

How to Judge Intentionally

Contrary to popular philosophical belief, judgment can indeed be an intentional action. That's because an intentional judgment, even one with content *p*, need not be intentional as a *judgment that p*. It can instead be intentional just as a *judgment wh-* for some specific *wh-* question—e.g. a *judgment of which x is F* or a *judgment whether p*. This paper explains how this is possible by laying out the means by which you can perform such an intentional action. This model of intentional judgment does not stand in tension with the fact that judgment is causally regulated for truth, and that it is correct only if it is true. On the contrary, the structure of intentional action explains how an intentional judgment has these features. An extended example is developed, and sufficient conditions on intentional judgment are laid out.

It has seemed to most philosophers that it is impossible to judge intentionally, as a necessary matter. Due to judgment's essential connection to truth, many have argued that it is not possible to *judge that p* intentionally.

But even if it is fully *conceptually* impossible to *judge that p* intentionally, though, that does not rule out intentional judgment more broadly. In particular, the impossibility of intentional *judgment that p* does not rule out the possibility of intentional *judgment wh-* for any *wh-* question, such as *judgment of which x is F* or *judgment whether p*. This has not yet been recognized in philosophical discussions of agency in judgment.

Here's the plan for this paper. In §1 I characterize judgment, intentional action, and a common argument against the possibility of intentional *judgment that p*. In §2 I distinguish intentional *judgment that p* and intentional *judgment wh-* to show why that common argument doesn't threaten the possibility of the latter. In §3 I set aside the possibility that intentional *judgment wh-* could be a basic action—an action to which you take no intentional means—and explain

what it would take for intentional *judgment wh-* to be performed as a nonbasic action instead. In §4 I describe one case of intentional *judgment wh-* as a nonbasic action. In §5 I generalize from this case to give sufficient conditions on intentional *judgment wh-*.

1. The Challenge

To get an initial grip on the nature of judgment, think of it as the event-like analogue of belief. A judgment happens at a given moment in time and belief does not happen at all, since it is a state and not an event. But judgment and belief share the same types of contents, as well as their attitudinal aspect.

More precisely, here are some necessary and sufficient conditions on judgment. Any mental event that

- (i) has as its object a proposition (in conceptual form),
- (ii) is causally regulated for the truth of that proposition, and
- (iii) is correct only if that proposition really is true

counts as a judgment. These conditions have been adapted from Shah and Velleman (2005). As they have persuasively argued, these two types of governance together capture the sense in which a judgment that *p* involves ‘taking’ something to be true, and thus distinguish judgment from other mental acts with propositional contents. I’ll follow them in these points too.

Shah and Velleman also take features (i) – (iii) to be constitutive of judgment. To have the concept of judgment, they argue, is to understand these, and to take these to be necessary and sufficient features of judgment. I will follow them on this point as well, but not because it will matter for the purposes of showing that intentional judgment is possible; all that matters there is that (i) – (iii) are *sufficient* conditions on judgment.¹ Rather, I will follow them on

¹ Similarly, it won’t matter how fundamental these conditions are. A mental event with features (i) – (iii) might count as a judgment only because (i) – (iii) all derive from more fundamental dispositions, commitments, or functional relationships. All that needs to be shown, given these simple sufficient conditions, is that a mental action can constitute an *intentional* instance of a mental event with (i) – (iii).

this point because it makes it simpler to argue that intentional *judgment that p*, under that very aspect, is impossible. My goal is to show that even the strongest form of impossibility—conceptual impossibility—of intentional *judgment that p* does not rule out intentional *judgment wh-*.

Now consider what an intentional action is. An intentional action is something you do intentionally. After Bratman (1984), philosophers of action still disagree about whether every instance of an intentional ϕ -ing involves acting on an intention to ϕ . Still, all can agree that any successful—and so non-deviant—execution of an intention to ϕ counts as an intentional ϕ -ing. Successfully executing an intention to ϕ involves acting on an intention to ϕ , which is a conceptual representation of ϕ -ing. Acting on an intention to ϕ involves setting an evaluative standard on an actual attempt to ϕ : the attempt is a success if it constitutes a ϕ -ing, and a failure otherwise. Acting on an intention also, crucially, involves causally guiding that attempt to ϕ towards actually constituting a ϕ -ing.²

With these characterizations of judgment and intentional action on hand, we can now understand why many philosophers have thought that judgment cannot be an intentional action. Here is this line of argument in summary, abstracted away from various details that vary across versions. This general type of argument is usually traced back to Bernard Williams (1973), and it usually concerns belief, but it can be adapted readily to threaten the possibility of intentional judgment.

Consider first what it is to judge or to believe something as a matter of intentional action: that would involve acting on an intention to judge something. Having some such intention involves exercising an adequate concept of judgment, which itself would require representation of judgment's necessary connection with truth. But to think of what you would be doing in this way—as constrained by truth in its correctness conditions and in its

² On guidance see Frankfurt (1978). The point about the dual role of intention is from Anscombe (1957). Cf. Ford, Hornsby, and Stoutland (2014), Frost (2019), Moran (2004), Paul (2009), Schwenkler (2015), and Setiya (2016).

generation conditions—makes it incoherent for you simply to pick a content p , and intend to judge that p . What you come to judge intentionally and so self-consciously *as* a judgment must be directed by what you take to be the truth. What must determine the content of a genuine judgment, then, cannot be your acting on some specific intention to judge that p , but rather the truth of the matter, conceived of by you as controlling that content. To put the main point very roughly, this argument claims that (what you take to be) the truth, rather than you, must control any judgment of yours.

A lot has been said to criticize this line of reasoning; partly in response to various criticisms, many different versions of this argument have been proposed.³ Some such arguments end up weakening the conclusion, so the *conceptual* impossibility involved in the conclusion above mutates into merely a metaphysical or perhaps even a causal impossibility. The goal here is not to dispute these niceties. To defend the possibility of intentional judgment, I'll simply accept the strongest possible conclusion of this kind of argument: that it is *conceptually* impossible to *judge that p* intentionally. Even this conclusion does not rule out the possibility of intentional judgment more generally.

Why should it matter whether we can judge intentionally—or, more generally, whether we have any agency in judgment at all? The issue is one of fundamental philosophical importance in its own right, but it also has further ramifications. Genuine epistemic norms seem to constrain the way we make

³ Some, like Williams (1973), say that judging that p or believing that p “at will” is impossible. Others say that “voluntary” judgment that p or “voluntary” belief that p is impossible—see Bennett (1990), p.90; Hieronymi (2009), p.146; McHugh (2011), p.251; Toribio (2011), p.349. Some restrict the thesis further. McHugh (2011) writes that you cannot voluntarily judge that p as a basic action. Shah and Velleman (2005) say that what is impossible is judging that p or believing that p voluntarily “without regard to whether p is true” (p.504). Williams (1973) and Toribio (2011) say you cannot judge that p or believe that p voluntarily, without regard to the truth of p , while you are aware of doing that. Dorsch (2009), Bennett (1990), and Hieronymi (2006, 2009) deny you can voluntarily judge that p without intervening to manage your belief states in non-truth-focused ways. Bennett (1990) puts this point in terms of “producing some intervening event that will lead to your getting the belief” (p.89). Dorsch (2009) puts it in terms of “performing another action which deliberately exploits passive effects” (p.38). Hieronymi (2006, 2009) influentially puts it in terms of an exercise of “managerial,” not “evaluative,” control. Two philosophers who explicitly discuss intentional judgment are Setiya (2008) and Yamada (2012). Cf. Strawson (2003); O’Shaughnessy (1980) p.544; Friedman (2019b, 2020), Jenkins (2021), Moran (2001, 2003, 2004), and Owens (2000).

judgments—and, correspondingly, the way that we form, maintain, and revise our beliefs. But if we have no agency in judgment, it is not obvious why it should make sense to apply genuine norms to judgments, or to beliefs. Moreover, we treat the capacity to judge as a person-level cognitive capacity. Understanding judgment as something that you can do intentionally offers a ready way of understanding how *you* are involved in your doxastic set.

Recognizing arguments against the possibility of intentional judgment, while also seeing the importance of epistemic norms and the role of the self in judgment, several philosophers have proposed competing theories of agency in judgment—ones that don't involve judgment's being intentional as such.⁴ It is not possible to do justice to all such theories in a reasonably short space, so I will not summarize these here. Instead, I offer the proposed view of intentional judgment as an alternative to these extant theories.

There are some philosophers—e.g. Lucy O'Brien, Christopher Peacocke, Ernest Sosa, and Matthew Soteriou—who allow the possibility of intentional judgment, or something much like it.⁵ But none has engaged significantly with the arguments against this possibility, so I will set these views aside too. Each can be supplemented with the picture of intentional judgment I provide below.

2. Intentional Judgment *Wh-*

Even given that intentional *judgment that p* is conceptually impossible. But this does imply that there is *no* kind of intentional action that could constitute a judgment that *p*. To see that there is yet room for a picture of genuinely intentional judgment, we need to understand the difference between intentional *judgment that p* and other forms of intentional judgment. My claim here is that you can successfully act on an intention with less determinate demands, which does not initially specify the content to be judged as *p*. For instance: you can

⁴ For some such developed approaches, see: Boyle (2011); Hieronymi (2006, 2009); Korsgaard (2009); McDowell (1998); McHugh (2011, 2013); Moran (2001, 2004); O'Brien (2007); Strawson (2003); Toribio (2011).

⁵ See O'Brien (2005), Soteriou (2013) p.246ff., Peacocke (2008) and (2009) Ch.6, and Sosa (2015), especially Chs. 3, 7, and 9.

successfully execute an intention to *judge whether p*, or to *judge which thing is F*, or to *judge wh-* for all sorts of *wh-* questions. To do that does imply that you make a judgment with some more determinate content—say, *p*—but it does not imply that you *judge that p* intentionally.

To see the difference, consider a point from classic action theory. Anything that you do intentionally might also constitute an intentional action of another kind, but not every token of a new event-type that your action constitutes will also count as an intentional action of yours.⁶ Here's an example adapted from Donald Davidson. On returning home in the evening, you might intentionally *flip the light switch*. Given the electrical wiring of your house, your action of intentionally *flipping the light switch* can also constitute an instance of another kind of action: an instance of intentionally *turning on the lights*. If, unbeknownst to you, there is also a prowler in your house, this intentional action might also constitute an event of *alerting the prowler to your presence*. But that event itself is not here an *intentional* alerting of the prowler to your presence.

Similarly, an event that executes your intention to *judge whether p*, or your intention to *judge which thing is F*, might indeed constitute a *judgment that p* without thereby constituting an *intentional judgment that p*.

Another aspect of the comparison with intentional bodily action is important too. When a given event constitutes your performing an intentional action, that event will have an indefinite number of determinate properties that are *not* specified by the intention you thereby execute.⁷ For instance, any flip of the light switch will be a flip with some determinate associated force—say, 1.23 Newtons. That light switch flip can be intentional as a light flip switch, and the event that executes it can have this determinate force of 1.23N, while it is *not* the case that you intentionally *flipped the light switch with a force of 1.23N*. You might leave the determination of specific applied force to the skillful motor routines your body runs when you execute that intention.

Along the same lines, a judgment might be intentional as a *judgment of which*

⁶ Cf. Anscombe (1957) and Davidson (1963/2001).

⁷ Compare Toribio (2011), pp.353-4.

thing is F, and the event that executes that intention might have a determinate content that *p*, even though it is *not* the case that you thereby intentionally *judge that p*, with that determinacy. In intentionally *judging which thing is F*, you might leave up the maximally determinate content *p* or *not p* up to some distinct process or mental procedure. Below I develop an example to illustrate how this works, and how it can make sense of positive epistemic requirements. For now, it's worth simply recognizing the possibility of intentional *judgment wh-* that is not also intentional *judgment that p*.

3. Nonbasic Action

How exactly could you perform an intentional *judgment wh-*? This kind of intentional action must be either a basic action—i.e. an action performed not by intentionally performing any other type of action—or a nonbasic action, one performed by performing another type of action intentionally.

While philosophers of action disagree about the nature of basic action—or whether it even exists—there is a rough point of agreement on this score.⁸ Good candidates for basic actions are things you do without insight into *how* you do them, such as raising an index finger. To say that these are basic actions is not to say that there is no more determinate description of what happens when you do them; we might give a complex description of the workings of motor neurons involved in raising your index finger. To say that an action is basic is just to say that these events are not *themselves* intentional actions of yours.

Could you intentionally *judge wh-* as a basic action? It's not clear to me either way, but I'll set aside the possibility for now.⁹ It would be much more difficult to explain how *judgment wh-* can be performed at all if there is no (intentional) *way* in which you perform this intentional action. The best case to explain, in defending intentional *judgment wh-*, is nonbasic intentional *judgment wh-*. For

⁸ Danto (1963) is the locus classicus for contemporary discussions of basic action. Sandis (2010) offers a good overview of discussions since then. Lavin (2013) and Thompson (2008) take a minority position against basic action; see Frost (2016) for powerful responses.

⁹ McHugh (2011) thinks there can be no judgment as a basic action (p.251). Sosa (2015) seems to think that judgment as an intentional action is usually a basic action (p.163ff.).

present purposes, then, we should find something *else* you can do intentionally that can serve as your means to intentionally *judging wh-*.

To do that, you must take some means that constitutes, rather than merely causes, your intentional *judgment wh-*. Intentionally ψ -ing, where ψ -ing merely *causes* your ϕ -ing, is not a way to ϕ intentionally.¹⁰ Here's Kieran Setiya (2008):

It is a necessary truth about [nonbasic] action that if one does *A* by doing *B*, doing *B* is a *constitutive not productive* means to doing *A*: It is an *instance* of doing *A* or a *part of the process* of doing *A*, not just a prior cause that makes it happen. That is why, although I can cause myself to blush by dropping my trousers in public, I do not count as blushing intentionally. (p.41)

Like almost all philosophers of action, I accept this point.¹¹

Consider, then, what it takes to ϕ intentionally as a nonbasic action. For that, it is sufficient that you

- (a) successfully execute an intention to ψ
- (b) *as a means* to ϕ -ing, where
- (c) ψ -ing really does constitute an instance of ϕ -ing—in the way you intend and because of the way you intend it.

We can use these conditions to see how judgment can be intentional: we can identify something you can do intentionally, describe how you can take that as a *means* to intentional judgment, and then explain how taking that means really does constitute a judgment in your circumstances in the way you intend.

Here's an example. You can *do a goofy dance* intentionally as a means to *making your niece laugh*. Your *doing a goofy dance* is, here, your attempt to *make your niece laugh*. Your ultimate intention to *make your niece laugh* in this way guides how you *do a goofy dance*. If your *doing a goofy dance* doesn't also constitute an instance of *making your niece laugh*—say, if she doesn't laugh—then your *doing a goofy dance* is a failure as a means to *making your niece laugh*.

¹⁰ For more on the need for constitutive means see Baier (1970) and Small (2019).

¹¹ For dissent, Kelley (forthcoming). Setiya (2008) thinks you can only ever take productive means to judgment—that is, by engaging in inquiry. That's why he thinks that judging itself cannot be an intentional action.

For your ψ -ing to count as a constitutive means to your *intentional* ϕ -ing, your ψ -ing cannot constitute your ϕ -ing by accident. If it did, then your ϕ -ing by ψ -ing would not count as an *intentional* ϕ -ing; it would be too lucky. For instance, if your goofy dance made your niece laugh only because you inadvertently tickled her in dancing, your *doing a goofy dance* would not constitute your making your niece laugh *intentionally*.

What more should we say about how means constitute intentional actions to rule out this kind of luck? That's partly because the way you guided your goofy dancing to make your niece laugh isn't what made it the case that your goofy dancing made her laugh. In other words, your making your niece laugh didn't happen *in the way you intended*—thus the subcondition of (c).

These reflections suggest the following lesson. In any nonbasic action, you need to have at least a tacit conception of *how* your ψ -ing is to constitute a ϕ -ing in this context—a conception which also guides the way in which you ψ .¹² Call this a “practical conception.” Now, not all means taken to ϕ -ings are viable means to intentional ϕ -ing, so we'll need a further distinction among practical conceptions. Call “executable” all and only those conceptions that really do as a matter of fact represent ways for your ψ -ing to constitute your ϕ -ing in your circumstances.

Say you intend to *turn the key* in order to *unlock the door*. To act on this intention, you need to have a practical conception of some way in which your turning the key is to be an unlocking of the door. To unlock the door *intentionally*, this conception must be executable. Not any key-turn will do; you need to turn the key in a certain direction, to a certain angle. If this executable practical conception guides that very key turn in just that way and as a result it constitutes unlocking the door, then turning the key is the way you intentionally unlock the door. In a case of success, your means (*turning the key*) constitutes your *unlocking the door* in the way you intend and *because* of your

¹² This also applies to ‘punctate’ actions. Cf. Vendler (1957) on achievements, Geach (1969), and Soteriou (2013), Chs. 2 and 10.

intending it in that way—since your practical conception guides that key turn.

The task facing us now is to identify something you can do intentionally as a means to a *judgment wh-* which can constitute an intentional *judgment wh-*.

Intentionally *judging that p* would certainly count as a constitutive means to intentionally *judging wh-*, but we've already ruled out that you could take any such means.¹³

Shah and Velleman (2005) also rule out another possible constitutive means. Perhaps you could intentionally *judge whether p* by trying to come to “an acceptance of *p* if and only if that acceptance would be correct in virtue of *p*'s being true.” The problem is that “pursuit of that aim would entail first ascertaining whether *p* is true,” and so already to judge that *p*.¹⁴

What we seem to need is a constitutive means to *judging wh-* which does not itself already involve making a judgment.¹⁵ This might sound absurd. Aren't we specifically looking for an action type that is a sub-type of judgment?

We are not, and this is the critical point—a point on which the entire argument in this paper turns. An intentional ψ -ing can constitute an intentional ϕ -ing in a particular context even if ψ -ing is not generally a subtype of ϕ -ing. That's because using ψ -ing as a means to ϕ -ing can be part of what makes your ψ -ing constitute a ϕ -ing in the first place.

Let's make another foray into action theory to understand this possibility.

What is it to use an action type as a means to another? You use ψ -ing as a means to ϕ -ing when you intentionally ϕ by intentionally ψ -ing. Your means ψ -ing constitutes your attempt to ϕ . Your intention to ϕ sets a standard on your performance of that ψ -ing: your ψ -ing is a success as a means to ϕ -ing just in case it constitutes a ϕ -ing, and a failure in that respect otherwise. Your intention

¹³ You are not even able to intentionally *judge that p* even when you already think *p* is true. To formulate that intention is already to make it moot. Cf. Setiya (2008), pp.48-9; Boyle (2011), pp. 2-3, 17-19, 22-23; Hieronymi (2009), pp.157; Müller (1992), pp.177-8.

¹⁴ Shah and Velleman (2005), pp.519-20. Compare Müller (1992), pp.177-8.

¹⁵ Setiya (2008), p.51, note 27. He writes of “intentionally forming-a-belief-about-the-question-whether-*p*,” which is a form of judgment, “it is hard to imagine ... what constitutive means we could take to this oddly indeterminate act.”

to ϕ also causally guides how you ψ towards being a ϕ -ing.

Now to the pivotal point. Sometimes your having a practical conception of how your means ψ -ing is to constitute your ϕ -ing is part of what *makes* that ψ -ing constitute a ϕ -ing at all. This is the case when simply thinking of your action in a certain way is part of what makes that action constitute another action type as well. Let's turn to an example of this important phenomenon.

Consider *carving a whistle* in order to *make a gift*. Carving a whistle can, but need not, constitute making a gift. When you do use *carving a whistle* as a means to *making a gift*, the former can simply constitute the latter—as long as you specify, in your practical conception, that the whistle just is to be the gift. There is nothing particularly mysterious about this: your *thinking* of something you are making as a gift in a certain way is enough to make that hand-crafted item into a gift, even before it is given. Your practical conception's specification of the whistle to be carved as identical to the gift to be made is an essential part of what makes it the case that the carving of the whistle constitutes the making of a gift. To use the terminology introduced above: your having this practical conception is part of what *makes* it executable.¹⁶

Seeing the possibility of this kind of case extends the range of potential options for constitutive means to intentional judgment.

4. A Case of Intentional Judgment

To see how you can judge intentionally, first consider how you can *think a true thought* intentionally.

Say you intend to *think a true thought of Nietzsche's given name*—i.e. a true thought that *X was Nietzsche's given name*, for some name *X*. What means could you take to do that? You could intentionally call to mind the given name you associate with “Nietzsche.” Assume for the sake of this example that you uniquely associate the given name “Friedrich” with “Nietzsche.”

Generally, a thought of just a name does not have a propositional content.

¹⁶ This is an adaptation of a point in [REDACTED FOR ANONYMOUS REVIEW].

But that does not preclude this action's being used as a *means* to thinking a true thought of Nietzsche's given name. You just need a practical conception that is executable. As explained above, having this practical conception can be part of what makes it executable.

Your practical conception could simply represent the given name you associate with Nietzsche as being that name *n* in a true thought that *n was Nietzsche's given name*. In acting on this practical conception, you intend to judge of whatever name you associate with "Nietzsche" that *it is Nietzsche's given name*. What remains for you to do is just to find that name to fill in.

In calling to mind "Friedrich" to execute your intention to *call to mind the given name you associate with "Nietzsche,"* your practical conception already relates that associated given name as *X* in a true thought of *X was Nietzsche's given name*. When you call to mind "Friedrich," then, there's nothing *additional* you need to do to *think a true thought of Nietzsche's given name*; your thought of "Friedrich" also constitutes a thought that *"Friedrich" was Nietzsche's given name*.¹⁷ The practical conception on which you act—that is, the way you intend for your means to constitute your thinking a particular true thought—partly makes itself executable.

To see how this ultimate mental action is intentional, return to those sufficient conditions on intentional action from §1. Let's fill in the variables with the action types in the example. For you to *think a true thought of Nietzsche's given name* intentionally, it is sufficient for you to

- (a) successfully execute an intention to *call to mind the given name you associate with "Nietzsche"*
- (b) *as a means* to *thinking a true thought of Nietzsche's given name*, where
- (c) *calling to mind the given name you associate with "Nietzsche"* really does constitute an instance of *thinking a true thought of Nietzsche's given name* in

¹⁷ Note that you uniquely determine the content of the thought you will have via your choice of constitutive means. You determine that content under one guise in your intention itself, and a distinct guise in *executing* that intention. This is a possibility missed by both Müller (1992) and Strawson (2003).

the way you intend and because of the way you intend it.

That you do (a) and (b) is simply given in the example, and (b) demands that you have at least a tacit practical conception of how your means is to constitute *thinking a true thought of Nietzsche's given name*. Condition (c) is the most interesting here: it is because you take *the given name you associate with "Nietzsche"*—that name you intend to call to mind—just to be Nietzsche's real given name that the one action can constitute the other action as well. The relation between your name-associations and the truth of your judgment is well captured by your practical conception, so you successfully execute your ultimate intention to *think a true thought of Nietzsche's given name* in the way you intend. In other words, you do that intentionally.

This nonbasic action is not an intentional *judgment*, since you don't perform it in executing an intention to *judge*. But it is a judgment—just not an intentional one.

To see why, recall those sufficient conditions on judgment from §1. Any mental event that

- (i) has as its object a proposition (in conceptual form),
- (ii) is causally regulated for the truth of that proposition, and
- (iii) is correct only if that proposition really is true

counts as a judgment. Here, your mental action has the content "*Friedrich*" was *Nietzsche's given name*, so (i) is fulfilled. You came to that thought via taking a means you took (rightly) to deliver Nietzsche's true given name, so (ii) is fulfilled. And this thought meets (iii) because it counts as a *success* only if it is executes your intention to *think a true thought of Nietzsche's given name*. This intention sets up truth as a necessary standard of correctness.

We can now extend this case to see how you can use *calling to mind the given name you associate with "Nietzsche"* as a means to intentionally *judging what Nietzsche's given name was*.

To do that intentionally, you need to have the concept JUDGMENT. If you have that concept, you can recognize as sufficient conditions precisely those

same conditions (i) – (iii). To perform a judgment intentionally, then, you can set out to *think a true thought* of some kind by taking a truth-directed means. That is just what you do by intentionally *calling to mind the given name you associate with “Nietzsche”* as a means to *thinking a true thought of Nietzsche’s given name*. You can simply use the same means as before—nesting it, now, inside yet another intention—to intentionally *judge what Nietzsche’s given name was*. It is no accident that doing all that constitutes a genuine judgment of Nietzsche’s given name, and so your judgment of Nietzsche’s given name is indeed an *intentional* judgment of the same.

5. Sufficient Conditions on Intentional Judgment

This individual case suggests the following sufficient conditions on intentional judgment. To intentionally *judge wh-* for some wh- question Q , it is sufficient that you:

- (1) successfully execute an intention to ψ with content x
- (2) *as a means to thinking a true thought that $F(x)$* (such that any $F(x)$ answers Q), where
- (3) ψ -ing really does constitute *thinking a true thought that $F(x)$* in the way you intend, and
- (4) you do all that *as a means to judging wh- with content x* .

In any case of intentional judgment it will matter, then, that there is some contentful action type ψ that you can clearly perform intentionally. It matters that you can use ψ -ing as a means to fulfilling an intention to *think a true thought that $F(x)$* , where x is given by your ψ -ing and F is a function specified by your practical conception. The fact that this intention demands a *true* thought is also important. It is partly because you subject that ψ -ing to the standard of success given by this intention that your ψ -ing ends up constituting a judgment, by fulfilling the sufficient conditions (i) – (iii) from §1.

Nothing said here implies that you can *judge that p* intentionally, at will, or

voluntarily. Nor does it imply that you can *judge wh-* for each and every *wh-* question you can entertain. All that this shows is that intentional *judgment wh-* is possible. My hope is that recognizing this possibility can help us understand the agency you bear with respect to your doxastic set, and thereby help us understand why norms apply to judgment at all.

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[One source redacted for anonymous review]

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