
"The Kant-Jung Book" (or KJB) is a project I have had in mind for some two decades, ever since I began reading Jung as a hobby to complement my scholarly research on Kant. In his autobiography, Jung openly confesses the significant influence Kant had on his intellectual development. For example, he expresses his frustration at how busy he was during his "clinical semesters" by recalling: "I was able to study Kant only on Sundays" (Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 122)! As Paul Bishop notes, tantalizing references to Kant and/or various Kantian concepts "pepper Jung's psychological writings" (p. 297). Not being or claiming to be a philosopher, Jung leaves these references undeveloped, claiming no more than to be developing depth psychology within essentially Kantian parameters.

The projected goal of KJB is to explore how far Jung's analytical psychology and Kant's critical philosophy can function as complementary intellectual systems, like yin and yang manifestations of one Tao: entirely different (indeed, opposing) forces that nevertheless work together toward the same unified goal, originally expressed by the inscription over the entrance to the temple at Delphi as "know thyself." Whereas Kant developed a transcendental philosophy grounded in a logically structured set of 12 a priori categories of consciousness that give form to the manifold aggregate of human knowledge, Jung developed an empirical psychology grounded in a haphazard collection of "archetypes" (categories of the unconscious) whose flowering produces a fixed set of psychological types that exhibits a logical pattern virtually identical to that of Kant's categories: Jung's four functions (sensation, intuition, thought, and feeling) correspond directly to Kant's four main categories (quantity, quality, relation, and modality), while Jung's three ways of experiencing each function
(introvert, extravert, and their combination in the integrated personality) correspond directly to Kant's three manifestations of each category (e.g., the three moments of quantity: unity, plurality, and totality). Likewise, Kant's doctrine of the unknowability of the thing in itself resonates deeply with Jung's doctrine of the Self as the mysterious totality of the human psyche, knowable only in the differentiated form of archetypal images and ideas. These examples merely touch the tip of the iceberg of connections that exist between Kant's philosophy and Jung's psychology, as expressions of two sides of one and the same worldview—a worldview I have elsewhere dubbed "Critical Mysticism" (see Kant's Critical Religion [Ashgate, 2000, Part Four].

When I first learned that Paul Bishop's book on Kant and Jung focuses on themes as obviously "mystical" as Jung's "synchronicity", Kant's "intellectual intuition", and Swedenborg (the Swedish mystic who fascinated both Kant and Jung), I thought this could be one of those rare opportunities when, rather than fanning the flames of urgency, reading another author's book satisfies one's scholarly "calling" to contribute to that particular area. "Perhaps this is it;" I mused; "maybe I won't have to write KJB after all!" In this hope, however, I could hardly have been more mistaken.

Paul Bishop makes his predisposition clear at the outset: he starts the Acknowledgements by explaining how this book extends his doctoral research on Jung, which placed Jung firmly within "the specific context" of "German Romanticism" (p. xiii). That Bishop will treat "Romanticism" and "Romantic" as dirty words had already been hinted in the Foreword, where the "Germanist", Raymond Furness, says this "book is, basically, a history of an error [i.e., Jung's error, in Romanticizing Kant], and... a salutary (and daunting) reminder of how frequently reason may be transformed into unreason" (p. xi). Accordingly, Bishop pays no attention even to the possibility that there may be meaningful connections between Kant and Jung, that the two scholars may have been constructing two sides of the same intellectual Way. From the point of view of Kant-scholarship, the book's most interesting discussions center around the popular nineteenth-century spiritualist scholar, Carl du Prel (1839–1899), who portrayed Kant as a closet mystic, heavily influenced by Swedenborg. Bishop's thesis is that Jung was duped by du Prel, and by his allegedly "Romantic" tendencies, to misinterpret Kant.

Unfortunately, Bishop never defends his anti-Romantic bias with anything like a reasoned argument. Rather, he merely assumes anyone who exhibits goals similar to those of nineteenth-century Romantics is not worthy of serious consideration. And his Kant-scholarship is no more impressive: he merely assumes that Kant, the philosopher who marked the transition-point between the Enlightenment and the period of German Romanticism, had affinities only with the former movement. Bishop's underlying argument seems to run like this: (1) Romanticism and all motifs typically associated with it are obviously irrational and untenable; (2) Jung's works exhibit numerous motifs typically associated with Romanticism; therefore, (3) Jung's works are obviously irrational.
and untenable. A corollary to this argument, it seems, is that Kant, being a
pre-Romantic philosopher, was eminently rational, and therefore should not
be associated with the likes of Jung. In this context, the main theme of Bishop's
book is to show that Jung's "concept of synchronicity only makes sense in terms
of" Kant's theory of intellectual intuition, even though Jung himself never
employed Kant's term (p. 2). Correspondingly, the main theme of this review is
to argue that Bishop is thoroughly mistaken.

Bishop's greatest strength is probably also the greatest danger of his approach:
he exhibits erudite scholarship on virtually every page. For example, the text
provides both German and English for most of its numerous, often lengthy,
quotations—a tedious practice that adds significantly to the book's length.
Having done an impressive breadth of research, Bishop refers to a wide
spectrum of books on numerous relevant topics. To begin, the Introduction
provides a brief overview of the references Jung makes to Kant and of all "eight
articles" and "five books" (p. 6) that address the Kant-Jung relationship. Yet the
reader is left with no idea of what Jung's interest in Kant was all about—except
that it had something to do with Swedenborg. The Introduction also makes an
initial attempt to argue that "synchronicity" meant for Jung what "intellectual
intuition" meant for Kant, and that Jung's acceptance of a concept Kant so
resolutely rejected proves that Jung was not a Kantian, but a "post-Kantian"—
i.e., a "Romantic" (p. 20), with all the nastiness Bishop believes that entails.
Here, as elsewhere, Bishop reveals he is not a Kant scholar.

Chapter 1 examines Jung's theory of synchronicity more closely. After
discussing possible connections Jung saw between synchronicity and modern
physics, Bishop cites "four definitions" (pp. 33–34) of the former term given in
Jung's book, Synchronicity. What escapes Bishop's notice is that these four
correspond to Kant's four categories: regarding quantity, synchronicity appears
as "meaningful parallels" between a "psychic state" and "external events"; its
quality appears as "the simultaneous occurrence of two different psychic states";
its relation is a person's awareness of a connection between "[a]n unconscious
image" and "[a]n objective situation"; and its modality (its definition proper) is
a unique combination of possibility, actuality, and necessity that Jung calls
"meaningful coincidence" (p. 34). Bishop dutifully quotes Jung's claim that
synchronicity must be understood from a strictly "hypothetical" perspective
(p. 34), yet shows no awareness of what this means in a Kantian context: it is
a heuristic fiction used to regulate our inquiries, rather than a concrete
(categorial) claim to have discovered something that constitutes human
knowledge. Intellectual intuition, for Kant, is always and only the latter. So
Bishop's attempt to identify Jungian synchronicity with this Kantian notion only
highlights his limited understanding of Kant. Instead of being grounded in
Kant's philosophy, Bishop's section entitled "Philosophical Implications of
Synchronicity" (pp. 36–51) describes how a wide variety of other scholars used
the relevant terms, ranging from Avicenna and Albertus Magnus to Geulincx,
Leibniz, and Schopenhauer. Jung, by contrast, had studied Kant—even if (for
a time) "only on Sundays"—so he had good reason for steering clear of any attempt to connect synchronicity with intellectual intuition. In short, Bishop's argument here is grossly unfair to both Kant and Jung.

Where Jung mentions Kant in Synchronicity, he agrees with Kant's theory that the a priori conditions of knowledge, space and time, are products of the mind (p. 42). From this, Jung infers that the unconscious mind is capable of putting aside these conscious forms and viewing the world differently in a manner that is not subject to normal categorial restrictions, such as causality. Bishop thinks Jung is perverting Kant at this point; but he forgets that Kant was constructing a philosophy of conscious knowledge, whereas Jung was explicitly constructing a psychology of unconscious ideas. Much of Bishop's scholarly footwork in this initial chapter is of immense value to the perceptive reader; disappointingly, Bishop himself seems unaware of that value, believing instead he has proved Jung's theory to be anti-Kantian (p. 49). His main complaint is that Jung tends to refer to synchronicity as a way of obtaining "absolute knowledge"; yet he fails to recognize that Jung was referring here only to a hypothetical apprehension of something that always remains a mystery to the conscious mind, and therefore has no relation whatsoever to Kantian intellectual intuition (which entails knowing or even creating the absolute as an empirical object, merely by thinking it). That the products of our unconscious are not incompatible with the Critical restriction of conscious knowledge to space and time is shown nowhere more profoundly than in Kant's own Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, where he assesses Swedenborg's mystical visions from a philosophical perspective. (See Chapter II of Kant's Critical Religion for a thorough argument along these lines.) Here, if anywhere, Kant showed he was capable of the same alleged "conceptual recklessness" Bishop attributes to Jung (p. 54).

Instead of moving directly to an examination of Kant's approach to Swedenborg, Bishop devotes the next three chapters to three stages in Jung's development: his early interest in philosophy, the use of Kant in his early writings, and the use of Kant in his writings after 1921. The upshot of Chapter 2 is that (p. 77) "Jung's attitude towards Kant was a highly personal one." Although there are no great surprises in this chapter, Bishop's survey benefits greatly, here and throughout the book, by the fact that he had access to Jung's personal library and carefully inspected all the (relevant) books Jung possessed. In this regard, Appendix A ("Editions of Kant in C.G. Jung's Library") provides a valuable resource for anyone interested in the Jung-Kant relationship, and Bishop's endnotes make ample (often instructive) references to Jung's marginal markings and comments. Again, Bishop has done his homework on this point, and has done it well.

By contrast, one wishes Bishop's reading of contemporary Kant-scholarship had extended beyond the few works included in his otherwise massive Bibliography; he bases his entire view of Kant's philosophy of science, for example, solely on Robert Butts' 1986 book, Kant and the Double Government Methodology. As a result, Bishop chides Jung for being "highly unKantian"
merely because Jung observed what many Kant scholars recognize Kant himself observed, that "there might be events which overstepped the limited categories of space, time and causality" (Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 120). For Kant (as Jung and many Kant scholars have recognized), such "overstepping" is possible, but cannot produce knowledge for us human beings, simply because we do not have access to intellectual intuition. Contrary to the impression Bishop wants his readers to take from his book, Jung never contradicted this basic tenet of Kantian philosophy, but understood and agreed with it far more accurately than Bishop does. Most of Bishop's other criticisms of Jung's views on Kant in Chapter 2 are similarly half-baked, as when he claims Jung went through a period of viewing Kant "negatively", when the negativity Bishop describes was focused primarily on Ritschl's interpretation of Kant (pp. 92–93).

The longest, and possibly most interesting, section of Bishop's book comes at the end of Chapter 2: "Excursus: Freud's Interest in the Occult" (pp. 102–129). Here Bishop provides an excellent contextualization for anyone who wishes to understand Jung's interest in the occult, for he demonstrates that Freud was fascinated by many of the same issues Jung was, yet he was unable to integrate them as consistently into his psychoanalytic theory. As Bishop puts it (p. 106): "Read against Freud's remarks about his intellectual development, Jung's seems far less eccentric than it usually does." Bishop's conclusion, however, is typically biased (p. 127): Freud's approach to the occult was superior to Jung's because at least "Freud was keen to reject any method that involved [that devilish scourge of the Romantic era!] intuition."

Chapters 3 and 4 are the shortest, most straightforward, and least objectionable of the book's six main chapters. The former begins with a helpful summary of how Jung employed Kant's distinction between analysis and synthesis in his early work on word-association, leading eventually to the split with Freud, which Jung himself expressed in terms of a need to complement Freudian analysis with psychic synthesis (p. 145). (Unhappily, Jung abandoned his initial idea of calling his new approach "psychosynthesis", and replaced it with the less distinctive name, "analytic psychology".) The next section argues that Jung's work on symbols, as a path beyond faith to knowledge, betrays "Jung's divergence from Kant" (p. 147), since the Preface to Kant's first Critique denied knowledge in order to make room for faith. But here Bishop allows a semantic similarity to becloud the deep and intentional difference in standpoint Jung adopted in his effort to complement Kant's philosophy. Kant's goal was to deny objective knowledge of God (etc.) in order to make room for rational (practical) faith, grounded in our moral nature. Jung's goal was to deny blind faith in God in order to make room for psychological knowledge, grounded in the realities of our religious experience. These goals are not in conflict, as Bishop claims.

The third and fourth sections of Chapter 3 examine Jung's book, Psychological Types. In the former, Bishop draws some clear correlations between Jung's view of "phantasy" and Kant's theory of "imagination". Here is one of the few places where Bishop suggests a potential area of genuine
compatibility, though he does so in a manner that furthers his main agenda (namely, to portray Jung negatively), by emphasizing Jung's failure to relate phantasy to Kant's third Critique. (Interestingly, Bishop himself had earlier committed the same error by referring to Kant's "two Critiques" [p. 87], calling them, along with Prolegomena, "the key texts of the critical philosophy" [p. 82]. And later, Bishop complains about Jung's "apparent ignorance of the third Critique" [p. 173], even though Appendix A clearly states [p. 412] that Jung's own copy of that book did contain marginal markings!) The chapter ends with a section assessing (negatively, of course) Jung's attempt to relate his theory of "archetypes" to Kant's distinction between "idea" and "image"; once again, the apparent conflicts Bishop finds are due more to his own superficial understanding of Kant than to any real incompatibility.

Chapter 4 begins by assessing Jung's portrayal of the archetypes as "categories of the imagination" (p. 176) in his later writings. Here Bishop continues his effort to persuade the reader that Jung's real intention is to claim knowledge of the sort Kant regarded as impossible, due to human beings' lack of intellectual intuition. He offers the legitimate criticisms that Jung seems to use "category" in an imprecise way, and that some attention to the third Critique would have been helpful [pp. 187, 192]. However, he fails to provide anything more than a "hint" that Jung's terminology sometimes "closely resembles that of intellectual intuition" (p. 178); indeed, Bishop seems unaware of the obvious Kantian implications of numerous texts he himself quotes, where Jung warns (for example) that the archetype "is in itself irrepresentable" (quoted on p. 179) or that "[t]he archetype as such is a hypothetical and irrepresentable model" (quoted on p. 180), so that all we can know (scientifically) about it must be based on the ideas and images we observe (e.g., in our dreams). This is vintage Kant; yet Bishop misconstrues it as an implicit acceptance of intellectual intuition. Moreover, Bishop claims that because "Kant saw his task as complete" (p. 184), he would never have approved of Jung's attempt to complement it. Yet Kant's bold claim refers only to his establishment of a transcendental foundation for all further scientific and metaphysical inquiry; he fully recognized that the task of building on that foundation an enduring system of metaphysical principles and/or scientific knowledge was a task that would have to be fulfilled by future generations. And Kant was keenly aware of his own generation's limited accomplishments in areas such as psychology.

Chapter 4 ends with a section entitled "Why did Jung think he was a Kantian?" Bishop states at the outset that his aim here is to exhibit Jung's "confused use of Kant". He cites several examples of such usage from Jung's later writings and claims Jung believed Kant's philosophy gave him "license" to make "claims about a transcendent realm" [p. 189]. This section, unfortunately, is mostly made up of quotations and is virtually devoid of any real argument. The conclusion, that Jung's "philosophical imprecision" enabled this "self-styled empiricist" to "entangle[e] himself in precisely those transcendent notions of mysticism that Kant himself unequivocally condemned" (p. 192), really just
restates Bishop's presupposition. If Kant's philosophical system was meant as a foundation for a new way of interpreting mystical experiences such as those of Swedenborg, then the single pillar that holds up the whole edifice of Bishop's argument collapses in a heap.

As such, the "make or break" argument of this book comes in Chapter 5, where Bishop examines Kant's view of Swedenborg, and of all things mystical. The chapter begins by detailing the eighteenth century's rejection of "enthusiasm" as "an epistemological disease" (p. 201), then outlines Kant's own position on the subject. What Bishop neglects here is that, especially in the highly negative context of the Enlightenment, Kant's view of enthusiasm was not as entirely dismissive as it is often portrayed to be, because the enthusiast and the philosopher share a common personality type, and that this accounts (at least in part) for the tendency philosophers have to let their minds run wild in the realm of speculation. (An excellent elaboration of this point is given in Gregory Johnson's contribution to a book I have edited with Chris Firestone in 2005 Kant's Philosophy of Religion [Indiana University Press, forthcoming].) In other words, Kant's concern about enthusiasm was so great not because it was something far away from the truth, but because it was so close to the truth, yet misrepresents it. This is precisely the reason Kant became interested in Swedenborg, to whom Bishop devotes the remainder of Chapter 5.

After four relatively short but helpful sections introducing Swedenborg, overviewing his reception in Germany, recounting the famous stories of Swedenborg's powers that fascinated both Kant and Jung, and sketching the context in Kant's life of his interest in Swedenborg, the core section of this chapter provides a detailed summary of Kant's 1766 book, Dreams of a Spirit-See, Illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics. (Kant wrote this after being one of only four persons who purchased all eight volumes of Swedenborg's Arcana coelestia (p. 220)—another of the seemingly endless string of trivial yet fascinating tidbits Bishop has gleaned from his careful research.) These four introductory sections present a curious mix of statements depicting Kant's philosophy as a "campaign against mysticism" (p. 224) and confessions that Kant nevertheless "persist[ed] in deploying a quasi-mystical vocabulary" (p. 225) that led avowed mystics to align themselves with Kant even within his own lifetime. Toward the end of his life, as Bishop fully admits, Kant's writings contained, at one and the same time, more and more "biblical and theological metaphors [that] ran the risk of bringing him closer to those who professed mysticism" and harsher and harsher warnings against the dangers of mysticism (pp. 227–228). How could this be? The clue (see Chapter II of Kant's Critical Religion) is that Kant continued interpreting mysticism through the lens of his early assessment of Swedenborg, which itself oddly exhibits this same twofold emphasis.

Kant's Dreams uses the problem of how to assess the validity of alleged experiences of spirits (or of a hidden, spiritual world) as an analogy to guide philosophers in understanding the more general problem of how to assess the
validity of all metaphysical claims. Kant employs a thoroughly Critical methodology by first adopting one perspective (defending the mystic’s claims by explaining how such experiences are possible), then adopting the opposite perspective (showing how knowledge of any such experiences is quite impossible), and finally adopting a "middle way"—one that focuses on the "practical" and emphasizes the need to honor the limits of human knowledge. The perceptive reader of Dreams who is already familiar with Kant’s mature philosophy can see many "seeds" of the latter in the former. Bishop’s 20-page summary of the book does fairly well in this regard. However, he falls prey to the tendency many interpreters have had, that is, to view the book primarily as a piece of sarcastic skepticism, rather than as a serious attempt to prepare for a genuinely Critical solution to the problem of mysticism. Bishop rightly concludes that for Kant, "Swedenborg’s work is the product of the wrong kind of intuition"—namely, “fanatical intuition” (p. 244); what he fails to note is that (in keeping with the analogy in its title), just as Dreams prepares the way for Critical philosophy by making a distinction between right and wrong kinds of metaphysics (i.e., based on whether it rests on a critique of the limits of human reason), so also there must be right and wrong forms of mysticism. Since Kant believed his philosophy was the foundation for all future developments of a correct metaphysics, he must also have regarded his philosophy as the foundation for all correct interpretations of mystical experience. Bishop totally misses this crucial nuance of Kant’s early project. Instead, he ends this section with an all-too-typical put-down of Jung: after claiming Jung "entirely overlooked" the three main aspects of Dreams (how it foreshadowed Critical philosophy, united mechanistic and teleological explanations, and employed a nuanced style), Bishop surmises that "Jung was unable to follow [Kant], perhaps because he did not fully understand, the path of the critical philosophy” (pp. 250–251). Yet Jung did understand a fourth and crucial aspect of Dreams that Bishop misses: it forges a new path for examining the nature of mystical experience, a Critical Mysticism that avoids the pitfalls of Swedenborg’s fanatical enthusiasm.

Chapter 5 closes with a lengthy and very informative, four-part summary of Kant’s Lectures on Psychology, as published in 1889 by the mystic, Carl du Prél. That Kant’s main purpose in Dreams was to provide the foundation for a Critical Mysticism, and that this aim is fully consistent with his mature Critical philosophy, is demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt in Lectures, for here Kant drops the stylistic (and self-protective, given the bias of Enlightenment thinkers against mysticism) sarcasm of Dreams and explicitly honors Swedenborg as one who presents the philosopher with experiences that call for explanation in a philosophically responsible way (unlike Swedenborg’s own fanatical explanations). Being an honest scholar, Bishop does not hide Kant’s positive portrayal of Swedenborg; on the contrary, he openly explains how Kant’s theory of "symbolic knowledge" attempted to account for such experiences (pp. 257–259). He rightly stresses that for Kant such knowledge is epistemologically
"inferior" to ordinary knowledge, since it is a type of conception, not intuition (p. 260); but he does not draw from this the obvious conclusion, that for Kant a measured ("Critical") form of mysticism is acceptable, without requiring intellectual intuition.

Having backtracked from his initial emphasis on Jung all the way to Kant and Swedenborg, Bishop devotes Chapter 6 to an examination of developments between Kant and Jung, with special emphasis given to the origins of scientific psychology (especially its relation to Neo-Kantianism in Germany) and the parallel development of interest in experimenting with the occult, both mystically and scientifically. Here, as throughout this book whenever encyclopedic knowledge of a broad spectrum of theories is required, Bishop is at his best, providing the reader with indispensable contextualization for understanding Jung's intellectual development. Unfortunately, as elsewhere, this service to the reader is compromised by Bishop's uncharitable assumptions that anything mystical must be "diseased and unhealthy" (p. 320), that anything "Romantic" is for that very reason untenable, and that Kant (unlike Jung) was never really interested in spiritual experience. That Jung himself explicitly rejected the label "Romantic" as a way of accounting for his interest in the spiritual realm (p. 331) carries no weight for Bishop; instead, failing to make any distinction between "spiritism" and "mysticism" (see, e.g., p. 332), and overlooking Jung's careful use of Kantian hypothetical ("as if") language when describing spiritual experiences (e.g., p. 341), Bishop never considers the possibility that Jung might have been constructing the psychological side of the same Critical Mysticism that Kant had already developed philosophically.

That the "conclusions" of Jungian psychology "go well beyond Kant" (p. 350) is only to be expected if, as Jung repeatedly claimed, he was attempting to complement Kant's worldview by applying it to the empirical field of depth psychology. The reason "Jung's world is full of mysteries" is not that it stands in "contrast with Kant's universe" (p. 351)—at least, not in Bishop's sense of being incompatible with it—but that the two perspectives examine the same reality from two sides, each having the other's seed at its core.

Bishop's Conclusion begins by recapitulating his conviction that Jung took over from du Prel an untenable interpretation of Kant as a mystic, then sketches how Jung's analytical psychology relates to each of six major developments in philosophy of science since Kant's day. The final section traces the influence of Jung's notion of synchronicity in recent (post-Jungian) literature, treating the reader to a veritable feast of some of the most profound and interesting books published over the past 35 years. Because Bishop adopts his usual posture of making fun of Jung throughout this section, he must repeatedly confess the "surprising" (e.g., p. 393) fact that most of these modern classics have regarded Jung's ideas as supporting their own insights! Again, such overviews of the literature are where this book's true value rests. The reader looks in vain for the proverbial "forest" that unites in one idea the myriad interesting trees. Such a grand overview is necessary if one is to appreciate how it makes sense that
Jung and Kant could be such happy bedfellows; yet one will not find such "Romance" in Bishop's work. For better or worse, this is not the long-awaited Kant-Jung Book.

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The tabloid headline announced "Miracles Reported after Seeing Gibson's 'Passion'." The implication behind the headline is that the Divine has endorsed the movie by giving a sign of special favor to some moviegoers. But according to Lisa J. Schwebel in Apparitions, Healings, and Weeping Madonnas, far from being special acts of God, these kinds of 'signs' can be more accurately understood as manifestations of normal human parapsychological abilities that often occur in spatial or temporal clusters when there is a significant amount of emotional energy in the air. Drawing upon a century and a half of parapsychological research and several centuries of Catholic theological tradition (especially the work of Karl Rahner), Schwebel presents a compelling case for the normalcy of what is often considered to be the miraculous.

Schwebel considers manifestations of ghosts and apparitions, prophecies and visions, healings, and odd physical events like weeping statues and shows how each has traditionally been a part of religious mystical experience and yet is readily explainable as a manifestation of perfectly normal human psi abilities. "For every public claim of a miracle," she writes, "the same paranormal phenomena appear in nonreligious contexts across the general population." Often these secular appearances are "more spectacular than among their religious counterparts" (p. 27). As case studies, she analyzes thirteen different religious miracles, ranging from little-known, one-off events to the widely heralded miracle reports from Lourdes and Fatima.

Schwebel begins her analysis by considering the appearance of ghosts and apparitions. Such manifestations are practically the defining feature of mystical experiences and are usually considered special signs of Divine favor by the visionary (or visionaries) and their followers. However, she points out, 42% of adults say that they have seen a ghost or appariation, which means that these kinds of events are not really as special as religious claimants might suggest (p. 41). Even theological tradition, she says, recognizes that such events are