The Greek Sources of Heidegger’s *Alētheia* as Primordial Truth-experience

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**Abstract:** Heidegger develops his reading of *a-lētheia* as privative un-concealment (*Unverborgenheit*) in tandem with his early phenomenological theory of truth. He is not simply reinterpreting a word, but rather reading Greek philosophy as having a primordial understanding of truth which has itself been concealed in interpretation. After shedding medieval and modern presuppositions of truth as correspondence, the existential truth-experience shows itself, no longer left puzzlingly implicit in unsatisfactory conventional readings of Greek philosophy. In *Sein und Zeit* §44, Heidegger resolves interpretive difficulties in Parmenides through his interpretation of *alētheia* and philologically grounds this reading in Heraclitus’s description of the unconcealing *logos*. Although this primordial sense of the word has already been obscured in Plato and Aristotle, the structural gradation of their theories of truth conserves the primordial pre-Socratic sense of truth as the experience of unconcealment.

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When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial ‘sources’ [den ursprünglichen “Quellen”] from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn. (GA 2: 29/SZ 21)

Heidegger’s reading of \( a \)-\( lētheia \) in a privative, etymological sense of \( Un \)-\( verborgenheit \), “uncoveredness,” has been cause for controversy among philosophers and philologists alike.\(^1\) In the complexities of this debate, it is quite easy to overlook the adjective in the phrase which describes Heidegger’s theory of truth in \( Sein und Zeit \) §44: das ursprüngliche \( Phänomen der Wahrheit \), the primordial truth-experience.\(^2\) In the passage of time the wellspring of original meaning goes dry, covered over by secondary interpretation. The task of destroying the history of ontology Heidegger lays out in §6 \( Sein und Zeit \) thus informs and inspires Heidegger’s reading of \( alētheia \) as \( a \)-\( lētheia \). The hermeneutic task of historical investigation is analogous to the broader uncovering of the truth-experience. Both require us to return to the primordial origin, the source prior to its derivative manifestations. Taking this cue from Heidegger himself, we would do best to understand his reading of \( alētheia \) by looking to its earliest development. The pronouncements on the Greek sense of truth in \( Sein und Zeit \) will seem peremptory and unjustified to whoever does not trace Heidegger’s etymology back to his interpretive readings of the Greek texts themselves. Heidegger’s own primordial truth-experience of \( alētheia \) as \( a \)-\( lētheia \) occurred in and through his direct encounter with substantial interpretive problems in Greek thought.

I will first lay out most of the relevant features of Heidegger’s primordial truth-experience independently. I will then demonstrate how this idea directly proceeds from Heidegger’s readings of Parmenides and Heraclitus, who present truth as existing alongside untruth. The pre-Socratic experience of truth is the experience of a gradual, never completed uncovering of beings hidden in the \( lēthē \), in concealment.
This primordial, always ongoing truth-experience leaves a deep structural impression, however implicit, upon the apparently more binary, rigidly formal theories of truth in Plato and Aristotle.

I. HEIDEGGER’S VOCABULARY OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL TRUTH

Truth as a-lētheia will occupy the empty space Heidegger has cleared by his objection to the correspondence theory of truth. In Sein und Zeit §44, Heidegger gives a brief history of the theory. Aristotle lays the groundwork for the attempt to draw a correspondence between mind and world with his claim that the experiences of the soul are homoiōmata, “likenesses” of things. Aquinas develops this idea in Aristotle and determines that truth should be an adaequatio of these two factors, a correspondence of mind and fact. The theory remains in the modern age, untouched even by Kant. Heidegger objects to the correspondence theory because it attempts to relate an ideal kind of being (intellectus) to a real kind of being (res). Judgement is a real act, an assessment of entities, but its content remains ideal. An ontological clarification of intellectus is needed to posit any relation of mind and thing, but precisely such a clarification is lacking (GA 2: 284–88/ SZ 214–17).

Phenomenology begins with this buried question, the question of how truth presents itself phenomenally, in the existential being which belongs to Dasein. Heidegger presents phenomenology as the necessary method of ontology in Sein und Zeit §7. The phenomenological truth is a disclosure of Being (Erschlossenheit von Sein) which is nothing less than the transcendental truth (veritas transcendentalis) which has evaded metaphysics (GA 2: 51/SZ 38). In Heidegger’s description of the Wahrheitsphänomen, the truth-experience, the phenomenological method acquires an epistemic scope, as it lets “that which shows itself [ta phainomena] be seen from itself [apophainesthai] in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” (GA 2: 45–47/SZ 34–35). This “showing itself” is truth as a phenomenon, the immediate and immanent moment of realization that arises in the truth-experience.
Contrary to most modern thinking on the subject, truth is not merely a property of depersonalized propositions. In a helpful example in *Sein und Zeit* §44, Heidegger asks us to consider a man who, with his back turned, asserts that a picture hanging on the wall is askew. He then turns around and sees that this is indeed the case. Though the original proposition is “true,” the truth-experience only arises in the confirmation of the proposition, the moment when it shows itself as true (GA 2: 287–89/sz 217–18). This truth-experience is distinct from the truth of a proposition. We can make true statements without knowing them in their truth, without having a truth-experience, as, for instance, in the case of hearsay. Moreover, as Sean McGrath points out, not every true statement is a confirmation of some verifiable external fact. Purely existential assessments such as “Peter is a true friend” are only verifiable “through action in an inter-subjective situation.” ³ Heidegger discusses truth at this pre-propositional level of its phenomenal recognition.

Dasein’s capacity for discovering and describing the truth, phenomenally or propositionally, cannot be divorced from its world-contexture, its being-in-the-world. ⁴ It is through the world that beings become open and closed to Dasein, and so Dasein’s access to beings is described through varied forms of the German word *schließen*, “to close.” Disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*) is the aspect of Dasein’s being-in-the-world crucial for Heidegger’s account of truth as discovered within the world. The philosophical tradition has recognized this disclosedness, but only in problematically metaphysical terms. In Descartes, this existential-ontological structure of Dasein was figuratively described as something ontic, and termed our *lumen naturale*, the illumination natural to being a human. But for Heidegger, the metaphor of inherent human enlightenment must be replaced with a more active, verbal metaphor of “closing” which more richly captures the complexity of existential being. In being open to the phenomena, Dasein practices an always already established familiarity with its factical world. Dasein “carries in its ownmost Being the character of not being closed off [Unverschlossenheit]” (GA 2: 177/sz 135). Disclosing indicates the character of beings as being “laid open” (*Aufgeschlossenheit*) within Dasein’s world (GA 2: 101/sz 75).
On the other side of the schließen metaphor, Dasein’s openness and access to its world is equally its enclosure therein. Dasein’s being is wholly contained within its world. In Sein und Zeit §28, Heidegger equates disclosedness with the etymology of Da-sein itself. The “there” is the disclosure which always comes along with Dasein. “By its very nature, Dasein brings its ‘there’ along with it. If it lacks its ‘there,’ it is not factically the entity which is essentially Dasein… Dasein is its disclosedness” (ga 2: 177/sz 133). This same formulation of Dasein as its disclosedness also appears in the truth-experience discussion in Sein und Zeit §44. “In so far as Dasein is its disclosedness essentially, and discloses and uncovers as something disclosed to this extent it is essentially ‘true’. Dasein is ‘in the truth’” (ga 2: 292/sz 221). The there of Da-sein is the world “in” which Dasein exists, and the world is the experiential context for the truth which Dasein is always underway at uncovering. Dasein is also known to itself through its disclosure, in which neither subject nor object has priority. The middle-voice form of the Greek apophainesthai likewise suggests only a “showing itself” without any prior one-sided commitment to a subject “having” an experience and objectifying the phenomenon.5 The understanding of the world and the understanding of Dasein happen together, in a single phenomenon, the “co-disclosure [Miterschlossenheit] of the self” (ga 24: 225/158).

As we open ourselves to and close ourselves off from our world, the phenomenological interpretation of truth shows itself to be full of rich connotations of a constant, inseparable interplay between what modern philosophy had set apart as a distinct subject and object. Graeme Nicholson claims that the description of epistemology in new terms like “the open” and “unconcealment” offers “some guarantee or hope that human inquirers can find the truth” by “suggesting the motion we and our object can make toward one another, with the hope of meeting and merging.”6 Operating on a psychological as well as philosophical level, the description of truth as a disclosure implies a certain intimacy, as when we disclose sensitive information to select company. We are on terms of the closest familiarity with the “there” – through the ecstatic projection of temporality, Dasein is the there. On a more physical level,
the root verb schließen connotes a shutting in, an enclosure, a locked-in quality accessible only to the one who has the keys, die Schlüssel. We ourselves are encased within a world of beings, which we, in turn, have the inherent capability to dis-cover (ent-decken).

In the second division of Sein und Zeit, the schließen metaphor will be still further developed, as the most primordial truth of Dasein is its authenticity, in which “resoluteness [Ent-schlossenheit] has caught up the possibility of death into its potentiality-for-Being” (GA 2: 407/sz 307). Of all the realities which Dasein may uncover as true, holding death for true (das Für-wahr-halten des Todes) is “more primordial than any certainty which relates to entities encountered within-the-world” and so “demands Dasein in the full authenticity of its existence” (GA 2: 351–52/sz 265). Dasein realizes the truth of its existential disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) by ceasing to be at all closed off (verschlossen).

In the phenomenon of resoluteness, Dasein fully recognizes its limitation in the moment it leaves it behind, experiencing an impassioned “freedom towards death [Freiheit zum Tode] – a freedom which has been released of the illusions of the ‘they,’ and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious” (GA 2: 353/sz 256). Insofar as we can say that Heidegger has a “criterion” by which truths are more or less primordial, the uncovering of any other truth must be less primordial than this authentic resoluteness, which uncovers Dasein itself as fully free.

The most authentic truth-experience does not correspond to any external state of affairs at all. It is rather Dasein’s own coming to terms with itself. Holding death for true is the self-recognition of the existential basis for any other holding as true. It is the truth-experience of realizing our being as a whole, of recognizing our world in its finite disclosure and ecstatic temporal unity. This most primordial truth-experience uncovers the existential basis underlying any other truth-experience.

One may criticize Heidegger for resorting to novel metaphors in this description, but these are metaphors with a profound point. Finding the truth is not an exercise in evaluating a correspondence relation, but an existential practice. As such a practice, it will never have the definite, binary character assumed in the correspondence theory. The
immediate, a-historical access to beings required for such a correspondence is simply unattainable. Even the most authentic truth-experience of resolute Freiheit zum Tode always occurs in an existential context of Dasein’s having fallen into das Man. Heidegger’s own attempt to reach a primordial Greek sense of truth occurs in a socio-historical context in which millennia of “the they” have commented upon and thereby covered over the original phenomena which the Greeks were first encountering. This distance from the original is not the product of inaccurate scholarship, but an inevitable part of our nature as temporal beings whose insights are always mediated through personal and historical time. Beings are in fact always, to some degree, in a state of concealment (verborgen) and must be uncovered as “a kind of robbery” (GA 2: 294/SZ 222).

II. WORLD-DISCLOSURE OF UNTRUTH WITH TRUTH

But why should this existential truth-experience require any sort of robbery? Here Heidegger’s metaphors lead us into his reading of αλήθεια as Unverborgenheit, “unconcealment.” Before turning to the Greeks, I will first describe unconcealment purely in Heidegger’s own terms. It can first be understood as a necessary consequence of the phenomenological method. Just as the phenomenologist recognizes what shows itself, he or she must also recognize that this showing itself is not exhaustive, comprehensive, or absolute. This methodological humility seeks to avoid overstepping its bounds in the traditional dogmas of metaphysics, and so makes space for what is not known alongside its positive claims. For this reason the question of the covering-up of beings appears in the exposition of phenomenology itself in Sein und Zeit §7, where Heidegger establishes that covered-up-ness “is the counter-concept [Gegenbegriff] to the ‘phenomenon’” (GA 2: 48/SZ 36). Phenomenology, as the study of what shows itself, must acknowledge that it always works alongside what remains invisible.8

The ways in which beings may be covered up are as varied as the ways in which they show themselves. They may be forgotten, buried
over, or deliberately disguised; they may be covered up only contingently or necessarily, as part of how they present themselves by their very nature. Since showing-itself is always embedded in the flow of experience, which at times accents some beings and obscures others, neither the clarity nor the concealment of beings is ever permanent. This concealment does not pertain to any special obscurity of the entity, but rather to Dasein’s world contexture. In his discussion of equipment in Sein und Zeit §16, Heidegger emphasizes that ready-to-hand equipment, which is ontically nearest to Dasein, remains covered-up as an objectified, present-to-hand entity, only becoming conspicuous in its absence (GA 2: 101/SZ 75). When we realize that we are most blind to what is nearest, concealment is understood not as some obfuscating inaccessibility, but as Heidegger intends, as the blind shadow of our everyday existentiell experience. The world in concealment is nothing more than the glasses sitting on our nose which go unnoticed until they have gone missing.

The concealment of beings can also be understood through the analytic of Dasein, whose world is disclosed as both an opening up and closing-off. The disclosure of Dasein’s world in its facticity necessarily implies that other beings, “possibly encounterable within the world, have been covered up (hidden) or disguised” (GA 2: 294/SZ 222). These beings are unconcealed in the course of living with one’s own cares and projects, in being “as comporting with beings [sich verhaltendes Sein bei Seiendem]” (GA 24: 224/157). This existential comporting is the basis for the robbing in which Dasein takes beings and establishes their existence as something of its own possession, belonging to its own world. Beings must be robbed insofar as Dasein must appropriate them in enacting its “mineness” (Jemeinigkeit) (GA 2: 57/SZ 42). This appropriating uncovering of truth also applies to distant, abstract objects of knowledge, perhaps especially so. As Heidegger remarks in his discussion of historicity in Sein und Zeit §6, Dasein should eschew the pretense of philological objectivity and instead aim for a productive appropriation (produktive Aneignung) of history, snatching the past into its own world (GA 2: 29/SZ 21). Returning to primordial sources is not yet another attempt to reach the long-sought “correct interpretation”
of disputed texts. Approaching historical thought in its original truth-experience will necessarily mean rooting out the interpretive presuppositions which have been laid upon the text, even if by its very authors. The truth-experience of historical texts can only be reached insofar as we uproot the covering under which it presents itself. A phenomenological reading is necessarily a reading which makes the text one's own by directly engaging for oneself the phenomena presented through another's interpretation. It aims not for correspondence to the author's original meaning, but a hard-won, almost stolen partaking in his or her basic truth-experience.

To strip Dasein of the ownness which robs beings and makes them its own would be to destroy its capacity for truth-experience. Such a scenario would be one in which we would vividly experience untruth as an existential deprivation of what is necessary for the authentic realization of the true. It would be more characteristic of nightmares than anything possible in familiar lived experience, as a brief Kafkaesque thought experiment may illustrate. One morning we awake in the basement of a stranger. We did not go to sleep in this basement, and we have never been in it before. Nonetheless, everything in the basement is totally normal — we have even been left a warm pot of coffee on the countertop — it is simply not ours. This is not an experience of truth, but of the shockingly surreal. This basement represents a complete break with our world. It may not be a fake or synthetic basement, but it lacks any significance to us, and “significance is that on this basis of which the world is disclosed as such” (GA 2: 190/SZ 143). Dasein has lost its “there.” Our own (jemeinig) state of thrown facticity has been discarded in this mysterious second thrownness into the unfamiliar, eliminating the factual basis on which disclosedness depends. The immediate experience of untruth can manifest as the phenomenon of the surreal, which in turn depends upon the phenomenon of alienation, the loss of Dasein's appropriating Jemeinigkeit in its hapless inability to take an utterly foreign world as its own.

Yet Dasein would go on as Dasein. As bizarre as our surroundings may be, they are not functionally different from our own bed, comb, and
coffee maker. Even as we suffered a nightmarish untruth-experience, we would retain some basic prior familiarity with the beings within the stranger’s basement. On one level, we must disown this experience, desperately attempting to supply some explanation which would connect us back to our world. But on another, more immediate level, everything around us works just as it works in the dozens of basements we have encountered. Until and unless someone opens the door to let us know what is going on, both descriptions of our situation obtain. We are totally lost and right at home. Truth-experience splits itself in a way exactly corresponding to the split in our engagement with the world. The average, everyday aspects of this basement experience are easily uncovered as ready-to-hand, while interpretations of significance, the Wozu, cannot be meaningfully formulated.

This nightmare magnifies the everyday existential reality of being at once among what is apparent and what is invisible, of being at once in truth and untruth. As a thrown projection whose factical care determines the contours of its disclosure, Dasein must, to some lesser degree, always be split in this way. “Only in so far as Dasein has been disclosed [erschlossen] has it also been closed off [verschlossen]” (GA 2: 294/sz 222). We are always among what stands beyond the boundary of disclosure without appropriating it to our world. We wake up and drink coffee in the basement of the stranger without ever feeling at home.

Heidegger looks to the etymology of the Greek word for truth to capture this element of ever-present concealment which comes along with Dasein’s being-in. Alētheia is originally an alpha-privative word, so that a-lētheia can be read in the same way we read a-typical. The noun lēthē ultimately comes from the verb lanthanō, “to escape notice, be hidden,” but also “to forget” in the middle form lanthanesthai. With a supplementary participle, it can acquire a sense of acting in blind self-concealment. In Herodotus’ retelling of a legend of Croesus, the king laments that he dined with Adrastus, slayer of his son Atys, without knowing of his crime, as he “without awareness [elanthane] fed the murderer of his son.”12 The truth-experience begins in this darkness, the concealment of both the world and the wider meaning of one’s own blind actions. Being amongst the unknown and being ourselves
unknown is our basic state, from which we may rob truth in privative acts of un-concealment, un-covering. This is the understanding of being as concealed that Heraclitus approaches when he says that nature loves to hide itself. As the being that uncovers beings, yet lives among them in their accustomed hiddenness, “Dasein is already both in the truth and in untruth” (GA 2: 294–95/SZ 222).

III. PARMENIDES: THE GODDESS ALETEIA’S PATHS OF TRUTH AND UNTRUTH

Sein und Zeit §44 opens with an apparent detour into the earliest history of philosophy. Heidegger takes up his familiar interlocuter Parmenides, who inaugurated ontology by identifying Being with its perceptive understanding, setting the course of Western metaphysics as a metaphysics of presence. Heidegger recounts how Aristotle reports that Parmenides himself was forced (anankazomenos) to reckon with the phenomena. Why should Aristotle speak of Parmenides as being compelled in this way, and why should Heidegger lead his discussion of truth with such a strange citation? Parmenides seems not to have heeded the phenomena at all. His ontology, based strictly upon logical deduction, denies the world as it shows itself. Parmenidean being-as-presence is a monad which negates everything dynamic in experience. Being is uncreated (agenēton), indestructible (anōlethron), unmoved (atremes), and unable to be finished, complete (ateleston). The past and future tenses of the verb also do not apply to it. It neither was nor will be, but simply is.

But there is more to Parmenides than this famous monism, though many scholars persist in treating it as his final ontological position. The rest of what remains of the rest of his single poetic work On Nature contradicts this interpretation. Heidegger reads Parmenides with a view to developing his own philosophy, but also with the intention of resolving ongoing questions about the unity of apparently conflicting Parmenidean doctrines. To these ends, he provides an interpretation of the whole poem which illustrates how Parmenides’ alētheia implies our being in untruth as well as in truth.
The complications of *On Nature* begin with its dream-like proem in which the subject of the poem, presumably the author, participates in a story of mares, a speeding chariot (with glowing and sounding axle), maidens (daughters of the sun), the House of Night, the Gates of the paths of Night and Day (complete with a thorough discussion of the posts, doors, and the keys that open them), guarded by “much-avenging justice [dikē polupoinos].”¹⁹

Given this cacophony of quasi-Homeric imagery opening the first work of Western ontology, it should come as no surprise that the proem has been “alternatively exhaustively analyzed and ignored by commentators.”²⁰ Somehow the author of an extreme form of rationalism described his philosophy against this allegorical, mythopoetic, perhaps even occult horizon. The cultural distance from the ancients is here quite apparent, as modern scholars are hesitant to concede that “the founder of Western logic was a mystic and came by his knowledge through a journey to the underworld and divine revelation.”²¹

But to Parmenides the seer and Parmenides the logician we must also add Parmenides the natural scientist, who laid out an apparently original cosmology. Following the proem and the monistic ontology, there is also a third and final section, the way of appearance (*doxa*). The conclusion of the monistic ontology discredits the way of appearance before it is even described, disparaging the doctrines to follow as the mere names mortals wrongly give their experience.²² Parmenides then goes on to describe a world of dualisms, especially focusing on the opposition of light and night which recalls the meeting of Night and Day in the proem. Despite the disclaimer, there is some attempt to combine this world of difference with the static unity he posits as the ultimate ontology. Since logical necessity demands that “what is not” does not exist, the duality of light and night must be only apparent, the concealing untruth in which we live. Neither can slip into non-being, so everything must contain both light and night equally.²³
This reconciliation of ontology with experience is what Aristotle refers to when he describes Parmenides as being forced to heed the phenomena, a comment which has been sorely overlooked in one-sided modern interpretations of Parmenides as a pure monist. However, logically rigorous his ontology may have been, Parmenides could not stand in sheer obstinacy against the phenomena of time, change, and difference, and so he wrote the second half of his poem even as he disowned it. For Heidegger, such “regression” into untruth is Dasein’s falling into “the They” (das Man), in which it is invariably given over to inauthentic “idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity,” the sort of inexact prejudices Parmenides characterizes as the way of appearance. Falling is inescapable, as permanent uncoveredness is not possible within a temporal world contexture. Some things will invariably show themselves as mere semblance, while what has been previously uncovered “sinks back again, hidden and disguised. Because Dasein is essentially falling, its state of Being is such that it is in ‘untruth’” (GA 2: 294–95/sz 222–23).24

The fact that a figure as foundational as Parmenides would spend his time developing doctrines he himself conceded to be less than fully true lends strong credibility to Heidegger’s reading of alētheia.25 Heidegger is correct in taking the poem as a whole because Parmenides’ ontology depends upon its contrast with the world of appearances, which must be recognized in at least this negating sense. The alpha-privative negative properties of Being (a-genêton, an-ôlethron, a-tremes) only acquire sense as the negation of the creation, destruction, and motion experienced in the phenomena. The proem serves to distinguish these paths as routes of varied unconcealment, as the goddess definitively deems “the solid heart of well-rounded Unveiling [Alētheiēs eukykleos]” superior to the “beliefs [doxas] of mortals, in which there is no unconcealed reliability [ouk. pistís alēthēs].”26 Alētheia encompasses both the monist path of truth and the error of the mortal path. As Heidegger will maintain in his own account of truth, the lesser path is described not as false in a contrary sense, but with a double negative, as that which has not been fully uncovered, and so cannot be reliable.
The allegorical details of the scene further suggest that Parmenides presents his doctrines as a religiously mediated unveiling. As our journey to full unconcealment begins, the daughters of the Sun, rushing to meet Parmenides, have “thrown back their veils [kalyptras].”27 They journey to the gates of Day and Night, the junction of what has been unveiled and what remains in concealment, corresponding to the two accounts the goddess will give. Heidegger believes that Alētheia herself is the ambiguous goddess of the poem through whose voice the philosophic doctrines are delivered. The proem is not something to be skipped over, but the first illustration of what Heidegger is attempting to retrieve in Sein und Zeit over two millennia later. The interpretation of Parmenides has such an important connection with his own project that he pauses in the middle of his explanation of the truth-experience in Sein und Zeit §44 to give his theory of the proem:

The goddess of Truth who guides Parmenides, puts two pathways before him, one of uncovering, one of hiding; but this signifies nothing else than that Dasein is already both in the truth and in untruth. The way of uncovering is achieved only in krinein logō, in distinguishing between these understandingly, and making one’s decision for the one rather than the other (GA 2: 294–95/SZ 222–23).

In his 1926 Marburg lecture course Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy, Heidegger’s fragmentary notes further develop this Parmenidean acceptance of untruth alongside truth. “To the Being of truth belongs essentially the untruth. Proof that error has its foundation, in whatever way it has entered the world” (GA 22: 64/53). Untruth also belongs to the phenomenal “letting itself show” of the truth-experience, in which errors are revealed as errors. It is only possible to give an account of an error as an untruth after one has had a truth-experience by which to recognize error as error. In Parmenides’ cosmology, only light or darkness may show itself, but, after we learn the ontological truth that what “is not” cannot be, we realize that both must always be present. To take
an example from modern science, the untruth of the geocentric theory of the solar system is co-disclosed in the truth-experience of the heliocentric theory of the solar system. A refutation or proof of impossible consequences may win debating points, but such arid demonstrations contribute nothing to the rich phenomenal awareness of untruth, in which error is fully uncovered as the counter-concept of proper understanding. A real sense of the false only arises in the truth-experience itself, through which “error is understood in its origin” (GA 22: 64/54).

Plato also briefly echoes this point in the enigmatic dialogue *Hippias Minor*, where Socrates argues that only an expert in a field can effectively lie about it. The expert has a truth-experience which makes him most powerful (*dynatōtatos*) to tell truths and lies alike (366e-369a). The ability to distinguish between them by their account (*krinein logō*) arises only in a state of existential unconcealment. The truth-experience that unlocks truths alongside untruths is mythically allegorized as an initiation by Parmenides and is later secularized by Plato as the phenomenon of expertise.

Heidegger’s reading of *alētheia* is deeply indebted to his original interpretation of Parmenides. Phenomenological ontology emerges as the natural solution to the ongoing scholarly question of the poem’s unity, recognizing and resolving the patent contradiction between his strictly monist ontological commitments and the dualist cosmology in the second half of *On Nature*. Taking what shows itself on a proper phenomenological basis, ontology can properly take beings as never showing themselves fully, as always being at once in truth and untruth. Western philosophy set itself down the wrong path towards an atemporal metaphysics of presence precisely when it discarded the second half of *On Nature*. In the very fact that Parmenides’ monistic ontology was far better preserved than his natural cosmology, we see the tradition covering up the eventual reconciliation with the phenomena which Aristotle reported as the ancient reading of Parmenides. The positive meaning and importance of untruth has remained hidden ever since.
IV. HERACLITUS: THE HERMENEUTIC LOGOS CLEARING THE LETHE

Parmenides’ goddess distinguishes between the two paths by judging between them based on their logos, krinein logō.29 Alētheia, as an act of uncovering, always results from an interpretive practice. Heidegger understands the logos as the hermeneutical operator which accomplishes unconcealment, signifying “entities in the ‘how’ of their uncoveredness” (GA 2: 290/SZ 219). In making this philological case, Heidegger stands on more established ground, as logos is a word of more established etymological interest than alētheia.30 It is the nominal form of legō, a verb with a semantic range wide enough to include definitions as varied as “gather,” “choose,” “count,” and “say.”31 One definition of the verb given by LSJ is straightforwardly hermeneutic: “to wish to say,” “to mean.”32 The gathering, choosing, and counting of entities represents the hermeneutic activity involved in giving a logos, which brings out the “how” of uncoveredness Heidegger seeks. Ultimately, the logos “means rather the same as dēloun [to make visible]: to make manifest what one is ‘talking about’ in one’s discourse” (GA 2: 43/SZ 32).

Heidegger philologically develops the logos as the “how” of uncovering in Sein und Zeit §44 with a treatment of Heraclitus’ first fragment (likely from the start of his lost book). The logos is a primary philosophical concept for Heraclitus, which he describes as lifting us out of a state of dreamy forgetfulness, accomplishing unconcealment. Heidegger describes this first fragment (below) as an account in which “the phenomenon of truth in the sense of uncoveredness… shows though” (GA 2: 290/SZ 219).

But of this principle which holds forever [the logos] people prove ignorant, not only before they hear it, but also once they have heard it. For although everything happens in accordance with this principle, they resemble those with no familiarity with it, even after they have become familiar with the kinds of accounts and events I discuss as I distinguish each thing accord to its nature and explain its constitution. But the general
run of people are as unaware \([lanthanei]\) of their actions while awake as they are of what they do \([i.e. \text{forget, } epilanthanontai]\) when they are asleep.\(^{33}\)

Though the \(\text{logos}\) is that which brings to unconcealment, some people are wholly unsensitive to it, and so they proceed without understanding. Like Parmenides, Heraclitus grants that untruth is our basic state and so grants in advance the limitation of the \(\text{logos}\) he will present.

Truth as unconcealment here appears as an original metaphor separate from any interposition of the nominal form \(\text{alētheia}\). The uncovering \(\text{logos}\) negates what lies at the root of \(a\text{-lētheia}\), the \(\text{lēthē}\), “hiddenness, concealedness.” Heidegger’s \(\text{alētheia}\) can be seen in its original composite parts: the hermeneutic \(\text{logos}\) which clears away the concealing \(\text{lēthē}\). The \(\text{lēthē}\) appears in the two forms of the middle verb \(lanthanesthai\), “to forget,” a concealing to oneself of what was once known, Dasein’s falling into untruth from prior unconcealment. The \(\text{logos}\) can take us out of the dream-like state in which the human being persists, blind to the word and not even self-aware in memory. As with Herodotus’ Croesus, the \(\text{lēthē}\) is not just an unawareness of beings, but, more profoundly, an existential state of self-blindness. Heidegger finds this fragment so philologically convincing that he deems those who would persist without a primordial reading of \(\text{alētheia}\) as “cover[ing] up the meaning of what the Greeks made ‘self-evidently’ basic for the terminological use of \(\text{alētheia}\) as a pre-philosophical way of understanding it” (\(\text{GA} \ 2: 291/\text{SZ} \ 219\)).

V. PLATO: ASCENT THROUGH A GRADATION OF \(\text{ALETHEIA}, \) A PRIORI DISCLOSEDNESS AS ANAMNEsis

Post-Socratic philosophy becomes increasingly interested in more technical questions of epistemology, erecting theories of truth which are less obviously disclosive of primordial \(\text{alētheia}\). It is indeed doubtful whether Heidegger would have ever had these ideas if not for Diels and Kranz’s groundbreaking publication of a scholarly edition of the pre-Socratic fragments in 1903. Philosophers comfortably read Plato and Aristotle
for two thousand years without translating *alētheia* as “uncoveredness” because their views could more easily be brought to accord with the correspondence theory of truth dominant in medieval and modern philosophy. The later Heidegger will indeed himself regard Plato as the one who replaced the primordial sense of *alētheia* with a new sense of truth as correctness, leading into later theories of correspondence.34

The early Heidegger, however, finds the primordial truth-experience in his phenomenological readings of Plato and Aristotle. The two founding figures of systematic Western philosophy directly reckoned with the truth as a phenomenon. Their proto-phenomenological instincts have been concealed in centuries of metaphysical interpretation, which takes these thinkers as representing archetypically “idealistic” and “realist” positions. Heidegger is unfortunately not very explicit on this point, but his comments on Aquinas and the correspondence theory of truth in *Sein und Zeit* §44 strongly suggest that the “primordial” Aristotle and Plato are Aristotle and Plato prior to Christian and Neo-Platonic reinterpretation.35 At the very least, their philosophies only became metaphysical in and through their primordial engagement with the phenomena, which can be uncovered in a reading sensitive to the truth-experience more readily seen in their pre-Socratic predecessors. While this post-Socratic development of truth-experience is not explicitly described in *Sein und Zeit* §44, Heidegger’s Marburg lectures on Greek thought, later published as *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy* and Plato’s “Sophist,” outline how *alētheia* as uncoveredness persists as an implicit theme in later Greek philosophy.

Plato’s metaphors of ascent from a lower world of sense to the higher world of pure noetic intellection express a locational distinction between the realm of truth and the realm of appearance.36 Dualism seems to be the consequence of such a distinction, yet Heidegger resists the tradition of treating Plato as a dogmatic metaphysician. He rather praises Plato for creating an enduring set of problems “always under-way, approached [in] obscurity.” The work of Plato is eternal precisely because it does not contain “some finished, so-called eternal truth” and instead “asks actual questions.” Platonic thought resounds not because
of the strength of the theory of forms, but rather because it represents “actual work in disclosing the phenomena” (GA 22: 142–45/118).

Heidegger’s approach to Plato in this early period is unapologetically Aristotelian, as even the Marburg lecture course on Plato’s Sophist begins with an extensive excursus on alētheuein in Aristotle. Every interpretation of Plato must ultimately legitimate itself in Aristotle, whose more direct engagement with the phenomena is a continuation of the Platonic project. Aristotle and Plato are engaging the same set of fundamental phenomenal problems which Aristotle brought into further clarity. What the tradition has interpreted as a distinctly Aristotelian realist position is simply the full uncovering of what has remained concealed in Platonic aporia. An understanding of Aristotle supplies the “guiding lines” which makes possible the realization of Plato’s “immanent intentions” (GA 19: 189–90/132).

Plato’s metaphysical account of being is an attempt to give an account of Dasein’s uncovering of the phenomena within in a world. The allegory of the cave is nothing other than a quite explicit metaphor for being-in. Being-in the cave involves levels of disclosedness, levels differentiated by the relative amount of light present in each of them. This light is the uncovering of beings at in their gradation of phenomenal clarity, as shadows, appearances, and forms. This increase of light is analogous to the movement from the ontic to the ontological, “overturning of the entire current basic position of Dasein itself with respect to what it takes at any level as a genuine being” (GA 22: 102–5). Crucially, the levels of disclosedness continue down into the darkness of the cave, so that no point on the spectrum is ever entirely “unreal,” but only wholly obscure. Heidegger deems Plato “the discoverer of the a priori” (GA 24: 463–64), which grants “a surrounding world, even if accessible only to a small degree… [which] is always already disclosed with Dasein” (GA 22: 102).

In developing this spectrum of unconcealedness, Plato makes himself answerable to what happens at the extrema of the continuum. At the top lies the form of the good, which Heidegger reads conventionally as “the fundamental truth itself, which makes possible all other
truths” (GA 22: 106). It is Heidegger’s interpretation of the bottom of the continuum that is quite ingenious. If we extend the continuum of uncoveredness down to its lowest limit, we describe beings which are entirely covered, about which we have no knowledge at all. Yet Heidegger demonstrates how Plato preserves the a priori disclosedness of Dasein’s world even when it comports with beings which have been entirely concealed. According to Plato’s doctrine of anamnēsis, articulated in the dialogues Meno and Phaedrus, what lies entirely in concealment may seem unknowable, but it has only been forgotten, existentially concealed. How would a knower recognize something as known without having already known it? Full concealment is just the forgetting (lanthanesthai) Heraclitus finds in those who do not heed the logos. As the famous demonstration of the uneducated slave’s understanding of geometry in the Meno makes clear, the forgottenness of our knowledge makes it possible for it to return through questioning which facilitates our discovery of the logos, with no positive teaching being necessary. Temporary ignorance does not break the continuity of world-disclosure.

Because “the possibility of comportment toward beings demands a precursory understanding of being” (GA 24: 463/325). Plato’s a priori is interpreted as a temporal feature of Dasein’s existential being, a priority in time. A secularized form of anamnēsis is present in the truth-experience, in which the world contexture of Dasein pre-discloses what has yet to be fully uncovered. This anticipatory sense can be seen in everyday phenomenal extrapolation. I will have a vague idea of what honey-baked chicken may taste like even if I have never eaten it. I can make a meaningful projection of the taste by remembering and combining the taste of all the other varieties of chicken and sweets I have consumed. Only an understanding of truth as alētheia allows these subtle extrapolating permutations of the truth-experience to suggest themselves, recognizing the daily experience of partial knowing lost in the strict binary between the true and the false.
VI. ARISTOTLE: VARIED MODES OF EXISTENTIAL ALETHEIA, APOPHANTIC ASSERTION AS DISPLAY

Aristotle opens his *Metaphysics* by declaring that “all human beings desire knowledge by their nature.” Just like Heidegger, Aristotle speaks of knowledge as inherently bound up with the *Existenz* of the human being. Heidegger interprets the activity of *alētheuein* for Aristotle as “to take out of concealment” through “varied modes of disclosing and understanding, pre-theoretically” (*GA* 22: 25). Knowledge arises by nature, *physei*, and not as a “supplementary faculty.” The first book of the *Metaphysics* thus situates knowledge as belonging to Dasein’s *existentialia*. The human being’s varied truth-experiences exist in a hierarchy corresponding to the levels of uncoveredness examined above in Plato, presenting “the manifold of possibilities and of modes of disclosing in a certain gradation” (*GA* 22: 24–25/20).

Aristotle’s movement through the levels of existential capacity for knowledge parallels the Platonic ascent to the forms. At the lowest level lies *aisthēsis*, sense perception, which, for Aristotle, “is common to all, easy, and has nothing to do with Wisdom.” Although sense perception is valid, as the senses are the “chief sources of knowledge about particulars,” they do not give an account (*legousi*) of the *to diáti*, the reason for what is phenomenally given. Between *aisthēsis* and *sophia*, the bookends of Aristotle’s spectrum of human knowledge, there lie increasingly complex *logoi*, interpretive accounts. Animals share with human beings sense perception, along with memory (*mnêmē*) and, to some degree, experience (*empeiria*). Crucially for Heidegger, memory and experience are an expansion of perception across the dimensions of time, such that they foreground the possibility of a world-contexture, enabling “freer orientation, circumspection, to take in at a glance” as opposed to living continually within the purely sensory phenomenon of encountering something for the first time. This makes beings possessing memory “more teachable,” as they are “not merely (perceptual) staring at, not simply bound to one and the same present (possibility)” (*GA* 22: 25/21).
Dasein, the possessor of technē, has a still deeper practical interpretation of experience, knowing the *to dioti kai tēn aitian*, “the reason why and the cause.”44 Technē interprets the world with greater temporal depth, as it “already also has its anticipation” so that it knows “the connection of the if this-then that,” reaching “a factual connection that holds without exception.”45 This understanding of technē is a further unveiling which arises “out of the “empirically [experientially] given,” an unveiling which shows the being as it “always and properly is,” arriving at conceptual knowledge (GA 22: 26/21–22). At each level a further interpretation of what simply shows itself in perception arises, and these interpretations manifest in the capabilities and projects of Dasein. The ability of those with technē to teach is a sign (sēmeion) that technē is more a form of epistēmē than empeiria. As something learned, a technē involves a communicable logos, while empeiria necessarily remains the property of the individual.

In so describing the necessary relationship between the activities of the human being and the disclosure of truth, the first chapter of the *Metaphysics* very closely resonates with Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein. Because each level of disclosure depends upon a successively deeper hermeneutic logos, we never permanently achieve full alētheia, instead living in and out of truth. In a recognition of temporality, life demands that we acquire some logoi, forget others, and occasionally master a few. Uncovering in all its forms occurs through our very nature and does not depend on a theoretical interpretation of truth.

But Heidegger charges that all later Western philosophy has neglected this core of Aristotelian epistemology and instead focused on Aristotle’s more limited remarks on propositions. In *On Interpretation*, Aristotle claims that exhibitive (aufweisend) speech alone is the only context where “trueness [to alētheuein] and falseness [to pseudesthai] occur”.46 Back in the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle holds that truth and falsity do not belong to objects, but to the synthetic judgements we make about them, judgements which Scholasticism in turn designated as beings of reason, *ens rationis*.47 In a sense, Heidegger is simply passing by the intensive development of this propositional project in modern formal
logic, eschewing it entirely in favor of his description of truth-experience. As Graeme Nicholson points out, Heidegger is open to accusations that he has ignored the discourse about truth and simply discussed the “context of [its] discovery.”\textsuperscript{48} But even accepting this criticism, Heidegger’s description of the truth-experience demonstrates how the current formalism of propositional truth has restricted deeper thought on the matter. Propositional truth is presented as a binary of true and false, but the experiential variety of world-contexture demands “more than the traditional two truth-values.”\textsuperscript{49} An obscurity, a deception, and an honest error lose their particular experiential richness when flattened into the category “the false.” As Aristotle demonstrates in \textit{Metaphysics} \textit{i}, the uncovering practices of \textit{alētheuein} must also be maintained in their distinctiveness. The coincidental birdwatcher and an expert ornithologist cannot be said to perceive “the true” about birds in any univocal sense. \textit{Aisthēsis} and \textit{epistēmē} are two entirely different phenomena.

Heidegger thus interprets the tradition’s dwelling on propositions as a narrow focus on asserting, which is only “one of Dasein’s intentional comportments” \textsuperscript{\textit{GA 24}: 295/207}. Truth may only apply to assertion (\textit{Aussage}), but assertion belongs only to Dasein as the logos \textit{apophantikos}, the logos through which beings show themselves so that affirmation and denial, truth and falsity apply.\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Apophansis} is the same Greek word through which Heidegger discussed phenomenology as a “letting show itself” of the phenomena in \textit{Sein und Zeit} §7 (\textit{GA 2: 45-47}; \textit{SZ 34-35}). The logos \textit{apophantikos} is the logos that accomplishes a letting show (\textit{-phainesthai}) of the being from itself \textit{(apo-)}, as it really is, an assertion of the being as unconcealed, as in truth. Heidegger, following Aristotle, describes the form of assertion as both diaretic and synthetic, at once distinguishing and integrating a subject and predicate to make a judgement (\textit{GA 2: 211}; \textit{SZ 159}; \textit{GA 24: 292-95}).

But even true assertions will not take us entirely into truth and out of untruth. Assertion highlights some aspect of the being in definite predication while other aspects become concealed in their being put out of display, their being excluded from the assertion. There is an intimate parallel between this synthesizing structure of assertion as conjunction
and disjunction and how beings show themselves in uncoveredness and coveredness. Assertion only uncovers what matters to Dasein. It is one of Dasein’s existential comportments, which always have an intentional basis in marking beings in a significantly determinate way. Judgements form because Dasein wants to predicate what matters in a being. This directed intentionality is seen in the prefix of Aristotle’s term dianoia, a thinking through (dia-) a being for a relevant determination, grasping it with a purpose in mind, to see it as being in a certain way. This dianoetic “looking through” arrives at the apophantic “as structure” in assertion, a being’s presenting itself as being in a certain way. But the presentation must also have its Gegenbegriff, its counterpart in what is not presented. The apophantic as structure through which beings show themselves also conceals them, as it an inherently two-sided “structure of the understanding and disclosing, of uncoveredness and coveredness” (GA 22: 164–66/138).

Making assertions is an activity of Dasein as finite and concernful as any other. Dasein crafts its assertions, hoping to accomplish the exhibition (Aufzeigung) of a being, a featuring of it as being on display (Aufweisung) (GA 24: 295–300). One implication of this turn of metaphor is that a display cannot be compared against the real thing, as the correspondence theory of truth demands. As Sean McGrath writes, “the proposition does not call for comparison but confirmation (Ausweis).” The proposition is confirmed (ausgewiesen) in the thing or not.” Every display is constructed within a social, communicative context in which Dasein practices the ongoing activity of confirming truth. Assertions belong to discourse as a “primordial existentiale of disclosedness” (GA 2: 214/SZ 161). The “communicatively determinant exhibition” of assertion in which truth and falsehood are always at stake is most evident in scientific discussion, but even in this context “assertion has not a primary cognitive function but a secondary one” (GA 24: 299–300/210).

 Retrieving the wider scope of Aristotle’s view of human knowledge, Heidegger’s main point about propositional assertion is negative. We do not live, work, or even think in purely propositional terms. In showing an entity “as” an entity, the apophantical as-structure of a proposition
depends upon the more primordial circumspective act of interpretation, the “existential-hermeneutic as” (GA 2: 210/SZ 158). The proposition “The sun is most severe at noon” is merely a display of how we have gathered together (per the logos) our experiences of the severity of the sun and interpreted them (per the hermeneutic “as”). Assertion only arises when we attempt to present this interpretation to other Dasein. Displaying truth is an intentional putting together of some aspect of one’s world on display for verification, but also for comparison, criticism, and revision. There are many more possibilities for the reception of a proposition than deeming it true or false. It may also be dismissed as vague or unthinkingly accepted as obvious. This wide range of phenomenal responses which a proposition may prompt cannot be made to fit on the Procrustean bed of logical formalism. Graeme Nicholson suggests a behavioral adverb as an alternative to the adjective “true” or the noun “the truth”: “He spoke truly’ has more in common with ‘He spoke loudly’ than has usually been seen.”54 As a phenomenon, truth-experience loses its solid, nominal character and adverbially modifies the behavioral existentialia.

In this highly unconventional account of propositional truth, it is evident that Heidegger’s primordial truth-experience reverses the usual epistemic priorities. For Heidegger, error is a precondition of being as we are, of existing within a finite, factical world-disclosure. We can only consider the elimination of error as a deliberate, intentional feature of exact communication when we manifest the truth-experience in discourse, placing beings on display and presenting them as being-uncovered to other Dasein. True assertion is the carefully crafted display of a final draft, the moment at which an uncovered being may be seen in its best display, as if it were not first taken out of concealment, as if it were something immediately given as present-at-hand.

Yet the existential moment of recognizing the true as true, the truth-experience, belongs to the pages of buried drafts which robbed the phenomena from their hiddenness. In the immediate activity of doing research we are always uncovering truth without any self-conscious presumption of final clarity, without the goal of correspondence to a transcendental
state of affairs beyond and separate from our ever-searching inquiry. Though, if asked, we may speak of truth in these terms, this beyond is only an illusion which arises when we treat propositions as if they really had delivered beings in a never-having-been-concealed clarity. The proposition does not speak from the pure beyond, but through the darkly diaphanous world the German poet Matthias Claudius compared to the moon in phase: “It is only half available to sight, but it is indeed whole and wondrous.”55
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Propositional Truth</th>
<th>Parmenides’s Ontology</th>
<th>Plato’s Allegory of the Cave</th>
<th>Aristotle’s Modes of Knowledge</th>
<th>Heidegger’s Primordial Truth-Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spectrum of Truth and Untruth</td>
<td>way of unconcealment (<em>alêtheia</em>)</td>
<td>the sun (form of the Good)</td>
<td><em>sophia</em></td>
<td>ontological unveiling of Being: Freiheit zum Tode; resoluteness (Ent-schlossenheit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>the heavens</td>
<td><em>epistêmê</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>things themselves</td>
<td><em>technê</em></td>
<td>ontic uncovering of beings; opening-up (aufschließen) and closing-off (verschließen)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>reflections (<em>eidola</em>)</td>
<td><em>empeiria</em></td>
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<td>way of appearance (<em>doxa</em>)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>shadows in the cave</td>
<td><em>aisthèsis</em></td>
<td>factical world disclosure (Er-schließung); falling into das Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method of Unconcealment</td>
<td>distinguishing by the logos (<em>krinein logî</em>)</td>
<td>recollection (<em>anamnèsis</em>) from forgetfulness (<em>lanthanesthai</em>)</td>
<td>giving an account (<em>legein</em>) of the reason why (<em>to dia tê</em>)</td>
<td>world-contextual unconcealment through the hermeneutic logos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Comparative chart of *alêtheia* as truth-experience in Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, and Heidegger
NOTES

I would like to express my thanks to Dr. Sean McGrath of Memorial University of Newfoundland for his early input on the direction of this paper and Dr. Lee Braver of the University of South Florida for his suggested additions.

1 Among philosophers, Ernst Tugendhat made the most widely influential postwar critique of Heidegger’s theory of truth. Tugendhat claimed that seeing the true proposition as that which uncovers simply substitutes one problematic criterion of truth as correspondence for another flawed criterion of truth as un-concealment. “One simply cannot see that towards which the true assertion is directed as merely consisting in the self-showing, in un-concealment as such. For the false assertion is also directed towards something that shows itself.” Ernst Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” in Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, Vol. 3, edited and translated by Christopher Macann, (London: Routledge, 1992), 85. As this paper will demonstrate, this criticism proceeds from a strictly propositional view of truth, which Heidegger aims to replace with an existential account.

Among philologists, the influential Paul Friedländer criticized Heidegger’s reading of alētheia in his 1954 work Platon. Friedländer largely focuses on responding to the later Heidegger’s comments on Platonic philosophy as marking a pivot to correspondence theory in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” “Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit,” and the Parmenides lecture course. Friedländer does point out that Homeric characters refer to spoken assertions as ἀλήθες, suggesting that even the earliest Greeks had a sense of alētheia similar to the modern sense of truth as correspondence between a statement and a set of affairs. Plato cannot have been the pivot point the later Heidegger believes him to be. Heidegger himself acknowledges and concedes this point in a colloquium in Paris in 1964 (published in German in 1969 as “Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens”), though his quite late
retraction has not made much of an impression on the scholarship on the topic. He continued to uphold the Greeks as having an access to Being lost in modernity, etymology aside. For a clear exposition and commentary on the debate, see Rui de Sousa, *Martin Heidegger’s Interpretation of Ancient Greek Aletheia and the Philological Response to it*, Ph.D. diss. (McGill University, 2000), https://escholarship.mcgill.ca/concern/theses/5b73px702.

I do not see why the more modern sense of truth as correctness Friedländer documented in Homer cannot have existed alongside the primordial sense of privative *a-lētheia* Heidegger uncovers; this would simply be a common case of linguistic polysemy.

The adjective *ursprünglich* appears at the sub-section heading “The Primordial Phenomenon of Truth and the Derivative Character of the Traditional Conception of Truth” (GA 2: 290/219). The phrase is particularly evocative of how Heidegger’s position differs from the traditional discourse on truth, and indeed it is given great emphasis in §44. “Indeed, the term *Wahrheitsphänomen* occurs so frequently throughout §44 (nineteen times in all) that we are justified in taking it to name his principal topic in the section”: Graeme Nicholson, “Truth as a Phenomenon,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 68:4 (2015): 805. I will be translating and referring to *Wahrheitsphänomen* and *Phänomen der Wahrheit* as “truth-experience” in order to more vividly accent the special existential, experiential character of this approach in English.


Koskela elaborates this point: “Heidegger thinks that we encounter entities as beings that are only in virtue of the world within which they can be disclosed and encountered… Dasein, a worldly human being, is constituted by its way of being in the world… Unconcealment is a worldly thing, so to speak, and human being is a necessary constitutive part of that world, and vice versa”: Jani Koskela, “Truth as Unconcealment in Heidegger’s Being and Time,” *Minerva: An Internet Journal of Philosophy* 16 (2012): 118–19.
5 Heidegger notes *phainesthai* as a middle form at GA 2: 58/28. The Greek middle voice is neither active nor passive, and so is of interest to phenomenologists seeking to overcome prior commitments to the transitive language of subjects and objects.


7 *Aufschließen*, which Heidegger equates with the “laying open” of beings in disclosedness (GA 2: 101/75), also means “to unlock.”

8 Andrzej Serafin has written about Heidegger’s wider interest in creating a “phenomenology of the invisible.” “Heidegger’s attitude towards physics and metaphysics, his theory of truth, his reading of Aristotle, his concept of Dasein, his understanding of nothingness are all situated within the problematic context of the relation between the invisible and the revealed. Heidegger’s thought is thereby posited at the point of intersection of phenomenology, ontology, and theology”: Serafin, “Heidegger’s Phenomenology of the Invisible,” *Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal* 6:2 (2016): 313.

9 This is actually Heidegger’s first reference to disclosedness in *Sein und Zeit*, which arises in a discussion of how equipment, though undiscovered insofar as it functions as equipment, is nonetheless part of the world-disclosure.

10 GA 2: 293/221 connects the thrownness of Dasein with its disclosedness. Thrownness “is constitutive for Dasein’s disclosedness. In thrownness is revealed that in each case Dasein, as my Dasein and this Dasein, is already in a definite world and alongside a definite range of definite entities within the world. Disclosedness is essentially factual.”

11 *Sein und Zeit* §18 discusses how such determinations of significance arise from the contexture of a world.

12 *Oikioisi hypodexamenos ton xeinon phonea tou paidos elanthane boskôn*: Herodotus, *Histories* 1.44.
Direct references to Heraclitus and Parmenides will be cited through the Diels-Kranz numbering system; in this case, dk 22B123.

Metaphysics 986b, 31.

The argument, somewhat reconstructed from Parmenides' poetic, non-linear exposition, runs as follows: If creation exists, a created being either originates in what is (Being) or in what is not (non-Being). It evidently cannot originate in non-Being, as non-Being does not exist. The alternative, creation from Being, would apply a division of this being from Being, which means it must be something other than Being, which means it is non-Being, and non-Being does not exist. Change is therefore an illusion. The argument appears at dk 28B8, 5-13. Gallop provides summary and criticism, describing this problematic reasoning as “dilemmatic”: David Gallop, Parmenides of Elea: Fragments, Text, Translation, and an Introduction (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984): 15-16.


Dahlstrom shows how Heidegger already had this interpretation of the second part of Parmenides’ poem as expressing Dasein’s falling into untruth in his 1922 lectures on Aristotle: Daniel Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Initial Interpretation of Parmenides: An Excursus in the 1922 lectures on Aristotelian Texts,” The Review of Metaphysics 70 (3): 511-13.
There does not seem to have been any praxis accompanying the monism Parmenides articulated, no call for withdrawal into a solitude from which to ease from all activity and approach the stillness of true Being. The unreality of change or the world of human experience seemed to have no effect on the biographies of those influenced by the Eleatic school. Melissus, who develops Parmenides’ arguments, led an active public life as a general. For this reason, Waterfield concludes that “Parmenidean monism was epistemological – a state of mind, rather than an ontological statement about the world”: Robin Waterfield, *The First Philosophers: The Presocratics and the Sophists* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 82.

DK 28B1, 30. Translation is my own, and attempts to bring out Heidegger’s understanding of *alētheia*.

DK 28B1, 10.

This idea has many interesting psychological implications. Consider, for one, the universal disdain for being corrected on a merely formal level, without any positive demonstration of a truth which allows us to actually see our falsehood as falsehood.

DK 28B7. Also referenced by Heidegger at *GA* 2: 295/225.

At least prior to Heidegger’s having inaugurated the etymology of *alētheia* as a philosophical topic. *Logos* most famously appears in John 1:1: “In the beginning was the *logos.*” Heidegger is indebted to Emil Lask for his reading of Greek *logos* as a hermeneutic structure of significance, which “yields a conception of the *logos* far removed from the traditional interpretation of *logos* as reason, *ratio*, or logic as the laws of correct or valid argument. *Logos* as discourse, as ‘letting be seen,’ is freed from its restriction to the *logos apophantikos*, the logic of judgments or propositions, and traced to the hermeneutic structure of Dasein’s factic understanding and interpretation”: Steven Crowell, “Lask, Heidegger, and the Homelessness of Logic,” *Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology* 25:3, 234.


Liddell-Scott-Jones, definition III.9.
Heidegger’s later reading of Plato can be found in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” “Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit,” and the Parmenides lecture course. William Richardson explains Heidegger’s later view of Plato: “In Plato metaphysics in the traditional sense takes its rise, for it is he who first conceives of thinking Being as a going ‘beyond’ the beings of experience to their being-ness, which he conceives as their what-ness, their see-ability, their Idea. Such a conception is possible only because a consequence of

\textit{physis} (process of shining-forth) is taken to be the essence of it. Hence \textit{physis} itself becomes for him that-which-is-to-be-seen, a being (\textit{eidos}). Being thus becomes conceived as a being. Likewise truth, no longer non-concealment, becomes correctness of view, conformity with the Ideas”. Richardson, \textit{Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought} (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 308.

But even the later Heidegger still saw this Platonic development as an incomplete concealment of primordial truth. Drew Hyland describes Heidegger’s reading of Plato at \textit{die Kehre} thus: “Heidegger’s first point is to show, very convincingly, that \textit{aletheia} in its originary sense of unhidenness is still very much at work in the cave analogy… But no longer purely. Heidegger now announces that truth as unhidenness is already infected, as it were, by another, different and more problematic conception of truth that is also at work here…. This fateful other essence of truth is truth as ‘correctness of vision’”. Hyland, \textit{Questioning Platonism: Continental Interpretations of Plato} (Albany: SUNY, 2004).

Hegel likewise excludes Plato and Aristotle from engaging in the metaphysics developed by their medieval and modern heirs. “Earlier philosophers and notably the Scholastics provided the material [\textit{Stoff}] for this metaphysics… Plato is not this kind of metaphysician, and Aristotle even less so, although it is usually

36 Cf. the ladder of love in *Symposium* 210a–212c and the allegory of the cave in *Republic* 514a–520a.

37 Meno’s objection is that we could never recognize virtue even if we found it. Without prior knowledge, recognition would also be impossible (*Meno* 80d–e).

38 *Metaphysics* 980a22, opening line. While this reading will focus on the more essentialized, dense notes in *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, Heidegger also treats the gradation of *alētheuein* in Book 1 of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* in the opening section of his lectures on Plato’s *Sophist*, §10–§17. (GA 19: 65–131). Heidegger gives a more detailed phenomenal account of each of these Aristotelian modes of knowing in this opening section, supplementing *Metaphysics* 1 with *Nicomachean Ethics* 6 throughout.


40 *Metaphysics* 981b.

41 Aristotle, in contrast to Heidegger, writes on the soul-life of plants and animals in *De Anima* in a way analogous to the gradations he posits here. Plants can reproduce but remain rooted to the ground, animals have locomotion, and humans have thought. Plant soul is vegetative, animal soul is sensible, and human soul is rational, building upon and including the plant and animal souls. Cf. *De Anima* 413a23.


45 Heidegger’s translation of the Greek *empeiria echei hypolēpsin* (*Metaphysics* 981a7): “hat auch schon ihren Vorgriff.”

46 Heidegger cites *De interpretatione*, 17a2f at GA 24: 256/180.
Heidegger cites *Metaphysics* 5.4, 1027b23ff at GA 24: 259/183.


*De Interpretatione*, 17a, 21–24.

Both terms use the *auf-* prefix, indicating a putting up, a placing in view.

This is the same root as *Aufweisung* with a change of prefix. The assertion is indicated as a pointing “up,” then confirmed as a pointing “out.”

McGrath, “The Interpretive Structure of Truth in Heidegger,” 53.
