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**Wisdom – Knowledge – Belief.  
The Problem of Demarcation in Plato's *Phaedo*\***

**Abstract**

The aim of the present paper is to show how Plato suggested demarcating between knowledge and other kinds of human intellectual activities. The article proposes to distinguish between two ways of such a demarcation. The first, called 'the external demarcation', takes place when one differentiates between knowledge and non-knowledge, the rational and non-rational or the reasonable and non-reasonable. The second, called 'internal', marks the difference within knowledge itself and could be illustrated by the difference between the so called hard and soft sciences. The analyses lead to the following conclusions. Plato refers to the whole of human intellectual activity as *doxa*, which is divided into two spheres. The first of them is knowledge proper whose criterion is *phronesis*. Three other kinds of *doxa* are derived from knowledge proper: 1) the traditional *peri phuseōs* investigation (called also *sophia*); 2) popular *doxai* concerning virtues; 3) wisdom of the antilogikoi. The difference represents the external demarcation. There may be, however, a difference in the scope of knowledge proper (the internal demarcation). If the *peri phuseōs* investigators were able to explain the field of values, the result of their investigation could be acknowledged as knowledge, although it would still be characterized as inferior due to its being based on senses. What is interesting about knowledge proper is that it is not firm and reliable but only hypothetical. It does not determine the skeptical reading of the *Phaedo* but it indicates that Plato has just begun his own philosophical project (which is still in progress) and the knowledge presented in the dialogue is his first positive suggestion how to solve the problem of demarcation.

When observing scientific life from a sociological perspective, one can clearly notice the important role played in modern society by various 'specialists', particularly if their area of expertise is exact sciences. We believe physicists when they

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claim that the universe came into being billions of years ago. It seems rational to assume that the Earth came into existence and initially was devoid of any life, which then appeared and evolved in such a way that it led to the emergence of *homo sapiens*. But it appears also irrational that man was created by God, that UFOs exist or that the fate of humans is written in the stars. The above examples indicate the first aspect of demarcation that I would like to discuss. I will refer to it as ‘external demarcation’. This seems to be the most frequently represented aspect in modern epistemological reflection, as part of which a *criterion* is sought for differentiating science from that which is not science, and which can be contained in weak convictions or in irrational faith (both these areas may be contained in the concept of metaphysics, broadly understood<sup>1</sup>). Scientists tell us that there is no scientific proof for the existence of God or UFOs, or a scientific confirmation of the verifiability of claims made by astrologers. When seeking a criterion that, as mentioned above, would have a nature of external demarcation, one desires to designate the area of scientific cognition and to separate it from other, ‘non-scientific’ domains. This obviously translates into the need to formulate an appropriate concept (conditions) of scientific knowledge, which concept becomes in fact the very scientific criterion.

The other demarcation aspect I will call ‘internal’ and this might also be regarded as a weaker form of the previous aspect. It presupposes that there exists a group of convictions that, with a certain degree of probability, most people regard as science, and the problem of demarcation arises precisely in this area. An example of this type of differentiation is the criticism of psychology by psychiatry or the criticism of representatives of arts by representatives of exact sciences. In the first case (external demarcation), it is about the differentiation between science and non-science, between that which is rational and irrational (reasonable and unreasonable<sup>2</sup>), in the other case, it is rather about the dispute about the form of that which is scientific (science – pseudoscience or better – worse science), in which for instance attention is paid to accuracy or the method of investigation (deduction-induction) as criteria for hierarchization (hard science – soft science).

One may ask the question, however, whether such a differentiation between external and internal demarcation appeared in antiquity and, consequently, whether it can be applied to it. It is very difficult to settle this issue with reference to the currents in ancient philosophy that appeared before the sophists. With the pre-Platonists, Heraclitus’ critical remarks about Homer and Hesiod<sup>3</sup> indicate that

<sup>1</sup> D. Gilles, *Philosophy of Science in 20th Century. Four Central Themes*, Oxford–Cambridge 1993, p. 155.

<sup>2</sup> L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 4.003, transl. D.F. Pears, B.F. McGuinness, London–New York 2001 [Polish translation: L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, transl. B. Wolniewicz, Warszawa 1997].

<sup>3</sup> DK 22 B 56 (H. Diels, W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Berlin 1966) = fr. 21 Marcovich (M. Marcovich, *Heraclitus. Editio maior*, Merida 1967) = fr. XXII Kahn (Ch.H. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus. An Edition of the Fragments with Translation and Commentary*, Cambridge–London–Melbourne 1979): “Men are deceived in the recognition of what is obvious, like Homer who was wisest of all Greeks. For he was deceived by boys killing lice, who said: what we see and catch we leave behind; what we neither see nor catch we carry away“ (all quotes from Heraclitus are from Kahn’s translation) [Polish translation: Heraklit,

the two poets, while possessing a certain knowledge about the sensorily cognizable reality, did not complement it with anything that could be called ‘knowledge of the essence’. They failed to recognize that apart from that which can be accessed with the senses, there exists a reality in the form of *Logos*, which causes, among other things, that opposites can and do constitute a unity. In the case of Heraclitus’, the statements about Pythagoras,<sup>4</sup> emphasis is put on the latter’s enormous dedication to science (*historia*), which only resulted in the creation – on the basis of other people’s reflections – of knowledge (*sophia*), which combines many domains (*polumatheia*), and so knowledge referring to many truths. Such a multitude of truths ignores the uniqueness of *logos* and cannot be applied in order to become a sage-philosopher, and so as such constitutes bad art (*kakotechnia*). In all the three cases we can read the fragments in a context that is ‘favourable’ to Homer, Hesiod and Pythagoras, i.e. conclude that according to Heraclitus, they possess some knowledge, which is characterized above all by a certain multitude, because it refers to a multitude, but they failed to recognize the *essence* of reality – its ontic unity. Then we would have to do with an interpretation in which the Ephesian’s fragments would talk about internal demarcation – within a broadly-understood knowledge. One can assume, however, that Heraclitus was much more critical in relation to the intellectual context that he found (and this is basically how his position is described in studies) and refused to designate the above-mentioned three authors as ‘wise men’. Consequently, the fragments referred to above would present a thought about external demarcation. We have a similar situation in the case of the philosophy developed by Parmenides, who – as is universally known – differentiates between the way of truth and the way of opinion. The differentiation expressed in such a general way fulfils the demarcation function both in the external and internal aspects, and this is so because in the *doksa* area there appears a difference between the conviction of the poem’s author and the convictions of other mortals. Thus, the juxtaposition knowledge-opinion, in which the author of the latter is Parmenides (or more generally – the poem’s lyrical subject), indicates internal demarcation, while the same juxtaposition in which *doksai* are an expression of convictions of other thinkers has a nature of external demarcation, refusing to attribute any cognitive value to other convictions<sup>5</sup>.

Such attempts to demarcate, i.e., separate philosophy/science from other domains of intellectual activity, were challenged by the sophists. Above all, they pointed out at the common basis of human knowledge, which – according to them

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*Fragmenty: nowy przekład i komentarz*, transl. K. Mrówka, Warszawa 2004]. DK 22 B 57 (= fr. 43 Marcovich = fr. XIX Kahn): “The teacher of most is Hesiod. It is him they know as knowing most, who did not recognize day and night: they are one.”

<sup>4</sup> DK 22 B 129 (= fr. 17 Marcovich = fr. XXV Kahn): “Pythagoras son of Mnesarchus pursued inquiry further than all other men and, choosing what he liked from these compositions, made a wisdom of his own: much learning, artful knavery”.

<sup>5</sup> DK 28 B 8, 60–61: “I tell you all the likely arrangement in order that the wisdom of mortals may never oustrip you”, translated by L. Tarán [*Parmenides. A Text with Translation, and Critical Essays*, Princeton 1965] [Polish translation: Parmenides, ‘Fragmenty poematu o naturze’, transl. M. Wesoły, *Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria* 10 (2001), pp. 71–85].

– was sense perception.<sup>6</sup> This constitutes the criterion for the truthfulness of judgments and, being accessible to all people, does not allow for differentiating knowledge. The difference occurs within subjective human convictions originating from sense perception, but it is pre-arranged and relative in nature,<sup>7</sup> as basically all human judgments can be designated as equipollent.<sup>8</sup> A differentiation that is in fact ostensible can only be made by appropriate argumentation in favour of a given opinion, which is not its justification in the sense of provision of an objective or absolute principle-reason, but rather a specification of a larger number or stronger reasons whose strength of influence would tip the balance towards one of them through subjective persuasion.

One may ask why our deliberations are to focus on the *Phaedo*, which in antiquity was classified as an ethical dialogue, which meant that the deliberations presented there were, according to the ancients, to have a practical application.<sup>9</sup> However, quite often in antiquity, it was looked upon as a dialogue about the soul,<sup>10</sup> whose essential activity has, above all, an intellectual dimension, although surely the ethical aspect cannot be regarded as less important.<sup>11</sup> Thus, one can assert that deliberations on demarcation, although they do not constitute the principal focus of the work, constitute a significant part of it. There is also another argument. I am not an adherent to the evolutionary or developmental interpretation of the thought of the founder of the Academy's,<sup>12</sup> but if one were to agree with the findings of the studies into relative chronology, the *Phaedo* is to have been created after Plato founded his own school of philosophy.<sup>13</sup> Thus, it can be assumed that in such a work one can find important deliberations on the issue of demarcation, because Plato might have desired to define his own field of examination and education, which, on the one hand, would attest to the Academy's originality and would differentiate it from other Athenian schools, and, on the other hand, would encourage potential students to enrol.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>6</sup> DK 80 B 7; DK 82 B 11a.

<sup>7</sup> A. Pacewicz, 'Relatywizacja dobra w filozofii sofistów?', *Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria* 14 (2005), pp. 7–22; S. Consigny, *Gorgias. Sophist and Artist*, Columbia 2001, p. 40. Sextus Empiricus (*Adversus Mathematicos* VII 48, 60, 65) counts Protagoras and Gorgias among philosophers who rejected the criterion for truth. This, however, should be understood as a rejection of the criterion for the absolute nature.

<sup>8</sup> DK 80 A 6a, A 20; V. Brochard, *Les sceptiques grecs*, Paris 1932, p. 16.

<sup>9</sup> Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum*, III, 49–50.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, III 58; Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes*, I 11, 24; on the immortality of the soul see Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*, II 18.

<sup>11</sup> P. Stern (*Socratic Rationalism and Political Philosophy. An Interpretation of Plato's "Phaedo"*, New York 1993, pp. 6–7) draws attention to the two-dimensionality of the dialogue in another aspect. He discerns in it a tension between the reference to another world that appears in the arguments for the immortality of the human soul and in the description of the land in which the soul resides after the body dies, and the situation in which Socrates finds himself – being in this world. The tension is equivalent to the disproportion of the two aspects of teaching present in the dialogue.

<sup>12</sup> A. Pacewicz, *O ewolucyjnym charakterze filozofii Platona*, [in:] A. Pacewicz, A. Olejarczyk, J. Jaskóła (red.), *Philosophiae Itinera. Studia i rozprawy ofiarowane Janinie Gajdzie-Krynickiej*, Wrocław 2009, pp. 373–390.

<sup>13</sup> W. Stróżewski, *Wykłady o Platonie. Ontologia*, Kraków 1992, p. 26

<sup>14</sup> W. Lutosławski (*The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic with an Account of Plato's Style*

The analyses to be done in this paper focuses on the following four terms: *doksa*, *sophia*, *epistēmē* and *phronēsis*.

*Doksa* and the derivatives of *dokeō*<sup>15</sup> are probably, in terms of range, the broadest epistemic term used by Plato in his dialogues. In the *Phaedo*, it principally seems to be a neutral notion, expressing a certain possibility, but receives a negative or positive connotation in a given context. Such a neutral expression becomes apparent for instance just before the first argument for the immortality of the soul. He formulates three conditions that are supposed to do away with the unbelief (*apistia*) that people have towards this issue. It should be demonstrated that: (1) the soul is after death, (2) it has some strength (*dunamis*), (3) it has *phronēsis*.<sup>16</sup>

Kebes wants to learn Socrates' opinion (*doksa*)<sup>17</sup> about it, but the manner of the discourse is determined by Socrates/Plato as *diamuthologeîn*,<sup>18</sup> with a limitation of the claim of truthfulness only to probability (*eite eikos houtōs echei eite mē*<sup>19</sup>).

In its negative connotation, *doksa* describes such an epistemic state that does not correspond to any state of things and, consequently, may or should be changed. This happens in the appearing threat about the suicide ban, as to which Socrates observes the possibility of holding the opinion (*dokseien*) that it is nonsensical (*alogos*).<sup>20</sup> Meanwhile, *some* justification for it can be found, although in this particular case it is some enigmatic *aporretoi logoi*,<sup>21</sup> according to which it is

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*and of the Chronology of His Writings*, London–New York–Bombay 1897) discusses the *Phaedo* in the chapter *Origin of the Theory of Ideas*. One can also mention the opinion formulated by K. Dorter (*Plato's "Phaedo": An Interpretation*, Toronto–Buffalo–London 1982, p. 134) and J. Dalfen (*Kenneth Dorter's Interpretation of the "Phaedo"*, [in:] C.L. Griswold (ed.), *Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings*, University Park 2002, p. 215) that one of the permanent issues present in Plato's dialogues is the problem of the limits of knowledge. R.K. Sprague interprets the *Phaedo* as a protreptic (*Plato's "Phaedo" as Protreptic*, [in:] S. Stern-Gillet, K. Corrigan (eds.), *Reading Ancient Texts. Vol. I: Presocratics and Plato. Essays in Honour of Denis O'Brien*, Leiden–Boston 2008, pp. 125–133).

<sup>15</sup> It should be pointed out that in ancient Greek there are at least two philosophically important groups of notions with a similar, if not the same, meaning. The first one comprises the verb *dokeō*, the adjective *doksastikos* and the nouns *doksa*, *doksis*, *dokēma*, *doksasia*, *dok-sasma*, while the other – the verb *oiomai*, the adjective *oiētikos* and the nouns *oiēsis*, *oiēma*. To date it has not been examined whether the groups differ in meaning or whether they can be used as synonyms. Studies into the term *doksa* concentrate primarily on the late dialogues; cf. for instance J. Sprüte, *Der Begriff der Doxa in der platonischen Philosophie*, Göttingen 1962; E. Tielsch, *Die Platonischen Versionen der griechischen Doxalehre. Ein hilosophisches Lexicon mit Kommentar*, Meisenheim am Glan 1970.

<sup>16</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, 70b 2–4.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibidem*, 70b 9.

<sup>18</sup> Apart from the *Phaedo*, the verb is to be found in *Apology of Socrates* (39e 5), where Socrates uses it to explain and evaluate what happened on the day of the defence. As is known, the explanation also contains two hypotheses regarding what happens to humans after death. On the other hand, in the *Laws* (632e 3–5), it indicates a certain alleviation of the discipline (strictness) of the dispute, in this case – on virtues.

<sup>19</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, 70b 6–7.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*, 61b 1–2.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*, 62b 3. K. Dorter (*Plato's "Phaedo"...*, p. 19) identifies their sources as Orphic, while M. Miles ('Plato on Suicide (*Phaedo* 60c–63c)', *Phoenix* 55 (2001), p. 244) talks about the

against the law (divine law – *ou* [...] *themiton*),<sup>22</sup> i.e. it is not pious (*ou hosion*).<sup>23</sup> This is also how the reference by Socrates/Plato and Simmias to the figure of Evenus can be interpreted.<sup>24</sup> Simmias asked by Xanthippe's husband whether Evenus is a philosopher, answers that he is convinced about it (*dokei*).<sup>25</sup> Within the context of the discussion on the sense of the philosopher's dying and the concept of philosophy presented in the *Phaedo*, this conviction of Simmias should change, as Simmias himself admits that Evenus is not inclined (*hekōn*) to follow Socrates' solutions and advice. *Doksa* is treated similarly in the case of the body-soul relation, which relation may have an appropriate or an inappropriate nature. The other form consists in making the soul similar to or even in equating it with the body. This is because the body has at its disposal stimuli in the form of pleasure and pain (*hēdonē kai lupē*), which are so strong that they may make the soul to be convinced (*doksadzousa*) that what the body is saying is true. Equation at the level of convictions (*homodoksein*)<sup>26</sup> has consequences in making similar in terms of action (*homotropos*) and in terms of eating (*homotrophos*), i.e. – generally speaking – ceases to be a pure being.<sup>27</sup> Conviction proper, however, treats this issue entirely the other way round – a (full) truthfulness is connected with that which is divine and what is *adoksaston*.<sup>28</sup> Possession of *doksa* in the negative sense is also reserved for those who are deprived of upbringing (*apaideutos*).<sup>29</sup> Such a person does not deliberate, but disputes (*amphisbetein*), does not use *phronēsis*, but his only goal is to win a dispute (*philonikōs*) and to convince the public.<sup>30</sup>

A positive connotation of the term *doksa* appears when there is a reference to the genuine philosophizing (*gnēsios philosophoi*) (or those who are *orthos philo-*

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Pythagorean tradition. Taking into account the emphasis on the role of piety and divine law in Plato's *Apology of Socrates* (30c 9–d 1), the Socratean tradition may be added or one may say that this was Plato's own idea.

<sup>22</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, 61c 10.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, 62a 6.

<sup>24</sup> W. Nestle (*Vom Mythos zum Logos, die Selbstentfaltung des griechischen Denkens von Homer bis auf die Sophistik und Sokrates*, Stuttgart 1975, p. 420) thinks Evenus is a sophist, and so does C. Rowe ('Contre Platon: Philosophie et littérature dans le *Phédon*', [in:] M. Dixsaut (ed.), *Contre Platon*. vol. II: *Le Platonisme renversé*, Paris 1995, p. 278) interprets the mention of Evenus as a philosopher as irony, which is regarded as groundless by T. Ebert (Platon, *Phaidon*, T. Ebert (Übers. & Komm.), Göttingen 2004, p. 113).

<sup>25</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, 61c 6–7.

<sup>26</sup> The significance and strength of such an equation is attested by several other fragments of *Corpus Platonicum*. In the *Republic* (433c 6), *homodoksia* of those in power is one of the elements considered when evaluating *polis* and a characteristic of a prudent human soul, i.e. a soul in which two inferior soul powers are subordinated to the supreme power (*ibidem*, 442c 10–d 3). In the *Statesman* (310e), one of the tasks of the royal art is not to allow the separation of prudent characters (*sōphrona*) from brave characters (*andreioi*), but to bind them with, among other things, similar opinions (*homodoksiai, doksai*).

<sup>27</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, 84d 4–e 3.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibidem*, 84a 8.

<sup>29</sup> The lack of upbringing is also connected with the above-mentioned impurity, which can be seen in Plato's *Sophist* (320d 6–e 3), which results from a failure to succumb to the elenctic procedure. In the *Timaios* (86e 1–2), the lack of upbringing food (*apaideutos trophē*) is directly identified as the reason for becoming a bad person.

<sup>30</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, 91a.

*mathes*<sup>31</sup>). In a rhetorically very well thought out disquisition,<sup>32</sup> there is presented a conviction which such people necessarily should present, which talks about equating the body with evil, and the soul with that which is good, about attaining the truth only after separating with the body.<sup>33</sup> The really philosophizing (the really loving *phronēsis*) are convinced that *phronēsis* will only be achieved in Hades.<sup>34</sup>

At last one can mention two more characteristics which may be attributed to convictions and being convinced. The first characteristic is variability, which can be noticed in the disquisition devoted to misology, and which is not really about conviction, but about the subject condition of being convinced. According to Socrates, sometimes man happens to believe (*pisteusēi*)<sup>35</sup> some true *logos*, but because of the lack of the art of argumentation (*technē peri tous logous*), over time one can become convinced (*doksēi*) that it is false, regardless of whether it is indeed so.<sup>36</sup> Such a perspective is certainly connected with the above introduced division into two aspects of conviction that can now be at least partly equated with the truthfulness and untruthfulness of *doksa*. The other characteristic is a certain gradeability of conviction. Socrates/Plato does not exclusively care about being convinced about something – such a goal motivates those only interested in winning disputes. The objective is to have a conviction in the highest degree (*malista dokein*) that one has something somewhat. The way to increase the degree of conviction is reasoning (*logidzesthai*) of a hypothetical nature: if X happens to be true then it is a beautiful/good conviction, and if not – then one stays ignorant (*anoia*), which in turn is evil.<sup>37</sup>

Originally, the term *sophia* was used to refer to poets, clairvoyants – generally to those who disclose knowledge that is inaccessible to mortals and cannot be disclosed in any other way. Its subject matter is not technology as such, but gods, humans, society. Wise men (*sophistes*) include Homer and Hesiod, musicians, pre-sophist philosophers – some of whom, e.g. Xenophanes and Heraclitus, equate *sophia* with *aretē*<sup>38</sup> – and heroes of stories – Prometheus or Odysseus.<sup>39</sup> In Plato's

<sup>31</sup> In the *Republic* (376b 8–c 2; 581b 9), a science lover is equated with a wisdom lover, who desires the truth from the earliest years (*ibidem*, 485d 3–4), by nature insistently aspires to being (*to on*), to encompass its nature (*phusis*) by becoming such as what is really real (*to on ontōs*), and does not stop at individual beings, which are the subject of beliefs (*ibidem*, 490a 8–b 7).

<sup>32</sup> T. Ebert (*Phaidon*, p. 140) talks about a peculiar *confessio Pythagorica*, and as a parallel, quotes a fragment from Archytas, which is cited in Cicero's *Cato the Elder On Old Age*.

<sup>33</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, 66b–67b.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*, 68a–b.

<sup>35</sup> This perspective shows a difference between the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. In the latter dialogue, in the famous metaphor of the divided line (*Republic* 509d–511e), although belief constitutes a type of conviction, it does not relate to the sphere of *logos*, but the objects of the sensory world.

<sup>36</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, 90b 4–d 7.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibidem*, 90d 9–91b 3.

<sup>38</sup> DK 21 B 2; DK 22 B 112 (= fr. 23f Marcovich = fr. XXXII Kahn). S.D. Sullivan, *Psychological and Ethical Ideas: What Early Greeks Says*, Leiden–New York–Köln 1995, pp. 170–171; cf. C.J. Vamvacas, *The Founders of Western Thought – The Presocratics. A Diachronic Parallelism between Presocratic Thought and Philosophy and the Natural Science*, Dordrecht 2009, p. 115; P. Hadot, *Czym jest filozofia starożytna?*, tłum. P. Domański, Warszawa 1992, pp. 42–47 [English translation: *What is Ancient Philosophy*, transl. P. Chase, Harvard 2002].

<sup>39</sup> G.B. Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement*, p. 24.

dialogue *Phaedo*, it only appears on its own twice, but nearly 40 times in the compound *philosophia*. However, these two meanings appear to have a considerable significance for the issue in question.

It occurs for the first time in the fragment presenting the intellectual path of Socrates/Plato, who admits that when he was young, he desired wisdom referred to as *historia peri phuseos*.<sup>40</sup> The reason for his desire was the knowledge (*eidenai*) about the causes (*aitiai*) that were supposed to be answers to the questions why (*dia ti*) every individual thing came into existence, perished and was. The scope of that knowledge, as is known, was not limited to learning the rules, but other issues were also considered within it. Socrates provides their examples, e.g. the coming into being of living creatures or epistemological issues (perception, thinking). In the explanation of *peri phuseōs* there appears a position that may be described as physicalistic, and which tends to present relations between individual beings in the quantitative aspect. However, from the perspective of the issue of demarcation, the most important of Socrates'/Plato's confessions is the one that after he started such deliberations he became convinced that by nature he was incapable (*aphues*) of conducting them, because they led him to scepticism (he ceased to know what he had thought he knew [*ōimēn eidenai*]). As is known, even the recognition by Anaxagoras of the proper cause of everything, i.e. the mind, did not help, because apart from indicating the cause, the philosopher of Clazomenae did not use it in explaining all spheres and aspects of reality. Socrates/Plato regarded the absence of valuation deliberations and criteria on the basis of which those might appear as a major deficiency. In my opinion, this is an attempt at resolving the issue of demarcation; the question is whether in the external or internal aspect. I believe that *historia peri phuseōs*, in which all data are based on the senses and in which physicalistic explanation predominates, is excluded from the scope of knowledge. If such philosophizing encompassed the axiological aspects and assumptions resulting not only from sense perception, this would be knowledge *sensu stricto* – a true philosophy of nature. According to Socrates/Plato, this does not apply, however, to the concepts that arose before his deliberations.<sup>41</sup>

For the second time the term *sophia* appears in the deliberations on the concept of hypotheses.<sup>42</sup> As is known, Sokrates/Plato, discouraged by deliberations like *peri phuseōs historia*, began the so-called 'second flowing' (*deuteros plous*),<sup>43</sup> which is to consist in presenting the truth of beings (*alētheia tōn ontōn*), with

<sup>40</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, 96a–99d.

<sup>41</sup> R. Bolton (*Plato's Discovery of Metaphysics. The New Methodos of the "Phaedo"*, [in:] J. Gentzler (ed.), *Method in Ancient Philosophy*, Oxford 1998, pp. 91–111) argues that Socrates rejects outright the possibility of physics existing as a science, because the only possible science is metaphysics; cf. H. Wagner, *Platos "Phaedo" und der Beginn der Metaphysik als Wissenschaft ("Phaedo" 99d–107b)*, [in:] F. Kaulbach, J. Ritter (hrsg.), *Kritik und Metaphysik. Studien. Heinz Heimsoeth zum achtzigsten Geburtstag*, Berlin 1966, pp. 363–382.

<sup>42</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, 99d.

<sup>43</sup> For more on this cf. e.g. D.L. Ross, 'The *deuteros plous*, Simmias' Speech, and Socrates' Answer to Cebes', *Hermes* 110 (1982), pp. 19–25; S.M. Tempesta, *Sul significato di deuteros plous nel "Fedone" di Platone*, [in:] M. Bonazzi, F. Trabattoni (cur.), *Platone e la tradizione platonica. Studi di filosofia antica*, Milano 2003, pp. 89–125.

the use of arguments (*logoi*).<sup>44</sup> This is how he found his own method, which – generally speaking – consists in:

1) assuming *logos* regarding a problem which is the strongest and recognizing something as to which one is convinced that it agrees with such *logos* (*sumphonein*) as true, and that which does not agree – as untrue;<sup>45</sup>

2) checking whether the theorems resulting from such a hypothesis mutually agree or disagree;<sup>46</sup>

3) in order to substantiate such a hypothesis later, another one, which is higher (*anōthen*) and the best (*beltistē*) is proposed, and so on, until there is obtained a hypothesis that is the most general and sufficient (*hikanos*)<sup>47</sup> for substantiating all the other ones.<sup>48</sup>

At the same time, Socrates/Plato warns against dialectic consideration of the very principle-hypothesis together with its consequences. This procedure is not followed by antilogicians, and this is because of their own wisdom; however, it should be complied with by philosophers.<sup>49</sup> Such a behaviour of antilogicians is justified by their views on things and *logos*. Earlier,<sup>50</sup> Socrates demonstrated that according to antilogicians there is nothing logical or certain in either sphere (*ouden hugies oude bebaion*), because everything is subject to constant change. Thus, for the second time, we have the issue of demarcation expressed – this time, between antilogic and philosophy; the question arises, however, whether in the external or internal aspect. Of key importance to the resolution of this issue is – in my opinion – the designation by the *Phaedo*'s author of the ontological-and-gnoseological concept which lies at the base of antilogicians' intellectual position, with the term *atechnōs*, i.e. 'against art'. I believe that the designation indicates external demarcation, ruling out antilogical wisdom from the sphere of knowledge. This happens not only because of the ontological position referred to above, but probably also because they use the juxtaposition truth-falsehood, however treating

<sup>44</sup> Socrates adds the reservation that a study of beings in *logoi* does not consist more in studying them in images than in action (*erga*). In this case, most probably we do not have to do with a traditional juxtaposition of theory and practice, but action refers to the operation of the senses; cf. P. Thanassas, 'Logos and Forms in *Phaedo* 96a–102a', *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 8 (2003), p. 9.

<sup>45</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, 100a 3–7.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibidem*, 101d 3–5.

<sup>47</sup> Obviously, the question might arise whether objectively or subjectively, especially in the context of the later mention of the method of hypotheses (*Phaedo*, 107b): "You are not only right to say this, Simmias, Socrates said, but our first hypotheses require clearer examination, even though we find them convincing. An if you analyze them adequately, you will, I think, follow the argument as far as a man can and if conclusion is clear, you will look no further" (translated by G.M.A. Grube, [in:] Plato, *Complete Works*, J.M. Cooper (ed.), Indianapolis–Cambridge 1997). It seems that the (inter)subjective aspect of sufficiency is emphasized here. For more on the method of hypotheses in the *Phaedo* cf. e.g. J.T. Bedu-Addo, 'The Role of the Hypothetical Method in the *Phaedo*', *Phronesis* 24 (1979), pp. 111–132; Y. Kanayama, 'The Methodology of the Second Voyage and the Proof of the Soul's Indestructibility in Plato's *Phaedo*', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 18 (2000), pp. 41–100.

<sup>48</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, 101d 6–e 1.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibidem*, 101d–e.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibidem*, 90b–c.

these notions interchangeably – the same can be true in one case and false in another case.<sup>51</sup> This does not mean, however, that antilogic must be entirely devoid of values, because although Plato “has a low opinion of antilogic as a style of philosophical debate, he does not suppose that its practice establishes that its practitioner is therefore a sophist. It is not in itself dishonest or directed to deceive”.<sup>52</sup>

As indicated by the above deliberations, both considerations of *peri phuseos* type and antilogical deliberations are excluded from the scope of wisdom or knowledge. It remains to be examined what falls within the scope of the term *epistēmē*.

For the first time, the term appears in the *Phaedo* when the argument from anamnesis is presented.<sup>53</sup> Knowledge together with *orthos logos* are located (*enousa*) in man, thanks to which man can answer properly asked questions (e.g. about geometrical figures<sup>54</sup>). Thus, knowledge is created by reminding and as such can be equated with reminding. Generally speaking, Socrates’/Plato’s deliberations enable us to determine that such knowledge is internally differentiated and the criterion for the differentiation may constitute the object to which the knowledge relates (‘a different knowledge about man and about a lyre’), and/or time (a reminder means perception of something earlier). The scopes of different domains of knowledge can be independent (man-lyre) or co-dependent on one another (Simmias-drawn Simmias). Sense perception is not a source of knowledge, because together with it only recognition (*gnōsis*) is created, and Socrates/Plato regards the general object (e.g. man, equality) as the proper object of knowledge; such general object can be compared with a sensory object and also reveal some deficiency in the latter.

However, it seems that apart from this type of knowledge, some other, inferior type of knowledge is allowed to exist, if one assumes that apart from a reminder *sensu stricto*, there is also anamnesis *sensu largo*. This is how one can interpret at least one example given in the *Phaedo*, which is said not to meet the requirements imposed on a correctly proceeding anamnestic process.<sup>55</sup> It is about Simmias’ reminder from his image. In this case, there occurs at a certain time interval first a sensory recognition of the sensory characteristics whose combination is referred to as ‘Simmias’, and then the recognition of a similar combination of characteristics reproduced in the image. Because even then the similarity has no character of identity, and so in perception one notices the difference between that which is perceived and that which is reminded (the difference between the image and the painted object). As a result of the other recognition there occurs a reminder,

<sup>51</sup> It is interesting that *pseudēs* appears in the *Phaedo* only once (90b 8).

<sup>52</sup> G.B. Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement*, Cambridge 1981, p. 61.

<sup>53</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, 73a–d.

<sup>54</sup> It is in the area of geometry that the concept of anamnesis is presented in Plato’s *Meno* (80d–86c); for more on this cf. e.g. R.E. Allen, ‘Anamnesis in Plato’s *Meno* and *Phaedo*’, *Review of Metaphysics* 13 (1959–1960), pp. 165–174; S.-I. Lee, *Anamnesis im “Menon” Platons Überlegungen zu Möglichkeit und Methode eines den Ideen gemäßen Wissenerwerbes*, Frankfurt am Main–Berlin–Bern–Bruxelles–New York–Oxford–Wien 2001.

<sup>55</sup> J.L. Ackrill, *Anamnesis in the “Phaedo”*: *Remarks on 73c–75c*, [in:] J.L. Ackrill, *Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, Oxford 1997, p. 22.

which according to the general postulate has the nature of knowledge, although it does not meet the condition of anamnesis *sensu stricto*, i.e. the falling within another scope of knowledge (*heteron ennoēsē hou mē hē autē epistēmē all' allē*<sup>56</sup>). Perhaps this type of knowledge includes for instance the ability to give poison to those sentenced to death (Socrates refers to that who is to give him poison as *epistemon*<sup>57</sup>). Another condition imposed on knowledge, namely its substantiation (*logon dounai*),<sup>58</sup> would apply to both types of knowledge, and obviously such substantiation will be of an entirely different character. In the case of anamnesis *sensu stricto*, the substantiation consists in the existence in the soul/memory of general concepts that are to be present in it all the time, and were forgotten upon incarnation and have to be brought back from oblivion. In the case of anamnesis *sensu largo*, however, the substantiation only consists in a number of earlier recognitions of the objects of sense perceptions and in an 'external' similarity between the object and the reproduction. If the above analysis is correct, then we have to do with internal demarcation, according to which knowledge is divided into that which is based on the general and that which is based on sensory experience.

With the knowledge of the first type the last concept I would like to consider, is connected. The concept is *phronēsis*. It is usually translated as 'wisdom'<sup>59</sup> or 'thinking'.<sup>60</sup> Before the *Phaedo*, it seems to function above all as a concept from the realm of ethics, which has not become well grounded in the ontological concept. It consists in knowing that which is good and which drives man's actions in such a way that he achieves happiness. This is obstructed by mistaken convictions, which should be overcome by using the elenctic approach.<sup>61</sup> In the *Phaedo*, its slightly different status is clearly seen. On the one hand, it is present in the soul in the form of general concepts, which is proved by an argument from anamnesis,<sup>62</sup> and, on the other hand, already after another incarnation, the soul has to acquire – or rather recover – it together with the truth, which it does by such activities as *dianoesthai* or *logismos*.<sup>63</sup> Full recovery is only possible if the soul is entirely separated from the corporeal factor – then the soul itself encompasses in thought that among beings which is in itself (*hoti an noēsēi autē kath' hautēn auto kath' hauto tōn ontōn*).<sup>64</sup>

<sup>56</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, 73c 8.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibidem*, 117a.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibidem*, 76d.

<sup>59</sup> So e.g. R. Legutko (Platon, *Fedon*, Kraków 1995) and G.M.A. Grube (Plato, *Phaedo*, [in:] Plato, *Complete Works*).

<sup>60</sup> Platon, *Phédon*, trad. L. Robin, [in:] Platon, *Ouvres complètes*, t. IV 1, Paris 1965. W. Witwicki (Platon, *Fedon*, [in:] Platon, *Dialogi*, Warszawa 1993) translates *phronēsis* as *poznanie*, while T. Ebert (Platon, *Phaidon*) as *Einsicht*.

<sup>61</sup> B. Rosenstock, *From Counter-Rhetoric to Askesis: How the "Phaedo" Rewrites the "Gorgias"*, [in:] B.D. Schildgen (ed.), *The Rhetoric Canon*, Detroit 1997, p. 85.

<sup>62</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, 76c.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibidem*, 65e 6–66a 8.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibidem*, 83b 1–2.

Another aspect of *phronēsis* noticeable in the *Phaedo* is its ethical dimension. It comes to the fore above all in the monetary exchange metaphor.<sup>65</sup> It is the very *phronēsis* that is the right means/measure (*orthos nomisma*) of a rightly made change (*orthē allagē*) aimed at achieving virtue (*aretē*). As a means/measure, it becomes a criterion in obtaining or realizing (buying) or giving, in the realizing in somebody else (selling) of individual true virtues (*alēthēs aretē*): valour, moderation, justice. Within the context of the above-mentioned deliberations concerning the way of conduct of antilogicians (although in the very dialogue they are mentioned later), it seems important that *phronēsis* constitutes a criterion external in relation to obtained or given virtues, because if somebody wants to realize a virtue without having such an external measure at their disposal, and only possessing an immanent criterion, he cannot justify rationally why he for instance prefers a given fit of passion to another one or a fit of passion with a higher intensity to another one with a lower intensity. And even if such a person seems to practise one of virtues thanks to their conduct, such conduct and such a virtue have a nature of a certain fiction (*skiagraphia*)<sup>66</sup> – something slavish, unhealthy and untrue. Plato recognizes then that there are two types of virtues, and the virtues of non-philosophers do not really deserve the denomination, as they are not substantiated in *phronēsis*. What is more, they do not meet another important condition that is imposed on the virtues and the very *phronēsis* – namely, the being of that which purifies (*katharsis, katharmos*).

In the *Phaedo* there also comes to the fore the peculiar attitude that is present in man when he becomes a philosopher, and which will be so strongly emphasized in the *Symposium*. It is about a philosopher as a lover, although not a lover of wisdom (*sophia*), because such wisdom has turned out not to be it, but a lover of (*erastēs*) *phronēsis*. A lover is above all aware that he will fully achieve the object of his love only after he dies.<sup>67</sup>

I would venture a thesis that *phronēsis* perceived as a certain type of wisdom replaces – in Plato's philosophical construction – the traditional *sophia*, both as regards the theoretical aspect and the practical-and-moral aspect. As such, it is the objective of human cognitive aspirations, and together with *epistēmē sensu stricto* it constitutes the gnoseological postulate, according to which there exists knowledge/wisdom, although it is not fully achievable during our intellectual activity as long as we are alive. Perhaps it is the best hypothesis because of which other hypotheses are worth considering, e.g. that whether the soul is immortal.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibidem*, 89a 6–89e 5. The fragment with the metaphor of the exchanging has been subject to numerous interpretations, the older ones of which are presented e.g. by J.V. Luce ('A Discussion of *Phaedo* 69a 6–c 2', *Classical Quarterly* 38 (1944), pp. 60–64; cf. also R. Weiss, 'The Right Exchange: *Phaedo* 69a 6–c 3', *Ancient Philosophy* 7 (1987), pp. 57–66; R. Legutko, *Komentarz*, [w:] Platon, *Fedon*, pp. 83–85; T. Ebert, *Kommentar*, [in:] Platon, *Phaidon*, pp. 148–149.

<sup>66</sup> *Skiagraphia* refers to the chiaroscuro or perspective method of painting, which is associated with the metaphoric meaning of 'illusion'. In this last meaning, it also occurs in the *Republic* (*skiagraphia aretēs* – 365c 4; *skiagraphia epithemenē goēteias* – 602d 2), while already in the *Theaetetus* it reflects a certain distance, thanks to which we can see something more clearly (208e 7–10).

<sup>67</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, 66e 2–4; 67e 6–68a 3.

Apart from determining that it is the highest value, it is difficult to establish whether it constitutes it on its own or together with other virtues, and what its relation to pleasure is, if one assumes that it is only juxtaposed with carnal pleasures.<sup>68</sup>

One can conclude, then, that most probably during the writing of the *Phaedo*, knowledge in the strict sense, based on a being in itself, is only a postulate, a kind of project, because Socrates/Plato seems to present it in the conditional: if there really is some true, reliable and cognizable *logos* (i.e. justification) (*ei ontos dē tinos alēthous kai bebaiou logou kai dumatou katanoēsai*), then we have access to the knowledge and the truth about the beings.<sup>69</sup> Similarly, the disquisition on the immortality of the human soul is also accepted conditionally (*eikos*). The status of the very hypothetical method is also not entirely clear. We learn when following the autobiographical disquisition in the dialogue that having become fascinated with *peri phuseōs*-type study, Socrates/Plato was convinced that it is wonderful to know the causes of all things.<sup>70</sup> The disappointment with this type of explanation may have been alleviated by Anaxagoras' concept, because once again Socrates/Plato came to believe<sup>71</sup> that this philosophy would provide answers to his doubts. Again, he was disappointed. He took more effort then, turned his attention to another sphere and again came to believe<sup>72</sup> that he should make use of *logos*. All three attempts are described as something that took place, but are no longer (*aoristus* is used there). Thus, it is not known for certain what philosophical position Socrates/Plato represented while recounting his philosophical way – whether he had rejected the hypothetical method or whether he was using it to continue his philosophical search. The hypothetical nature of the deliberations is also attested to by the frequency of use of terms expressing doubt, above all probability (*eikos*), which is not always translated correctly. Knowledge is then a distinguished area of *doksa*, which can also encompass an improved (if such a version existed) version of knowledge *peri phuseōs*, which would anyway be a knowledge with a status inferior to that based on *logos*. Within *doksa*, and beyond *epistēmē*, a number of various views would function, such as the traditional explanation of *peri phuseōs*, untrue views of the virtue or the concept of antilogicians.

<sup>68</sup> J.C.B. Gosling, C.C.W. Taylor, 'The Hedonic Calculus in the *Protagoras* and the *Phaedo*: a Reply', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 28 (1990), pp. 115–116.

<sup>69</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, 90c 8–d 7.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibidem*, 96a 8–9.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibidem*, 97c 3.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibidem*, 99e 4.