Profiling, Neutrality and Social Equality

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Abstract: Traditional views on which beliefs are subject only to purely epistemic assessment can reject demographic profiling, even when based on seemingly robust evidence. This is because the moral failures involved in demographic profiling can be located in the decision not to suspend judgement, rather than supposing that beliefs themselves are a locus of moral evaluation. A key moral reason to suspend judgement when faced with adverse demographic evidence is to promote social equality—this explains why positive profiling is dubious in addition to more familiar cases of negative profiling and why profiling is suspect even when no particular action is at stake. My suspension-based view, while compatible with revisionary normative positions, does not presuppose them. Philosophers of all stripes can reject demographic profiling both in thought and deed.

1. Introduction

Demographic profiling is philosophically puzzling. Those who engage in profiling—drawing inferences about individuals by relying on statistical generalisations about their sex, race, or socioeconomic class—are often open to criticism even when relying upon robust evidence. To explain why, some suggest that we must accept revisionary theories on which beliefs are susceptible to moral evaluation in hitherto unexpected ways. This paper argues that we can reject profiling, both in thought and deed, without endorsing revisionary commitments which blur epistemic and moral evaluation of belief.

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1 This is the penultimate draft of a paper forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
The core argument is that by closely attending to the nature of the neutral attitudes, particularly suspended judgement, we can maintain that beliefs should only be assessed against purely epistemic standards, even if there can be moral reasons to suspend judgement prior to forming a settled view. Drawing on social egalitarian theory, I aim to show why beliefs that result from profiling are intrinsically undesirable—regardless of whether they lead to any particular action. Appreciating the intrinsic value of social equality allows us to explain why positive profiling is often deleterious as well as more familiar cases of negative profiling. Recognising the importance of social equality and the risks involved in profiling, so I claim, provides reason to adopt a default policy of suspending judgement when all we have available is statistical evidence pertaining to the prevalence of certain virtues, vices, or intelligence-level within some demographic group.

2. Relying on Statistical Evidence

Statistical evidence is criticised from various quarters. Epistemologists have been preoccupied (chiefly through ‘lottery cases’) with epistemic deficiencies in statistical evidence\(^2\), philosophers of science have worried about the reference-class problem for probabilistic inferences\(^3\), and scholars of jurisprudence have questioned the legal value of naked statistics.\(^4\) Despite such concerns, there are clearly cases where bare statistical evidence rationally requires (or at least licenses) belief and action. Take the following case:

*Blow a Gasket:* You read a report stating that model \(M\) cars have a marked propensity to break down. Specifically, 20\% of them have a fault causing them to blow a gasket within five years. This, so the report says, makes them the least reliable car released in the last decade. At the showroom, you see a selection of cars. You think to yourself that the model \(M\) car is comparatively less reliable than the other cars. On that basis, you choose to buy another type of car.

While the evidence does not support the probable unreliability of any particular car, it licenses the thought that a given model \(M\) car is *probably less reliable* than those belonging to other

\(^3\) Reichenbach (1949) provides a canonical statement. Hajek (2007) provides further discussion.
\(^4\) For overview, see Redmayne (2008) or Ross (2020).
models. It seems rational to act on the basis of that comparative belief by choosing not to purchase a model $M$ car.

Perhaps there are special prohibitions about relying on unfavourable statistical evidence about human beings? Cases inspired by debates about the proof paradox suggest not. Adverse statistical evidence does seem to license certain cognitive and practical responses in the interpersonal domain even if not in the courtroom. Take a case (lightly adapted) from the legal literature:

*Attackers:* There are 20 employees on a cruise ship working on deck. 19 of them attack, rob, and sadistically torture a wealthy passenger, putting into action a plan that the 20th employee knew nothing about. The 20th employee played no role in the assault and could have done nothing to stop it. There is no further evidence available to settle the question of any particular employee’s involvement.\(^5\)

Suppose that, as should happen according to many legal philosophers, all employees are released without criminal charge because the evidence is insufficient for conviction.\(^6\) Now suppose that one of these released employees moves in next-door to you. You have read about the case and know all about the incriminating statistical evidence. It is arguably not permissible to act on the bald proposition *my neighbour is dangerous*, for instance by publicly denouncing them.\(^7\) However, it nonetheless seems epistemically rational to form the belief that, given your evidence, there is a heightened chance of your neighbour being dangerous. This is supported by the fact that it is prudentially rational to modify your behaviour.\(^8\) For instance, it would be reasonable to initially adopt a heightened degree of caution in your dealings with them, for example by refraining from giving them your spare-key for safe keeping as you usually would with a new arrival to your sleepy town.\(^9\)

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\(^5\) Adapted from the famous Prisoners case in Redmayne (2008), where the potential attackers are prisoners in a yard.

\(^6\) See Enoch et. al (2012), Smith (2018), Pritchard (2018), Littlejohn (2020), and Gardiner (2020) for a selection of arguments for the conclusion that legal verdicts should not be based on naked statistics.

\(^7\) Buchak (2014) discusses the role of outright belief in legitimising blame.

\(^8\) I consider the relevance of this fact in relation to legal verdicts in Ross (2021).

\(^9\) See Munton (2020) for a useful attempt to identify a purely epistemic flaw in such evidence.
It appears we can rationally form comparative beliefs about humans using adverse statistical evidence and moderate our behaviour accordingly. What, then, is special about cases of demographic profiling? It will help to focus on an example.\(^{10}\)

_Diner:_ You work at a diner. From time to time, teaspoons are stolen. You know, based on a recent extensive analysis of CCTV footage, that members of demographic Y are responsible for 90% of all teaspoon thefts. Suppose demographic Y is distinctively marked out by a certain appearance. One morning, you wait on only two tables: one with members of demographic Y and another with members of demographic Z. Taking their collective dishes to be washed, you notice that a number of teaspoons have disappeared.

Two key questions arise:

**The practical question:** how should one act in light of adverse demographic evidence?

**The cognitive question:** what is the best cognitive response to adverse demographic evidence?

Let’s start with the practical question. Ought you act on the basis of the adverse demographic evidence—say, by pursuing the members of Y and accusing them of theft, or treating them with heightened suspicion when serving them? It seems compelling to suppose not. But why? What is special about demographic statistics that distinguishes them from the aforementioned cases?

We already possess the outline of an answer to the practical question. Legal scholars have noted that relying upon adverse demographic evidence exposes members of certain groups to a higher ex ante risk of mistaken conviction compared to other defendants facing similar charges (Di Bello and O’Neill 2020). For, by making certain demographics susceptible to inculpatory evidence not used against other groups, they would find themselves convicted of crimes more often. Even if we grant that profile evidence is fairly reliable, it is not infallible. Given that mistakes invariably occur when using any type of fallible evidence, the result would be that members of the profiled group would suffer from more mistaken convictions than

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\(^{10}\) I’m interested in drawing inferences about individuals from a body of statistical evidence. There are separate issues concerning *generic* statements (e.g. ‘sharks attack bathers’). See Leslie (2017).
others. The worry is that imposing an increased ex ante risk of mistaken conviction on members of certain groups fails to treat them as equals before the law.11

The broad concern generalises to the interpersonal domain. Since actions performed on the basis of profiling usually involve unwanted consequences for those being profiled, the same thought about raising the risk of erroneously penalising certain people applies outside as well as inside the courtroom. Especially when demographic membership is marked by a visually salient sortal characteristic like dress or skin-colour, profiling will lead to members of that demographic being repeatedly exposed to accusations, defensive behaviour, and suspicion. Again, given the fallibility of profile evidence, this unwanted treatment will not always be warranted by the actual behaviour of person being profiled. While these mistakes are individually unfortunate, their repetition risks instantiating an oppressive pattern against members of profiled groups. Andreas Mogensen draws on Marilyn Frye’s evocative ‘birdcage analogy’ in precisely this context:

\[(J)\]ust as a single wire is no significant impediment to freedom apart from its place within a network of others, so individual elements of an oppressive society may not appear as morally troubling as they are unless viewed as part of the larger pattern of similar injustices of which they form part. (Mogensen 2019: 17)

The focus on oppression also distinguishes demographic profiling from the Attackers case in which behaviour modification in response to statistics was reasonable: in that case, we were relying upon identity-contingent evidence (presence on a cruise-ship at time t) which does not risk oppressing any group marked by a persistent salient sortal characteristic. These considerations undergird a powerful reason not to act on the basis of adverse demographic evidence.

This leaves the cognitive question. Is it permissible to believe that an individual member of demographic Y is comparatively more likely than other customers to be a thief just so long as these beliefs are not made overt?

An affirmative answer (call this the split response) is, on its face, compatible with acknowledging downstream harms of profiling. Moreover, the split response comports with

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11 There are various relevant proposals in the literature on the proof paradox discussing why courts should not base verdicts on mere statistics: for instance, see Wasserman’s (1992) focus on autonomy, or Nunn (2015) on due process. See Ross (2020) or Backes (2020: section 2.1) for general discussion.
some aspects of ordinary practice: there are many beliefs permissible to hold, but impermissible to make manifest that you hold. For instance, one paradigmatic way we make our beliefs manifest to others is by asserting their contents. There are many examples of rational beliefs that we ought not assert. Suppose you know on impeccable evidence that a colleague is being passed over for promotion. There may be factors that make asserting this belief impermissible, for example prudentially impermissible (if you tell them, they will shoot the messenger), or morally impermissible (if you tell them, it will precipitate a breakdown minutes before their keynote address). The fact that we should keep a belief covert is not necessarily grounds for supposing that we should not hold it in the first place.

I will reject the split response, by providing a new rationale for the idea that profiling beliefs, even when covertly held, are intrinsically undesirable. However, before outlining my own positive view, I want to discuss and raise challenges for two prominent alternative attempts to reject the legitimacy of profiling beliefs—the moral wronging view and the moral encroachment view.

3. Immoral Beliefs and Moral Encroachment

This section discusses two influential theories that reject many profiling beliefs. Both approaches contain insights but have distinctive theoretical costs. The first is that profiling beliefs morally wrong their subjects, and the second is that the associated moral risks render profiling beliefs epistemically irrational.

3.1 Are profiling beliefs a locus of moral evaluation?

There is a natural view about normativity on which the epistemic and the moral are evaluative domains with different objects. According to this conception, our beliefs should be assessed against epistemic norms, while our actions (plus omissions) and character fall under the governance of moral norms. In an influential series of papers, Rima Basu has argued that profiling beliefs provide decisive reason to reject this traditional normative account.\(^\text{12}\)

According to Basu’s theory, beliefs themselves are a proper locus of moral evaluation. Granting this allows us to say that profiling beliefs morally wrong their subjects. (I’ll call this the moral wronging view henceforth). Under the moral wronging view—and for Basu this is a

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key virtue—the moral wrong of profiling is compatible with there being robust evidence rationalising the profiling belief. The central example she uses to motivate the view is that of the ‘rational racist’ being criticisable for believing that a black diner will tip less, even if they are aware of empirical studies supporting just this hypothesis (Basu 2019: 2). The clear advantage of the moral wronging view is providing a straightforward vindication of the idea that the cognitive practices of the ‘rational racist’ are morally unsavoury.

Issues surrounding doxastic voluntarism are especially pertinent for the moral wronging view, given that it is prima facie attractive only to criticise agents for matters within their control. The familiar worry is—in contrast with action—we cannot believe or disbelieve at will. In one paper, Basu says we must choose between either ‘giving the rational racist a pass’ in virtue of holding that we can only be morally evaluated for that which is under our control (a ‘control condition’), or we must deem concerns about control a ‘theoretical technicality’ that must be abandoned to vindicate the conclusion that racist beliefs wrong their subjects.13 In later work, Basu and Schroeder go further by mounting a two-pronged attack against control-based objections: first, they advert to various theoretical arguments against control conditions14, and second, they suggest that control conditions fail to account for the fact that how we settle a line of inquiry is often ‘a matter of our own psychology, and thus up to us’.15

Although Basu and Schroeder perhaps overstate the extent to which our psychology is in fact up to us, I agree that there is much to recommend rejecting excessively strict control conditions on moral responsibility. However, what we lack is an account of what positive response is both possible—and required—when facing a question about which we have only adverse demographic evidence. I take it that it is a natural desideratum, one that I further defend in the next paragraph, that we should prefer a solution to the problem of profiling that does not require that we actively believe against the evidence. But nor can we simply become like an inanimate object and entertain no cognitive response whatsoever. In the final section, I will aim to outline just such a solution to this issue, drawing on the positive epistemic state of suspended judgement.

14 See Basu and Schroeder (2019: 188).
15 Ibid.: 194
Before moving on, it will be dialectically helpful to emphasise two further points regarding the moral wronging view. Firstly, it bears emphasis that treating beliefs as a locus of moral wrong is theoretically heterodox. A common view holds that truth (or knowledge) is the ‘aim of belief’ and that norms concerning belief’s evaluation concern fundamentally veritistic notions such as strength of evidence or reliability.\(^\text{16}\) Familiar extant views which do talk about moral duties to have certain beliefs—such as the Cliffordian view that we have a moral duty to believe the truth\(^\text{17}\)—are fundamentally veritistic in nature. Of course, a view being revisionary is no reason to dismiss it, especially not if it manages to capture important data-points surrounding the intuitive wrong of profiling. Nonetheless, preferring the traditional normative dichotomy between the epistemic evaluation of belief and the moral evaluation of action, omission, and character is not merely a conservative preference. A second reason to prefer that we restrict beliefs only to epistemic evaluation—and reject views that require, morally speaking, that we believe against the evidence—is to preserve coordination between normative domains. What I mean by coordination is the preclusion of certain types of normative conflict. Prima facie, it would be preferable to avoid situations in which our best epistemic theory licenses believing \(p\) but our best moral theory states that believing \(p\) is morally impermissible.\(^\text{18}\) In later work, Basu and Schroeder (2019) accept the force of the coordination problem. Their solution is to suggest this issue might be dealt with by accepting a further view: namely, that epistemic rationality is itself impacted by moral considerations. It is to that view I turn next.

3.2 Do moral factors make profiling beliefs epistemically irrational?

Although treating belief as a locus of moral evaluation is fairly radical, there is another way to incorporate moral considerations into doxastic assessment. This view draws upon an approach in epistemology which argues that pragmatic factors, in addition to truth-related factors, are relevant for epistemic rationality. As the epistemological terminology puts it, the suggestion is that pragmatic factors encroach upon epistemic assessment of belief. So, for instance, a now-venerable argument contends that the importance of a belief’s truth for you

\(^{16}\) Chan (2013) is a classic collection on the aim of belief.

\(^{17}\) See Clifford (1877). A famous exception is found in William James (see Pace (2011) for contemporary discussion).

\(^{18}\) Whether this would generate dilemmas depends on whether we can sensibly speak about the correct response ‘all things considered’.
can determine how much evidence is needed for it to count as justified or known.\textsuperscript{19} Some have sought to extend this idea to argue that belief is subject to \textit{moral encroachment}. Encroached views of epistemic rationality remain controversial—many are the arguments for and against pragmatic encroachment. Equally, it is an open question whether pragmatic and moral encroachment stand or fall together (see Fritz (2017) and Bolinger (2020b) for opposing perspectives).

Bolinger (2020a) has a particularly helpful way of framing the moral encroachment response to the profiling problem: she claims that epistemic justification is impinged upon by the \textit{moral risks} that we run by accepting some proposition \(p\).\textsuperscript{20} On this account, the riskier a proposition, the higher the epistemic standards we must meet to justifiably accept it. Take the \textit{Diner} case—by accepting that one particular party is more likely than the other to be responsible for the theft, we run a heightened risk of violating their interests by exposing them to wrongful accusation, a risk underscored by the fact that they have a heightened susceptibility to profiling because of a visible sortal feature they possess. Given these risks, so the thought goes, the epistemic standards required for justified acceptance are raised beyond the point at which they are met by the merely statistical evidence we have available.

Notably, the moral encroachment view avoids the normative coordination problem because it claims that moral factors only play a role in \textit{determining whether a belief is epistemically rational}. Beliefs are not treated as a locus of moral evaluation in their own right. Another attractive feature of this view is explaining why profiling is problematic even if we happen to believe \textit{truly} that the subject of the profile possesses some negative characteristic. Bolinger writes:

\textit{Having accepted that} \(p\), \(S\) might directly harm \(A\) by acting as if \(p\). But even if she luckily avoids imposing these harms—either because \(p\) is in fact true, or because \(S\) never has the opportunity to act on her assumption that \(p\)—she wrongs \(A\) if she accepts \(p\) without adequate justification. She’s closed inquiry too early, \textit{recklessly}

\textsuperscript{19} See DeRose (1992) for the best-known example.
\textsuperscript{20} Bolinger remains neutral on the relationship between belief and acceptance, noting they are identical on some views but not others. Alternative versions of moral encroachment focus on knowledge, for example Moss (2018) treatment. An important predecessor is Pace (2011); Gardiner (2018) provides helpful discussion. Jackson and Fritz (forthcoming) discuss moral encroachment on credences.
exposing A to unjustified risk of suffering the harms involved in p-based mistakes.

{Bolinger 2020a: 2423 emphasis added}

However, like the moral wronging view, simply arguing for the morally encroached nature of epistemic rationality leaves us without a \textit{positive} characterisation—that doesn’t involve believing against the evidence—of how we should respond to negative profiles. Moreover, we might have some doubts about the scope and nature of the prohibitions generated by the moral encroachment view. A first is that the moral encroachment view diverges from the moral wronging view in how it diagnoses what I’ll call \textit{inert profiling}—cases in which acting on the basis of profiling beliefs is precluded. These cases come in two different varieties. One type of inert profiling is when no action is at stake. For example, suppose someone is sitting at home idly flicking through a magazine, forming profiling beliefs about those photographed therein. A second type of inert profiling is when there is a profiling-relevant action at issue, but the agent has committed not to act for some independent reason. Basu provides an instructive example: suppose a security guard has the job of preventing shoplifting, they profile someone as a shoplifter, but they are committed to doing nothing because they hate the company they work for. Intuitions may vary, but I agree with Basu that inert profiling is prima facie objectionable. The moral wronging view says that the beliefs involved in inert profiling are wrong. It is not obvious how the moral encroachment view—which ties epistemic rationality to the moral risks of acting on beliefs—can explain discomfort with profiling when acting impermissibly is ruled out by circumstance or prior commitment. A second related issue is that any prohibition on profiling under a view which focuses on expected moral costs must be \textit{contingent}. This is because the agent is enjoined to weigh the strength of the evidence against the expected costs of having the belief. There are reasons to worry about this sort of approach: one is that we can arbitrarily increase the strength of the evidence supporting the negative profile or minimise the expected moral costs yet plausibly still have intuitive resistance to such profiling, while another perhaps deeper worry is that we might expect the morally responsible agent to have a more fundamental aversion to profiling rather than it being contingent upon weighing and balancing the costs in each particular case. A third issue—relevant to both the moral wronging and moral encroachment view—is that these approaches don’t straightforwardly explain what is wrong with \textit{positive} profiling (for example, automatically supposing an Asian person is good at maths). It is, I think, an open question.
whether we always wrong the subject of a positive profile. Suppose someone receives some
enviable position due to positive profiling. While they have not been treated as an equal, it
does not strike me as obvious that this necessarily harms the subject of the profile. Similarly,
for moral encroachment views, it is not clear that there will be strong moral risks associated
with every case where we might positively profile somebody.

I don’t claim that these are insurmountable problems, although they are important data-
points I think we ought to capture. I begin the defence of my own view in the next section.

4. Profiling and Social Equality

I’ll begin by first highlighting a purely general problem caused by profiling beliefs, not
contingent on some identifiable wrong or harm being done to any individual. In doing so, I
will draw upon a particular conception of justice—namely, social egalitarianism.

Departing from G. A. Cohen’s adage that justice has some ‘currency’ that ought to be
distributed fairly, social (or relational) egalitarians stress the non-material components of
equality. Take class differences, such as aristocracies. While class differences are often
accompanied by distributive inequalities—money, manor houses, etc.—what is objectionable
about such hierarchies is not reducible to distributive inequality. Some of these problems
might be explained with reference to how they inhibit other valuable ideals, such as the ideals
of democratic governance. However, some of what is problematic about the existence of such
hierarchies is simply attitudinal. It is objectionable for a society to believe that there are
people of inherently superior stock, that there is a class of betters or elites, even if these
statuses did not entail an unequal distribution of material goods or opportunities. Social
equality does not, however, require that we form no opinions about the strengths and
weaknesses of our fellow citizens. A standard distinction is often drawn between hierarchies
of status, such as those holistic evaluative distinctions found in aristocratic or caste-based
societies, and hierarchies of esteem, which pertain to specific characteristics. Although
hierarchies of status are generally objectionable, social equality is not threatened by some

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22 See Fourie (2015) for a collection. The roots of analytic social egalitarianism were developed in a body of work
by, among others, Iris Marion Young (1990), David Miller (1997), Jonathan Wolff (1998), and Elizabeth Anderson
equality is contested: see Scheffler (2015) and Lippert-Rasmussen (2018).
23 E.g. see Fourie (2015) or Wolff (2019) for discussion.
differences in esteem in so far as these can be legitimately earned. For example, experts who earn intellectual deference because of their good judgement are compatible with social egalitarian ideals. What relational equality does require is a level playing field with respect to earning the esteem of your fellow citizens.

This level playing field obviously requires material goods. One is hard-pressed to earn esteem as a scientist if denied a rudimentary education. However, bearing in mind my suggestion that relational (in)equality has an attitudinal dimension, there are also constraints placed upon the cognitive attitudes it is desirable to possess. Specifically, I think relational equality presupposes a default attitude of indifference about whether any particular person possesses certain characteristics deserving of heightened or lowered esteem. The esteem-worthy characteristics about which we should have this default indifference includes, at minimum, intelligence, virtue, and vice, but there is also an argument—which I won’t pursue here—that it may also include various domain-specific skills and competencies (for example technical or sporting abilities). When I refer to an attitude of indifference, I do not mean indifference in the sense of not caring, but rather in the stricter etymological sense of not making a distinction. This indifference is a default because it is what we should assume until we have personalised evidence that disrupts our indifference. The idea is simple: prior to someone distinguishing themselves one way or the other, we should not believe them more or less deserving of esteem than anybody else.24

The beliefs that result from demographic profiling undermine the attitudinal requirements of social equality. By harbouring antecedent beliefs about the esteem-relevant characteristics of our fellows before an individual has had the opportunity to personally distinguish themselves one way or the other, we are not providing those we encounter with a level playing field. Not only are such attitudes at odds with social equality in themselves, but they also have deleterious downstream cognitive effects. Attitudes of social equality are important because they facilitate what we can term evidential parity. Evidential parity has two parts: one concerning positive assessment and the other concerning negative assessment. Social equality demands that we ought not: (i) give members of certain groups heightened benefit of the doubt, nor (ii) tend to interpret evidence as confirming the worst about certain groups

24 See Xiaofei and Ye (forthcoming) for a recent attempt to delineate the boundary between individualised and statistical evidence.
over others. Having beliefs characteristic of profiling is in tension with these dispositions. Take a straightforward example. Suppose you believe that a member of some demographic X is, in virtue of their demographic, more likely to be a bad driver. Suppose you see them perform a careless manoeuvre. You will be primed to see this evidence as confirming your antecedent belief about their poor driving, rather than as an exception, or as an isolated event with scant evidential value. You would have the opposite reaction to the same evidence about someone whom you profile as a cautious driver. In this sense, your prior cognitive attitudes will lead you to interpret new evidence in fundamentally different ways. This draws out the connection between social equality and another valuable good, namely autonomy. The cognitive components of social equality are important because they facilitate the autonomy of those we encounter: it enables them to self-author how they are received by their fellow citizens, rather than have the reception of their behaviour coloured by prior assumptions. The foregoing considerations, I suggest, also provide an instructive diagnosis of why positive profiling is attitudinally undesirable even if it does not involve any harm to the person(s) subject to the positive profile. Just as according someone with a lofty status—such as a privileged caste—offends social equality, so does according someone with a default assumption of heightened esteem.

Of course, agreeing that there are downstream cognitive and practical harms which typically stem from profiling beliefs is separable from being persuaded that the beliefs themselves are intrinsically destructive of social equality. Although making this point is perhaps not strictly required for my overall argument, I am in fact persuaded by the stronger view: profiling attitudes are intrinsically inconsistent with the ideals of social equality. We have already discussed some suggestive cases in favour of this conclusion, namely inert profiling where there is no particular action under consideration, and positive profiling where risks to the subject of the profile may not be apparent. These, I suggest, are undesirable in their own right rather than their undesirability being contingent on any downstream effect. The following imaginative exercise, I suggest, further supports this view. Consider your ideal conception of a socially just society. Is it a matter of indifference to you whether: (i) the members of that society accord default parity of esteem between their fellows, or (ii) the members of that

society possess attitudes which rank and grade their fellows prior to encountering them, but suppress these to act in an outwardly even-handed way? Clearly, there is something about the second scenario which offends our conception of justice. The attitudes characteristic of social equality are important in virtue of being necessary for a socially just society. Profiling beliefs, in so far as they preclude the realisation of social justice, are of intrinsic disvalue.

To close, it is worth acknowledging that social equality would sometimes be served by lacking access to certain types of adverse demographic evidence. This alone may suffice to undermine recent arguments in favour of demographic differences research.26 However, the gathering and disseminating of adverse demographic evidence can serve a legitimate socio-political function. Democratic accountability is one example. The fact that some negative characteristic—for example alcoholism or criminality—is statistically prevalent within some demographic can underscore valuable criticisms of how certain groups are treated, identify public spending priorities, and measure progress between strategies for addressing problems. These critical uses of demographic evidence can ultimately be productive of social equality. Given that such evidence can serve a legitimate function, it is incumbent on us to provide a precise characterisation of how we should respond to it in our daily lives.

5. Profiling and Epistemic Neutrality

I now outline a positive response to the problem of profiling. The ambition is to vindicate a negative assessment of profiling within a traditional conception of moral and epistemic normativity—one denying the susceptibility of belief to moral evaluation, appealing only to truth-related factors in determining epistemic rationality. To develop this account, I will draw on the attitudes of epistemic neutrality.

When discussing social equality, we reflected upon the importance of not harbouring antecedent views about whether an individual is more or less likely to have certain virtues or vices before having evidence pertaining to their individual conduct. One way to avoid drawing pernicious distinctions is to suppose that is simply equally likely for any individual to possess the relevant characteristics. But this response—which may require believing against the evidence—is not the only way for attitudes to conform with social equality. In addition to

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26 For defence of demographic differences research, see Carl (2018) and Cofnas (2020).
endorsing or rejecting a proposition there is a third type of response open to us. These are the epistemically neutral attitudes.

Neutrality is different from the mere absence of any cognitive attitude. Inanimate objects lack cognitive attitudes towards every proposition without being epistemically neutral. Neutrality, as the Pyrhonians knew well, is a positive state of mind. Despite the familiarity of these neutral states, only recently has the nature and normative profile of neutrality been subjected to rigorous analysis (see Friedman {2013, 2017, 2019}, Rosa {2021}, McGrath {forthcoming}).

McGrath {forthcoming} helpfully distinguishes three different types of epistemic neutrality: agnosticism, suspension, and inquiry.

Agnosticism is having an intermediate confidence about some proposition.

Suspension is intentionally omitting judgement on some proposition, whether with a view to judging later, or to refraining from judging.

Inquiring is the goal-directed state of mind we are in when trying to answer a question.

An important desideratum for my account is that our response to profiling should not involve believing (or holding a credence) against the evidence. Agnosticism can naturally be represented as a middling credence that \( p \) or full belief that \( p \) is (roughly) just as likely as not. If there can be profiling cases involving strong evidence, agnosticism is not a promising way to stay within the bounds of purely truth-related epistemic rationality. However, the normative profile of suspension and inquiry are more distinctive. It is to these, particularly to suspension of judgement, that we should turn in responding to the problem of profiling.

Suspension of judgement is interestingly unlike other epistemic states—like full beliefs or degrees of confidence—because it involves a commitment not to endorse any particular conclusion about some question. Suspension of judgement can serve a variety of different roles. We might suspend judgement in order to continue to inquire, to postpone inquiry, or to terminate inquiry indefinitely. A lesson from recent work is that suspension is normatively distinctive. While beliefs are typically assessed against the strength of your evidence at a particular time \( t \), suspension can seemingly be justified by pragmatic factors. For example,
you might be deciding which car to purchase and the evidence at $t$ might seem to strongly favour car A over car B. But, suppose you asked a car-savvy friend for advice and see that she has just sent you a long email about the merits of the two models. It seems justifiable to suspend judgement on which car to buy until you have energy to read the email at a later point. This reason to suspend judgement does not concern how strong your evidence is at $t$, but rather the pragmatic fact that better evidence is available in the future.\footnote{There are other examples, such as where you are temporarily impaired at $t$—again, it seems justified to suspend judgement until the impairment passes. For discussion, see McGrath (forthcoming). Additional cases are provided by Schroeder (2012).} Notably, there is a sense in which you are justified in suspending judgement \textit{even if} the judgement about which car to buy, once formed, would have been epistemically justified at $t$ given the fact that the evidence strongly favoured car A over car B. Such cases suggest that the permissibility of suspending judgement is, in fairly routine cases, not undermined by the epistemic permissibility of forming a judgement on the question under discussion. For example, while we may have strong evidence that $p$ at $t$, the prospect of utterly decisive evidence whether $p$ in an hour seems to be a good reason to suspend judgement notwithstanding the epistemic permissibility of believing $p$ at $t$. The amenability of suspended judgement to non-evidential justification is further supported by the existence of pragmatic reasons \textit{not} to suspend. For instance, if matters are urgent, suspending judgement may be rendered irrational by countervailing pragmatic reasons: you must decide \textit{now} based on the evidence currently available.

I claim that not only does suspended judgement admit of pragmatic justification, but, crucially, that it also admits of \textit{moral} justification. I will illustrate with a case.

\textit{Panel.} You are browsing the dossier of a candidate you will later that day interview for an academic position. On reading the candidate’s name—James Smith—you have a nagging feeling that a philosopher with this name was embroiled in a torrid affair with a friend of yours. But you can’t be sure. You’d \textit{only} heard about this disreputable romance from someone else, via email, and the name was inessential to the conversation. Doubts creep in. James Smith is a common name. You might be mixing it up with \textit{Joe} Smith, or \textit{another} James Smith. This would easily be settled by opening your email. You know if you do make your mind up...
that it was him, then you’ll be unfairly hostile. You take your ethical responsibilities as interviewer seriously so, despite your curiosity, you decide it would be best to suspend judgement. You dwell on your doubts, then commit to stop thinking about it until afterwards, distracting yourself by opening their writing sample.

Suppose you cannot recuse yourself at this late stage. In such a case, you have a moral reason to suspend judgement on Smith’s involvement in the disreputable romance. The moral consideration, namely fairness to a job candidate, is a distinctive feature of the case. It would not be present, for instance, if you had no interviewing duties—then you would be free to make up your mind on the basis of recollection, or to check the email sent by your friend.

By focusing on moral reasons favouring suspending judgement, we capture the important data-point that an agent can be open to criticism in virtue of forming a particular belief—here, because they ignore the moral reasons in favour of suspending judgement. Holding that suspended judgement admits of moral justification is entirely consistent with it being the case that, once formed, your belief would only be assessable against the strength of the evidence supporting it. The choice whether or not to suspend judgement is a distinct locus of moral assessment, separate from supposing that the epistemic rationality of belief is encroached upon by associated moral costs, or that belief itself is a subject of moral evaluation.

Suspension of judgement, I suggest, is the appropriate response to cases in which we have only demographic statistics speaking to the likelihood of someone possessing some particular virtue, vice, or level of intelligence. Return to the Diner case. My claim is that the correct response is to suspend judgement about whether any particular diner is responsible, or even whether they are more likely to be responsible, for the theft. Suspension of judgement in the Diner case can either be permanent or temporary, depending on whether further non-statistical evidence is going to become available in the future.

The moral reasons in favour of suspension here are (at least) two-fold: there are the moral risks of exposing members of a certain demographic to undeserved heightened scrutiny, and secondly, since relational equality is an important value well-intentioned agents should be concerned with promoting, there is reason to avoid forming attitudes which are destructive
of relational equality. These are forceful moral reasons to suspend judgement. They obtain irrespective of whether the profiling belief, if formed, would be epistemically rational.\(^{28}\)

Although focusing on individual cases can make it sound as if the decision to suspend must be taken anew every time we face profiling scenarios, a better view is that we ought to adopt a default policy of suspending judgement when all we have to go on is adverse demographic information pertaining to virtue, vice or intelligence. As has been effectively explained by Bratman (1989), we often constrain deliberation in advance by committing to \(\phi\) (for example wear a seatbelt) without weighing up costs and benefits every time we face a \(\phi\)-relevant decision. Adopting such a pre-commitment to suspend judgement in profiling scenarios exhibits a standing concern for social equality. It also provides a satisfying perspective on an issue noted earlier with the risk-based moral encroachment view: namely that it seems somewhat pathological to weigh the costs and benefits of profiling every time we encounter such cases.

So, the view is that a default policy of suspending judgement is the best response to cases in which demographic statistics could support an inference as to the intelligence, virtues, or vices of a member of that demographic. This includes, under my account, both positive and negative profiles. I find it hard to conceive of legitimate exceptions to this policy with respect to these characteristics, even if it is fairly straightforward to find examples where other sorts of profiling are justified. For instance, it seems permissible for a medical practitioner to use statistical information to profile someone for a demographically prevalent illness such as sickle cell disease. Whether or not there are such exceptions for the view I have outlined here is a challenge I leave for opponents to pursue.

By way of considering three important objections, I want to end by reflecting on some broader normative issues raised by my suspension-based solution to the problem of profiling.

Firstly, since I describe judging and failing to suspend in broadly agential terms, doxastic voluntarism worries re-emerge. We should not overstate such worries. Clearly, we do suspend judgement on some questions. Regardless of whether we have direct control over our judgements, we certainly have various types of indirect control. There are many practical

\(^{28}\) The same applies even if the profiling belief would count as knowledge. For discussion of probabilistic knowledge and profiling, see Moss (2018).
ways in which we can prime ourselves to suspend: for instance, if we want to avoid forming a judgement about the misdeeds of a friend, we might interrupt a story that looks like it will paint them in a negative light. There are cognitive elements to our control too. For example, Weatherson (2008) effectively shows that we have control over our stock of beliefs since we are able to deliberately identify doubts and bring ourselves to a point of uncertainty about propositions we are weighing up. These aspects of control are evident in the Panel case—we can bring ourselves to suspend judgement by intentionally omitting to gather further evidence, and by consciously entertaining doubt. In profiling cases, it is generally easy to identify and entertain doubts apt to prime suspension of judgement. This is because any individual may easily be an exception to a statistical generalisation about the group of which they are a member. This doubt is straightforward to identify and dwell upon. Humans vary in significant and unpredictable ways, even if some adverse characteristic is predominant within a group. Indeed, the extreme variability of humans is an important difference between us and other categorizable entities such as tokens of particular type of car.

A second worry is derived from the apparent peculiarity in my view that we can morally criticise agents for failing to suspend but deny that beliefs borne from this failure to suspend are open to moral evaluation. Indeed, given that I argue that profiling beliefs are destructive of social equality, one might wonder how we can make sense of the exclusion of belief from moral evaluation.

In response, I suggest that the moral evaluation of belief is a category error. Agents can be rightly criticised for forming certain beliefs even if beliefs themselves are not a proper locus of moral evaluation. The fact that the creation and maintenance of something is assessable against a norm n does not mean that the thing itself is assessable against n. A simple example illustrates. Clearly, it would be morally better had the Falkland Islands not been strewn with landmines. Everyone can accept that. But this doesn’t mean that the landmines themselves were a locus of moral evaluation, even if their presence was morally detrimental. (Landmines have the function of exploding when stepped upon. The norms of being a good landmine are derivative of this function.) Rather, we morally evaluate the people who put the landmines there and/or the people who failed to remove them. Even if we were to felicitously call the

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29 See Munton (2020) for discussion.
30 Historical note: while this paper was under review, the Falklands were in fact finally declared landmine-free.
Falkland landmines ‘morally bad’, this would be an attenuated way of saying that it is bad that they were placed, that they were not removed, or that they are liable to have certain bad effects. It would be a category error to call the landmine itself a subject of moral evaluation. I think something similar holds for the evaluation of belief. The aim of belief is truth (or knowledge)—the norms of epistemic rationality are derivative of that aim. What is morally evaluable is choosing to manage (viz. create and maintain) your stock of beliefs in a way that evinces disregard for: (i) the importance of social equality, and (ii) downstream risky effects of holding profiling beliefs. This preserves the idea that moral evaluation only pertains to our actions, omissions, and our character. Allowing oneself to form a judgement can be a type of action—or, at least, failing to bring oneself to suspend can be a type of omission—and these are a proper locus of moral evaluation.

Finally, I want to reflect upon and forestall misunderstanding about where this paper leaves us with respect to the distinction between moral and epistemic normativity.

An initial worry is a narrow one as to whether suspension might violate some epistemic norm prohibiting believing against the evidence. My answer to this worry is that suspension of judgement is not a type of belief—it is intentionally prescinding from believing, a different type of cognitive act. So, even if the evidence in favour of the candidate belief is strong, we don’t believe contrary to the evidence if we suspend. However, recommending suspension in profiling cases does not require us to reject a normative or prescriptive reading of the idea our beliefs should aim at truth or knowledge. In so far as it is popular to endorse conditional readings of such norms—for example that the (apparent) truth of a proposition \( p \) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for being obligated to believe \( p \)—we can retain normative readings of the aim of belief while still leaving room to permit suspension of judgement.

Although my account is traditional by holding that belief is amenable only to epistemic assessment, it accommodates the thought that non-epistemic matters impinge upon the proper conduct of our doxastic lives more broadly. For example, I argue that the decision not to form a given belief can be legitimised by moral factors. So, in this sense, moral reasons

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31 This shorthand appears in other evaluative domains, e.g. we say a textbook ‘contains knowledge’ even though the textbook is not an epistemic subject.
favouring suspension can weigh on the opposite side of the scale against epistemic reasons to form a belief. However, the existence of these moral reasons bearing on how we regulate our intellectual lives is in fact entirely unsurprising, because the relevance of non-epistemic factors in such matters are routine and prevalent. This can be seen clearly with inquiry, another of the neutral attitudes. Sometimes we are justified to stop inquiring into some issue because, for example, it is bad for our health (pragmatic), or because the fruits of our inquiry will be misapplied and put to malign ends (moral). Things are much the same with suspension: it is amenable to moral and pragmatic justification. Thus, moral and pragmatic factors matter for the broader question of how we conduct ourselves as thinking agents, even though it would be a category error to say that beliefs borne from a failure to suspend are themselves a locus of moral evaluation.

6. Conclusion

Traditional views that preserve a sharp distinction between epistemic evaluation of belief and moral assessment of action and character are compatible with rejecting demographic profiling. The moral failures involved in demographic profiling can be located in the decision not to suspend judgement, rather than supposing that beliefs themselves are a locus of moral evaluation. A key moral reason to suspend judgement when faced with adverse demographic evidence is to promote social equality—explaining why positive profiling is dubious in addition to familiar cases of negative profiling and why profiling is suspect even when no particular action is at stake. This view, although compatible with revisionary normative views, does not presuppose them. Hence, philosophers of all stripes can reject demographic profiling both in thought and deed.32

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