The unity of human personhood in Kant’s philosophical system is not incompatible with a belief in the duality of human nature, nor with an appreciation of the fragmented nature of our empirical existence. Kant portrays human beings as belonging simultaneously to both the phenomenal and the noumenal “worlds,” as being causally determined by events in the natural world that we cannot control, yet having the spontaneous power to initiate freely chosen actions that constitute a moral world. Likewise, he makes numerous finer distinctions between various types or aspects of human character or personality throughout the three Critiques as well as in his minor writings, lectures, and notes. As demonstrated by the foregoing articles, selected from the essays presented at the “Kant in Asia” conference held at Hong Kong Baptist University, May 20–23, 2009, we find in each Critique and throughout Kant’s writings a sometimes mesmerizing array of distinctions regarding our nature as human beings; yet, each Critique is united by its focus on one of three central questions: “1. What can I know? 2. What should I do? 3. What may I hope?” Moreover, these questions are themselves united by a fourth question that combines the other three: “What is man?”—a deceptively simple question that seems to call for one, all-encompassing answer.

Kant’s clue as to how we can, paradoxically, both believe in the fundamental unity of human personhood and acknowledge the seemingly endless “aggregate” of unorganized facts that characterizes our human nature is that Critical philosophers must employ a special kind of reasoning he calls “architectonic.” My purpose in this article is not to describe how architectonic reasoning manifests itself in all Kant’s intricate theories of human personhood—that task was effectively

STEPHEN R. PALMQUIST, Professor, Department of Religion and Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist University. Specialties: Kant studies, philosophy of religion, logic of symbolism. E-mail: stevepq@hkbu.edu.hk

Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38:4 (December 2011) 569–583
© 2011 Journal of Chinese Philosophy
fulfilled by the many insightful papers presented at the conference and aptly represented by the small selection contained in this collection. Rather, after discussing Kant’s special, architectonic approach to philosophical reasoning and its systematic relation to the twelve categories, I shall suggest that, provided we recognize the role of the questioner’s interpretation to be more important than any presumed “predictive” function, the same approach can be found, in its essential nature though not in its detailed out-working, in the oldest and arguably the most influential of all Chinese classics, the *Yijing* 《易經》.

Architectonic reasoning, as I understand Kant’s term, refers to what is more often nowadays referred to as “constructive” reasoning. The main difference between these terms lies in the different metaphor implied in each: While “constructive” suggests that we make a theory (or perhaps, knowledge itself or some aspect of it) in the way a construction worker builds a building, “architectonic” suggests that we impose a plan onto the raw material that constitutes our theories (or, again, knowledge itself) in the way an architect plans a project before the builders begin to work on it. Whereas constructivist approaches are often opposed to approaches that emphasize our “receptivity” to an independently existing reality, Kant opposes the unity obtained by starting with an architectonic plan to the diversity obtained by starting with the “aggregate” of facts received from the world’s input. That these two sets of metaphorical distinctions are essentially the same is evidenced by the fact that Kant himself often uses metaphors of construction in the course of applying his architectonic approach: Both metaphors distinguish between seeking a unified understanding by imposing predetermined assumptions onto one’s subject matter and welcoming diversity by attempting to allow one’s subject matter to speak for itself. My thesis in what follows will be that both Kant and the *Yijing* rely first and foremost on architectonic reasoning and that a proper interpretation of each requires the reader to take this approach seriously; this alone can safeguard Kantian philosophy from being rejected as an untenable apriorism and the *Yijing* from being rejected as mere divination. If I am correct, then the “Chinaman of Konigsberg”³ was even more authentically Chinese than either he or Nietzsche realized.

II. The Dao, the Yijing, and Kant’s Architectonic

While the *Yijing* (the Book of Changes) is primarily a set of commentaries, their focus is on interpreting the set of sixty-four unique hexagrams, or *gua*, that can be constructed out of combining six lines that are either broken or unbroken. Because each line can appear in
only these two forms and each component of the system contains exactly six such lines, the sixty-four gua represent all possible permutations of any system exhibiting this logical form. This is true for the simple, mathematical reason that \(2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2\) (i.e., \(2^6\)) equals 64.\(^4\) The Chinese classic interprets each gua as a symbol representing a certain human situation or type of situation based on its unique arrangement of broken and unbroken lines. Those who use the Yijing as a guideline for decision making (or, more crassly, as a tool for divining the future) adopt this set of sixty-four logical relations as an a priori framework: a random process is used to select one of the sixty-four gua, a choice that contains within it a change to a second gua, and the interpreter then views the pair as a symbolic representation of the change being exhibited by some situation they wish to understand more fully. Mastering the Yijing requires one to learn the nuances of 4,096 (i.e., \(64 \times 64\)) mathematically possible types of situational change generated by the logic of this system. Although I am far from being an expert on this system, I shall illustrate near the end of this article how such applications might operate as an architectonic guideline for interpreting practical human situations.

An intriguing feature of this ancient framework for interpreting human experience is that it all arises from a fundamental unity, the Dao (though the Dao paradoxically also underlies the very distinction between unity and diversity). As expressed in the well-known lines from section 42 of Lao Zi’s Dao De Jing:\(^5\)

\[\text{DAO generates the One} \]
\[\text{The One generates the Two} \]
\[\text{The Two generates the Three} \]
\[\text{The Three generates all things.} \]

Reading these lines in connection with their roots in the Yijing provides an excellent expression of the book’s underlying assumption, that unity and diversity are not necessarily incompatible concepts but can work together to elucidate how we experience human life as a coherent whole.

This well-known passage has some interesting implications for the question of how the unity of human personhood can coexist with the diversity of life as we experience it; but what has any of this to do with Kant? It has to do with Kant because he famously (or by some accounts, infamously) insists that philosophers ought not interpret the world in the manner of Aristotle, by merely collecting data from our observations of the world and inductively classifying these according to some likely set of conclusions, but should rather impose order onto our subject matter through a predetermined principle of division that we give to the system of concepts we employ.\(^6\) The Dao on its own is
a name for undifferentiated wholeness, not unlike Kant’s “thing in itself.” We come to know it as “one,” “two,” “three,” and eventually “all things,” only by imposing our mental categorizations (the sixty-four gua, in classical Chinese traditions) onto it. This—dare I say?—Kantian aspect of philosophical Daoism might go unnoticed if we interpret it apart from its relation to the Yijing. Likewise, Kant’s unified answer to the “What is man?” question is likely to remain obscure if we do not recognize how his table of twelve categories originates as a presupposition of architectonic reasoning. Let us therefore look first at chapter 3 of CPR’s Transcendental Doctrine of Method, where Kant explains what he means by “architectonic,” then examine how he provides early hints concerning this important philosophical method in the untitled introductory section of chapter 1 of the Transcendental Analytic, where he explicitly refers to the “clue” that leads to the discovery of the categories.

Chapter 3 of Kant’s System of Perspectives exhibits the detailed, multilayered structure of Kant’s so-called “architectonic plan” for constructing his philosophical system; the book’s remaining chapters argue that commentators who misunderstand and prematurely reject Kant’s theories typically do so because they fail to appreciate how his various arguments contribute to this plan as a whole. Appendix III.2 of the sequel, Kant’s Critical Religion, offers a detailed response to a subsequent criticism of the former volume’s alleged misunderstanding of Kant’s use of the term “architectonic,” presenting in the process a more explicit account of what Kant means by this key term. Without repeating all the details, the following section summarizes the key features of Kant’s position that appear more fully in those two studies.

### III. Summary of Kant’s Account of Architectonic

Kant begins the Architectonic chapter with this intriguing definition: “By an architectonic, I understand the art of systems. Since systematic unity is that which first makes ordinary cognition into science, i.e., makes a system out of a mere aggregate of it, architectonic is the doctrine of that which is scientific in our cognition in general.” Here we see Kant connecting architectonic with system making, apparently hinting at a metaphor between the roles of the architect and the philosopher. Just as an architect’s job is to design or “make the plan” for a building, the architectonic philosopher’s task is to make systems by imposing order onto the “mere aggregate” (i.e., the unorganized data) that otherwise characterizes our experience of the empirical world. Perhaps the most intriguing aspect suggested by this passage is
that Kant calls architectonic an “art,” even though it is at the same time, somewhat paradoxically, the formal factor that makes a body of knowledge scientific. He then adds that reason prescribes laws that unify “the manifold cognitions under one idea.” This idea, he tells us, is “the rational concept of the form of a whole” that determines both “the domain of the manifold” and “the positions of the parts with respect to each other.” That is, the task of architectonic reasoning is to determine the relation between the otherwise unrelated parts of a system’s logical form.

Two sentences later, Kant again emphasizes this relational aspect. Apparently, he had an architectonic reason for placing this chapter third in the Doctrine of Method: it fulfills a function that corresponds to the category of relation in his Table of Categories. As I argued in chapter 7 of *Kant’s System of Perspectives*, the component of the Doctrine of Elements that functions as the architectonic structuring plan is the categories, applied in the schematized form of the principles of pure understanding. Here in the Doctrine of Method, Kant therefore appears to be alluding to a necessary connection between the formal structure of the categories and that of all architectonic reasoning. If this interpretation is accurate, then why did Kant not simply come out and state that architectonic reasoning uses the table of categories (or its predecessor, the table of the logical forms of judgment in thought) to impose systematic patterns onto our thought processes? The reason, I believe, is bound up with Kant’s strategy in dividing the main text of the Critiques into “Doctrine of Elements” and “Doctrine of Method” sections. In each Critique with this division, the two sections are meant to be independent of each other, in the sense that they work toward the same goal but from opposite perspectives: content first, then form. No chapter in the Doctrine of Method appeals directly to the results of the Doctrine of Elements, nor vice versa; rather, each reveals in different ways reason’s need for just the sort of thing the foregoing Doctrine of Elements has provided. To connect architectonic in chapter 3 of the Doctrine of Method too explicitly with the $4 \times 3 = 12$ pattern determined by the categories in the Doctrine of Elements would have been to beg the question he was attempting to answer. To name the categories or even their numerical structure would have been to focus on the content of the preferred architectonic plan; but Kant’s focus in the Doctrine of Method is on the proper form of philosophical reasoning, a form that could be different for different philosophers.

The second paragraph of the Architectonic chapter also states that the purpose of imposing onto the aggregate of our knowledge an idea that relates the parts to each other within a whole is to “support and
advance [reason’s] essential ends.” Kant, unfortunately, does not explain what he means by this phrase. However, the remainder of the paragraph suggests he is thinking here of reason’s ultimate goal, the unification of all knowledge; for he claims this prescriptive function of reason (i.e., reason’s architectonic unity) “allows the absence of any part to be noticed in our knowledge of the rest,” so that “there can be no contingent addition ... that does not have its boundaries determined a priori,” thus guaranteeing the completeness of the system being constructed. In the Doctrine of Elements, the only tool Kant develops for achieving such lofty aims is his choice to pattern his systematic divisions on the formal structure established by the tables of categories and logical functions. Perhaps hinting at his own earlier usage, he concludes this paragraph of the Doctrine of Method by comparing a rational system’s potential to “grow internally ... but not externally” (i.e., to be “articulated” rather than “heaped together”) to that of “an animal body.” This metaphor is easily understood as referring to Kant’s conviction that, when constructing a table of categories in reference to any set of conceptual relations, we must resist the temptation to add a single new member (e.g., 4 + 1 = 5), for this destroys the logical unity of the conceptual relations under consideration. Instead, we must account for any new members by making further internal divisions, just as Kant does when he breaks down each category into three “moments” (4 × 3 = 12).

The third paragraph contains the next two references to “architectonic.” It begins by distinguishing between two ways of relating a schema and an idea. Viewed empirically, the schema presents the manifold of knowledge to us independently of any unifying idea, whereas from reason’s a priori perspective, the schema “arises only in consequence of an idea ... and does not await them empirically.” The latter alone, Kant states, “grounds architectonic unity.” One of the main differences between these two forms of relation is that when viewing the schema “empirically,” we cannot know the “number [of its aims] ... in advance”; but science requires certainty in its distinctions and so must impose them a priori—that is, “architectonically, for the sake of its affinity and its derivation from a single supreme and inner end.” This passage provides clear evidence that the a priori unity imposed on the aggregate by reason’s architectonic art has to do with the 4 × 3 = 12 pattern of the categories. For Kant’s point is precisely that reason’s architectonic form (as revealed in the categories) enables us to do what would be impossible if we were to use a merely empirical method: to determine the appropriate number that composes any given set of concepts. Reason’s ability to discern the pattern in advance is the source of the affinity of the manifold’s parts in an architectonic system.
The fourth paragraph warns the reader that, although the founder of every new science bases it on an idea, the initial attempt to schematize that idea “seldom corresponds to the idea; for this idea lies in reason like a seed.”\textsuperscript{17} As a result, Kant encourages us to be willing to go beyond the descriptions given by the founders and first proponents of any new science, for they “often fumble around with an idea that they have not even made distinct to themselves”; our focus should instead be on the idea and its grounding in reason. This accords well with the articulation of the logical structure of the architectonic form of Kant’s System, given in chapter 3 of \textit{Kant’s System of Perspectives}. If Kant is to avoid being hypocritical, he would have to confess that he, too, like the founder of any new science, had only a vague grasp of the “idea of the whole” that brought unity and completeness to his System of transcendental philosophy. (My goal in \textit{Kant’s System of Perspectives} was to apply this advice of Kant’s to the task of interpreting the architectonic structure of his own System.)

The next three occurrences of “architectonic(ally),” coming in the fifth paragraph of chapter 3, do not tell us anything fundamentally new about Kant’s understanding of the term. The paragraph begins by lamenting that systems are typically constructed initially as aggregates and that “only after we have long collected relevant cognitions haphazardly like building materials” does it first become “possible for us to glimpse the idea in a clearer light and to outline a whole architectonically, in accordance with the ends of reason.”\textsuperscript{18} (The fact that Kant made essentially the same point in the so-called Metaphysical Deduction,\textsuperscript{19} in criticizing Aristotle’s method of collecting categories, provides clear evidence that the table of categories is Kant’s most complete expression of the formal structure he prefers when employing architectonic reasoning.) After likening the development of aggregate systems to the work of “maggots,”\textsuperscript{20} he claims that “so much material has already been collected” in relation to human cognition that giving “an architectonic to all human knowledge...would not only be possible but would not even be very difficult.” He then says the remainder of the chapter will merely outline “the architectonic of all cognition from \textit{pure reason}.”

From this point, much of chapter 3 consists of a series of twofold divisions of reason and/or philosophy, intended to provide the reader with a bird’s eye view of the architectonic form of transcendental philosophy. We can skip over the details of Kant’s exposition, not only because the various divisions appear at times to be somewhat incompatible with each other, but also because they are advanced as \textit{examples} of architectonic divisions, not as further explications of the meaning of the term as such. Instead of recounting the details of each division, we can pass on to Kant’s final use of “architectonic” in the
first Critique. Six paragraphs before the end of chapter 3, immediately after summarizing “the entire system of metaphysics” in terms of “four main parts,” Kant reaffirms several aspects of the meaning of “architectonic” that I am defending here: “The original idea of a philosophy of pure reason itself prescribes this division; it is therefore **architectonic**, in conformity with its essential ends . . . ; and for that very reason [this division] is unchangeable and legislative.” Here, again, this term entails that reason has prescribed a division (i.e., \(4 \div 2 = 2\) “in conformity with its essential ends;” because it conforms to reason’s ends (i.e., to the categories applied in the principles, as we shall see below), this division can be regarded as authoritative and “unchangeable.”

Without looking any further into the details of the Doctrine of Method’s Architectonic chapter, let us turn to the Doctrine of Elements, to chapter 1 of the Transcendental Analytic, where Kant first introduces his perplexing “clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding.” In the short (untitled) introductory section, Kant explicitly compares the “mechanical” method of attempting to find completeness among the manifold concepts that arise out of our observations of the world with the special method adopted by the transcendental philosopher. The former method is the one Aristotle used to gather and present his list of categories; such “concepts that are discovered only as the opportunity arises will not reveal any order and systematic unity, but will rather be ordered in pairs only according to similarities . . . , from the simple to the more composite.” By contrast, the latter “has the advantage but also the obligation to seek its concepts in accordance with a principle”; Kant thus adopts this approach to produce a table of categories consisting of concepts that “spring pure and unmixed, out of the understanding, as absolute unity.” The resulting table illustrates the correct procedure for architectonic philosophizing, while that procedure constitutes the “clue” to understanding why Kant thinks the twelfold table of categories is complete in the form he presents it. Adopting such a predetermined, architectonic plan is the only way to avoid a situation where the choice of basic concepts depends merely “upon whim or chance.”

**IV. Consulting the Yijing for Architectonic Insights**

While Kant’s \(4 \times 3 = 12\) table of categories seems to exhibit a rather different form from the Yijing’s 26, the relationship between their form and their applications in specific empirical situations can be regarded as parallel. I shall therefore conclude with some further
reflections on the *Yijing*, based on an experimental application of the latter to the main thesis advanced in this article, that the unity of the *Yijing* is based on a predetermined, *architectonic* form in the same way that Kant’s table of categories is. At the risk of appearing foolish to any interpreters who are not yet convinced that one must take into account Kant’s belief in the architectonic nature of correct philosophical reasoning, if we are to interpret his philosophical doctrines accurately, I shall treat the *Yijing* as itself offering us an architectonic plan of its own and will “ask” it a specific question about the unity of architectonic reasoning. By randomly selecting a pair of *gua* in the manner mentioned in section II of this article, I hope to shed further light on the usefulness of architectonic reasoning.

An interesting characteristic about the *Yijing* is that it appears to be based on chance. For example, at 3 a.m. on the night before the “Kant in Asia” conference began, I used sixteen colored marbles to select one of the sixty-four *gua*, while thinking about the following question: “What is the likely result of an attempt to connect Kant’s theory of the unity of architectonic reasoning, as manifested in his table of categories, with the formal structure of the *Yijing*?” The immediate outcome of my little experiment was, indeed, random in the sense that my choice of marbles could have led to the selection of any two of the sixty-four possible *gua*. One might argue that this is so different from Kantian architectonic as to be totally irrelevant. But wait. Kantian categories do not remove the randomness and contingencies of our day-to-day experience; nevertheless, they still help us understand how the diversity of empirical knowledge can be unified. Should we not give the *Yijing* an equal chance to accomplish the same goal?

My choice of marbles ended up presenting me with *gua* 21, changing into *gua* 38. Number 21 is called “biting through” (*shi ke* 嚇嗑); it shows an open mouth with an obstruction. The maxim for this *gua* reads: “Energetic biting through overcomes the obstacle that prevents joining of the lips.” This suggests that the attempt to reconcile the opposing points of view (of Kant and the *Yijing*—and ultimately, of Kant and Asian philosophy) is possible but will require hard work. This first *gua* represents the situation I, the asker, had come from: during the several months prior to the conference, I had found the need, as Convener, to “bite through” several obstacles. Significantly, the second *gua* (number 38) is called “Opposition” (*kui* 臘). While this may appear to be not very auspicious, we should not make such an assumption too hastily. At one level, it seems almost as if the message conveyed by this *gua* ended up predicting the future: after the conference, a colleague whose preferences I had “bitten through” opposed me so strongly that he lodged a formal complaint. However, the question I asked the *Yijing* was not personal; so let us instead
consider the following, deeply Kantian message that happens to be conveyed by the commentary on gua 38:

In general, opposition appears as an obstruction, but when it represents polarity within a comprehensive whole, it has also its useful and important functions. The oppositions of heaven and earth, spirit and nature, man and woman, when reconciled, bring about the creation and reproduction of life. In the world of visible things, the principle of opposites makes possible the differentiation by categories through which order is brought into the world.29

Just how different is this use of architectonic reasoning from that adopted by Kant? They are obviously not exactly the same. But we should not expect them to be identical, given that the Yijing predates Kant by several thousand years. Kant’s employment of the categories served as a transcendental basis for understanding the modern scientific and religious worldview (see endnote 27). The Yijing did (and does) nothing of the kind, for empirical science was (at best) in its infancy (if not still in its period of gestation) when the system of sixty-four gua was first conceived. Nevertheless, it does exemplify a method of thinking that is remarkably similar to Kant’s. Kant’s predetermined divisions in philosophy (especially the categories) lead us into insights about science and religion, just as the random selection of a pair of gua, when interpreted as a predetermined set of symbols describing $64 \times 64$ life situations, can lead us into remarkable insights about how to understand any given life situation.

In the wake of this (arguably successful) experiment, I performed a second experiment while compiling the papers for this Special Issue. This time, I asked a question related to the specific context of the articles appearing in the present collection. Having posed the question “What influence will Chinese philosophy have on Kant-studies in the coming twenty years?” I randomly selected marbles that corresponded to gua 20, with a changing fifth line, transforming it into gua 23. Thus, both gua have “earth” (three yin lines) as the lower trigram and an upper trigram consisting of a lower yin and an upper yang line; the only line that changes is the middle line of the upper trigram, from yang to yin, causing the upper trigram to change from “wind” to “mountain.”

Gua 20 is called “Contemplation (View)” (guan 觀)30 and is shaped like a tower, depicting wind blowing over earth. If our experiment is successful, this gua should symbolize the original (i.e., current) situation related to the question posed, wherein we find that Chinese philosophy has already begun to have some influence on Kant studies. Fittingly, gua 20 is traditionally associated with the moment of contemplation in the ancient sacrificial rites, between the invocation of the Deity, through an ablution and libation, and the
The light force (yang) is in retreat as the dark force (yin) rises up to displace it. The former corresponds to the Western/Kantian emphasis on rationality, the latter to the Eastern/Chinese emphasis on a more open, creative approach. In other words, the first gua suggests that Chinese philosophy is already “on the rise” in its influence on Kant studies but that the present moment (in relation to the questioner, this would refer to the compilation of this Special Issue) affords an opportunity to stop and contemplate the lay of the land from the platform of Kant studies that lies more or less undisturbed at the top. The text says: “A man of influence is at hand, but his influence is not understood by the common people”; there is “no blame” in such a situation for the “inferior man,” but for the “superior man” it is a cause for “humiliation.” Since the “superior man” traditionally refers to the questioner, the opening gua can be interpreted as a symbolic reflection of my recent attempts to move away from an exclusively Western approach to interpreting Kant’s philosophy to more a yin-centered approach that makes room for the insights of Chinese philosophy.

This interpretation is supported by the fact that in the second gua, number 23, the yang in the fifth line of gua 20 changes into a yin, so that only the top line remains as yang. This new gua is called “Splitting Apart” (po), a “mountain” resting on “earth.” It presents us with the image of a house, whose “roof” (the top yang line) “is being shattered” by the effect of the five rising yin lines, so that “the house collapses.” The commentary on this gua is ominous, with almost every line signaling “misfortune.” The judgment describing this gua states:

Splitting Apart. It does not further one
To go anywhere.

As the image of the mountain on the earth implies:

Thus those above can insure their position
Only by giving generously to those below.

The situation during the next twenty years may be inauspicious from the point of view of today’s Kant scholarship, with numerous obstacles to be faced: “inferior people are pushing forward and are about to crowd out the few remaining strong and superior men.” Nevertheless, the oracle recommends that “one should submit to the bad time and remain quiet,” inasmuch as this new situation manifests “the laws of heaven.”

The transformation from gua 20 to 23 is more auspicious if we focus on line 5, the only line that actually changes. In gua 20, this line carries the meaning: “The superior man is without blame,” provided that in contemplating his own life he insures that “his influence on
Attempts to discourage contemporary Kant scholars from overemphasizing the yang are therefore good, provided that in so doing one seeks to promote rather than destroy the “house” of Kant. The fifth line in gua 23 conjures up the image of “A shoal of fishes” and means: “Everything acts to further.” It is the only yin line in this gua that sits next to a yang (the top line); this suggests that “the nature of the dark force undergoes a change. It no longer opposes the strong principle [i.e., the yang]... but submits to its guidance.” Indeed, this fifth yin line is essentially leading all the other yin lines, like a shoal of fishes, to the yang. The influence of Chinese philosophy may therefore have its greatest impact on Kant studies during the coming twenty years if it does not attempt to overshadow Kant completely (i.e., to transform the only remaining yang line into a yin), but rather allows Kant’s essential insights to stand, as it were, atop the mountain of reason.

The paradox we face when attempting to employ architectonic reasoning also constitutes what is arguably the single most dangerous temptation faced by philosophers (or by anyone thinking philosophically). We always have the tendency to believe that our structured understanding of the nature of reality (or of any given situation) represents the absolute truth. It is no accident, perhaps, that the Yijing’s reputation has been spoiled in so many circles: the gua are often used explicitly for divination, as if we human beings could know the future simply by casting yarrow sticks (or grabbing marbles out of a bag). Yet, if we resist this temptation, employing architectonic reasoning without forgetting that we have created the structures in the first place, then it can be the source of great wisdom and insight. In such uses, we actually are “divining the truth” by imposing an architectonic structure onto the empirical aggregate. Without adopting this approach, we can never hope to find unity in the midst of our diverse efforts to cultivate personhood. Yet the lesson of Kant’s Critical philosophy is that (as aptly expressed by my friend Guy Lown, one of the participants in the Kant in Asia conference, in a discussion we had on this topic just as I was finalizing the collection of essays in Cultivating Personhood) even though the purpose of architectonic systems is to divine the structure of reality, we must learn to do this without regarding the outcome of our reasoning as divine. I can think of no better way of realizing this goal than by observing (architectonic reasoning being but one of many examples of) how Kant’s ideas are alive in Asia, and Asian ideas resonate in Kant.
An earlier version of this article was presented at the “Kant in Asia: The Unity of Human Personhood” conference (Hong Kong), on May 21, 2009, and subsequently published as “The Unity of Architectonic Reasoning in Kant and I Ching,” in Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy, ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 811–21. This revised version benefited from the feedback offered by Professor Chung-ying Cheng.

1. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), A805/B833; hereafter abbreviated “CPR,” with page numbers cited for both the first (“A”) and second (“B”) editions. Aside from CPR, references to Kant’s writing will cite the volume and page number of the Berlin Academy edition of Kant’s collected works.


4. For a discussion of the intricate logical relations imbedded in Yi Jing, see Peter D. Hershock, “The Structure of Change in the Yi Jing in Philosophy of the Yi Yi: Unity and Dialectics, Supplement to Volume 36 of Journal of Chinese Philosophy (2009): 48–72. Hershock argues that the sixty-four gua are best arranged as a system of four main gua (numbers 1, 2, 63, and 64), out of which twelve secondary gua arise, and that each of these twelve is linked to four derivative gua. The resulting pattern clearly exhibits how the architectonic of the Yi Jing (4 + 12 + 48 = 64) incorporates a structure identical to that of Kant’s table of categories. The main difference, as we shall see, is that Kant does not break down each of his twelve categories into four subcategories.


6. For a good account of the tendency among early twentieth-century Kant scholars to blame all the infelicities one sees in Kant’s writings on his architectonic superstructure, see Paula Manchester, “What Kant Means by Architectonic,” in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Band II (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), 622–30. Manchester’s own interpretation of Kant’s view of architectonic is, however, unfortunately clouded by her overly Aristotelian reading of Kant’s usage, combined with an overemphasis on the significance of Kant’s reference to the “teaching” of reason in connection with architectonic. As I shall demonstrate, Kant explicitly contrasts his position with Aristotle’s “aggregate” approach, so it seems highly unlikely that he saw himself as merely refining the same meaning Aristotle gave to this term.


9. Manchester views Kant’s “architectonic” as essentially following Aristotle’s use of the special Greek term, architektôn (Manchester, “What Kant Means by Architectonic,” 524n). After reviewing the history of different uses of this term, she assumes Kant must have been writing within this Greek tradition; unfortunately, she never presents such a thorough analysis of the distinctive way Kant himself uses the term, especially in light of his explicit contrast between his view of how to construct a table of categories and that of Aristotle (see endnote 3). Manchester and I debated this issue at a special session of the 1998 World Congress of Philosophy but without reaching agreement.

10. Kant, CPR, A832/B860.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

15. Ibid.
17. Ibid., A834/B862.
19. Ibid., A79-81/B105-7.
20. Ibid., A835/B863.
21. Ibid., A836/B864.
22. Ibid., A847/B875.
23. Ibid. Kant also uses the term “architectonic” in a number of his other writings; for further discussion of these references, see Appendix III.3 of Kant’s Critical Religion.
24. CPR, A66/B91.
26. Ibid., A67/B92, emphasis added.
27. Ibid., A67/B92. These two methods are aptly illustrated by an example Kant provides in the Second Preface of Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, where he says reason and Scripture should have “not only compatibility but also unity” (6: 13, Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, trans. Werner Pluhar [Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009]). For an overview of how Kant’s architectonic pattern applies to the text of this book, see my “Introduction” to Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, trans. Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009), especially xxii–xlv. Exactly how this “unity” arises (or might arise) is a question Kant does not clearly answer in that context. But if we understand the way architectonic reasoning operates, the problem of the unity of “the religion of reason” with empirical religious ideas can be easily solved. For a discussion of how this relates to the problem of religious pluralism, see Brandon Love, “Kant’s Religious Perspective on the Human Person,” in Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy, ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 563–72.
30. Significantly, guan is not only a gua, but also a crucial concept for Chinese philosophy; see Chung-ying Cheng, “Yi Jing as Cosmic Education: Language and Philosophy,” available online at http://zhouyi.sdu.edu.cn/english0/newsxitong/selectedPapers/20061010195258.htm. See also Jesse Flemming, “The Onto-Hermeneutics of Guan,” in The Imperative of Understanding: Chinese Philosophy, Comparative Philosophy, and Onto-Hermeneutics: A Tribute Volume Dedicated to Professor Chung-Ying Cheng, ed. On Cho Ng (New York: Global Scholarly Publications, 2008). However, my focus here is not on the overall meaning of guan, but on the symbolic meaning of its appearance as part of the random response to my question.
32. See Chung-ying Cheng, “Li 禮 and Qi 氣 in the Yiijing 《易經}: A Reconsideration of Being and Nonbeing in Chinese Philosophy,” in Philosophy of the Yi 易: Unity and Dialectics, Supplement to Volume 36 of Journal of Chinese Philosophy (2009): especially 81–92. Cheng repeatedly emphasizes the importance of creativity in arguing that “Qi is the natural process of change while li is the end product . . . of change”—i.e., “the internal structure of the qi process” (82).
33. Yiijing, 84.
34. I am grateful to Chung-ying Cheng for drawing my attention to this important point.
35. Yiijing, 94.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., 85.
39. Ibid., 96.
40. Ibid.
41. Cheng, “Li 禮 and Qi 氣 in the Yiijing 《易經}:” warns against this danger (86), emphasizing that the Yiijing is best viewed not as a book of divination but as putting forward “a coherent metaphysics of change, transformation, and movement.”
reminder should remove any doubt about the goal of the foregoing “experiment”: in consulting the Yijing, we make no pretentious claim to predict the future, but simply draw wise insights from the symbolic forms presented in the book. See also Chung-ying Cheng, New Dimensions of Confucian and Neo-Confucian Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 172–4; Cheng portrays the gua as “symbolic images” that enable us to “participate in the creative activities of the tao” (173).