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PLATO'S THEOLOGY IN THE TIMAEUS 29E–30A

Abstract. In this paper the Platonic concepts of Goodness, Belief and Will as they appear in the passage 29d–30a of the Timeaus, are examined. The main intention is, through this examination, to explore whether — and, if yes, why — these notions constitute essential elements of Plato's theology.

Keywords. Plato's theology, Demiurge, God, Goodness, cosmos, myth.

In the passage 29d–30a of the Timeaus dialogue, one of the most famous of the entire Platonic corpus, Plato introduces the Demiurge as the Creator God of the cosmos. What makes the appearance of the Creator God of particular interest and gives it an extremely innovative character is the Plato's attempt, through the speaker Timaeus of the dialogue, to expand the reason for which God creates what exists, the cosmos.

Before proceeding further, a reminder is necessary here: from Aristotle on the term “theologia” is used to indicate the ultimate form, the highest

1 We use the name Timaeus in italics when we refer to the dialogue's name. When it is about the homonymous character of the dialogue, his name is written unmarked.

2 D. Sedley, suggests Timaeus as a nominee for “the title of the single most seminal philosophical text to emerge from the whole of antiquity” and doesn't hesitate to consider it as “the great manifesto of Platonism” (Sedley D. Hesiod's Theogony and Plato's Timeaus // Plato and Hesiod: Boys-Stones / eds G. R. Johannes, H. Haubold. Oxford, 2010. P. 246–258), while P. Shorey, declares that Timaeus is the chief source of cosmic emotion in European Literature (Shorey P. Platonism: Ancient and Modern. California, 1938. P. 92).

3 We haste to remark that the Demiurge of Plato, the God Creator of the Cosmos, does not appear in the Timaeus for the first time. R. D. Mohr (1985), mentions the several appearances of the Demiurge in the Republic VII (530a) as well as “at crucial junctures in all of the late, so-called 'critical' dialogues which expound positive doctrines, that is, the Sophist (265c–266d), Statesman (269c–273e), and Philebus (26e–27b, 28d–30e)” (Mohr R. D. Plato's Theology Reconsidered: What the Demiurge does // History of Philosophy Quarterly. 1985. Vol. 2, N 2. P. 30). However, only in the Timaeus Plato devotes a considerable description of the Demiurge's attributes, which, as Mohr suggests, must be considered literally.
principle of metaphysical thinking with implications for cosmology⁴. This fact allows to approaching a mainly cosmological Platonic work, the *Timaeus*, as one of the dialogues — carriers of Plato’s theological convictions.

A condition that appears in the entire ancient Greek philosophical thinking and consequently applies also to Plato, is that the creation of the cosmos does not imply *creatio ex nihilo*. As Sedley remarks, Plato would no more than any other ancient thinker allow generation out of literally nothing⁵.

Creation out of absolutely nothing seems to be a philosophical concept developed into a doctrine of faith only within the Christian philosophical tradition. Tollefsen, in his investigation of the Doctrine of Creation according to the Neoplatonic Christian philosopher Dionysius the Areopagite, suggests three fundamental conditions that a specifically Christian doctrine would require to be fulfilled. Namely: that: i) God created out of His own free will, ii) He did not create out of some eternally pre-existent substance, and iii) He created the world (matter and form) in such a way that it had a temporal beginning⁶.

If this is the case, one might wonder: under which specific presuppositions one is authorized to speak of the creation of the cosmos within the frame of the philosophy of Plato and especially the particular expression of this concept in the *Timaeus*.

An initial answer to this question can be found in *Timaeus* 29e, where Plato uses the verb «ξυνέστησεν» and the adjective «ξυνιστὰς» for activities of the Creator which primarily refer to the assembly of pre-existing material and not to generation or creation⁷. Despite the use of a terminology that seems to be common between Plato and the Biblical scriptures, one could claim that there is no room for identification of the Platonic concept of creation with the relevant Biblical tradition, since considerable differences appear between them. Kretzmann, for instance, in comparing Plato to Moses, presents noticeable differences between them the most relevant

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⁴ For the suggestion of the firm connection between cosmology and theology in Plato and Aristotle, the discussion on the notion of the will in late antiquity (see also n. 27), as well as the comments and fruitful remarks on the development of the argumentation in and the structure of this paper, I am indebted to my supervisors at the University of Oslo, Professors Eyjólfr K. Emilsson and Torstein T. Tollefsen.

⁵ Sedley D. Hesiod's Theogony and Plato's Timeaus. P. 250.


⁷ This remark is made by V. Kalfas in his comments on the *Timaeus* published, unfortunately, only in Greek (*Kalfas V.* Plato Timaeus / intr., trans., comm. by V. Kalfas. Athens, 1995).
of which to our discussion in this paper is that the activity of Timaeus’ Demiurge is “merely shaping and ordering matter that is already in existence”, instead of creating the world out of nothing as omnipotent.  

If one would like to explore the differences any further, an important indication of the difference between the Platonic and the Biblical concept of creation is the use by Plato of the past tense for the verb declaring the formation of cosmos: “ζυνέστησεν”. The verb Plato uses here, ‘συνίστημι’, indicates that the Demiurge constructs, that is puts things together. If we accept that putting things together implies the pre-existence of things that are to be put together, such a pre-existence is impossible within the Biblical and Christian doctrine on creation, as it has been already said. Given that, one should have to admit that what remains as an option for Plato when he speaks of the creation, is nothing more than establishing order — by giving forms — to the pre-existing chaotic matter.  

If we should try to reproduce the meaning of the Timaeus passage that interests us in a few words, we would say the following. Plato declares in brief that his intention is to announce the reason for which the Creator constructed the universe. As he proceeds immediately after his announcement he surprisingly introduces as the cause, or motif of the creation, a claim: namely that the Creator God was Good. This claim has a principal implication: the Creator God wished all that He creates, all that He brings from Chaos to Order, so to speak, to become like to Himself. Plato grounds this implication on this assumption that in Him who is good, there is no grudge that could ever arise for anything.

What so far appears as the main conception of the passage is the idea of Goodness as a metaphysical principle. However, this concept it is not

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9 In addition, one could also recall the opening of the Gospel of John: ‘Through Him all things were made, and without Him not one thing was made that has been made’ (1:3), which seems to imply that there is a beginning of the cosmos. This beginning is indicated by the difference between the eternity of the divine reality and the corruptibility of the physical cosmos.  
10 Tim. 29e: ‘Let us now state the Cause wherefore He that constructed it constructed Becoming and the All’. The original Greek text has the following: ‘Λέγωμεν δὴ δι’ ἦν τινα αἰτίαν γένεσιν καὶ τὸ πᾶν τὸδε ἡξυνεστῆσαν’. I use the original text and its English translation as presented by R. G. Bury, in the Loeb Classical Library Plato Series, Vol. 234, published in 1966.  
11 Tim. 29e: ‘He was good, and in Him that is good no envy ariseth ever concerning anything; and being devoid of envy He desired that all should be, so far as possible, like unto Himself’: ‘Αγαθὸς ἦν ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τοῦτον δ’ ἐκτὸς ὅν πάντα δ’ τι μάλιστα γενέσθαι ἐβουλήθη παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ’.
a new concept within Platonic thinking and worldview. Why, then, is it important to take the notion of Goodness into account on this very point?

It seems that Plato ascribes the concept of Goodness, which he already was referred to many times in the dialogues, as an attribute of God. This attribution becomes particularly interesting, if one also takes into consideration what has been said on the Good in the Republic where Plato formulates his famous suggestion that the Good is beyond substance, superior to it in terms of rank and power\(^\text{12}\).

The combination of these Platonic ideas and suggestions, in the aforementioned passage of the Timaeus and the Republic, leads us to understand that when Plato characterizes the God Creator as Good, he ascribes to Him a property, a faculty, which is in fact beyond all properties and faculties. If this claim is correct, then how is it possible to have a clear idea of what is the Creator’s God Goodness? Since His Goodness is beyond substance, we must think, or imagine, that this Goodness is, paradoxically speaking, a property that is a non-property; a property so unique that becomes rather identical to its carrier; an identity in such a way that God and Goodness are one and the same in Plato’s thinking.

Even if one could find it quite reasonable to accept the above hypothesis as an option for interpreting Plato’s notion of the Good in this very passage (Tim. 29e), we could still ask why does Plato choose this particular way to explain the creation of the cosmos? Namely, why does he introduce a notion that seems to be so unique that it deserves to be placed even far beyond the place above the heavens [ὑπερουράνιος τόπος]\(^\text{13}\)? Why is the Platonic Good placed not with but even beyond the ideas, and finally identified with the Creator God of the universe? And, most surprisingly, why Plato asks from us, to accept such an explanation? If it is true that Plato several times intentionally leads his audience towards a faith process, one might wonder, what is the reason for asking our acceptance in this passage?

Reading carefully the passage 29e–30a, one must not forget to pay attention to a warning Plato himself expresses quite often in many of his dialogues. When his narrative reaches a very difficult point he hastes to inform us that, given both the manner of expanding his ideas and his human nature, he is not able to develop his thought in a different narrative

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\(^{12}\) Rep. 509b: “the good is not being, but superior to it in rank and power”: ὁ ὄντος αὐτὸν ὄντος ὄντος, ὄντος ἄγαθον, ἀλλὰ ἐπέκεινα τῆς ὄντος πρεσβείας καὶ δυνάμει υπερέχον. The English translation I use here is suggested by G. M. A. Grube and revised by C. D. C. Reeve, in (Plato Complete Works / ed. by J. M. Cooper. Indianapolis, 1999. P. 1130). However, it seems to fail to reproduce the exact sense of the Greek. I think it is crucial to maintain the sense of ἐπέκεινα as beyond.

Therefore, what has been said must be taken as it is. It has to be accepted as a matter of faith. Plato seems to say that it cannot be described by any kind of logical explanation. On the contrary, he informs us that it is not possible to obtain any sort of evidential reasoning for the Goodness of God the Creator. This impossibility constitutes the reason that prompts us to accept the suggestion of the Creator God as the Good and His Goodness as precisely the cause of the creation of the cosmos.

Independently of the decision of accepting Plato’s suggestion or not, one might wonder at this point whether Plato, when he uses a metaphor, he does it on purpose, in order to indicate something, or he literally means what he suggests. If he intentionally uses a metaphor, then the Timaean setting of the Good God the Creator as the cause of the creation, seems to appear as an undoubtedly mythical construction. This hypothesis has been supported by several scholars and it seems that find a fair ground on Plato’s very words: likely accounts [εἰκότες λόγοι]15.

Plato seems to use a metaphor, a poetic image, a myth to describe the conditions of the creation of the cosmos. And in this case there is no reason to worry any further, since a myth, by nature, does not demand from anyone to proceed into a specific reasoning. A myth simply leaves much free space for many interpretations.

But, speaking of myth does not suggest that one should underestimate Plato’s metaphysical intuitions. Because a friend of myths is no less a friend of the wisdom and the truth. Besides, one should add to this what Aristotle has claimed in his Metaphysics. Namely, that myths are composed of miracles and wonders. And therefore, he who loves the myths is already a philosopher16. One might argue that Aristotle, in book 12 of his Metaphysics, does justice to Plato by admitting what characterizes the antiquity thought: that the Divine pervades the whole of nature in a philosophical notion maintained in the form of myth17.

14 Tim. 29d: “remembering that both I who speak and you who judge are but human creatures, so that it becomes us to accept the likely account of these matters and forbear to search beyond it”.

15 R. Hackforth, and L. Brisson, consider the Demiurge of the Timaeus as the mythical equivalent of the cosmic Nous (Hackforth R. Notes on some passages of Plato’s Timaeus // Classical Quarterly. 1944. Vol.38. P.33–40; Brisson L. Le Même et l’ Autre dans la structure ontologique du Timée de Platon. Paris, 1974). Moreover, V. Kalfas, seems to join those who reject a literary reading of the creation in the Timeus and argues for the need of decoding the text (Kalfas V. Plato Timaeus).

16 Aristot. Met. A, 982 β 17–19: ‘Now he who wonders and is perplexed feels that he is ignorant, thus the myth-lover is in a sense a philosopher, since myths are composed of wonders’.

17 Aristot. Met. IB, 1074 β 1–4: ‘A tradition has been handed down by the ancient thinkers of very early times, and bequeathed to posterity in the form of a myth, to the effect that these heavenly bodies are gods, and that the Divine pervades the whole of nature’.
Even if one feels confident to confirm that in this Timaeus passage Plato’s real intention is simply to develop a new version of cosmological theory by transforming and elaborating ancient and Presocratic cosmogonical myths, some reservation should be kept. Menn, attempts to show how Aristotle modifies Plato’s doctrine on the Good as the first divine principle and argues that Plato intends the Demiurge of the Timaeus as a real being, identical with the Nous of the Philebus and of the Laws’ book 12. He adds that although there are some things that may be mythically said about the Demiurge they do not make Him a ‘mythical character’.

Our claim is that Plato, by introducing the Goodness of God the Creator as the cause of the creation, namely as the cause of not excluding anything from the status of being good-like, tries to reconcile the world of Gods with humanity and the cosmos. What we suggest is that he tries to establish an argument for the unification of the physical with the metaphysical through the connecting bond of the beyond-all Goodness; and, to do so — if our hypothesis is correct — he needs to address theology. His theology is beyond the limits not only of physics but also of metaphysics. Having said in the Republic that the Good is beyond being, therefore beyond the ideas, namely beyond metaphysics, and by suggesting in the Timaeus that the Demiurge is Good, he seems to introduce theology as a path towards understanding of the creation of the cosmos. If that is correct, it seems that for Plato the creation of the cosmos by the Good God is a theological event. Nevertheless, theological events cannot be confirmed through evidential reasoning; that is why Plato prefers to speak with likely accounts, since they do not contain evidence, but they are evidence-like.

An assertion that strengthens our belief that only through likely accounts what we call theological aspects of Plato’s cosmology in the Timaeus can be developed, is found in Timaeus 28c. There Plato remarks that it is hard to find the Maker and the Father of the Universe and even if He can be found, it is impossible to describe Him to human beings. By reading this sentence, a first understanding is that it constitutes an indirect justification of the use of likely accounts and the theological approach of the creation.

However, this claim of Plato might easily surprise the reader and make him wonder: Is such a claim at all true? Or, is Plato really acting as an initiator who -being in a status of righteous fury- speaks under the influence of sacred inebriation?

Plato seems silently to admit that, even if hard, there is however a possibility for one to see the Father and the Maker of the Universe. His

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19 Tim. 28c: ‘Now to discover the Maker and Father of this Universe were a task indeed; and having discovered Him, to declare Him unto all men were a thing impossible’.
account indicates clearly that God the Creator is, at least, someone and, therefore, something more than a simple impersonal cause. But what makes it impossible to declare God the Creator to humans?

This impossibility can be understood in the following way. Declaring something to someone involves two parameters: (a) the subject that is declared and (b) the receiver of the announcement. With respect to (a) we have already mentioned that, according to Plato, there is an initial difficulty in finding the Maker. With regard to (b), the responsibility of accepting or discarding the announcement challenges exclusively the person who is involved in this process, the receiver. The use of the participle “ἀποδεχόμενος” and the verb “ἀποδέχοιτ᾽ ἂν” bears on the last mentioned aspect. At the same time, Plato claims that men of wisdom would have to accept [ἀποδέχοιτ’ ἂν] the Good Demiurge as the Maker of the Cosmos and as its Supreme Principle.20

We notice that in this passage the term of acceptance is used twice, and instead of the term evidence. Acceptance seems to be the only way of recognizing the Good Demiurge as the Creator of the Universe. Acceptance of likely accounts [εἰκότα μ.rdfν ἀποδεχομένος] is introduced as the only appropriate way to learning about the Gods and the generation of the Universe.21

If true knowledge about Gods and the generation of the Universe may be obtained, then the careful reader of the Timaeus might hold that Plato has already reached that point, since he seems fully aware of the relevant difficulties. Therefore, he knows that the truth cannot be captured through an evidential reasoning. Because evidential reasoning is not sufficient to that, Plato seems to suggest the receptivity of human beings as the path towards the truth.

Of course, one might reasonably wonder about the validity of our hypothesis. However, this hypothesis is not an arbitrary one: it is grounded upon a declaration Plato has set up earlier. Namely, that there is a relation of analogy between becoming and being, belief and truth.22 Irrespective of the ways this sentence can be analyzed, what is rather clear here is the presence of two groups of notions: the one could be characterized ontological (the pair becoming — being) and the other epistemological (the pair belief — truth).23

20 Tim. 29e: “This principle, then, we shall be wholly right in accepting from men of wisdom as being above all the supreme originating principle of Becoming and the Cosmos.”
21 Tim. 29d.
22 Tim. 29c: “for as Being is to Becoming, so is Truth to Belief.”
23 R. G. Bury (1929), comments that the first pair of notions recapitulates something fundamental in Platonic philosophy, namely the distinction between Being and Becoming. Being is changeless, eternal, self-existent, apprehensible by thought only. Becoming is the
But what is the meaning of this analogy, of this comparison? To answer this question one should consider Plato’s assertion that the Demiurge, in order to give form to the formless, sees towards that which never changes and remains always as it is [τὸ ἀϊδίον], and according to that creates the most fair among all that have come into existence [(κόσμος) κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων]²⁴. That which always is and never changes, namely the being, has its opposite; that which is always under change, therefore it is nothing, but paradoxically exists as change, namely the becoming. To understand better the above analogy, we should take into consideration the existence of two different concrete levels here: the one of the substance [οὐσία] and the other of the continuous becoming [γίγνεσθαι].

One could interpret Plato’s statement that the Truth is to Belief what Being is to Becoming, by saying that the Truth corresponds to Being, while the Belief to Becoming. Being — in order to be apprehensible for the human being — demands completely different capacities than Becoming. The first is apprehensible by thought with the aid of reasoning, since it is ever uniformly existent, while the second is an object of opinion with the aid of unreasoning sensation, since it becomes and perishes and is never really existent²⁵. 

Now, if we agree that human beings are located ontologically on the level of becoming while the Good Demiurge is the real Being, then it seems that the faculty the human being has in its disposition for seeking the truth is belief. In this respect, Plato seems to argue that unless we accept the likely accounts, there is no other way of speaking of the Demiurge. This claim can be formulated with the following assumption: there are things that cannot be explained, but only believed. Why this is so? Because the relation of Becoming to Being is such as the relation of Belief to Truth. And, therefore, only under the condition of belief can those who exist within becoming speak of the truth, namely of the Goodness of the Demiurge.

Let us now turn to the will, which also appears in the passage 29e–30a of the Timaeus. Like the notion of acceptance, Plato uses the notion of the will with the verb ‘ἐβουλήθη’ and the participle ‘βουληθείς’. These two notions are ascribed to the Demiurge²⁶. A long discussion can be developed about the question whether the participle βουληθείς or the verb ἐβουλήθη can correlate with the concept of the will as it has been developed in ancient Greek philosophy and later on, when it appears as

²⁴ Tim. 29a.
²⁵ Tim. 28a.
²⁶ Tim. 29e: ‘He desired that all should be…’ and Tim. 30a: ‘For God desired that…’
definite property of human beings. Moreover, is there any similarity of the will of Plato’s Demiurge with the concept of the will developed within early medieval philosophy?

These questions can hardly be handled within the limits of this paper. However, what is quite relevant to our approach here, is the following: does the participle βουληθείς have any connection with freedom? Is there any assignment of a faculty of will to the Good Demiurge that could imply that He is free? And, if yes, to what extent is He free? Or is this will subject to something else? And, if yes, what would that be?

The will seems to be subject to necessity. When one reads the term ἐξ ἀνάγκης in Tim. 28b, one might think that since existing things are necessarily beautiful, they should also be necessarily good. Nevertheless, the necessity involved in Tim. 28b1 seems to be a conditioned one: if the Maker look at the beautiful model, his product is necessarily beautiful as well. There is nothing about the question whether he necessarily looks at his model or whether he makes even if he looks. That question can be raised from considerations about his nature. We are told that the Demiurge is good and ungrudging. Hence, he looks at the best model and actually makes something. Does he do that out of necessity? Despite if one disagrees that such a question is really raised in the Timaeus, it seems not completely unfounded to examine whether a necessity does occur at the level of God the Creator, or not.

But what does the text really mean? Is it the case that the will, as it appears in this passage, applies both at the level of real being, namely on God the Creator, and the level of human beings that exist in the region of becoming, the level of the world?

Necessity is the state governing the preexisting material. One could imagine the necessity as creating specific conditions. These conditions force the Maker to take them into account prior to proceeding to the formatting of the cosmos according to His own Goodness. There is no escape from this necessity. It exists with the matter. Whether this necessity has the potential to prompt the Demiurge to create because it is good to create, is not clear. But it seems that the Good Creator creates goods because of His free will and not because this is required by the necessity that arises from His goodness.

27 There is a general consensus among scholars that there is no notion of will in Plato and Aristotle. Most scholars attribute its introduction to early Christian authors. Recently, Michael Frede has attributed it to the later Stoics, in his much contributing on the notion of the will Sather Lectures in the University of Berkeley, California (A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought / ed. by A. A. Long, foreword by D. Sedley. London, 2012).

28 Tim. 28a: ‘when the artificer of any object, in forming its shape and quality, keeps his gaze fixed on that which is uniform, using a model of this kind, that object, executed in this way, must of necessity be beautiful’.
To conclude, when one carefully reads the passage that explains the creation of the world by the Goodness of God the Creator, one might recognize the power of the philosophy of Plato. Plato uses a very vivid way of expanding his ideas about the creation. The questions I tried to formulate within this paper show that it is not always easy for one to rescue the vividness of philosophy. One could might agree that in the *Timaeus* 29e–30a Plato has put himself in the hard exercise of raising questions that go far beyond philosophical contemplation.

In this respect, Platonic theology, as it is developed by Plato's philosophical mind, seems to intend not to give the correct answers, but, rather, to formulate the proper questions. As proper questions we consider those which leave free room to revelation. And if Plato's real intention is to reveal, through the Goodness, the Belief and the Will, the Maker and the Father of the Universe, one, then, could regard the above terms as elements of Plato's theology.
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