In previous work (Pitt 2004, 2009, 2011) I have argued that conscious thinking is a kind of experience, characterized by its own kind of phenomenology. This phenomenology – *cognitive* or *conceptual* or *propositional* phenomenology – differentiates conscious thinking from other kinds of conscious experience, just as their kinds of phenomenology differentiate them from each other. Thoughts with different contents have different phenomenologies of this kind, which constitute their contents. Thoughts, qua conscious experiences, are individuated in the way that *all* conscious experiences are differentiated – *phenomenally*. For each experiential modality there is a determinable kind of phenomenology – visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, proprioceptive, etc. – and token states of these various kinds are individuated by maximally specific determinates of these determinables. What makes them the particular states they are is their phenomenology; and what makes a thought the thought that it is is its cognitive phenomenal character.

One feature that thought is usually taken to have in common with language is *compositionality*. Indeed, the Language of Thought Hypothesis has it that thought, being language-like in certain essential respects, *is* a language. (I prefer to think of language as being thought-like. Thought comes first.) In order to explain the creativity, systematicity and productivity of thought, it seems that we must take the contents of thoughts or complex concepts to be determined by the contents of their constituents and their structural relations – just as we do in explaining the creativity, systematicity and productivity, as well as comprehensibility of novel
utterances and learnability, of language. This is especially so if the semantics of language is *grounded in* the semantics of thought. If the meanings of words and sentences are identical to the contents of concepts and thoughts, then if linguistic meaning is compositional, thought content must be compositional as well.

One might worry, however, that complex cognitive phenomenology (the phenomenology of a complex concept or thought) cannot in general be compositional, since phenomenology seems to be subject to contextual variation, or contrast effects. For example, a particular color may look different when seen with other colors. A wine may taste different when tasted with food, and with different kinds of food. A particular chord may sound different depending upon which chords precede it or follow it. And so on. But if phenomenal character can change with context, and a change in phenomenal character entails a change of experience (I consider this non-negotiable), then it will not be true in general that experiences can be combined to form more complex experiences whose constituents are *those very same* experiences. If, when phenomenally individuated experiences combine, their phenomenology changes, they become different experiences. (More precisely, they cease to exist and are replaced by different experiences.) And if this is true of cognitive phenomenology, then the content of a thought or complex concept will not in general be factorable into the contents its constituents have in isolation.

The experienced color of the small square on the left and that of the small square on the right are different.
The one on the right is the same color as the one on the left, but it looks different when embedded in the larger square. Hence, though the look of the combined squares can be factored into the look of the pink square and the grey square embedded in it, it cannot be factored into the look of the pink square and the grey square in isolation (the one on the left).

If there are similar effects for cognitive phenomenology, then we might find ourselves having to say that the content of a complex thought or concept does not include the contents of its constituents. For example, if the thought contents $p$ and $q$ are phenomenally constituted, there would be no guarantee that there is a complex conscious thought whose content is composed of the contents $p$ and $q$. If cognitive phenomenology is subject to contexts effects, it is possible that when the thoughts that $p$ and $q$ are experienced together their phenomenal characters, and, hence, their content, change. But if thoughts are individuated by their content, then the original thoughts cease to be thought when one attempts to think them together. In which case when one is thinking the thought $p$ and $q$ one is not thinking its constituent thoughts $p$ and $q$. This hardly seems coherent. So if it does happen, it would be a very good reason to reject a phenomenalist account of conceptual content.

Before addressing this worry, it will be helpful to distinguish two kinds of phenomenal compositionality. A complex experience or phenomenal state (I use the terms interchangeably) is
post hoc compositional if its phenomenology is factorable into constituent phenomenologies, but these constituents are not the phenomenologies of the experiences that came together to form it (they had different phenomenal characters). That is, the phenomenology of the complex is determined by the phenomenology its constituents have in context; but it is not determined by the phenomenologies its constituents have out of context (as in, say, Ganzfelt experiences), and it is not constant across all contexts. Let us call this latter kind of compositionality ante hoc compositionality. Phenomenology in general, it seems, cannot be assumed to be compositional in this second sense. The experience of the squares on the right is not composed of the experience of the square on the left and the experience of the embedding square on the right. But ante hoc compositionality is what is required to explain phenomena like the creativity, systematicity and productivity of thought. If cognitive phenomenology is not ante hoc compositional, there would be serious pressure to abandon the idea that it is content-constitutive.

One way to respond to this worry would be to deny that compositionality is typically ante hoc. Here one might cite the linguistic phenomena of topicalization and focus, which involve surface relocation or phonetic stress of a sentential component (without changing its underlying structural relations), as in the following examples:

(1) You can’t trust him.
(2) Him you can’t trust.
(3) You can’t trust him.
(4) You can’t trust him.

Some linguists claim that these operations have an effect on the meaning of the sentence. If this is correct, then linguistic meaning cannot be taken to be in general ante hoc compositional. And
one could argue that the same sort of thing happens with the thoughts these sentences express. And if these phenomena do not spoil compositional explanations for creativity, productivity and systematicity in language, they should not spoil them for thought.

There is however an important disanalogy between topicalization and focus and phenomenal context effects. As far as I am aware, topicalization and focus do not affect the meanings of constituent expressions, whereas contrast effects concern the phenomenal character of the components of complex experiences.

Another way to deny that compositionality is ante hoc would be to adopt an analogue for thought of Frege’s context principle – viz., “it is only in the context of a proposition that words have any meaning” (Frege 1884/1953, §62). If concepts have content only in the context of thoughts, phenomenal contrast effects would not present a problem for the phenomenal intentionality of thought thesis. If it were true that concepts only have phenomenal properties in context, there would be no contrast effects. I will not pursue this response. I think Frege’s motivation for adopting his principle is ad hoc (it is introduced only to further his logicist program, and does not have independent support. Moreover, it is patently false that experiential components of complex experiences (such as the grey square on the right) have no phenomenal properties in isolation. The grey square does not disappear if you move away from the larger one.

A more promising route would be to argue that we do not after all need ante hoc compositionality to have a theory of thought content that can explain creativity, productivity and systematicity. For, if context effects are not arbitrary – if, that is, there are principles determining when and why phenomenal contents change the way they do in different contexts (as I assume
there is for, e.g., colors), then such principles could simply be incorporated into a theory of composition for complex thought contents. And we would have a useful kind of compositionality after all: the content of a complex concept or a thought is determined by the contents of its constituent concepts, their structural arrangement, and the relevant features of the experiential context in which it occurs. On such a view cognitive content would be in part contextually determined, but a complex content would still be determined by (albeit in a more complex way) the contents of its constituents.

Adding a context clause to a definition of compositionality would be like adding a structural relations clause to the simple (and false) mereological rule that the content of a complex expression is the sum of the contents of its constituents. Just as certain semantic evidence (e.g., that ‘Tristan loves Isolde’ does not mean the same as ‘Isolde loves Tristan’) would lead one to modify a principle of mereological compositionality to get structural compositionality (the content of a complex expression is determined by the contents of its constituents and their structural relations), some such evidence could lead one to modify the structural principle of compositionality to get contextual compositionality.

However, this approach would not remove the specter of the possibility of thinking that \( p \) and \( q \) without thinking that \( p \) or that \( q \). For, whether or not context effects have principled explanations, if contents can change in context, then it is possible that the contents of thoughts contents change when they are combined with other thoughts.

I think the best way to handle the compositionality worry is simply to deny that there is contextual variation of meaning experience. This is perhaps an empirical question; but I do not think there is any introspective evidence of such variation. Just as it is manifest to linguistic
intuition that the meaning of ‘chiliagon’ (thousand-sided plane figure) is the same in the
sentences ‘chiliagons have one thousand sides’, ‘chiliagons are plane figures’ and ‘Descartes
liked chiliagons’, it is manifest to introspection that the phenomenal cognitive content of the
concept CHILIAGON is the same in corresponding thoughts. We are directly aware of conceptual
contents, and directly aware of their sameness and difference. We can know, directly, whether or
not our CHILIAGON experience changes with change of cognitive context. Indeed, it is most
likely this that allows us to know that ‘chiliagon’ means the same thing regardless of its linguistic
context. Neither linguistic intuitions (speaker judgments about grammatical properties and
relations) nor introspective judgments are infallible. However, introspection itself – which is in
my view (see Pitt 2004) simply conscious experience – is. We can make faulty judgments
about our experiences, but we cannot mis-experience them (there is no appearance-reality distinction
for appearances). With proper attention and care, our introspective judgments can obtain a high
degree of reliability, just like linguistic intuitions.

The specter of thinking that \( p \text{ and } q \) without thinking that \( p \) is thus vanquished. This
house is clean.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Thanks to two anonymous referees for helpful comments on a previous draft.
REFERENCES


