

Faith and the Structure of the Mind

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Abstract Faith, broadly construed, is central to the political, social and personal life of any rational agent. I argue for two main claims: first, that a typology of faith based on the fine-grained Indic categories of *bhakti*, *śraddhā*, *prasāda*, *abhisampratyaya* and *abhilāṣa* (each of which I explain) dissolves many of the philosophical problems associated with the nature of faith; second, that this typology of faith has elements that cannot be encompassed in a belief-desire psychology. The upshot is that the structure of the mind is more complicated than belief-desire psychology admits and that understanding the nature of faith has a role to play in charting the structure of the mind.

Keywords Faith · Folk psychology · Mental structure

Introduction: Theistic vs. Non-Theistic Faith

What is the nature of faith?

Theists are likely to hear this question as: what is the nature of *faith in God*? This is unsurprising, as ‘faith’ is shorthand for ‘faith in God’ in the Abrahamic tradition from which it emerges (Anscombe 2008). In the classic formulation found in *Hebrews* 11:6, faith is the ‘assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen,’ while Hugh of St. Victor defines it as ‘faith (*fides*) is a form of mental certitude

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about absent realities that is greater than opinion (*opinio*) and less than scientific knowledge (*scientia*).¹ These formulations raise a central philosophical concern for faith in God: can such assurance and conviction ever be rational? In a seminal paper, Clifford (1877) reasoned that it is only when we rationally assess relevant evidence that we track the truth. Why? Because when we believe anything on insufficient evidence, we greatly increase the risk of believing falsehoods, as there are more ways of being wrong than of being right. Believing falsehoods leads to harm, as when a ship owner believes his ship to be sea-worthy when it is not. Thus, Clifford (1877) concludes that ‘it is wrong always, everywhere, for any one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.’ So if faith is the assurance and conviction regarding absent realities, how can we have sufficient evidence to believe in God? Responding to this challenge is a major philosophical task for all reflective theists.

Central as the challenge of rationalising faith may be, it does not exhaust faith’s philosophical interest. My interest in faith relates to questions that are orthogonal to theism. In these non-theistic contexts, there is evidence for faith and consequently *rationalising* faith is not as pressing a concern. My concern is with faith broadly construed, not merely faith in God. (A terminological caveat: the proper contrast to theistic faith is non-theistic faith and the proper contrast to religious faith is secular faith. I do not think these oppositions mark the same boundaries: for example, strands of Buddhism and Hinduism are non-theistic, but arguably ‘religious’ in a sense opposed to ‘secular.’ At any rate, I finesse this issue by speaking only of non-theistic faith, which is a more capacious category that includes non-theistic religious faith and secular faith.)

Faith is central to the life of any rational agent, whether they are theists or not. Baier (1980) argues that faith is essential to joining and sustaining a moral order where we sacrifice personal advantage for the returns promised by membership in that moral order. Take a simple example: when people queue in an orderly manner to enter the Metro, they sacrifice whatever personal advantage they might gain from elbowing their way to the front of the queue for the returns promised by a moral order in which every person’s turn is accorded the same moral weight (contrast the lack of civic faith often witnessed when traffic lights fail). Faith is essential to mastering a difficult skill, craft or art, such as miniature painting. Without faith, faced with the litany of errors that characterise any acquisition of skill, we would give up too soon. Faith is just as important when entering into and sustaining a marriage or other close personal relationship. Hence, the nature of faith—political, practical, personal—is not merely of central concern to the theist, but to any rational agent. An objector could *stipulate* that ‘faith’ is just shorthand for ‘faith in God’, but such a stipulation would be implausible because, as I have illustrated, the phenomenon of faith is central to the life of any rational agent.

(The relation between theistic and non-theistic faith is independently interesting. One view is that they do not fundamentally differ in kind: they are either exactly the same mental state directed to different subject matters or they are mental states that

¹Quoted in Swinburne (1981/2005: 139).

only differ in degree along a certain dimension—with different subject matters, naturally. The opposing view is that they fundamentally differ in kind: either because their subject matters differ fundamentally or because the theistic mental state of faith is produced by cognitive mechanisms that are *sui generis*, analogous to what Plantinga (2000), following Calvin, calls a *sensus divinitatus*—a special cognitive mechanism for forming beliefs in the existence of God. Since I find no argument for the existence of God compelling (see Sobel 2009), I do not think God exists, and hence I do not think that the mental state of faith is directed onto any fundamentally different subject matter. Since I do not think that God exists, I do not find any plausibility in a *sensus divinitatus*. Thus, I think it is overwhelmingly plausible that theistic and non-theistic faith are of the same metaphysical kind albeit their epistemic statuses differ radically.)

I characterise the nature of faith from the first-person standpoint—‘what it’s like’ for the subject—primarily to set a manageable limit to inquiry and because that is the pole of the phenomenon that I want to focus on. Outside my purview are the social and economic factors implicated in faith, as are the objects of faith—particular persons, man-made artefacts, structures and institutions, and natural objects like mountains, rivers and forests. Important as these are to a complete account, the first-person standpoint is fundamental. The social and economic factors are only important in virtue of the fact that they constrain the first-person standpoint. The objects of faith are only objects of faith because individuals repose faith in them. (If a personal God exists, these objects would not be objects of faith for God, but objects of *knowledge*).

What is the relation between the first-person perspective on faith and any ritualised action (secular or religious)? One view is that faith is an *activity*. Supposed ritualised action *constitutes* faith: for example, to have faith in a student is nothing over and above treating her respectfully, supporting her when she stumbles, encouraging her when she wavers. (‘Constitution’ is an asymmetric dependence relation weaker than identity but stronger than causation. For example, the clay constitutes the statue, but since it can persist even when the statue is destroyed, it is not identical to the statue. The clay does not cause the statue either, since if causing it were one of its causal powers, it is unclear why the clay ceases to cause the statue when the clay is mushed so as to destroy the statue. I do not mean to suggest that the activity view is a form of logical behaviourism but rather it is an enactivist approach to faith, motivated by the enactivist approach to perceptual experience defended by O’Regan and Noë (2001) and Noë (2004)). In contrast to the view that faith is an activity stands the view that it is a *state*. On the state view, faith-behaviour is one thing, its subjective character another. The state view allows that it is possible to behave in a manner typifying faith but to lack it; for example, one behaves ‘as if’ one had faith in a student. The state view also allows faith to exist without any behavioural manifestation. On the state view, the subjective character of faith is dissociated from faith-behaviour in both directions, hence there is no possibility of a constitutive connection between them. The state view can concede that ritualised action may well *cause* faith to arise, but it does not itself *constitute* it. The state view accords with Pascal’s, who thought that the way to acquire faith is to behave as the faithful do, thereby causing faith to arise naturally (Swinburne 2005). However, the question of the relation between the first-person perspective on faith and ritualised action presupposes that there is unitary

concept of faith; I will argue that there is no such unitary concept and as such, the question of the relationship between faith and action is ill-posed.

I turn now to motivating and developing a typology of faith that draws on Indic traditions, in particular a typology of faith drawn from Buddhist materials. I will show that this typology of faith, largely drawn from the *Divyāvadāna*, can be used to dissolve many of the philosophical problems associated with faith.

A Typology of Faith

There is little philosophical consensus on the nature of faith. One central disagreement is whether or not faith is propositional. ('Snow is white' and 'Schee ist weiss' both express the proposition that snow is white. We can take an *attitude* towards that proposition: we can know it, believe it, wish it, hope it, expect it, etc. To say that faith is propositional is to say that it consists of one such attitude directed towards a proposition.) If faith is propositional, is it a form of knowledge (Plantinga 2000) or is it a form of belief falling short of knowledge (Swinburne 2005)? If faith is not propositional, is it a primarily affective allegiance to moral principles (Braithwaite 1966) or strong hope and powerful trust (Clegg 1979)? In the face of such fundamental disagreements, one might suspect that the meanings these thinkers attach to faith differ, and hence that they are talking past each other. Perhaps the range of phenomena clubbed together under 'faith' are too discrete to come under any unitary understanding of faith.

It is helpful to turn to Buddhist materials, such the *Divyāvadāna* (helpfully presented in Rotman 2008), where there is no single word corresponding to 'faith'. Instead, there are at least five words—*bhakti* (devotion), *śraddhā* (trust), *prasāda* (serenity), *abhisampratyaya* (rational conviction) and *abhilāṣa* (aspiration)—picking out distinct concepts, all of which plausibly fall under the rubric of faith. Hence, within the Indic tradition, we find a finer grained delineation of the conceptual terrain than we inherit with the word 'faith' and it is to exploring these concepts that I now turn (throughout, my concern is not textual and philological fidelity but conceptual clarity). The upshot of this inquiry is that the concept of faith is best differentiated into that of *bhakti*, *śraddhā*, *prasāda*, *abhisampratyaya* and *abhilāṣa*, which I will now explain.

Bhakti is paradigmatically a feeling of devotional love, directed towards a living or divine person, who has the power to intervene in worldly matters, for example, by improving health or dispelling danger. In *bhakti*, devotion is instrumental given with the expectation of something in return (though that rare item, true *bhakti*, is given without the expectation of anything in return); it is typically expressed in an act of prayer (Rotman 2008). One might, for example, have *bhakti* in one's spiritual teacher. It seems plausible that *bhakti* can come in different strengths, an idea we might model by considering its counterfactual robustness. That is, we can model the strength of *bhakti* by determining whether the agent still has it when circumstances are appropriately changed. For example, were I to lose *bhakti* in my spiritual teacher after she innocently misquotes a text, then my *bhakti* in her would not be very strong;

were I to retain *bhakti* in her even when she admits to grave financial improprieties it would be very strong (but perhaps misplaced!).

Śraddhā is a state of trust or confidence which, in contrast to *bhakti*, need not be directed towards a living or divine *person*, but can also be directed towards what such a person says.² One can have *śraddhā* (trust/confidence) both in the speaker and the speaker's utterances. What is the force of this distinction? I may have *śraddhā* in the speaker but think that a particular token utterance of the speaker is false; conversely, I may have *śraddhā* in the speaker's utterances without having it in the speaker, a point nicely illustrated by an example borrowed from Anscombe (2008): suppose you are convinced that the speaker is both mistaken and that he will say the opposite of what he believes to be true; so if he says *p*, then he believes *not-p*, about which he is actually mistaken—so what is actually the case is *p*, which is what he says! In such a case, you have *śraddhā* in what the speaker says, but not in the speaker. Unlike *bhakti* (devotional love), which may occur without any evidence of the existence of the object of *bhakti*, it is necessary for *śraddhā* that a person have some confirmation of the object of *śraddhā*, either via indirect visual evidence or via the testimony of someone who has directly understood or seen the object of *śraddhā* (Rotman 2008). *Śraddhā* typically results in an act of *giving* (Rotman 2008). For our purposes, the most important feature of *śraddhā* is that it changes the orientation of the will.

Prasāda involves a deeper degree of understanding than *śraddhā* (trust/confidence) and conveys, in the words of Gethin (1991/2001: 112), '... a state of mental composure, serenity, clarity or purity, and trust.'³ It is also translated as 'inspired clarity.' (Clegg 1979 too discusses the 'serenity' of faith, admirable because there is much to disturb it, as a sign of strong-mindedness missing in those of weaker character.) *Prasāda* also typically results in an act of giving.

Abhisampratyaya is a more refined state of *prasāda* (mental serenity) in which there is conviction or trusting confidence that something is the case or in the truth of specific claims. The key point is that *abhisampratyaya* is a form of *rational* acceptance (Rotman 2008).

Abhilāṣa is a state of longing or yearning to be like what one has faith in, with the confidence that one can in fact become like that (Rotman 2008). It is this strand of faith that leads Tennant (1943/1989: 111) to claim that 'Faith is an outcome of the inborn propensity to self-conservation and self-betterment which is part of human nature, and is no more a miraculously superadded endowment than is sensation and understanding.'

What is the relation between these states? I will assess how these states relate to each other in terms of value shortly, but consider now their logical relations. On one view, not all these states are on par, logically. How so? Consider that the shades crimson, scarlet and ruby are *ways of being red*—they are not on par with red; we

²The secular analogue of *śraddhā* is *viśvāsa*.

³While Rotman's analysis of *prasāda* makes much of gift giving, I think this emphasis is misconceived. This is because, as Rotman (2008) notes, there are cases of *prasāda* that have nothing to do with any gift-giving—what is central, rather, is the mental state of *prasāda*.

say that red is a *determinable* whose *determinates* are the shades of red (Funkhouser 2006). Analogously, according to Asaṅga's account in his *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *śraddhā* (trust/confidence) is a determinable whose determinates are *prasāda* (mental serenity), *abhisampratyaya* (rational conviction) and *abhilāṣa* (aspiration):

What are the forms of *śraddhā*? It is conviction in what is real, *prasāda* regarding that which has virtuous qualities, and longing for what is possible. It has the function of providing a basis for will.

(Quoted in Rotman 2008: 145)

I depart from Asaṅga's usage. Whereas Asaṅga wants to use *śraddhā* as an umbrella term encompassing *prasāda*, *abhisampratyaya* and *abhilāṣa*, I think it is more accurate to regard it as picking out a phenomenon on par with them. Let me explain.

Leaving aside *bhakti* (devotional love) and *abhilāṣa* for the moment, it seems that there is a natural progression from *śraddhā* to *prasāda* and finally to *abhisampratyaya*. Trust and confidence strengthens into a state characterised by serenity and culminates in one that is rationally accepted. Each step of this progression does not logically necessitate the next step: *śraddhā* (trust/confidence) might not evolve to *prasāda* (mental serenity), *prasāda* might not evolve to *abhisampratyaya* (rational conviction). What is important is that *śraddhā* is just one among this progression of states, because it picks out a distinct and psychologically plausible state that does not seem to stand as a determinable to a determinate. Again, we might helpfully model these states by the differing extents to which they are counterfactual supporting. So, it seems plausible that *śraddhā* is less counterfactually robust than *prasāda*, which in turn is less counterfactually robust than *abhisampratyaya*.

What is the relation of *bhakti* (devotional love) and *abhilāṣa* (aspiration) to the progression of states I have discussed? *Abhilāṣa* fits naturally with *abhisampratyaya* (rational conviction) because when the agent has a serene and clear understanding of specific claims that she rationally accepts, then she is in good position to yearn to realise the state she aspires to. Even so, one can imagine *abhilāṣa* failing to arise with *abhisampratyaya*, just as one can imagine that *abhilāṣa* arises with *śraddhā* or *prasāda*. In contrast, *bhakti* does not seem to stand in obvious relation either to *abhilāṣa* or to the progression of *śraddhā*, *prasāda* and *abhisampratyaya*. The orientation of the agent in *bhakti* is essentially geared towards a person, where what is of intrinsic value is that person. On the other hand, these other states differ structurally from *bhakti* because they are not essentially geared towards a person, but towards realising a beneficial state. In the former, but not in the latter, the *particular person* that is the object of *bhakti* is the essential conduit for the emergence of the beneficial state.

How do these states relate to each other in terms of value? It is plausible that the progression of *śraddhā* (trust/confidence), *prasāda* (mental serenity) and *abhisampratyaya* (rational conviction) is also a progression of value: the mental state becomes progressively firmer, clearer, better grounded. The value of *abhilāṣa* (aspiration) does not seem clearly commensurable with this progression, rather, it seems intrinsically valuable in its own right. The independent and intrinsic value of *abhilāṣa* fits well with the idea that it can coherently arise along with any member of the progression of states. What about *bhakti*? Given that the orientation of the will in *bhakti*

is geared towards a particular person who is seen as the locus of value, rather than towards the cultivation of beneficial states, it too seems to be outside the progression of states. Do *bhakti* and *abhilāṣa* differ in value? I am inclined to favour the latter over the former, if only because there is all the difference in the world between recognising someone to be of value and worthy of devotional love and recognising that what makes them valuable imposes normative demands on oneself, e.g. to cultivate the very qualities that make them valuable.

This typology of faith shows that central debates about faith are misconceived. Is faith propositional? Well, it seems very clear that one form of *abhisampratyaya* (rational conviction) is propositional. Is faith largely a connative, rather than a cognitive state? Well, it seems clear that *śraddhā* (trust/confidence) and *bhakti* fit that description. Is faith a kind of allegiance to moral principles? Well, when *abhilāṣa* (aspiration) is directed to moral principles, it does not seem outlandish to characterise it as a form of allegiance. Is faith a form of trust? Well, both *śraddhā* and *prasāda* fit the bill. Whether *abhisampratyaya* (rational conviction) is a form of *knowledge* or merely belief is a nice question. I am inclined to think that it falls short of knowledge. This is because knowledge makes faith redundant, for example, if while training to run a 5-minute mile I *know* that I will succeed, I no longer require any kind of faith that I will do so. Since knowing the future is not cognitively open to us, we typically require faith to carry on. (Of course, we sometimes say ‘I just know that you’re going to ace your exam,’ but this signals emphatic confidence in the exam-taker and is not really a claim to *knowledge*.)

This brings to an end my typology of faith. I have argued that we can get a better grip on faith by differentiating it into *bhakti*, *śraddhā*, *prasāda*, *abhisampratyaya* and *abhilāṣa*. Each of these marks out psychologically plausible and distinct states of mind. These states exhibit a degree of structure in the progression from *śraddhā* to *prasāda* and then *abhisampratyaya*, which is also a progression in value. Most significantly, by drawing these distinctions, we dissolve several philosophical questions regarding faith. I now turn to discussing the significance of this typology of faith to our understanding of the structure of the mind. Understanding the structure of the mind is pivotal for understanding the genesis and mechanisms of transformation, here understood as a deeply significant alteration in the agent’s orientation and engagement with the world.

Belief-Desire Psychology and the Structure of the Mind

The dominant model for explaining behaviour in both philosophy and psychology is the belief-desire model (also standardly referred to it as ‘folk psychology’ or ‘belief-desire psychology’). We are often very adept at predicting the behaviour of other people. For example, if you know that I am a tea drinker, then you can reliably predict I will choose tea over coffee. We are also remarkably good at attributing mental states to other people, predicting their future mental states and explaining their behaviour in terms of their past mental states. For example, I can tell by your behaviour that you are hungry; I can predict that you will get irritable if you do not eat soon; if I see you filling in a complaint form at the restaurant, I can infer you were not satisfied

with your meal. Belief-desire psychology, as the name suggests, takes beliefs and desires as the elements for the explanation of behaviour. For example, consider this toy case: if I go to India Gate for ice cream, then this is explained by my desire for ice cream coupled with a belief that I can get ice cream at India Gate. Though the model is couched in terms of ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires,’ these are to be understood in as fine-grained a way as is required; for example, the model recognises the subtle differences between *hoping* and *wishing* that the sun shines tomorrow. The belief-desire model is simple, powerful and intuitive.

The belief-desire model purports not only to explain behaviour, but to tell us about the structure of the mind. Assume that the belief-desire model successfully predicts and explains both what we think and what we do. Such predictions and explanations are causal: your desire for ice cream is what *causes* you to go to India Gate. Notice that were you to desire cloth rather than ice cream then that would cause you to go to Shanker Market, not India Gate. Change either the desire or belief element, and you get different behaviour. Thus, the unit of what seems to be causally efficacious is your belief-desire pair. How else would you account for the sensitivity of exhibited behaviour to the changing pattern of desires and beliefs? It is natural to think that the underlying mental data structures mirror the functional structure of desires and beliefs. So when I attribute to you a desire for ice cream, reasons the proponent of the belief-desire model, I am committed to a mental architecture that is sensitive to the semantic and functionally discrete units that may be causally active or inactive, depending on what your behaviour turns out to be. So belief-desire psychology not only explains and predicts behaviour, but it also reveals facts about the structure of the mind.

In the project of understanding the structure of the mind, the significance of belief-desire psychology has been challenged in two ways: first, that it has structural import but is radically incomplete; second, that it lacks structural import altogether. I will consider these challenges in reverse order.

Consider the challenge that belief-desire psychology lacks structural import altogether.⁴ Bogdan (1993) argues that belief-desire psychology faces *the gap problem*: the gap between belief and desires and the underlying architecture of the mind needs to be closed, in a principled manner. Bogdan is sceptical that there is any such principled mapping between belief and desires on the one hand, and the underlying architecture of the mind on the other. Why? Consider the relation between commonsense physics (on which objects do not accelerate to the ground at the same rate) and the actual physics of the world (on which they do): the former consists of practical concepts that serve the pragmatic function of helping us get about in the world, but ‘Their degree of intellectual penetration into the nature of physical things is commensurate with their practical functions’ (Bogdan 1993)—in particular, it is no sure guide to the underlying structure of reality. Analogously, belief-desire psychology serves a practical function but it would be rash to think that it mandates any particular underlying mental architecture—a view also recently defended by Godfrey-Smith (2005).

⁴See Dennett 1978 for an early statement of such a view.

Compelling as this challenge to belief-desire psychology may be, it is not compelling enough. While I cannot provide a full defence here, Jackson and Pettit (1990) provide a strategy to resist the challenge. They think that our folk psychological concepts are *functional* concepts and it suffices for having beliefs and desires that we are in states that satisfy these roles; these functional roles have realisers but we need not commit to what they are. All we need to commit to is that the realisers—whatever they turn out to be—have the functional architecture of our (functional) folk psychological concepts; such an isomorphism seem unexceptionable. I turn now to the second challenge to belief-desire psychology.

Consider the challenge that belief-desire psychology has structural import but is radically incomplete. Unlike the first challenge, it is not a sceptical challenge. This challenge concedes that belief-desire psychology has implications for mental structure, but it insists that belief-desire psychology is not the whole picture. Belief-desire psychology needs supplementation. What *kind* of supplementation? Gendler (2008a, b) has argued that in addition to beliefs and desires, we need to appeal to *aliefs*. Gendler (2008a, b) argues that aliefs are implicated in the following phenomena: ‘... subjects are reluctant to drink from a glass of juice in which a completely sterilized dead cockroach has been stirred, hesitant to wear a laundered shirt that has been previously worn by someone they dislike, and loath to eat soup from a brand-new bed-pan’; in each case, subjects do not *believe* that the juice is dangerous, the shirt ‘infected’ or the bedpan unclean. Yet they refuse to drink, wear or eat in these cases. We need to appeal to something more than beliefs and desires to understand their behaviour. Gendler conceives aliefs as mental states which we share with non-human animals, that are conceptually and developmentally antecedent to cognitive attitudes, encode patterns of responses to stimuli, need not be conscious, are not subject to rational assessment, can generate action without mediation via desire, and typically include an affective component. Regardless of whether Gendler’s specific supplementation is plausible, what she is pressing on is the inadequacy of belief-desire psychology. The objection I will develop to belief-desire psychology is structurally analogous to Gendler’s objection.

Can all the phenomena associated with faith—those picked out by *bhakti*, *śraddhā*, *prasāda*, *abhisampratyaya* and *abhilāṣa*—be fully explained by belief-desire psychology? *Abhisampratyaya* and *abhilāṣa* seem to be susceptible to an analysis in terms of beliefs and desires. The objects of *abhisampratyaya*—what is the case and the truth of specific claims—can be straightforwardly rendered in terms of propositions (Believe: that Rakesh speaks truly). *Abhilāṣa* is the desire to realise a beneficial state, which can again be characterised propositionally (Desire: that I run a five 5-minute mile). One may quibble with these decompositions, but for my purposes, I will grant that a fully worked out account is in principle possible for these states (if it turns out they too cannot be accounted for by belief-desire psychology, that is just grist for my mill). It is not clear, however, that *bhakti*, *śraddhā* and *prasāda* are susceptible to decomposition. Let me focus on *śraddhā*.

There are compelling reasons to doubt that belief-desire psychology gives the correct explanation of *śraddhā*. This emerges most clearly when we consider what it means to have *śraddhā* in a person. You may believe many propositions about that person: that they are a good doctor, and that it is good that they are a doctor. You may

even feel a characteristic warmth towards them.⁵ But is your *śraddhā* in your doctor nothing over and above those propositions coupled with warmth towards her? I think that to think so is to confuse the *byproducts* of *śraddhā* with *śraddhā* itself. No doubt, if you have *śraddhā* in a person, you will think that they are good at *X*; you will feel a characteristic warmth towards them. But these are not the essence of *śraddhā*. Why not? Because you can have *śraddhā* in a person even if you do not believe that they are particularly good at *X* (for any value of *X*!). Your *śraddhā* in a person survives changes in your moods and general affect—you might be momentarily very angry with someone whom you have *śraddhā* in.

In response to this objection, the proponent of the belief-desire model might insist that at any given moment, your *śraddhā* can nevertheless be characterised by a belief-desire pair. Another tack she could take is that your *śraddhā* is the total disjunction of all the propositions and affective states you bear towards that person. But neither strategy is particularly compelling. Even if there some associated belief-desire pair I can identify for every moment of *śraddhā*, given the ever changing range of beliefs and the range of affective states that I can bear toward the person in whom I have *śraddhā*, we lose our grip on what *śraddhā* is. The second strategy is psychologically implausible: when I have *śraddhā* in a person, I do not believe a massively disjunctive proposition. These defences thereby fail.

Another response to my objection—this time from the foes of belief-desire psychology who, nevertheless, do not want to multiply entities beyond necessity—would be to assimilate *śraddhā* to the extant categories challenging belief-desire psychology, such as aliefs. While *śraddhā* shares an affective and action-generating components with alief, they seem to pick out quite different types of states: unlike aliefs, *śraddhā*-type states typically are conscious and subject to rational assessment. This is further evidence that *śraddhā*-type states are really a distinct psychological kind.

On the assumption that belief-desire psychology has structural import and that it cannot correctly explain *śraddhā*, then belief-desire psychology is radically incomplete. We have already seen evidence for that claim in the form of aliefs. The objection to belief-desire psychology is deepened when we add *śraddhā*-type states, which do not seem to be naturally captured by belief-desire psychology.

Conclusion

I have argued that faith is of central concern not just to the theist, but to all rational agents. I argued that characterising faith as a unitary phenomenon leads to philosophical puzzles that can be dissolved by the fractionation of faith into *bhakti*, *śraddhā*, *prasāda*, *abhisampratyaya* and *abhilāṣa*, each of which is psychologically plausible. I then used this typology of faith to argue that belief-desire psychology, as standardly conceived, is radically incomplete. At the very minimum, belief-desire psychology

⁵These two claims are how Price (1965), in his classic discussion of belief, reduces evaluative belief-in to belief-that, i.e. to a propositional attitude. I reject his analysis.

requires supplementation with *śraddhā*-type states. It is an open question, left for further research, whether *śraddhā*-type states should in turn be decomposed into more basic psychological constituents or whether they are themselves fundamental.

Acknowledgments Thanks to the anonymous referees of this journal and Ramdas Lamb, Kritika Yeg-nashankaran and Bronwyn Finnigan for their written comments on an earlier draft. A version of the paper was presented at a conference —“On Faith: the Transformative Possibilities”—organised by the Patna Collective, and I’m grateful for the feedback I got there. Thanks to Matt MacKenzie for his encouragement and help.

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