Introduction

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This volume is meant to contribute to an intercultural understanding of human rights in the context of India and its relationship to the West.¹ It is distinct in that it is multi-layered, addressing meta-ethical, normative, social, legal, and political issues in the theory, application, and implementation of human rights. Although there is extensive literature on human rights in the field of African, East-Asian, and Islamic studies, there is a comparative dearth of conceptual research relating to South Asia, and in particular, the sub-continent of India.² Moreover, most of the prior research that exists in this area is mainly of an empirical and sociological nature. The present approach is multi-layered and multi-disciplinary, with a special focus on conceptual issues in ethical, political, and legal discourse. Much of the previous literature on human rights and non-Western understandings has explored the manner in which human rights may be supported from within these frameworks, which is an important post-Eurocentric step to take. The essays in this volume pioneer an approach that takes a further step, asking what the West may learn about human rights from non-Western societies.
The legitimacy of the international legal order and state sovereignty is increasingly premised on the discourse and practice of human rights. Purported violations are seen to warrant and justify coercive intervention. The importance of human rights appears uncontroversial: such rights seek to specify the conditions under which human beings in society can live a minimally decent life; they are thought to apply universally and cross-culturally. The motivation for recognizing and realizing such rights arose in the aftermath of World War II. The *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR) (1948) specifies an extensive list of basic and fundamental rights that all civilized nations must recognize as authoritative.

Given the purpose of the Declaration in specifying an extensive list of basic and universal rights and freedoms, one would assume that deliberation on such a critical matter would include the widest range of parties from as many diverse traditions as possible. After all, the Declaration is supposed to concern the ‘human family’, ‘all peoples and nations’, in ‘the spirit of brotherhood’ (UDHR 1948). Yet it is well known that the UDHR was drafted on the basis of little consultation with non-European peoples and nations. From its very inception, the Declaration has been criticized as parochial. Many non-Western peoples contend that this particular interpretation of the basic universal values underlying the Declaration, their definition and their prioritization, and indeed, their very articulation in terms of the language and philosophy of rights is not cross-culturally shared. The Declaration strikes many as biased in favour of Euro-Western forms of social organization and governance, individualism, and liberalism. Such an objection usually further contends that demanding that non-Western nations comply with a document which they had no role in drafting perpetuates a Western imperialist colonial discourse that uncritically presumes that Western norms set the standard and non-European peoples must simply conform. Such a presumption hinders international intercultural dialogue on one of the most meaningful, necessary, and crucial issues of our times.

A common response from some Westerners is to interpret such a challenge as a wholesale rejection of human rights and the basic values and principles that underlie such rights. It is assumed that this challenge is a disingenuous mask for the arbitrary abuse of political power, a cover for nefarious self-interested intentions. While such
a response may certainly be warranted in specific cases, it relies too heavily on over-generalization and ignores serious underlying concerns.

The charge of parochialism is often a demand for basic equality and a seat at the table: to have one’s voice heard and to be recognized, to be an equal participant in drafting an agreement to which one is expected to conform. It is a demand for the power to define, interpret, balance, and prioritize the basic ethical values that underlie the UDHR within the contested and developing contexts, histories, power-struggles, philosophies, legal traditions, and social, economic, and political frameworks of one’s self-understandings. If self-determination of formerly colonized peoples or _svarāj_ in the Indian context (also a human right) does not enable them to achieve this freedom, then it has surely been a vacuous victory; this is a freedom that Western nations, on the other hand, arrogate for themselves as a natural birthright. That is, the salient point of the challenge is not a rejection of fundamental universal rights to basic freedoms and equality, or the project of attempting to converge on cross-cultural norms of decency, but rather an acknowledgement that such basic values are always articulated and justified, specified, prioritized, and implemented within the self-understandings of various communities. That is, they are, and must be, realized in the vernacular.

Values, norms, and legal practices that resonate with peoples’ self-understandings and those which are justified from within various rich normative vernacular frameworks become rooted and have a better chance of success than those that are imposed. As such, it is reasonable and necessary that communities, nations, people articulate, define, and justify universal values within their histories and moral, religious, and philosophical frameworks—as Jacques Maritain contended from the start, in 1948. What is critical in arriving at a global convergence on human rights in the context of diversity is agreement on basic ethical standards of freedom and equality, such as freedom from discrimination, civil and political freedom, equality before the law, and assurance of the basic necessities of life such as food, shelter, clothing, health, and education, without the requirement that these be justified from a Euro-Western metaphysical, philosophical, or legal framework. As Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1955), Hans-Georg Gadamer (Pantham 1997), and James Tully
(1995) contend: the purpose of such convergence is not uniformity in diversity, but rather, unity in diversity.

However, the attempt to specify universal ethical principles and norms within particular contexts gives rise to variances and divergences. Striving for global convergence on such norms requires deliberation on what is an acceptable spectrum of differences in understanding and implementation. As the essays in this volume highlight, divergences and disagreements range from attempts at greater specificity, to prioritization, to deep conceptual differences: for example, what freedom of speech requires, the prioritization of healthcare rights, educational rights, and economic rights to deeper issues involving grounding ethical principles on the ‘dignity and worth of the human person’ and members of the ‘human family’ as opposed to the value of life in general—such a position carries with it substantial epistemological and ontological assumptions that may not be shared. Some divergences challenge the very articulation of ethical values in terms of the language and discourse of individual rights. Such discourse places little emphasis on moral duty and obligation; rights discourse brings with it substantial philosophical and legal commitments that may not resonate with particular local self-understandings.

We should be careful to note that the issue here is not simply about where and how Indians can find internal sources within their own traditions to justify basic norms of moral decency. This is already to load the dice in favour of the Western self-congratulatory and etiolated spirit that too often characterizes the hegemonic discourse of human rights. Such a spirit hinders fruitful inter-cultural deliberation and excludes a priori, alternate possibilities, insights, and understandings. On the contrary, differences that Indian articulations bring to light may be something from which Westerners can learn; these articulations may also provide a worthwhile and valuable contribution to the global deliberation on human rights.

Many variances regarding human rights norms occur within Western nations themselves. Of course we should expect as much, since cultures, traditions, and nations are multi-voiced and contested, enmeshed in internal struggles between the powerful and the disenfranchised. There is a gamut of disagreements concerning the nature of basic rights and their prioritization in Western countries: these include disagreements on the welfare state, health care, access
to education, freedom of speech, capital punishment, the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment (for example, waterboarding), not to mention the place of non-human animals in our ethical considerations. Many neo-liberal Americans repeatedly reject economic rights, along with health rights, which are seen as private matters having nothing to do with social justice or public responsibility. These views differ substantially from the prevailing ideas in Canada and many other countries. However, if Western nations may debate, deliberate, and even reject some portions of the UDHR in the name of their values, traditions, and self-understandings, without being charged or suspected of rejecting the basic enterprise of human rights and minimal ethical norms, then why are non-Western nations not afforded the same consideration?

The essays in this volume are a multi-layered and multi-disciplinary contribution to ongoing global deliberation seeking to converge on human rights standards and norms. The book has three sections. The first part of the volume deals with metaethical and theoretical issues: Sonia Sikka begins by re-thinking the debate on relativism and universal values in the context of the UDHR; next, drawing on moral psychology, Nigel DeSouza finds bases for people’s mature appreciation of human rights in their pre-reflective moral formation. DeSouza argues for a John Rawls–Charles Taylor approach to convergence since it fits well with moral development in actual contexts. Jay Drydyk provides a critical examination of the ‘overlapping consensus’ proposed by Rawls and the ‘unforced consensus’ proposed by Taylor, asking whether these concepts capture the kind of mutual understanding that human rights require in a multi-cultural, pluralistic world. Sumi Madhok’s chapter addresses the crucial issue of gender equality in India; examining the Sathin movement, she offers new insight into convergence of women’s rights with the creation of vernacular rights cultures in India.

Unique strategies for justifying human rights can be found in Indian intellectual traditions. Contributors to the second part of this volume explore various normative sources for such justifications and show how these have the potential to broaden and enrich global deliberation of human rights. Shashi Motilal provides an analysis of the concept of dharma as a potential source for a duty-based understanding of human rights. In the following chapter, Gordon Davis
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analyzes the specific Buddhist approach to human rights that was advanced by B.R. Ambedkar (father of the Indian Constitution); this is compared with other approaches both in Buddhist tradition and in contemporary Western political philosophy. Shyam Ranganathan explores an account of human rights grounded in Patañjali’s theory of personhood. Finally, Ashwani Peetush argues that deliberation on basic human rights norms in a pluralistic global context needs to be based on a more robust concept of political toleration than is common in Western legal and political thought; he illustrates sources for such toleration within interrelated Indian conceptual and philosophical histories.

In the third section, we turn to lessons that may be learned about the realization of human rights from Indian social practices and applied contexts. To begin, Bindu Puri discusses Gandhi’s interjection in the drafting of the UDHR; Puri argues that although Gandhi struggled for basic and fundamental rights for women and lower castes, he grounded such a struggle in the ideas of duty and satyagraha or adherence to truth. Then Gopika Solanki focuses on dalit communities and their social and legal battles for equality; she illustrates the varied meanings, uses, and success and failures of human rights within the modern Indian state and vernacular contexts. Amar Khoday focuses on freedom of religion and legal and the political controversies surrounding anti-conversion laws. In the context of displaced peoples and refugees in India, Niraja Jayal argues that human rights discourse can only be fruitful where citizenship rights are robustly effective.

Preview of Chapters

Meta-Ethical and Theoretical Issues

Sonia Sikka re-examines the debate between the purported universality of human rights and cultural relativism. She argues that cultural relativism, as it originates within anthropological literature, does not necessarily lead to moral relativism as philosophers have objected. Cultural relativism for most anthropologists is a methodological tool: a suspension of judgment to facilitate a more objective understanding of other cultures in order to combat potential Eurocentric bias; it is
not the idea that all ethical values are arbitrary and subject to one’s culture. At the same time, however, the view that divergent values and norms of a society be respected has shielded some societies from legitimate criticism and reform, which, for example, has had detrimental consequences for women. The reason is not that insufficient attention has been paid to the internal diversity of cultural values, but that another critical factor is neglected: who controls the means of production of cultural values. What may be offered as a cultural value may reflect nothing more than the interests of those who have the power in producing such value while disregarding the interests of the weaker. The caste system in India is a case in point, a stock example that is often used by Western anti-relativist discourse meant to amplify differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’. However, it is odd to discuss the inequalities of caste, while neglecting the power relations that have produced this ideology of domination—not to mention the long history of internal resistance by the oppressed in India. Such neglect continues to inform superficial analyses of ‘their values versus ours’. Furthermore, while Sikka agrees that there may certainly be a degree of commonality of shared human needs and interests, and corresponding tendencies to suffer from shared forms of deprivation, she argues that such universal principles allow for a good deal of variation in terms of their articulation. She thus argues for a pluralistic understanding of human rights where various societies may determine for themselves how to define, balance, and prioritize cross-cultural values.

In the following chapter, Nigel DeSouza explores the moral psychology of ethical judgments and human rights. He contends that James Griffin’s recent account of human rights, which would require others to adopt Western substantive values of autonomy, liberty, and minimum provision, would fail to receive widespread justification. DeSouza points out that every human being is raised into an interrelated set of norms, values, and goods which make up the ethical fabric of their society. Each individual first acquires a pre-reflective and inner sense of the ethical, through the formation of their evaluative and motivational propensities, which manifests itself in the form of ‘ethical know-how’. DeSouza argues that it is only on this basis that critical moral reflection is possible and that ethical/moral concepts make any sense at all—including the concept of human rights.
The ideas of overlapping consensus (Rawls) and unforced consensus (Taylor) recognize this fact and thus provide a better means for securing meaningful justification of human rights, since they acknowledge that true justification of human rights for most people relates to the thick ethical languages of their communities. This opens the door to a broader model for conceiving the sources of justification of human rights that seeks to overcome the problem of being culturally ethnocentric.

Jay Drydyk then delves into the differences between Rawls’s ‘overlapping consensus’ and Taylor’s ‘unforced consensus’, focusing on the problem of how credible agreement on the value and importance of human rights can be reached in a world that is culturally and ethically pluralistic. The consensus that Rawls had in mind is agreement on shared political values—not about what is valuable and important throughout life, but only about what is valuable and important in political life. ‘Overlap’ is achieved when people find further support for these values in their broader moral ideas. However, Rawls insisted that these broader moral ideas should not be put forward directly in political justification, for example, Christians should not advocate political arrangements such as human rights on purely Christian grounds, which they cannot expect their non-Christian fellow citizens to accept. Drydyk argues that to exclude people’s actual moral values and paradigms from political justification in this way is ineffective, unnecessary, and excessive. He finds Charles Taylor’s approach to be superior in that it calls for people to recognize that their different values and moral ideas are each in their own way worthwhile and may all converge in supporting human rights. The challenge posed by this approach is to show how and why such convergence might come about. After drawing out some possible solutions from Taylor’s work, Drydyk aligns them with his own solution, ‘responsible pluralism’.

Drawing on her ethnographic work with the sathins, a grassroots women’s movement in rural Rajasthan, Sumi Madhok investigates the critical issue of gender equality and women’s rights in India with the production of vernacular rights cultures. She contests the ‘politics of origins’ framework that dominates some human rights discourse and argues for a shift towards a ‘politics of meanings’. Without losing sight of the historical power relationships and hegemonic motivations that often accompany human rights discourse, she questions
whether genealogical obsessions with the origin of human rights are justified. In contrast, her analysis focuses on the self-understandings, subjective, and institutional articulations, of specific human rights struggles by women in India. Madhok illustrates how her conceptual framework, one of vernacular rights cultures, helps us to conceptually capture the dynamic politics of rights and entitlements in Southern Asia and overcome crude indigenisms and dangerous neo-nativisms that continue to disempower women. She suggests that, as a conceptual intervention, thinking in terms of ‘vernacular rights cultures’ will help us move beyond arguments of Eurocentrism, cultural relativism, or celebratory universalism that can no longer adequately capture the dynamism of the citizenship claims that are increasingly vocalized and fought for. The experiences of making rights, claims, and entitlements that Madhok documents are like all gendered experiences and phenomena, and provide insights into a fascinating set of issues: the attachment of rights to privileged gendered bodies, contested and fought for by the marginalized, the precarious, and the powerless.

Normative Sources and Intellectual Traditions

Shashi Motilal argues that an unforced global consensus on human rights needs to revolve around the concept of moral obligation rather than individual rights. The discourse of rights is not a plausible candidate for global convergence since it carries with it substantial ontological, epistemological, and political presuppositions rooted in the Western liberal tradition that may not resonate well within the Indian context. Motilal contends that the concept of moral obligation is far more basic and has wider acceptance and appeal in diverse global contexts. Despite many differences that the major world ethical and religious traditions express in terms of their metaphysical, theological, and other commitments, a minimalistic notion of moral obligation in some form often exists. This can serve as the core element in justifying, defining, and determining an international code of conduct without undermining key elements of the diverse background traditions. Motilal explores particular aspects of the concept of dharma in Hindu traditions as providing a more suitable and hopeful contender for progressive convergence on basic ethical values and international norms in India. She illustrates how
a re-interpretation of a dharma ethic would provide valuable insight and understanding not only about human well-being but also about the interrelatedness that such well-being has to the rest of nature.

Autonomy is seen as one of the underlying values of personhood that human rights seek to protect. Gordon Davis shows that there is a degree of convergence between the original justification of autonomy in Western Enlightenment thinking and justifications for autonomy in ancient Indian texts. Although there is little evidence of institutionalized human rights protection in either ancient Buddhist monastic traditions or ancient Indian society more generally (as is the case in ancient Western societies), the depth and scope of Buddhist ethical ideas provide resources for indirect justifications for valuing certain kinds of autonomy and for deriving rights related to individual autonomy. These justifications have become more explicit in the writings of modern Indian Buddhists such as B.R. Ambedkar. While a foundation for human rights can be developed out of ethical ideas in ancient Buddhist writings (including both the Pali Canon and later Mahayana texts), this foundation would be distinctively teleological in its normative structure. Ambedkar's defences of human rights overlap with such an approach but add a concern with certain forms of justice that may be considered novel within Buddhist tradition. Davis discusses some recent normative theories of human rights, such as James Griffin's, which favour something along the lines of the ancient Buddhist approach more than an approach like Ambedkar's; but even a partial convergence of ancient and modern conceptions is an encouraging sign for those who wish to defend universalist claims about the foundations of human rights.

In his chapter on normative sources for human rights in Indian traditions, Shyam Ranganathan argues for an account drawn from Patañjali's theory of personhood. He contends that the question of human rights is ambiguous. On the one hand, it might seem to raise the question of the rights that humans have by virtue of being human; or, it may be a code for something else, that is, personal rights. Conflating human rights with personal rights is natural if one's perspective is tied to anthropocentrism. However, such a stance is certainly not culturally universal; historically, it is derivable from a cultural orientation that is Greek in origin. Such an orientation conlates thought with language (logos), and identifies humans as
uniquely deserving of moral consideration, to the exclusion of non-human knowers. The thesis that thought is linguistic impedes insight and understanding of both Indian and Western contributions to political and moral thought. Along these lines, Ranganathan contends that the idea that we have rights by virtue of being human is problematic. In contrast, he argues for an account of personal rights derivable from Patañjali’s philosophy. On this account, persons are non-natural abstractions with an interest in ‘abstracting from content’ (objects). Put another way, a person is a self-directed abstraction from content. Any organism that as a matter of self-direction ought to move towards or away from objects of interest is a person on this view. The rights necessary for the good of persons conceived of as such are those that detach from contextual factors; they are rights that transcend species, sex, caste, race, class, age, ability, and sexual orientation.

Given the plurality and diversity inherent in both domestic and global contexts, toleration and respect for differences is central to issues of justice and human rights. Indeed, in the context of uneven historical power relationships, toleration must frame the global deliberation on basic human rights norms. With this in mind, Ashwani Peetush explores the ideal of toleration in Indian traditions. He points out that, as an ideal, political toleration is commonly thought to be a product of European history and philosophical thought, originating in response to societal conflict and the Wars of Religion in the West, then exported to the rest of the world by colonialism or globalization. This ignores the rich indigenous sources for toleration that have existed in India for millennia. Peetush explores three central and predominant ideas in India as providing justification for distinctly Indian forms of legal and political toleration. He examines how toleration, and indeed more strongly, respect for difference and pluralism, emerge through three influential and related Indian self-understandings: the theory of anekāntavāda or non-absolutism; the concept of ātman or self; and the idea of pratīṣṭānapārāda or inter-connectedness. Peetush draws attention to the fact that in the Indian context, political toleration, recognition, and respect for various philosophical and religious doctrines and practices arise from principles internal to these vernacular traditions, not despite them. This difference from the European historical, legal, and conceptual
background entails that one cannot simply graft Western articulations of toleration, secularism, and liberalism onto India, because they may lack relevant similarities. He concludes that perhaps it is the West that may have something to learn from Indian articulations of legal and political toleration and respect for diversity and differences.

Social Practices and Applied Contexts

Gandhi rejected the central idea of the 1948 Declaration that human rights belong to human beings simply in virtue of their humanity. This may appear odd, given Gandhi’s central role in the historical struggle for basic equality and freedom for the oppressed and most vulnerable in society. Bindu Puri reconstructs Gandhi’s position on human rights, his insistence on duty, non-violence or *abimsha*, and local and concrete engagement with social, political, and economic injustice. It is evident, as Puri illustrates, that Gandhi’s own specification of what justice requires was similar to the UDHR; Gandhi opposed human rights discourse only because he did not accept the presuppositions of the early liberal conception of human rights set forth in the UN Charter. Puri shows that Gandhi’s position can be understood in light of two factors. First, the primary set of moral rules that constitute justice must be understood as involving unilaterial duties and obligations towards others, not as individual entitlements. Such duties need to be understood as an extension of kinship relationships, where others are not seen as adversaries whose interests are different than our own, but rather, as kith and kin, towards whom we have foundational duties of love and respect. Getting one’s due in terms of basic moral rights here emerges out of the process of giving others their due. This is a precondition of one’s own sense of self-respect and consequently the source of legitimacy of one’s claims to basic human rights. Second, justice as *satyagraha* or adherence to truth cannot be arrived at through third-party adjudication from international institutions, abstracted, and twice removed from the particular; justice requires non-violent resistance and local concrete engagement, where one has direct access to the situation and facts, unmediated or abstracted from the specificity of local contexts.

The possibilities and limitations for dalits of availing human rights bodies, using strategic and ethical articulations of human
rights as rhetorical and material tools to resist symbolic violence through law in Western India is the subject of Gopika Solanki’s chapter. Tracing on-going cases filed under the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and the Scheduled Tribes (STs) (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (1989) that penalizes violence against dalits and adivasis, Solanki analyzes the varied meanings of ‘human rights’ and ‘social justice’ that emerge from litigants, NGO workers, the police, judicial actors, and state and national human rights commissions during the course of investigation and trial. Viewing the process of adjudication as a productive encounter between a variety of state and societal actors, she discusses the institutionalization of ideas of human rights in the criminal justice system as a result of these interactions, and outlines the implications of their encoding in the everyday workings of criminal law in India. In addition, Solanki focuses on the political agency of dalit women and illustrates how dalit women’s rights committees have, using the Atrocity Act, broadened the human rights approach from a legalistic approach to a development enterprise. They effected this change by establishing conceptual links between human rights and different conceptions of poverty and development and between law, social hierarchies, and social policies; in doing so, they have challenged the capture of the public distribution system and public policies by the elites and dominant castes, demanded accountability from state administrations, and offered different routes to challenge caste discrimination.

Religious conversions in India inextricably implicate human rights. Thus Amar Khoday explores the legal and political aspects of the controversies surrounding such conversions. Khoday argues that, in effect, anti-conversion laws in India are often a tool of upper castes in Hindu society to prevent lower-caste dalit communities from enacting forms of social and political resistance. In recent years, state governments in India have placed a number of limits on the ability of individuals to convert. These limits include having to provide prior notice to a government official of one’s intent to convert and in effect demonstrate the genuineness of their new religious beliefs. Such legislation ostensibly seeks to protect vulnerable individuals from being forced to convert or being manipulated into converting through financial means, although its motive is far from clear given the historical power imbalance between upper and lower
Khoday argues that such legislative manoeuvres are problematic for a number of reasons. They intrude into individual autonomy and the right to follow one’s chosen religion and religious identity. Furthermore, these statutes portray those seeking to convert as helpless victims rather than agents making choices in their own best interests. Furthermore, these acts intervene to counter-act socio-cultural resistance of dalits, SCs, and indigenous groups against dominant caste communities seeking to preserve their power. Khoday argues that conversion is a form of social defection and is used to show disdain for the practices of those communities. It is a political tool and statement that seeks to emancipate the oppressed from social injustice and inequality.

Exploring Hannah Arendt’s political thought, Niraja Gopal Jayal contends that human rights are rendered meaningless in many parts of India by lack of state presence and effective citizenship. Indeed, as Arendt argued, the horrors of the holocaust demonstrate that the idea of natural rights, in and of themselves, offer no protection whatsoever. The fact that millions were rendered homeless and stateless because of religious persecution, led Arendt to contend that human rights cannot be defined in isolation from the rights of citizenship. Similarly, the conditions of refugees in India illustrate that without juridical and political status a person is rendered in a condition of absolute rightlessness or ‘abstract nakedness’, a pre-political state of nature. Jayal’s field research on Jodhpur and Jaisalmer migrants from Pakistan to India illustrates the classic sense in which such people search for recognition of their legal and juridical personhood, so that they may have access to substantive welfare rights and access to government education and other institutions, as citizens of India. However, as Jayal’s study shows, juridical citizenship, although necessary for having rights, is far from sufficient for enjoying such rights. What is missing, Jayal argues, is the core element of Arendt’s notion of belonging to a political community: civic agency in a robust sense, where belonging means being able to participate fully in the life of a community. This is something refugees lack. Jayal urges that while legally India has recognized an expanded set of socio-economic rights (the right to water, healthcare, housing, and the right to sleep) for which it must continue to ensure access, India also needs to nurture the conditions which make full civic agency possible: to construct a
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community and public-sphere where the voices of the dispossessed and displaced are seen as worthy of being heard.

Notes

1. We recognize that the dichotomy between the West and the non-West is used to characterize widely disparate and conflicting self-understandings, nations, and peoples; we use ‘West’ and ‘non-West’ to refer to the very real political distinctions that continue to inform social, economic, legal, and political imagination, and the power relationships that continue to exist between European nations and Western settler societies and their former colonies as a result of the history of European imperialism and colonization. The essays in the present volume illustrate that such a dichotomy is far too crude, general, and broad to capture diverse epistemological and ontological self-understandings, yet they affirm that the dichotomy is a concrete political reality that cannot be ignored without substantial cost to non-European peoples everywhere. The dismantling of such a dichotomy is often itself used by Western political theorists, not as a form of liberation for non-European peoples, but the opposite: to undermine the effort towards emancipation. This is often the case, for example, when Western theorists attack Aboriginal leaders for claiming substantive differences with Western nations in terms of their forms of social organization and other religious and philosophical commitments.

2. For example, regarding the East Asian values debate, see Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (1999), and Bhikhu Parekh (2000); with respect to Africa and Islam see Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im (2003) and (2001).

References


