THE YIJING AND PHILOSOPHY: FROM LEIBNIZ TO DERRIDA

I. Introduction

The Yijing, the early Chinese classic known as the Book of Changes, reveals in its opening passages the significance, harmony, and dynamic creativity of the ceaseless transformation of things and situations:

Qian dao bian hua, ge zheng xing ming, bao he da he, nai li zhen. shou chu shu wu, wan guo xian ning.

(The way of heaven/the creative [qian] is transformation, so that each thing obtains its own genuine life and is maintained in great harmony. Heaven is thus advantageous and beneficial. A leader emerges from the multitude of things, and the myriad things enjoy repose.)

The Yijing, associated with the legendary sage ruler Fuxi and a Neo-Confucian interpretation in its earliest European reception, has been approached through radically diverse and conflicting interpretive strategies in China and in Europe. Its contested character is apparent in the opposing assessments of the philosophers Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. In this article, I examine the imaginative construction and interpretive politics of “China” by elucidating the Yijing’s problematic reception in Western philosophy from Leibniz to Hegel and Jacques Derrida. Various Western philosophers have approached the Yijing with conflicting interpretive stakes and strategies. Whereas Leibniz interpreted it an expression of and source for genuine philosophy and a new logic and mathematics, Hegel rejected it for a work of abstract “childish” picture-thinking that was—as Derrida notes of Hegel’s discussion of the Chinese language—simultaneously too abstract and formal and too empirical and naturalistic.

Leibniz, Hegel, and Derrida did not know the Yijing’s earlier history as the Zhouyi, a Bronze Age Zhou Dynasty work concerned with divining success in war and sacrifice through reading
auguries. Nor did they appreciate its complex transformations in Chinese traditions, from the early Confucian interpretation that emphasized its ethical character and the Confucian–Daoist syncretic reading of Wang Bi 王弼 to the cosmological and metaphysical systematizations of later Neo-Confucians such as Shao Yong 邵雍 and Zhu Xi 朱熹.  

Nonetheless, even if Leibniz and Hegel inadequately understood the *Yijing*’s textual history or its early and later reception in the Chinese context, their discussions of this seminal Chinese work indicate distinct approaches to interpreting others and other cultures, and this reception raises issues of the epistemology, hermeneutics, and politics of intercultural communication. The task of interpretation, and hermeneutics as the art of interpretation, involves addressing questions of how to interpret others through traces, signs, and artifacts. Over this distance and separation of self and other, such encounters can also evoke questions of how to interpret the natural world as it is mediated through language, history, and culture. Such concerns potentially problematize the idea of philosophy itself—whether it is exclusively European as Hegel and his antagonistic reader Derrida end up concurring, or whether it has—despite itself—a more universal and indeed a genuinely philosophical import, as indicated by Leibniz’s response to the *Yijing* and Chinese thought.

**II. Leibniz, the *Yijing*, and the Question of Interpretation**

Leibniz’s approach to the *Book of Changes*, and China, was shaped by the early Jesuit missions in China, whose works he read and with whom he engaged in extensive correspondence. Leibniz’s position was in some ways close to that of the Jesuit missionary and radical figurist Joachim Bouvet. Jesuit figurism and “ancient theology” identified the *Yijing* with the primordial language of Adam and Noah and as prophetically expressing implicit Christian truths. Bouvet’s *Yijing* was a work of the Jewish patriarchs and the key to all arts and sciences. The arc of the correspondence between Leibniz and Bouvet and Leibniz’s writings on China indicate the differences between the two men. Bouvet was predominantly interested in proving Biblical truths to be universally valid in opposition to the emerging sciences and the pagan wisdom of the later Chinese, all of which he held to be genuine wisdom derived from ancient Jewish sources through Noah. Leibniz, however, sought to articulate the coherence of the three (Christianity, science, and Chinese philosophy). Leibniz’s intercultural interpretive strategy also differed from those of and his correspondent Louis Bourguet and Nicolas Malebranche, who evalu-
ated all alien beliefs and practices from a perspective of Christian orthodoxy. Bourguet argued that the *Yijing* had nothing to offer, identifying the kind of thinking expressed in the *Yijing* as pagan and a refined atheism that confused material and immaterial substances, conflating the creator and the created.

As Richard J. Smith has noted, “The binary structure of the *Yijing* entranced and inspired Leibniz [. . . although] the number symbolism of the *Yijing* remained numerological and never truly mathematical.” For Leibniz, the binary order of the image–number system (*xiangshu xue*) developed by the Song Dynasty Neo-Confucian philosopher Shao Yong meant that the *Yijing*’s lines, trigrams, and hexagrams expressed an arithmetic system of binary numbers proving the mathematical form through which knowledge of the world could be generated and ordered. Leibniz interpreted the basic line (—) and broken line (– –) as 1 (signifying God’s oneness) and 0 (signifying absolute nothingness). These are symbols of creation ex nihilo—God’s creation of the world from nothing without requiring an originary matter—in which 0 becomes 1 and generates the sequence of the myriad things.

Leibniz extracts a metaphysical conclusion from the binary character of mathematics and the *Yijing*, that nothing “can enter into the composition of things” as does the zero in arithmetic. The *Yijing*’s eight trigrams (*bagua*) are analogies or symbols of something coming from nothing. This is not the creativity of the nothing and the spontaneity of things described in early Daoist texts such as the *Daodejing*. Leibniz’s account of the relative nothingness or finitude as imperfection, privation, and sin contrasts with the transformative self-generation of things described by Wang Bi.

Leibniz supposed the Fuxi order of hexagrams implied that Fuxi was a theist portraying the absolute nothing prior to creation and the seven days of creation through the continuous creative activity of the monotheistic creator. Why does the movement from nothing to something entail a third term, “God,” such that Fuxi is an implicit theist? It is because both terms, beings and nothing, could only be justified and explained through a third term that is external to and provides the ground and context for both. If there is no God, Leibniz argued, there is not sufficient reason for existence over nonexistence, and the world would sink and disappear into the abyss of nothingness. Since the world does exist, the sufficient reason of being and nothing must also exist. Wang Bi wrote of the self-generation and creativity of things from nothing, such that the “*dao* of change and transformation does not act out of sense of purpose but behaves spontaneously” and that it is without consciousness and deliberation. This free self-flowing evokes the natural spontaneity of Leibniz’s monads, “the pre-established order by virtue of which everything proceeds
thereafter by its own natural propensity,” yet appears incompatible with the entelechy or teleological purposiveness of Leibniz’s God, who guarantees each thing its own natural course.16 Interestingly, Wang Bi notes in another passage the need for a “progenitor from which all things derive” since “nonbeing cannot be brought to light by means of nonbeing but must take place through being.”17 But this progenitor is not a transcendent deity as it is for Leibniz but the creative (qian 乾), yang 陽, and heaven (tian 天) that transforms the world from within the world.

Leibniz suggested in his later correspondence with the Jesuits that his interest in the Yijing is not metaphysical or mystical but practical. Although initially more optimistic about its capacity to elucidate the emergence and decay of phenomena, the Yijing represented for the older Leibniz not so much a perennial philosophy of timeless ideas but rather “a living logic,” a pragmatic and probabilistic logic in relation to the changing course of phenomena.18 Leibniz’s project of formulating a universal symbolic language and “art of arts” aimed to interpret not only texts but the phenomena of the world. Leibniz’s binary dyadic mathematical model provided a principle for appropriately ordering, arranging, and systematizing knowledge and the world in its variability and transience. Leibniz recognized that binaries are not statically dualistic but encompasses contrary and complementary relations of mutuality and differentiation. Leibniz’s model is a misinterpretation if the Yijing’s logic involves the transformation into opposites rather than structural differentiation based on the excluded middle.19

The Yijing’s pragmatic probabilistic rationality, hidden yet revealed in a language that “twists and turns but hits the mark,” provides elements for Leibniz of an encyclopedia according to which one can interpret and respond to worldly phenomena.20 There is a hermeneutics of nature in Leibniz and in Chinese traditions of reading the Yijing, which Leibniz articulates as part of the progressive illumination and domination of nature.21 This tension between the open variability of nature and its potential mastery through the forms and figures of the Yijing remains at work in later Western interpretations such as Richard Wilhelm’s.22

III. LEIBNIZ, HEGEL, AND DERRIDA:
THE QUESTION OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

Countering Leibniz’s rationalistic elucidation of the Yijing’s logic, Hegel, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, critiqued Leibniz for his uncritical affirmation of Chinese texts, language, and culture. Hegel partitions Chinese civilization into abstract form and unfamil-
iar content, and contrasts the seductive splendid form with the dissatisfying content of Chinese cultural products, political institutions, and social practices, asserting that one must “not let the form beguile us into putting the Oriental elements on a par with our own, or even preferring them to our own.” Hegel’s “oriental world” is one of seduction that beguiles the abstract rationalist who is rootless in his own form of life and community and unable to recognize the lesser content of this alien life.

Just as Hegel criticized Leibniz’s formalistic understanding (Verstand) as an inferior version of reason (Vernunft), Hegel suggests that the Yijing itself is too formal, lost in the abstract, and thus empty, possessing only superficial categories of understanding without attaining the concrete rationality of speculative synthesis. The Yijing lacks the “impulse of the concept” that grasps universal natural and spiritual powers in their concreteness, that is, reason as Vernunft; it is simultaneously too abstract and—according to his deficient understanding of its elemental images—too absorbed in the particularities of ordinary perception and representation. Hegel associates the empty formalism of abstract dyadic categories, designated the “religion of measure,” with the arbitrary contingency of divination practices and superstitious content. Accordingly, this reveals a lack of subjectivity and interiority, which are the necessary prerequisites for the individual, historical, and philosophical consciousness uniquely developed in modern Europe. Hegel has no conception of how the logic of the Yijing is a kind of “formal indication” in which the seemingly formal and abstract opens up the play of the experiential and the concrete through emptying. As the late Eastern Han Dynasty philosopher Xu Gan of the Yijing in his Zhonglun (Balanced Discourses), it is emptying the heart that allows it to be receptive and responsive. Hegel misses such responsiveness as well as the self-respect and individuation in relation to nature and the orientation toward cultivating reflection and appropriate practical action emphasized in Confucian readings of the Yijing. Leibniz and Hegel both had limited knowledge of the Chinese commentarial traditions that give the Yijing much of its content and elucidate its philosophical significance.

Hegel contended, contra Leibniz, that the tendency toward abstract representation in Chinese characters meant the undoing of Chinese science. Science does not require formalization but the simplicity and determinacy of language and conceptualization provided by the presentation of spoken language or living speech in alphabetic words. Hegel interpreted the Yijing’s hexagrams, and the characters of the Chinese language which he thought derived from them, as static abstract pictures of arbitrary empirical phenomena, concluding that “the irreducible privilege of the name”—that is, the vocalized word
transparent in alphabetic writing—established the superiority of the alphabetic script in comparison with the compositional analytic character of the “hieroglyph”—a Hegelian thesis Derrida criticized as logocentric.32

Paradoxically, logocentrism, defined as the superiority of oral and alphabetical language and as the precedence of the subject and the name, implies that the arch-rationalist Leibniz’s project of making language more logical through the reduction of the oral to the written and the subjective to the compositional and analytic logic of elements is not logocentric. To counter getting Leibniz off the hook by deconstructing his critics from Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Hegel to Ferdinand de Saussure, Derrida includes a non-phonological variety of logocentrism oriented toward mathematical, logical, and artificial written languages rather than the seemingly natural and living spoken word.33 In this sense Derrida sides with Hegel and the phonocentric critique of non-phonocentric mathematical and logical writing.34

The indirectness and weakness of Derrida’s analysis of Leibniz’s project may be seen in his statement: “That is why, appearances to the contrary, and in spite of all the seduction that it can legitimately exercise in our epoch” . . . “the Leibnizian project of a universal characteristic that is not essentially phonetic does not interrupt logocentrism in any way.”35 These “appearances to the contrary” cannot interrupt the essence of Leibniz’s project, because it is committed “to the logos or the infinite understanding of God.”36 Derrida reiterates Hegel’s very language here, as China and Leibniz are bound together at the level of the appearance and the image, and also in seduction. Derrida can apply logocentrism to Leibniz through a reductionist reading that ignores the role of the infinite in Leibniz’s privileging of writing over speech. It is precisely the abbreviations of written language, logical symbolism, and mathematical writing that allows the infinite complexity and texture of nature to emerge. The mathematical model of nature is not “reductive” but the most appropriate one to its complexity, contingency, and variability.37 God and the logos are in this case bound to, rather than minimizing, the thoroughgoing plurality of the world.

Leibniz is one of the rare Western philosophers to recognize the Chinese script as having intellectual or rational aspects in contrast to later Western tendencies from Hegel to Ernest Fenollosa and Ezra Pound to Derrida to identify it with natural sensuousness and intuition.38 Derrida’s critiques retain Hegel’s assessment of the Chinese language as ahistorical, immobile and fixed, exteriority without interiority and subjectivity, insufficiently grammatical and ideational; it remains as “natural” and uninterpreted as animal tracks and tortoise shells with which Chinese writing is said to have begun.39 Derrida
never dissents from Hegel’s assertion that philosophy begins in the West and repeats it throughout his career. It is only the assessed value of that beginning and tradition that he questions. Derrida relies on the pictorial-imagistic elucidation of Chinese characters initially developed in nineteenth-century racial linguistic theories. These theories, reversed without being problematized in the twentieth-century intuitionist interpretation of Chinese, was committed to the superiority of Sanskrit—as the language of spirit, intellect, and grammatical organization—and the inferiority of Chinese. A language allegedly lacking grammar and history, Chinese was incommensurable with Indo-European languages and thus incomprehensible. The Chinese language descended from being the most universal language in Leibniz to being the most particular language in Hegel, as the one most bound to and absorbed in the image.

Derrida relies on his own Hegelian inspired “Chinese prejudice,” an ahistorical vision of Chinese writing, to counter the Leibnizian “philosophical” interpretation. Derrida again emphasizes the falsity of the appearance of Leibniz’s philosophy of language, that is, that it appears to stress written over spoken language. If this were genuinely the case, and not a mere seeming and seduction, it threatens to undermine Derrida’s critique of logocentrism as phonocentrism and separate Leibniz from Western philosophy’s essence and destiny. To sustain this metanarrative, Derrida must uphold that the “Chinese model only apparently interrupts it [i.e., Leibniz’s ethnocentric logocentric metaphysics] when Leibniz refers to it to teach the characteristic.” Here Derrida describes the “hieroglyphic prejudice” as a “European hallucination” imposed upon the Yi jing’s hexagrams and Chinese characters, which are often conflated in Western discussions. Derrida concludes that Leibniz’s accentuating of writing ultimately expresses the same European logocentrism—the hegemony of logos as reason and spirit that one-sidedly privileges oral language and the speaking subject. Derrida discovers the underlying identity of the logocentric and phonocentric in Hegel’s critique of the Chinese language and anachronistically imposes it on Leibniz. Derrida’s anachronistic deconstruction of Leibniz is ironic given Hegel’s dismissal of Leibniz’s recognition of the rationality inherent in nonphonetic languages and his valorization on this basis of the Chinese language.

Derrida does not sufficiently recognize that Hegel marks Leibniz as well as the Chinese language. Despite Derrida’s stated reversal of Hegel’s critique of the Chinese language, both he and Hegel remain committed to its incomprehensibility for philosophy (i.e., for Europeans). Derrida neither returns to nor renews Leibniz’s affirmation of the philosophical dimensions of the Chinese language or the symbolism of the Yi jing. These are inevitably a European projection about
the inexplicable and incomprehensible Chinese for Derrida. Despite its actual plural sources, encounters, and confrontations, philosophy is—according to Derrida and recent exponents of the Eurocentric essence of philosophy such as Rodolphe Gasché—an exclusively European venture defined by its Greek origins and its Latin and modern European transformations. In Derrida, as much as in Hegel, albeit without the language of hierarchical subordination in the history of spirit, the Chinese can have forms of thought and knowledge but no philosophy.

Derrida declines to engage Eastern thought, because it is not philosophy, while critiquing Leibniz for disturbing these boundaries. Derrida remains an essentialist—despite “appearances to the contrary”—about “East” and “West” insofar as he asserts that any genuine encounter is impossible in the context of Chinese difféance. Derrida does moderate the radicalness of this duality in later statements that philosophy is not exclusively determined by the historicity of its Greek origins and other kinds of thinking are philosophical. But Chinese and other non-Western kinds of thinking are philosophical even as they continue not to be philosophy:

Today it’s a well-known phenomenon—there is a Chinese philosophy, a Japanese philosophy and so on and so forth. That’s a contention I would resist. I think there is [too much] specifically European, specifically Greek in philosophy to simply say that philosophy is something universal. Now saying this, I think that every kind of thinking, thought, is philosophical. I will distinguish philosophy and Denken, thinking. Philosophy is a way of thinking. . . . So when I say, well, philosophy has some privileged relationship with Europe, I don’t say this Eurocentrically but to take [history seriously]. That’s one temptation, to say philosophy is universal.

Regardless of Derrida’s later uncertainty, his early writings reconfirm a binary relation between the creative one (1) and the passive nothing (0), no longer as God and absolute nothingness as with Leibniz, but between the West as active knower and the Rest as passive, mysterious, and unknown. Leibniz’s flawed yet hermeneutically more open engagement with China is less ethnocentric than the tradition from Hegel to Derrida, since Leibniz does not categorically exclude “China” as un-philosophical or as an ineffable and infinitely distant alterity. Such impossibility becomes a trap that reproduces itself and which no hermeneutics can escape; an abyssal sinkhole (xikan 塌陷). Derrida reverses Hegel on language, logic, and China while remaining committed to Hegel’s premises. Whereas Hegel reduces the Other to the same, his language of absolute difference and alterity risks never communicating with the other who is separated into complete incomprehensibility. The conditions of the impossibility of communication never allow a transition into the possibility and risk
of concrete interaction and association, as self and other stand face to face without seeing each other or speaking with one another. Such a proximity without the possibility of interaction is the *Yijing*’s definition of obstruction or stagnation (pi 了).\(^{51}\)

Expanding Derrida’s argumentation, Zhang Longxi argues that Leibniz imposes European spirit upon Chinese content, presupposing that these elements lack facticity, materiality, resistance, or texture of their own.\(^{52}\) Since Leibniz adopted elements of Chinese thought and the logic inherent in Chinese hexagrams and characters as a blueprint for his own linguistic, logical, and mathematical projects, this cannot be fairly claimed to be projection without encounter, receptivity, and learning. Further, what Leibniz stressed in his later *Yijing* interpretation can no longer be appropriately described in terms of logocentric metaphysics, figurist ancient theology, and Pythagorean mysticism. The later German philosophical reception did not maintain this appreciation. Arthur Schopenhauer still found in the *Yijing* this Pythagorean combination of music, mathematics, and mysticism and Kuno Fischer portrayed the *Yijing* as a dogmatic realism of being determined by mere time and number.\(^{53}\)

In his later *Yijing* reception, Leibniz no longer stresses to the same degree the possibility of a universal symbolic language that would offer a universal determinate logic proceeding deductively from the a priori but rather a living pragmatic logic of things; in which he is concerned with a reasoning concerning situations, probabilities, and appropriate responses.\(^{54}\) The abandonment of his early vision concerning the truths to be deciphered from the *Yijing*’s hexagrams and the radicals of the Chinese script brought him nearer—despite the remaining distance—to Wang Bi’s explication of the *Yijing*, that it is a book of exemplars, models, and paradigms that engages change and the transformation of things and encourages self-reflection and action.\(^{55}\)

### IV. Leibniz, the *Yijing*, and the Possibility of Intercultural Philosophy

Several points should be made in response to Hegel’s and Derrida’s discussions of Leibniz and China. Hegel sees the characters of the Chinese language and the *Yijing*’s hexagrams as an abstract representational pictorial thinking. Imagistic thinking is inadequate to the determinate negativity and movement of the dialectical concept that penetrates the concrete particulars.\(^{56}\) Despite his commitment to dialectical thinking, Hegel did not recognize the possibility of the dialectical image and the *Yijing*’s dialectical dimension. Leibniz explicated
this dialectical dimension as a mathematical and encyclopedic ordering principle and which later Chinese thinkers have stressed is neither random nor deterministically preprogrammed.\textsuperscript{57}

The \textit{Yijing}'s dialectical character lies with its openness with systematicity and plurality with order, features that led Leibniz to associate it with a living logic, a pragmatic hermeneutical logic of nature and life. This need not entail the domination of nature that motivates some readings and uses of the \textit{Yijing} criticized by orthodox Confucians as merely occult and technical.\textsuperscript{58} Nor is it a submersion of the person in an impersonal fate and destiny, since corresponding to this logic of transformation is the cultivation of self-respect and opportunities for action within a changing world often outside one’s power.\textsuperscript{59} There is no harmony between humanity and nature without the human agent of transformation, who realizes the dao through virtue and propriety, and responsively nourishes things without coercing them.\textsuperscript{60}

This living logic moves through the gamut of elements and yet there is constancy in transformation. Chung-ying Cheng has distinguished the unforced harmony (\textit{he} 和) of a whole, which equalizes and balances between the excessive and the deficient through sensibility and taste, from the identity and external conformity and sameness (\textit{tong} 同) of a totality.\textsuperscript{61} Xu Gan remarked that the noble person “seeks harmony but not conformity.”\textsuperscript{62} According to Xu Gan, a sage’s virtue—like fine music or cuisine—is a harmony formed from a multiplicity of elements or ways rather than drawing on one.\textsuperscript{63} The \textit{Yijing} states that the recourse to excessive force and integration signals increasing danger, weakness, and the inability to gather things appropriately into harmony.\textsuperscript{64} The \textit{Yijing}'s dialectic is consequently irreducible to the constancy and identitarian logic of the self-same subject that reproduces and reintegrates itself through each encounter. It does not entail a domination and mastery of nature aiming at its control and exploitation. The \textit{Yijing} suggests an open formally indicative logic and ethos of humility that calls on one to engage the turning point and practice return (\textit{fu} 復) and daily renewal.\textsuperscript{65} This transformative movement of return indicates the possibility of a hermeneutics of and responsiveness to nature, particularly to the extent that the human and natural are relational. This relational nexus means that the humanly interpreted natural world cannot avoid or be reduced to dialectical integration and conceptual mediation.

In contrast to what can be interpreted as the coercive character of the Hegelian dialectic, which posits an underlying subject or name throughout the temporal-historical process of change that culminates in a teleological absolute, the \textit{Yijing} is a portrayal of the spontaneity and self-transformation of things in their self-being and immanence,
and change as purposiveness in transience, order in alteration, and harmony across singularities, without presupposing a predetermined purpose or telos.\textsuperscript{66} The \textit{Yijing} is not about abstract time but the dynamic temporality of the living moment (\textit{shi} 時), and provides an alternative to the choice between teleological and mechanical causality that Leibniz strived to mediate through his account of monads. It is, as Ming Dong Gu observes, “a system of representation, and because of its unique structure and principle of signification, it forms an open hermeneutic space with infinite possibilities of interpretation.”\textsuperscript{67} The \textit{Yijing} is an open semiotics in relation to a changing world, indicating an interpretive material logic with reference to nature.

Even supposing Leibniz and Hegel are equally distant from Chinese thought and culture, two different models for encountering the expressions and products of others can be seen in their discourses. Whereas Hegel reduces Chinese philosophy to the equivalent of an inferior pre-philosophical stage in the history of Western civilization, Leibniz through his own model of interpretation and his own interests opens communication with humans who are radically foreign yet not thereby beyond the reach of communication and exchange. Leibniz’s hermeneutical art imperfectly indicates a third alternative to subjugating the other to the same and reifying the other as incommensurable or incommunicable. This hermeneutics of intercultural exchange cannot be based in the exclusivity of a particular name or subject reintegrating everything alien into itself; rather it presupposes an underlying cosmopolitan spirit that recognizes the human in humans unlike ourselves and interprets them through listening and learning.

Leibniz is one of the few philosophers—in a cultural context that typically denies philosophy to the non-Western world—to genuinely prefigure cross-cultural philosophy. While maintaining the uniqueness of Christianity, Leibniz’s writing repeatedly stresses how philosophy from the Greeks to the moderns has learned from and has deep affinities with non-Western thought, even if those traditions do not share the conception of the soul and God demanded by Leibniz’s religious-philosophical commitments.\textsuperscript{68} Leibniz’s approach is a failure for David E. Mungello. He contends that Leibniz does not resolve the tension between rational secularization and religious commitment, because he reduces religious to intellectual functions.\textsuperscript{69} This criticism underestimates the role of the affective and of the image in Leibniz’s thought. Moreover, contrary to Heidegger’s criticism of Leibniz that underestimates the moral-religious orientation of his philosophy, the will is oriented toward the good rather than the subjectivity defining the good, and the intellect is more of a moral-spiritual phenomenon than it is calculative and instrumentally rational.\textsuperscript{70} His adopting a middle position between secular skepticism and belief in the super-
natural for the sake of accentuating the ethical agrees with significant strands in Confucian philosophy.\textsuperscript{71}

Leibniz's orientation toward rational religion and generosity and tolerance without ascetic self-denial—the ability to extend oneself without being swept away, to nourish without being exhausted, as Wang Bi articulates it\textsuperscript{72}—guides Leibniz's reception of Eastern religions and philosophies. His praise for Confucian concerns and criticism of Buddhist theses are pointed examples. This position is complicated by his more suspicious responses to Islam and Turkish culture in the context of the wars between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. Also in this case, one should not reduce his reflections to mere prejudice as he praises and criticizes various Islamic theological and philosophical tendencies rather than rejecting them as such and as a whole or based on ethnic or racial grounds.\textsuperscript{73}

Leibniz's tendencies toward tolerance and cosmopolitanism, despite their particular limitations, are important because (1) they do not require self-negation or the denial of one's own ideas, ethical orientation, and way of life, and (2) they contrast positively with later and contemporary ethnocentric belief in the unchanging essence of "East" and "West," itself the product of racial theories that emerged in the later history of the Enlightenment and Western philosophy.\textsuperscript{74}

Defined negatively or positively through what it lacks compared to the "West" (reason, logos, etc.), "China" and the "East" have been constituted as what "we" are not and cannot know.\textsuperscript{75}

Rather than asserting that Leibniz could not learn from non-Western sources, as Derrida claimed, despite "appearances," a more careful reading indicates the possibilities and limits of cross-cultural encounter and exchange in Leibniz. His openness, articulated in his ethical conception of a charity tempered by wisdom and the promotion of true felicity, challenges us to extend and revise our ideas of philosophy and hermeneutics. Many philosophers are still beholden to branding of philosophy as exclusively Western. Yet, as noted repeatedly since Joseph Needham, Western philosophy and science have already been impacted by Chinese and other non-Western sources, most obviously Middle Eastern philosophical and scientific traditions. Chinese philosophy has already informed Western thought through Leibniz's affinity and receptivity with respect to the holistic, organic, and vital depiction of life as free flow, dynamic process, and harmony in multiplicity.\textsuperscript{76}

Reconsidering Leibniz's project suggests an alternative to the current universalism and particularism that persist in disregarding non-Western forms of thought. Where the universalist-cosmopolitan tradition from Kant to Jürgen Habermas neglected or has been hostile to non-Western thought because of its cultural particularity,
the historically oriented tradition from Hegel to Derrida and Richard Rorty claims exclusivity by defining philosophy as a solely Western project or pathology. Leibniz’s example of cross-cultural exchange is an alternative to both of these; it provides a model of pragmatic and asymmetrical cosmopolitanism that allows philosophical argumentation and adaptation across traditions.

V. Harmony and Singularity

Although Leibniz recognized philosophy’s Greek sources and the uniqueness of Greek thought, these sources did not bind philosophy to the intellectual heirs of Greece alone, since philosophy expresses universal concerns just as particularity resonates with the whole. It was the holistic naturalism of the *Yijing* that attracted Leibniz to it in the first place, a naturalism hardly imposed from outside Chinese traditions. The harmony Leibniz identifies, like that of the *Yijing* itself, does not proceed by subsuming a particular under a universal or mediating it within a totality. Instead of employing a model of comprehensive integration, which he criticizes as monism, Leibniz concludes that all is one: “But it does not follow from this that all things are different only by virtue of accidental qualities. . . .” The world disclosed through Chinese philosophy, resonating with Leibniz’s own model of a mutually accord between a plurality of singulars (monads as unique configurations and perspectives of the whole), is the unforced harmony and conjunction of “supreme unity” and “the most perfect multiplicity.”

Leibniz’s articulation of the whole and the singular is hermeneutical rather than dialectical and evokes Chinese correlative thinking in contrast to the subordinating thinking characteristic of Hegelian philosophy, certainly as it is presented by critics such as Derrida. Leibniz’s whole is a dynamic mirroring web of monads, each radically individual in itself. The whole is not totalitarian but a harmony among multiple individual singularities that addresses and allows each to respond according to its own natural propensity. The commitment to a transcendent being does not lead in this case to the denial of the immanent significance and singularity of things. Leibniz’s monadology of individual natural substances is in accord with the tendency in the *Yijing*, and Chinese philosophy more generally, to maintain that each thing has its own meaning, measure, and natural spontaneity. The whole can be perceived through modesty in relation to the other and cannot arise from any derivation from common origins or particular ethnic kinships.
Unlike Bouvet, who denied that Fuxi and the *Yijing* are even Chinese, Leibniz did not hold that the *Yijing* and the most ancient philosophy of the Chinese must be explained as derivative of a more original Judaic tradition. Leibniz did engage in speculation about the possible Jewish patriarchal sources of ancient Chinese wisdom. Like Bouvet, he contrasted the ancient mathematical and moral wisdom of the *Yijing* with the fallenness of contemporary Chinese into atheism and superstition, when the *Yijing* might be said to have had the opposite historical and hermeneutical development from supernatural divination to moral and personal guidance. Nonetheless, Leibniz also suggests strategies of intercultural learning and philosophy since for him the *Yijing* need not be Judeo-Christian or Greek, despite his commitments to these traditions, in order to be philosophical and exemplary.

Leibniz accordingly praises and advocates learning from ancient and modern Chinese philosophers who admirably explain phenomena from natural causes as well as their natural harmony, deny anthropomorphism, and recognize the virtue and reason embodied in heaven and the whole of nature, even if not the revealed Christian God. Leibniz recognizes the way of reason and virtue, the *daō*, to be “in accord with natural theology” and further concludes, in a double act of assimilation of the other to one’s own and reversal of one’s own to the other, “It is pure Christianity, insofar as it renews the natural law inscribed in our hearts—except for what revelation and grace add to it to improve our nature.” This assimilation to Christianity in fact assimilates Christianity to the ethical and a normative-pragmatic framework of communication. In the context of European belief in its religious and philosophical superiority, Leibniz reminded his correspondents to interpret foreign practices and teachings as fairly as possible in the spirit of Pauline charity and without hyperbole and exaggeration.

VI. Conclusion

Leibniz’s insistence on the rationality of the Chinese might be seen as assimilation to a non-phonocentric mathematical *logos* that is ultimately Eurocentric, given some of his farfetched ideas about the origins and import of the *Yijing* and the Chinese language. Yet Leibniz’s approach—despite its historical conditions and interpretive faults—allows the imagistic and pictorial to speak and have a philosophical status denied to it by Hegel and Derrida. Leibniz’s discourse has the opposite effect of “totalizing logocentrism,” since it points to and opens up communication with others as beings
capable of reason and written and spoken language. Others are not isolated in their irrationality, nor are the Chinese in their supposed “inscrutability,” as in Hegel’s disapproval or Derrida’s reversal of Hegel.

Leibniz’s extension of rationality to others does not confirm an integrating totality of the same but instead points to the most extensive multiplicity. Further, reason is bound to a humility, modesty, and willingness to enter into exchange and communicate under changing and uncertain yet not therefore incomprehensible conditions. Rationality has a basic moral and hermeneutical character for Leibniz, which remains suggestive for cross-cultural philosophy today in contrast to an undifferentiating cosmopolitan universalism or an isolating parochial particularism.

Hegel and Derrida—equally absorbed in their own climactic “end of philosophy,” which by definition is closed to what is non-Western—neglect the ethical dimension of rationality and interpretation in their criticisms of Leibniz as a theory-oriented “rationalist.” Nor do they undertake such reflection in their reductive discussions of Chinese language and thought. Humility and charity in relation to the other is an alternative art of hermeneutics to both (1) the mastery of the other that always believes it understands the other better than the other understands herself and (2) the abandonment of the other to the incomprehensible, who I never risk engaging, and the perils of communication and interpretation are forsaken in the coercive purity and solitude of transcending all interpretive violence.

As opposed to reifying the incomprehensibility of the Other in order to avoid the risks of misinterpretation and miscomprehension typical of communication across languages and cultures, the misunderstandings that are the only point of departure for hermeneutics according to Friedrich Schleiermacher, we might risk communicating with others with modesty and an awareness of the finitude and facticity that inspires and unsettles communication. In the commentary on the image in hexagram 15 (qian 謙) (modesty), we find an indication of this path of humility in cross-cultural interpretation and a justice in identifying what should and should not count as philosophy:

\textit{Di zhong you shan, qian; jun zi yi pou duo yi gua, cheng wu ping shi.}

地中有山，謙；君子以裒多益寡，稱物平施。（Within the earth, a mountain. The image of modesty. The noble person reduces that which is too much, and augments that which is too little. He weighs and balances things.)
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2. Leibniz and Hegel both relied upon Philippe Couplet, Confucius Sinarum philosophus (Paris: Apud Danielem Horthemels, 1687), which only provided partial selections from the Yijing. Leibniz additionally engaged in an extensive correspondence with Jesuits in China.


5. For the broader context of Leibniz’s hermeneutics and engagement with China, see Franklin Perkins, Leibniz and China: A Commerce of Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).


11. Things, Leibniz reflects, “are bounded or imperfect by virtue of the principle of negation or nothingness they contain, by virtue of the lack of infinity of perfections in them, and which are only a nothingness with respect to them” in G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, trans. and eds. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1989), 149.


14. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 149.


17. Ibid., 60–61.


25. Ibid., 109.


36. Ibid.

37. This point can be made without presupposing an inner accord between mathematics and nature, as in Wilhelm, *Lectures on the I Ching*, 63–64.


44. Derrida considers the *Yijing* only in the context of Leibniz and Hegel and did not develop his own account of it. Derrida cannot see the *Yijing’s* rationality and
significance, as Leibniz once did, since for him it remains outside of Western philosophy and its deconstruction.


49. Ibid.


54. On probabilistic logic and the art of interpreting and responding to one’s situation, compare Cheng, “Inquiring into the Primary Model,” 44.


63. Ibid., 9.


70. Given Leibniz’s prioritizing of the good over the will, and justice over the instrumental, Roger Berkowitz’s Heideggerian critique of Leibniz’s modernistic and calculative scientism is unconvincing. In *The Gift of Science: Leibniz and the Modern Legal Tradition* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), Berkowitz depicts Leibniz as progressive modernist radically applying the model of the new mathematical sciences to law and politics such that, despite his own conciliatory and ethical-religious project, Leibniz becomes a primary source for legal scientism and positivism. Yet Leibniz’s new method of jurisprudence was not only about the application of the geometrical method to law and the reduction of justice to legality.


77. For a careful portrayal of Leibniz’s China through the image of a “commerce of light,” see Perkins, *Leibniz and China*.


79. On its naturalism, note Cheng, “Inquiring into the Primary Model,” 43.


81. Ibid., 80–81.


83. On the critique of transcendence from Nietzsche to Deleuze as a denial of immanent self-generative significance, which problematically applies to the religious thinking of Leibniz and later thinker such as Schleiermacher, see for instance Daniel W. Smith, “Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence: Two Directions in Recent French Thought,” in *Between Deleuze and Derrida*, eds. John Protevi and Paul Patton (New York: Routledge Press, 2003), 46–66.


86. Leibniz, *Writings on China*, 105–10, 134; the *Zhouyi* began as a book of divination concerning war, sacrifice, and marriage without moral or mathematical concerns, and gradually became a more complex document as noted in Rutt, *Book of Changes*, 8, 40, 126, 136; on the hermeneutics of the *Yijing*’s emancipation, cultivation, and transformation, see Cheng, “Inquiring into the Primary Model,” 36–39; on the
mutuality of natural process and moral cultivation, see Gu, “Time as Emotion,” 129–49.
88. Ibid., 105.