Leadership, Ethics, and the Centrality of Character

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Scandals in business (such as Volkswagen's dieselgate and, earlier, the Enron scandal), politics and the public sector (the Petrobas affair in Brazil, for instance), sports (think of the corruption charges against FIFA's Sepp Blatter) and the military (Abu Ghraib springs to mind) have brought the matter of ethical leadership to the forefront. But although this increased attention has had the collateral benefit that most handbooks on leadership now pay more attention to the importance of leading ethically, this will generally still be in a separate chapter. To make thing worse, that chapter on leadership is more often than not one the last chapters of the book, perhaps followed by a chapter on, say, diversity. This all testifies to the fact that leadership and ethics are habitually treated as related though separate spheres. It would be much better, of course, if leadership and ethics were treated as belonging to a single domain. Ethics is clearly an aspect of leadership, and not a separate approach that exists alongside other approaches to leadership such as the trait approach, the situational approach, etc.. Interestingly, this thinking and writing about ethical leadership as just one approach among many other leadership styles appears to be a relatively recent invention. In the works of Plato, Plutarch, Machiavelli and Locke, for example, we see (political) leadership and ethics dealt with as a single subject. It was not before the twentieth century that we saw the rise of a separate leadership industry. Its results are largely unimpressive; it has not made leaders necessarily more effective, let alone more ethical.[1]

Yet, on a more positive note, over the last few decades (say since the publication of James MacGregor Burns' classic *Leadership* in 1978)[2] we have also witnessed an increasing attention for leadership theories that profess to be

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[1] See Barbara Kellerman, *The End of Leadership* (HarperCollins 2012). Other examples involving failing leadership are the extravagant bonuses and the selling of subprime mortgages in the banking sector, and endemic corruption in the public sector in most of the world's countries. It seems that many leaders today do not so much struggle with moral dilemmas, as it is their integrity that is tested: it is clear what is the right thing to do, yet there are temptations to choose the wrong course of action. See for the distinction between tests of integrity and moral dilemmas: Stephen Coleman, 'The Problems of Duty and Loyalty' (2009) 8 (2) *Journal of Military Ethics* 105–106.

[2] James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership* (Harper and Row 1978).

ethical, such as transformational, authentic, spiritual and servant leadership. But it is not always clear, to say the least, what exactly the ethical component of these theories consists of. As for instance Ciulla points out, ethics in leadership theories is often rather different from what ethicists consider important.

> … philosophers who specialize in ethics see their subject differently than do social scientists. Studies of charismatic, transformational, and visionary leadership often talk about ethics. In these studies, ethics is part of the social scientist's description of types or qualities of leaders and/or leader behaviors. From a philosopher's point of view, these studies offer useful empirical descriptions, but they do not offer detailed critical analysis of the ethics of leadership.[3]

It is very much the question to what extent paying lip service to the importance of values really makes these modern leadership theories more ethical. The argument for leading ethically that underlies transformational leadership (the leading theory today) is, for instance, mainly functional: leaders who appeal to the values of their followers are thought to be more effective, and to have followers who are more satisfied with their leader, than leaders who fail to do so (while unethical transformational leadership is explained away as pseudo-transformational leadership). Clearly, such a functional line of reasoning does not amount to a moral argument. The obvious flip side of a functional argument for leading ethically is that it loses its force as soon as a leader finds a way to be more effective, and perhaps even to have more satisfied followers, without being ethical – military history is replete with leaders who were absolutely effective but not ethical at all.

So it is perhaps a good thing, then, that the chapters in this volume are written more from an ethical perspective than from an effective leadership point of view, by either ethicists or military practitioners with an interest in ethics. It is perhaps telling that none of the contributors to this volume on leadership and military ethics refers to modern leadership theories; all contributors rightly consider themselves to be quite capable of writing on military leadership

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3   Also, 'the study of ethics and the history of ideas help us understand two overarching and overlapping questions that drive most leadership research. They are: What is leadership? And what is good leadership? One is about what leadership is, or a descriptive question. The other is about what leadership ought to be, or a normative question. These two questions are sometimes confused in the literature.' Joanne B. Ciulla, 'Ethics and Leadership Effectiveness' in John Antonakis, Anna T. Cianciolo, and Robert J. Sternberg (eds), *The Nature of Leadership* (Sage 2004) 302–327.

without taking recourse to the products of eighty years or so of leadership studies. Their combined efforts have resulted in a book that explicitly takes leadership and ethics for the *armed* forces as its starting point. The military is one of the few organizations that can legitimately use violence, and military leaders have to deal on a regular basis with personnel who have either used or experienced violence. It is this intertwinement of leadership and violence that separates military leadership from leadership in other professions. It also makes the ethical challenges for leaders within the military all the more testing. Although the different contributors to this book address a wide variety of topics, there are a few concerns that turn up in more than one chapter. The issue that springs out is a question that involves both ethics and leadership. It is the question of character: does character matter, or more specifically, does the character of leaders matter?

The Centrality of Character Challenged

An important first question regarding the goal of professional ethics education is whether it wants to be functional, that is, aimed at making people better at their job, or aspirational, that is, aimed at turning people into more moral persons.[4] Underlying that question is the more fundamental question whether there is a difference between (mainly functional) role morality and (more aspirational) general morality. Sometimes, this is clearly the case: a lawyer might be expected to defend the guilty, spies must now and then lie, and at times role morality will ask you to do more than is expected of ordinary civilians.[5] Although one could argue that also for the military role morality differs from general morality, we see that there is nonetheless a tendency in military ethics education toward a more aspirational approach that aims at making soldiers better persons, mainly based on the view that a bad person is not likely to be a morally good soldier (although he or she could be an effective one).[6] This question about the aim of ethics education is separate from, but not unrelated to, the question what should be the basis of ethics education. Clearly, the aspirational approach focuses on character, while the functional approach

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4   Jessica Wolfendale, 'What is the Point of Teaching Ethics in the Military?' in Paul Robinson, Nigel de Lee and Don Carrick (eds), *Ethics Training and Development in the Military* (Ashgate 2008); see also Paul Robinson, 'Ethics Training and Development in the Military' (2007) Spring *Parameters*.

5   Stephen Coleman, *Military Ethics* (OUP 2013) 37–39.

6   Robinson (n 4).

is more based on conduct and outcomes.[7] This corresponds loosely with the three main strands in moral philosophy, namely virtue ethics, rule based ethics, and utilitarianism. These three schools are also the three main contenders regarding the question which moral theory offers the best means to improve the chances of military personnel behaving ethically.

The first one mentioned, virtue ethics, focusses on the kind of person one wants to be, and calls for the development of good predispositions – we are virtuous to the extent that doing the right thing gives us pleasure. In this, virtue ethics differs from its main contender, duty-based ethics, which stresses the importance of universal, categorically binding moral norms, and asks us to follow moral rules *against* our natural, selfish predispositions. Utilitarianism, finally, holds that we should base our judgment of whether an act is morally right or wrong (and hence also whether it should be done or not) upon the foreseen consequences. Utilitarianism differs in this aspect from virtue ethics and duty-based ethics, which both stress the importance of acting from the right intentions, implying that good consequences alone do not make an action good.

Notwithstanding the fact that there are utilitarian and duty-based elements in the ethics of the military, most militaries today see the aspirational virtue ethics approach as the best way to underpin the ethics education of military personnel.[8] And not without reason: what makes virtue ethics interesting for the military is that it assumes that virtues and character can be developed, at least to some extent, while more rule-based approaches have the in a military context important downsides that rules and codes lack the flexibility necessary in today's missions, and that they are mostly ineffective when there is no one around. Utilitarianism is rarely seen as a good basis for the ethics education for military personnel, mostly because 'an outcome-centered approach may lead all too easily to military expedience as the sole guide to actions in war.'[9]

Virtue ethics has its drawbacks too, however, the main one being that it takes for granted that there is a more or less direct relation between character and conduct. An increasing number of authors suspect that this direct relationship does not actually exist. Several contributors to this volume, for instance,

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7   One could also argue, however, that by aiming to install both 'general' virtues, such as integrity and honesty, and more military specific virtues, such as courage and discipline, the military in fact combines an aspirational and a functional approach.

8   See also Peter Olsthoorn, *Military Ethics and Virtues: An Interdisciplinary Approach for the 21st Century* (Routledge 2010).

9   Reed R. Bonadonna, 'Above and Beyond: Marines and Virtue Ethics' (1994) 78 (1) *Marine Corps Gazette* 18.

emphasize in their respective chapters that social psychologists such as Albert Bandura, Stanley Milgram, and Philip Zimbardo have been pointing out for already a few decades now that the situations we find ourselves in determine our conduct to a far greater extent than we tend (or like) to think.[10] Especially Milgram's research on obedience and Zimbardo's Stanford Prison Experiment, by far the most well-known experiments in social psychology, have popularized the idea that we can all be brought to harm innocent others.[11] These two experiments have made their way into popular culture, and formed the basis for movies, stage plays, and television shows. Apparently, the idea that people have a dark side, and that under the right (or wrong) circumstances we and (especially) others can be brought to do about anything, fascinates many of us. Outside popular culture, this idea that we underestimate the influence of situational factors goes under the name of fundamental attribution error: the tendency people have to over attribute the behaviour of others to dispositions instead of situations.[12] That insight that people tend to make this error is as lot older than social psychology itself, however: it is not very different from the time-proven insight that knowing what is right is not always sufficient to bring people to actually do the right thing.[13]

It is a good thing that ethicists, and that includes military ethicists, are more and more inclined to take these insights about how situations matter into account. Some go a bit further than that, however, and claim that the results of modern social psychology research fatally undermine both virtue ethics and some widely held intuitions about moral responsibility. This is the so-called situationist challenge, which has some serious consequences for military ethics too. For instance, concentrating on military virtues implies a focus on the individual, and according to situationists such a virtue ethics approach mistakenly suggests that incidents involving military personnel are in the majority of cases the result of moral defects at the individual level, and that individual

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10   See for instance the chapter by Tom McDermott and Steve Hart, and that by Miriam C. de Graaff, Peter W. de Vries, Walter J. van Bijlevelt and Ellen Giebels, respectively Chapter 2 and 3 in this volume.

11   See the chapter by Tom McDermott and Stephen Hart in this volume for more information on both experiments.

12   Gilbert Harman, 'No character or personality' (2003) 13 (01) *Business Ethics Quarterly* 87–94.

13   Surendra Arjoon 'Reconciling Situational Social Psychology with Virtue Ethics' (2008) 10 (3) *International Journal of Management Reviews* 235. This, incidentally, explains why it is that research shows that ethics professors behave no better than their colleagues from other departments. Eric Schwitzgebel and Joshua Rust 'The Moral Behavior of Ethics Professors: Relationships among Self-Reported Behavior, Expressed Normative Attitude, and Directly Observed Behavior' (2014) 27 (3) *Philosophical Psychology*.

soldiers are morally responsible for their own misdoings.[14] This blaming of individual soldiers is incorrect, situationists hold, for the (to them) obvious reason that the situational factors that we experience in normal life, or in experiments such as that of Milgram and Zimbardo, amount to little in comparison with the situational forces soldiers are subjected to in combat – just think of sleep deprivation, military training and culture, (racial) ideology, and the role of the primary group.[15] As Doris and Murphy put it, 'If situational pressures of the sort adduced in the experimental record can impair the exercise of normative competence, we can reasonably conclude that the extreme and often prolonged situational pressures typical of warfare can induce quite severe impairments in normative competence.'[16]

However, the truth of the situationist claim that situations are more important than our character would not only have serious implications for virtue ethics is general, and for the extent to which we can hold perpetrators morally responsible, but also for the way we can best educate military leaders. It would imply that character formation and the development of virtues, at present the preferred method in military ethics education, is by and large ineffective. It is for that reason important to know to what extent the claim situationists make is in fact true. Understandably, virtue ethicists maintain that this claim is too strong. They have tried to rescue the military virtues from the hands of situationists and social psychologists, for instance by pointing out that many of their arguments, that look so at odds with the trust that most militaries have in virtue ethics, rest one a rather one-sided interpretation of the findings of social psychology research.[17] It is often overlooked, for instance, that quite a few participants in the experiments of Milgram and Zimbardo did not succumb to situational pressures.[18] Moreover, virtue ethicists point out that they do not assume that most people are virtuous, but that there are virtues, and that we

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14   See also Paul Robinson, 'The Fall of the Warrior King: Situational Ethics in Iraq' in Don Carrick, James Connelly, and Paul Robinson (eds), *Ethics Education for Irregular Warfare* (Ashgate 2009).

15   See for instance John M. Doris and Dominic Murphy, 'From My Lai to Abu Ghraib: The Moral Psychology of Atrocity' (2007) 31 (1) *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 34.

16   Doris and Murphy (n 15).

17   See for instance Adam Croom, 'Vindicating Virtue: a Critical Analysis of the Situationist Challenge Against Aristotelian Moral Psychology' (2014) 48 (1) *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science* 18–47.

18   Richard A. Griggs and George I. Whitehead III, 'Coverage of the Stanford Prison Experiment in Introductory Social Psychology Textbooks' (2014) 41 (4) *Teaching of Psychology*; Gina Perry, *Behind the Shock Machine: The Untold Story of the Notorious Milgram Psychology Experiments* (New Press 2013).

can attain them if we work hard enough. Hence that situations might have less influence on soldiers who have received a training based on virtues than on people who lack that training. Military training and education are designed with an eye to installing the relevant virtues, and it is a bit presuming to write off all such efforts as ineffective.

In the end, the view that both character and situation have a significant influence on our conduct is probably more accurate than the view that it is mainly the situation we find ourselves in that determines whether we do the right thing or not.[19] That is admittedly not a very surprising insight, but it is probably a correct one. This view, that also underlies some of the chapters in this volume, leaves us also with some ground for optimism regarding the role of character and character formation. Yet, that there still is a role for character formation does not alter the fact that a program for military ethics education that does not take the actual possibilities and shortcomings of a character-based approach into account would be irresponsibly theoretical. Ethics education should not only aim at furthering virtues, but also at giving insight in the factors that make unethical conduct more likely to take place.[20]

To conclude, military ethicists should not, as some moral philosophers have done who were absorbed in the debate between situationists and virtue ethicists, take a position that puts all emphasis on either the role of character or the importance of the situation. As Cook and Syse write: 'papers in which philosophers argue with the positions of other philosophers, no matter how interesting they may be by the canons of the discipline, are not really military ethics in our sense.'[21] Being a form of applied ethics, military ethicists are almost duty-bound to take an inclusive approach to the different schools in moral philosophy and the social sciences.

The Centrality of Leadership Challenged

The fundamental attribution error, leading to an overrating of the role of character in ethics, has a counterpart in the field of leadership studies: in a rather devastating book on today's leadership studies and the modern leadership industry, aptly titled *The End of Leadership*, Barbara Kellerman describes how we

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19   See also Croom (n 17).

20   The ability to recognize ethical issues, and to see the adverse influence the organization sometimes has, can make people act ethically in spite of the situation. Arjoon (n 13) 225.

21   Martin L. Cook and Henrik Syse 'What Should We Mean by "Military Ethics"' (2010) 9 (2) *Journal of Military Ethics*.

grossly overrate the importance of the role of leaders and leadership.[22] Leaders have become significantly less important over the last few decades, and power has in fact shifted in the direction of followers. It is our 'leadership attribution error' that leads us to mistakenly assume 'that good outcomes depend on good leaders; that good leaders are good people; and that good people can be trained, or educated, or developed, to be good leaders.'[23] Not unlike virtue ethics, this believe in the significance of what leaders do underestimates today's increasingly complex context that often makes leaders considerably less influential than we – and they – think they are.

Kellerman describes at length the factors that have made leaders less effective, and she treats this loss of influence mainly as a negative. Not surprisingly, as almost all leadership theories tend to emphasize the strong leader, and are primarily about how to augment one's impact as a leader.[24] Such leadership theories tend to assume that, to be effective, a leader has to have a lot of influence over his or her subordinates, while less visible leadership will be negatively portrayed as laissez-faire leadership.[25] Yet, one could also take a more positive view on the diminishing influence of leadership today, and argue that with today's better-educated followers leaders are less necessary than they once were, also in the military. However, as it stands, most Western militaries want their leaders, in line with most modern leadership theories, to be strong and visionary. So not only are there many modern leadership theories that 'put much stress on the omnipresence and omniscience of the leaders'; there are just as 'many military leadership doctrines [that] build on these theories.'[26] Nonetheless, there are also a few theories that espouse a somewhat

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22   Kellerman (n 1).

23   Ibid 180–181.

24   See also Peter Olsthoorn and Joseph Soeters, 'Leadership and the Comprehensive Approach' in Gerard Lucius and Sebastiaan Rietjes (eds), *Effective Civil-Military Interaction in Peace Operations: Theory and Practice* (2016 Springer); Peter de Bock and Peter Olsthoorn, 'Leadership Development of Junior Army leaders: a Dutch Perspective' (2016) 16 (4) *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*.

25   See for instance Bernard Bass, *A New Paradigm of Leadership: An Inquiry into Transformational Leadership* (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 1996).

26   Ad Vogelaar, 'Leadership from the Edge: A Matter of Balance' (2007) 13 *Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies* 36. At the same, militaries consider decentralization of leadership important too. But such leadership can only work if leaders are prepared to stay on the background now and then, and occasionally suppress their desire to interfere. The question is which tendency wins through.

less obtrusive leadership style, but, equally unsurprising, these theories do not get a lot of attention in most militaries.

Kerr and Jermier's substitute theory of leadership, which takes a very different perspective than most other leadership theories in that it does not aim at increasing the influence of the leader, but at making his or her leadership less necessary, is a good example of such a theory that proposes a more modest style of leadership.[27] Building on the well-known distinction between people-oriented behaviour (motivating employees) and task-oriented behaviour (clarifying tasks etc.) that underlies most behavioural approaches to leadership, Kerr and Jermier have identified several aspects of the organization, the assigned tasks, and the employees, that can form a substitute for leadership. Structured tasks, for example, can function as a substitute for task oriented leadership behaviour, while intrinsically rewarding work might form an alternative for relations oriented behaviour. Interesting for the military: strong group cohesion can be a replacement for both forms of leadership behaviour. But also subordinates having a professional orientation, based on a high degree of training and education, can serve as a substitute for both task-oriented behaviour and relations oriented behaviour.[28] A hospital manager does not have to tell a surgeon how to do his or her job, nor is there a need to motivate him or her. And if the military profession is indeed a profession too, there might be less need for leadership in the military than is commonly thought.[29]

So, it seems that we tend to overestimate the role of character in military ethics, and the role of leaders when we talk about leadership. Where does that

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27   Steven Kerr and John Jermier 'Substitutes for leadership: Their meaning and measurement' (1978) 22 *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*. Another example is Robert Greenleaf's theory of servant leadership, mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, which in fact did draw some favourable attention within some militaries. Robert K Greenleaf, *Servant Leadership: A Journey into the Nature of Legitimate Power and Greatness* (Paulist Press 2002). Yet, on the whole this theory remains rather unclear and somewhat underdeveloped, while also this approach to leadership once more emphasizes the importance of a leader having a strongly articulated vision. Robert F. Russell and A. Gregory Stone, 'A Review of Servant Leadership Attributes: Developing a Practical Model' (2002) 23 (3) *Leadership & Organization Development Journal* 147.

28   Kerr and Jermier (n27) 398. The theory also identifies some neutralizers: factors that nullify a leader's influence, such as subordinate insensitivity to rewards or, perhaps more relevant in the military context, geographical distance between leader and subordinates.

29   As the Chinese philosopher Lao-Tzu said, around 550 BC: 'A leader is best when people barely know he exists. Not so good when people obey and acclaim him. Worse when they despise him. But of a good leader who talks little when his work is done, his aim fulfilled, they will say "We did it ourselves."' Cited in Charles C. Manz and Henry P. Sims, JR, 'Superleadership: Beyond the myth of heroic leadership' (1991) 19 (4) *Organizational Dynamics*.

leave us, in the introduction to a volume on military ethics and leadership? Do situationism, and the idea that we are witnessing 'the end of leadership,' together not strongly suggest that, seeing that neither character not leadership seem to matter an awful lot, it is at the end of the day not so much the ethically behaving soldier or leader that deserve our praise or blame, but only the environment that steers him or her? This is probably not something most contributors to this volume would agree to, and for good reasons: even if it is true that the situation determines our conduct to a greater degree than we like or tend to believe, this does not automatically make moral responsibility evaporate; it merely shifts, from the perpetrators to their superiors. Clearly, this brings both character and leadership back into the discussion. The 'barrel of apples began rotting from the top down,' Zimbardo famously wrote in his book on the Abu Ghraib scandal.[30] Holding the higher strata of the organization (and the political leadership) responsible for the misbehaviour of military personnel at Abu Ghraib, Zimbardo nuances his own situationist point of view considerably, as it suggests that the situations military personnel finds themselves in no longer excuses them once they have risen above a certain threshold level in the organization. The context soldiers have to work in is not a given, but at least partly the result of the actions and policies of military (and political) leaders – notwithstanding Kellerman's declaration of the end of leadership. Even in a time that leadership is increasingly questioned, good leadership still matters a great deal. Leaders create (and bear responsibility) for the ethical climate that has an effect on the chances of military personnel crossing the thin line between legitimate force and excessive violence. Holding leaders responsible is also perfectly in in line with the common intuition that, after having reached a certain organizational level, you can no longer hide behind the fact that you were just doing as others did, or were merely following orders.

Of course, it is hard to say at what level leaders begin to be morally responsible for their own doings and that of their subordinates. Nonetheless, it at first sight makes good sense to already attribute considerable moral responsibility to those who have reached the level of junior commissioned officer. That it is first and foremost officers who should stand between their men and women and a war crime forms a plausible reason for that. They will in general not only have received the miltary training aimed at installing virtues, but hopefully also the education that should enable them to recognize – and counter – the

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30   Philip Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil* (Random House 2007) 415.

situational pressures under which misconduct is more likely to take place.[31] Yet, in the era of what has been called the strategic corporal, with many non-commissioned officers functioning with a relatively high degree of autonomy, one could argue that there is ample reason to attribute responsibility to these non-commissioned leaders too.[32] If we do so, however, we should perhaps also reconsider that just-mentionned policy, prevailing in most militaries, of directing most of the efforts in ethics education towards (aspiring) officers,[33] and start giving more attention to the ethics education (perhaps ideally combining virtue ethics with insights from social psychology) of NCOs and soldiers – so that they are as well-prepared as they can be to face the testing situations that war and peacekeeping inevitably bring. It is a good thing, therefore, that the these NCOs and soldiers are, in a way, the focal point of the first chapter that follows this introduction.

Overview of the Rest of This Book

In that next chapter, Lieutenant Colonel Tom McDermott and Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Stephen Hart RM tackle the important issue of how small-unit military commanders are to explain crucial ethical concepts to their young warriors – in general not too interested in the nuances of virtue ethics or deontology. The aim of their chapter is simple but vital: to help commanders armour themselves, and their soldiers, against the kind of atrocities we have witnessed in My Lai and Abu Ghraib, and to give them a framework with which to understand, explain and anticipate ethical risk. To do so, McDermott and Hart draw, in the first part of their chapter, heavily on the insights social psychology offers, emphasizing the important role situational factors play in making unethical conduct more likely to happen. The second part of the chapter tries to provide the small-unit commander with some useful advice, based on both research and their own practical experience, to prevent this from happening.

Very much in line with McDermott and Hart, Miriam C. de Graaff, Peter W. de Vries, Walter J. van Bijlevelt and Ellen Giebels argue that leaders play a crucial role in initiating and directing team actions in ethically challenging situations

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31   An additional reason is that leaders above the junior level are perhaps responsible for the ethical climate in which atrocities can happen, they are themselves just not that often involved in the actual *committing* of atrocities.

32   Charles C. Krulak, 'The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War' (1999) 83 (1) *Marine Corps Gazette*.

33   See also De Graaf, Den Besten, Giebels and Verweij in this volume.

during military operations. Their chapter addresses how military leaders are being prepared to cope with such situations. Generally, ethical challenges require actors to be morally competent, in order to be able to come to morally sound decisions. The authors focus on the gap between leadership education in ethics and the translation of moral insights into actions in theatres of operations. They argue that this gap between education and practice is largely due to the neglect of psychological mechanisms in military training. Even when insights into psychological mechanisms are integrated into leadership courses, they remain mostly theoretical. The Armed Forces of the Netherlands are used as a case to illustrate these issues. The chapter ends with some suggestions for ethics education that can stimulate moral competence in military leaders, in the classroom as well as in the field.

David Whetham's paper zooms in on some of the ethical challenges that these military leaders actually experienced during the coalition operations of the group of ABCA states of Australia, Great Britain, Canada and the United States of America. Whetham's main focus is on the challenge of ethical relativism that soldiers from the ABCA states have been faced with when they were working with partners who did not appear to view the same situation in the same way. Famous examples are corruption and the sexual abuse of so-called chai-boys in Afghanistan, two practices military leaders sometimes struggle with, as they are insecure whether interfering does not amount to ethical imperialism. Whetham convincingly argues that this is not the case: it would make criticizing other cultures impossible and deny any prospect of progress.

These three chapters that focussed on the role of (junior) military leaders in preventing unethical conduct are followed by two chapters on the integrity of military leaders. In their contribution to this volume, Nathan L. Cartagena and Michael D. Beaty build in two ways on the argument (made by Berghaus and Cartagena elsewhere) that fragmentation is a significant problem for soldiers; that soldiers can combat it by striving to cultivate virtues within and across the domains of their lives; and that such virtue-relevant goals help soldiers live integrated lives. First, they argue that soldiers experience a form of fragmentation that Berghaus and Cartagena did not identify – namely, societal fragmentation – and that military leaders should provide models of ethical training that address it. Second, they contend that integrity is one virtue soldiers should strive to cultivate within a virtue-relevant goal framework.

In his chapter on integrity, Patrick Mileham addresses the inherent tensions, dichotomies and often acute contradictions in military service, particularly during conflict. In the first half of the chapter he emphasizes the importance of the correct use of words in the discipline of military ethics. Mileham shows the way by carefully unpacking the differentiation between 'moral' and 'ethical.'

The second half of the chapter investigates the tension between personal and professional virtues. Mileham delves into the connexions between character, conscience, altruism and integrity, the latter being the personal virtue that arguably unites all other virtues and defines all professions on the basis of trust.

Mihaly Boda's contribution is about the complex relationship between a soldiers' autonomy on the one hand, and military authority on the other. More specifically, he applies the work of Joseph Raz on the nature of authority to military leadership and command. As authority seemingly rules out autonomy defined as self-government, military authority seems to be at odds with soldier autonomy. In the traditional view of Samuel Huntington and others, autonomy has to give in. Boda tries to reconcile authority and autonomy by pointing out how out military authority leaves room for a restricted form of moral autonomy as long as soldiers have joined the military of their own free will, or have been conscripted in a case of supreme emergency.

Serving almost as an illustration of Boda's argument, Angelika Dörfler-Dierken focuses in her chapter on the typical German conception of *Innere Führung*, which encourages military personal to see themselves as citizens who accept personal responsibility for their own actions, and who are a normal part of civil society and thus not different from other groups of German society. Its four principal dimensions are the integration into state and society; the legitimation of the armed forces and their missions; the motivation and the willingness of soldiers to perform their duties; and, moreover, the soldier's life in the armed forces. The concept of human dignity is at the heart of these principles. *Innere Führung* ensures the realization of fundamental constitutional and social norms and values, and focuses on the individual responsibility of each single soldier, who is trained to act in accordance with the law and their personal conscience. In this way, *Innere Führung* supports a humanitarian and peaceful mind set of German military personnel and provides them with a positive self-image.

Arseniy Kumankov's chapter investigates different approaches to the theoretical grounding of humanitarian intervention. First, the conception of intervention offered by Michael Walzer, who is known to be an advocate of unilateralism, is examined. According to Walzer, states should be proactive and decisive in cases when human rights are violated somewhere. This chapter also considers Carl Schmitt's arguments against military actions on moral grounds. Kumankov proposes multilateralism as an alternative to the approaches of Walzer and Schmitt – humanitarian intervention may be justified as a measure initiated by a supra-state body.

George Wilkes' essay presents a framework for relating professional military ethics to culturally specific understandings of ethics, giving particular

attention to assumptions made about guilt and confession after ethical failures occur. As national contexts shape very different views of what it is about military ethics that really matters in practice, his essay suggests the public interest in serious, nuanced understanding of the divergent approaches to promoting professional military ethics education. With an eye to practical pressures, many experts will seek to exclude culturally specific normative approaches from professional military ethics education. The essay explores how this exclusion nevertheless leaves practical and conceptual problems.

De Graaf, Den Besten, Giebels and Verweij provide a review of empirical research on moral judgment within a military context. They conducted a sensitive search of online databases and identified 33 relevant empirical studies published in ISI journals between 1985 and 2013. Analysis of those publications shows that the majority of the studies used a cognitive rather than an affective or integrative (combined) approach to moral judgment. As is the case with moral judgment research in other disciplines, the affective and the integrative approach are both relatively new and are increasingly receiving scientific attention. Their systematic review revealed that lower ranking servicemen, those who actually find themselves in combat situations and the operations themselves, are systematically overlooked in studies of moral judgment processes in the military. Furthermore, studies conducted in the U.S. military tend to dominate the field; especially the armed forces of non-Western cultures remain overlooked. Taken together, this study highlights the fact that further empirical research in this field is required.

Boris Kashnikov argues that in contemporary warfare a truly decisive military victory requires the wisest motives, most virtuous of means and supremely altruistic goals, in order to appeal to and satisfy international consensus vested in a supranational, global 'sovereign authority.' Realizing such idealism through military means is often elusive, leading to frustration and 'disenchantment,' as we seem unable to bring about the final goal of a lasting peace. Modern-day campaigns, Kashnikov observes, continue to be perpetuated by fear, hubris and greed. Motives on all sides are skewed and asymmetric, having little to do with endurance, courage and honour inherent in the character of the human actors involved. While the USA have taken responsibility for acting as the global sovereign authority, it has to be recognized that currently we are witnessing a perpetual state of war, with failure and disenchantment not only in terms of means, but in terms of motives and goals. As such the war is unwinnable and this increases current and future ethical dilemmas for military leadership.

Deane-Peter Baker, finally, looks into the question whether the nature of special operations presents particular ethical challenges for military leaders,

both within and outside of the special forces community, during military operations. Military personnel involved in such operations incur more risk, work often in relative isolation, and use unconventional tactics, and these factors make it more likely that they will face ethical dilemmas. Surprisingly, this is something that has drawn little academic attention. Based on an analysis of leadership issues and ethical challenges that are inherent to special operations, Baker offers a framework to make deeper and wider research possible.

All chapters in this book are based on papers delivered at the 5th EuroISME conference in 2015 in Belgrade, Serbia, and it is good to see that the diverse backgrounds of the conference participants is also present in this volume – meaning that not all chapters are written by authors from English speaking countries. I am very much indebted to all the anonymous reviewers who made such useful comments on earlier versions of the different chapters in this volume. Many thanks also to Bea Timmer, Lindy Melman and Ester Lels at Brill for their support during the publication process. Finally, I would like to thank EuroISME for giving me the opportunity to edit this book – it has been a rewarding enterprise.