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Killing in War
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theories, which is especially useful given that it clarifies several terminological issues, both in the literature as well in the text. From then onwards, the book traces disjunctivism from its introduction by J. M. Hinton in the 1960s to its use and development by Hinton again in the 1970s, Paul Snowdon and John McDowell in the 1980s, M. G. F. Martin, Jonathan Dancy, Alan Millar, Howard Robinson, Harold Langsam and Snowdon in the 1990s to A. D. Smith, Mark Johnston and Martin in the noughties.

An interesting feature of the collection is that not all papers are presented as arguments for (or against) disjunctivism as such. Rather the papers largely fall into three camps. In the first camp we get the chronologically earlier papers that introduce various forms of disjunctivism to shed light on pre-existing debates. For instance Snowdon (1981) uses disjunctivism to argue that the causal theory of perception isn’t a conceptual truth. Similarly, Martin (1997) shows us how we need to adopt disjunctivism to save naı̈ve realism.

In the second camp we get the straightforward arguments for and against disjunctivism. Millar (1996), for example, assumes that the main reason to be a disjunctivist is that it enables us to avoid the risk of committing to sense-data. He argues that we face this risk only if we assume that awareness of our visual experiences involves visually perceiving these experiences. Moreover, he argues that if we instead assume that such awareness only involves forming beliefs about our visual experiences, we no longer risk committing to sense-data and therefore we no longer have reason to be disjunctivists.

In the third camp we get the chronologically later papers that aim to clarify the disjunctivist position. Johnston (2004), for instance, argues that disjunctivism shouldn’t be treated as the negation of the view that perceptual experiences, hallucinations and illusions share a common core but should instead be treated as a way of resisting this view. Martin (2004) for his part explores the accounts of experience to which disjunctivists need to be committed.

Given the diverse set of applications that disjunctivism is put towards and the extensive clarifications of the view at hand, this collection presents a powerful case for disjunctivism, even by contemporary standards.

Raamy Majeed
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In his latest book, just war scholar Jeff McMahan argues compellingly against what he calls the ‘orthodox view’ of killing in just war theory. Above all, he challenges the thesis of the moral equality of combatants, according to which combatants of all warring parties have an equal right to employ (lethal) violence against each other.

Contrary both to the ‘orthodox view’ and to many people’s intuitions, McMahan argues that not only political and military leaders may be held morally responsible for participating in an unjust war. Rejecting the thesis that ordinary soldiers or combatants are responsible only for their conduct in war (jus in bello), he claims that they are morally responsible also for fighting at all in a war that lacks a just cause, i.e. an unjust war. According to McMahan, soldiers are morally required to ensure that they participate only in wars that satisfy the jus ad bellum conditions; they should refuse to serve in wars that do not satisfy these conditions and are therefore unjust. Epistemic uncertainty may excuse
soldiers who wrongly believe themselves to be fighting in a just war, but, if in doubt, soldiers should still refuse because the risk of being wrong about a war’s being just is greater than the risk of being wrong about a war’s being unjust. If soldiers are nevertheless participating in an unjust war, McMahan continues, all their actions in the course of that war become unjust, i.e. morally wrong, even if they comply with the rules of *jus in bello*. McMahan concludes that while unjust combatants may legitimately be targeted, just combatants are not legitimate targets in war, because the latter are fighting for a just cause and so have not forfeited any right not to be attacked unless they have violated the rules of *jus in bello*. Soldiers, therefore, are not morally equal. More generally, McMahan argues convincingly against double standards in morality, showing how moral standards upheld outside of war should apply equally to warfare.

McMahan’s book is a uniquely comprehensive and concise analysis of one of the central problems of traditional just war theory and a successful attempt to overcome some of its major flaws. Independently of whether or not one agrees with all implications of his argument, one cannot but acknowledge its outstanding contribution to contemporary just war theory. McMahan’s thought-provoking theses will greatly benefit the debate among all just war scholars. It is certainly a book anyone interested in questions related to the ethics of warfare and military interventions should read.

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To what extent are we agents in our mental lives? If we can have control over our thoughts then what is the scope of this mental agency; what kinds of mental state can we intentionally bring ourselves to have; and how, if at all, are mental actions related to bodily actions? Such questions have been largely ignored in previous philosophy of action. *Mental Actions* collects twelve original papers (with an introduction by Matthew Soteriou) by influential writers in philosophy of action and mind, including Alfred Mele, Christopher Peacocke, Brian O’Shaughnessy, Pamela Hieronymi, and Thomas Pink, to begin addressing this significant oversight. As Soteriou points out in his introduction, getting clearer on mental agency can inform a range of more general debates and many of the contributors consider such implications. For example, Lucy O’Brien [Ch. 11] argues that the fact that having a demonstrative thought (such as *that glass is heavy*), when there is no such object in the world, can be subjectively indistinguishable from a similar, successful demonstrative thought, suggests that Object-Dependent Externalism about mental content (that entails that if there is no object referred to then there is no thought at all [215]) is false; Soteriou [Ch. 12] argues that our ability to introspect mental actions means that there must be a conscious vehicle with phenomenal character for such active thinking; Pink [Ch. 5] argues that since we cannot intentionally form particular desires or beliefs, ordinary bodily action must involve a *sui generis*, practical mode of exercising rationality if we want to accommodate moral responsibility for our actions; and so on.

These are interesting, well-argued, and largely well-written papers making this a valuable collection. One notable point that arises from it is that there is considerable agreement on important questions, such as the scope of mental agency, but that this can be obscured by the authors’ use of different terminology. For instance, Mele