THE EARLY RECEPTION OF PETER AURIOL AT OXFORD

PART 1:
FROM OCKHAM TO THE BLACK DEATH

Rondo Keele*

Abstract

The important impact of the French Franciscan Peter Auriol (ca. 1280-1322) upon contemporary philosophical theology at Oxford is well known and has been well documented and analyzed, at least for a narrow range of issues, particularly in epistemology. This article attempts a more systematic treatment of his effects upon Oxford debates across a broader range of subjects and over a more expansive duration of time than has been done previously. Topics discussed include grace and merit, future contingents and divine foreknowledge, and the logic of the Trinity.

Scholars of Medieval Latin philosophical theology have known for decades that the philosophy of French Franciscan Peter Auriol played a major role in seminal debates occurring at Oxford in the age of Ockham, approximately 1318-1324. Up to now, the modern secondary literature on Auriol’s influence on Oxonian philosophy in this period features the Venerable Inceptor himself as the central figure, and epistemological issues – more particularly, theories of cognition and skepticism – have been the traditional topics of consideration. Due to the state of Auriol’s texts and the relatively recent arrival of critical editions of the Oxonians whom he influenced, for

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example Ockham’s confere Walter Chatton (d. 1343/4), historiography on the reception of his philosophy at Oxford remains inchoate and partial. For example, research in just the last twenty years has increasingly revealed the vital role played by Chatton, who, often opposing Auriol in acting as a defender of his own style of Scotism, was a crucial conduit for the Parisian master’s controversial ideas on other subjects less frequently noted by scholars: e.g., future contingents, divine foreknowledge and prophecy, and also the role of will and intellect in moral actions. None of these traces could have been noticed without the recent editions. Similarly, up to now most research on Auriol at Oxford has focused on and just before the early 20s, without systematically examining to what extent Auriol’s ideas were taken up the 30s by new generations of theologians, many of them Dominicans interested in these same ideas, influenced as much by Ockham as by Aquinas. This article will certainly treat the traditional epistemological ideas Auriol contributed to Oxford debates among Franciscans in the 20s, but will also seek to redress the gaps mentioned above. We do not claim this study gives the final word on these matters; when more editions appear this story will need to be expanded and perhaps altered a little, but our intent is to create a solid beginning for those scholars keen to make such expansions, as well as to offer clues for the likely figures and topics from which they will find it fruitful so to do.

1. Methodology

A complete analysis of intellectual influence would ideally consider several dimensions. To take a simple metaphor, we should measure not only its length (how many years and eras its power lasted), but also its width (how many issues and people it touched), and, more qualitatively, its depth (how much impact it had on seminal issues). This analysis of Auriol’s influence at Oxford is the first of two studies which seek to lay the groundwork for other scholars interested in tracing his influence among English Franciscans of the early fourteenth century, including a group of thinkers themselves important and influential in turn, people such as William Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Adam Wodeham. The current article addresses length
and breadth rather than depth; that is, it deals with figures, careers, and currents as opposed to an examination of how deeply his impact was felt. The issue of depth can scarcely be addressed in a single article-length study, but a contribution to that goal will be made in a planned follow-up article, which will discuss Auriol’s analysis of the relationship between will and intellect.

As to the temporal boundaries within which we will search for Auriol’s impact at Oxford, we will confine ourselves in length to about thirty years only; given the initial width and immense depth of Auriol’s influence, such a length is more than enough. When Ockham read the Sentences in 1317-19 Auriol was at the height of his powers and fortunes as a theologian, and it was just about this time, and in fairly mature form, that his ideas began migrating to England. From about 1317 to 1330 we see intense interest in Auriol on certain issues; here the breadth and depth of his influence are considerable. Some interest remains in the 1330s and early 1340s, but by 1349 plague had reached England, and Oxford was beginning a change in theological method and a general decline from which it would not recover for some time. Hence, Bradwardine’s De causa Dei (1344) is a very natural point to break off this study.

Although the purpose of this article is to break new ground on the question of Auriol’s influence at Oxford, we must begin by summarizing for the reader as compactly as possible two previously well-covered subjects on Auriol and Oxford: the question of who first began to discuss Auriol in England (Part 2 below), and the famous treatment of Auriol’s theory of esse apparens by Ockham, Chatton, and Wodeham (Part 3). For these portions of the study we rely on current scholarship with minimal critical comment, attempting only to set before the reader the situation as it stands. The purpose for doing this is to make this article more self-contained, by providing the reader what he or she needs to see how and why Auriol’s influence at Oxford has been treated up to now. Giving background in this way seems preferable to simply referring the reader to external sources in a footnote, on the one hand, or attempting to offer all the primary evidence, on the other.

Who were the Oxonians of note whom Auriol might have influenced? A list of the names often appearing in current scholarship, in
roughly chronological order, also giving their affiliations (Franciscan, Dominican, or Secular) and approximate dates, is as follows:

- Henry of Harclay S (1270-1317)
- William Alnwick F (1275-1333)
- Thomas Wylton S (fl. 1312)
- Richard Campsall S (1280-1350)
- John Reading F (1285-1346)
- William of Ockham F (1287-1347)
- Walter Chatton F (1290-1343)
- John Rodington F (1290-1348)
- Richard FitzRalph S (1300-1360)
- Robert Holcot D (1290/1300-1349)
- William Crathorn D (fl. 1330)
- Thomas Bradwardine S (1290-1349)
- Adam Wodeham F (1298-1358)
- Robert Halifax F (1300-1350)

Some notes are in order about how we shall use this list. First, for the purposes of our study, ‘Oxonian’ is interpreted very broadly to include important theologians associated with Oxford in any substantial way during the relevant period. By casting a wide net we hope to yield as much fresh information as possible. Nevertheless, we are only investigating reactions to Auriol in England, more specifically at Oxford, or in certain restricted cases, London. Hence ‘Oxonian’ broadly but ‘Oxford’ more strictly. Second, the figures listed above are grouped into three classes, the second two of which correspond to two distinct generations of theologians trained at Oxford. This division is not arbitrary, but it will not be defended here; other researchers have found such a rough grouping natural and convenient for analyzing trends there. Finally, the dates given for each figure are rough but reasonable, they are only offered so the reader can have a general sense of chronology. We reserve greater precision for the relevant parts of our detailed discussion below. With Auriol’s impact as a reference point, we can conveniently refer to these periods as early

(1315-1317), middle (1318-1330), and late (1331-1344), understanding the boundaries between periods to be a bit arbitrary and not particularly sharp.²

While surveys of the figures listed in the middle and late periods will form the bulk of the article (in Parts 4 and 5 respectively), it would be an opportunity missed if we did not at least consider the question of why Auriol had such strong influence on certain issues during this period, and indeed, why he came to be discussed in depth at Oxford in the first place. Was it basically accidental, say, the result of the high profile of Ockham and Chatton in contemporary polemics? Or could the cause be more circumstantial and political? These three decades were a highpoint in the Poverty Controversy, in which Ockham played an important role opposing Auriol’s mentor and patron, John XXII. Auriol’s philosophy might have drifted across the Channel, carried on by these (largely) unrelated ecclesiastical and doctrinal currents, receiving initial scrutiny within the Friars Minor because of a professional relationship he happened to have with a powerful and controversial figure. Or again, the root cause might be that many of Auriol’s ideas either radically reinterpret or openly oppose those of Scotus, and hence English Franciscans such as Chatton, anxious for Scotus’s legacy, saw Auriol as a force to be reckoned with. On this hypothesis, the story of Auriol in England in the second quarter of the century might simply be a subplot in the narrative of Scotus’s legacy. Of course, properly considered, these explanations are not exclusive of each other; perhaps some combination of them will finally seem reasonable. Part 6 concludes the article on this note.

A final methodological point. None of the hypotheses mentioned above is intended to be reductive, or to ‘explain away’ his influence. Auriol was an interesting thinker and a prolific writer, and it is not surprising that he would be studied in England at this time. Nevertheless, treating our survey as a set of data to be explained, we will conclude the article by asking to what degree these explanatory hypotheses fit the data, thereby attempting a preliminary explanation

² For example, we will place Wodeham in the late period despite the fact that some important work comes in the end of the 20s; for the general justification behind this grouping see note 1 above.
of how and why just these particular ideas of Auriol loomed so large in Oxford theology between Ockham and the Black Death.

2. The Early Period

The state of our information on the exact dates of Auriol’s movements and texts is nascent and uncertain, and may never improve substantially. Usually we are dealing with ranges of dates wide enough to admit competing hypotheses. Similar remarks apply to the entire group of theologians at Oxford who may have been responsible for initiating English reactions to Auriol. There may even be important figures yet to be discovered. For all these reasons, it is fruitless to attempt a definitive reconstruction of the precise mechanisms by which Auriol’s ideas first reached Oxford. Nevertheless, since scholars have speculated about certain issues regarding the initial vectors and the first responders, to bring the reader up to speed we will begin here with a brief treatment of these issues as they currently stand, and perhaps advance the subject some small distance by weighing in on the matter of Wylton vs. Alnwick as initial vector, and Ockham vs. Reading as first responder.

We have few data points in Auriol’s biography from which to work, but given our purposes here, this is all we need.\(^3\) Auriol studied in Paris early in the century,\(^4\) then lectured in Bologna (1312) and Toulouse (1314) almost certainly on the Sentences in one or both places, and was in Paris studying theology by autumn 1316, where he again lectured on the Sentences, until 1318. His Scriptum of book I of the Sentences was copied out in a particularly elaborate version by May 1317. Given the size of that work, it is reasonable to assume that the copying took several months, and the research and writing many months more, hence his Scriptum was likely written in Toulouse sometime between the years 1314 and 1316, and was probably complete by the autumn of 1316. He was recommended to be a master

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4 Scholars sometimes give the year 1304, but Friedman says this evidence is inconclusive. See ibid.
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on 14 July, 1318 by John XXII, and had definitely taken his oath and his station by the fall of that year. Auriol produced one *quodlibet* around 1320, and remained in Paris until mid-1321. For present purposes these claims can serve as fixed points upon which to begin our discussion of the vectors of influence.

The Initial Vector? Alnwick and Wylton

Where in our list of suspects can we find a plausible starting-point for the first traces of influence? To find the precise vector of Auriol’s ideas from the continent is too much to hope for; nevertheless, we should begin with what has been said about the question. It is well known that one of the earliest, unambiguous examples of Auriol’s impact at Oxford came from Ockham, around 1318.5 We also know Auriol provoked a strong reaction on the continent around the same time and probably earlier, for example, from Hervaeus Natalis.6

5 There are many examples of responses to Auriol in Book I of Ockham’s commentary, some of which will be discussed in detail below. Ockham lectured on the *Sentences* in 1317–19, but our only extant version of his Book I, called the *Scriptum*, was redacted, beginning early in 1318. The argument for this conclusion actually involves Auriol; the manuscript copy of Ockham’s *Scriptum* in Florence Bibl. Nat., Conv. soppr. A.3.801, which seems to witness an incomplete, early revision of the text, does not refer to Auriol as ‘doctor’, while the other witnesses to the *Scriptum* do. The implication is that this witness, and so the beginning of Ockham’s effort at redaction, dates to before Auriol’s magistracy, which ran through academic years 1318–19 to 1319–20. The editors draw two important consequences from this: (1) as a whole, Ockham’s *Scriptum* should be dated to after fall 1318, since this pre-1318 witness is incomplete, (2) the beginning of Ockham’s reaction to Auriol should be dated to before fall 1318. Even if we allow a safer terminus ante quem of 1319, allowing that Ockham may not have learned of Auriol’s magistracy until 1319, Ockham also shows some awareness of Auriol in the *Reportatio* of book II, a text which probably also dates to about 1318. See G. Gál – S.F. Brown (eds.), *Ockham, Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum Ordinatio (= OTh IV)*, St. Bonaventure, NY 1979, p. 36* (the editors’ introduction), and P.V. Spade, “Introduction,” in: id. (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, Cambridge 1999, p. 5. However this all works out, it is clear that his contact with Auriol’s ideas and texts in this period is real, but very spotty; for example, he begs off giving very many arguments against Auriol on the question "utrum solus filius sit verbum in divinis," because "paucas vidi de dictis istius doctoris." OCKHAM, *Scriptum*, I, d. 27, q. 3, ed. G.J. Etzkorn – F. Kelly, *Ockham, Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum Ordinatio (= OTh IV)*, St. Bonaventure, NY 1979, p. 328; henceforth all citations of Ockham will adhere to the common method, e.g., this last citation would read “OCKHAM, *Scriptum*, I, d. 27, q. 3 (OTh IV, p. 238).”

6 *Quodlibet* IV, dating from around 1316–18, is clearly a reaction to Auriol; see R.L. Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, ca. 1260-1330,” in: C. Schabel
However, given the dates of Auriol’s activities, and the known dates of the Oxonians listed, we can surely do better by way of investigating even earlier reactions to Auriol at Oxford, and indeed, we should try to push back the date of first contact as far as evidence allows. What about the earlier generation of names associated with Oxford: Henry of Harclay, William of Alnwick, Thomas Wylton, and Richard Campsall?

Two of these can be set aside immediately. It is historically possible that the secular Henry of Harclay would have heard of Auriol and read him, since the latter may have lectured on the *Sentences* as early as 1312, and Harclay did determine *Quaestiones ordinariae* between this date and his death in 1317, but it is unlikely he would have been the first to comment directly on Auriol’s view based on acquaintance, and it is very unlikely that Auriol’s writing had crossed the Channel before Harclay’s death. Campsall, another secular, was teaching theology at Oxford at just the right time, but, unfortunately, so little survives of his actual works that although no definite trace of Auriol’s ideas can be found in what we do have, there is no reason to conclude either positively or negatively on that basis.

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8 Campsall is so tantalizing a figure that the temptation to conjecture about his influence and to reconstruct his theories from later quotations is irresistible (Tachau does this responsibly and to good effect with regard to intuitive and abstractive cognition; see K. Tachau *Vision and Certitude*, pp. 158-166.) No doubt his importance to Ockham and Chatton was considerable, but without more texts to help convert speculation to hypothesis, caution is warranted. For example, with respect to Auriol in particular, we find interesting logical connections between Auriol’s views on future contingents, especially bivalence and excluded middle, and those of Campsall; nevertheless, we simply do not have enough material or enough context to trace influence. See C. Normore, “Petrus Aureoli and his Contemporaries on Future Contingents and Excluded Middle,” in: *Synthese* 96 (1993), pp. 83-92.
Thomas Wylton is more promising, and is sometimes suggested as the initial vector. This secular master, originally from Merton college, went to Paris for theology training at least by 1308\(^9\) (and perhaps as early as 1304),\(^{10}\) where he remained for quite a while, only returning to England in 1322, despite holding many prebends there during his Parisian sojourn.\(^{11}\) It is possible that Auriol’s name first came to notice at Oxford through contacts which Wylton obviously retained with England; we know that while in Paris Wylton argued against Auriol at an early date on several subjects concurrently important at Oxford: divine power and the ontology of relations (in his *Quodlibet* of late 1315 or early 1316, qq. 1 and 17 resp.);\(^{12}\) and the nature of theology and virtue (in certain *quaestiones disputatae* of 1316).\(^{13}\) However, even though the first internal Oxonian responses to Auriol might have been ‘action at a distance’ instigated by Wylton from Paris, we have no corroborating evidence; there is no reason to believe Wylton’s discussion of Auriol on relations would have crossed the Channel any earlier than Auriol’s own texts, nor is there evidence that Wylton’s *quodlibetal* discussion of relations was known at Oxford any earlier than, for example, Ockham’s own treatment of Auriol’s theory of relations (1318).\(^{14}\) By the time we have definite evidence of Wylton’s physical return to England in 1322, the reaction to Auriol was already well underway.


\(^{12}\) For the date and location of the *Quodlibet*, see C. Trifogli, “The *Quodlibet* of Thomas Wylton,” pp. 234-236; for the questions addressing Auriol, see p. 254. These disputations may have been held in Lent 1316, but Advent 1315 seems more likely.

\(^{13}\) L.O. Nielsen, “The Debate between Peter Auriol and Thomas Wylton on Theology and Virtue,” in: *Vivarium* 38 (2000), p. 35-98, esp. 46-50. Previous analyses (e.g., Weisheipl, “Repertorium Mertonese,” p. 222) had placed these debates around 1318-19, but Nielsen makes a convincing case for the earlier date based on relative dating of the content of another debate in Wylton’s 1317 *determinatio*, now in MS 416 of the municipal library in Bordeaux. For a discussion of the background and specific content of the exchange between Auriol and Wylton in this manuscript, especially on the theory of relations, see M. Henninger, “Thomas Wylton’s Theory of Relations,” in: *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 1 (1990), pp. 458-490.

\(^{14}\) For example, in Ockham, *Scriptum*, I, d. 30, q. 2 (OTb IV, p. 328).
Not only did Wylton arrive late on the scene, he seems to have had no impact on the reaction to Auriol once he arrived in England. The only known works of Wylton composed at Oxford were done when he was a master of arts there, long before, a time during which Auriol was still a boy. Neither Ockham nor Chatton seems to have taken notice of Wylton upon his return to England in 1322, and he was probably dead by 1327, so for all we can tell, his role in the general response to Auriol, while significant, was likely confined to Paris.¹⁵

William of Alnwick, who debated with Wylton in France, is another strong candidate. Alnwick knew Scotus personally in Paris, whence, after commenting on the Sentences in 1314,¹⁶ he crossed the sea to Oxford sometime before 1316. Thus he may have heard of the ideas of his fellow Franciscan while in Paris (perhaps even discussing Auriol with Wylton), and then, at a rather early date, have carried word of them, or at least of Auriol’s growing reputation, to Oxford. Further investigation confirms this idea: Alnwick mentions a reasonably distinctive position on the beatific vision in q. 10 of his Quodlibet, determined at Oxford sometime between 1315 and 1317.¹⁷ In that question, “Circa esse intelligibile conveniens creaturae ab aeterno etc.,” Alnwick describes a distinction concerning what sorts of information the blessed get about creatures through the beatific vision, and how one ought to think about human beatific cognition of creatures through the divine essence versus cognition of them in the Word. Ledoux speculates that this distinction is due to Auriol,¹⁸ and although

¹⁶ A.B. Emden, A Biographical Register, p. 27.
¹⁷ A date of 1316-1317 is found in A.B. Emden, A Biographical Register, p. 27 and in Alnwick, Quaestiones disputatae De esse intelligibili et De quodlibet, ed. A. Ledoux, in: Bibliotheca Franciscana scholastica medii aevi, 10, Quaracchi 1937, p. X, esp. note 6. Ledoux’s text contains an edition of the entire Quodlibet. For a brief overview of the questions and manuscripts of this quodlibet, see W.O. Duba, “Continental Franciscan Quodlibeta After Scotus,” in: Theological Quodlibeta: The Fourteenth Century, pp. 569-649, esp. 598-600. Duba prefers a date one year earlier than Emden’s and Ledoux’s.
¹⁸ A. Ledoux, Quaestiones disputatae, p. 582. Ledoux offers Auriol, Quodlibet, q. 10 and Ockham, Quodlibeta septem, IV, q. 9 (OTh IX, pp. 342-345) as sources for comparison. His citation of Ockham is almost surely incorrect; at the very least it does not correspond to the numbering of the questions in the modern critical edition, for IV, 9 is about whether angels can read our thoughts, and does not invoke this distinction at all. We should recall Ledoux was working without the benefit of these editions. Perhaps he meant to refer to the question in Quodlibeta septem today numbered IV, q. 5 (OTh IX, pp. 319-322), where editor J. Wey refers us to this very question in Auriol’s Quodlibet.
The identification is by no means certain, his claim is borne out by subsequent developments; later both Chatton (in the spring of 1323)\(^{19}\) and Ockham (first in 1318, and again in the fall of 1323)\(^{20}\) pick up on this same distinction and discuss it in such a way that it is clearly attributable to Auriol. And we do know quite independently that Alnwick was interested in Auriol’s views, since there is an unambiguous reference to Auriol in his *Determinationes* of 1322, given in Bologna.\(^^{21}\)

So although Wylton may have been among the first important Oxonians to encounter Auriol’s thought in mature form, and although we do not have enough evidence to decide conclusively between ‘Wylton acting at a distance’ or ‘Alnwick, newly arrived in England, defending Scotus’, nevertheless the corroborating biographical facts, textual evidence, and chronology fit better with Alnwick’s case. Hence, of the earliest four figures associated with Oxford in our list, Alnwick has the best claim for being the vector for Peter Auriol’s views to Oxford.\(^{22}\)

The First Responder? Reading and Ockham

If Alnwick really is the vector, then he is in a sense the first responder to Auriol in England. However, fellow Franciscans William of Ockham and John of Reading, are among Auriol’s early readers as well;
how early were they? Ockham’s response to Auriol dates from 1318, and in Book I of his roughly contemporary Sentences commentary, Reading quoted at length and addressed Auriol’s views on final cause, in conjunction with his supportive discussion of Scotus’s triple-pri-macy argument (the argument for God’s existence depending on the first being’s primacy in terms of efficient causality, final causality, and eminence). Therefore it would be nice to know as precisely as possible the date of this, Reading’s only extant commentary on the Sentences, which Etzkorn and Gál regard as an ordinatio version. Although it is not possible to assign clear absolute or even relative chronologies to Alnwick, Reading and Ockham’s responses; nevertheless, a few important points should be noted.

In his classic treatment, Longpré offered a relatively late date for this text (preserved exclusively in cod. Flor. Nat. Conv. Soppr. D.IV.95), arguing that Reading could not have read the Sentences before 1319. However, Stephen Brown has shown that parts of Reading’s extant Sentences commentary are sources for Ockham’s Prologue, which was read in 1317 and revised beginning in 1318, thus under-mining Longpré, and allowing Brown to posit “two redactions of at least part of Book I of the Sentences” of John Reading, one of which was prior to 1319. These facts suggest the possibility that parts of Reading’s text are witness to an earlier tradition of reacting to Auriol. Hence modern scholars generally hold that Reading’s reaction to Auriol is earlier than was previously assumed. But could they be ear-lier even than Alnwick’s Quodlibet?

Probably not. First, Ledoux shows conclusively that Reading’s Sentences I d. 1 q. 3 quotes from Alnwick’s Quodlibet q. 5 verbatim and at length. Granted this act of quotation could have taken place in

23 For example, Auriol’s Scriptum, I, d. 3 is quoted at length in Reading’s Book I, d. 2., q. 3. See G.J. Etzkorn, “John Reading on the Existence and Unicity of God, Efficient and Final Causality,” in: Franciscan Studies 19 (1981), pp. 110-221, esp. 185. There are other instances of extensive direct use of Auriol as well, e.g., in Reading, Prologus, q. 10, ed. S. Livesey, in: Theology and Science in the Fourteenth Century, Leiden 1989, pp. 140-205.
26 A. Ledoux, Quaestiones disputatae, pp. lIV-lvII.
the 20s, when Reading made a late redaction of his text, but this still suggests that his original commentary may have been directed against arguments which arose during Alnwick’s quodlibet, an event the younger Reading would have been bound to attend. Second, and more to the point, even if we were to assume, as many do, that Reading was slightly senior to Ockham in terms of career path, and that he responded to Auriol in his bachelor lectures, how much earlier could Reading have been, really? A reasonable guess as to Reading’s bachelor reading of the Sentences is 1316-18, given his 1319 or 1320 inception as master, and the compelling evidence of simultaneous mutual revision and quotation between Ockham and Reading during this period. But such a dating would not make Reading an earlier responder than Alnwick; it would put Reading’s reaction at the same time as or just after Alnwick’s Quodlibet. Moreover, hypothesizing a bachelor reading any earlier than 1316 would make it too early for Reading to have even taken Auriol into account, unless we assume that he learned of Auriol from someone who had recently been in Paris, someone just like Alnwick. Reading is early, certainly among the earliest, but he is not likely the first cause of Auriol’s influence in England. A more reasonable supposition is that Alnwick carried Auriol’s name, ideas, and maybe some of his texts to Oxford, presenting Auriol’s views as a challenge to Scotus as early as 1315, and that Reading, after attending Alnwick’s quodlibet debates, turned to Auriol’s ideas, if not immediately in his bachelor lectures, then

27 See G. GAL – S.F. BROWN, Ockham, Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum Ordinatio, in OTh II, editors’ introduction, St. Bonaventure, NY 1970, pp. 18*-34*. Reading quotes Ockham’s Scriptum at length in his Sentences, I, d. 2, q. 2, but strangely departs from it in I, d. 3, q. 2, although he continues directly quoting. The editors argue that in the latter instance Reading relies on the now lost reportatio version of Ockham for his quotations; “videtur, saltem in praesenti, Ioannem de Reading etiam in his locis verbotenus exscriptisse exemplar suum, at exemplar illud non erat Ordinatio [= Scriptum] Venerabilis Inceptoris, sed potius quaedam reportatio lectionum eius” (p. 33*). This suggests Reading was revising Book I just as Ockham was revising his own commentary, as early as 1318. Putting this together with Brown’s evidence mentioned immediately above we can draw but one conclusion: Ockham’s Scriptum is a source for Reading’s revised Sentences commentary, and vice versa. These two were probably closer in career paths than is sometimes claimed.

28 S. LIVESEY, Theology and Science in the Fourteenth Century, pp. 3-7. K. TACHAU also reached the same opinion over twenty years ago based on different considerations; see Vision and Certitude, p. 173, note 58.
certainly in revising his own commentary sometime after 1317. Since we know that Ockham himself also attended Alnwick’s quodlibet, or at least that he was familiar with the contents of those disputations,29 and since we know that he too began to respond to Auriol a short time later, it may be that this public event was a watershed for the insular reception of Auriol as an important new Franciscan thinker.

There seems to be no evidence of any earlier reactions to Auriol at Oxford, nor do we expect to find any; given Auriol’s career trajectory, this is about as early as common sense would suggest. In sum, the current state of our knowledge suggests the following points. (1) Although the earliest unambiguous textual evidence for Auriol’s reception at Oxford occurs in Reading and Ockham, nevertheless there is a trace of Auriol (even if more conjectural) in Alnwick’s earlier Oxford Quodlibet, debated sometime in 1315-17. (2) This trace, together with the biographical facts, physical movements, and the relative dates of the other prime suspects, suggests that, perhaps after attending Alnwick’s quodlibet, Reading began to react to Auriol around late 1317 or maybe a bit earlier. (3) Ockham’s response began at the same time, possibly also in 1317, but definitely by 1318. (4) None of this is meant to imply that large chunks of Auriol’s texts were already circulating widely at this time in England; it actually took a few years for copies of his Scriptum to start to circulate widely at Oxford, and as circulation began, redacted Oxonian texts begin to show verbatim quotation.30 To put the matter most generally and conservatively, in a single sentence: current research suggests that peripatetic Franciscans made Auriol known at Oxford around 1316 (give or take a year) and, within about a year of impact, prominent theologians of that order began discussing his ideas, on an increasingly wide range of subjects, based on limited but steadily increasing textual access.

It is quite evident that Reading was motivated to respond to Auriol by his own adherence to Scotism. His defense of the triple-primacy

30 K. Tachau, Vision and Certitude, pp. 88 and 316. Both Ockham’s Scriptum and Reading’s Ordinatio, revised a few years after Auriol’s Scriptum came out, have long verbatim quotations from the Scriptum. And this is true of the situation generally. For example, in Part IV below, we discuss how in 1322 Chatton called one of Auriol’s theories from Book II of his Sentences commentary, made in 1317-18, a nova opinio.
argument from attacks by Auriol has already been mentioned. But Auriol’s understanding of the Subtle Doctor’s distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition was also a target for Reading, a fact which requires us to digress into the issue for which Auriol is most known in the current secondary literature: his novel epistemology.

3. Ockham, Chatton, and Wodeham: Epistemological Interlude

Auriol’s impact on Reading having already been summarized, we may leave Reading behind at this point in the story, for two reasons. First, Ockham’s reaction to Auriol began at roughly the same time as Reading’s, and like Reading’s it laid great stress on epistemology; however, Ockham’s epistemology was not formative on Reading. Indeed, Auriol’s own epistemological views were actually more urgently discussed by Ockham, Chatton, and Wodeham than were Reading’s, so, although Reading played an important role in associating Auriol’s name with epistemology in England, and in bringing him to the attention of Chatton and Ockham, this is Reading’s most important contribution. Second, Reading was physically absent during the heyday of Auriol’s impact on English epistemology, since after 1322 he was in Avignon, and he did not leave the city before his death in 1346.

Walter Chatton’s views and career path were intimately linked with Ockham’s, but he was several years younger, and belongs chronologically between him and the next generation of theologians, including figures such as Rodington and FitzRalph. Wodeham was younger still, about seven to ten years behind Chatton in theology training. Nevertheless, Ockham’s reception of Auriol’s epistemology was highly conditioned by his debates with Chatton, and Wodeham’s own

31 Ibid., p. 167.
32 Ibid., p. 179.
34 There are considerable problems with the absolute dating of Wodeham’s career path, and with both absolute and relative dating of some of his Sentences lectures. For two views, see W.J. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, and also R. Wood, “Introduction,” in: Adam de Wodeham, Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum, ed. R. Wood – G. Gál, St. Bonaventure, NY 1990, pp. 30*-38*. However, on anyone’s dating system our claims here still hold. (Henceforth, citations to Wodeham’s actual text in this edition, as opposed to the introduction, will have the form “Wodeham, Lectura secunda”).
response to Auriol begins with a correction of the early misunderstandings of Auriol that he saw in Ockham and Chatton. For these reasons, despite the spread, it seems reasonable to discuss these three figures in one go, and afterward, returning to strict chronology, to consider them again individually on select non-epistemological issues.

Because of modern philosophical tastes, excellent twentieth-century scholarship, and passionate concern with theory of knowledge in early fourteenth-century Oxford, there is a vast secondary literature on Auriol, Ockham, and Chatton concerning intuitive cognition, esse apparente, skepticism, and concept formation. Indeed, these topics figure heavily in Ockham’s and Chatton’s early reactions to Auriol, and Ockham’s habit of discussing Auriol on epistemological issues remained throughout his entire theological career; in his last important theological work, Quodlibeta septem, Ockham again disagreed with Auriol (as he understood him) on intuitive cognition of non-existents.

How did it come about that Auriol’s name was associated so strongly with Oxford epistemology in the 1320s? The scholarly consensus seems to be this. Auriol inadvertently raised the specter of skepticism at a time when (1) we find multiple, widely different interpretations of Scotus’s idea of intuitive and abstractive cognition, and when (2) Ockham was particularly innovative in rejecting the species account of cognition and advancing a radically different theory of knowledge in its place. Couple this with the fact that these early reactions to Auriol were based on misunderstandings of his intent and of the context of certain arguments on perceptual error, thereby exaggerating the threat of skepticism already implied. The result was a sometimes chaotic movement by leading Oxonian Franciscans to

35 There are many studies on these subjects. Two classic treatments are Ph. Boehner, “Notitia Intuitiva of Non Existents According to Peter Aureoli, O.F.M. (1322),” in: Franciscan Studies 8 (1948), pp. 388-416, and K. Tachau, Vision and Certitude, who provides an excellent bibliography up until the mid 1980s. For sources after, see the bibliography in R.I. Friedman, “Peter Auriol,” in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. We have based our account primarily on Tachau and Friedman, but in the notes we only cite Tachau in detail, since Friedman’s internet article is unpaginated.

36 Ockham, Quodlibeta septem, VI, q. 6 (OTb IX, pp. 606-7). Ockham’s sixth quodlibet likely dates from around 1324, although some controversy over dating exists; for a discussion of these matters, see R. Keele, “Oxford Quodlibeta from Ockham to Holcot,” in: Theological Quodlibeta: The Fourteenth Century, pp. 651-692, esp. 655-659.
interpret Scotus, reject Auriol (as he was understood), and safeguard some certainty for the viator. So important is this sequence for the story of Auriol’s reception in England that a relatively detailed account of it must be given here.

A very short version of these details is as follows: Ockham and Chatton had just enough rope to hang themselves, i.e., they possessed just enough of Auriol’s texts to misunderstand him in a rush to judgment, and anyway, Ockham had little chance of being directly influenced by Auriol, since his (and Reading’s) basic ideas on intuitive cognition were already formed by the time Auriol’s texts showed up in England; Chatton was influenced by Auriol, but he only added further dimensions to this misunderstanding, which were again influential on Ockham; Wodeham, well acquainted with both men and their debates, had much better access to Auriol’s texts, and so was the first Oxonian to realize Chatton’s promulgated misreading and its consequences. This sequence was momentous not only because it engrossed three of Oxford’s most important theologians during the 20s and early 30s, but also because it resulted directly in Ockham defending his position on the question “can God by absolute power cause an evident cognition of a non-existent” at a time when his version of ‘absolute power’ talk sounded a bit heretical, for example, when applied to the need for created grace. Hence, this lingering epistemological controversy may have been a small partial cause of his summons to Avignon and subsequent career implosion.

Now a slightly longer version of the same story. Tachau has shown in great detail how, beginning with (1) Roger Bacon’s synthetic and comprehensive species theory of cognition, and (2) Peter John Olivi’s and Henry of Ghent’s criticisms of it, Scotus sought an improved account of both sensory and intellectual cognition in via that retained

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37 See Part 4 below.

38 The issue of cognition of non-existents showed up in John Lutterell’s Libellus, the book that, when shown to John XXII, resulted in Ockham’s summons to Avignon. See CHATTON, Prologus, q. 2 a. 2, ed. J. Wey, Walter Chatton Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias: Collatio ad Librum Primum et Prologus, Toronto 1989, p. 86, n. 1. (Hereafter this Chattonian text, the prologue to his revised Lectura commentary on the Sentences, is cited as “CHATTON, Prologus.”) See also K. TACHAU, Vision and Certitude, pp. 207-208, where she notes a further wrinkle: Lutterell’s knowledge of Ockham’s views on cognition of non-existents seems to have come, not from Ockham’s own texts, but from Chatton’s summaries of them in the Prologus.
a place for the species posit (together with its explanatory power in optics), yet overcame its central paradox: that although knowing was supposed to be an assimilation of knower to known through species mediation, the species, having only diminished being (esse diminutum), was ontologically essentially different from the simple, real beings that produced them (esse simpliciter et reale). To do this, Scotus described a form of cognition that gave “immediate, direct contact with objects,” a form of cognition able to occur in both the sensory and intellective powers, and running concurrently with species-based abstractive cognition, also in both sensory and intellective powers (these are roughly, imagination and conceptual memory respectively).39 Dusting off some terminology from a slightly older, inchoate epistemological notion, he recycled the phrase intuitive cognition (cognitio or notitia intuitiva) and applied it as the name of this type of act.40 For present purposes, the most important features of Scotus’s doctrine of intuitive cognition for later interpreters were that (1) it dealt in some way with things as existing, whereas abstractive cognition did not concern itself with this, and (2) it was the basis of existential certitude.41 For these reasons, and also because Scotus’s account was designed in part to respond to criticism that the species posit itself undermines certitude, in the course of his discussion he raised and addressed skeptical concerns. But because his theory did not adequately deal with these concerns at all points, and because Franciscans after him felt bound to engage and defend these innovations in some fashion, skeptical worries were never far away whenever these thinkers were discussing intuitive cognition.

Into this situation stepped Auriol, who, like many others in his Order, discussed the new distinction. But he was relatively roundabout in coming to the distinction itself; it was not the center of his epistemology. Instead he began his theory of knowledge by positing a special form of existence caused by cognition, esse apparens.42 The main thrust of this notion is that when the sense of vision, for example, goes to work on an external visual object, it has a formative

40 Ibid., p. 70.
41 Ibid., pp. 73-75.
42 He uses many synonyms; see ibid., p. 90. ‘Esse objectivum’ was a popular variant with Chatton and Ockham.
ontological effect on that object, changing the object from its normal mode of being, esse reale, to esse apparens; that is, seeing Socrates makes the extra-mental being Socrates exist as being-seen. So too with intellation; the intellectual concept of Socrates just is Socrates himself in esse apparens, i.e., the concept of Socrates is Socrates-as-mentally-grasped. This esse apparens is what terminates the act of cognition. Thus for Auriol, concepts of extra-mental things are nothing but those extra-mental things themselves, conceived.

Now, this is a very odd and original idea Auriol has here, not at all easy to grasp. Moreover, certain arguments he gave for the reality of esse apparens in Scriptum d. 3 q. 3 a. 1 were also interesting and surprising, and, most importantly, they require meditation on the nature of perceptual error.43 Let us confine our attention to the sensitive faculties for a moment, particularly vision. How could we possibly show that the senses are having the effect on objects which Auriol claims they are, that is, the effect of putting them in esse apparens? When perception is working, the esse apparens of the object and its esse reale exist in conformity; so true cognition reveals nothing. What about cognitive failure? Consider a person in a moving boat on a river. He looks to the shore and sees the trees there are moving; if the boat is moving to his left then the trees (seem to) move to the right. The trees in esse reale are not moving, as we know; what follows is that the trees we see and the trees in esse reale are not the same thing. What we do see could only be the trees in esse apparens. In short, we really see a false thing in this case of cognitive failure; hence the false trees must be in some sense real, i.e., they must have esse; obviously not esse reale; therefore esse apparens. Again, a straight baton is twirled rapidly in the air; we see a circle. What is this circle that appears to us? Not a thing in the stick, which is straight; nor is it an independently existing thing that just happens to be there in the air, somehow separable from the twirling stick (one wants to say, “there is no real independent circle in the air there”); neither is it a thing in the process of vision or in the eye, since we see the circle nowhere else but in the air. Therefore the circle simply is the stick, in esse apparens; it is the stick itself, shaped by visual perception.

It is vital to note that Auriol’s arguments from illusion have no purchase and make no sense whatsoever in relation to their conclusion apart from a context in which veridical cognition is the norm. Illusions are cracks in a normally reliable process that allow us a glimpse into the inner workings of that process, just as many diseases afford an understanding of health. The exception proves, and reveals, the rule. So too Auriol’s stress on illusion is evidence of his non-skeptical, reliabilist disposition.44

Given that esse apparens is the central idea in Auriol’s theory of cognition, how then did he go on to view the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition? Not as determined by their objects, as Scotus had, but according to their different modes of operation. Intuitive cognition acts immediately and non-discursively, offers its objects as present, is productive of esse apparens, and, following from this last property, is the cause of sensory illusion on those rare occasions when that happens, since the perception of a being in esse apparens (without proper conformity of that same being in esse reale) is the source of cognitive error.45 Abstractive cognition by contrast acts discursively, does not offer its objects as present, and hence is not similarly involved in cognitive error.46 Thus, Auriol associated intuitive cognition with cognitive error (with important qualifications, but, nevertheless), with the result that it is possible to have a naturally occurring intuitive cognition of a non-existent object.47 So while it would clearly be a complete misunderstanding of Auriol to say that for him intuitive cognition is the source – not of certainty as with Scotus – but rather of uncertainty, still it is easy to see how someone very familiar with Scotus’s texts but not with

45 K. Tachau, Vision and Certitude, p. 108.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., p. 110. Ockham and Reading also held that this was possible, albeit only supernaturally, and for quite different reasons. Because Reading’s route to this conclusion passed through quite different terrain than Auriol’s or Ockham’s, it did not play a role in Chatton’s rebuttals of this general position. See ibid., pp. 170-171.
Auriol’s could form the wrong impression, in at least two ways: (1) one might think that *esse apparens* is something coming in between the perceiver and the object perceived, (2) one might think that Auriol considers intuition to be the source of existential certitude, just as Scotus did.

In fact Ockham himself formed the wrong impression in the first way. Since Ockham departed considerably from the perspectivist tradition in his own epistemology, rejecting causal explanations via cognitive mechanisms and intentional objects, and replacing them with an account in which certainty was obtained in acts of judgment based on direct, totally unmediated perceptual contact between perceiver and perceived, he was set on rejecting every particular mechanistic, mediated account of cognition, including species accounts *in medio* and *in intellectu*. One obvious technique for supporting such a reductive account of sensitive intuitive cognition is to argue that species (for example) are unwanted mediators between perceiver and thing perceived. Interpreting Auriol’s *esse apparens* as merely another such mediator, Ockham argued against Auriol on the basis of this incorrect impression.48

The mistake was then amplified by Chatton, who adopted it but also added the second mode of misunderstanding listed above. In the light of Auriol’s rather striking ideas on intuition, Chatton made the following totally understandable but not entirely correct connections, most compactly expressed in his *Prologus*, q. 2 a. 2. 49 (1) Auriol’s *esse apparens* is just Scotus’s *esse diminutum*, and is an *ens fictum* (fine, but a bit misleading). (2) *Esse apparens* is just Auriol’s word for some extra-mental mediator, distinct from the object seen, which mediates the object of vision to the perceiver (following Ockham; but absolutely incorrect). (3) Vision by *esse apparens* as per (2) above is Auriol’s version of sensitive intuitive cognition, the only type of cognition that is able to underwrite


49 CHATTON, Prologus, pp. 86-94. For commentary, see K. TACHAU, Vision and Certitude, pp. 186-189; on Chatton’s reaction to Auriol, see also D. PERLER, Zweifel und Gewissheit, pp. 267-272.
sensory certitude *in via*, according to Scotus (absolutely incorrect). (4) Auriol holds that *esse apparens* and intuition are at the root of perceptual error (completely correct, but very misleading in this context). The clear conclusion from these four principles is that Auriol’s treatment of illusion has opened the door for skepticism very wide indeed, because if correct, our sensory perceptions would not be directly of objects, but rather of mediating *ficta* that can, and in fact do, easily lie to us. Hence, Chatton concluded that if Auriol (as misunderstood) were right, “all our certainty would perish,” since certainty comes most of all from the senses.50 Since Ockham’s epistemology was not widely adopted at Oxford in the first decades after its development, and since Auriol was best known in England among fellow Franciscans, and moreover since Chatton was one of the most influential polemicists among the Franciscans of his time, it was Chatton’s (mis)characterization of Auriol that made the deepest impression on subsequent writers. Partly for this reason, as far as we can tell, no one at Oxford ever adopted Auriol’s theory of concepts or intuition.51

However, the coda to this movement is that Chatton managed to convince Ockham, who in 1318 had been developing a nominalist theory of general concepts as *ficta* possessing some sort of reduced being, that his *ficta* were not far different from Auriol’s (misunderstood) *esse apparens*, a posit Ockham had already rejected. In a now well-documented sequence, Chatton coaxed Ockham by 1323 to change his mind completely on this subject, and to adopt Chatton’s own *intellectio* (or mental-act) theory of concepts, according to which one’s concept of X is just the act of thinking about X.52 Thus one important but very indirect impact of Auriol’s original and anti-Scotistic epistemology was to move Ockham’s theory of mind in a new direction.53

50 Chatton, Prologus, p. 89 (q. 2, a. 2, ll. 91-95).
51 K. Tachau, Vision and Certitude, p. 315.
53 K. Tachau, Vision and Certitude, pp. 148-153. However, some recent research suggests the role of Chatton and Auriol in this change in Ockham is overstated, and that Ockham had other independent, positive reasons to change his theory based on an
Auriol’s epistemology came to Wodeham’s attention through its central position in Chatton and Ockham’s debates, and it is clearly Chatton’s work that piqued his interest, since Wodeham agreed with him that Ockham’s *ficta* would be little different from *esse apparens* as Chatton misunderstood it.\(^{54}\) Nevertheless, beginning in the late 20s, Wodeham first among Englishmen read Auriol aright on *esse apparens*, realizing his teachers had in fact missed Auriol’s intent, and he spent much of his time disentangling these very errors from genuine doctrine. Liberated from false preconceptions, Wodeham considered afresh which arguments in Ockham and Chatton had weight against Auriol and which did not.\(^{55}\) For example, Wodeham admitted Ockham scored against Auriol regarding the paradoxical ontological status the *esse apparens* would have to have,\(^{56}\) but denied Ockham understood Auriol’s real view on the role of *esse apparens* in error, namely, that one and the same *esse apparens* is first true, then false, after its object is removed.\(^{57}\)

However, even with his fresh understanding both of the true role of *esse apparens* in perceptual error and Auriol’s intent in positing it, Wodeham rejected it as a necessary posit to account for vision. For example, he agreed with Chatton that the illusory experiences which form the core of Auriol’s argument can be explained in terms of error in judgment by the internal, common sense. Even after understanding *esse apparens* correctly, it seems that Wodeham no more than anyone else at Oxford was willing to follow Auriol in making the external sense the fundamental locus of cognitive error.\(^{58}\)

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Nevertheless, Auriol again played an important indirect role here, just as with Ockham, in pushing Adam to an alternative view, in his case, on the objects of knowledge. Simple intuitive cognition is not sufficient by itself to base certainty of judgment, Wodeham reasoned, for, as Auriol’s ‘experiences’ showed, no model of cognition based solely on direct apprehension and intellectual judgment was adequate to certainty if, as Ockham had argued, evident assent can be caused even in the absence of the object the assent is about. For if Ockham were correct about this last point, then we should have evident assent to ‘the trees move’ in Auriol’s relevant example, even though this (mental) sentence is false when it appears in the mind of the man in the boat. But if, with Ockham, we hold that such ‘evident’ propositions are the adequate objects of scientific knowledge, we have an enormous problem in our epistemology, since we would know the false. For this reason, Adam concluded mental sentences themselves are not adequate objects of scientific knowledge. Out of this crux, it seems, his theory of *complexe significabile* emerged. 59

In sum, Wodeham gave Auriol’s epistemology the best hearing it ever got at Oxford, but it still made no positive headway there. In fact, the moral of the story may be that Auriol’s impact on Oxford epistemology in the 20s and early 30s was enormous, but indirect and chiefly (but not exclusively) negative. Few adopted any of his ideas, but the best and brightest Franciscans felt compelled to react to him and to understand him as carefully as the available texts allowed.

4. The Middle Period

With the importance placed in the literature on these fascinating epistemological issues, it is easy to form an imbalanced impression regarding Auriol. In fact, between the late teens and middle 20s, Reading, Ockham and especially Chatton found a wide variety of Auriol’s ideas worth discussing, some of which were later picked up by Wodeham in the late 20s and early 30s. A quick sampling of just some of this range should convince the reader of the need to correct this impression: one finds Auriol cited by some subset of these four figures on the notion of final cause, on the production of the world

ex nihilo versus its existence from infinity, on the unity of scientia, on the triple-primacy argument, on the logic of various Trinitarian puzzles, on grace and charity, on the reduction of the Aristotelian categories, and on moral psychology. After Scotus and Ockham, Auriol holds a respectable third place in Chatton’s citations of near contemporaries. Something analogous is true of Wodeham, if we add Chatton’s and FitzRalph’s names to the ‘most-cited’ list.60 It must be admitted, however, that these men usually did not substantially agree with Auriol’s outlook on these important subjects any more than they agreed with his theory of knowledge. Auriol is frequently cited, and particular formulations and arguments are borrowed from him, but with one or two notable exceptions discussed below, his influence at Oxford seems to have been primarily negative, even when he was accurately interpreted.

Ockham

Excluding epistemology, what kind of impact did Auriol have on fellow Franciscan William of Ockham? First of all, an important case of non-influence must at least be noted here. Auriol’s solution to the problem of future contingents was quite radical and original compared to those of his time. He said that since if God could know true future contingents as true, the immutability of his knowledge would entail their necessity, hence contingent propositions about the future are neither determinately true nor determinately false. Moreover, God’s knowledge cannot be of the future qua future; rather, says Auriol, his knowledge is indistant from what we call the future. But his position seems to have had little or no impact on Ockham, whose own solution is far more conservative.61 On the other hand, three cases of influence (both positive and negative) are particularly


61 For a summary of Auriol’s theory, see C. Schabel, Theology at Paris, 1316-1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents, Aldershot/Burlington USA/Singapore/Sydney 2000, p. 124. For its lack of impact on Ockham, see H. Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, Leiden 2004, p. 231. Indeed, Auriol’s contention that future contingents are neither true nor false seems to have had no full imitators at Oxford, although perhaps some followed him part way, as we shall see below. For partial imitators, see ibid., p. 207.
instructive: the absolute necessity of grace, predestination, and the reduction of Aristotle’s categories.

In traditional discussions God’s grace is given freely by pure mercy to certain souls which then act rightly, ‘meriting’ thereby salvation for those good acts. In Ockham, Chatton, and Auriol this traditional scheme is not followed; a different dialectic prevails. For the sake of simplifying an enormously complicated topic, let us say that these three discussions of the necessity of grace were shaped by the need to satisfy three competing theological requirements: (1) that the salvation of a soul depends fundamentally on God’s free and sovereign actions, e.g., by granting grace to that soul, (2) that God is obliged to act correctly, reasonably, with perfect knowledge, and wisdom, (3) that salvation of a soul is connected with its merit, and so with its own free acts.\textsuperscript{62} We require (1) in order to avoid the Pelagian heresy, whereby God is not a final judge, distributing punishment and mercy, but a mere legislator, whose laws can be naturally obeyed by creatures to such a degree that their salvation is in effect earned. We require (2) in order to avoid believing in a capricious or arbitrary God. We require (3) in order to motivate people to care for their own souls, by asserting a connection between their conduct now and their fate hereafter. But it is difficult to weave these three together into a consistent account, since any one of them tends to undermine at least one other when we do. (1) and (3), in the form of grace and merit, are classically at odds. Moreover, we can generate puzzles by taking these claims two at a time and examining the remainder: if God grants grace to a soul based on his perfect knowledge of how it will act, then it is not free, so (1) and (2) undermine (3); if God grants a soul salvation based on ordinary knowledge of its merit after the fact, then he is simply handing out salvation according to the rules, and so (2) and (3) subvert (1); if God sees that a free soul always chooses rightly but by his sovereignty can still reject it, then it seems he is not good and reasonable after all, so (1) and (3) undercut (2). We have a trilemma here, not airtight, but nevertheless.

Oddly, although stressing (2) and (3) to the detriment of (1) is most correctly called Pelagian, since this is what made Pelagius famous, anyone who took a non-traditional approach to grace stood a chance of being called a Pelagian if the slightest imbalance could be detected in their attempt to balance (1)-(3). In the fourteenth-century the term ‘Pelagian’ was used quite loosely, not only for views which seemed to compromise (1). In fact, somewhat surprisingly, some theologians who worked very hard indeed to support (1) ended up being called Pelagians for the way they did so. Both Auriol and Ockham might be classed in this group, but for very different reasons based on very different approaches.

Ockham and Auriol both tended to approach philosophical problems by relentlessly working out the consequences of a single idea or insight. In this instance Auriol addressed the trilemma by starting from the principle of God’s immutability, which Auriol understood in connection with God’s sovereignty, in line with (1) above. Now, some people are saved and some are not; likewise some people are first acceptable to God and subsequently not. If there were absolutely no creaturely basis for this difference and this change, then the basis would have to be attributable to God alone. But since God is immutable, if based in him, the condition would be necessary, and so salvation would be necessary; hence there would be no difference between the damned and the reprobate based in their merit, nor could there be any change in acceptation of souls based on their actions, and (3) would be false. But (3) must be preserved, hence we must hold that some created thing is required for salvation; indeed, the created order is the logical place to locate the basis of divine acceptation; hence we need to posit some form in the soul, such as grace. But in order to keep the divine response to grace from seeming arbitrary and conflicting with (2), we should insist on the absolute necessity of grace, which Auriol understands as a habit in the soul; God is so reasonable and wise that he infallibly loves whatever soul has grace and hates whatever soul has mortal sin, and cannot do otherwise, even by his abso-

63 AURIOL, In I Sent., d. 17, a. 2 (ed. Romae 1596, I, 408b-410b). We have used Ockham’s quotations of Auriol as our primary source here; see OCKHAM, Scriptum, d. 17 (OTh III, pp. 440-568), in particular, those in d. 17 q. 1.
lute power. Thus Auriol argued that God responds determinately to grace.\textsuperscript{64}

Of course this sounds as if we are undermining (1) again, and thus have wandered into Pelagianism (broadly construed), by compromising God’s freedom. Does Auriol really mean to say that, simply by the possession of grace, God is compelled to accept a soul for beatitude? It seems we cannot conclude otherwise starting from Auriol’s basic position. To avoid the Pelagian ring, and perhaps to echo the traditional position, Auriol said that grace itself is freely given by God, so he is determinately responding to a created quality in the soul that he himself put there, and so is not determined by a creature after all, and so is free. (1) is safe.

But not really, of course, because this just begs the question: if God freely decides who gets grace, then either he does so based on knowing what that soul will do or not. If so, then he ‘freely’ gives this grace based on the actions of a creature, and so from the top, a creature, viz., a soul, determines by good actions and obedience that God will freely give it grace, which grace determines God to save the soul having it, and God is again determined by a creature. We have simply made the Pelagian explanatory circle one step larger. But if God does not give grace based on knowing what the soul will do, then either this is because he does not know or because he does not follow consistent rules for this sort of thing, or because human conduct is not the ultimate basis of salvation. In any case either (2) or (3) seems to fail. If we shore up (2) and (3) again, (1) will be to that extent weakened. In short, we can raise the whole controversy all over again even after Auriol inserts his trick for saving (1).

In rejecting this view and explaining his own, Ockham said that to claim the absolute necessity of grace is a form of the Pelagian heresy.\textsuperscript{65} In his opinion, Auriol worked far too hard to accommodate (2). Strictly speaking, (2) is incorrect; God cannot be said to be reasonable, good or wise in the sense of being obliged to an independent standard of reason or goodness that he then happens to meet. Strictly speaking, God cannot have any obligations whatsoever; that is the deep meaning of (1). In fact, Ockham asserts, God by his absolute

\textsuperscript{64} Ockham, Scriptum, d. 17, q. 1 (\textit{OTh} III, pp. 441-445).
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p. 455.
power can accept any soul for any reason, and no created form of any kind does or can oblige God to give beatitude to anyone. 66 Because Ockham is willing to uphold (1) even at a high cost to (2), while Pelagius did the reverse, he regards his own position as maximally removed from Pelagianism. 67

Not everyone agreed with this self-assessment, however, and Ockham’s own response was widely regarded as partly Pelagian, probably because any diminution in the efficacy of created grace suggested a concomitant increase in the efficacy of merit based on human free will, and Ockham certainly placed enormous stress on the importance of human freedom. 68 Moreover, people not reading Ockham carefully might reason that if grace is not needed for salvation then God is not needed for salvation, even though clearly Ockham’s real point is that, absolutely speaking, only God is necessary for salvation. 69 Since Ockham invoked the absolute/ordained power distinction in his response to Auriol here, and since the manner in which he used these concepts against what he saw as overinflated metaphysics was a source of worry for many of his opponents, 70 it seems that here as in epistemology, a strong reaction to Auriol may have played some part in later suspicion of Ockham’s orthodoxy.

If the issue of grace deals with the created mechanisms of salvation in relation to both the divine and created wills, then predestination addresses how merciful divine intent and perfect divine knowledge, in the overall plan of salvation, can be related to sin and to divine action in saving and damning. Thus predestination is a close cousin of the debate over grace, although each problem has its own distinct center of gravity. Moreover, both issues were vital to Oxford theology in the period from Ockham to Bradwardine. In a recent study, J. Halverson has looked in detail at Auriol’s impact on discussions of predestination at Oxford. It seems that (as on so many other subjects) the thirteenth-century consensus was challenged in the early

66 Ibid., p. 454.
67 Ibid., p. 455.
68 See G.J. Etzkorn, “Walter Chatton and the Absolute Necessity of Grace,” p. 37, where the author briefly discusses the reasons why Ockham was misunderstood on this issue by the Avignon examining commission.
69 Not all those who charged Ockham with Pelagianism were simple; Chatton and Lutterel made interesting arguments against his view. See M. Adams, William Ockham, vol. II, pp. 1279-1297.
fourteenth, and that Auriol played a central role in this change. To the *opinio communis*, which held that the divine will was active in saving certain individual souls from sin by offering them grace, but inactive in allowing sin to engulf others by not offering grace, Auriol offered instead a doctrine of general election, whereby God’s fundamental, general intent is to save every soul that does not resist him. Hence, he freely offers grace to all, but only some (those ultimately given beatitude) actually accept. We note here again Auriol’s deep commitment to God’s reasonableness and goodness.\(^71\)

It will be seen immediately how this view could be called Pelagian, since it lays stress on the role of human choice in the salvation process, and might make beatitude seem a reward earned by the choice to accept grace. Given the discussion of grace immediately above, the reader may be surprised to learn that one theologian strongly influenced by Auriol’s doctrine of general election was William Ockham.

This is not to say that Ockham would approve of every aspect of Auriol’s doctrine of predestination, including the theory of divine attributes, and the connotative distinction, upon which that theory is based.\(^72\) Rather, Halverson argues Auriol’s influence is seen in Ockham’s implicit assumption that God has made a general offer of grace, which, when responded to positively by a human soul whose actions are then freely accepted by God, becomes thereby the ultimate source of merit.\(^73\) For Ockham claims that God’s grace can be considered in two ways: as an absolute power to accept souls and their actions, and as acceptance of certain souls and actions according to an ordained scheme of salvation, the basis of which is an infusion of grace in some souls by God. But God does not infuse grace here but not there based on foreseen merits and demerits – this is quite opposite to the whole grain of Ockham’s explanation, and anyway, as indicated above, merit is an effect, not a cause, of grace – rather, God’s offer of grace is perfectly general, and usually resistible. It is the resistance on the part of certain free created wills that explains why some are ultimately

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\(^72\) Ibid., Chapters 1-3.

\(^73\) Ibid., p. 120. Halverson finds evidence of this, among other places, in Ockham, *Scriptum*, d. 17, q. 2 (*OTh* III, pp. 471-472).
saved and some not.74 Ockham’s view is not comprehensible in conjunction with the view that God passively damns by inaction or that God damns based on foreseen demerits, both views that Auriol rejected for the first time in the scholastic tradition.75

We will return to predestination below in connection with Bradwardine; for now we should conclude our discussion of Ockham with a final word about Auriol’s possible influence on his use of connotation theory.

Although there is some controversy in the details, scholarly consensus is that Ockham used a connotative analysis of certain terms to argue for smaller ontologies than were commonly accepted by fellow theologians of a more realist bent. Connotative analysis was not Ockham’s only tool for pushing ontological reduction, he used the razor on occasion, and even more often arguments from real distinction based in divine omnipotence.76 But connotative analysis played a particularly prominent role in his programmatic reduction of real beings in Aristotle’s categories from ten down to two, viz., substance and quality. We have mentioned that Auriol also made good use of connotative semantic analysis to treat the divine attributes, and it is well-known that Auriol also argued systematically for a reduction of Aristotle’s categories. So an obvious question is whether Ockham was influenced by Auriol in either or both of these areas.

Space forbids developing a definitive answer to the question here, so we instead offer a prima facie case for a negative answer, together with a tantalizing clue that the positive case could nevertheless be fruitfully investigated.

That Ockham is not drawing very directly on Auriol here can be argued in two ways. First, a glance at some of his major discussions of category reduction by connotative analysis does not reveal any obvious connections or borrowings from Auriol. For Auriol thought that relational terms such as ‘similarity’ and ‘equality’ directly signify concepts, while Ockham had a habit of positing connotative signification for these relational terms and for most others as well, meaning that for

74 J. Halverson, *Peter Auriol on Predestination*, pp. 120-121.
75 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
Ockham the ultimate signification of such terms ended up being extra-
mental instead.\textsuperscript{77} Second, a more likely and ‘nearer’ source for Ock-
ham’s approach to connotative reduction is fellow Oxonian Richard
Campsall.\textsuperscript{78} This does not mean that Auriol was not a more remote
source for Ockham, but there are at least these reasons to be skeptical.

However, in the \textit{Scriptum}, in his treatment of the existence of rela-
tions as distinct from absolute things, Ockham makes an interesting
side in the midst of his own response to the \textit{opinio communis}.\textsuperscript{79}
Natural reason, he says, cannot in any way establish the reality of
anything but absolute beings; there are no respective entities whatso-
ever in the world. However, one “tedious” argument to the contrary
suggests that, since a stick cut in half is no longer one continuous
thing, no matter how near together we subsequently place the cut
ends to each other, then since there is no absolute entity preventing
this reunion, if only absolute entities existed, the halves would be able
to be made continuous by mere proximity. Thus, something besides
absolute entities, say a respective entity which the whole had and the
parts lack, or which conversely the whole lacked and the parts now
have, explains the impossibility of reunion by proximity.

Ockham thinks this argument can be settled (in a fairly obvious
way) by recourse to the opinion that points and lines are themselves
absolute entities distinct from the lines and planes which (respect-
ively) contain them, and which in fact terminate the ends and edges
of those entities (respectively). However, he continues:

\[\ldots\] if we deny the opinion [that points and lines are absolute entities distinct
from the lines and planes which (respectively) comprise them], on the
grounds that it goes strongly against the mind and principles of Aristotle, it
is more difficult to refute the preceding argument, [i.e., the “tedious” one
about the cut stick]. Nevertheless, I omit one solution for the present,
because I have not seen the [text] made by the people holding the contrary
opinion, although perhaps they already made it and just hid it from me, just
as perhaps I have said many things which already have been said by others,
although I may not know these things were said by them.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{77} M. \textsc{Henninger}, “Peter Aureoli and William of Ockham on Relations,” in: \textit{Fran-
\textsuperscript{78} K. \textsc{Tachau}, \textit{Vision and Certitude}, p. 158, note 5.
\textsuperscript{79} Ockham, \textit{Scriptum}, d. 30, q. 2 (\textit{OTh} IV, p. 327).
\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 328.
What exactly prompted this remark will probably never be known. But it seems fairly clear that someone with whom Ockham was interacting on the issue of respective entities, seemingly someone attending his lecture or in his intellectual milieu, has made an argument that the above opinion on points and lines is to be denied, but that interlocutor did not do Ockham the courtesy of showing the argument to him in writing. Ockham is clearly chiding the opponent for not being forthcoming. That same person, to extrapolate somewhat from Ockham’s final, more defensive remark, seems to have also accused Ockham of saying some things about res respectivae which had already been said by others. Ockham defends himself from the charge of unattributed borrowing from that third party by claiming not to be acquainted with those views; any similarity between Ockham’s approach and this third party’s is purely coincidental. In short, this passage could be interpreted as a worry over priority claims.

Now, one well-known view which was regarded as similarly anti-realist in this phase of Oxford discussions of respective entities was Auriol’s. Although Ockham and Auriol’s positive theories of relations importantly differ, it may be that Ockham was accused of borrowing anti-realist arguments from Auriol without attribution, a charge he felt obliged publicly to reject here. Thus there may have been a general contemporary perception that he stole some aspects of his approach to category reduction from Auriol.

Chatton

It is especially ironic that Franciscan Walter of Chatton is most remembered today for misreading Auriol on esse apparentis, because of


82 This may also explain Ockham’s puzzlingly strong insistence, a bit earlier in the Scriptum, that if all the time he has spent looking at Auriol’s words were added together, they would not add up to 24 hours: "Quia tamen paucta vidi de dictis istius doctoris – si enim omnes vices quisque respexi dicta sua simul congregarentur, non completer spatium unius diei naturalis [...]"; see OCKHAM, Scriptum, I d. 27, q. 3 (OTH IV, p. 238), also quoted by D. PERLER, Zweifel und Gewissheit, p. 239. More puzzling still is the fact that this remark follows a long and accurate quotation from two different distinctiones of Auriol’s Scriptum. Perhaps Ockham copied Auriol very quickly.
all our figures at Oxford, his reading of Auriol was probably widest. Chatton reacted to Auriol in all of his major theological works: *Reportatio* (1321-23), *Lectura* (including the *Prologus*, c. 1323-4), and *Quodlibet* (c. 1330). Moreover, his interpretations of Auriol improved in accuracy as the decade advanced, since more texts became available and since Ockham’s absence from the scene after 1324 freed Chatton to take on Auriol more independently, in a fashion less conditioned by the concerns of his famous interlocutor. Auriol’s influence on Chatton arguably peaked with the *Lectura*; he and Ockham are the main targets in almost every question, and Auriol’s reasoning is presented in much greater length and detail than in the *Reportatio*. Auriol was still an important target in the *Quodlibet*, but that text cites an enormous absolute number of opinions from a very broad range of sources, and shows little interest in epistemology, so Auriol’s ideas get lost in the crowd. Moreover, as a quodlibet, the text reflects the interests of the audience as much as the master, so it may be that we see Chatton’s focus on Auriol becoming diluted by the broader interests of a new generation of theologians seemingly less anxious about the integrity of Scotus’s legacy.

Another clue to explaining the reduced interest in Auriol between Chatton’s *Lectura* and his *Quodlibet* can be sought in the received scholarly view that Ockham, Chatton, and Wodeham were all living in London between 1321 and 1323 or so. While this view has been questioned recently, nevertheless, if true this spatial fact may have played an important role in the declining focus on Auriol, for the three most important figures in that movement spent the period of most intense discussion of his ideas actually outside of Oxford. The

83 Auriol’s strong presence on epistemology in the *Prologus* has already been documented. As for the body of the *Lectura* commentary, which we possess only through dist. 17, editor Etzkorn’s introductions and *apparatus fontium* show his presence plainly and incontrovertibly. The three volumes of this series are (1) G.J. Etzkorn, *Lectura super Sententias, Liber I, Distinctiones 1-2*, Toronto 2007; (2) *Liber I, Distinctiones 3-7*, Toronto 2008; and (3) *Liber I, Distinctiones 8-17*, Toronto 2009 (these volumes are numbered 156, 158, and 164, respectively, in the Pontifical Institute’s *Studies and Texts* series).

84 See R. Keele, “Oxford *Quodlibeta*,” pp. 666-678, esp. the chart of issues and opponents on pp. 676-677. Out of twenty nine questions, only the first half of q. 24 deals with epistemology.

85 The case is not as strong as is usually thought. For a discussion of the issues, see *ibid.*, pp. 656-659.
implications of this would be quite serious; some more will be drawn below. Its connection to the Quodlibet is that, very possibly, when Chatton returned to Oxford sometime between 1324 and 1329, he found in his absence that interest in Auriol was considerably reduced, and not easily reigned in an audience-driven disputation.

One other point seems noteworthy here. Chatton’s theory of divine foreknowledge and future contingents was quite radical, and he seems to have attempted to deflect any danger it might attract by (likely willfully) misattributing some elements of his own views onto structurally similar elements in Auriol’s.\(^{86}\) Chatton is quite timid in discussing future contingents generally (“nihil volo asserere in quacumque materia periculosâ”), but he seems fascinated by Auriol’s boldness, and while he overtly rejects Auriol, some parts of his solution are strikingly similar; here we may have some evidence of indirect adoption of Auriol’s ideas in the middle period.\(^{87}\) In fact Auriol was genuinely innovative on this difficult issue. Chatton seems to have recognized that his intrepid approach would solve this most difficult problem more genuinely than some of the tepid compromises attempted from other quarters, but at a high cost theologically, and so for that reason he both respected and feared Auriol on this issue. But as we will see below, this attitude to Auriol’s solution faded fairly quickly in the upcoming generation of Oxonians.

Chatton seldom overtly agreed with any ‘modern’ other than Scotus; his modus operandi was to seem to agree with Scotus on nearly everything, even when giving a fairly unorthodox and independent interpretation of the Subtle Doctor.\(^{88}\) For him, Auriol and Ockham were rival interpreters of Scotus, more or less equal in importance. Hence, Chatton’s reaction to Auriol is superficially similar to his reaction to Ockham; we see almost always overt disagreement but still some assimilation of ideas, including occasional borrowing of arguments without


attribution. Nevertheless, Auriol’s impact does not bear the signs of *viva voce* disagreement we see in his disputes with Ockham; Auriol almost certainly never responded to Chatton, even in writing, so there is less positive influence and disguised intellectual debt. Auriol was never Chatton’s interlocutor *viva voce*.

Indeed Auriol was no one’s teacher at Oxford. Nor did he travel there, nor have any other direct personal connections there. And now we reach a key point for understanding the magnitude and shape of Auriol’s impact on Oxford: having never been to Oxford himself, and having generated no students who could defend him there as the native English reaction began, even the ideas of a theologian of his caliber could not long survive the transfer. And this is really the story of Auriol at Oxford before the Black Death; too brilliant to be ignored, too unconventional to be openly imitated.

Rodington and FitzRalph

Our next two figures were both about as far behind Chatton in their careers as Chatton was behind Ockham, but their relationships to Auriol’s views are quite divergent. John of Rodington, who was Franciscan master ca. 1332, responded to Auriol’s theory of cognition rather indirectly in II *Sent.* d. 1 q. 3 a. 3 (1328-9?), so he was definitely aware of Auriol on this score. Moreover, to the extent that he knew of his fellow Franciscan on *esse apparens* it was through Chatton’s misreading, and his objections mirrored Chatton’s arguments against *esse apparens* as unnecessary mediator. But Auriol does not show up as an interlocutor in the parts of his *Quodlibet de conscientia* (1333-4) that have been studied. The explanation for this is by no means certain, however, it may not be accidental that Rodington deals with Auriol on epistemology in the 20s, during the same period that

89 K. TACHAU, *Vision and Certitude*, pp. 225-226; W.J. COURTENAY, *Adam Wodeham*, pp. 82-83. The dates of Rodington’s commentary are not very secure, but it was definitely composed in the middle period.


Chatton was keeping the issues alive, but that he drops him in the 30s, right after the last of Wodeham’s commentaries was made. Just as in Chatton’s *Lectura* versus his *Quodlibet*, we see here some (negative) evidence that wider interest in Auriol diminished after the 20s.

We do have some positive evidence that the use of Auriol as a key authority by Oxford Franciscans was quite general, and not just confined to the few figures for which we have names and well-preserved texts. In an analysis of the fourteenth-century Codex Latinus Monacensis 8943, Etzkorn found a large compilation of various texts, perhaps made as a study in preparation for composing a *Sentences* commentary.\(^92\) The original manuscript, of which Clm 8943 is a copy, was made by an anonymous English Franciscan, drawing from mostly Franciscan authors.\(^93\) In addition to copying books II and IV of Ockham’s *Reportatio* in their entirety, this manuscript contains various questions excerpted from Scotus, Ockham *alibi*, Chatton, Rodington, and notably for us, Auriol. Etzkorn suggests that the original compilation was produced around 1325, right in the heart of our middle period.\(^94\) The text excerpts from Auriol’s *Sentences* commentary on various opinions: the production of the world from eternity, the theory of place (*locus*), the Trinity, merit in Christ, and the nature of acts of belief.

This same manuscript also contains two questions from our next figure, Richard FitzRalph. He was a secular, gave his bachelor lectures sometime between 1326-29, was a master at Oxford in 1331-32, and then became chancellor there in 1332-34.\(^95\) In epistemology, FitzRalph was a perspectivist, accepting the existence of both intelligible and sensible species; he argued directly and vociferously against Rodington on cognition.\(^96\) But in his somewhat traditional stance on cognition he seems not to have felt obligated to react to Ockham or to Auriol. Again, on future contingents, FitzRalph felt no need to

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93 Ibid., p. 248.
94 Ibid., p. 267.
discuss Auriol, or even Scotus himself.\textsuperscript{97} One source of positive influence was in moral psychology, in particular the priority of intellect or will, where FitzRalph showed himself familiar with some of Auriol’s arguments.\textsuperscript{98}

And here we see the wider consequences of the shift in focus discussed above in relation to Chatton. If Ockham, Chatton, and Wodeham were in living in the same place during this period of intense discussion of Auriol, then their movement back and forth from Oxford, together with the tendency of Franciscans mostly to cite authorities within the Order, insured that Auriol would certainly be heard and discussed by Oxford Franciscans. But there is little reason why a bold and original thinker such as Auriol would quickly get a very sympathetic or direct reading there outside the Order. Nor was Ockham’s high profile in itself sufficient to insure Auriol’s text would be looked at directly; those outside the Franciscan Order interested in Ockham seemed to feel no particular need to seek a deeper reading of Auriol on their own.

5. The Late Period

In this period we begin to lose the trail. One possible reason is that many important figures at this time have \textit{Sentences} commentaries that are lost, or else in general their surviving works are unedited, hence our available sample size shrinks. To judge by what we do have, the trends already discussed simply play themselves out to their logical conclusion: Auriol’s influence is largely negative with just a few exceptions, and other than in Wodeham, the initial intensity of direct contact with Auriol’s thought at Oxford dies down considerably.\textsuperscript{99}

Some Dominicans: Holcot and Crathorn

The figures who begin the final period of our study are Dominicans, active at Oxford in the 30s, and contemporaneous with Wodeham.

\textsuperscript{97} C. Schabel, \textit{Theology at Paris}, p. 246.
\textsuperscript{98} W.J. Courtenay, \textit{Schools and Scholars}, p. 286.
\textsuperscript{99} We will discuss Bradwardine out of order here, because although he is older than Wodeham, his relevant texts are later.
Robert Holcot’s *Sentences* lectures, which have been partly edited and studied, but not critically edited in full, were begun in 1331, and his *Quodlibeta* and *Sex articuli* were written a few years after that. In his epistemology Holcot was keen to spar with his *socii* and with the previous generation of Oxonians, especially Ockham and Chatton, and his views draw on material connected with and inspired by Auriol (for example the perceptual errors, Ockham’s seeming conflation of presence and existence in his definition of intuitive cognition), but he shows no awareness of the origin of these things, nor direct familiarity with Auriol’s own discussions. The issues Auriol’s thought had introduced via Ockham and Chatton had become by this time part of the fabric of Oxford discussions, quite independent of their origins.

Halcot’s views on predestination are not currently an object of scholarly consensus. Some have argued that Holcot thought God grants salvation based on foreseen merits, but Halverson argues instead that Holcot is quite similar to Ockham on predestination, except that Holcot is explicit, where Ockham is implicit, in accepting the assumption that God has made a general offer of grace, but extends salvation to the individual soul provided it does not resist and is properly prepared to accept that grace. This notion of general election, an initial extension of grace to all, is of course Auriol’s view, and Holcot seems to have become increasingly confident in expressing this opinion as his career progressed. Holcot’s theory is not entirely consonant with Auriol’s, since the former rejects while the latter accepts the absolute necessity of grace, and here, as in epistemology, it is not clear if Holcot read Auriol directly or simply imbibed his influence through Ockham.

Holcot’s opinion on future contingents tells the same story: definite echoes of Auriol, but no direct engagement. Later in his theology career Holcot seemed to join with his contemporary confre Arnob.

of Strelley in saying that there is no determinate truth or falsity in contingent propositions about the future, a view whose originator was Auriol.\textsuperscript{105} Otherwise, on this issue Holcot was influenced by Ockham in the main, and Chatton in certain details; Auriol’s contribution to the discussion has become such a part of the accepted background that it cannot be determined whether these Dominicans were reading him directly at all.\textsuperscript{106} None of the available editions of Holcot’s text we have examined quotes Auriol or responds to him in a focused and direct manner.

William Crathorn was perhaps a year more advanced in his career than Holcot. He is quite a bit less studied than Holcot, and the poor survival of his texts probably has some role in this.\textsuperscript{107} On epistemology Crathorn was a maverick, striking out in very new directions. He held a species account of the perceptual and intellectual process, but combined this with the claim that sensory faculties are completely passive, and that it is species themselves that are directly known.\textsuperscript{108} One sees promising echoes of Auriol in his discussion of the “experiences”, but there is no treatment of Auriol’s approach or concerns. In this respect Crathorn is like Holcot, responding directly only to his socii and to Ockham.\textsuperscript{109} Again, his views must certainly be interpreted within the Oxford context which Auriol helped create, but Crathorn shows no fresh engagement with Auriol \textit{per se}.

\textsuperscript{105} C. SCHABEL, \textit{Theology at Paris}, pp. 243 and 249; H. GELBER, \textit{It Could Have Been Otherwise}, p. 239.


\textsuperscript{107} His \textit{Sentences} commentary has been fully edited; see CRATHORN, \textit{Quaestiones super librum sententiarum}, ed. F. HOFFMANN, in: \textit{Quästionen Zum ersten Sentenzenbuch}, Münster 1988. Nevertheless, it is little studied, and it is not known how extensive his quodlibets are; they may include two questions sometimes attributed to a John Graffon or Cratfon. See R. KEELE, “Oxford Quodlibeta,” pp. 688-689, and W.J. COURTEENAY, “Postscript: The Demise of Quodlibetal Literature,” in: \textit{Theological Quodlibeta: The Fourteenth Century}, pp. 693-699, esp. 697.


Wodeham

Of all the figures in this period the Franciscan Adam of Wodeham was most concerned to read carefully (and usually to rebut) Auriol’s non-epistemological views. His response is generally patterned after Chatton’s: stressing epistemology (as already discussed) but actually ranging rather widely. For example, Wodeham discussed Auriol on “knowledge of God, the Trinity, grace, the power of creation, and the problem of quantity.” Wodeham knew Auriol’s *Scriptum* well, as we have seen in our discussion of epistemology; more evidence of this comes, for example, in his discussion of future contingents. In fact, the following is a good characterization of Auriol’s considerable influence on Wodeham compared to Chatton: in Wodeham, Auriol is given a serious and wide-ranging reading, and is held to have a level of authority comparable to Ockham (but again, without the personal connection); one great difference, however, is that Wodeham’s better textual familiarity sometimes leads to very fine-grained agreement and disagreement with Auriol over certain details, whereas Chatton, especially early on, more often worked only with the gist of Auriol’s ideas. An excellent illustration of all these points can be found in an example from the primary non-epistemological topic on which Wodeham felt bound to discuss Auriol: the logic of the Trinity.

One important goal of Christian declarative theology is to exposit the doctrine of the Trinity as sensibly as possible. The central tension in that effort will be to find ways of talking about the triune God which avoid implying a unity either too tight or too loose. Balance is everything. For example, we have one God and three persons: Father, Son, Holy Spirit. But this God cannot be held to be one to such an extent that the persons are not internally related in certain ways, for

110 Although some of his work, such as the *Lectura Secunda*, dates to the late 1320s, Wodeham is still best placed in the late group.
113 W.J. Courtenay, *Adam Wodeham*, p. 59. Oxford work on the logic of the Trinity declined precipitously after 1334, so Wodeham was one of the last to treat the problem from the perspective of the new English theology. On this point see W.J. Courtenay, *Schools and Scholars*, pp. 278-280, and also R.L. Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350*. 2 vols., Leiden/Boston 2013, pp. 663-752. For Ockham specifically, see *ibid.*, Ch. 10, pp. 601-662.
indeed, we have that the Father alone begets the Son, and (in the West) together with the Son spirates the Holy Spirit, so we must somehow account for asymmetrical relations. But this asymmetry cannot be allowed to damage the unity either, as in Arian-style reasoning. Many semantic and logical puzzles are consequent upon any attempt to go beyond the bare statement of the Trinitarian creed.

Early fourteenth-century English theologians often had to fine-tune this balance by expositing creedal pronouncements on the Trinity in the face of significant new developments in the theory of inference, in semantics, and the metaphysics of distinctions. These developments generated both new puzzles to solve and new tools to solve them with, so in Trinitarian discussions of the time we see ancient creeds and centuries of authoritative approaches combining with absolutely new methods, a sometimes volatile mixture.

One particular puzzle which concerned Auriol and Wodeham touches on theories of inference, predication, supposition, and negation. Consider the contradictories “God begets God” and “God does not beget God” (Deus genuit Deum, Deus non genuit Deum), which Lombard briefly discussed in Book I d. 4 of the Sentences. It is fairly obvious how we could get a puzzle by focusing on the grammatical object in each case. But this pair also suggests a more general puzzle based simply on the subject and the verb. For we want “God begets” to be true, since the Father begets the Son and the Father is God. But this commitment entails immediately by ordinary logic that we should also concede “God does not beget” as false. However, the theory of

114 For Auriol’s general orientation to Trinitarian paralogisms, see H. Gelber, Logic and the Trinity, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin 1974, pp. 130-143. In that work Gelber discusses the main solutions to paradoxes in terms of identity, distinction, and the fallacy of accident. In her treatment of Auriol, Gelber concentrates on a certain paradox in the Scriptum, dd. 2 and 8, while we treat a different puzzle in d. 4. Similarly, her discussion of Wodeham is only obliquely relevant to our more narrow purposes here, since she covers different puzzles, and works exclusively with Wodeham’s Oxford lectures, while we focus on the Lectura secunda.

115 Although genuit and non genuit are perfect tense verbs, it is not possible to translate them using an English past tense while keeping the phrasing parallel between the affirmative and negative; in English one must say ‘begat’ and ‘did not beget’, respectively. Since nothing in the logic depends upon the fact that we are dealing with past tense and perfect aspect, and since the categorical propositions involved may be treated (and were treated by Wodeham, Ockham, et al.) as tenseless for purposes of analysis, I will translate using English present.
the Trinity is not closed under entailment; always the logical implications of any claim must be checked against the balance mentioned above. For in explaining the Trinity we might want to claim “God does not beget” to be true as well, since neither the Son nor the Spirit beget. And so this is an open question for the theologians: whether or not to concede that “God does not beget” is false? Our answer will likely be conditioned by how we explain the truth of ‘God begets’, of course, but no simple correlation exists between how the one is answered and how the other is; a proliferation of semantic approaches leaves many options for preserving the balance.

In his *Scriptum* d. 4 sect. 15, Peter Auriol claimed there were two ways of approaching this matter. First, accept that “God does not beget” is false, then explain away the bad consequences by finessing the logical exposition of that sentence; or, second, take “God does not beget” as true, and finesse the logical relationship between that sentence and its contradictory. After explaining and then rejecting Aquinas’s attempt at the first approach to the exclusion of the second, Auriol carefully embraces both approaches with an eye on maintaining the balance just mentioned. On the one hand, the doctrine of the Trinity strictly requires us to accept the truth of both “God begets” and “God does not beget” simultaneously. However, if we consider the matter in another way, we will say that “God begets” is true, while “God does not beget” is false.

First, we see that by paying careful attention to reference and the nature of the terms, in fact both “God begets” and “God does not beget” are equally true. “God does not beget” is true because an indefinite affirmative is made true by the truth of just one corresponding singular affirmative, and clearly “the Son does not beget” is true. But “God begets” is also true, since “God ought to be conceived through the mode of a certain three-fold substance, and hence anything verified of God should be verified of any of the three which subsist in deity,” that is, of each of the Divine Persons.

But to accommodate ordinary usage, Auriol claims, a certain logical principle applies which allows us to say instead that “God begets”

116 *Auriol, Scriptum I In Sent.*, d. 4, sect. 15, nn. 36-41, ed. *Buytaert*, p. 731.
118 *Ibid*.
is true, and “God does not beget” false. Auriol’s logical principle is that, in ordinary usage, indefinite affirmative propositions entail singular affirmatives, while indefinite negative propositions entail universal negatives. He illustrates with an example. If we ask whether there was a dove on Noah’s ark, the positive indefinite response “dove was on the ark” (“columba fuit [in arca Noe]”) should be understood to claim that “not all doves, but just a certain dove, was on the ark” (“[responsio] intelligitur de quadam, non de omni”). However, the contradictory answer, the indefinite negative “dove was not on the ark” (“columba non fuit [in arca Noe]”) entails the universal negative “no dove was on the ark” (“nulla [columba] fuit”).

When this principle is applied to the theological case, we see that “God begets” entails that “not all God, but just a certain God, begets,” while “God does not beget” entails that “no God begets.” But clearly, speaking loosely, the former implication, more than the latter, is in line with the creed; after all, not all the persons of the Trinity beget, but just the Father, while the claim that no God begets sounds simply false. So, using this logical principle, we should concede that “God begets” is true and that “God does not beget” is false, since the implication of the former, more than the latter, resonates with the creed.

In the context of his *Lectura secunda* discussion of whether abstract terms for God typically apply to concrete ones, Wodeham generates several *instantiae*, in solution of which he considers both Ockham and Auriol.\(^{119}\) Noting Peter’s two approaches as just described, Wodeham accepts the first one, claiming that Ockham had said similar things,\(^ {120}\) but he rejects the logical principle that underwrites the second one and so would allow us to differentiate truth values — as “partim bene, partim ex mala logica.”\(^{121}\) Wodeham is not very clear or expansive here, but his remark seems to refer to the two halves of Peter’s principle, the first part being that (1) indefinite affirmative propositions entail singular affirmatives, the second that (2) indefinite negative propositions entail universal negatives. But which is the bad part? Wodeham says he might be willing to follow Auriol, except that the

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120 OCKHAM, *Scriptum*, d. 4, q. 1 (*OTH* III, p. 14).
121 WODEHAM, *Lectura secunda*, vol. II, p. 240 (Book I, d. 4, q. un., sect. 5).
first part, concerning the treatment of indefinite affirmatives, does not in fact conform to ordinary usage. Wodeham then recounts the dove example illustrating the treatment of indefinite negatives, but approves of it, calling this second part “probabilis.” So the logic of the first part is bad but the second is good. Is Wodeham’s attitude reasonable here?

In order to discuss this question with precision, let us adopt the convention that ‘S’ and ‘P’ stand for subject and predicate class terms, and ‘s’ for a proper name. Now, we first adopt the standard terminology for referring to categorical propositions here:

- **universal affirmative** (A-form) “All S is P,” e.g., “all men are mortal”
- **universal negative** (E-form) “No S is P,” e.g., “no men are mortal”
- **particular affirmative** (I-form) “Some S is P,” e.g., “some men are mortal”
- **particular negative** (O-form) “Some S is not P,” e.g., “some men are not mortal”
- **singular affirmative** “s is P,” e.g., “Socrates is mortal”
- **singular negative** “s is not P,” e.g., “Socrates is not mortal”
- **indefinite affirmative** “S is P,” e.g., “man is mortal”
- **indefinite negative** “S is not P,” e.g., “man is not mortal”

Using the precision this terminology allows, and studying Auriol’s example with the dove, we can divide his claim into two principles, the first of which Wodeham rejects:

**Principle I:** An indefinite affirmative proposition entails a conjunction of the corresponding singular affirmative and the contradictory of the corresponding universal affirmative, i.e.,

“S is P” entails
(a) “s is P,” for some s which is an S, and
(b) “not all S is P.”

More compactly, Principle I says “S is P; therefore a certain s, but not all S, are P.”

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122 *Ibid.*: “quaelibet indefinita affirmativa aequipollet singulari, negativa indefinita negativae universali, nisi quod dicit hoc esse ex usus accommodatione, quod non video quoad primum de indefinita affirmativa.”

123 *Ibid.*: “De negativa dat exemplum: si quereretur an columba fuit in arca Noe, et diceretur quod non, intelligeretur quod nulla columba ibi fuisse; similiter in proposito. Responsio est probabilis [...].”
Principle II: An indefinite negative proposition entails the corresponding universal negative, i.e.,

“S is not P” entails
“no S is P”

The question here is why Wodeham rejects Principle I as bad logic on common usage, but accepts Principle II as probable, and whether he is correct to do so.

The general opinion in English term logic seems to have been that indefinites should be treated as particulars for most syllogistic purposes. Why then does Wodeham approve of Auriol treating them as universals in the negative case? We can give a plausible interpretation of his approval of Auriol’s Principle II as follows: for if an indefinite affirmative is correctly treated as a particular affirmative, then its contradictory, an indefinite negative, could be treated as the contradictory of a particular affirmative, i.e., as a universal negative. So an argument for Principle II might be this:

(i) “S is P” can be treated like “some S is P.”
(ii) Therefore, the contradictory of “S is P,” viz., “S is not P,” can be treated like the contradictory of “some S is P.” That is, we can substitute on the basis of equipollence.
(iii) Therefore, “S is not P” can be treated like “it is false that some S is P.”
(iv) “It is false that some S is P” entails “no S are P” by the law of contradictories.
(v) Hence, an indefinite negative entails a universal (negative), as Auriol claims and Wodeham approves. 125

124 E.g., William of Sherwood held this view, as did Walter Burley. N. Kretzmann, William of Sherwood’s Introduction to Logic, Minneapolis 1966, pp. 29-30; P.V. Spade, Walter Burley: On the Purity of the Art of Logic, the Shorter and the Longer Treatises, New Haven 2000, p. 103, esp. note 86. But note that in neither case does the logician identify indefinite affirmatives, as opposed to negatives, in stating the equivalence; that this is the intent may be gathered from context, however. Spade claims that this practice was in fact normal for medieval logicians generally; see P.V. Spade, Thoughts, Words, and Things, version 1.1a, http://pvspade.com/Logic/docs/thoughts1_1a.pdf, p. 22, esp. note 24. Boethius also treated indefinites as particulars; for example, in Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos he assigns indefinites precisely the same inferential relations as particulars. See C. Thomsen Thörnqvist, Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii Introductio Ad Syllogismos Categoricos: Critical Edition with Introduction, Commentary, and Indexes, Gothenburg 2008, pp. 43-48.

125 Auriol claims more, actually, stating that “S is not P” and “no S are P” are equipollent. But he does not need anything so strong here. Entailment one direction is enough, since the larger point is to show that “God does not beget” validly entails the falsehood “no God begets,” and so should be rejected.
The *prima facie* legitimacy of Principle I is not so obvious. First of all, in “S is P; therefore a certain s, but not all S, are P,” the antecedent, as an indefinite, seems to contain less information than the consequent, which is conjunctive and quite a bit more definite. So it is difficult to believe that we have a strict entailment here. However, if Auriol instead intends to give us one plausible gloss of “S is P,” in order to remove some ambiguity, say, then this is fine, for when we say things of the form “S is P” we really do sometimes mean that a certain S but not all are P. Angry generalizations are often so glossed upon calmer reflection; think of “politicians are liars.” So Auriol’s thinking in Principle I is not illegitimate *per se*, and is not really so far outside common usage. And at any rate the logic here seems at first glance to be no worse than in Principle II. Wodeham’s rejection of Principle I is therefore puzzling.

One might seek a clue to Wodeham’s rejection of Principle I and acceptance of Principle II in Ockham’s logic, since Wodeham cites Ockham with approval in relation to the first approach above, in which “God begets” and “God does not beget” are both true. But actually Ockham is no help for sympathetically interpreting Wodeham here, for two reasons.

First, Ockham would not agree even on Wodeham’s support for Principle II, because Ockham explicitly glosses indefinite negatives – not as universal negatives like Auriol and Wodeham – but instead as particular negatives. That is, asserting that indefinite negatives are true just in case their subject terms are empty or else supposit personally for something their predicates do not, Ockham claims that “S is not P” just means “some S is not P.”126 And indefinite affirmatives, Ockham claims, are always, save certain rare funny cases, simply equivalent to particular affirmatives. Ockham’s view is consequent upon his supposition analysis of truth conditions. Judging from the *Summa logicae* discussion, Ockham’s reasoning seems to be this:127

(i*) “S is P” can be treated like “some S is P,” because in both cases the proposition is verified just in case S supposits for something the same as P (*pro aliquo eadem*).

(ii*) Therefore, “S is not P,” as its contradictory, is verified just in case the opposite truth conditions hold, that is, just in case it is false that S

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127 Ibid.
supposits for something the same as P. This can occur in two ways. Either (a) there are no S's at all, or else (b) there are S's but it is false that S supposits for something the same as P.

(iii*) Assume there are S's, that is, assume condition (a) is not in play. Then, condition (b), that “it is false that S supposits for something the same as P,” is itself equivocal; it can mean (1) “S supposits for nothing that P supposits for” or else (2) “there is something S supposits for that P does not supposit for.” Ockham accepts the latter gloss of condition (b) but not the former.128

(iv*) Hence, for Ockham, “S is not P” is verified just in case there are no S’s or in case there is something S supposits for that P does not supposit for.129 These are also the truth conditions for O-form (particular negative) propositions. So “S is not P” means “some S is not P.”

(v*) Hence, an indefinite negative is equivalent to a particular negative (pace Auriol and Wodeham).

Notice, the choice of gloss in (iii*) makes all the difference. If instead we took gloss (1), then ‘S is not P’ would be verified just in case S supposited for nothing P supposits for, which are the truth conditions of an E-form, i.e., a universal negative. In short, take gloss (1) and we get Auriol and Wodeham’s answer instead.

Ockham’s argument for taking gloss (2) is that for the truth of an indefinite, whether affirmative or negative, the truth of but one inferior singular is sufficient. Hence, Ockham wants us to be able to reason from “this s is P,” to “S is P,” and similarly from “this s is not P,” to “S is not P.” But if “S is not P” means or entails “no S is P,” then the truth of “this s is not P” would entail “no S is P” by transitivity; and of course a singular is not nearly sufficient for its corresponding universal. “S is not P” must mean “some S is not P” instead. And Ockham seems on solid ground here, despite the fact that the dove example sounded quite plausible when we first read it. What in the world has gone wrong?

The problem, of course, lies in the example itself. For the term ‘columba’ in “columba non fuit [in arca Noe]” might seem to be a categorical term signifying doves, amenable to regular categorical analysis. But in fact, because in the example we are inquiring into the ultimate fate of all doves as a collection, the term ‘columba’ really

128 Why he makes this choice will appear shortly below.
129 The first clause is needed so that O-form categoricals lack existential import, for otherwise they do not contradict A-forms, which have it.
names the species, and so primarily signifies, not doves, but the species itself insofar as it is a species. This is why the inference seemed plausible: imagine Noah being asked, “Is species ‘dove’ on the ark?” The answer “Dove is not on the ark” means, “the species is unrepresented on the ark,” and so no doves at all are there. This is why Auriol and Wodeham approve of the move from indefinite negative to universal negative here, because ‘dove’ invokes the species as a whole. But in this sense of ‘columba’, Ockham’s reasonable claim that we must have an implication from a singular to corresponding indefinite would clearly fail, for this is a bad consequence: “Danny the dove is not on the ark; therefore species ‘dove’ is not on the ark.” Poor Danny may have been one of those doves of iniquity, left out to drown. But notice that Ockham is correct to begin with a singular negative and end with the particular negative when instead columba is taken for what it normally signifies, for this is a good sequence: “Danny the dove is not on the ark; therefore dove is not on the ark; therefore some dove is not on the ark.”

It might be said, therefore, that we simply have here two different but equally legitimate analyses of the indefinite negatives in common usage, which can be characterized by the consequences they do and do not allow:

**Interpretation #1 – (Auriol, Wodeham)**

“S is not P; therefore no S is P” is valid, but obviously

“s is not P; therefore S is not P” cannot be allowed

**Interpretation #2 – (Ockham)**

“s is not P; therefore S is not P; therefore some S is not P” is valid, but obviously

“S is not P; therefore no S is P” cannot be allowed.

Perhaps, it will be said, when we use indefinites we sometimes mean the first, sometimes the second. However, it is not the case that we just have two different but equal analyses of indefinites here, because Ockham’s logical theory can explain why indefinites should be treated as particulars, and still explain why the dove-example suggests a misleading analysis of the negative indefinite.

Now Ockham would agree that in “columba non fuit” the term ‘columba’ refers to the species, but he would not allow it to refer to species in a way that makes it seem as if species have real extra-mental existence. To put it in Ockham’s language, in “columba non fuit,”
the term ‘columba’ has to have simple supposition, that is, ‘columba’ supposits, not for doves, as it does on ordinary personal supposition, but for the general concept ‘dove’ in mental language, which according to his mature theory of concepts, is just the act of thinking about doves.

Then, according to Ockham, the rule that indefinites are equivalent to particulars applies only if both terms in the indefinite proposition have personal supposition; mixed cases in which one of them has simple supposition do not count. And in fact the dove case seems to be of just this sort. In Summa logicae, Ockham says that indefinites with either subject or predicate in simple supposition are not convertible with particular propositions, but should instead be taken as singular propositions, for in this case in fact we have the proper name of a general concept, i.e., a collection in thought of singular entities extra animam. So – and this is Ockham’s great insight here – properly speaking, “columba non fuit” has the form “s is not P,” not the form “S is not P”; moreover and correspondingly, the predicate must be understood as applying to general concepts, that is, to acts of thinking about many singulars at once. The only alternatives are that the subject of the sentence instead refers to some extra-mental universal or to individual doves. Not the first option, since Ockham (and Auriol!) were both nominalists about extra-mental universals. But neither can the second be accepted as a good analysis, since if it were, then ‘columba’ would have personal supposition, and so “columba non fuit” would follow from a singular, just as Ockham noted, but Interpretation #1 does not allow. So Ockham is right; in this example the indefinite negative “columba non fuit [in arca Noe]” means something like “‘dove’ is not a concept whose supposita were all on the ark.”

A brief symbolic treatment makes the point sharply, and allows us to demonstrate the relative superiority of Ockham’s interpretation. We adopt the conventions that (1) set and class names are in bold type, while corresponding predicates will be in regular typeface, and that (2) sets are in Roman letters, while proper classes (i.e., sets of

130 OCKHAM, Summa logicae, pars II, cap. 1 (OPh I, p. 247), and II, cap. 3 (OPh I, pp. 257-8). Ockham ends chapter 3 by saying that his remarks on indefinites with simple supposition work for other puzzle cases, including specifically “God begets.” Cf. OCKHAM, Scriptum, d. 4, q. 1 (OTh III, p. 14).
sets) are in Greek. Then, let ‘D’ name the set of all doves, ‘A’ name the set of animals on the ark, let ‘Γ’ name the class of sets of animals whose members are all on the ark, let ‘d’ name a particular dove, let ‘Dx’ be “x is a dove,” and ‘Ax’ be “x is on the ark.” Then, the difference between the two approaches is rather like the difference between the sentences “D ∩ A = ∅” (the set of doves and the set of ark animals are disjoint) and “D ∉ Γ” (analogous to the Ockhamist ‘‘dove’ is not a concept whose supposita are all on the ark”). For the former sentence deals with the question of set extensions (which members of one collection are members of the other), while the latter deals with set relations (which sets are members of other sets of sets); the latter sentence is in effect second-order, since it would allow quantification over sets, not just within them. Translating Ockham’s insight into this terminology, we can argue that Interpretation #2 does correctly exposit the indefinite “dove is not on the ark,” while Interpretation #1 does not. For an indefinite ought to follow from a singular, but

-Ad; therefore D ∩ A = ∅

is a bad consequence, while

-Ad; therefore D ∉ Γ

is a good one. Moreover, “D ∩ A = ∅” entails “∀x (Dx → -Ax),” while “-Ad” does not. The upshot is that “D ∩ A = ∅,” which corresponds to Auriol and Wodeham’s understanding of the indefinite “dove is not on the ark,” cannot effectively exposit that proposition, and so an indefinite negative does not entail the corresponding universal negative. Principle II is a logical failure.

However, “D ∉ Γ” is entailed by “-Ad.” Moreover, this exposition does not fail based on other entailments of “-Ad”; the two relevant existential generalizations entailed by “D ∉ Γ” itself also follow from “-Ad.” For we have both that

D ∉ Γ; therefore ∃x (Dx & -Ax)

and that

D ∉ Γ; therefore ∃X (X ∉ Γ)\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{131} If D is really a proper name, as Ockham would claim it is, and (X ∉ Γ) an open sentence, then ∃X (X ∉ Γ) must be a legitimate conclusion.
are good consequences. But since Dd and -Ad, we have independently that \( \exists x (Dx & \neg Ax) \). Moreover, from Dd and -Ad, and from the definition of \( \Gamma \), we have that \( \exists X (X \notin \Gamma) \). Moreover, given Ockham’s ontology in his mature theory of general concepts, the variable of second-order quantification in \( \exists X (X \notin \Gamma) \) only ranges over acts of thinking about things falling under species concepts, and hence its ontological commitments are only to acts of thinking (qualities), and to things like doves and such (substances). Ockham’s logic here is consonant with his ontology.

It may be objected that if Ockham made mixed supposition indefinites equivalent to singulars, then since in the Middle Ages singulars were held to be equivalent to universals, Auriol and Wodeham were right after all. But this does not follow, for remember, in this example the subject term ‘columba’ has simple supposition even after exposition, and so refers, not to doves, but to the concept of doves, and the rule treating singulars as universals only works when the terms have personal supposition. That this restriction is correct will be observed in the fact that this is a bad consequence: “‘dove’ is not a concept whose supposita are all on the ark; therefore no concept is such that all its supposita are on the ark.”

A couple of important results follow from all this logical analysis. Auriol and Wodeham are wrong, and Principle II is a very illogical treatment of indefinites compared with Ockham’s far superior supposition analysis. Moreover, Ockham discussed the example “God does not beget” at least three times in connection with indefinites in *Summa logicae*, and Wodeham is sometimes thought to have actually written the Prologue and Chapter I.51 of that text for Ockham, so he certainly should have been familiar with Ockham’s doctrine. There is but one conclusion we can make: *Wodeham read Auriol more carefully than he read Ockham on this particular issue.*

132 Ockham himself held that singulars were equivalent to universals for most syllogistic purposes. See OCKHAM, *Summa logicae*, pars III-1, cap. 8 (OPh I, p. 384).

133 This entire Ockhamist analysis is an excellent example of the ‘intensional’ nature of Ockham’s theory of supposition, as defined in C. NOVAES, “An Intensional Interpretation of Ockham’s Theory of Supposition,” in: *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 46/3 (2008), pp. 365-394. It seems to us that Novaes’s understanding of the application of Ockham’s supposition theory, and so its meaning and purpose, is quite sound.

134 W.J. COURTENAY, *Adam Wodeham*, p. 34.
Moreover, for Principle II in Auriol’s analysis of indefinites to be applicable to the theological case, then, in strict analogy with the dove example, we would have to affirm two things:

(1) “God does not beget” means “the species ‘God’ does not beget,” and,
(2) the consequence “the species ‘God’ does not beget; therefore no God begets” is valid, but since the conclusion is false, we are correct to avoid saying “God does not beget” in accommodating common usage.

However, this seems utterly erroneous, for who, in claiming “God does not beget” thinks they are talking about God as a species? We have moved far off balance if we are thinking of God as a species with three singular instances under it. More importantly, the consequence “the species ‘God’ does not beget; therefore no God begets” is clearly invalid, and involves a category mistake, which our Ockhamist analysis perceives and corrects; species are not the kinds of things that beget, only individuals are. By contrast, the Ockhamist analysis of “God does not beget” would instead require us only to affirm:

(1*) “‘God’ is not a concept all of whose supposita beget,” and,
(2*) the consequence “‘God’ is not a concept all of whose supposita beget; therefore some supposita of ‘God’ does not beget” is valid.

These two claims seem much more in line with the doctrine of the Trinity. Wodeham and Auriol are simply wrong; Principle II is neither a good analysis of common usage for indefinites nor is it applicable to the Trinity. And so we posit another conclusion. Wodeham followed Auriol into error when Ockham could have set him right on this particular issue.

Finally, Ockham is no help for sympathetically interpreting Wodeham on Principle I, i.e., where he rejects Auriol’s claim that “S is P” entails “a certain s, but not all S, are P.” Wodeham was right of course to reject this by strict logic. Ockham’s own theory on this point was partly consonant with Auriol, for although Ockham says indefinite affirmatives are equivalent to particulars (provided the terms have personal supposition), while Auriol equates them with singulars coupled with the denial of a universal affirmative, if we look at Ockham’s truth conditions in terms of supposition theory, the two views have some common ground. For if “S is P” means that S supposites for something the same as P does,135 making it equivalent to a particular

affirmative, then since any singular is sufficient for the truth of a particular affirmative, and since a particular affirmative also entails some singular because the former have existential import, for Ockham “S is P” is equivalent to “s is P” for some s. And this is just (Ia) above, the first half of Auriol’s Principle I.

However, there is no obvious way to get part (Ib) by strict logic on Ockhamist logical grounds. Why would “S is P” entail that “not all S are P,” or what is the same thing, that “some S are not P”? Our original instincts seem validated here; the consequent carries too much information for this to make a strictly valid entailment. Nevertheless, this exposition is reasonably in line with common usage; when we say “some S is P” we often do mean “some S but not all are P,” since if we meant “all” we would have just said it in the first place. So in fact this part of Auriol’s logical strategy, the one Wodeham rejected, actually seems more acceptable according to common usage, and so in the end Principle I seems a reasonable explication while Principle II is an open mistake. Wodeham was right to detect a logical error in Auriol’s two-part principle; however, he was utterly turned around about where the mistake is. That this is so is a testament of how nearly equally Auriol and Ockham weighed as authorities for Wodeham.136

Bradwardine

Thomas Bradwardine was an important secular Mertonian who championed both new forms of scientific analysis and a return to Augustine in theology. He reigned in arts at Oxford, then was a master of theology there around 1334.137 His association with the university lasted until about 1335, when he joined Richard de Bury’s circle, the beginning of a very successful ecclesiastical career.

The name ’De causa Dei’ speaks volumes about Bradwardine’s attitude in writing the book. When a theologian surrounded by and in

136 It is important to note that neither Ockham’s Scriptum nor Chatton’s Reportatio or Lectura, in their respective discussions of Lombard’s Book I, d. 4, treats Auriol’s views on that same distinction. However, both men quote Auriol in conjunction with I, 5, and in many other places, on the subject of the Trinity. Wodeham’s reaction was therefore without specific precedent in either of his two main teachers.

137 W.J. COURTEENAY, Schools and Scholars, p. 271.
constant conversation with other theologians imagines he needs to write a book addressed to that very audience which comes down boldly on the side of God, we know he considers himself a reformer.\textsuperscript{138} For example, in the preface of this text, composed in the late 1330s and published in 1344, after he was already absent from Oxford a decade, Bradwardine bemoans the presence of those who prefer philosophical considerations to theological ones in the very council chambers of theology itself, a situation he compared to that at the time of the Pelagians.\textsuperscript{139}

Although the text is poorly studied – perhaps because of its sheer size, about 900 pages in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century edition – nevertheless it seems clear \textit{De causa Dei} is part of the backlash to the new English theology, with its critical spirit and inventiveness in developing and applying semantic theory, mathematics, and natural science to theological conundras. In the book, Bradwardine displays broad erudition, citing enormous numbers of ancient and early mediaeval authors. Pagan, Christian, and Muslim writers all show up: we see lines of Ovid, mention of Alexanders both Aphrodisian and Macedonian, opinions of Averroes, Avicenna, \textit{et alii Saraceni}, and of course many citations of Augustine, Lombard etc. In fact, Bradwardine gives a nod to nearly everyone in the Western tradition until he reaches the very trend he is reacting to, at which point he stops naming names. Indeed, one of the latest theologians he mentions by name is Scotus, and then only a couple of dozen times; by contrast Augustine is mentioned by name about 900 times, or once per page on average.

For all these reasons, it is not easy to decide exactly who the \textit{moderni} he opposed actually were. The subtitle of \textit{De causa Dei}, given

\textsuperscript{138} For the audience, consider that in his opening letter, Bradwardine dedicates the book “ad suos Mertonenses.” For his attitude, consider that in his preface, after explaining the \textit{hybris} of his opponents he begins his description of the corrective approach in his book with the words “Zelo igitur zelans pro causa Dei”; see \textit{De causa Dei}, London 1618, praefatio, p. b2.

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Ibid.}, p. b: “Porro, sicut antiqui Pelagiani ventoso nomine saecularium scientiarum inflati Consistorium Theologicum contenentes Philosophicum flagitabant: ita et moderni. Audivi namque quosdam advocatos Pelagii, licet multum provectos in sacris apicibus, affirmantes Pelagium nusquam potuisse convinci per naturalem et philosophicam rationem; sed vix arguebatur utuncque per quasdam auctoritates Theologicas satis nudas, maxime per auctoritatem Ecclesiae, quae Satrapis non placebat. Quapropter per rationes et auctoritates philosophicas ipsos disposui reformare.”
either as *Contra Pelagianos* or *Contra Pelagium*, is not as much help as one might imagine, since the term possessed little precision or historical relevance at this time if even Ockham’s views on grace could be labeled ‘Pelagian’. The label ‘Pelagian’ here really stands in for a certain generic anthropocentric trend in theology of which the emphasis on logic is but one species.

There exists an older tradition of scholarship, which sees much of fourteenth-century English philosophical theology in terms of an Augustinian revival in the face of skeptical trends started by Scotus and culminating in Ockham. Despite increasing recognition that this view is too course-grained to explain trends at Oxford, one particular dogma of that older tradition has continued to be repeated: that Auriol was a primary target for Bradwardine.¹⁴⁰ For example, in a recent study of Bradwardine’s theory of time, E. Dolnikowski says Ockham and Auriol were the most direct critical targets for Bradwardine’s *De futuris contingentibus* (whose critical arguments were later expanded in *De causa Dei*).¹⁴¹ Following this claim with a one-page exposition of Auriol’s views on indeterminate truth, the author next turns to Ockham, who is by contrast discussed at considerable length; in the end it is only Ockham and Ockhamism which are successfully connected to Bradwardine’s rebuttals. Indeed, apart from this single discussion, Auriol’s name only appears in this study on one other occasion, suggesting the links between him and Bradwardine are simply being assumed in line with the older scholarly tradition. There is clearly something strange about this situation, unless Auriol is thought somehow to be an Ockhamist.

Consequently, only more detailed critical study of the text will allow us to learn more definitively who the opponents were; for now


all we can say relative to Auriol is this. (1) A computer search of the early-modern edition for ‘Petrus’, all variant spellings of ‘Auriol’, as well as ‘Doctor Facundus’, yields no occurrences (nor, for that matter, does ‘Ockham’, ‘Holcot’, ‘Wodeham’, etc.). (2) None of the specific views on predestination or grace described in De causa Dei are Auriol’s, and at any rate, the text shows little concern with the doctrine of predestination and election as such. Nevertheless, (3) Bradwardine would have certainly opposed Auriol’s approach to grace, and probably predestination, if he knew of it. Moreover, (4) in his discussion of future contingents, Bradwardine is likely reacting to Oxford authors such as Chatton, Arnold Strelley, and Holcot, not to Auriol directly.

In sum, it seems almost impossible that Bradwardine would not have known who Auriol was. But as for the question of whether Bradwardine actually read any Auriol, or whether he actively considered Auriol as part of the “Pelagian trend,” these issues cannot be settled with the available scholarship, and the answer probably will not change our assessment of Auriol’s impact on Bradwardine anyway; however the details come out, Bradwardine was not reacting to Auriol per se. In fact, it does not seem strictly correct to include Bradwardine in the Oxford reaction to Auriol in a strong sense, and if not directly in the anti-Pelagian Bradwardine, then probably nowhere else in the early 40s. The ripples of Auriol’s impact at Oxford were dying down at the same time the tide in Paris was rising with Gregory of Rimini.

Halifax

Robert Halifax is a good place to stop, because, given the pattern we have discovered, if we cannot find traces of Auriol’s thought in this Franciscan, then the trail has gone completely cold. In his (still unedited) Sentences commentary, for which we have only nine questions covering topics in Lombard’s Books I and II, Halifax quoted Wodeham. Hence, we have every reason to believe that Halifax

142 J. Halverson, Peter Auriol on Predestination, p. 5.
would have known of Auriol, if from nowhere else, then at least from Wodeham. His commentary can be safely dated to 1333-40; we have no other writings clearly attributable to him.\textsuperscript{144} Halifax was the Franciscan \textit{lector} around 1336, and became known in Paris by the early 40s, along with the slightly older Oxford group, including Wodeham, Holcot, and FitzRalph; indeed, Rimini quoted him as early as 1342.\textsuperscript{145}

In epistemology, Halifax shows a return to perspectivist accounts of cognition, and to Scotus’s original definition of intuitive and abstractive cognition, with a simple acceptance of species in the medium. In his renewed interest in the role of light in vision and cognition, Halifax reaches back past both Ockham and Auriol to Grosseteste.\textsuperscript{146} Ockham’s epistemology had gained no purchase, and if Ockham’s style of approaching epistemology was not amenable to Halifax, then, as the reader will likely have guessed, neither was Auriol’s.\textsuperscript{147} Halifax was most influential on his contemporaries on the subject of fruition and grace, but these views have received no modern attention.\textsuperscript{148} Perhaps a future study will uncover a remnant of Auriol’s influence here, since this was also an issue for which Oxonians looked to Auriol, but judging by what we currently have, by the late 30s, even among the Franciscans at Oxford, Auriol had lost his readers.

6. \textit{Conclusion}

The route of Auriol’s influence at Oxford has now been traced along its length, and some outstanding features along the path have been explained and assessed. In a second study we will examine the depth of Auriol’s influence on Oxford through a case study, choosing for

\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 138. Courtenay had hoped in 1973 that new and at that time unsynthesized information about Wodeham’s career might yield more precise dates for Halifax’s commentary, but by 1978 he realized the new data was of no assistance, since Halifax only paraphrases Wodeham, whose various commentaries have similar wording at the relevant points of quotation anyway. The quotation does not seem to be from Adam’s \textit{Lectura secunda} at any rate. See W.J. Courtenay, \textit{Adam Wodeham}, pp. 119-120.

\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Ibid.} See also K. Georgeades, “Robert of Halifax,” in: \textit{A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages}, pp. 607-608.


\textsuperscript{147} K. Tachau, \textit{Vision and Certitude}, pp. 310-311.

this purpose an issue derived from the point of widest influence, the middle period. It remains now only to consider in conclusion, using all the previous discussion as background: Why did it have just the shape it did?

The introduction canvassed several hypotheses for its initial impact. (1) It was basically accidental, the result of the high profile of Ockham and Charton in contemporary polemics, and their interest was the result of casting around for whatever seemed controversial in fellow Franciscan authors. (2) It was because Auriol’s ideas either radically reinterpret or were thought to oppose those of Scotus. (3) It was circumstantial and political; Auriol’s philosophy drifted across the Channel, carried by the ecclesiastical currents of the Poverty Controversy involving his friend and patron, John XXII.

Our evidence suggests a complex combination of these three is near the truth, and, in fact, we must add a fourth observation: the ‘intranational’ and ‘international’ movement of the friars. We assert that the explanation for Auriol’s initial influence at Oxford (1315-1317) comes down to three complementary factors. (1) He was innovative on traditional theological issues, and was (2) a Franciscan innovative in particular in his understanding of issues dear to Scotus and Scotists at a time when there was an attempt in some quarters to establish a Scotistic orthodoxy for the Franciscan Order. 149 (3) The celerity of his career advancement was, if not unexampled, then certainly very noteworthy, and his patron was John XXII, partial instigator of many headaches for Auriol’s Order; this put his name in circulation in a way that perhaps aroused enmity and jealousy. (4) The fluidity of movement of the Fra tres Minores between Paris and Oxford, and between Oxford and London, meant that important and interesting ideas flowed easily back and forth within the Order. Interestingly, three of these four factors resonate in the biography of Alnwick, identified above as a good bet for the initial vector of Auriol’s views to Oxford. For Alnwick was a devoted (if ‘independent’) Scotist, older, yet less accomplished than Auriol, and peripatetic between Paris (at the time of Auriol) and Oxford (at the time of Reading and Ockham).

149 In particular, by Reading and Alnwick. See W.J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, pp. 185-189; for this trend at Oxford in particular after 1314, see W.J. Courtenay, “The Academic and Intellectual Worlds of Ockham,” p. 22.
Our theory of the origins of Auriol’s influence being understood, the correct explanation of Auriol’s sustained influence among the first generation of theologians to take him up extensively, viz., Reading and Ockham, comes down to two very different factors. First, the quality of his ideas and arguments. Indeed, quality of thought is the only thing Ockham ever respected in an opponent. Second, the critical tenacity of Chatton while a theology student played a large role. His (ultimately misguided) linking of Auriol and Ockham on epistemology while converting Ockham to the intellectio theory was decisive in the sustained reaction to Auriol in this period (1318-1330). But this same pattern seems to hold outside epistemology as well; once taken up by Ockham and Reading, Ockham’s own high profile assured that the next group of interpreters of Scotism would have to look at Auriol’s non-epistemological views as well. Chatton and Rodington entered the scene, and by the time they did, parts of Auriol’s commentary were available at Oxford (and probably Greyfriars London if Chatton et alii were instead there in 1321-23). Moreover, Chatton found many new theories in this material which he felt required rebuttal over and over throughout the 20s.

Despite this attention, Auriol had no real defenders at Oxford, and generated little direct interest outside his Order. Hence with Holcot and his socii, together with Wodeham, we see a new stage, a later generation of theologians (1331-1344), including many prominent Dominicans. Auriol’s opinions are now part of the general fabric of Oxford theology, but Chatton’s influence was still keenly felt on specifics, especially in Wodeham’s work. For Chatton had attacked Auriol again in his Oxford quodlibet around 1330, which event all these young men were bound to attend. As Ockham’s epistemology and nominalism failed to catch hold in Oxford during the 30s and early 40s, and as Chatton moved on to Avignon, so engagement with Auriol’s thought waned at Oxford. Bradwardine’s anti-Pelagianism might seem an exception, but really he represents an extreme and not very influential reaction to the new English theology, in which Ockham was prime participant, but Auriol at best an honorary member. Bradwardine aimed at local targets; he did not really engage with Auriol on specifics, but only reacted fiercely against a larger trend. In the end, Auriol’s light dimmed even among the Franciscans of this period.
In sum, Alnwick or someone like him planted the seed in English soil, but the debates between Ockham and Chatton were the primary engines of its growth into the early 30s, with Chatton playing the role of a major pivot, linking older with newer generations. It is historically possible that its decline after Wodeham would have been followed by a period of renewal around the time of *De causa Dei*, as part of an anti-anti-Pelagianism; it would only have needed texts to continue to be widely available, and for defenders to cross over to Oxford. But this possibility of renewal became lost in the general uncertainty, chaos, and relatively restricted travel in the late 40s, driven by the Hundred-Years War and the Plague. Fortunately, Auriol’s thought had a considerable afterlife elsewhere, surviving both the man and the high Middle Ages by several centuries.

Rondo Keele
Louisiana Scholars’ College
Northwestern State University
Morrison Hall 203
Natchitoches, Louisiana 71497
keeler@nsula.edu