

gards the attribution of forward-looking responsibility—for the choices agents now make—as justified by “the future beneficial consequences of the practice” (163). Not only does this instrumental justification face familiar objections, of the kind made against consequentialist justifications of punishment, but it also leaves doubts about the independent moral role that Persson claims for autonomy. If the weight we give to the choices made by agents about how to live their lives is justified only or primarily by the beneficial consequences of assigning such weight, it is not clear why well-being does not subsume autonomy.

Persson’s critique of prioritarianism, though cleverly and intricately developed, rests on the doubtful assumption that prioritarians regard actual individuals with neutral net welfare as lacking any claim to greater welfare, since their present welfare, being zero, cannot be weighted at all. On this assumption, the welfare claims of the worst off get increasingly weighty as they decline in absolute value until, at the limit, their weight plummets to zero. I find it hard to believe that this is a reasonable interpretation of prioritarianism, or that prioritarians would not have plausible grounds for rejecting this assumption.

I have engaged some of Persson’s claims in detail, and I do not want to lose sight of the forest for the trees—a vast, thick forest. Despite, or because of, the challenges posed by the breadth and the complex arguments of this book, it is rewarding to read through. It manages to be philosophically serious without being ponderous and to be self-referential without being self-important. Persson’s valuable contributions to a wide variety of topics make this book an important contribution to both normative and practical ethics.

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Rose, Julie L. *Free Time*.

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On Saturday, May 1, 1886, tens of thousands of Chicago workers walked off their jobs. Employers responded by hiring strikebreakers and by firing and blacklisting union members. On May 4, strikers gathered in Haymarket Square in protest of the police shooting of two demonstrators at the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company. When police attempted to break up the gathering, a demonstrator threw a bomb. The police in turn opened fire on the crowd. Unable to determine who threw the bomb, the authorities arrested eight anarchists on the charge of conspiracy and sentenced seven to death in a sham trial. Though the Haymarket Affair has been largely forgotten in the United States, labor movements around the world commemorate its legacy as May Day.

Among the workers' demands was an eight-hour day, memorialized by Isaac G. Blanchard and Jesse Henry Jones's "Eight Hours" (published in 1878):

We mean to make things over, we are tired of toil for naught,  
 With but bare enough to live upon, and never an hour for thought;  
 We want to feel the sunshine, and we want to smell the flowers,  
 We are sure that God has will'd it, and we mean to have eight hours.  
 We're summoning our forces from the shipyard, shop and mill,  
 Eight hours for work, eight hours for rest, eight hours for what we will!

The insistence that free time is a matter of justice was obvious to the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century labor movements. It was also a central concern of much socialist and anarchist philosophy. Though the labor movement eventually secured significant victories in reducing the length of the work week, one-third of employed Americans continue to work forty-five hours or more a week. One-eighth of employed Americans work more than fifty-five hours (9). Surveys suggest that most of these people would prefer to work less. Many other Americans have irregular and unpredictable schedules, limiting their ability to plan their week and to coordinate activities with family and friends. The ideal of eight hours for what we will remains an ideal yet to be realized.

Why, then, have leisure and free time become marginal topics in contemporary political philosophy? The Malibu surfer living off public benefits is a stock figure to be audaciously defended or reprimanded. Political philosophers have invoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' "right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay" (Art. 24) as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the proliferation of human rights. John Rawls's only sustained discussion of leisure seeks to show that his theory of justice does not count people who choose unemployment as among the least advantaged (20–21).

In *Free Time*, Julie L. Rose seeks to redeem free time as a central component of a just society. Working within an account of liberal egalitarian proceduralism that takes antipaternalism, nonperfectionism, and neutrality as fundamental principles, she defends the view that all citizens are entitled to a fair share of free time. Liberal egalitarianism requires that citizens receive a fair share of free time so that they can pursue their conception of the good and effectively exercise their formal liberties and access opportunities.

Within the liberal tradition, an entitlement to free time faces at least four objections. The first objection is that free time is trivial. Free time is not sufficiently important to be the focus of a theory of justice. In a world where many people lack food and shelter, it is perverse to complain about a deficit of leisure. Second, guaranteeing leisure is dangerously illiberal, especially if it involves prohibiting people from working more than a certain number of hours or at certain times. Not only does this risk unduly interfering with people's liberty, but it also risks imposing a controversial conception of the good life. Third, guaranteeing leisure is burdensome. If leisure is a requirement of justice, then others have an obligation to ensure that everyone receives their fair share. This would require the costly rearrangement of social institutions such as workplaces and childcare. Finally, the guar-

antee of free time is misplaced. Political philosophers mostly follow economists in accepting the “time-money substitutability claim” that treats free time as fungible with work. People who wish to have more time can work fewer hours or pursue less lucrative but more flexible careers. Since money is easier to distribute than time, we should redistribute it so that everyone can choose leisure if they wish.

Rose argues that the first three objections rest on a mistaken understanding of leisure as a specific good (16). These objections seem compelling because they treat leisure as time that can be used for specific activities such as philosophical contemplation, recreation, or paid work. Specific goods can be exchanged for other goods: we can forgo paid work for more recreation. In contrast, Rose argues that leisure should be understood as the resource of free time. Unlike specific egalitarianism, which tells us which particular goods should be redistributed, the liberal proceduralism that Rose favors addresses inequality by attending to the background distribution of resources.

Liberal proceduralists see income and wealth as general resources. In Rose’s view, free time is a necessary component of just background conditions: like money or wealth, leisure is an all-purpose means necessary “to pursue one’s conception of the good, *whatever it may be*” (27). Since, on Rose’s account, justice requires effective and not just formal freedom, free time is a precondition to the effective freedom to participate in politics, religion, and family life, as well as to exercise central rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, association, and occupation. Far from being trivial or illiberal, free time is necessary for autonomy and to access most of the fundamental liberal rights. If this is burdensome, the burdens are justified on the grounds that they support basic freedoms.

In response to the superfluity objection, Rose argues that time and money are only imperfectly substitutable. In practice, workers have limited discretion over the number of hours worked. Moreover, not all basic needs can be satisfied by purchasing goods or services. Meeting personal bodily needs demands time, not just money. Though it is possible to hire others to care for children or for elders, it is likely unjust to insist that people substitute commodified care for their own intimate caring for their loved ones.

Rose insists that all citizens have a fair share of free time in which they are not satisfying their own basic needs or the basic needs of others through work or caregiving (118). Caregiving in particular requires workplace accommodations such as paid leave, extended short-hours schedules, and flexible work hours (126). Against the charge that parents choose to procreate and thereby impose a new obligation on society, Rose points out that children are public goods, providing nonexcludable benefits to society. Children contribute to the tax base and provide caregiving to the older generation (121–22). Fairness requires that those who produce public goods receive compensation to prevent others from free riding on their efforts (121). (Rose acknowledges the possibility that children, beyond a certain number, may in fact not be public goods [123 n. 20]. Her solution is to treat caregiving of children over a certain number as a matter of free time.)

If we have a right to the reasonable access to free time, conceived as a resource, what institutional and policy changes are necessary? Rose surveys three possibilities, a universal basic income, mandated work hour flexibility, and a com-

mon period of free time. She advocates for Sunday closing laws which provide a shared common period of free time for freedom of association. In response to the worry that prohibiting Sunday work is illiberal, Rose insists only on “reasonable access to periods of shared free time” (97). Voluntary work on a rest day will generally not be prohibited; rather, what is important is that workers are able to refuse work on Sundays (106)—it is access to shared time, not shared spare time, that is guaranteed.

*Free Time* is an admirable defense of a neglected cause. Nonetheless, it has a number of significant limitations. First, its arguments are unlikely to persuade people not committed to liberal egalitarian proceduralism. This includes libertarians who deny that governments should be in the business of distributing resources such as money or health care, let alone free time. More formidably, the account excludes potential allies who endorse perfectionist and communitarian views of justice.

Rose’s discussion of *Gowan v. Maryland* (1961) reveals some of the limitations of her account. *Gowan* proposed three secular purposes for Sunday closing laws: “the creation of a community atmosphere of repose, the maintenance of a cultural tradition, and the coordination of citizens’ free time” (103). Rose defends the third purpose, coordination, and ignores the perfectionist and communitarian purposes (culture and community, respectively). In doing so, she turns her back on leisure’s philosophical heritage. Leisure is a more robust concept than free time, containing value judgments within its meaning. Aristotle saw leisure as a necessary condition for the pursuit of knowledge. Intellectual inquiry demands leisure, conceived as the freedom from the necessity of providing for basic needs. Without leisure, people cannot pursue what is valuable in itself. Leisure in turn is only possible for properly educated people with sufficient wealth within a well-governed polis surrounded by friends. Much of the philosophical tradition from Seneca’s exhortation to dedicate oneself to philosophy in “On the Shortness of Life” to Aquinas’s *vita contemplativa* follows Aristotle. Their primary task is to determine which ends are valuable for their own sake and thus worthy for those blessed with leisure.

Rose is explicit in endorsing liberal proceduralism, not Aristotelian perfectionism. She endorses free time, not leisure, and scrupulously refuses to stipulate a conception of the good life. Perfectionists will object that treating leisure as a resource forgoes the difficult, philosophical task of determining which goods are in fact valuable. Communitarians, in turn, will object that Rose’s account is too individualistic, downplaying the role of leisure in establishing a shared culture and community across generations. The neglect of perfectionist and communitarian arguments leaves a significant gap in Rose’s theory. Her theory is ill-suited for criticizing social norms that demand long working hours despite exponential gains in productivity (a topic raised by Robert Sidelsky and Edward Sidelsky in *How Much Is Enough? Money and the Good Life* [New York: Other, 2012]). It also provides little guidance for how governments should use finite public funds in supporting and creating infrastructure so that people can fruitfully make use of their free time.

Second, *Free Time* focuses almost exclusively on the United States, missing the opportunity to turn to other countries as models and to explore how free time is influenced by cross-border connections. For example, workers in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland work far fewer hours per

year than US workers with similar or greater levels of productivity. Do some of these societies approximate Rose's conception of justice? Furthermore, Rose follows Rawls in restricting justice's focus to citizens living within a particular society. The amount of free time to which one is entitled depends on the norms and level of development of one's society (129). This ignores how free time is in fact partly a result of divisions of labor across borders and of migration. If wealthy societies can guarantee just background conditions by relying on production under (arguably) unjust conditions abroad, is this acceptable? What if free time is acquired at the expense of migrants recruited to provide caregiving?

Third, Rose conceives free time as an issue of distributive justice, a function of the number of hours in the day, the time required for rest and for meeting one's basic needs, and one's favored distributive principle (equality, sufficiency, etc.). While it is probably necessary to stipulate a clear distinction between time spent meeting basic needs and free time for the purposes of her theory, the reality is more nuanced. Work does not fit into "free" or "unfree" time—many people work because it gives their lives meaning and because they need money. Necessary caregiving can be both a burden and a central life project. The conception of basic needs also blurs in important ways, as Adam Smith illustrated with the day laborer ashamed to appear in public without his linen shirt. In the day laborer's society, a linen shirt has become a basic need. Even seemingly voluntary activities may be tinged with necessity. Rose gives the example of political campaigning or running for office as a possible way that one might choose to spend one's free time (143). This may be best conceived as a duty necessary for a functioning democracy.

The point is not that distinctions between free and unfree time cannot be made or validly posited for the purposes of outlining a theory. Rather, the concern is that the focus on distribution is misplaced. The corporate lawyer who puts in eighty-hour weeks is not a figure of sympathy because we assume that she could quit. More controversially, the caregiver who passes much of the week with his loved ones is not being treated unjustly if he finds meaning in his labor. It is not primarily the asymmetry in the amount of free time (however this is ultimately conceived) that is of moral interest. Rather, it is the fact that many people are coerced by employers and constrained by social conditions to live much of their lives under compulsion. For the purposes of justice, free time may better be analyzed by looking at coercion, domination, and structural injustice.

This connects to a fourth limitation. Though Rose alludes to the nineteenth-century labor struggles for "eight hours for what we will," her account gives short shrift to class and limited attention to structural barriers to gender equality. A class-based analysis would call attention to how low-wage workers are often forced to work long hours, including in the evening and graveyard shifts, and to take multiple jobs. They also find themselves vulnerable to scheduling that prioritizes the flexibility of employers. A gender-based analysis would not only show that women perform more care work than men but also morally assess the mechanisms that explain why this difference persists. A more ambitious analysis would analyze how class, gender, race, and disability intersect in ways that are not captured by focusing on individuals' access to free time.

Despite these limitations, *Free Time* is a model of Rawlsian political philosophy: precise, rigorous, closely argued, and empirically informed. Rose's case for

the importance of free time for justice is compelling. She has done us a service in reviving free time as a topic for liberal egalitarianism.

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Shields, Liam. *Just Enough: Sufficiency as a Demand of Justice*.  
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Sufficientarianism, generally speaking, is the view that securing enough of certain goods is of special importance to distributive justice. Compared to egalitarianism and prioritarianism, sufficientarianism has been less frequently defended by political philosophers, which makes the thorough and original defense of sufficientarianism in *Just Enough* an important contribution to the debate on distributive principles. The aim of the book is to show that sufficientarian principles, which are uniquely characterized in terms of what Shields calls the *positive thesis* and the *shift thesis*, have an indispensable and extensive role in a sound theory of justice. It argues that sufficientarian principles are indispensable in that they are distinct from and more plausible than rival principles (such as egalitarian and prioritarian ones) and have an extensive role in our reasoning about practical issues.

After chapter 1, which outlines the basic ideas to be discussed, the book can be divided into two parts, one theoretical and one applied. The theoretical part consists of chapters 2 and 3, where Shields provides a unique account of sufficientarianism that avoids some of the problems with other versions of the theory and defends a principle of sufficient autonomy. In chapters 4–6 Shields applies this version of sufficientarianism to practical issues concerning justice in education, child-rearing rights, and global distributive justice.

In chapter 2, Shields discusses two ways in which sufficientarianism has been understood and the main objections to them. Historically, sufficientarianism has been understood mainly as a *headcount* claim (i.e., we should maximize the number of people who have enough of some good) or as an *upper limit* claim (i.e., no distributive principle applies to benefits among people who have enough of some good). The headcount claim faces the objection that it recommends, quite implausibly, benefiting people closer to the sufficiency threshold by denying benefits to people further below the threshold. The upper limit claim has been criticized on the ground that the lower the sufficiency threshold is set, the more implausible it would be to say that no distributive principle applies above the threshold, and the higher the sufficiency threshold is set, the less distinctive sufficientarianism would be from prioritarian views. Shields provides a new minimum account of the fundamental structure of sufficientarian principles, which can avoid those objections. He proposes that sufficientarianism should be understood as a combination of the following two theses:

*Positive Thesis.* We have weighty noninstrumental reasons to secure at least enough of some good(s).