Foundational consequentialists hold that the ranking of outcomes (or possible worlds) in terms of their goodness is at the foundation of all moral assessment. They hold that moral assessments of right and wrong acts, good and bad rules, virtuous and vicious character traits, etc. are all ultimately a function of how outcomes rank. But foundational consequentialists disagree on what is to be directly evaluated in terms of this ranking of outcomes, which is to say that they disagree on what the primary evaluative focal points are. Act-consequentialists hold that there is but one primary evaluative focal point: acts. They evaluate acts in terms of how their outcomes rank (the higher ranked the outcome, the morally better the act) and then evaluate everything else in terms of the morally best acts. Thus, the morally best rules are those that, if internalized, would most reliably lead to the performance of the morally best acts. Rule-consequentialists, by contrast, take rules to be the sole primary evaluative focal point. They evaluate rules according to how their outcomes rank and then assess everything else in terms of the morally best rules. So the right acts are those that conform to the morally best rules (Hooker 2000). And in contrast to both act- and rule- consequentialists, global consequentialists hold that there are multiple primary evaluative focal points, as they refuse to privilege the moral assessment of any one type of thing and hold instead that we are to evaluate everything under the sun—including acts, rules, beliefs, intentions, character traits, and even eye color—directly in terms of how their outcomes rank (Pettit and Smith 2000).

In this paper, I’ll be concerned with only a subclass of foundational consequentialist theories: those that take acts to be among the primary evaluative focal points. This, of course, includes act-consequentialism, but it also includes consequentialist theories, such as global consequentialism, that hold that acts are but one of many primary evaluative focal points. Thus, the subclass that I’ll be concerned with excludes only those foundational consequentialist theories, such as rule-consequentialism, that deny that acts are to be evaluated directly in terms of how their outcomes rank. I’ll call such theories indirect foundational consequentialist theories, and, correspondingly, I’ll call the

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1 I borrow the terms foundational consequentialism and primary evaluative focal point from Kagan 2000.
theories that I’ll be concerned with *direct foundational consequentialist theories*. I’ll argue that direct foundational consequentialist theories should evaluate acts in the context of the agent’s background attitudes, where an attitude (such as a belief, a desire, or an intention) counts as a background attitude with respect to S’s φ-ing if and only if it is some attitude other than the intention of S to φ. I’ll argue that we need to consider the agent’s background attitudes, because, as I’ll show, whether S’s φ-ing will have good or bad consequences often depends on what background attitudes she has. Ultimately, then, I’ll be arguing that the primary evaluative focal point should be a compound of acts and attitudes and not simply the acts themselves. If I’m right, direct foundational consequentialists should accept a new kind of consequentialism, which I call *attitude-consequentialism*.

But before we can get to the importance background of attitudes, there are a couple of questions to address first. One such question is whether we are to evaluate all acts, or only a subset of acts, in terms of their consequences. For even if we’ve settled on the idea that acts are to be among the primary evaluative focal points, that doesn’t necessitate our holding that every act is to be evaluated directly in terms of how its outcome ranks. Indeed, I’ll argue that we should reject this view. In any case, there are a number of different views for us to consider. The view that I think we should reject—the view that we should, for every act, assess it directly in terms of the goodness of its consequences—is

*Act-Consequentialism*: For any act φ that is available to S, it is permissible for S to φ if and only if, and because, there is no available alternative act ψ such that S’s ψ-ing would produce more good than S’s φ-ing would.²

This view is problematic, as it conflicts with a very plausible principle of deontic logic and, as a consequence, implies that an agent can, through no fault of her own, be under a set of obligations that it is logically impossible for her to jointly fulfill. This principle of deontic logic holds that if S is obligated to perform both A₁ and A₂ (e.g., to both speed up and change lanes) then S is both obligated to perform A₁ (to speed up) and obligated to perform A₂ (to change lanes). More generally and formally, the principle is

² The variables ‘φ’ and ‘ψ’ range over individual acts (e.g., pushing the red button), conjunctive acts (e.g., pushing both the red and green buttons), and sets of actions (e.g., performing all the individual actions involved in earning a PhD). This is important because an adequate moral theory must tell us not only both whether it is permissible to take Drug A at t₁ and whether it is permissible to take Drug B at t₂, but also whether it is permissible to perform the set of acts consisting of taking both Drug A at t₁ and Drug B at t₂. Given the way Drug A and Drug B interact with each other, it may not be permissible to perform this set.
To illustrate how act-consequentialism’s verdicts can conflict with this principle, consider the case of Professor Procrastinate (Jackson and Pargetter 1986, p. 235). He receives by email an invitation to write a book review. If he were to accept the invitation and write the book review, this would be best for all concerned, as he’s the best person for the job. Second best would be his not accepting the invitation, as the journal would then get the next best person to write the review. And worst of all would be his accepting the invitation and never writing the review. It is unfortunate, then, that Professor Procrastinate is a notorious procrastinator. So although he could accept the invitation and write the book review, he would not write the book review even if he were to accept the invitation. He would instead end up procrastinating indefinitely, never writing the review.

Should Professor Procrastinate accept the invitation? Act-consequentialism says ‘no’, for there is an available alternative (e.g., his not accepting) whose outcome would be better than that of his accepting. Thus, it is, on act-consequentialism, impermissible for him to accept the invitation. Nevertheless, act-consequentialism implies that he should accept and write. For this set of actions is available to him and the outcome of his accepting and writing would be better than that of any other available alternative set of actions. So act-consequentialism implies both that Professor Procrastinate is obligated to accept and write and that he is obligated to not accept. But it is logically impossible for him to fulfill both of these obligations. We should, therefore, reject act-consequentialism, for we should not accept a view that implies that an agent can, through no fault of her own, be under a set of obligations that it is logically impossible for her to jointly fulfill.

Of course, one may object that if Professor Procrastinate would not accept and write even if he were to intend to accept and write, then the set consisting of his accepting and writing is not available to him. Now I’m quite sympathetic to this worry. Indeed, the view that I’ll be arguing for—viz., attitude consequentialism—implies that Professor Procrastinate’s accepting and writing is not, in the relevant sense, available to him. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which his accepting and writing is available to him, and it’s an open question whether this is the relevant sense. So, for now, let me just explain the sense in which his accepting and writing is available to him and stipu-

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3 Two acts, \( \varphi \) and \( \psi \), are alternatives if and only if \( \varphi \)-ing and \( \psi \)-ing are mutually exclusive.

4 It may not be his fault that he is procrastinator. Indeed, let’s suppose that an evil demon made him this way.
late that act-consequentialism, as I’ll conceive of it, takes this to be the relevant sense. (If you don’t think that this is the relevant sense of ‘availability’, then you should reject act-consequentialism and accept a different view, one that denies that this is the relevant sense of ‘availability’—that is, you should accept a view such as attitude consequentialism.)

To understand the sense in which Professor Procrastinate’s accepting and writing is available to him at the time he receives the invitation, note that his accepting and writing consists in his performing the following set of actions: replying to the email, retrieving the book when it arrives in the post, reading each of its chapters, taking notes on them, sketching some ideas for the review, writing a first draft, writing a second draft, etc. Call this set ‘φ’. Act-consequentialists, as I conceive of them, hold that φ is, as of t, available to S if and only if, and because, there is some schedule of intentions, I, beginning at t such that S would perform all the acts of which φ is composed if S’s intentions were to follow I. And it is in this sense that Professor Procrastinate’s accepting and writing is, as of the time of the invitation, available to him. For there is a schedule of intentions, or so I’ll assume, such that Professor Procrastinate would accept and write if his intentions were to follow this schedule. It’s just that being a procrastinator, he’s never going to form the intention to start reading the book now. He’s only ever going to form the intention to start reading the book later.

Now, apart from rejecting this notion of ‘availability’, which I’m just stipulating is the notion of ‘availability’ that act-consequentialism is committed to, the only way to avoid the problematic implication that Professor Procrastinate is obligated both to not accept and to accept and write is to evaluate only a subset of acts in terms of their consequences and then appeal to something other than their consequences in determining the deontic statuses of the other acts. There are generally two approaches, depending on whether we are to take minimal acts or maximal acts to be the primary evaluative focal point. A minimal act is an act that, once begun, cannot be stopped by its agent short of its completion. Examples include all instantaneous acts, such as placing a bet, as well as some non-instantaneous acts, such as beheading by guillotine (Sobel 1976, p. 198). A maximal act, by contrast, is one such that there is no available alternative act that is more specific than it, where one act ψ is more specific than another φ if and only

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5 More precisely, a set of actions φ is, as of t, available to S if and only if there is some schedule of intentions, I, extending over a time-interval, T, beginning at t such that the following are all true: (a) if S’s intentions followed schedule, I, then S would carry out all the intentions in I; (b) S’s carrying out all the intentions in I would entail S’s performing all the individual acts contained in φ; (c) S has just before t the capacity to continue, or to come, to have the intentions that I specifies for t; and (d) for any time t in T after t (t < t), if S’s intentions followed I up until t, then S would have, just before t, the capacity to continue, or to come, to have the intentions that I specifies for t. (This is borrowed with some revisions from Ross 2012, p. 81.)
if $\psi$-ing entails $\phi$-ing but not vice versa. Thus, typing the word ‘the’ is more specific than typing. And typing the word ‘the’ and then taking a sip of coffee is more specific than typing the word ‘the’. An example of a maximal act, then, would be any of the maximally-specific ways of acting over the remainder of one’s life.\(^6\)

Now, if we make minimal acts the primary evaluative focal point, we’ll need to use the following principle to assess non-minimal acts:

\[\text{Agglomeration: } [\text{SP}(A_1), \text{SP}(A_2), \ldots, \text{& SP}(A_n)] \rightarrow \text{SP}(A_1, A_2, \ldots, \text{& A}_n),\] where ‘SP($x$)’ stands for ‘S is permitted to perform $x$’ and where ‘$x$’ ranges over only minimal acts.

This principle holds, for instance, that if I am both permitted to perform $A_1$ and permitted to perform $A_2$, then I am permitted to perform both $A_1$ and $A_2$. When we assess minimal acts directly in terms of the goodness of their consequences and then employ agglomeration to assess all non-minimal acts, we get what I’ll call

\[\text{Minimal Act Consequentialism: (1)} \text{ For any minimal act } \phi \text{ that is available to S, it is permissible for S to } \phi \text{ if and only if, and because, there is no available alternative minimal act } \psi \text{ such that S’s } \psi \text{-ing would produce more good than S’s } \phi \text{-ing would. And (2)} \text{ for any non-minimal act } \chi \text{ that is available to S, it is permissible for S to } \chi \text{ if and only if, and because, every minimal act of which } \chi \text{ is composed is permissible.}\]

This view is clearly false. I may be permitted to touch the left rail at $t_1$ and also permitted to touch right rail at $t_1$, as both acts are in themselves harmless. But it wouldn’t follow that I’m permitted to touch both rails at $t_1$, as that, we’ll suppose, would result in my death by electrocution. Yet that’s what minimal act consequentialism implies. We should, therefore, reject minimal act consequentialism.

Perhaps, then, we should take maximal acts, not minimal acts, to be the primary evaluative focal point. But there are two types of maximal acts to choose from, one extends the relevant pattern of action across only time and the other extends it across both time and individuals. Note that a pattern of action is just a set of actions involving

\(^6\) As defined, minimal acts are not, as the name might suggest, at the opposite end of some spectrum from maximal acts. For one, at the opposite end of the spectrum from a maximal (i.e., a maximally specific) act we find, not a minimal act, but an act that is maximally unspecific—namely, the act of doing something. (After all, there is no act that is less specific than the act of doing something.) For another, minimal acts do not lie on any spectrum, for minimal acts are not defined in terms of any gradable notion such as specificity. Acts cannot be more or less capable of being stopped short of their completion. They either can or cannot be stopped short of their completion.
different time-slice agents, where every discrete act has its own discrete time-slice agent such that any two acts performed over different spans of time or by different individuals have different time-slice agents. And expanding on act-consequentialism notion of ‘availability’, I’ll call a pattern of action realizable by a set of time-slice agents, TSA, if and only if, and because, each act of which it is composed is available to some time-slice agent who is a member of TSA. Lastly, a pattern of action is maximally specific if and only if its realization entails the realization of all other realizable patterns.

As I said, there are two types of maximal acts. First, there are maximal intra-actions, which are just those maximally specific patterns of action that are realizable by a single individual over time. Second, there are maximal inter-actions, which are those maximally specific patterns of action that are realizable by the set of all individuals over time. This distinction yields two different versions of consequentialism. First, there is

Intrapersonal Consequentialism: (1) For any maximal intra-action \( \phi \) that is realizable by S over time, \( \phi \) is optimal if and only if, and because, there is no other maximal intra-action \( \psi \) that is realizable by S whose realization would produce more good than the realization of \( \phi \) would. And (2) for any act \( \chi \) that is available to S, it is permissible for S to \( \chi \) if and only if, and because, the realization of some optimal maximal intra-action realizable by S entails S’s \( \chi \)-ing.

This view is problematic. The problem is that it makes personal identity practically relevant when it isn’t.\(^7\) To illustrate, suppose that Professor Procrastinate will undergo some psychology-preserving but potentially identity-destroying process (such as fission or teleportation) sometime after he must accept the invitation but before he must start writing the review. And, for the moment, let’s just consider the case of teleportation. Do we really need to figure out whether the person who comes out of the tele-transporter (call him Post) is the same person who went in (call him Pre) in order to determine whether or not Professor Procrastinate should accept the invitation? Intrapersonal consequentialism says that we do. If, on the one hand, Pre and Post are both time-slices of the same person (viz., Professor Procrastinate), then intraper-sonal consequentialism implies that Professor Procrastinate (i.e., Pre) is obligated to accept the invitation. For if Pre and Post are both time-slices of Professor Procrastinate, then the pattern of action consisting of Pre’s accepting the invitation and Post’s writing the review counts as being realizable by Professor Procrastinate. And if this pattern of action is realizable by Professor Procrastinate, then it would certainly be the best pattern of action that is realizable by Professor Procrastinate, meaning that Professor Procrastinate would be obligated to perform any act of which this pattern is com-

\(^7\) See Parfit 1984 for a more thorough discussion of the practical irrelevance of personal identity.
posed. Thus, if Pre and Post are both time-slices of Professor Procrastinate, then intrapersonal consequentialism implies that Professor Procrastinate (i.e., Pre) is obligated to accept the invitation.

If, on the other hand, Pre and Post are not both time-slices of Professor Procrastinate, if only Pre is a time-slice of Professor Procrastinate, then intrapersonal consequentialism entails that Professor Procrastinate is prohibited from accepting the invitation. In that case, the pattern of action consisting of Pre’s accepting the invitation and Post’s writing the review would not count as realizable by Professor Procrastinate. For even if Pre were to accept the invitation and intend to write, Post would not write the review. So the best that Professor Procrastinate can do is to refrain from accepting the invitation. So, if Pre and Post are distinct persons, intrapersonal consequentialism implies that Professor Procrastinate (i.e., Pre) is prohibited from accepting the invitation. Thus, on interpersonal consequentialism, we get very different answers as to whether Pre should accept the invitation depending on whether Pre and Post are time-slices of the same person.

But what does it matter whether Pre and Post are time-slices of the same person? What matters, it seems to me, is whether Pre’s intending to write the review at the time of his accepting the invitation will result in Post’s writing the review. If it won’t, then it seems that Pre should not accept the invitation. But if it will, then it seems that he should accept the invitation even if the person who will later write the review is not numerically identical to him. What’s important, then, is whether Post will carry out Pre’s intention, not whether Post is numerically identical to Pre. Thus, the problem with intrapersonal consequentialism is that it focuses on the irrelevant: namely, personal identity.

If we want to avoid this problem and still make maximal actions the primary evaluative focal point, we will need to make inter-actions, not intra-actions, the focus. If we do, we get

*Interpersonal Consequentialism:* (1) For any maximal inter-action $\varphi$ that is realizable by the set of all individuals over time, $\varphi$ is optimal if and only if, and because, there is no other maximal inter-action $\psi$ that is realizable by the set of all individuals whose realization would produce more good than the realization of $\varphi$ would. And (2) for any act $\chi$ that is available to S, it is permissible for S to $\chi$ if and only if, and because, the realization of some optimal maximal inter-action realizable by the set of all individuals entails S’s $\chi$-ing.

This view avoids making moral obligations dependent upon personal identity, but it does so at the price of having some very counterintuitive implications. To illustrate, consider the following case, which I’ll call The Buttons because it involves two individ-
uals, Coop and Uncoop, each with a button in front of them. Depending on who pushes his button at $t_4$, the consequences will vary—see Table 1. Assume that the resulting utiles will be evenly distributed over all parties, including both Coop and Uncoop. Assume that Uncoop is uncooperative (hence, his name) and will not push even if he thinks that Coop will push. Coop, by contrast, wants to cooperate but knows that Uncoop is unwilling to push.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Buttons</th>
<th>Uncoop: Pushes</th>
<th>Uncoop: Not-pushes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coop: Pushes</td>
<td>100 utiles</td>
<td>0 utiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coop: Not-pushes</td>
<td>0 utiles</td>
<td>60 utiles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What, then, should Coop do? It seems clear that he should not-push, for the alternative (his pushing while Uncoop not-pushes) would be much worse: 0 utiles as opposed to 60 utiles. Yet interpersonal consequentialism holds that Coop should push, for all the optimal maximal inter-actions realizable by the set of all individuals (which includes both Coop and Uncoop) involve both he and Uncoop pushing. Now, if there were some way for Coop to ensure that Uncoop pushes, then it would make sense to require Coop both to ensure that Uncoop pushes and to push himself. But, in this case, there is no way for Coop to ensure that Uncoop pushes. Indeed, no matter what Coop does, Uncoop will not-push. Given this, it seems that Coop should not-push as well. And since interpersonal consequentialism holds otherwise, we should reject this view. The problem with interpersonal consequentialism, then, is that it requires Coop to play his part in the best realizable pattern of action even if the circumstances are such that there is no way for him to see to it that this pattern will be realized and playing his part under such circumstances would be disastrous for both him and others.

It seems, then, that what we need is a theory that holds that one is obligated to play one’s part in some good pattern of action only if one can see to it that that pattern will be realized. To see this, consider that in contrast to Coop, Uncoop can see to it that the pattern of action consisting in their both pushing is realized. Since Coop is willing to cooperate, he would push at $t_4$ if Uncoop were to promise him at $t_3$ that he will push at $t_4$. Thus, Uncoop can see to it that they both push by both promising Coop at $t_3$ that he will push at $t_4$ and then pushing at $t_4$. Given this, it seems that Uncoop is obligated both to promise Coop at $t_3$ that he’ll push at $t_4$ and to push at $t_4$.

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8 This case is borrowed with revision from Regan 1980, p. 16.
Now, in *The Buttons*, Uncoop can see to it that the optimal pattern of action is realized by performing certain actions, but sometimes the only way to see to it that the optimal pattern of action is realized is by forming certain attitudes. To illustrate, consider what I’ll call *The Buttons 2*, a case that’s just like *The Buttons* except that in this case Coop will push at $t_4$ if and only if Uncoop desires at $t_3$ to cooperate. And assume that Coop will be able to read Uncoop’s mind at $t_3$ to determine whether he has this desire. In this case, it seems that Uncoop should desire to cooperate at $t_3$ and push at $t_4$. So, in both *The Buttons* and *The Buttons 2*, Uncoop can see to it that Coop pushes at $t_4$, it’s just that in the former it’s by promising Coop at $t_3$ that he’ll push at $t_4$, whereas in the latter it’s by desiring at $t_3$ to push at $t_4$.

Of course, if cases involving mind reading seem too fanciful to you, then consider a variant on the case of Professor Procrastinate, which I’ll call *Professor Procrastinate 2*. The difference between this case and the original is that in this case Professor Procrastinate receives two emails. One is from a journal, inviting him to write a book review. The other is from his department chair, asking him to commit to a topic for his seminar next semester. If he accepts the invitation while intending to respond to his chair with a commitment to make the book the topic of his seminar, he will read the book and write the review. However, if he accepts the invitation while intending to respond to his chair with a commitment to teach his seminar on Kant (a topic over which he tends to obsess), he will not read the book or write the review, but will instead obsess over how to interpret Kant. Thus, his accepting the invitation to write the book review will have good consequences if and only if he intends to respond to his department chair with a commitment to teach his seminar on the book.

What these cases illustrate is that whether or not an agent’s φ-ing would have good consequences can depend on what background attitudes she has, or had. (An attitude is a background attitude with respect to S’s φ-ing if and only if it is some attitude other than S’s intention to φ.) Uncoop’s pushing at $t_4$ will have good consequences if, and only if, he desired at $t_3$ to cooperate. And Professor Procrastinate’s accepting the invitation to write the book review will have good consequences if, and only if, he intends to reply to the chair’s email with a commitment to teach his seminar on the book. This, I believe, suggests an alternative to all the problematic accounts of the primary evaluative focal point that we’ve considered thus far: a compound of both actions and their background attitudes.\(^9\)

\(^9\) As Ellie Mason (2002, p. 301) puts it, consequentialists should assess the consequences of all “the controllable elements of a life (whatever they may be) together [emphasis mine],” because the consequences of one controllable element (such as an act) can, as I’ve shown, depend on what the other controllable elements (such as the background attitudes) are.

For an argument that background attitudes (such as beliefs, desires, and intentions) are, in the relevant sense, controllable, see *Portmore 2014*. 
When we take such a compound of actions and their background attitudes to be the primary evaluative focal point, we get

*Attitude Consequentialism:* (1) For any act $\varphi$ and set of background attitudes $B_1$, it is permissible for $S$ to $\varphi$ in the context of possessing $B_1$ if and only if, and because, (a) $B_1$ is a permissible set of background attitudes, (b) $S$ would $\varphi$ if $S$ were to intend to $\varphi$ while possessing $B_1$, and (c) there is no alternative act $\psi$ and permissible set of background attitudes $B_2$ (where $B_2$ may or may not be identical to $B_1$) such that $S$ would $\psi$ if $S$ were to intend to $\psi$ while possessing $B_2$ and the consequences of $S$’s $\psi$-ing in the context of possessing $B_2$ is better than the consequences of $S$’s $\varphi$-ing in the context of possessing $B_1$. And (2) it is permissible for $S$ to $\varphi$ if and only if, and because, there is some set of background attitudes $B_1$ such that it is permissible for $S$ to $\varphi$ in the context of possessing $B_1$.

Condition 1a is necessary, for, in general, it won’t be permissible to $x$ and $y$ if it is impermissible to $y$. Thus, it won’t be permissible for $S$ to $\chi$ while possessing $B_i$ if it is impermissible for $S$ to possess $B_i$. And we are to assess whether it is permissible for $S$ to possess $B_i$ by looking not only at whether it permissible for $S$ to possess each of attitudes of which $B_i$ is composed *individually*, but also at whether it is permissible for $S$ to possess all these attitudes *collectively*—that is, in conjunction with both each other and the intention to $\chi$. Thus, a set of background attitudes $B_i$ (that are background to $S$’s $\chi$-ing) is permissible if and only if it is permissible for $S$ to possess all the attitudes of which $B_i$ is composed in conjunction with both each other and the intention to $\chi$.

Condition 1b is necessary given the need to avoid the possibility that agents could be required to form ineffective intentions. And, as we’ve seen from *Professor Procrastinate*, whether an intention (such as the intention to write a book review) will be effective or not depends on what one’s background attitudes are. If Professor Procrastinate intends to write the book review while having the background attitude of intending to commit to teaching his seminar on the book, then the intention to write the book review will be effective. But if Professor Procrastinate intends to write the book review while having the background attitude of intending to commit to teaching his seminar on Kant, then the intention to write the book review will be ineffective.

Lastly, condition 1c is needed to make the view consequentialist. And condition 2 just explains the relationship between the permissibility of the compound of $\varphi$-ing in the context of possessing $B_1$ and the permissibility of one of its component part, viz., $\varphi$-ing.

Having explained attitude consequentialism, I can now proceed to demonstrate how it avoids the pitfalls of its predecessors. I’ll start by considering act-consequentialism and the (original) case of *Professor Procrastinate*. Unlike act-consequentialism, atti-
tude consequentialism does not require Professor Procrastinate both (1) not to accept and (2) to accept and write. Admittedly, attitude consequentialism, like act-consequentialism, implies that Professor Procrastinate should not accept the invitation, for, even in the context of possessing a permissible set of background attitudes, his not accepting would have better consequences than his accepting. But, unlike act-consequentialism, attitude consequentialism denies that Professor Procrastinate is required to accept and write. According attitude consequentialism, an agent can be required to perform a set of actions only if there is some permissible set of background attitudes such that she would perform that set if she were to intend to do so while possessing those background attitudes. But the case of Professor Procrastinate is one in which it is stipulated that he will not accept and write even if he intends to do so. So, unlike act-consequentialism, attitude consequentialism does not imply that Professor Procrastinate is under a set of obligations that it is logically impossible for him to jointly fulfill.

Unlike minimal act consequentialism, attitude consequentialism prohibits my grabbing both the right and left rails at \( t_1 \). Grabbing both rails at \( t_1 \) would have disastrous consequences (regardless of my background attitudes) in that it would result in my death by electrocution. And, more importantly, there is an alternative (e.g., grabbing only one rail at \( t_1 \)) that would, in the context of possessing a permissible set of background attitudes, have better consequences. So although attitude consequentialism agrees with minimal act consequentialism that I am both permitted to grab the right rail at \( t_1 \) and permitted to grab the left rail at \( t_1 \), it denies that I’m permitted to do both at \( t_1 \), because, unlike minimal act consequentialism, attitude consequentialism eschews the agglomeration principle.

Unlike intrapersonal consequentialism, attitude consequentialism is only concerned with whether Pre’s intention to write the review will be carried out by Post, not with whether Post is numerically identical to Pre. If Pre’s intention will be carried out, then Pre should accept the invitation while having the intention to write the review as a background attitude, for, in that case, accepting the invitation will have good consequences. If, however, the intention would not be carried out, then Pre should not accept the invitation, for, in that case, accepting the invitation, even while having permissible background attitudes, will have bad consequences. So, unlike intrapersonal consequentialism, attitude consequentialism considers personal identity to be irrelevant. What matters is what will happen if Pre accepts the invitation while possessing the intention to write the review. If what will happen is that Post will write the review, the Pre should accept regardless of whether or not Pre and Post are time-slices of the same person.

Lastly, unlike interpersonal consequentialism, attitude consequentialism holds that agents are required to play their parts only with respect to those patterns of action that they can ensure will be realized. Consider again The Buttons, where the optimal
pattern is the one in which they both push. Since Uncoop is going to not-push no matter what Coop does, thinks, or feels, there is no way for Coop to ensure that the optimal pattern will be realized. So, contrary to what interpersonal consequentialism implies, Coop should not-push, as attitude consequentialism implies. This is best the best that Coop can do given that Uncoop is going to not-push. However, attitude consequentialism rightly holds that Uncoop should push. By promising to push while intending to push, Uncoop can ensure that they both push.

In conclusion, I think that direct foundational consequentialists should take a compound of actions and background attitudes to be the primary evaluative focal point and thereby adopt attitude consequentialism.10

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References


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