method in the study of religion and the postmodern critique of meaning and explanation" (11).

There are many ways to respond to the standard model, but van Slyke’s is an eirenic one, admitting the importance of cognitive methods in the study of religion but rejecting its reductionism in favor of “emergent cognition,” which requires attention not only to the initial conditions determined by our biological hardware but to two other essential determinants: the specifics of our embodied status and the social environment in which our cognitive practices emerge. All three are fundamental because “human cognition is very ‘leaky’ in that it is difficult to draw a hard distinction between internal vs. external factors in the formation of human cognition” (43). If, for example, human groups are at least as complex as ant colonies, then our neural functions will be constantly adapting on the basis of unpredictable environmental experiences, which provide feedback, forming new configurations of behavior that will, in turn, be modified by future encounters (47–50). Once environmental and social factors are brought back into play reduction, in any serious sense, is off the table. Understanding a given tradition will require attention to what a community believes, why they believe it, and the reasons they are inclined to give for the truth of their beliefs. This will return to center stage the full panoply of “folk psychological” terms—intentions, desires, beliefs, preferences, and so on—that cognitive scientists hoped to dispense with.

Some of us, I suspect, are likely to follow Donald Davidson in doubting both the philosophical credibility and the explanatory value of the cognitive approach to human behavior. Van Slyke, however, embraces the “neural Darwinism” of Gerald Edelman as a basis for a more complex account of the brain, which resists not only reductionism but the simplified analogy with computer programs. In the second half of his book, van Slyke elaborates a nonreductive view of the cognitive science of religion that combines the “bottom up” processing of sense experience with the “top down” work of beliefs and expectations (65). In so doing, he does not so much develop a theory of religion as illustrate the potential ways in which this version of cognitive science can illuminate some issues in the study of religion. One by-product of this will be something of a litmus test for the presence of pseudoscientific ideologues. Those who continue to insist on the naturalistic reduction of religion to a disposable by-product of evolution are probably not looking for truth, just victory.

In the meantime, van Slyke’s volume provides a handy guide to a variety of cognitive approaches and their limits. One note of caution: he uses the vocabulary of neurobiology freely and without much background explanation. There is not even a basic map of the brain. Therefore, I recommend Edelman’s Wider Than the Sky (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005) as companion reading. It has lots of figures, including a brain map, and a very helpful glossary.

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unclear and rarely explicit, Dorrien’s approach effectively exposes each scholar’s humanity. This makes for interesting reading, but significantly increases the book’s length. Given the lucid style and careful attention to detail in this otherwise impeccable work of historical scholarship, the appearance of several incorrect dates is surprising: Kant’s *Religion* appeared in 1793, not 1792 (7), and several events from the 1790s are inadvertently reported as occurring a century later (67, 163, 167).

Dorrien presents a series of overlapping chronological studies, with seven main chapters focusing on the intricate theories, life circumstances, and secondary scholars relating to (respectively) Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schleiermacher, G. F. W. Hegel, Søren Kierkegaard, Albrecht Ritschl, A. N. Whitehead, and the two twentieth-century giants, Karl Barth and Paul Tillich. Each chapter penetrates into the lives of these (and numerous related) characters, including matter-of-fact reports about their sex lives: Friedrich Schlegel’s “scandalous affair” (89), Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s “sexual fantasies” (125), Friedrich Schelling’s affairs with a friend’s wife and her daughter (178), Hegel’s illegitimate son with his (married) landlady (197–98), Kierkegaard’s father having “impregnated his maid” (262), Barth’s unhappy marriage (484), Tillich’s sexual indulgences (490), and so forth. Dorrien’s non-judgmental account of each scholar’s life typically remains silent regarding whether the experiences recounted had any formative influence on the scholar’s ideas—though he hints that the messiness of *Phenomenology of Spirit* reflected Hegel’s life in 1806. More suggestions regarding such interconnections would have been helpful. Dorrien portrays each set of ideas not systematically, but as a tapestry woven from the details of each scholar’s life. He thus challenges various “textbook” accounts, especially regarding Hegel, whose line of influence is treated far more fully than Kant’s. Dorrien’s Hegel did not awaken philosophy to a new appreciation for history, but incorporated history (movement of concepts) into logic and metaphysics.

Whereas the seven intervening chapters are almost entirely descriptive, chapters 1 and 9 present Dorrien’s interpretive framework. Kant is the “brightest light” (545) of this whole tradition, yet those who followed agreed with F. H. Jacobi in discarding Kant’s thing in itself. Schelling comes out looking like the most tragic major figure: few appreciate how much Hegel depended on him; yet when he took over Hegel’s professorial chair, late in life, those who attended his inaugural lecture (including Kierkegaard, Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, and Mikhail Bakunin) were already transcending Schelling-Hegel idealism. While Dorrien lauds Tillich’s achievement, Barth takes the prize as “the greatest theologian since Schleiermacher” (565), because he was the most successful in resisting idealism—though not completely. The damning features that led to the downfall of philosophical idealism, casting a dark shadow on the whole tradition of liberal theology, were its assumption of white supremacy and the rising success of science; these prompted philosophy’s retreat into the backwaters via the analytic tradition.

While Dorrien’s historical analysis is thorough, almost to a fault, some omissions are conspicuous. Among pre-Kantian philosophers, John Locke alone gets a full hearing—curiously placed in the Schleiermacher chapter. David Hume’s role is downplayed, except as Kant’s gadfly. Even Benedict de Spinoza, despite being repeatedly acknowledged as the preferred means of circumventing Kantian ignorance of the thing in itself, is discussed only as interpreted by post-Kantian idealists, never on his own terms. Given his focus on idealism, perhaps Dorrien can be excused for never mentioning Arthur Schopenhauer. But with a subtitle claiming to examine the “logic of modern theology,” never mentioning contemporary theologians such as Wolfhart Pannenberg seems questionable.

Despite his focus on biographical details, often seeming to enter into the main characters’ minds to reveal how they thought or felt at key junctures, Dorrien re-
mains ironically aloof. He rarely takes a firm stance in assessing the various positions he summarizes: I found less than twenty uses of “I” or “my” referring to Dorrien himself—most appearing in the introductory or concluding chapters. While such restraint may be admirable for a historian, more emphasis on evaluating the logic of the main characters and their ideas in the seven central chapters would have better justified the subtitle, which seems incongruous with much of the book: aside from a few pages on Schleiermacher’s theology in chapter 3, chapters 2–5 read more like a history of philosophy; the book contains very little theology until the chapter on turn-of-the-century theological historicism and the two chapters on early twentieth-century theology. The introductory and concluding chapters, highlighting Dorrien’s account of how the influences occurred, make a convincing case for the claim that post-Kantian idealism was the dominant philosophical influence on (liberal) theology. Yet I could not help wondering: has the conventional liberal-conservative distinction lost its relevance for twenty-first-century theology, just as many have outgrown the analytic-continental distinction in philosophy?

Following chapter 2’s springboard discussion of Kant’s system and its reinterpretation by Johann Fichte, Dorrien accurately reports (and implicitly accepts) German idealism’s response to Kant via Fichte. Dorrien demonstrates masterfully how modern liberal theology sprang from this tradition. What he never considers is that, if German idealism erred in reading Kant via Fichte and Jacobi, then a new Kantian philosophical theology is possible—an option explored by various interpreters of Kant’s philosophy of religion over the past twenty-five years, none of whom Dorrien acknowledges. Arguably the weakest link in his chain of argument is his treatment of Kant’s groundbreaking Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, covering only three pages (similar to his coverage of Kant’s 1764 Observations). He adopts the standard reductionist interpretation instituted by Wilhelm Herrmann (336), portrays Kant’s as a “truncated moral religion” (539). Had Dorrien consulted the latest interpretive trends, his historical study might have included clues as to how the impasse in modern theology can be overcome by refusing to allow Hegelian Spirit to eclipse Kantian Reason.

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Michael Morgan introduces readers to Emmanuel Levinas. Newcomers to Levinas’s work will appreciate Morgan’s pedagogical manner: he explains to the reader what parts may be dense philosophically, what terms need to be defined, and when readers should expect careful analysis. He also revisits previous arguments before launching into new ones. He grounds his reader in philosophical idealism, transcendental argumentation, skepticism, Husserlian phenomenology, Cartesian dualism, Kantian ethics, Spinoza’s metaphysics, literature, post-Holocaust theology, epistemology, alterity, and ontology, inter alia. In sum, he teaches newcomers how to read philosophy. Experienced readers of Levinas’s oeuvre will also appreciate Morgan’s careful presentation of Levinas’s life and thought. Even though some may take issue with his numerous genealogies of “Western Philosophy,” they will easily discern the erudition and acumen of a careful reader of philosophy and of history. Both kinds of readers will notice in Morgan’s portrait of Levinas an intellectual biography of the twentieth century, which is the record of the tempestuous relationship between what Levinas termed the Greek and the Jew. “Greek,” for Levinas, “is the language of totality, grounded in the correlations of subject and