insight.”

Wartenberg’s chapter is a comprehensive introduction to the main arguments against FAP and some possible replies. It summarizes the origins of the debate, its positions, from extreme to moderate, and points to the core problems of FAP. As this chapter is a kind of introduction to the debate, I suggest reading the primary bibliography to further understand the details and lines of argument. Wartenberg’s
position, nonetheless, may be seen as too conservative, especially when compared to Sinnerbrink’s film-philosophy approach. Indeed, Wartenberg can be seen as being too committed to “very specific techniques” of philosophy as he, himself, admits.\textsuperscript{xiv} On the one hand, this can be seen as a strategic move in order to convince as many philosophers as he can, thus opening a broader acceptance by the most conservative philosophers of the idea that films may be new means through which one can philosophize. But, on the other hand, this may be viewed as too restrictive, and it may not respond completely to what Livingston terms as the “rationality objection.” With Hegelian inspiration, Livingston asks “If we in fact believe a more efficient means to our goal is available, would it not indeed be irrational to pass it by?”\textsuperscript{xv} So, if film is constantly compared against traditional philosophical means, this may be a lost cause. If we can rely on texts to philosophize, why even bother considering other means?

Wartenberg hints towards an answer to this challenge by admitting that films have abilities texts do not. He claims that “film is both a visual and temporally extended artform [that] gives it an immediacy that is greater than other artforms in its presentation of philosophy.”\textsuperscript{xvi} This may not seem very concrete, but if we consider Wartenberg’s analysis of The Matrix in Thinking on Screen, we can better understand how this can philosophize in ways that are prompted by cinema’s nature that cannot be done in texts.\textsuperscript{xvii} So, maybe the challenge here should be that Wartenberg and philosophers who may defend this moderate version of a pro-FAP thesis, ought to present more compelling examples of films that make use of their specific techniques that turn them possibly better ways, in some sense, to philosophize, than other more traditional means.

Chapter 10, written by Murray Smith, has a very telling title: “Film, Philosophy, and the Varieties of Artistic Value.” It presents the opposing view to Wartenberg’s.

Smith begins with an Arthur Danto passage: “Like persons, works of art are a great deal richer than philosophy can or should want to capture.”\textsuperscript{xviii} This already points to something about Smith’s thesis: he uses this phrase to put art on a pedestal, which is, according to Danto himself, a way to philosophically disenfranchise art.\textsuperscript{xix} That is the strategy Smith adopts to refute FAP: try to show the incompatibility between art’s and philosophy’s ends.

Smith asks the crucial question “according to what conception of ‘philosophy’ can these films be said to be ‘doing’ philosophy?” Immediately, he charges FAP advocates of not meeting the “norms of philosophy” because films, indeed, are not works of philosophy.\textsuperscript{xx} For Smith, differences between philosophy, the sciences, and the
arts are not accidental. However, he admits that this “division of labor” has been questioned, giving the example of Edouard Machery’s experimental philosophy as blurring the lines between philosophy and science. Thus, Smith wonders if we can also question the “division of labor” between philosophy and film. Here he cites Paisley Livingston’s famous list to think about this question:

- Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*
- W. V. O. Quine, *Word and Object*
- John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*
- Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*
- Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*
- Frank Capra, *It Happened One Night*

What Smith wants to suggest here, with Livingston, is that we find it strange to see the last two titles on this list, since films are not regarded as works of philosophy. “[W]e do not customarily treat filmmakers – let alone Hollywood filmmakers – as philosophers,” according to Smith. It looks like, for Smith, Hollywood filmmakers are excluded *a priori* from any possibility of counting as philosophy. But Smith does not provide any argument for this view. As many philosophers harbor a Platonic prejudice against arts in general, here we find a prejudice against Hollywood filmmakers in particular.

Smith also refers here to Cleanth Brook’s “Heresy of Paraphrase,” according to which we should not put art into competition with science, philosophy or theology. Thus, for Smith, “while philosophy seeks to clarify our understanding of the world, the vocation of art is to deliver an adventure in perception, cognition, and emotion.” Here he poses the traditional idea that philosophy is absolutely committed to epistemic goals, and that we evaluate philosophical theories solely by their arguments and ideas, not their beauty.

Knowing that this argument denies FAP, Smith agrees with Wartenberg that we should avoid the “easy solution,” adding that to defend FAP we need “i) a suitable, ambitious and complete conception of philosophy as a practice (rather than an attitude or stance), and ii) the execution of which practice is solicited by the design of a film.”

Thus, Smith designates what he thinks to be three “norms of philosophy” for robust philosophizing, or “regulating ideals” to achieve philosophy’s epistemic aims:

1) rational warrant: philosophy’s “attention to the rational – or non-rational or irrational […] underpinning of our beliefs and practices.” The rational
assessment of these underpinning is done, according to Smith, through the
tools of logic;
2) empirical support/soundness: we should also take into account the empirical
evidence at our disposal;
3) reflective maturity: inspired by Rawls’ reflective equilibrium, according to
Smith the philosophical conclusion we reach should be “the product of a
sustained process of reflection, of testing our beliefs and assumptions by
examining them from a multitude of angles.”

Given these “norms of philosophy”, Smith believes that philosophy is more
demanding than science: it is regulated by norms that go beyond empirical evidence.

Smith here addresses one criticism posed against his argument: that his view of
philosophy is “too parochial, too narrowly bound to an analytic conception of
philosophy.” He replies that these norms are inspired by Socratic dialogue and refers
to Hegel as a non-analytic philosopher for whom it would be irrational to use art for
epistemic ends when we already have philosophy. This is the “rationality objection”
Livingston derives from Hegel. Smith does not, however, address Livingston’s own
reply to this objection that we are not in the position of having to choose between doing
philosophy through traditional media or through other artistic media—we can use
both. Wartenberg is also sympathetic to this claim.

Nevertheless, Smith’s reference to Socrates and Hegel do not seem to put the
criticism of having a narrow and analytic conception of philosophy to rest. Philosophers
from different schools or approaches can share the same ideas, varying only on their
methods or styles, so it is not surprising that we find the same ideas in philosophers as
different as G.W.F. Hegel, Arthur Danto, or Bertrand Russell. Furthermore, even if
Hegel thought that art should not be used to epistemic ends, Smith did not say how
Hegel’s or Socrates’ philosophy was regulated by these norms. This seems to be an
appeal to authority that isn’t very accurate nor supported by a strong argument.

The “too narrow of a conception of philosophy” objection to Smith seems to
remain a fair criticism. These norms of philosophy are, at best, not norms, but general
illuminating principles for a good philosophy practice and, at worst, a misunderstanding
of how philosophy has been done during millennia, imposing an analytic, western-
centric XX century type of philosophizing. For example, according to Noël Carroll,
“Smith’s argument against movie-made philosophy on the basis of ambiguity is not
conclusive, because at best he is dealing with tendencies.” The same criticism applies
to this chapter: Smith seems to be committed to controversial conceptions of philosophy and art.

However, Smith goes on to argue that art is not as concerned with cognitive value, even if art isn’t cognitively trivial, as Jerome Stolnitz thought. Art has, according to Smith, a plurality of values that do not reduce to cognitive ones. This seems to be a less contentious point, yet it seems to contradict his thesis. If art can also have cognitive values and purposes, why should we maintain that films cannot have any relevant philosophical value? It still is not clear why we would have to “reduce” a work of film to its epistemological potentials in order to accept FAP. For example, according to Wartenberg, Modern Times is an example of a film that has philosophical value, but it doesn’t mean its comedic value is reduced. Quite the opposite, it is the philosophical content of certain film scenes that make them comical.

To better understand how art and, particularly film, contrasts with philosophy in the level of concern with cognitive value, Smith refers, again, Danto’s thought on the relationship between art and philosophy. Danto’s Hegelian view of contemporary art is, generally, that art reached a great level of self-consciousness, as are examples such as the works of Duchamp and Warhol, regarded as philosophical works. Thus, Smith thinks that avant-garde films may be good candidates of self-conscious filmmaking, as self-reflective art. However, Smith wants to address films that are outside this tradition, since mainstream films are usually the objects of focus by philosophers who argue for FAP.

The first film he explores is Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982). According to Smith, the film “dramatizes a trio of ‘existential-ethical’ concerns:” “the limits of self-knowledge”, “the subordination of a class of agents with the same capacities as the subordinating class”; and “the condition of living in the shadow of imminent and premature death.” The point Smith wants to stress is that this film, as a fictional narrative, does not offer any empirical support and is not submitted to rational examination for such philosophical ideas being, thus, unable to achieve reflective maturity. This seems to point to the idea that such film does not fulfil the norms of philosophy. Furthermore, for Smith, asking a fictional film to fulfil such norms would be an “absurd demand.” What he proposes is that we analyze the “film’s sensuous embodiment of its ideas to locate the source of its value,” explaining that with “sensuous” he means the “various levels of response and appreciation (…) from bodily reflexes to imaginative reflection.”
Another point to reiterate is that something having a primary goal does not impede it from having a secondary and still valid goal. In this case, it is possible that *Blade Runner* is primarily concerned with making an artistic film and, secondarily, a philosophical one.

Smith gives another example of a film that has been getting philosophers’ attention: the documentary *The Act of Killing* (2012) by Joshua Oppenheimer. According to Smith, even though this documentary has ethico-political value, since it “raises ethical questions,” it does not probe “the evidence presented from numerous angles, offering counterexamples and counterarguments” and, thus, is not able to establish reflective maturity. Again, this film fails to fulfill all three norms of philosophy. On the other hand, for Smith *The Act of Killing* does, indeed, present critical and ethical claims through its aesthetic experience and its set of norms as a work of art that is not the same as the set norms for philosophy.

In “Film Art, Argument, and Ambiguity” (2006), Smith also made an argument that follows this strategy of analyzing particular potential philosophical film. There, he examined Carl Reiner’s *All of Me* (1984) to contrast it with what appears to be a kind of similar philosophical thought experiment – Bernard Williams’ thought experiment on personal identity. In “Personal Identity and Individuation” Williams puts the hypothesis of a magician that makes a trick where he puts the emperor’s mind into a peasant’s body, and vice-versa. Williams’ goal was to show how, even being possible to conceive a body switch (as Locke conceives), that would imply various problems, which suggests that the Lockean perspective on personal identity is problematic. Smith states that this thought experiment, although having a comical potential, has a primarily epistemic role. In *All of Me*, there is also a body switching from a woman’s mind to a man’s body, resulting in comedic narrative and visuals. According to Smith, the main goal of *All of Me*, contrary to Williams’ thought experiments, is primarily comical.

The particular argument that Smith makes in these three cases is slightly different. With *Blade Runner*, he aims to show that this film does not give sufficient empirical support to a certain philosophical thesis, nor it is submitted to rational examination, thus being unable to achieve reflective maturity. With *The Act of Killing*, the documentary does not achieve reflective maturity either since it does not show us the evidence from various points of view, nor does it offer counterexamples or counterarguments. And *All of Me*’s main goal is not philosophical but comedic, which shows that film’s priority is not epistemic, but aesthetic.
Smith’s strategy seems to consist of giving examples of films that could have philosophical potential, and then trying to demonstrate how they cannot, in fact, philosophize. But why should we think that a few examples (of films that may not even be the best candidates for FAP) should convince us of the general conclusion that no film can philosophize? Of course, this is a consequence of Smith’s a priori thesis that no film can ever philosophize. But why take so much space of the article trying to show examples of that? If it is an a priori issue, no example is required to confirm it, let alone many examples. Nonetheless, Smith’s strategy here may be this: as Blade Runner and The Act of Killing have been consistently considered, by philosophers, as good examples of cinematic philosophy, if he can prove that neither of these strong candidates of FAP actually philosophizes, other weaker candidate films do not philosophize either. This could be a viable strategy, however, it still seems a bit strange to try convincing advocates for FAP that no film can philosophize on the basis of analysis of just two cases.

In the final part of the chapter, Smith summarizes his thesis. He claims that his argument is not eliminativist, but deflationary. He concedes that art can have cognitive value, but not in a philosophical manner. He also makes two important concessions: films can “be appropriated for philosophical purposes” and that we could “accept that there is an area of overlap between the domains of art and philosophy”, even conceding that Wartenberg’s example of the documentary Ways of Seeing may occupy such an area. But doesn’t this contradict his previous positions? What does he mean by this area of overlap? Smith even states that “there seems to be no impediment in principle to the use of the techniques of cinema […] for philosophical purposes, and even meeting the exacting demands of rational warrant, empirical adequacy, and reflective maturity.”

He finishes the chapter with Danto, stating that “Danto seems at pains to emphasize that philosophy and literature should not be wholly or simply identified with one another, no matter how significantly they overlap.” But again, Wartenberg, for example, never argues that film and philosophy should be equated.

Overall, this chapter seems to fall into the trap of confusing the two kinds of metaphilosophies that I previously mentioned. I also worry Smith holds aesthetic assumptions that may not be very plausible, such as the idea that art tends to be ambiguous.
This chapter’s argument is a bit different from his previous argument in “Film Art, Argument, and Ambiguity.” His previous argument was more directed at the explicitness vs. ambiguity issue, while in this chapter he raises the issue of fulfilling the “norms of philosophy,” which are contentious. Are we supposed to find every norm met in every single philosophy paper, for instance? Maybe we should question whether all philosophical production, in fact, meets those norms.

Nonetheless, Smith makes an honorable and very interesting effort to clarify his metaphilosophy here, which is a positive evolution from his previous article on the issue, and an advance over other opponents of FAP. Smith still does fairly represent, in my view, the opposition to FAP with arguments that extend beyond film, and that could even be applied to other pretensions of defending philosophy through any art form. However, as he concedes, his metaphilosophy does not definitively refute FAP. So, I see the debate around FAP as a debate around presupposed metaphilosophical conceptions, and Smith’s clarification of this aspect of the debate seems, to me, the exact point of contention and the correct observation to make.

Both chapters I’ve discussed here are quite different. Wartenberg’s chapter serves as an overall introduction to the topic and to his ideas; it is a guide to understanding FAP. Smith’s chapter, on the other hand, presents a new argument against FAP, although his conclusion is not as opposed to FAP as one might expect. Note that Wartenberg does not develop his own arguments as much since he addresses various arguments and objections. With Smith’s concessions by the end of his chapter, I don’t know if he is becoming increasingly receptive to FAP. After all, Smith is, or was, one, if not the, major opponent to FAP in the literature. Surely, his arguments in this chapter are controversial, so we can expect some reply and the further extension of the debate. To conclude, this section of Current Controversies in Philosophy of Film is a combination of a great introduction to the idea of film as philosophy and a new perspective on the existing debate. Combined these chapters contain all the source materials to introduce this issue to philosophy and films studies courses and start various debates on film’s abilities or limits. As these chapters touch on metaphilosophical subjects too, and on new means to philosophize, these may be also used to more advanced philosophical courses on metaphilosophy and philosophical methodology.

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REFERENCES


NOTES


vi Ibid, 166.


viii Russell, “The Philosophical Limits of Film,” 166.

ix Wartenberg, “Film as Philosophy. The Pro Position,” 179.

x Wartenberg, “Film as Argument,” *Film Studies* 8 (2006), 131.


xii Wartenberg, “Film as Philosophy. The Pro Position,” 179.

xiii Ibid, 180.


xv Livingston, “Theses on Cinema as Philosophy,” 17. Livingston makes a very interesting metaphor with this subject. He imagines we have a screwdriver and a coin to tighten a screw. It would be irrational to use the coin instead of the screwdriver when we know the screwdriver to be more effective. However, Livingston recognizes that in this equation we do not have to choose between one or the other: we can use both tools. In the case of films, we can use them accompanied by texts, but never without them. (Cf. Livingston, *Cinema, Philosophy, Bergman*, 56.)

xvi Wartenberg, *Thinking on Screen*, 137.

xvii I strongly recommend reading Wartenberg’s analysis of *The Matrix*. But, briefly, Wartenberg argues that the film is a thought experiment that extends Descartes’ *evil genius* thought experiment inasmuch as it makes us experience the same doubts as the main character, Neo.


xxi Livingston, “Recent Work on Cinema as Philosophy,” 590.

xxii Smith, “Film, Philosophy, and the Varieties of Artistic Value,” 184.


xxiv Smith, “Film, Philosophy, and the Varieties of Artistic Value,” 185.
Ibid, 187.


Ibid, 190.

For Livingston’s very interesting screwdriver example of this objection, cf. Livingston, *Cinema, Philosophy, Bergman*, 56.

Ibid, 57.


Smith, “Film, Philosophy, and the Varieties of Artistic Value,” 193.

Ibid., 193–94.

Ibid., 194.


Smith, “Film Art, Argument, and Ambiguity,” 39.

Smith, “Film, Philosophy, and the Varieties of Artistic Value,” 196.

Ibid, 197.

Ibid, 197.

Ibid, 197–98.