Anti-Intellectualism

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Intellectualists disagree with anti-intellectualists about the relationship between truth and knowledge. According to intellectualists, this relationship is intimate. Knowledge entails true belief, and in fact everything required for knowledge is somehow relevant to the probability that the belief in question is true. According to anti-intellectualists, this relationship isn’t intimate. Or, at least, it’s not as intimate as intellectualists think. Factors that aren’t in any way relevant to the probability that a belief is true can make a difference to whether it counts as knowledge. In this paper, I give a new argument for anti-intellectualism and draw out consequences of this argument for the pragmatic encroachment debate. The standard purist objection to pragmatism is that pragmatism entails anti-intellectualism. As I show, anti-intellectualism follows from premises that are plausible even if purism is true, so the standard purist objection to pragmatism fails.

1. Introduction

Compare two claims about your belief that Hume was a Scottish philosopher: first, that this belief can’t amount to knowledge unless it’s based on good evidence that Hume was a Scottish philosopher, and, second, that it can’t amount to knowledge unless you wear a size-9 shoe. The first claim is plausible while the second is obviously false—but why? What makes the difference? A popular, initially plausible answer is that only truth-relevant factors matter for knowledge. A factor is truth-relevant (I will say) just in case it affects the probability that your belief is true, either from your own point of view, or from some more objective perspective. The evidence for your belief that Hume was a Scottish philosopher, the reliability of the cognitive faculties that produced this belief, and so on, all affect the probability that your belief is true—if not from your own point of view, then at least from some more objective perspective. In contrast, your shoe size almost certainly does not affect the probability that your belief is true, from your perspective or any other. Let ‘intellectualism’ name the view that only truth-relevant factors can make the difference between knowledge and belief that falls short of knowledge. Intellectualism explains why it’s implausible that your belief that Hume was a Scottish philosopher cannot amount to knowledge unless you wear a size-9 shoe.

Intellectualism has recently fallen under criticism, and it is a central subject of dispute between views that I will call ‘pragmatism’ and ‘purism’. By ‘pragmatism’, I will mean the

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view familiar from Fantl and McGrath (2002), Hawthorne (2004), Stanley (2005), and others, according to which knowledge depends at least in part on our practical interests. By ‘purism’, I will mean the negation of pragmatism.² Since pragmatism entails that truth-irrelevant changes in your practical interests can affect whether you know, pragmatism entails anti-intellectualism. Purists resist pragmatism precisely because it entails anti-intellectualism.³

Resisting pragmatism is necessary but not sufficient for defending intellectualism. Though pragmatism entails that intellectualism is false, purism does not entail that intellectualism is true. In fact, as I will argue in this paper, purism does not even suggest that intellectualism is true, since anti-intellectualism follows from premises that are plausible whether or not purism is true. If my argument succeeds, the standard purist objection to pragmatism fails. I conclude this paper by discussing a view that I call ‘epistemic perspectivism’—the view that knowledge depends at least in part on truth-irrelevant features of our epistemic perspectives. I argue that, while epistemic perspectivism entails anti-intellectualism, epistemic perspectivism is the least radical or revisionary view among our relevant options. Contrary to some recent descriptions of anti-intellectualism as a kind of epistemological heresy,⁴ anti-intellectualism will emerge as the traditional epistemological view.

2. Minimal versus full justification

Some beliefs cannot be justified unless formed in response to evidence, but how much evidence does the justification of these beliefs require? This depends on whether we are talking about (what I will call) minimal justification or full justification. This distinction is familiar from the Gettier literature even if the terms ‘minimal justification’ and ‘full justification’ are not. It also has underappreciated consequences for the anti-intellectualism debate. Consider the following case.

**Barns:** At T1, Betty is driving through Wisconsin. She sees a barn at 5th and Elm, forms the belief that there is a barn at 5th and Elm, and thereby comes to know that there is a barn at 5th and Elm. Much later, at T2, Barney is driving through Wisconsin just like Betty, but now all of the barns have been replaced by barn


facades, except for the barn at 5\textsuperscript{th} and Elm. By dumb luck, Barney happens to look at the barn at 5\textsuperscript{th} and Elm and form the same belief as Betty.

Betty’s belief amounts to knowledge while Barney’s does not, even though Barney’s belief is (we can suppose) based on exactly the same evidence as Betty’s belief. This is a familiar point about Gettiered beliefs and their non-Gettiered counterparts, but notice that Barney could transform his belief into knowledge through the acquisition of better evidence. For example, suppose Barney gets out of his car, walks around inside the barn and climbs into the hayloft. On the basis of his evidence at this point, Barney could know that there is a barn at 5\textsuperscript{th} and Elm, and he could know this even with all of the facades nearby. The barn facades do not make it impossible for Barney to know that there is a barn at 5\textsuperscript{th} and Elm. They simply raise the amount of evidence required for him to know that there is a barn at 5\textsuperscript{th} and Elm. In Barney’s circumstances at T2, but not in Betty’s circumstances at T1, knowing that there is a barn at 5\textsuperscript{th} and Elm requires evidence that rules out the possibility that the barn-like structure at 5\textsuperscript{th} and Elm is just a facade.

From here forward, let’s say that S’s belief that $p$ is fully justified just in case she has enough evidence to know that $p$ in the circumstances in which she actually finds herself, and let’s say that her belief that $p$ is minimally justified just in case she has enough evidence to know that $p$ in some circumstances or other. Knowledge entails full justification, since S has enough evidence to know that $p$ in her actual circumstances if she does know that $p$. And full justification entails minimal justification, since S has enough evidence to know that $p$ in some circumstances or other if she has enough evidence to know that $p$ in her actual circumstances. Minimal justification does not entail full justification, of course, and neither minimal justification nor full justification entails knowledge, since neither entails truth.

At T2, Barney has enough evidence to know that there is a barn at 5\textsuperscript{th} and Elm in some circumstances or other (e.g., Betty’s at T1), but he does not have enough evidence to know that there is a barn at 5\textsuperscript{th} and Elm in his actual circumstances. Thus, at T2, Barney’s belief that there is a barn at 5\textsuperscript{th} and Elm is only minimally justified. To be fully justified in his belief that there is a barn at 5\textsuperscript{th} and Elm, Barney needs evidence that rules out the possibility that he is looking at a facade. Since Betty does know that there is a barn at 5\textsuperscript{th} and Elm, however, and since knowledge entails both minimal justification and full justification, Betty’s belief is both minimally justified and fully justified. And since Betty and Barney have exactly the same evidence that there is a barn at 5\textsuperscript{th} and Elm, it follows that, even if the amount of evidence required for minimal justification remains fixed across contexts (as I will assume throughout), the amount of evidence required for full justification does not. Unlike the threshold for minimal justification, the threshold for
full justification is not stable. It cannot fall below the threshold for minimal justification, since it entails minimal justification, but it can be pushed above it.5

The distinction between minimal justification and full justification will be important to the argument for anti-intellectualism in §§3-5. From here forward, by ‘justification’, I will always mean minimal justification. This usage corresponds to the standard description of Barney as justified in his Gettiered belief. When I mean full justification, I will always use the term ‘full justification’. By ‘sufficient evidence’, I will mean evidence that is sufficient for minimal justification, not evidence that is sufficient for full justification. Similarly, by ‘insufficient evidence’, I will mean evidence that is not sufficient for minimal justification. On this usage, Barney has sufficient evidence that there is a barn at 5th and Elm, even though his belief falls short of knowledge, and even though he could transform his belief into knowledge by simply gaining more evidence. Since the threshold for minimal justification does not move, the threshold for sufficient evidence does not move either.

According to the arguments in §§3-5, reasons for thinking that you are not minimally justified in believing that \( p \) can raise the amount of evidence required for full justification in believing that \( p \), and thereby prevent you from knowing that \( p \). Since these reasons can be truth-irrelevant with respect to your belief that \( p \) (as I will show), truth-irrelevant factors can make a difference to knowledge.

3. An argument for anti-intellectualism

When pragmatists say that knowledge depends on truth-irrelevant factors, they mean that differences in truth-irrelevant factors can entail differences in knowledge, and do so without entailing any difference in what the relevant person believes. This latter claim is true if any possible scenario satisfies the following description: \( S \) knows that \( p \) at some time \( t \), her belief that \( p \) falls short of knowledge at some other time \( t^* \), yet there is no truth-relevant difference between the world at \( t \) and the world at \( t^* \) with respect to her belief that \( p \). Call scenarios that satisfy this description ‘encroachment scenarios’.

Intellectualism entails that encroachment scenarios aren’t possible. In this section, I will argue that encroachment scenarios are possible, and that we get them from cases where

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5 If it’s possible to know without evidence (cf. Moon 2012), then we can understand minimal and full justification in terms of strength of epistemic position, and give whatever non-evidentialist account of strength of epistemic position we prefer. In this case, we can say that \( S \) is minimally justified in her belief that \( p \) just in case her epistemic position is strong enough for her to know that \( p \) in some circumstances or other, and fully justified in her belief that \( p \) just in case her epistemic position is strong enough for her to know that \( p \) in her actual circumstances.
truth-irrelevant features of our epistemic perspectives prevent us from knowing. Consider the following scenario.⁶

Smith asks the students in his intro philosophy class for examples of beliefs based entirely on testimony. His student Penny thinks for a while and says that she recently asked a zookeeper what emus eat, and then formed the belief that emus are omnivores solely on the basis of the zookeeper’s say-so. Smith then argues that Penny is not justified in this belief. He starts by defending a strong version of fallibilism on which, even though justification does not require evidence that rules out the usual far-fetched skeptical hypotheses, it does require evidence that rules out what he calls ‘realistic’ possibilities of error. To illustrate, Smith mentions a recent conversation where he misspoke and told someone that Hume was a 17th century philosopher, not realizing his mistake until it was too late. After pointing out that mistakes like this happen somewhat regularly, and that there are similar ways we might be misled virtually anytime we believe something solely on the basis of testimony, he concludes that beliefs based merely on testimony are rarely justified. Smith then asks Penny whether her evidence rules out the possibility that the zookeeper misspoke. After Penny admits that it does not, Smith concludes that her belief that emus are omnivores is not justified.⁷

Along the way to this conclusion, Smith presents a battery of arguments for his version of fallibilism, but no arguments for any more moderate version of fallibilism. As a result of Smith’s lopsided teaching and skill at defending his pet view, Penny finishes the class with excellent reason to believe that she is not justified in believing that emus are omnivores, and comparatively little reason to believe that she is justified in believing that emus are omnivores. Luckily, however, Penny decides to major in philosophy, and she takes your seminar on fallibilism. She studies hard and, after carefully weighing the full range of relevant considerations, she eventually changes her mind about the minimum amount of evidence required for justified belief. By the end of the semester, she concludes that the threshold for justified belief is low enough to count many mundane testimonial beliefs as justified, including her belief that emus are omnivores.⁸

Call this scenario ‘Penny’s Progress’, and note what has and hasn’t changed over the course of Penny’s reflections on fallibilism. On the intended understanding of this scenario, Penny hasn’t changed her mind about the amount or strength of her evidence that emus are omnivores, or anything like that. She doesn’t think that she now has more

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⁶ Throughout, I will assume both that skepticism is false and that whether S knows that p is not itself a truth-relevant factor with respect to S’s belief that p, since encroachment scenarios are trivially impossible if either assumption is false.

⁷ Smith’s view, let’s suppose, resembles Wayne Davis’s (2007) variety of fallibilism.

⁸ She accepts something like Jennifer Lackey’s (2009) version of fallibilism, let’s suppose.
or less evidence than she originally had, or that her evidence now provides more or less support for the proposition that emus are omnivores than it originally did. Nor has she changed her credence that emus are omnivores, the probability she would assign to the proposition that emus are omnivores, or anything like that. Nor, finally, has Penny changed her mind about whether emus are omnivores. Instead, she has only changed her mind about the amount of evidence required for justified belief, and consequently changed her mind about whether her belief that emus are omnivores is justified. Penny’s change of mind is analogous to my change of mind if I believe at T1 that I don’t have enough gas in my tank, and then believe at T2 that I do have enough gas in my tank—not because I have changed my mind about the amount of gas in my tank, but because I have changed my mind about the distance to my destination. Penny hasn’t changed her mind about emu diets, the amount or quality of her evidence that emus are omnivores, or anything like that. She has only changed her mind about epistemology.  

Where ‘T1’ names some time early in the story when Penny is convinced that she lacks sufficient evidence that emus are omnivores, and ‘T2’ names some time late in the story when Penny believes that she has sufficient evidence that emus are omnivores, the following premises entail anti-intellectualism, since they entail that Penny’s Progress is an encroachment scenario.

(P1) At T1, Penny’s belief that emus are omnivores falls short of knowledge.

(P2) At T2, Penny knows that emus are omnivores.

(P3) There is no truth-relevant difference between the world at T1 and the world at T2 with respect to Penny’s belief that emus are omnivores.

I find each of these premises plausible. Call the moment when Penny first formed the belief that emus are omnivores ‘T0’. Throughout the story, from T0 to T2, Penny retains her belief that emus are omnivores. Yet Penny’s reflections on fallibilism from T0 to T2 needn’t make any difference to the probability that this belief is true, either from Penny’s point of view, or from any more objective perspective. They needn’t affect Penny’s credence or level of confidence that emus are omnivores, they needn’t affect the amount or quality of her evidence that emus are omnivores, they needn’t affect the reliability of the cognitive processes or faculties responsible for her belief that emus are omnivores,

9 Here I assume that it is possible to believe both that p and that one lacks sufficient evidence that p. I defend this assumption in §5, and also show how the argument for anti-intellectualism does not depend on it. In §5, I also address an objection to this description of Penny’s mental life that might arise from Daniel Greco’s (2014) discussion of a similar case.
and so on. Of course, they might affect any or all of these things. We can imagine scenarios where Penny’s relevant cognitive faculties become less reliable as she changes her mind about the minimum amount of evidence required for justified belief, and so on. But we can also imagine scenarios where Penny’s reflections on fallibilism do not affect any of these things, and this is the relevant point. Because Penny’s reflections on fallibilism from T0 to T2 don’t entail any difference in her evidence that emus are omnivores, any difference in the reliability of her relevant cognitive faculties, etc., anti-intellectualists can just stipulate that her reflections on fallibilism from T0 to T2 don’t affect any of these things.

In general, a factor $F$ isn’t truth-relevant with respect to $S$’s belief that $p$ unless there is some perspective from which it affects the probability that her belief is true. Conditional on the proposition that $S$ believes that $p$, however, the probability that her belief that $p$ is true is identical to the probability that $p$. Thus, assuming that $F$ does not affect whether $S$ believes that $p$, $F$ will affect the probability that her belief that $p$ is true iff it affects the probability that $p$. Since Penny’s reflections on fallibilism from T0 to T2 do not affect whether Penny believes that emus are omnivores, her reflections on fallibilism from T0 to T2 affect the probability that her belief is true iff they affect the probability that emus are omnivores. But fallibilism has nothing to do with emus, and we can assume that Penny knows this. Since Penny’s reflections on fallibilism clearly needn’t affect any relevant probability that emus are omnivores, there is no reason why anti-intellectualists cannot just stipulate that the differences between the world at T0, T1, and T2 aren’t truth-relevant.

Since this stipulation ensures that (P3) is true, purists have three options: they can reject (P1), they can reject (P2), or they can embrace anti-intellectualism. There would be little point in rejecting (P2). Consider the following argument.

(1) At T0, Penny knows that emus are omnivores.

(2) If, at T0, Penny knows that emus are omnivores, then, at T2, Penny knows that emus are omnivores.

$\therefore$ (P2) At T2, Penny knows that emus are omnivores.

This argument is valid. In order to resist (P2), purists must reject (1) or (2). They can’t reject (2) without abandoning intellectualism, since (as we just saw) anti-intellectualists can stipulate that the differences between the world at T0, T1, and T2 aren’t truth-relevant. If purists want to defend intellectualism by rejecting (P2), they must reject (1). But unless some version of skepticism about testimonial knowledge is correct, anti-
intellectualists can also stipulate that (1) is true. And even if skepticism about testimony is correct, anti-intellectualists can simply change the details of the case. Since full-blown skepticism is false (we are assuming), anti-intellectualists can simply build the case around a different proposition—e.g., the proposition that Penny has hands.\(^\text{10}\) Since rejecting (1) would merely accomplish a slight change in the details of the case, since purists can’t reject (2) without abandoning intellectualism, and since (1) and (2) entail (P2), purists who want to resist anti-intellectualism must reject a different premise than (P2). This leaves just (P1).

But (P1) is also plausible. Consider the following argument.

\[(3) \quad \text{At T1, Penny has excellent reason to believe that she is not justified in believing that emus are omnivores, and comparatively little reason to believe that she is justified in believing that emus are omnivores.}\]

\[(4) \quad \text{If, at T1, Penny has excellent reason to believe that she is not justified in believing that emus are omnivores, and comparatively little reason to believe that she is justified in believing that emus are omnivores, then, at T1, Penny’s belief that emus are omnivores falls short of knowledge.}\]

\[\therefore \quad \text{(P1) At T1, Penny’s belief that emus are omnivores falls short of knowledge.}\]

This argument is also valid, and premise (3) is true by hypothesis—it simply describes Penny’s situation at T1.\(^\text{11}\) This leaves just (4). If purists want to continue defending intellectualism, they must argue that (4) is false. But (4) is hard to resist. We are using the sentence ‘Penny believes that she is not justified in believing that emus are omnivores’ as shorthand for ‘Penny believes that she ought not believe that emus are omnivores for lack of sufficient evidence that emus are omnivores’. According to (4), Penny’s belief that

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\(^{10}\) This would give anti-intellectualists a case similar to Greco’s (2014) case.

\(^{11}\) Readers wondering whether Titelbaum’s (2015) ‘fixed point thesis’ can be leveraged against (3) should note that the reasons for and against thinking that Penny is justified in believing that emus are omnivores depend heavily on contingent empirical matters of fact—on facts about patterns of human judgment, on facts about when it is and is not felicitous to assert various knowledge ascribing and knowledge denying sentences, on facts about the reliability of our cognitive processes and faculties, etc.—as the literature on infallibilism makes clear. To give one example, Fandel and McGrath open a recent discussion of infallibilism with these comments: ‘We all make mistakes, and not only when we purposely ignore our evidence or coax ourselves into believing what we would like to believe. Our primary sources of information about the world are fallible at least in the sense that they sometimes lead us to false beliefs’ (2009, p. 6). Empirical observations like these figure into the standard objection that few of our beliefs are justified if infallibilism is true. But as Titelbaum himself points out (p. 253), the fixed point thesis isn’t plausible unless we restrict it to truths that are knowable \textit{a priori}. (Notice also that, even if it’s possible to know ‘from the armchair’ that Penny is justified in believing that emus are omnivores, it doesn’t follow that this can be known \textit{a priori}, as Williamson (2005, 2007) points out, and as Henderson and Horgan (2013) acknowledge in a different way.)
emus are omnivores can’t amount to knowledge if Penny has excellent reason to believe that she ought not believe that emus are omnivores for lack of sufficient evidence that emus are omnivores, and comparatively little reason to believe either that she has sufficient evidence that emus are omnivores, or that she ought to believe that emus are omnivores even though she lacks sufficient evidence that emus are omnivores. While I think (4) is the least plausible of the premises supporting (P1), (P2), and (P3), I also think (4) is considerably more plausible than its negation. The idea is simply this: Penny’s belief that emus are omnivores is epistemically botched, flawed, shoddy, defective, sub-par, etc., if she has excellent reason to believe that she lacks sufficient evidence that emus are omnivores and comparatively little reason to believe that she has sufficient evidence that emus are omnivores. Since epistemically defective beliefs aren’t knowledge, (4) is true.

Purists might reply that, while Penny knows that emus are omnivores, she’s not in position to know that she knows that emus are omnivores, and this is why her belief that emus are omnivores seems epistemically defective. But this response isn’t satisfying. All by itself, the fact that Penny isn’t in position to know that she knows that emus are omnivores only explains why her belief that emus are omnivores does not seem epistemically ideal. It doesn’t explain why her belief seems epistemically defective. By saying that Penny’s belief is epistemically defective, we are saying not just that her belief is epistemically improvable in some way. We’re saying that it constitutes an epistemically failure. The judgement isn’t just that Penny could be doing better, epistemically. It’s that she’s doing rather poorly, epistemically. But knowing is a way of doing rather well epistemically, even when one’s belief falls short of being epistemically ideal. Since one might know that p without being in position to know that one knows that p, the mere fact that Penny isn’t in position to know that she knows that emus are omnivores doesn’t explain why Penny’s belief seems epistemically defective. A better explanation, surely, is that her belief seems epistemically defective because it is epistemically defective. But if Penny’s belief that emus are omnivores is epistemically defective, then either (4) is true or epistemically defective beliefs can amount to knowledge. Since (3) and (4) entail (P1), purists must chose between accepting (P1) or maintaining that knowledge is a low bar indeed.12

This is the intuitive case for (P1), but anti-intellectualists can also emphasize the range of extant views that entail (P1). This premise follows from versions of internalism on which S knows that p only if she holds some higher-order belief to the effect that she has sufficient evidence that p, but it’s important to notice that (P1) also follows from some

12 Of course, if one cannot know that p without being in position to know that one knows that p, then Penny’s belief that emus are omnivores unambiguously falls short of knowledge, and (P1) is consequently true.
paradigm *externalist* ways of thinking. According to Michael Bergmann (2005), for example, we should reject these higher-order requirements, since they generate a vicious regress, but any alternative view must capture their *prima facie* appeal (pp. 427-31). To satisfy both of these desiderata, Bergman defends a view on which it’s possible to know that p without believing that one’s belief that p is ‘epistemically well-credentialed’ (p. 419), but not possible to know that p while believing (or being epistemically obliged to believe) that one’s belief that p is *not* epistemically well-credentialed (pp. 420-27). Since, at T1, Penny should believe that her belief that emus are omnivores is supported by insufficient evidence, Bergman’s view entails that, at T1, Penny’s belief that emus are omnivores falls short of knowledge.

To give another example, Penny’s second-order evidence gives her what Ram Neta (forthcoming) calls a ‘side defeater’ for her belief that emus are omnivores. On Neta’s view, Penny is propositionally justified in believing that emus are omnivores, but her second-order evidence prevents her from being doxastically justified in believing that emus are omnivores. In addition to *having* sufficient first-order evidence that emus are omnivores, Penny must base her belief on this evidence, and it must be epistemically *proper* for her to base her belief on this evidence. The problem is, the epistemic propriety of basing her belief on this first-order evidence is exactly what Penny’s second-order evidence prevents. Since, on Neta’s view, knowledge requires both propositional and doxastic justification, Neta’s view entails that Penny doesn’t know that emus are omnivores at T1.

Brian Weatherson (2012) gives us another example. According to Weatherson, ‘knowledge, unlike justification, requires a certain amount of internal coherence amongst mental states’ (p. 96). On his view, Penny’s belief that emus are omnivores is justified, since it ‘tracks’ her first-order evidence, but it still falls short of knowledge, since it ‘doesn’t cohere sufficiently well with what she should believe’ (p. 97). Penny’s belief that she lacks sufficient evidence that emus are omnivores gives her what Weatherson calls a ‘coherence-based defeater’ for her belief that emus are omnivores (ibid), and this defeater prevents her from knowing.

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13 BonJour (1985) arguably endorses exactly these higher-order requirements. As Bergman points out (pp. 428-30), it’s hard to make sense of BonJour’s discussion of Norman the clairvoyant without assuming that, on BonJour’s view, knowing that p requires holding some higher-order belief to the effect that one’s first-order belief that p is epistemically well-credentialed.

14 A natural idea here is that, because Penny’s second-order evidence requires Penny to believe that her first-order evidence is insufficient, Penny could properly *accept* that emus are omnivores on the basis of her first-order evidence, but she cannot properly *believe* that emus are omnivores on this basis. (See page 6, footnote 4, of the draft available on Neta’s website.)
We even get (P1) from views that might seem to entail that (P1) is false. Take Ernest Sosa’s virtue epistemological view, for example. It’s tempting to think that, on Sosa’s view, Penny knows that emus are omnivores at T1, since she only falls short of reflective knowledge at T1. But this temptation is only half right. Penny does fall short of reflective knowledge at T1, but reflective knowledge is just what most epistemologists mean by ‘knowledge’. This becomes especially clear when, in response to Duncan Pritchard’s (2009) objection that Barney has animal knowledge in fake barn country, Sosa says that animal knowledge is tantamount to ‘brute cognition’, and he concedes that animal knowledge is really only knowledge in some metaphorical sense (2009, p. 430). As Sosa points out, even the electric eye that operates the door at the grocery store can have animal knowledge (p. 431). This means that, on Sosa’s view, Penny only knows that emus are omnivores in some metaphorical sense. While Sosa’s view might initially appear to conflict with (P1), it actually entails (P1). We could multiply examples, but the point is clear enough: even if (P1) isn’t beyond dispute, it’s clearly at least defensible. But if (P1) is true, then so is anti-intellectualism, since (P2) and (P3) fall out of the details of Penny’s Progress, and since (P1), (P2), and (P3) jointly entail that intellectualism is false. The upshot is that anti-intellectualism is at least plausible. And notice: we have not arrived at this conclusion by relying on any of the standard arguments for pragmatism, or any of the considerations that drive these arguments. (P1), (P2), and (P3) are just as plausible from a purist perspective as they are from a pragmatist perspective. After all, purism is just the thesis that knowledge does not depend in any interesting way on our practical interests. All by itself, this thesis provides no reason to think that (P1), (P2), or (P3) is false. The upshot is that, if purism is plausible, then so is purist anti-intellectualism.

4. Knowledge, justification, and rationality

If (P1) is true, then, at T1, Penny’s belief that emus are omnivores falls short of knowledge. But why, exactly? Is it unjustified, irrational, Gettiered, or what?

Knowing that a belief falls short of knowledge does not require explaining why that belief falls short of knowledge in terms of familiar epistemic categories like rationality and justification. Gettier’s counterexamples showed this much. Penny’s Progress is similar. We might reasonably think that Penny’s belief falls short of knowledge at T1 even if we aren’t sure exactly why it falls short of knowledge—even if we aren’t sure

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15 See, for example, Sosa (2011), pages 9-13, and especially footnote 6.
16 Sosa (2015) develops these themes in detail. Note also that Penny arguably lacks animal knowledge that emus are omnivores, since her belief is arguably not adroit. (See, for example, Sosa (2011), ch. 1.)
whether it falls short of knowledge for being irrational, for being unjustified, for being Gettiered, or for some less familiar reason. Still, it is an interesting question whether her belief falls short of knowledge for being unjustified, for being irrational, for being Gettiered, or for some other reason, so I will say what I can about these things.

Penny doesn’t know that emus are omnivores at T1, but should could have known this at T1 if she had better evidence—if, for example, after her trip to the zoo, she had spent several years observing emus in the wild. For in this case, even if Penny had remained convinced that beliefs based merely on testimony are not justified, this conviction would have been irrelevant to her belief that emus are omnivores. Since Penny does know that emus are omnivores at T2, since she has exactly the same evidence for this proposition at T1 and T2 (just the zookeeper’s testimony), and since this evidence isn’t sufficient for her to know that emus are omnivores at T1, it follows that Penny is fully justified in believing that emus are omnivores at T2, but only minimally justified in believing this at T1.

Is Penny’s belief that emus are omnivores rational at T1? This question is vexed. If we mean that Penny’s belief is supported by sufficient evidence, or that it is minimally justified, then the answer is ‘yes’. But if, by ‘rational’, we mean that her belief is fully justified, the answer is ‘no’. If we mean that Penny’s belief coheres with everything else she believes, then the answer is ‘maybe, depending on what else Penny believes’.17 But if we mean that Penny’s belief coheres with everything she has good reason to believe, then the answer is ‘no, since Penny has good reason to believe that she lacks sufficient evidence that emus are omnivores’. If, by ‘rational’, we mean that Penny ought to believe that emus are omnivores, then the answer is ‘maybe, depending on which norms govern belief’. If truth is the only norm governing belief, then Penny should believe that emus are omnivores, since emus are omnivores.18 But if knowledge is a norm of belief, then Penny should not believe that emus are omnivores, since her belief falls short of knowledge.19 If minimal justification is the only norm governing belief (or if truth and minimal justification are the only norms governing belief), then Penny should believe that emus are omnivores, since she is minimally justified in believing that emus are omnivores.20 But if full justification is a norm of belief, then Penny should not believe that emus are omnivores, since she is not fully justified in believing that emus are omnivores. And so on.

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17 See §5.2, below.
The point, of course, is that there are many plausible responses to the question whether Penny’s belief is rational. Alex Worsnip (2015) distinguishes between two uses of the word ‘rational’ (one oriented toward coherence and another oriented toward evidence), and, as Plantinga observes, there are more than just two uses of this word. As he puts it,

[...]rationality is protean and ‘rationality’ is multiply ambiguous. … There is Aristotelian rationality, which goes with being a rational animal; there is means-end rationality and Foley rationality, an epistemic special case of it; there is the sort of rationality that amounts to sanity, to epistemic proper function; and there is the rationality that is really a matter of believing in accord with the dictates of reason. (1993, pp. vii-viii)

Here we have at least four disambiguations of the word ‘rational’ (none of which corresponds to either of Worsnip’s disambiguations), and for each of these four disambiguations there appear to be further ambiguities. To give just one example, in his Blackwell Companion to Epistemology entry on rationality, L. Jonathan Cohen starts with the simplifying assumption that ‘[t]o be rational is to be guided by legitimate reasoning’ and then says without pausing that there are ‘at least nine types of rationality’ (2010, p. 663). At least nine of them! For just one disambiguation of ‘rational’. That’s quite a lot. To my mind, no sensible epistemologist would assert without clarifying her meaning that Penny’s belief is (or is not) rational.21

At T1, Penny’s belief that emus are omnivores is minimally justified and true, but not fully justified. Since it isn’t fully justified, it falls short of knowledge.22 If Gettiered beliefs just are minimally justified true beliefs that fall short of knowledge, then Penny’s belief is Gettiered. If Gettiered beliefs must fall short of knowledge in the specific way illustrated by Gettier’s famous cases (whatever exactly that is), then Penny’s belief is arguably not Gettiered, even though it is minimally justified and true, but not knowledge.23 There are many legitimate conceptions of rationality. On some of them, Penny’s belief is rational. On others, it’s not. To my mind, the question whether Penny’s belief is rational is best answered by stipulative definition. The crucial point—and the only point relevant for the purposes of this paper—is that Penny’s belief plausibly falls short of knowledge. For as

21 Following Alston (2005), I’m tempted to say the same thing about asserting without qualification that Penny’s belief is (or is not) justified.
22 Or alternatively, since it falls short of knowledge even though minimally justified and true, it’s not fully justified. Notice that defending (P1) neither requires taking a stand on whether knowledge is conceptually prior to full justification, nor requires giving an account of full justification that does not depend on the concept of knowledge.
we noted above, this conclusion entails that anti-intellectualism is plausible, and it entails that anti-intellectualism is plausible even if purism is true.

5. Objections and replies

The argument for anti-intellectualism in §3 assumes that anti-intellectualism does not have any unacceptable consequences of its own, that Penny’s Progress describes a possible scenario, and that intellectualism does not follow from any independently compelling view. All three assumptions might be doubted. In this section, I will consider arguments against each assumption. According to the first, the costs of accepting anti-intellectualism are much higher than the costs of rejecting (P1), (P2), or (P3), since we lose our grip on knowledge if we reject intellectualism. According to the second, the details of Penny’s Progress conflict with natural ways of carving the distinction between belief and acceptance. According to the third, the fact that (P1), (P2), and (P3) are individually plausible does not show that anti-intellectualism is plausible, since evidentialism and epistemological expressivism both conflict with the conjunction of (P1), (P2), and (P3). According to all three objections, while (P1), (P2), and (P3) might be individually plausible, their conjunction is not. In this section, I argue that none of these objections is compelling.

5.1 Veritism

According to the first objection, while (P1), (P2), and (P3) are individually plausible, their conjunction is implausible for the same reason that pragmatism is implausible: it entails anti-intellectualism! As we saw in the opening paragraphs of this paper, without intellectualism, we will have no principled reason for maintaining any difference in plausibility between the theories of knowledge that epistemologists actually defend and countless patently absurd theories of knowledge (e.g., theories according to which knowledge entails a particular shoe size). According to this objection, intellectualism is presupposed in all of our theorizing about knowledge; since we lose our grip on knowledge without intellectualism, the costs of rejecting intellectualism are clearly much higher than the costs of rejecting the conjunction of (P1)-(P3).

To assess the force of this objection, we must note how knowledge might depend on truth-irrelevant factors, if intellectualism is false. Consider the following familiar cases, and assume that they differ only insofar as the stipulated differences in Hannah’s practical interests require that they differ.
**Low Stakes:** Hannah is driving past the bank on Friday afternoon. She has her paycheck in hand and she plans to deposit it, but there are long lines so she considers returning to deposit her paycheck on Saturday morning. She knows that it does not matter when she deposits the paycheck.

**High Stakes:** Hannah is driving past the bank on Friday afternoon. She has her paycheck in hand and she plans to deposit it, but there are long lines so she considers returning to deposit her paycheck on Saturday morning. She knows that there will be disastrous consequences if she does not deposit her check before noon on Saturday.

According to paradigm versions of pragmatism, Hannah knows that the bank will be open on Saturday in Low Stakes, but the stipulated differences in her practical interests take her out of position to know this in High Stakes. These stipulated differences don’t take Hannah out of position to know that the bank will be open by affecting her evidence that the bank will be open. She has exactly the same evidence for this proposition in High Stakes and Low Stakes. Instead, according to these versions of pragmatism, Hannah’s practical interests take her out of position to know that the bank will be open by raising the amount of evidence required for her to know that the bank will be open. Instead of evidence that the bank will be open, she needs better evidence that the bank will be open. She might get, for example, the kind of evidence she might get from talking to someone inside the bank—evidence that would rule out the possibility that the bank has recently changed its Saturday hours. On paradigm versions of pragmatism, the stipulated differences in Hannah’s practical interests between Low Stakes and High Stakes raise the amount of evidence required for Hannah to be fully justified in believing that the bank will be open, and they do so without affecting the evidence itself. More generally, the stipulated differences in Hannah’s practical interests raise the amount of evidence required for full justification.

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24 Cf. Fantl and McGrath (2002), Weatherson (2012), and Ross and Schroeder (2014). The standard explanation for this change runs in terms of the amount of evidence required for Hannah to rationally act as if the bank will be open.
without affecting the probability that Hannah’s belief that the bank will be open is true, either from her perspective, or from any other perspective.  

If (P1)-(P3) are true, we should say exactly the same thing about the stipulated differences in Penny’s epistemic situation between T1 and T2. Since Penny knows that emus are omnivores at T2, and since she has exactly the same evidence that emus are omnivores at T1, Penny is minimally justified in believing that emus are omnivores at both T1 and T2. At T2, she is also fully justified in believing that emus are omnivores. Penny is not fully justified in believing that emus are omnivores at T1, however, since she does not have enough evidence to know that emus are omnivores at T1. To know that emus are omnivores at T1, Penny needs better evidence than just the zookeeper’s testimony. She needs, for example, the kind of evidence she might get from observing emus in the wild—evidence that would rule out the possibility that the zookeeper misspoke when he said that emus are omnivores (or at least render this possibility irrelevant). Thus, if (P1)-(P3) are true, the stipulated differences in Penny’s epistemic situation between T1 and T2 affect the amount of evidence required for Penny to be fully justified in believing that emus are omnivores, and they do so without affecting the probability that her belief is true, either from her perspective, or from any other perspective.

These details are important because, if some factor F affects the amount or quality of evidence required for S to be fully justified in believing that p, F is clearly epistemically relevant with respect to S’s belief that p even if it’s not strictly speaking truth-relevant with respect to S’s belief that p. Henceforth, let’s say that a factor is threshold-relevant with respect to S’s belief that p just in case it affects the amount or quality of evidence required for S to be fully justified in believing that p, and let’s use ‘veritism’ to name the view that F cannot make the difference between mere true belief and knowledge unless F is either truth-relevant or threshold-relevant. While pragmatism and the conjunction of (P1)-(P3) both entail that intellectualism is false, they are both consistent with veritism. By distinguishing between intellectualism and veritism, anti-intellectualists can give a nice explanation of the difference in plausibility between the claim that you cannot know that Hume was a Scottish philosopher without good evidence that he was a Scottish philosopher, and the claim that you cannot know this unless you wear a size-9 shoe—

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25 Notice that no version of pragmatism entails that the stipulated differences in Hannah’s practical interests raise the amount of evidence required for Hannah to be minimally justified in believing that the bank will be open. Given our stipulative definition of ‘minimal justification’, Hannah’s practical interests cannot raise the amount of evidence required for her to be minimally justified in believing that the bank will be open unless they somehow raise the minimum amount of evidence required for Hannah to know that the bank will be open in any situation, including Low Stakes. Obviously, no version of pragmatism has this result.  

namely, only the latter conflicts with veritism, since your evidence is truth-relevant while your shoe size is not even threshold relevant. Since anti-intellectualists can embrace veritism, it seems false that we lose our grip on knowledge if we reject intellectualism on the basis of (P1)-(P3).

5.2 Impossibilism

According to the second objection, the problem with (P1), (P2), and (P3) is not that they entail anti-intellectualism. Rather, the problem is that the details of Penny’s Progress in virtue of which (P1)-(P3) are individually plausible conflict with natural ways of carving the distinction between belief and acceptance. According to a view suggested by Adler (2002a) and Adler and Hicks (2012), it’s impossible to simultaneously believe both that \( p \) and that one lacks sufficient evidence that \( p \). On this view, as soon as Penny forms the belief that she lacks sufficient evidence that emus are omnivores, her attitude toward this proposition loses its status as a belief, and it must now be categorized as an instance of mere acceptance. Call this view ‘impossibilism’, since it says that it’s impossible to believe both that \( p \) and that one lacks sufficient evidence that \( p \). If impossibilism is true, then Penny does not know that emus are omnivores at T1—but not because her belief falls short of knowledge at T1. Instead, she doesn’t know this because she lacks the requisite belief. But if Penny lacks the requisite belief, then (P1) and (P3) are both false.

In response to this objection, it is important to note three things. First, impossibilism is too strong. Even if one cannot occurrently believe both that \( p \) and that one lacks sufficient evidence that \( p \), it’s possible to be mistaken about what one non-occurently believes, or at least unaware of what one non-occurently believes, and it’s implausible that one cannot believe both that \( p \) and that one lacks sufficient evidence that \( p \) in a case where one is unaware of one of these beliefs. This, presumably, is why Adler and Hicks (2012) stop short of endorsing full-blown impossibilism. The strongest thing they say is that ‘[y]ou cannot in full awareness believe that \( p \) and believe that what reasons you possess are insufficient to establish that \( p \)’ (p. 143, my italics).

Second, impossibilism is not sufficiently motivated. Adler’s (2002a) arguments for impossibilism focus entirely on cases where your reasons for believing that you lack sufficient evidence that \( p \) are plainly evidence that \( \neg p \). But any evidence that \( \neg p \) will be truth-relevant with respect to your belief that \( p \). As a result, at most, Adler’s arguments only motivate a version of impossibilism that is restricted to cases where your reasons for

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27 For example, in Adler’s diner example (p. 7), when your colleague tells you that David is in his office, you acquire reason to think that you lack sufficient evidence that David is at the diner, but these reasons are clearly evidence that David is not at the diner.
believing that you lack sufficient evidence that \( p \) are truth-relevant with respect to your belief that \( p \). But this restricted version of impossibilism would be consistent with the conjunction of (P1)-(P3).

Third, and most important, even if full-blown impossibilism is true, it doesn’t require any modification of (P1), (P2), or (P3). Notice that no premise in the arguments for (P1), (P2), or (P3) requires that Penny ever forms the belief that she lacks sufficient evidence that emus are omnivores. The argument for (P1) requires that Penny’s reasons to believe that she lacks sufficient evidence significantly outweigh her reasons to believe that she has sufficient evidence, but it does not require that Penny believes what these reasons support. After all, premise (3) just says that Penny has excellent reason to believe that she lacks sufficient evidence that emus are omnivores, and comparatively little reason to believe that she has sufficient evidence that emus are omnivores, and premise (4) just says that, if Penny has excellent reason to believe that she lacks sufficient evidence that emus are omnivores, then Penny’s belief that emus are omnivores falls short of knowledge. Neither premise requires that Penny ever forms the belief that she lacks sufficient evidence that emus are omnivores. Since no other premise in the arguments for (P1), (P2) or (P3) requires that Penny forms this belief, (P1), (P2) and (P3) are consistent with full-blown impossibilism.

5.3 Evidentialism

According to the third objection, instead of accepting anti-intellectualism on the basis of (P1), (P2), and (P3), we should reject the conjunction of (P1)-(P3) on the basis of its conflict with the highly intuitive thesis that Adler (2002b), Shah (2005), and others call ‘evidentialism’, according to which only evidence can be a reason to believe.\(^{28}\) According to this objection, since evidentialism is more plausible than the conjunction of (P1)-(P3), it’s not reasonable to accept anti-intellectualism on the basis of (P1), (P2), and (P3), or even conclude that anti-intellectualism is plausible on the basis of (P1), (P2), and (P3). Instead, we should reject the conjunction of (P1)-(P3) on the basis of its conflict with evidentialism.

This objection is interesting but it faces several difficulties. What exactly is the evidentialist thesis? Belief and disbelief are not the only doxastic attitudes that you might take toward a proposition. You might instead withhold. Is evidentialism simply a thesis

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\(^{28}\) Notice that this version of evidentialism is not identical to the evidentialist accounts of justification defended by Conee and Feldman (1985), according to which \( S \) is justified in believing that \( p \) only if her evidence supports believing that \( p \).
about reasons to believe, or is it also a thesis about reasons to withhold? If the former, then evidentialism is equivalent to (E1), below. If the latter, it’s equivalent to (E2).

(E1) R isn’t a reason for S to believe that p unless R is evidence that p, and R isn’t a reason for S to believe that \( \sim p \) unless R is evidence that \( \sim p \).

(E2) R isn’t a reason for S to believe that p unless R is evidence that p, R isn’t a reason for S to believe that \( \sim p \) unless R is evidence that \( \sim p \), and R isn’t a reason for S to suspend judgment with respect to \( <p> \) unless R is either evidence that p or evidence that \( \sim p \).

Neither (E1) nor (E2) poses any serious threat to the conjunction of (P1)-(P3). If evidentialism is equivalent to (E1), then evidentialism is consistent with the conjunction of (P1)-(P3). After all, (E1) is consistent with the claim that Penny’s belief that emus are omnivores falls short of knowledge at T1 because she has non-evidential reasons to withhold at T1 that she lacks at T2.29 Let’s assume that evidentialism is equivalent to (E2), then. In this case, anti-intellectualists have at least two options. First, they can argue that evidentialism is still consistent with the conjunction of (P1)-(P3). While (E2) rules out the possibility that Penny has non-evidential reasons to withhold, this is not enough to guarantee any conflict with the conjunction of (P1)-(P3), since the conjunction of (P1)-(P3) does not entail that there are non-evidential reasons to withhold. As we saw in §3, (P1)-(P3) are consistent with the view that minimal justification is the only norm of belief. Second, even if knowledge or full justification is a norm of belief, anti-intellectualists can point out that (E2) is both insufficiently motivated and susceptible to counterexample. Unlike belief, suspension of judgement is not a truth-evaluable doxastic attitude. My suspension of judgement with respect to \( <p> \) cannot be true or false, regardless of the truth-value of \( <p> \). Nor does suspension of judgement ‘aim at truth’ in any relevant sense. Given these clear differences between belief and suspension, it is hard to see what motivates the last conjunct of (E2).

The real problem for (E2), however, is that its last conjunct looks false. Suppose I gain evidence for \( <p> \) and later gain evidence for \( <\sim p> \), so that my evidence for \( <p> \) ends up perfectly counterbalanced by my evidence for \( <\sim p> \). Call this fact about my evidence ‘F’, and consider the following argument.

29 By ‘non-evidential reasons to withhold with respect to \( <p> \)’ I mean reasons to withhold with respect to p that are neither evidence for \( <p> \) nor evidence for \( <\sim p> \). According to Baker-Hytch and Benton (forthcoming), the knowledge norm of belief generates a further norm according to which ‘one must: refrain from believing that p if one comes to believe or accept that one’s belief that p is not knowledge’ (p. 28). If this is right, then any reason to think one’s belief that p isn’t knowledge that is neither evidence for \( <p> \) nor evidence for \( <\sim p> \) would presumably be a non-evidential reasons to withhold with respect to \( <p> \).
Evidence for any proposition is evidence against its negation. If $F$ is evidence for $<p>$, then $F$ is evidence against $<\neg p>$. Since evidence against a proposition is never evidence for that proposition, $F$ is evidence for $<p>$ only if $F$ is not evidence for $<\neg p>$. But $F$ lends equal support to both $<p>$ and $<\neg p>$, if it lends any support to either of them. Thus, $F$ is evidence for both of them if it’s evidence for either of them. Since $F$ is evidence for $<p>$ only if it’s not evidence for $<\neg p>$, $F$ cannot be evidence for both of them. Thus, $F$ isn’t evidence for either of them. But $F$ lends equal support to both $<p>$ and $<\neg p>$, if it lends any support to either of them. Thus, $F$ is evidence for both of them if it’s evidence for either of them. Thus, $F$ is evidence for both of them if it’s evidence for either of them. Since $F$ is evidence for $<p>$ only if it’s not evidence for $<\neg p>$, $F$ cannot be evidence for both of them. Thus, $F$ isn’t evidence for either of them. But $F$ is a paradigm reason to suspend judgment with respect to $<p>$. Thus, $F$ is a reason to suspend judgment with respect to $<p>$ that is neither evidence for $<p>$ nor evidence for $<\neg p>$.31

This argument is compelling. Its premises seem true, its conclusion is unsurprising given clear differences between belief and suspension, and it doesn’t commit us to anything as strong as Mark Schroeder’s (2012a) idea that reasons to suspend with respect to $<p>$ must come from somewhere other than the evidence for and against $<p>$.32 The last premise of this argument entails that (E2) is false, however, since it entails that the last conjunct of (E2) is false. Thus, evidentialism is implausible if it’s equivalent to (E2). The upshot is that evidentialism poses no serious challenge to the conjunction of (P1)-(P3).33

5.4 Epistemological expressivism

According to the fourth objection, the problem with the conjunction of (P1)-(P3) is that it conflicts with Daniel Greco’s (2014) epistemological expressivism. If (P1) and (P2) are both true, this is only because Penny believes at T1 that she is not justified in believing that emus are omnivores, and then believes at T2 that $she$ is justified in believing that emus are omnivores. According to Greco, however, Penny’s first-order belief that emus are omnivores and her second-order belief that she is justified in believing that emus are omnivores are really about the same thing: namely, whether emus are omnivores. This is

30 Plausibly, $F$ does not support either of them either. My evidence for $<p>$ supports $<p>$, and my evidence for $<\neg p>$ supports $<\neg p>$. Plausibly, neither $<p>$ nor $<\neg p>$ gets any additional support from $F$, the fact that my evidence for $<p>$ equals my evidence for $<\neg p>$.

31 I give roughly the same argument in Roeber (forthcoming), but its target there is an objection that Stewart Cohen gives against Schroeder’s version of pragmatism.

32 See also Schroeder (2012b), and notice that, since $F$ is a fact about my evidence for and against $<p>$, this argument is consistent with the view that reasons to suspend with respect to $<p>$ must at least supervene on one’s evidence for and against $<p>$.

33 Of course, purists pushing objection 3 might modify (E2) so that its last conjunct says that Penny’s reasons for suspending judgment with respect to the proposition that emus are omnivores must at least come from her evidence for and against the proposition that emus are omnivores, even if they aren’t themselves pieces of evidence for and against the proposition that emus are omnivores. But modified this way, (E2) would still be both insufficiently motivated and consistent with the conjunction of (P1)-(P3).
because Penny’s second-order belief that she is justified in believing that emus are omnivores is really ‘a species’ of the first-order belief that emus are omnivores (p. 211). According to objection 4, Penny’s second-order belief at T1 that she is not justified in believing that emus are omnivores must therefore be a species of the first-order belief that emus are not omnivores. If there is any sense in which Penny believes that emus are not omnivores at T1, however, then (P3) is false, since the presence of this belief at T1 would be a clear truth-relevant difference between the world at T1 and T2.

This objection depends on Greco’s expressivism, and Greco motivates his expressivism by showing how it preserves the intuition that epistemic akrasia is always irrational. Epistemologists who lack this intuition (or have it but think that it must be mistaken) might find Greco’s view unmotivated.34 There are two further problems for objection 4, however. First, objection 4 assumes that, at T1, Penny believes that she is not justified in believing that emus are omnivores. As we noted above, anti-intellectualists can drop this assumption, since (P1) only requires that, at T1, Penny has excellent reason to believe that she is not justified in believing that emus are omnivores. By simply stipulating that Penny does not believe what her reasons support, anti-intellectualists can side-step objection 4. There is a deeper problem for objection 4, however. Even if Greco is right about Penny’s belief (at T2) that she is justified in believing that emus are omnivores, and even if Penny does hold the belief (at T1) that she is not justified in believing that emus are omnivores, it is difficult to extend Greco’s account of Penny’s belief at T2 to her belief at T1.35

In general, the belief that one is not justified in believing that p cannot be a species of the belief that ¬p. If the belief that one is not justified in believing that p were a species of the belief that ¬p, then it would be impossible to believe that one is not justified in believing that p without also believing that ¬p. But this is possible. I believe that I’m not justified in believing that the number of stars is even, and I do so without believing that the number of stars isn’t even. There is literally no sense in which I believe that the number of stars isn’t even.36 Nor can the belief that one isn’t justified in believing that p be a species of suspension of judgment with respect to <p>. If the belief that one isn’t justified in believing that p were a species of suspension of judgment with respect to <p>,

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34 See Coates (2012), Wedgwood (2012), Lasonen-Aarnio (2014), Williamson (2014), and Weatherson (2012, MS) for examples of epistemologists who either lack this intuition or have it but think that it must be mistaken.

35 I say ‘extend Greco’s account’ because, while Greco says explicitly that the belief that one is justified in believing that p is a species of the belief that p (p. 211), he doesn’t say that the belief that one is not justified in believing that p is a species of the belief that ¬p.

36 Of course, I also believe that I’m not justified in believing that the number of stars is odd. But I definitely don’t believe that the number of stars is neither odd nor even, since I see that this is obviously false.
then it would be impossible to believe that one is not justified in believing that \( p \) while being fully convinced that \( \neg p \). But this is also possible. I believe that I’m not justified in believing that \( 2 + 2 = 7 \), and I am fully convinced that \( 2 + 2 \neq 7 \). This means that, even if the belief that one is justified in believing that \( p \) is a species of the belief that \( p \), Penny’s belief that she is not justified in believing that emus are omnivores needn’t be either a species of the belief that emus are not omnivores, or a species of suspension of judgment with respect to the conjunction that emus are omnivores. (And of course, it’s clearly not a species of the belief that emus are omnivores.)

Now, if Penny believes at T1 that she is not justified in believing that emus are omnivores, then (presumably) she also believes at T1 that she is not justified in believing that emus are not omnivores. The proponent of objection 4 might therefore suggest that, while the belief that one is not justified in believing that \( p \) is not a species of suspension of judgment with respect to \( \langle p \rangle \), the belief that one is neither justified in believing that \( p \) nor justified in believing that \( \neg p \) is a species of suspension of judgment with respect to \( \langle p \rangle \). But this suggestion is also implausible. Beliefs are truth- evaluative and they aim at truth, while suspensions of judgment are not truth- evaluative and they do not aim at truth. The belief that one is neither justified in believing that \( p \) nor justified in believing that \( \neg p \) might motivate or explain suspension of judgement with respect to \( \langle p \rangle \), but it’s hard to see how belief in any proposition could itself be a species of suspension of judgement with respect to a proposition. A truth- evaluative mental state that aims at truth is not plausibly a species of any mental state that is not truth- evaluative and does not aim at truth. The upshot is that, even if Greco is right about Penny’s belief at T2 that she is justified in believing that emus are omnivores, nothing analogous seems true of her belief at T1 that she is not justified in believing that emus are omnivores.37

Given all this, however, we have no reason to think that Greco’s epistemological expressivism conflicts with the conjunction of (P1)-(P3).

37 As Greco notes (2014, p. 211), these considerations raise an analogue of what Schroeder (2008) calls ‘the negation problem’ for expressivism. Applied to Greco’s version of expressivism, the negation problem is simply the problem of answering this question: if the belief that one is justified in believing that \( p \) is a species of the belief that \( p \), then what does the belief that one isn’t justified in believing that \( p \) amount to? Greco rightly observes that solving the negation problem is beyond the scope of his paper. It’s also important to note that Schroeder’s own solution to the negation problem doesn’t help objection 4. On Schroeder’s view, the sentence ‘murder is wrong’ expresses disapproval of murder, and the sentence ‘Penny believes that murder is wrong’ is true just in case Penny has ‘a very general positive attitude’ toward blaming for murder (p. 589). Applied to Penny, Schroeder’s view presumably says that the sentence ‘Penny believes that she is not justified in believing that emus are omnivores’ is true just in case Penny has a very general positive attitude toward blaming herself for believing that emus are omnivores. But of course, whether Penny has a very general positive attitude toward blaming herself for believing that emus are omnivores needn’t constitute any truth-relevant difference between the world at T1 and T2, so proponents of objection 4 cannot rely on Schroeder’s solution to the negation problem.
6. Epistemic perspectivism

How should we respond to the objection that pragmatism entails anti-intellectualism, then? We should be unmoved. Purism is consistent with anti-intellectualism, since purism is consistent with (P1), (P2), and (P3), which jointly entail anti-intellectualism. Since the conjunction of (P1)-(P3) is plausible whether or not pragmatism is true, anti-intellectualism is plausible whether or not pragmatism is true. Given this, however, there seems little point in objecting to pragmatism on the grounds that it entails anti-intellectualism. We might have other reasons to reject pragmatism, of course. But if we do, we should find purist anti-intellectualism plausible. Either way, cases like Penny’s Progress undermine the standard objection to pragmatism.

Do cases like Penny’s Progress motivate any interesting departure from traditional epistemology? Suppose we remain agnostic about pragmatism, but accept anti-intellectualism on the basis of (P1), (P2), and (P3). Do we thereby arrive at some radical or revisionary view? By hypothesis, nothing changes between T1 and T2 except truth-irrelevant features of Penny’s epistemic perspective. If Penny knows that emus are omnivores at T2 but not at T1, then knowledge can depend on truth-irrelevant features of our epistemic perspectives. Let ‘epistemic perspectivism’ name the view that knowledge can depend on truth-irrelevant features of our epistemic perspectives. Is epistemic perspectivism a radical or revisionary view? I want to say, ‘no’. By hypothesis, the stipulated differences in Penny’s epistemic perspective at T1 and T2 capture all of the relevant differences between the world at T1 and T2. But as a result of just these stipulated differences, Penny has excellent reason to believe that she lacks sufficient evidence that emus are omnivores at T1 but not T2. Since there is nothing radical or revisionary about the claim that reasons to believe that you lack sufficient evidence that \( p \) can take you out of position to know that \( p \), epistemic perspectivism does not look like a radical or revisionary view. Of course, epistemic perspectivism entails anti-intellectualism, and many purists accuse anti-intellectualism of being radical or revisionary. But this accusation is hard to defend once we distinguish between intellectualism and veritism, and note that anti-intellectualism is consistent with the latter. Contrary to some recent descriptions of anti-intellectualism as a kind of epistemological heresy, anti-intellectualism should be the orthodox epistemologist’s view.

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38 For example, following Ichikawa, Jarvis, and Rubin (2012), we might think the most plausible versions of pragmatism conflict with the truism that what we ought to do depends on what we ought to believe, and not the other way around.

39 See Grimm (2011) for a nice discussion of this accusation.

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