‘Analytic’ Philosophy of Religion

I begin with a very quick historical overview of ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion. I then turn to briefly canvas the kinds of questions that are asked by ‘analytic’ philosophers of religion in connection with religious language, metaphysics of religion, epistemology of religion, axiology of religion, politics of religion, and the definition of ‘religion’. I conclude the body of the paper with a very brief discussion of possible futures for ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion. Finally, there is a short appendix on the treatment of Islam and Arabic philosophy within ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion.

1. A Brief Historical Overview

The history of the parting of the ways of what are sometimes called ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ philosophy is contested (see, for example, Friedman (2000) and Gordon (2012).) The nature of ‘analytic’ philosophy is also open to debate (see, for example, Beaney (2017) and Soames (2003)). One way to get a good sense of the nature of ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion is to consider work published in Sophia (founded in 1961), Religious Studies (founded in 1964), the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (founded in 1970), and Faith and Philosophy (founded in 1983).

While Bertrand Russell wrote extensively on religious questions, there are grounds for treating Ayer (1936) as the foundational text for contemporary ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion. Relying on his verificationist account of meaning, Ayer asserted that characteristic religious claims, e.g. ‘God exists’, are meaningless. For the next thirty years, ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion was conducted in the shadows of logical positivism, primarily concerned with questions about the meaningfulness of religious language. Some might cite Flew and MacIntyre (1955) as an illustration of the dreariness of ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion during this period.


In the past twenty years, there is no shortage of works continuing discussion of the same questions about the existence of God, the nature of the divine attributes, and the rationality of religious belief from perspectives that are overwhelmingly white, male, Anglophone and focussed almost exclusively on Christianity; see, for example: Audi (2011), Bayne (2018),

In the past twenty years, there have been various calls for revision of practice in ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion. Some of these criticisms call for broad ranging reforms; see, for example: Harris (2002), Harris and Insole (2003), Coakley (2005), Harrison (2007), Diller and Kasher (2013), Ellis (2018), Draper and Schellenberg (2018) and Mizrahi (2019).

Perhaps partly in response to these criticisms, there has been some increasing recognition that more could be done to include non-white, non-male, non-Anglophone, more-than-merely-Christian-focussed perspectives in discussions in ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion.

Meister and Copan (2007) provides one indication of the then current state of ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion. The work divides into nine parts. The first part is ‘Philosophical Issues in World Religions’, with chapters on Hinduism, Buddhism, African Religions, Chinese Religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam; the second part is ‘Key Figures Philosophy of Religion’, with chapters on Augustine, Shankara, Ibn Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and James. The remaining parts of the book discuss religious diversity, the concept of God, arguments for God’s existence, arguments against God’s existence, philosophical theology, Christian theism, and recent topics in philosophy of religion. It is noteworthy that the latest of the non-Christian key figures in philosophy of religion is Maimonides (d.1204); it is even more noteworthy that there is almost no significant engagement with texts and thinkers in non-Christian traditions beyond the first two parts of the book. There is some engagement of this sort in Part III, particularly in the chapter by Yandell; but, on the whole, other religions enter into discussion solely as conceptualised from Christian-focussed perspectives.

In 2016, Routledge launched a series Investigating Philosophy of Religion. That series contains books on Buddhism—Burton (2017); Daoism—Kohn (2019); Hinduism—Ranganathan (2018); Islam—Aijaz (2018); and Judaism—Goodman (2016). Some other works have appeared recently with similar aims: see, for example, Lebens et al. (2019). These works are serious attempts at ‘analytical’ philosophical engagements with non-Christian traditions. However, these works currently stand as islands in a sea that remains almost exclusively focussed on Christianity, practised by people who are predominantly white, male, and Anglophone. Whether there are broader changes afoot remains to be seen. One interesting recent development which might possibly be taken as a counter-indication is the rise of ‘analytic’ theology; see, for example, Crisp and Rea (2009), Rea (2009), and the issues of the Journal of Analytic Theology, launched in 2013.

2. Religious Language

Discussions of religious language in ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion might have broad applicability. Questions that receive quite a bit of attention include: (a) whether religious language should be given literal interpretation; (b) whether religious language should be
understood to be cataphatic; and (c) whether religious language should be given a realist construal.

It is clear that much religious language is metaphorical. The question whether religious language should be given literal interpretation arises only in cases where religious language is not metaphorical. A view that has had historical importance is that much religious language is analogical: words in religious language have literal meaning, but that literal meaning differs from the meaning that those words have when used in non-religious language. One difficulty that confronts any view of this kind is explaining how these words in religious language acquire their analogous literal meanings: what enables us to take words that have literal use in non-religious contexts and use them with different literal meanings in religious contexts?

It is not uncommon for religious believers to claim that at least some religious subjects can only be discussed apophatically—i.e., in terms of what they are not—rather than cataphatically—i.e., in terms of what they are. This kind of view often goes along with the thought that the relevant objects of religious concern—or, at least, the intrinsic natures of the relevant objects of religious concern—lie entirely beyond our understanding. One difficulty that faces views which maintain that relevant objects of religious concern lie entirely beyond our understanding is to explain how it is possible to use words to refer to those objects. It is not possible—even in principle—to fix the referent of a term by saying only what the referent of the term is not. Of course, this difficulty does not arise if we suppose only that the intrinsic natures of the relevant objects of religious concern lie entirely beyond our understanding.

Some ‘analytic’ philosophers of religion maintain that at least some religious language should not be given a realist construal. There are many different forms that anti-realist construals of parts of religious language might take: expressivist, Wittgensteinian, fictionalist, and so forth. One challenge that confronts views of this kind is that they do not sit well with what many religious believers say about the realist status of their own religious claims. It does not seem out of the question that some who consider themselves religious are expressivists, or Wittgensteinians, or fictionalists about their own uses of religious language. But it is much harder to accept that all users of religious language are best viewed through an anti-realist lens.

Suppose that someone claims that some object of religious concern to them is ‘good’. We might suppose that we should give an anti-realist construal of that claim. If we give a realist construal of their claim, we might suppose that the claim should be understood literally: the object of religious concern is evaluated in just the same kinds of ways in which mundane objects are evaluated. Or we might suppose that the claim should be understood analogically: the object of religious concern is not good in the same sense in which mundane objects are good. And—no matter where we fall with respect to the above considerations—we might suppose that their claim is evidence that they have a cataphatic conception of this object of religious concern: they suppose that we do have some understanding of the intrinsic nature of the object in question.

3. Metaphysics

Discussions of metaphysical matters in ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion often have a narrow focus; but it is not hard to see how that focus could be broadened. No matter what are taken
to be the objects of religious concern, we can ask questions about the existence and nature of those objects. Do the putative objects exist? If they exist, what is the modality of that existence? If they exist, what are their essential properties? If they exist, what is the modality and nature of their relationship to us? If they exist, are they fundamental existents? If they exist but are not fundamental existents, how are they constituted or constructed? Are the objects of religious concern parts of our universe? Are the objects of religious concern located in our spacetime? If not, are the objects of religious concern located in some other, non-overlapping spacetime? Are the objects of religious concern merely temporal (but not spatial)? Are the objects of religious concern neither spatial nor temporal? Are the objects of religious concern subjects of experience? Are the objects of religious concern free agents? Are the objects of religious concern virtuous? Are the objects of religious concern loci of value? Do the objects of religious concern have the same kind of fundamental metaphysical constitution that we have? Are the objects of religious concern composites of form and matter? Are the objects of religious concern composites of nature and existence? Do the objects of religious concern have parts? Do the objects of religious concern have the same kind of modal status that we have?

It is obvious that we can ask these kinds of questions about putative divine beings. But, for example, religious concerns might lead us to ask these kinds of questions about ourselves. Do we have immaterial souls? If we have immaterial souls, do our immaterial souls exist eternally? If we possess immaterial souls, have our immaterial souls been coupled with material bodies in prior lives? If we have immaterial souls, will our immaterial souls be coupled with material bodies in later lives? If we have immaterial souls, will we have future existence as unembodied immaterial souls? Is our present existence one in which we are unembodied immaterial souls? Is our present existence one in which we are immaterial parts of a divine being? Is our present existence one in which we are material parts of a divine being? If we are immaterial souls, are we fundamentally immaterial souls? If we are non-fundamentally immaterial souls, how are we constructed or constituted? If we are immaterial souls, what are our essential properties? If we are immaterial souls, do we have parts? If we are immaterial souls with parts, what are those parts?

Religious concerns might also lead us to ask similar kinds of questions about a range of other beings: animals, plants, ecosystems, geological formations, planets, stars, human institutions, aliens, AIs, and so forth. Which of these things have immaterial souls? Which of these things have eternal immaterial souls? Which of these things have different phases united by a single immaterial soul? Which of these things partake in the divine? Which of these things are most favoured by the divine? Which of these things is it appropriate for us to take to be objects of religious concern?

4. Epistemology

Discussions of epistemological questions in ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion have mostly focussed on issues in individual epistemology: questions about epistemic and doxastic states and attributes of individual human beings. What can an individual know about matters of religious concern? What can an individual reasonably be certain of in matters of religious concern? What can be proven about matters of religious concern? What is the range of reasonable individual opinion when it comes to matter of religious concern? How is belief about matters of religious concern related to beliefs about other subject matters? How might
beliefs about matters of religious concern justified? What are reliable sources of information about matters of religious concern? Do we have dedicated cognitive mechanisms that work on matters of religious concern? What is it to have faith in objects of religious concern? What is it to have trust in objects of religious concern? What is it to have hopes related to objects of religious concern? How are faith, trust and hope distinguished from, and related to, one another? How are faith, trust and hope distinguished from, and related to, knowledge, certainty, and belief? What is the proper role of religious experience in the formation of religious beliefs? Is it possible to have experiences of objects of religious concern if those objects are not parts of our universe? Is there expert consensus on matters of religious concern? Is there anything that it is proper to regard as authoritative when it comes to matters of religious concern?

Recently, in ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion, some attention has turned to questions in social epistemology, concerning, in particular, the significance of disagreement about matters of religious concern. Are there experts when it comes to matters of religious concern? If there are experts when it comes to matters of religious concern, how can they be identified by non-experts? If there are experts when it comes to matters of religious concern, do they agree in their verdicts about matters of religious concern? If there are no experts when it comes to matters of religious concern, or if there are experts when it comes to matters of religious concern but they disagree in their verdicts about those matters, how should the rest of us respond to manifest widespread disagreement about matters of religious concern? In the absence of expert consensus and the presence of widespread disagreement, should we suppose that we should all become agnostic about matters of religious concern? In the absence of expert consensus and the presence of widespread disagreement, should we rather suppose that it is fine for everyone to stick to their guns when it comes to matters of religious concern? When we are thinking about these kinds of questions, should we take account of how opinion about matters of religious concern are distributed? Does it matter whether my opinion on questions of religious concern are idiosyncratic? Does it matter whether my opinion on questions of religious concern is shared by billions of other people?

In other subject areas, ‘analytic’ philosophy has started to pay attention to other questions in social epistemology concerning, for example, the spread of information and misinformation across populations: which social practices promote collective knowledge rather than collective error and ignorance? Following the lead of Mills (2007), we might suspect that group structures of domination—privilege and subordination—tend to promote, and reproduce, self-deception, bad faith, evasion and misrepresentation on the side of the privileged. Moreover, we might suspect that, alongside gender, race, and class, religion can play this kind of structuring role. Where it does, we might expect to see, in the wake of long actual histories of systemic religious subordination, manifestations of what we might call ‘religious ignorance’: conviction of exceptionalism and superiority about religious standing, insistence that the dominant religion is essentially egalitarian and inclusive, proclamation that past departures from egalitarian inclusion were minor deviations from the norm, editing of historical memory in ways that enable self-representation according to which differential privilege—and the need to correct it—does not exist, and so forth. We might suspect, given conditions of intersectionality, that it will not be easy to identify and investigate current instances of ‘religious ignorance’—but we might also think that it is relatively easy to point to historical examples.

5. Axiology
Discussions of axiological questions in ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion often have a narrow focus; but it is not hard to see how that focus could be broadened. No matter what are taken to be the objects of religious concern, we can ask questions about the value of those objects. Does the value of other things depend upon the existence of objects of religious concern? Does the value of other things depend upon the actions of objects of religious concern? Does the value of other things depend upon the attitudes of objects of religious concern? Could the value of other things depend upon the existence of objects of religious concern? Could the value of other things depend upon the actions of objects of religious concern? Could the value of other things depend upon the attitudes of objects of religious concern? Does the value of other things depend upon the existence of objects of religious concern? Does the value of other things depend upon the actions of objects of religious concern? Could the value of other things depend upon the attitudes of objects of religious concern? Does the value of other things depend upon the existence of objects of religious concern? Does the value of other things depend upon the actions of objects of religious concern? Could the value of other things depend upon the attitudes of objects of religious concern? Does the value of other things depend upon the existence of objects of religious concern? Could the value of other things depend upon the actions of objects of religious concern? Could the value of other things depend upon the attitudes of objects of religious concern? Does the value of other things depend upon the existence of objects of religious concern?

Alongside these axiological questions that we might ask about objects of religious concern, there are also meta-axiological questions that will influence our answers to those axiological questions. What are values? What makes it the case that something has value? If things have values, what makes it the case that something has the particular value that it has? Are objective values metaphysically objectionable? Are objective values less metaphysically problematic if there are appropriate kinds of objects of religious concern? Are objective values epistemologically problematic? Are objective values less epistemologically problematic if there are appropriate kinds of objects of religious concern? Can nihilism about values be reconciled with the existence of objects of religious concern? Can expressivism about values be reconciled with the existence of objects of religious concern? Can subjectivism about values be reconciled with the existence of objects of religious concern? Can response-dependence of values be reconciled with the existence of objects of religious concern? (Alongside the meta-axiological questions, there are also meta-metaphysical, meta-epistemological, and meta-methodological questions that are relevant to discussions of objects of religious concern. But we shall not try to canvass those kinds of questions in this article.)

6. Politics

Discussions of politics of religion in contemporary ‘analytic’ philosophy has been dominated by questions about the proper relation between religion and political authority in ‘liberal democracies’. According to Eberle and Cuneo (2015), we can take the principle that is the central focus of the discussion to be something like this: *citizens of a liberal democracy may support the implementation of a coercive law if and only if they reasonably believe themselves to have plausible secular justifications for the implementation of the law that they are prepared to offer in political discussion.* While this principle is supported by most secular liberal political theorists—e.g. Jürgen Habermas, Charles Larmore, Steven Macedo, Martha Nussbaum and John Rawls—as well as by some religious liberal political theorists—such as
Robert Audi—it is also rejected by most religious liberal political theorists—e.g., Chris Eberle, Philip Quinn, Jeffrey Stout and Nicholas Wolterstorff—as well as by religious ‘new traditionalists’—such as Alisdair MacIntyre, John Milbank, Christine Pickstock and Stanley Hauerwas—who reject it as part of a wholesale rejection of liberal democratic theory. It is worth noting that there is no seat at the table, in the discussion of Eberle and Cuneo (2015), for non-liberal secular political theorists: anarchists, communists, cosmopolitans, socialists, and their ilk.

From a broader perspective, we might suppose that ‘analytic’ philosophy of the politics of religion takes on questions like the following: What role does religion have in the foundation of political authority? What role does religion properly play in a well-ordered political system? What role do religious authorities have in a well-ordered political system? What role should religious authorities play in the education of citizens in a well-ordered political system? What role should religion have in a syllabus for the education of citizens in a well-ordered political system? What role should religion have in the teaching of humanities and sciences that is properly part of the education of citizens in a well-ordered political system? What role should religious authorities have in a well-ordered political system? What role may religious institutions and organisations have in the provision of social services—e.g., accommodation assistance, communications services, emergency services, employment assistance, food assistance, health care services, law enforcement services, marital assistance, parenting assistance, policy research, and public broadcasting services—in a well-ordered political system? Should religious authorities, individuals and organisations be given exemptions from laws designed to mitigate or eliminate discrimination and intolerance grounded in, for example, age, caste, disability, gender, name, nationality, race, region, religion and sexual orientation?

7. Definition of ‘Religion’

The definition of ‘religion’ has been a fraught topic, not just in ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion, but across the Anglophone academy. According to Taliaferro (2019), a religion is a communal, transmittable body of teachings and prescribed practices about an ultimate, sacred reality or state of being that calls for reverence or awe, a body that guides its practitioners into what it describes as a saving, illuminating or emancipatory relationship to this reality through a personally transformative life of prayer, ritualised meditation and/or moral practices like repentance and personal regeneration. While, as Taliaferro points out, this definition does not entail that ‘religion’ requires belief in God or gods, this definition does entail that ‘religion’ requires ‘teachings and prescribed practices’ premised on the claim that there is a ‘saving, illuminating, or emancipatory relationship’ to ‘an ultimate, sacred reality or state of being that calls for reverence or awe’. However, it seems to me that this condition is not satisfied by the major Indian religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, etc. In those religions, there is a practical goal—‘no more of all this’—that is emancipatory; but one does not achieve that goal by being appropriately related to ‘an ultimate sacred reality or state of being that calls for reverence or awe’. Despite his good intentions, it seems to me that Taliaferro’s definition is still tied too closely to Abrahamic conceptions of religion.

As I have argued elsewhere, we can do better by following the lead of Atran (2002). Very roughly: religions are passionate communal displays of costly commitments to the satisfaction
of non-natural causal beings and/or the overcoming of non-natural causal regulative structures resulting from evolutionary canalisation and convergence of: (1) widespread belief in—or acceptance of—non-natural causal agents and/or non-natural causal regulative structures; (2) hard to fake public expressions of costly material commitments to the satisfaction of those non-natural causal agents and/or the overcoming of, or escape from, those non-natural causal regulative structures; (3) mastering of people’s existential anxieties by the making of those costly commitments; and (4) ritualised, rhythmic, sensory coordination of all the above in communion, congregation and intimate fellowship. On this account, while Abrahamic, Iranian, Indian, East Asian, African, Indigenous and New religions are all correctly classified as religions, atheism, naturalism, philosophy, and secular political ideologies and practices are all correctly classified as not religions. While, of course, the definition does not pick out everything that participants take to be important to religion, it seems that the definition does what definitions are required to do: it correctly sorts religions from things that are not religions.

8. Futures

There is no shortage of opinion about how ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion might be improved. I shall briefly canvas some ‘internal’ advice and then some more ‘external’ advice.

Draper and Schellenberg (2017) present a range of opinions classified according to ‘focus’ and ‘standpoint’. Perhaps ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion might be improved if it altered its focus in the following kinds of ways: rejecting the idea that belief is both essential and fundamental to religion; abandoning the identification of religion with faith in authority and revelation; aiming for and embracing truly global consideration of religion; pursuing genuinely important questions that religions pose to philosophy; pursuing genuinely important questions that philosophy poses for religions; identifying and promoting naturalistic religions; and recognising and working with our many proper partners in the natural sciences, social sciences, humanities and arts who are also engaged in the serious study of religions. Perhaps, too, ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion might be improved if it altered its standpoint in the following kinds of ways: recognising that there is much more to ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion than analytic theology; building bridges with continental philosophy; understanding the attractiveness of religious Mooreanism; taking the most fundamental considerations to concern religious and non-religious lives; and adopting an openness to competing interpretations of familiar religious texts, traditions, and practices.

Eckel et al. (2021) take, as their focus, the rehabilitation of philosophy of religion, not merely the rehabilitation of ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion. Following the lead of Wildman (2021), they organise their introductory discussion according to four categories: (1) global perspective; (2) multi-disciplinarity; (3) critical theory; and (4) real world applications. While the first two themes are evident in Draper and Schellenberg (2017), the third theme is much more prominent in Eckel et al. (The fourth theme is little more than a gleam in the eye.) What is most interesting, I think, is that there has been increasing uptake, over the past couple of decades, within ‘analytic’ philosophy, of critical theories of class, race, gender, and so forth. However, as I noted earlier, there has not yet been much spill-over to ‘analytic’ philosophy of religion. Perhaps, one day soon, we will see many more philosophers of religion—including ‘analytic’ philosophers of religion—involved in multidisciplinary research that has real world outcomes.
9. Appendix: Arabic and Islamic Philosophy

Of the 2,580,106 entries in the PhilPapers database—https://philpapers.org/, as at 21/05/2021—there are 2014 entries devoted to Arabic and Islamic philosophy. Among these entries, there are 454 on ibn Sina, 373 on ibn Rushd, 176 on Mulla Sadra, and 73 on al-Farabi. Apart from the material on Mulla Sadra, almost all of this work is focussed on medieval Arabic and Islamic philosophy, often with an eye on the influence and reception of this work in Christian and Jewish philosophy.


There is a continuing tradition of serious Western study of Arabic and Islamic philosophy over the past few decades. Works that would be mentioned in any account of this tradition include, for example: Fakhry (1983), Leaman (1985), Hourani (1985), Leaman and Nasr (2001), Laliwala (2005), Adamson and Taylor (2005), Nasr (2006) and McGinnis and Reisman (2007). Marenbon (2012) contains three substantial chapters on medieval Arabic and Islamic philosophy. And so on. However, it is clear that (a) this work is regarded by most contemporary analytic philosophers of religion as a niche specialty interest, and (b) the focus of most of this work is historical, with a particular emphasis on quite distant historical periods. As Mizrahi (2020) notes, there are serious concerns about (1) the over-representation of Christian—and, in particular, conservative Christian—theists in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion; (2) the malign influence of cognitive biases—including overconfidence and confirmation bias—in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion; and (3) the evident disconnect, in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, from the lived experience of those who are not practitioners of mainstream Christianity.

Mizrahi (2020) suggests that there is an onus on analytic philosophers of religion to revise their practice in ways that show to non-Christians that work in analytic philosophy of religion resonates with their religious outlooks. In particular, Mizrahi suggests that analytic
philosophers should engage in something like consciousness raising by considering religious beliefs, questions, problems, and arguments couched in non-Christian terms. To illustrate this proposal, Mizrahi constructs examples involving (a) divine attributes and the Shahadah and the hajj; and (b) the Qur’an, divine revelation, and the primary of Arabic. As Mizrahi emphasises, this would be just one small step along the path to a more genuinely inclusive discipline. And it would be vulnerable to undermining in much the same kind of way that similar moves in, for example, analytical feminist philosophy have proven vulnerable to undermining.

I suspect that, in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, the prevailing view is that it is up to proponents of minority—non-conservative, non-Christian—views to get themselves heard, published, etc. This suspicion is of a piece with the further suspicion that the nature of identity politics will make it harder to forge progress in philosophy of religion than to forge progress in other areas of philosophy. There are no missionaries within philosophy seeking to win converts to given racial identities, or gender identities, or class identities, or the like. But, of course, within philosophy of religion, there are many missionaries seeking to win converts to their religious identities. We might expect those missionaries to be less than enthusiastic about promoting others who could be missionaries for competing religious identities.

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