This paper outlines an Husserlian, phenomenological account of the first stages of the acquisition of empirical knowledge in light of some aspects of Sellars’ critique of the myth of the given. The account offered accords with Sellars’ in the view that epistemic status is attributed to empirical episodes holistically and within a broader normative context, but disagrees that such holism and normativity are accomplished only within the linguistic and conceptual confines of the space of reasons, and rejects the limitation of the relevant normativity to the cognitive domain. Attention to the phenomenological notion of motivations in our mapping of the structure and acquisition of empirical knowledge reveals a form of weak categoriality given in experience, one outside exclusive mediation by language and concepts but also not merely causal.

Section 1 outlines some basic aspects of Sellars’ account of empirical knowledge in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (hereafter EPM), including a regress objection that arises due to his claim that empirical knowledge presupposes knowledge of general facts about perception. Section 2 examines Sellars’ later revisiting of the objection, via his critique of Roderick Firth, in “The Lever of Archimedes” (hereafter LA), focusing on his analysis of the “Myth of the Categorial Given” and his use of the notion of ur-concepts. Section 3 looks at Sellars’ psychological nominalism and his rejection of the explanatory primacy of experience in light of the strict dichotomy between the space of causes and the space of reasons, and shows how Firth’s account aligns with phenomenology in its advocating for an irreducible and non-inferential role for experience. It also raises an important objection to Sellars’ account concerning the categorial givenness of causality. Section 4 turns to Husserl, arguing that his conception of motivation in the *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas II* reveals a third explanatory or logical space “between” that of causes and that of reasons. Section 5 further develops this account with regard to the explanatory role of lived experience. Section 6 revisits the regress objection to Sellars from the phenomenological standpoint just developed, and argues that an Husserlian account of empirical knowledge offers a viable alternative to Sellars’ that overcomes the regress objection and gives proper explanatory weight to the evidence of lived experience vis-à-vis scientific presuppositions about causality.

Among the most frequently cited ideas of Sellars is the claim that “in characterizing an episode or state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.” This passage appears in EPM §6 in the context of Sellars’ general critique of foundationalism, which in that work takes the more specific form of a critique of sense-data theories that would seek to ground empirical knowledge in basic and self-evident experiential content.

One major undercurrent of appeals to the myth is the seeming necessity of some manner of foundationalist approach in order to account for the way that knowledge not only occurs in
experience but is in some sense grounded in it. As Sellars notes, for many philosophers, if we were to bypass this foundationalist concern in favor of a holist or coherentist antifoundationalism, we would be left with the problem of explaining how the system of interconnected beliefs or other propositional states constituting our knowledge is not only internally coherent, but also has the “epistemic authority” of direct contact with the world, and not just with other beliefs (LA, §§125-26). Coherentism risks becoming nothing more than, in McDowell’s apt phrase, “moves in a self-contained game.” The foundationalist emphasizes that if beliefs are about the world in a way that has conditions of success or failure (which they must be, since we indisputably sometimes have false beliefs), then there must be some epistemically prior level at which the world itself determines—justifies by in some sense giving as self-evident foundation—the conditions of such success or failure.

Sellars attacks this foundationalist inspiration and the specific forms of the myth of the given that it generates in the first of his 1977 Carus Lectures, which is entitled “The Lever of Archimedes.” LA is directed against a broad class of “direct apprehension” accounts of empirical knowledge, including but not limited to sense-data theories (§§125-26). In that context, it revisits, some twenty years later, important claims about the myth of the given from EPM that Sellars no longer finds satisfactory, foremost among them his response to a regress objection that can be raised against his characterization of empirical knowledge.

1. The Regress Objection to Sellars’ Account of Empirical Knowledge

The regress objection arises in response to Sellars’ insistence that, in order for an observation report about perception (“Konstatierung” in the passage below) to count as an expression of empirical knowledge, the knower not only needs observational knowledge of the particular perceptual fact at issue (the condition the traditional foundationalist is most keen to secure), but also needs knowledge of general facts of the form “X is a reliable symptom of Y”:

[T]o be the expression of knowledge, a report must not only have authority, this authority must in some sense be recognized by the person whose report it is. And this is a steep hurdle indeed. For if the authority of the report “This is green” lies in the fact that the existence of green items appropriately related to the perceiver can be inferred from the occurrence of such reports, it follows that only a person who is able to draw this inference, and therefore who has not only the concept green, but also the concept of uttering “This is green”—indeed, the concept of certain conditions of perception, those which would correctly be called “standard conditions”—could be in a position to token “This is green” in recognition of its authority. In other words, for a Konstatierung “This is green” to “express observational knowledge,” not only must it be a symptom or sign of the presence of a green object in standard conditions, but the perceiver must know that tokens of “This is green” are symptoms of the presence of green objects in conditions which are standard for visual perception (EPM, §35).

Sellars reasons that this requirement that the knower possess general facts of perceptual reliability alongside facts about particulars “requires an abandonment of the traditional empiricist idea that observational knowledge ‘stands on its own two feet’,” since such general facts could never result from individual perceptual episodes whose content is limited to particulars (EPM, §36). Hence the
claim that attributions of knowledge are not empirical descriptions. But in line with this reasoning, the requirement also threatens a regress: Sellars’ claim is that I cannot know particular perceptual facts without knowledge of general facts about perceptual reliability. But surely I cannot acquire general facts about perceptual reliability without some knowledge of prior particular perceptual instances, which would then presuppose other general facts, and so on.\textsuperscript{2}

In EPM, Sellars raises the regress objection but brushes it off in a mere two paragraphs, via the claim that, in a current state in which she possesses the requisite general facts as well as the requisite particular facts, a knower can appeal to the memory of what she now knows to have been \textit{at a prior time} reports of particular facts (but which \textit{at that previous time} were merely her exercise of “verbal habits” caused by perceptual stimuli) as the basis from which the general facts of perceptual reliability were arrived at. The general facts are thus said to be acquired via a sort of inductive reasoning on the basis of previous non-epistemic states:

\begin{quote}
[W]hile Jones's ability to give inductive reasons \textit{today} is built on a long history of acquiring and manifesting verbal habits in perceptual situations, and, in particular, the occurrence of verbal episodes, e.g. ‘This is green,’ which is superficially like those which are \textit{later} properly said to express observational knowledge, it does not require that any episode in this \textit{prior time} be characterizable as expressing knowledge” (EPM, §37, my emphasis).
\end{quote}

Sellars’s response to the regress objection relies on a temporal distinction, relative to the subject, between abilities and states of the (now) knower and of the (then) mere perceiver, on the basis of which we, as it were, “bootstrap” our way into the cognitive and epistemic domain.\textsuperscript{3} In their commentary on EPM, deVries and Triplett nicely sum up the major theoretical commitments involved in Sellars’ strategy here:

\begin{quote}
Synchronically speaking, the raw materials of which our knowledge is composed are responsive and correlational abilities that are, individually considered, noncognitive. But structured in a certain way, those abilities have cognitive properties they could not have in isolation. […] Knowledge \textit{supervenes on} states of organisms that have acquired a sufficiently complex set of such abilities. Our attributions of knowledge are normative evaluations of the states of individuals with such abilities. To insist that the individual states and abilities that furnish the empirical objects of such evaluations must themselves be epistemically evaluable individually and independently of the overall context within which they occur is simply to beg the question in favor of the given.\textsuperscript{4}
\end{quote}

Note that this response to the objection involves several important further constraints that Sellars places on any account of empirical knowledge (I will return to these in comparison with Husserl later in the paper):

(1) Holism: Sellars’ account relies on the notion that perceptual states \textit{in combination} have a cognitive status and thus may be epistemically relevant in a way that those states taken individually do not. For Sellars, having any one concept always presupposes a “whole battery of concepts of which it is one element” (EPM, §19).
Normativity: The general facts about perceptual reliability that Sellars thinks are required for perceptual knowledge alongside the perception of particulars are required insofar as they provide for a kind of normativity: they provide the conditions of success and failure against which we measure individual perceptual episodes. In order to perceive something in the visual field as green, I must have knowledge of a general fact of the form “X is a reliable symptom of greenness.” As this “perceiving-as” formulation suggests, the normativity constraint as met by knowledge of general facts can also be understood in terms of a categorial requirement for knowledge. (The issue of categoriality is dealt with further in the next section.)

Minimal perceptual basis: Implicit in Sellars’ account is the presumption that certain minimal relevant aspects of non-cognitive perceptual states as they are present precategorically in some sense inform the later, cognitive states through which we gain awareness with the help of conceptual categories. This presumption is necessary in order for Sellars to maintain that there is some sort of relationship—not an isomorphism, but a relation nonetheless—between knowledge, at the categorial level, and the (prior) basic perceptual states to which it pertains. In the terms used by DeVries and Triplett above, individual perceptual states and abilities must still somehow provide the “raw materials” that furnish the empirical objects of such evaluations.” And such furnishing is only possible on the basis of—to use Sellars own terms in the block quote above—a superficial likeness between verbal episodes in mere perception and verbal episodes that express observational knowledge. Even for the antifoundationalist, that superficial likeness must in some way be based in the perceptual states themselves, such that those states can accomplish the necessary furnishing, however sparse it may be.

The challenge is to explain such furnishing via a middle course that avoids both the Scylla of coherentism-qua-moves-in-a-self-contained-game and the Charybdis of the given. Taken too strongly, the requirement that there be some sort of relationship between the precategorial states of the (mere) perceiver and the categorial states of the knower would put Sellars back in the camp of foundationalism and a return to the myth of the given. The requirement is acceptably weakened, on Sellars account, with the proviso that the relationship between the precategorial and the categorial must be construed (1) holistically and (2) within a normative context. LA takes up these issues in light of Sellars’ dissatisfaction with EPM’s “inductive reasons” response to the regress. It attempts to give a further genetic account of the sort of proto-conceptual states and abilities of a perceiver that are the basis for the “verbal episodes” that later become inductive reasons, and thus to navigate a middle course that allows those states and abilities a certain sort of epistemic import (thus meeting constraint (3)), without ceding to them the individual and independent epistemic evaluability that would accord them such import outside the space of reasons (thus running afoul of Sellars’ commitment to (1) and (2)).

2. Ur-concepts and the Myth of the Categorial Given
Sellars constructs his revised response to the regress objection in LA via critique of a 1964 paper by Robert Firth. In “Coherence, Certainty, and Epistemic Priority,” Firth interprets C.I. Lewis’ notion of the epistemic priority according to which “statements that have independent, noninferential, warrant...serve as the ground of all the rest of our empirical knowledge,” and contrasts Lewis’ foundationalist view with several different versions of coherentism (about truth, about justification or warrant, and about concepts). On Firth’s Lewisian account, statements
about certain perceptual states or episodes serve as foundations for knowledge by means of *primitive concepts* through which we have direct awareness, independent of and prior to inferential relations.

The appeal to primitive concepts is an attempt by Firth to get around a problem that arises for foundationalist accounts that insist on the epistemic priority of “looks” concepts over “is” concepts. Such accounts insist that, from a genetic perspective, a child must acquire the concept “looks red” prior to the concept “is red,” since the child’s earliest expressions of “red” do not reliably differentiate between actual cases of red and cases where there is only the appearance of red. In Sellars’ terms, the child does not yet possess the general facts about perceptual reliability or have the (propositional) knowledge of standard conditions requisite for possession of the concept “is red.” On a coherence theory not just of justification but of concepts, Firth points out, it would be impossible to have the concept of “looks red” before that of “is red,” since insofar as they are contrasting concepts, the two would have to be acquired together.¹¹ Firth thus provides a genetic account of more primitive concepts to argue that there is, e.g., a primitive concept of red epistemically prior to both “is red” and the contrasting “looks red” (LA, §§7-11). For Firth, it is this primitive concept—what Sellars in LA calls an “ur-concept”—that serves as the foundation upon which, once they have later acquired the linguistic resources to distinguish between is-talk and looks-talk, the child can arrive at the contrasting concepts of “looks red” and “is red.”

Sellars’ criticism of Firth focuses not on the notion that such ur-concepts exist—Sellars does not deny this as a basic ontological claim¹²—but on the idea that they can somehow function noninferentially as a “lever of Archimedes,” allowing one to move up from the level of experiences as directly apprehended givens to the level of basic beliefs, and thereby to explain the way in which sense experience can serve as an ultimate justification for knowledge claims: “the fulcrum is the given, by virtue of which the mind gets leverage on the world of knowledge” (LA, §1). In light of (3) the “minimal perceptual basis” aspect of his response to the regress objection in EPM, in the later consideration of these issues in LA Sellars seeks to distance his account of perceptual knowledge from that of Firth and Lewis, which he ultimately finds guilty of the myth of the given, by arguing, in contrast to Firth, that the child has an ur-concept of “is red” genetically prior to the concept of “looks red,” and genetically prior to the (non-ur-) conceptual contrast between “is red” and “looks red.”¹³

How is Sellars’ ur-concept “is red” supposed to be better than Firth’s proto-concept “red” as attributed to an experience? Sellars’ idea is that categoriality—the status of something as something—is an *epistemic* concept, whereas what it is for that something to be a case of that something is an *ontological* concept (LA, §§152-68). The problem with theories such as Firth’s is not the presupposition of an ontological given, but the assumption that an epistemic (and thereby, for Sellars, cognitive) given comes along with it for free. They ignore the gap between something being a certain way, and the epistemic status of that something as being that way. Firth’s appeal to a primitive concept of red “prior” to the is/looks contrast is thus problematic, for Sellars, not in its appeal to a primitive concept, but in its appeal to the idea that red can be directly apprehended (self-evidently given) as an experience of red, which for Sellars presupposes (per impossible) some kind of direct, unmediated apprehension of general facts about, e.g., the reliability of experiences of color. To attribute a proto-concept of red to experiences is problematically to allow unmediated perception a kind of epistemic status it cannot have.
Expressed as a principle, the criticized view says:

[Principle of Categorial Givenness:] If a person is directly aware of an item which has categorial status C, then the person is aware of it as having categorial status C (LA, §44).

Sellars writes, “This principle is, perhaps, the most basic form of what I have castigated as ‘The Myth of the Given.’ […] To reject the Myth of the Given is to reject the idea that the categorial structure of the World—if it has a categorial structure—imposes itself on the mind as a seal imposes an image on melted wax” (LA, §§44-5, emphasis in original). The myth of the given is thus, at its core, a myth concerning the givenness of the categoriality of experience, or, in terms of the conditions highlighted above, of the idea that we can get (2) normativity directly from experience. For Sellars, experience, independent of conceptual mediation, can never provide knowledge of general facts and thus can never fulfill this categorial role, and ipso facto can never be given as playing this role. To think that it could is precisely to conceive of knowing as an “empirical description of [an] episode or state,” rather than to situate it in the space of reasons. Knowledge of such categorial facts, due to their generality, cannot be gained from singular perceptual episodes all in one go. Knowing general facts about the reliability of putative perceptions of red is a conceptual, propositional affair; it is not like a particular episode of perceiving red. So it does not make sense to analyze this sort of knowing of it in terms of a description of direct experience.

Sellars takes it that on his own account the ur-concepts involved in perception do not harbor such hidden epistemic and categorial status, insofar as he explicates the ur-concepts in relation not to experiences but to physical objects:

[W]hereas the Firthian account explicates this contrast in terms of an ur-concept of red in which it is experiences rather than physical objects which are red, the ur-concept of red which I have sketched is the concept of a redness which, along with other colors, is the very stuff of which physical objects are made. Thus my ur-concept of red is prior to the concept of a physical object's being red only in the sense in which the concept of a slab of marble is prior to the concept of a marble table (LA, §§65-66).

Sellars seems to mean that, although his ur-concept of red is genetically prior to the concept of a physical object’s being red, it is not thereby an ur-concept which attributes redness to phenomena putatively other than or prior to physical objects—phenomena such as, according to the view Sellars attributes to Firth, experiences themselves. Rather, “the concept of a red physical object is simply that of an individuated volume of red stuff which behaves in generically stuffy ways; and, specifically, in the manner characteristic of a determinate thing kind” (LA, §62). The child’s ur-concept of red, while not a concept of a property of physical objects as such, is a concept of “red stuff” that, once the child reaches a suitable degree of conceptual maturity (enters the space of reasons as a suitably mature language-user), will come to be seen as the concept of a property of physical objects. There is, for Sellars, no other viable candidate for what the concept of red could ultimately be a property of: “[T]he only available determinate concept in terms of which to grasp the redness which is somehow present in the experience, is that of redness as a physical stuff, the redness of physical objects in the spatio-temporal-causal order” (LA, §92).
This original grasp of redness in a causal register is none other than, in Sellars’ original response to the regress objection in EPM as discussed above, the “perceptual situation” which is the impetus for our “verbal episodes.” Later, once we enter the space of reasons, we recognize that situation to have provided the basis for the linguistic categoriality that allowed us to gain observational knowledge (EPM, §37, cited above). Since in the case of the child such a grasp is not yet in the space of reasons, it does not need to meet the (epistemic) justificatory requirement of the co-possession of knowledge of general facts about the perceptual reliability of red sensations under standard conditions. And yet, insofar as it is what will later come to be recognized as belonging in the space of causes, it is in an ontological sense already available to the child even though they cannot yet have knowledge of it insofar as they have not yet entered the space of reasons.

3. Psychological Nominalism, Experience, and the Causal Given
As this account implies, the central characteristic of the epistemic and cognitive domain to which categoriality belongs, according to Sellars—the domain in which we acquire general facts about perception—is its articulation via propositions and concepts. In the case of perceptions of color, to be aware of e.g., a case of blue as a case of blue requires having both the concept of blueness and the propositional knowledge that the item is blue. It is this conceptuality and propositionality that allows the case of blue to stand in an inferential relation to other conceptually and propositionally articulated items, and thus to be situated “in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says” (EPM, §37, cited above). The bare ontological fact of something being a certain way lacks this conceptual and propositional status: sensing is a nonconceptual state, a “being experienced in the mode of sensing,” whereas “taking” (i.e., taking something as something) is a conceptual state, a “being experienced in the mode of conceptualization” (LA, §§114, 144).

This connecting of categoriality and normativity to concepts and propositions, and thereby to linguistic capacities, is paradigmatic of Sellars’ “psychological nominalism”: the claim, expressed without qualification in EPM §29, that “all awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts, etc., in short, all awareness of abstract entities—indeed, all awareness even of particulars—is a linguistic affair.” Sellars justifies this position via a genetic story about “verbal behaviorism”: the idea that the intentionality and categoriality of thought is to be explained in terms of the intentionality and categoriality of language, rather than the other way around. In EPM §§ 48-50, this is presented in the myth of “Our Rylean Ancestors,” according to which the existence of inner thoughts is first posited on the basis of conceptually prior overt public linguistic behavior. According to the myth, thought is still prior to and indeed the cause of overt expressions of language ontologically, in terms of the order of being (as on the “classical view”), but it is secondary to them epistemically, in the order of conceptual explanation. While the existence of linguistic content may presuppose the existence of impressions or thoughts as its cause—as explained within the space of causes—our awareness of impressions or thoughts—in the space of reasons—is itself dependent on our language.

But what if we think—with phenomenologists—that there must be, in perceptual knowledge, a role for experience itself, which is not ultimately reducible to the propositional or conceptual content contained in inferences about experiences or to the effects of causal properties in disguise?
This, in effect, the core commitment of Firth that Sellars attacks: in allowing that there may be something like a content of experience that is neither simply causal nor already in the space of reasons, Firth is according to experience an irreducible role.

For Sellars, this means that Firth’s account ultimately presupposes the *categorial givenness of experience itself*:

> [T]he idea that our ur-concept of red is that of a manner of experiencing strikes me as most implausible. I can only account for the fact that philosophers have talked themselves into it by attributing to them the following line of thought: When a child has an experience of the kind which it is useful to baptize by saying that “O looks red to Junior,” what is really going on is that O is causing Junior to sense redly. Junior is directly aware of this sensing redly. Therefore, he is directly aware of it as a sensing redly” (LA, §43).

What is implicitly assumed in Sellars’ attribution is as revealing as what is explicitly critiqued: Sellars writes that he “can only account for” the claim he is criticizing in terms of a further *causal* claim: outside the conceptual and propositional domain of explanation in the space of reasons, the appeal to experience *simply must* amount to an explanation in which the item of experience somehow *causes* the awareness of that item as red. Given that Sellars does not deny that there is some ontological givenness in play in color perception, and yet takes it to be an error to allow apprehensions characterized by such givenness a place in the space of reasons, and thus the epistemic or cognitive domain, he places them in the only other explanatory domain he recognizes: the logical space of *causes and effects* (hereafter: “space of causes”).16

Instead of “causes,” in most of the lecture, when referring to Firth’s account, Sellars uses the broader formulation “[is] responsible for”, as in “the child believes the object to be responsible for the existence of an expanse of red, i.e., for his seeing this expanse to be an expanse of red” (LA, §53; emphasis in original). Neither the word “causes” nor its cognates occur in Firth’s original paper, so the imposition of this vocabulary is clearly Sellars’ own. He also characterizes his own account of such being-responsible more specifically in terms of causal properties.17 The explication of the object’s “responsibility” for ur-concepts in terms of causation is of a piece with Sellars’ broader commitment—most famously presented in “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man” to granting ultimate explanatory priority to the “scientific image” in terms of causal properties of scientific objects over the “manifest image” in terms of properties partly attributable to the mind.18

But this commitment to ultimately causal explanations opens Sellars’ account to an obvious challenge. Sellars finds Firth committed to the Myth of the Categorial Given in assuming that the child will have an ur-conceptual repertoire that includes the ur-concept of experience, such that the child is capable not only of experiencing red but of being aware of that experience as an experience of red.19 But Sellars also characterizes his own version of the child’s ur-concept in terms of such an as-structure: “Junior has an ur-concept of a physical object as an *individuated volume of color stuff which is endowed with certain causal properties*” (LA, §61, my emphasis).20 It would seem, then, by parity of reasoning, that Sellars’ own account would be similarly guilty of the myth of the categorial given in assuming that the child will have an ur-conceptual repertoire that includes the ur-concept of causality, such that the child is capable not only of experiencing red stuff but of being aware of that stuff as *causing* their perception of redness.
It thus appears that both Sellars and Firth presuppose the Principle of Categorial Givenness that Sellars criticizes: “If a person is directly aware of an item which has categorial status C, then the person is aware of it as having categorial status C” (LA, §44, cited above). But the ur-concept of causality is not criticized by Sellars in the same way as the ur-concept of experience he attributes to Firth: Sellars notes with approval that the attribution of a concept of causal properties to colored stuff would be “a natural move by a proto-theory uncontaminated by the Myth of the Given” (LA, §97, my emphasis).

Why this privileging of the categorial givenness of causality when that of experience has been excluded? Again, the answer ultimately leans on the space of reasons/space of causes dichotomy: there is, as such, no logical or explanatory space belonging to experience for Sellars. Thus an appeal to experience that is categorially articulated must be, at some level, a disguised appeal to an explanation that is ultimately either causal or inferential. Insofar as that experience is by definition non-inferential, Firth’s account ultimately cannot but amount, for Sellars, to a sort of disguised appeal to a causal explanation. Sellars’ own categorial appeal to causality, by contrast, wears no disguise. Insofar as that appeal is categorial, it seems that Sellars is surreptitiously allowing causality’s epistemic givenness to come along for free—no mediated apprehension of general facts about causality required.

4. The Space of Motivations
While there may be good reasons to be suspicious of Sellars’ acceptance of the myth of the categorial given in the case of causality, it may seem that, insofar as we take sense experience to rest outside the domain of explanation via inference and reason, we have no other option. But this is the case only if we reject the phenomenological appeal to experience as noted above and endorse Sellars’ exclusive dichotomy of explanatory spaces. If this is a false dichotomy, what alternatives are obscured by it? In this section I sketch the outlines of an answer by appeal to Husserl’s phenomenological account of motivation, and argue that it points to a third explanatory space.

Husserl identifies a domain of the normativity of experience outside of traditional logic and determinative judgments—that which correlates with inference and what Sellars calls the “space of reasons”—but also outside explanation in terms of law-governed nature in the sense of Sellars’ “space of causes.” Husserl first describes motivations in the Logical Investigations (hereafter LI), and expands upon the concept in later works, especially Ideas II. In LI, this domain is introduced via an analysis of signs, such as a country’s flag: when we see the flag, it serves as a mark whose intended purpose is to call to mind the nation it indicates. When this occurs for a subject—when I see the flag and think of the nation—it is experienced as motivating a belief or surmise in the reality of the other. This relation of ‘motivation’ establishes a descriptive unity among our acts of judgment in which indicating and indicated states of affairs become constituted for the thinker (First LI, §2, translation modified). Here we are in the domain of judgment, conceived as a specific type of intentional act involved in knowledge, and the relation of motivation through which the content is brought to awareness is clearly located in the domain of experience itself.
Furthermore, although Husserl takes such motivation to be an act of the subject experienced by that subject, he explicitly notes that it need not be experienced evidently or with insight [einsichtiges] by the subject—i.e., the subject need not be self-consciously aware of motivation as motivation, as this passage from the later, more-developed account of motivation in Ideas II makes clear: “In some cases it can be perceived. In most cases, however, the motivation is indeed actually present in consciousness, but it does not stand out; it is unnoticed or unnoticeable (‘unconscious’)” (Ideas II, 234). The parenthetical is not an allusion to psychoanalysis, but rather an appeal to the notion—largely developed in the period between LI and the Ideas—that intentionality is operative not only in moments of explicit (more technically: “thematic”) awareness, but also nonthematically, in the background or as part of the intentional horizon of our lived experience. One act of judgment may motivate another within this broader nexus without my being aware of this relation as motivation. And in such cases, although it is a relation between a subject’s intentional acts and constitutes content for a thinker, motivation may be said to be unconscious and non-cognitive.

At the same time, despite the fact that it is conceived as non-cognitive in this way, motivation is not conceived as an external relation of causation. This is a clear departure from Sellars, for whom “non-cognitive” essentially implies “causal” in the context of perceptual explanation. For Husserl, even if we can tell a purely physical, causal story about the way in which the flag caused me to think of the nation it indicates, this is not what we are describing when we say that our belief or surmise is motivated in our experience of the flag. In Ideas II, Husserl does refer to “motivational causality,” which suggests a relationship between motivation and causation, but the passage immediately makes clear that such motivational causality is “not real causality” and still has a “fully proper sense” (Ideas II, 227). Subsequently in the passage Husserl clearly distinguishes motivation as an intentional relation ascribed to experience from “real psychophysical process” and “all recourse to brain processes, nerve processes, etc.” (ibid, 229). Relations of motivation on Husserl’s account thus cannot be assimilated to causal relations a la Sellars’ space of causes.

But nor, for Husserl, are these phenomena thereby to be assigned to what Sellars would call the space of reasons: Already in LI, Husserl explicitly distinguishes the phenomenon of indication from “demonstration in the strict logical sense in the case of an inference which is or could be informed by insight.” Strictly logical inferences are distinguished from cases of mere indication, governed by motivation, in that logical inferences are “bound up with the fact that there is an objective syllogism or proof, or an objective relationship between ground and consequent, which corresponds to our subjective acts of inferring and proving. These ideal unities are not the experiences of judging in question, but their ideal ‘contents’, the propositions they involve” (First LI, §3, my emphasis). While motivations are introduced via an analysis of signs in the Logical Investigations, Husserl’s more-developed account in Ideas II makes clear that the unique status of relations of indication and the motivations that occur on their basis is ascribed to experience itself, rather than to the propositional and conceptual terms in which they appear in inferences. Just as there may be a corresponding causal explanation, but that is not the primary phenomenon in Husserl’s description, so may there be a corresponding explanation in terms of propositions, syllogistic inferences, and ideal conceptual contents, without that being the primary phenomenon in the description either.24
5. Experience as Given

Of course, Sellars’ distinction between the space of reasons and the space of causes is not a distinction between kinds of content, but rather between the explanatory paradigms in which we situate content. If we take motivations to delineate a third logical space, they should thus point not to a different kind of content, but to a different form of explanation—ultimately, for the purposes of this essay, a form of explanation involved in the justification of empirical knowledge. To understand how and why one might think that there is “room” for such a third explanatory space, it helps to note how Sellars’ differential treatment of experience and causality as discussed in Section 3 is rooted, ultimately, in a presumption about explanatory priority that differs radically from that of the phenomenologist.

In much contemporary philosophy of mind, inference to the best explanation has essentially come to mean inference to the best causal explanation. But this according of ultimate priority to the causal order often appears to be—to echo Wittgenstein—not a result of investigation but a requirement. The same methodological commitment to the ultimate priority of causal explanatory schemes is evident in Sellars’ privileging of the scientific over the manifest image (though Sellars does, it should be noted, go to great lengths to attempt to justify the requirement in this case), and in his well-known appeal to the scientia mensura: “In the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not” (EPM §41). For phenomenologists, by contrast, ultimate descriptive and explanatory priority is accorded to experience itself, analyzed according to distinctions that become evident via the investigation of intentionality. I contend that this is no more problematic a methodological starting point than Sellars’ antecedent commitments to the priority of causal and ultimately scientific explanation or to the complete linguistic and conceptual mediation of thoughts and impressions. (It is, I think, significantly less problematic, but I won’t argue for that stronger claim here.)

The key to defending this contention is to make plain both the full theoretical weight phenomenologists accord to experience and its intentional structure, and what motivates this methodological stance. Note first that the central notion, on an Husserlian phenomenological account, is experience, rather than perception more narrowly construed. While perception is the paradigmatic case of experience, for Husserl the content of an experience is not strictly synonymous with perceptual content, both because there can be non-perceptual experiences (such as rememberings and imaginings) and—especially important in this context—because even perceptual experiences involve nonthematic horizonal and anticipatory contents that are not directly perceived (more on this below).

Furthermore, experience is analyzed ultimately in intentional rather than conceptual or linguistic terms. On the Husserlian account I am sketching, intentional acts themselves, rather than language, are the ultimate vehicle of content, and that content is best understood outside traditional externalist and internalist paradigms, not in terms of mental states, but in terms of lived experiences. The meaning of our judgments about our lived experiences, upon phenomenological analysis and reflection, may appear conceptually and propositionally, and in that sense they may be said to belong to what Sellars calls the space of reasons, but the judgings themselves (“experiences of judging”) are acts belonging to experience. For Husserl, as the above discussion
of motivations shows, judgings may be analyzed on their own experiential terms, independently of the categories of rationality or causality. Such analysis focuses not on propositions or concepts but on the intention-fulfillment structure of intentional acts. It is this domain in which the content of empirical knowledge is ultimately given—in which the mind connects with the world.

How can an intentional act constitute a domain of givenness? According to Husserl’s later, transcendental account of intentionality, as developed beginning in the *Ideas*, intentionality is not a property of an “inner” mental state, nor of an “outer” perceptual cause of our ideas, but rather the co-relational structure of experience itself, on the basis of which we distinguish inner from outer. From the standpoint of phenomenological description, we do not first have “inner” mental states that only then get related to external objects via representations. Nor do we first have external objects that in special cases are related to mental states by causing them. The “first thing” is the correlation itself. Rather than antecedently construing this as a relation between inner and outer episodes, Husserl in his later work considers it to be a fundamental co-relation that can be further analyzed, in phenomenological reflection, from the side of the subject (in Husserl’s terms: noetically) or from that of the object (noematically). It is on this basis that Husserl will later flesh out his claim from LI, noted above, that motivations are ultimately responsible for the “descriptive unity among our acts of judgment in which indicating and indicated states of affairs become constituted for the thinker” (First LI, §2). The “rays” through which intentional acts structure and give meaning to experience can be analyzed in both directions—from noesis to noema (“subject to world”), but also from noema to noesis (“world to subject”):

Apprehensions of things and of thingly nexuses are “webs of motivation:” they are built through and through from intentional rays, which, with their sense-content and their filled content [Sinnes- und Füllegehalte], refer back and forth, and they let themselves be explicated in that the accomplishing subject can enter into these nexuses (Ideas II, 236).

Compare this to Sellars account, cited above, of an ur-concept pertaining to color as an “individuated volume of red stuff which behaves in generically stuffy ways; and, specifically, in the manner characteristic of a determinate thing kind.” Whereas for Sellars, outside the space of reasons, the ultimate priority of ur-concepts is accorded to physical objects, for Husserl, as for Firth, it is accorded to the experiences through which objects (physical or not) appear with sense. Husserl’s account of intentionality as a correlation, rather than a unidirectional relation, means that the noema (in the case we have been examining, the state of affairs the child experiences that motivates our adult conception of “looks red”) is as much responsible for the content of the experience as any putatively linguistically or conceptually mediated noetic contribution from the side of the subject. And that responsibility is genuinely constitutional—contributive of content—and not merely causal. It is experience itself that is given.

6. The Regress Objection Revisited
But is not Husserl’s account then committed to the myth of the given? To answer this question, it will be useful to compare aspects of Husserl’s account with the three aspects of Sellars’ account identified in my treatment of his response to the regress objection in Section 1. First, as Husserl emphasizes in the passage above, motivations are always situated in a broader intentional “field” or “space”: they do not occur in isolation, but rather in holistic “nexuses,” horizons, or “webs” of
correlational intentionality. In effect, Husserl’s account of the epistemic role of perception is holistic, in a way that parallels constraint (1) in Sellars’ account noted above, but with a crucial difference: for Husserl such holism is already operative “below” the level of propositions or concepts, in the content of lived experience itself, such that epistemic import is not only not limited to the thematic or cognitive domain, but is also possible independent of linguistic mediation.

Second, the space of motivations is, like Sellars’ space of reasons, normative, and Husserl’s account thus meets constraint (2). As I have argued at length elsewhere, Husserl’s later phenomenology recognizes a version of what Hannah Ginsborg in dubs “primitive normativity”: a form of normativity operative directly in embodied perceptual experience, below the level of our language and concepts, and paradigmatically exhibited in the child’s pre-linguistic and pre-conceptual but still meaningful responsiveness to the world. In terms of the example of the perception of color, on Husserl’s account, the child does not need conceptual or linguistic mastery, and does not need to see (or “take”) a state of affairs “as” anything, in a conceptual or propositional sense, in order to implicitly anticipate, that, e.g., the backside of an object will look roughly the same as the front, or that it will not suddenly stop appearing to their eyes (via what adults would categorize as color perception, with its attendant general facts and propositionally articulated norms) and begin appearing to their ears (via what we would categorize as sound perception). If the child’s experiential awareness suddenly shifted from seeing an object to hearing one, without another interceding visual experience such as another object obscuring the view or the closing of the eyes, the child would not think that the visual object suddenly became a sonic one, but rather that she was now experiencing a different object. On the view I am advocating, this change in the child’s thinking (a change in intentional acts as governed by their horizons) is explained not inferentially, in terms of the norms entailed by the child’s system of propositions or concepts (indeed, they may not even have acquired the requisite battery of concepts or capability to hold propositionally structured beliefs), but motivationally, in terms of norms given in embodied perceptual experience itself.

Such norms affect our experience by modally structuring what Husserl calls “anticipation” [Antizipieren]: “the change of apperceptive sense takes place through a change of the expectation-horizon of the multiplicities anticipated as normal (i.e., as running on harmoniously).” Such anticipation may remain non-thematic, and in that sense may not feature among the explicitly recognizable contents of perception, but it is nonetheless present in experience and mediates it in the sense of partially determining our future perceptual possibilities:

If the sense of a thing is determined by the instances of givenness of the perception of it… then it… necessarily refers us to continuously unified connections of possible perceptions that extend from any implemented perception in infinitely many directions in a systematically and firmly rule-governed manner, and, to be sure, in each direction without end, constantly dominated by a unity of sense.

On the Sellarsian account, of course, such normative structuring cannot be unpacked in terms of anything but our language and concepts as the sole structurers of the content of our experience, and that normative structure will, qua linguistic, be located in the space of reasons. The only alternative, for Sellars, is explanation in terms of the non-normative, non-cognitive, and ipso facto
causal. And causal explanations, as non-epistemic, are not capable of accounting for the normativity necessary for knowing.

The Husserlian account differs in that, as noted above, such normative structuring is ultimately unpacked in terms of intentional acts, and insofar as the structuring or determining relation itself is explained neither causally nor inferentially, but motivationally: “The unity of motivation is a nexus founded in the relevant acts themselves, and when we inquire into the ‘because,’ into the grounds of a personal behavior, we seek to know nothing but precisely this nexus” (Ideas II, 241). This nexus belongs to experience itself, and is thus ultimately explained via appeal to the space of motivations, even if our accounts of it are expressed in and refined with the help of our language and concepts, and even if the patterns of behavior pertaining to it, viewed third-personally, can be explained naturalistically in causal terms by our best natural science.

Does this analysis of normative structuring outside the space of reasons amount to an appeal to experiencing-as, and thus rely on the sort of categoriality that Sellars has ruled out in his critique of the myth of the categorial given? Yes and no.

It does, in the sense that motivational contents are more than just causal phenomena: the Husserlian conception of the normative function of anticipations in perceptual experience shows that they do in some way present the world as given and as categorially structured in a weak sense. The child may be said to be aware of red even if they are not aware of it as red (in the Sellarsian sense that they have mastery of the concept (or the ur-concept) red), insofar as, outside the space of reasons, they still have norm-governed perceptual experiences and not simply causally governed behavioral responses to states of affairs that adults would characterize in terms of redness. Anticipations play the normative epistemic role that Sellars assigns to the (for him conceptual and propositional) knowledge of general facts about perception, such as its reliability under standard conditions. They guide our sense-making and are thus epistemically relevant, but they do not present the world as structured categorially in the stronger Sellarsian sense according to which categorial structuring is a linguistic, conceptual, or propositional affair belonging to the context of inferential justification.44

Nor does this account conflict with our commonsense intuition that our adult (conceptually or linguistically mediated; cognitive) conception of the same state of affairs is in a sense more refined than the child’s. Pace Sellars, the child may not be able to make inferences on the basis of that state of affairs in ways that we would expect of an adult perceiver fully initiated into our linguistic and perceptual norms. But motivations do not cease to be relevant upon our achievement of adult conceptual and linguistic mastery. In order to be able to accept that, as adults, we may have more refined conceptions as a result of perceptual experiences, we must accept some more primary level of conception which is open to refinement.45

This shows how the phenomenological account I have been sketching answers to constraint (3) identified in Sellars’ response to the regress objection. For it retains the idea that certain minimal relevant respects of perceptual states as they are present precategorically (in the sense of being prior to conceptually or propositionally articulated categories, as for the child) are retained or translated into the explanation of those states of which we are later aware with the help of conceptual

Rump, “The Space of Motivations, Experience, and the Categorial Given” 14
categories, thus avoiding the problem of an internally consistent but empty coherentism that fails to make contact with the world.

But the later Husserl’s account still recognizes an underlying normativity that we can think of as a sort of “proto-“ or “anticipatory” categoriality; it is still epistemically relevant in its (admittedly sparse) furnishing of the sort of primitive normativity necessary to get the game of knowledge off the ground. Contra Sellars, the fact that the child may not be able to locate a state of affairs in the space of reasons does not force an explanation of the child’s actions as no more than non-epistemic “behavior” or their utterances as mere “verbal behavior” in a separate space of causes. The child is already making sense of the world, and not just being causally influenced by it, in that the fulfilment (or non-fulfilment or frustration) of intentional acts still motivates additional thoughts and bodily actions in a way that the underlying states, considered as purely physical phenomena rather than as experiences, do not cause. The child’s awareness may be motivated without them being aware that it is motivated, and without them being aware of the experience as an experience. The motivation remains in this sense non-cognitive (but not thereby causal), even if it is only genetically later, on reflection, and when equipped with linguistic mastery and the requisite conceptual repertoire, that the child can recognize it as such.

How does this version of the claim that a conceptual as-structure is imposed on perception only later fare any better than that offered by Sellars in his “inductive reasons” response to the regress in EPM, (which, as noted above, he eventually came to regard as unsatisfactory, leading him to revisit the issue in LA)? The Husserlian version of the claim does not rule out that the child’s awareness now or in its “living present” is already legitimate form of awareness. It is not yet categorial awareness, in the strong Sellarsian propositional or conceptual sense, and is not yet thematic or reflective awareness that will issue in propositional knowledge claims, but it is still “awareness” in the sense of being a form of normative responsiveness not reducible to natural-scientific or causal criteria. Accepting that there can be such awareness goes hand in hand with accepting an explanatory space of motivations.

Indeed, Sellars himself might be interpreted as moving in such a direction, insofar as, in his later revisiting of the regress objection in LA, his account of awareness no longer appears to be so strictly limited by the notion of the space of reasons. As opposed to the unqualified characterization of all awareness as linguistic in EPM, in LA §154 he allows that, e.g., a case of “blue experience” “may in some justifiable sense be… a blue awareness” (my emphasis). The Husserlian account that I have offered above may be understood as justifying precisely this sense by further attention to the intentional structure of experience itself as explained or described via the space of motivations.

Conclusion
The above phenomenological sketch of the first stages of the acquisition of empirical knowledge agrees with Sellars in the “abandonment of the traditional empiricist idea that observational knowledge ‘stands on its own two feet’.” It rejects the givenness of perceptual particulars that are epistemically relevant independently and individually, and it accords with Sellars in the view that epistemic (as opposed to merely ontological) status is only to be (1) accorded holistically, and (2) within a normative context. But it disagrees that such holism and such normativity are
accomplished only within the linguistic and conceptual confines of the space of reasons, and it rejects the limitation of normativity to the cognitive domain. When our mapping of the epistemic role of perception is opened up to include a space of motivations—as distinguished from both the space of reasons and the space of causes—it becomes clear how, while general or categorial facts necessary for knowledge could never result from individual and independent perceptions, whose content is limited to particulars, the requisite categoriality may still be given in the broader context of intentional lived experience, which provides (3) the minimal perceptual basis necessary for our empirical knowledge to be not only internally consistent, but also more than a set of moves in a self-contained game.

With these Husserlian modifications, the regress that threatened Sellars’ account of empirical knowledge dissolves: It may indeed be the case, as Sellars argues, that empirical knowledge requires both a categorial component pertaining to general facts about the reliability of perception, and a particular component pertaining to individual perceptual episodes. But if these sorts of knowledge arrive on the scene together, in the primacy of experience, then the regress generated by the conflicting claims of epistemic primacy does not get off the ground. The notion that they could not arrive on the scene together except as mediated by language was the result of Sellars insistence that categorial knowledge must take cognitive and conceptual or propositional form; his psychological nominalism; and his reliance on the space of reasons/ space of causes dichotomy. But from the phenomenological perspective outlined here, these were not results of investigation but assumed requirements. I have argued for the rejection of these requirements and the embrace, instead, of a third explanatory space evident in experience itself—the space of motivations. It seems to me that we can accept givenness in this space as a result of investigation rather than a mere requirement with at least as much right as we can the givenness of causality.

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1 McDowell 1996, 5.
2 EPM, §36; Cf. O’Shea 2007, 127ff.
3 For a defense of Sellars from “epistemic bootstrapping,” see O’Shea 2007, 128ff.
4 deVries and Triplett 2000, 103.
5 A similar claim is in the background of Fales’ (1996) critique of Sellars on this point for ultimately relying on justifications from memory. Fales argues that memories must themselves count as a form of noninferential knowledge: they must amount to knowledge since it is not enough for such memories to be mere beliefs about previous perceptual episodes, and that knowledge must be noninferential since the genetic role it plays in Sellars account is such that there can be no prior knowledge (133ff).
6 Cf. O’Shea’s (2007) claim that for Sellars there must be some kind of “superficial similarity” between the child’s proto-perceptions and the adult’s perceptions based on “intrinsically similar sensations” (128).
7 For more on this idea, see McDowell 2009.
8 This is the crux of DeVries and Triplett’s (2000, 101ff.) defense of Sellars against the objection from Fales referred to in a note above. I am not convinced that appeal to these two aspects ((1) and (2) in my treatment) are enough to save Sellars from this objection, for reasons that are implicit in the phenomenological position developed below, but which I cannot further discuss directly here.
9 The idea that LA can be seen as a revisiting of Sellars response to the regress appears in O’Shea 2007, 125-36. My account in the following paragraphs is indebted to his discussion, though I disagree with his evaluation of Sellars’ success on this point, for reason that will become clear below.
10 Firth 1964, 557, 546.
11 Firth 1964, 547.
As Christias (2014, 361) notes, "The space of reasons is a logical space whose 'objects' are concepts (propositions, beliefs) that stand in normative (material inferential) relations to each other," while "the space of causes is a logical space whose 'objects' are non-conceptual, non-normative states of affairs that stand in non-normative relations to one another." Sellars uses the phrase "space of reasons" in EPM (§36) but not the term "space of causes," though it does appear in later works. While the notions of inference and logic are not identical, due to their closeness, to avoid confusion, I prefer the adjective "explanatory" to "logical" as a general descriptor the different spaces at issue, only one of which is inferential.

See, for example, LA, §§47, 58, 97.

Sellars, 2007c. See also LA, 242, note 6, where Sellars specifically frames the child's proto-theory as a manifest image conception.

See LA, §48. This is the most charitable interpretation of Sellars' reading of Firth. At other points in LA (including, arguably, §43, quoted above) he attributes to Firth the much stronger "adverbial" view that the redness is actually a property of the experience.

The awkward phrasing of "which is endowed with…" might be seen as an attempt to get around the sort objection I am raising, insofar as it could be taken to place the final phrase outside the scope of the "as" clause ("…as an individuated volume of color stuff [and that object/stuff, independent of how it appears to the child] is endowed with certain causal properties"). But a reading of that phrase as within the scope of that as-clause seems more natural, and better fits with its placement as only the third step (and the first containing an "as"-clause) in the genetic progression Sellars outlines as an alternative to that of Firth in LA §61.

Cf. Alston's (2002, 81ff.) critique of Sellars' appeal to a strict distinction between causal and justificatory relations.

The notion that the phenomenological account of motivation might point to a sort of third explanatory or logical space has already received some attention in the literature, but primarily with a focus on Merleau-Ponty (Dreyfus 2005, Wrathall 2005, O'Conaill 2013, O'Conaill 2014). In what follows, I focus instead on Husserl's account of motivation, which differs in important respects (Carman 1999). For another recent treatment of Husserl on motivation (though not specifically as constituting an explanatory logical space), see Walsh 2017.

This of course does not rule out motivations standing in close relation to reason. As Husserl puts it Ideas II, reason need not "reign" in motivations, but it is not excluded either (Ideas II, 232). Cf. O'Conaill (2014) on way in which reason may be involved in the space of motivations.

Meixner 2016, 400.


This is one important point of difference between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Whereas Merleau-Ponty may be said to further unpack the phenomenological fidelity to experience by broadening the notion of perception, Husserl may be said to do the same by insisting—especially in his later work—that the account of experience—even perceptual experience—must be widened to include elements beyond perception strictly construed.

Alweiss 2009.

For Husserl's account of the role of reflection in the phenomenological method and its relationship to language and predication, see Rump forthcoming.

To put the point differently, for Husserl the theory of meaning is ultimately a theory of intentionality, which encompasses but is not limited to a philosophy of language, whereas for the analytic tradition to which Sellars belongs, both meaning and intentionality are subtopics within the philosophy of language.

See Hopp 2011 for a detailed defense of the Husserlian notion that fulfillment stands at the center of perceptual knowledge.

Drummond 2012.


LA, §62.

For Husserl's conception of Sinn as a primary level of meaning, as distinguished from linguistic meaning (Bedeutung)—a view I argued was developed between LI and the Ideas, and which became central to Husserl's later work—see Rump 2018.
31 Rump 2021.
32 See the explanation of Husserl’s technical sense of “anticipation” below.
33 This is because there is a basic or “primitive” normativity built into lived experience itself, even in non-linguistically mediated modes. This normativity is indeed still intersubjective, but it arises from a context of social practices and embodied habits, including, but by no means limited to habits of speaking and writing (Rump 2021).
34 While I further unpack this claim below with reference to Husserl’s conception of anticipation, it should be noted that it could also be explained via his conception of pre-conceptual types. Husserl’s type-theory is, in many ways, the more apt point of comparison with Sellars on ur-concepts as discussed above, but explication of this important notion would exceed the scope of this essay. For a recent account of Husserl on types, see Diaz 2020.
35 Crisis, 162. For the connection to the holistic criterion identified above, see Husserl’s discussion in Cartesian Meditations of “a multiform horizon of unfulfilled anticipations” (CM, 61ff).
36 See my claim above that for Husserl the contents of perception do not exhaust the contents of experience.
37 Husserl 2014, 78, my emphasis. Compare Sellers’ claim in PH, 334-335, that “the phenomenal world, thus conceived, of public physical objects, sounds, flashes, etc., exhibits a lawfulness which is formulative in phenomenal terms, i.e., in terms of the directly perceptible qualities and relations of these objects.”
38 As non-conceptual and non-propositional, the conception of “epistemic” invoked here corresponds most naturally with an anti-intellectualist conception of knowing-how. My characterizations below of the child’s anticipatory awareness as broadly epistemically relevant may be taken in the same vein, Sellars may be said to anticipate this sort of response to his position when he claims, in EPM, that the issue cannot be solved by an appeal to knowing-how as opposed to knowing-that (1997, §36). I do not have space to address this response here, but would like to note it in passing as a locus for continued work on this issue, for which it would be particularly important to sort out the difference between conceptual and propositional epistemic contributions in a way I have not been able to here.
39 Cf. Firth’s description of the child’s maintaining of primitive concepts even upon acquisition of more sophisticated ones (Firth 1964, 547-48).
40 Cf. Drummond 2003.
41 Compare Brandom’s (2000, 48) characterization of the relevant kind of awareness in terms of “conceptual classification.”
42 “All awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts, etc., in short, all awareness of abstract entities—indeed, all awareness even of particulars—is a linguistic affair.” EPM, §29 (cited above).

Works Cited