Abstract. Drawing on Black radical thought, some political theorists have elaborated a notion of ‘fugitive freedom’ that challenges us to understand freedom beyond the canonical concepts of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ liberty. The idea of fugitive freedom concerns the vast liminal space between being enslaved and enjoying complete political (or ethical) liberty. Whereas for traditional political theory, there are two ‘conditions’ or ‘statuses’ assigned to subjects (‘free’ or ‘slave’), reflection on slave narratives and the history of maroon communities points to freedom expressed in escape, flight, and movement away from domination. Fugitive freedom is enabled and sustained through quotidian, clandestine practices of communication, concealment, care, and refuge. Inspired by these exhortations to reimagine the forms that freedom can take, this paper finds in Spinoza a notion of fugitivity, understood as a counter-power, animated by the desire to escape domination, generate solidarity, and forge mental community.

Keywords. Spinoza, slavery, domination, fugitivity, freedom, marronage

Drawing on Black radical thought, some political theorists elaborate a notion of ‘fugitive freedom’ that challenges us to understand freedom beyond the canonical concepts of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ liberty. The idea of fugitive freedom concerns the vast liminal space between being enslaved and enjoying complete political (or ethical) liberty. To this day, political theory appeals to the distinction in Roman Law, according to which there are two ‘conditions’ or ‘statuses’ assigned to subjects (‘free’ or ‘slave’). Recent thinkers argue that reflection on slave resistance, rebellion, and maroon communities suggests a distinctive understanding of freedom, which is expressed in escape, flight, and movement away from domination. ‘Fugitivity’ names freedom generated through refusals of domination and the production of alternative forms of social life. Fugitivity, evasion, and marronage require sustained,
quotidian, clandestine practices of communication, concealment, care, and sanctuary. Fugitivity, they suggest, becomes significant for political theory only when our hermeneutics takes slavery seriously.

Inspired by these exhortations to reimagine the forms that freedom can take when we strive to think ‘in the wake’ of slavery, I suggest that we find in Spinoza indices of fugitive freedom. 1 Attention to Spinoza’s representations and analyses of servitude, slavery, and bondage call into view unauthorised seizures of power and connection. By ‘fugitivity’, I understand a counter-power animated by the desire to escape domination, generate solidarity, and forge mental community. Given that Spinoza associates freedom with reason and intellectual perfection, my proposal may seem surprising. Yet, surprising angles are precisely what the hermeneutic of fugitivity offers to political theory and the history of political thought. Thinkers of fugitivity, by reflecting upon the insights and experiences of the enslaved, challenge, enrich, and proliferate our understandings of freedom, power, and human striving. Although I will only begin to sketch it here, theoretical reflection on slavery and fugitivity presses us to reinterpret Spinoza’s thinking on freedom. In particular, the perspective of fugitivity urges us to attend to what Spinoza thinks cannot be suppressed and foreclosed, even when subject to extraordinary domination.

Fugitive Freedom

From the point of view of racial domination and the history of resistance to slavery, some argue that canonical concepts of freedom are inadequate. 2 In political theory, three concepts of freedom typically orient analysis. Each of these concepts relies on an idea of slavery to draw the contours of the freedom being defined. Yet, according to critics, the experiences and practices of enslaved people do not play a meaningful role in these conceptions of freedom. Thus, while thinkers often invoke the idea of ‘the slave’ and legal definitions of slavery, they seldom reflect upon how human beings have negotiated, resisted, disrupted, and endured slavery. As a result, even though, as Orlando Patterson argues, the realities of slavery inspire the western ideal of freedom, 3 canonical concepts of freedom tend to be abstract, idealised, and ‘static’. 4

Made (in)famous by Isaiah Berlin, one canonical concept is the idea of ‘positive liberty’. This ideal is grounded in a classical, Stoic notion of freedom, understood as self-actualization or self-mastery. In the well-known words of Berlin,

The ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. 5
The language of mastery, here, implies a relationship to its opposite, slavery. Positive liberty, for Berlin, entails the power to direct and control oneself rather than being acted upon by ‘external’, alien forces, or wills. For ancients and Stoics, enjoying the power of self-mastery has nothing to do with one’s legal status. Indeed, they often point out that an enslaved person might enjoy greater powers of self-mastery than a capricious, lustful, and abusive master or tyrant. Rather, Stoic self-mastery concerns the extent to which someone exercises psychological resolve and fortitude. A free person remains independent of her (irrational) desires, needs, and circumstances; she keeps her mind trained on what truly matters and on what reason judges to be best; she is her own master. She remains indifferent to goods such as status, reputation, and wealth. She is independent insofar as she concerns herself only with what is exclusively ‘up to her’, which is the cultivation of her virtue and the proper use of her intellect and will.

A second canonical idea of freedom is ‘negative liberty’, defined as freedom from the interference of other agents. As Berlin puts it, ‘I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others’. What matters most from this point of view is that no one – especially state or religious authorities – prevents us from pursuing whatever ends we determine to be valuable for ourselves. To enjoy negative liberty is to be permitted to as much sovereignty over the private exercise of our wills as is compatible with the liberty of others. Those with liberty from interference are not expected to conform to the demands of a master, but neither are they pressed to master themselves. Negative liberty imposes legal restraints with respect to how we treat others; it demands that we do not harm, enslave, or instrumentalise others; it demands that public authorities do not unnecessarily and excessively restrict individuals’ range of choices. In contrast to positive liberty, to be owed respect for negative liberty does not depend upon living a ‘good’ or ‘respectable’ life, exemplifying ‘human virtue’, or demonstrating enlightened rationality. We are, from this point of view, owed the freedom to make good or bad choices, and to otherwise live as wish.

Neo-republicans have introduced a third, also negative, concept of ‘freedom as non-domination’, defined as freedom from uncontrolled, arbitrary power. We are free, on this conception, if we have confidence that laws as well as social and political norms reliably protect us from domination. According to Pettit, ‘in the republican tradition … liberty is always cast in terms of the opposition between liber and servus, citizen and slave’. Pettit claims that reflecting on how slavery provides a paradigmatic instance of domination allows us to appreciate the enduring value and distinctiveness of republican freedom: ‘Domination … is exemplified by the relationship of mater to slave or to servant’. A master is authorised ‘to practice interference … at will and with impunity: they do not have to seek anyone’s leave and they do not have to incur any scrutiny or penalty’. Simply put, a master can do whatever he pleases to his slave, and an enslaved person has no (or little) sanctioned recourse. Someone enjoys freedom as non-domination when she is not
in the position of a slave, or in a position that shares significant features of slavery. For example, someone is non-dominated when others must take into account her wishes when regulating, constraining, and governing her, and when she has reliable means to complain and influence the behaviours of those who might control or interfere with her. She is free when ‘unlike the slave, [she] is not subject to the arbitrary power of another’.12 Whereas positive freedom names an ethical ideal of individual self-actualisation, the two negative notions are prized in the realm of political liberty. Freedom as non-interference and as non-domination name two perspectives from which to understand the proper aims of government. Should laws and political institutions aim to protect life, liberty, and property, while otherwise leaving agents as much room as possible to define and pursue their ends as they see fit? Or should the focus of legislation be to ensure the free status of its constituents? From the second, republican point of view, being left alone to determine one’s ends is less important than having a say about what is done to you, and thereby being able to influence the shape of power and authority that governs one’s life.

As several theorists point out, canonised concepts of political liberty often define freedom in opposition to slavery.13 It is not difficult to see how consideration of slavery is illustrative. It gives shape to the various ideas of freedom through providing a vivid contrast. The Roman Digest defines slavery as ‘an institution of the jus gentium, whereby someone is against nature made subject to the ownership of another’.14 On this definition, slavery violates a person’s nature, but natural law permits slavery when a person has forfeited their natural rights (for example, when committing assault or participating in [what is taken to be] unlawful combat). The definition is followed by the etymological assertion that ‘Slaves [servi] are so-called, because generals have a custom of selling their prisoners and thereby preserving [saving, from servo, servare] them rather than killing them’.15 Roman law thus acknowledges that humans are not, pace Aristotle, slaves by nature, but it also allows for multiple circumstances under which humans can be appropriately assigned the status of ‘slave’ rather than ‘free’. Under Roman law, the enslaved can legally be treated as though they are property, fungible things that can be bought, sold, exchanged, and deployed as instruments to realise the ends of their masters.16 Several critics object to how slavery serves each of these canonical concepts as the contrast to freedom.17 For some, slavery does not capture the kinds of unfreedom that ought to preoccupy current political theorists, which are more subtle, diffuse, unconscious, and structural.18 For others, such as Neil Roberts, these canonical accounts rely heavily on the idea of slavery, but miss the opportunity to identify distinctive modes of freedom that the enslaved succeeded in bringing about. That is, they ignore the experiences of the enslaved and the resistant practices and forms of life that they win for themselves despite being enslaved.19 As a result, slavery and freedom are represented as ‘static’ and seamless rather than dynamic and multi-dimensional.20 In reality, however, like any form of oppression, slavery is a ‘predicament’ that people endure, negotiate, and sometimes manage to refuse and evade.21
Barnor Hesse, Juliet Hooker, and Jennet Kirkpatrick, among others, draw portraits of what is in-between the classic conceptual antonyms of slavery and freedom: a vast liminal space of ‘fugitivity’.\(^{22}\) Whereas, for traditional political theory, there are two ‘conditions’ or ‘statuses’ assigned to subjects, studies of slave resistance and the history of maroon communities, for example, highlight freedom expressed in escape, flight, and movement away from domination. Being ‘a slave’ is not something stable, carved into stone. The freedom expressed in fugitivity is unofficial, unauthorised, and forbidden. It is taken, not granted. It is a mode of freedom that is against and beyond the law. To be enacted, it must be kept out of reach of dominators, enslavers, lord proprietors, and police.

In *Freedom as Marronage*, Roberts argues that taking seriously the reality of flight from slavery forces us to re-conceptualise both freedom and servitude. *Marronage* refers to the practice of escaping slavery. Although many escaped only for hours or days, others fled to create autonomous communities, modes of life that eluded plantations and colonial authorities. Maroon communities were initiated by people who liberated themselves from slavery, who ran away from a life at the mercy of masters and drivers. Some maroon communities were short-lived, but others became established, growing to include members who were not fleeing slavery: free Blacks, Creoles, Indigenous peoples, Jews, and some whites.\(^{23}\) These ‘zones of refuge’ might have attracted anyone urgently seeking sanctuary from police powers, social ostracization, forced or perilous labour, religious persecution, or other evils of their civilizations.\(^{24}\) For Roberts, attention to *marronage* foregrounds the agency of enslaved people who refused and fled their circumstances to generate alternative social realities. Histories of *marronage*, slave revolts and rebellions (large and small), highlight how slavery is not something that people endure passively.\(^{25}\) Moreover, because maroon societies had to improvise constantly in response to efforts to recapture and destroy them, *marronage* highlights mobility, adaptability, and creativity as characteristics of freedom. *Marronage*, therefore, is nothing like a socially recognised status, supported by stable institutions, laws, and norms. It is not ‘a standing rule to live by’.\(^{26}\) It is fugitive. Freedom as *marronage* is a versatile refusal to be dominated, which eludes those standing rules that far too often stand on people’s necks.

Although the word ‘fugitive’ suggests something fleeting, evanescent, ephemeral, and temporary, everywhere there has been slavery, there have been those who collaborated to claim their freedom. Fugitives establish clandestine networks, subterranean economies, and hidden communities in inaccessible locations. In their reflections on the practices of ‘the underground railroad’, Haro and Coles stress that successful escape was not something individuals could easily carry out on their own.\(^{27}\) The ‘Fugitive Slave Act of 1793’ makes explicit that the threat to slavery is not only the flight of enslaved individuals and groups from their masters. Slavery is also made vulnerable by the willingness of sympathisers to facilitate, harbour, and care for those who fled.\(^{28}\) For fugitives from slavery to make their ways to enduring sanctuary, people devised furtive ways of communicating escape
routes, sharing the locations of safe houses, and devising strategies to elude
detection. Struggles against domination involve ‘building power … from creative
dialectics between concealment and publicity, autonomy and proliferating con-
ditions, illegality and changing laws’. For Haro and Coles, the Underground
Railroad illustrates how fugitive freedom is enabled and sustained through
quotidian, clandestine communication, concealment, care, and refuge. Fugitivity
often requires creative law-breaking, the proliferation of imaginative codes and
symbols, and the invention of new forms of community. Fugitivity is not just a
movement away from brutality, domination, and servitude. It is a movement toward
alternative forms of sociality, cooperation, and power.

What thinkers of fugitivity highlight, then, is how personal and political freedom
does not necessarily involve either a direct confrontation with (capital S) State
power or formal emancipation, let alone the full actualisation of human virtue and
autonomy. Freedom can be expressed in refusal, escape, and relocation beyond
the reach of state power and the dominant culture. It does not have to be
recognized and incorporation into the ranks of social and political standing and
influence. James Scott argues that, for most of human history, the great threat to
state power was not revolt, rebellion, and usurpation of sovereign power. Rather,
‘the bedrock of popular freedom’ was physical flight. Early states maintained and
cultivated their territories by subjecting the majority of their population to forced
labour and servitude. The balance of power in pre-modern states, it seems,
resembled life in the fledgling colonies in the early modern Americas and the
Caribbean. It was a context in which most inhabitants were unfree, ‘subjects under
duress’, and there was peripheral territory that was not under the control of official
government. It was a situation in which the local forms of state power were new,
precarious, and brutal, while requiring the subjection of the numerical majority to
servitude. There have always been ‘zones of refuge’ from the ‘manifold afflictions
of state-making projects’. There have always been people who have chosen
alternative subsistence practices and social structures to maintain their indepen-
dence from the violent practices of political domination, especially forced labour
and slavery. In the words of Scott, ‘The list of such refugia is at least long as the list of
coercive labour schemes that inevitably spawn them’. Maroonage and fugitive
freedom, then, have long existed alongside and shaped human projects of
civilization, domination, and slavery. Yet, for much of political theory, they
remain out of view. Political thought remains fixated on the dynamics internal to
the polis, without appreciating the influence of what lies beyond the city walls and
past the cane fields.

Thus, although Enlightenment philosophers do not seem to perceive
‘barbarians’, fugitives, and voluntary exiles as architects of their own freedom,
they have long been there, bringing into being alternative ways of life, refusing
the terms of cultural and political membership imposed upon them. If, today, there
remain few zones of refuge beyond the reach of the modern state, thinkers of
fugitive freedom insist that there are still normative and hermeneutic resources
within this mobile and creative conception of freedom. What happens, however, when we bring them to bear on Spinoza who is, for many, an exemplar of uncompromising rational autonomy?

**Perfect Freedom**

Most generally, freedom for Spinoza consists in acting ‘through the laws of [one’s] nature alone’. In order to be perfectly free, one must act from her own power, her internal resources, and what follows from or belongs to her nature. A perfectly free being is compelled by nothing outside herself; she is absolute. No finite beings, such as humans or their societies, are absolute, according to Spinoza. Whatever exists, exists necessarily within and by virtue of God: ‘God alone is a free cause’. Humans and other finite beings depend upon God (Nature) and infinitely many ambient others, but we can be more or less powerful, more or less able to perceive and generate ideas, more or less able to affect and be affected by other bodies. In other words, although freedom is scalar and comes in degrees for finite beings like us, Spinoza seems to suggest that the more we can be like God, the freer we are.

Spinoza’s understanding of freedom is perfectionistic. Berlin takes Spinoza to be an exemplar of Enlightenment rationalism, and thereby a paradigmatic advocate of positive liberty. For Berlin (and others), Spinoza embraces a Stoic ideal of self-mastery, delivered through the rational grasp of one’s place in nature. Some align Spinoza with the classical Republican tradition, according to which political liberty entails being governed according to the common good in contrast to the private good of particular rulers. This lens may be considered less perfectionistic than the Stoic one, since republican freedom concerns limits on the kind of rule that is acceptable rather than a particular, substantive ideal that people ought to actualise. Spinoza invokes Cicero’s republican motto repeatedly, ‘the people’s welfare is the highest law’, and declares that laws must advantage the people to avoid treating them as ‘slaves’. Yet, he also suggests that the popular welfare is a substantive end, proper to human nature, for example, when he claims that a free state is structured by ‘what sound reason teaches to be useful to all men’. He likewise asserts that a commonwealth is not worthy of the name unless it aims not merely at the preservation of biological life but at ‘the true virtue and life of the mind’. This implies a compatibility (or, on a stronger interpretation, a convergence) between ethical perfectionism and political liberty, for Spinoza.

As we have noted, Spinoza maintains that we are free insofar as we desire and act from virtue and reason, which he also describes as ‘our nature alone’. We are free when we are moved by ‘our own power’ – our reason and strength of character – rather than by haphazard passions. This makes Spinoza an awkward candidate for the rather non-ideal, imperfect notion of fugitive freedom, which is expressed in the flight from domination, violence, and servitude. Whereas Spinoza’s freedom is aligned with acting from love, joy, and consummate
knowledge, marrouage and fugitivity respond to the damaging force of external causes. How can Spinoza’s freedom be expressed as fugitive flight?

In order to answer that question, let us highlight a persistent feature of ideal freedom in his thought. Spinoza often represents virtue and power, synonyms of freedom, with the image of joining with others to constitute ‘one mind and one body’. Although God alone is an absolutely free cause, free of all compulsion and externality, humans approach freedom to the extent that they are able to combine mental and corporeal powers with other beings in nature. Spinoza claims that, from reason, we desire nothing more than that all should so agree in all things that the minds and bodies of all would compose, as it were, one mind and one body. From freedom, we strive to combine with others for the ‘common advantage of all’. In his Political Treatise, he claims that a commonwealth is more powerful, more self-determined, to the extent that it is ‘determined by the power of a multitude which is led as if by one mind’. Reason, too, is described as a shared fund of mental resources, named the ‘common notions’. For Spinoza, we are the kind of beings who become powerful – more able to think and act in a way that preserves and enhances our existence – the more we have in common with others. Self-determination, in other words, follows not from fortifying ourselves against others but from combining and coordinating our powers. I can do more from my nature, the more that nature is constituted by enabling relationships with others. Thus, although freedom undeniably consists in maximising and perfecting our intellectual power, according to Spinoza’s view, we empower ourselves only to the extent that we overcome our isolation and ‘join forces’ with as many other bodies and minds as possible.

Simply put, we cannot realise our characteristically human powers alone. Far from it. The more firmly and better we are joined to others, the freer and more capable we are of acting from our nature, perfecting our reason, and exercising virtue. Thus, Spinoza says that the free person is animated most by two desires in particular: one is animositas (courage or tenacity) through which we intelligently strive to persevere in being. The free person desires to live what Spinoza calls ‘a human life’, irreducible to mere survival, and she accurately grasps the means to preserving and enhancing her life. Second, the free person acts from generositas, the desire to join others to oneself in friendship. This suggests – and this is substantiated in many other claims throughout the Ethics – that friends are the most important ‘means’ to our power, preservation, and freedom. Freedom for Spinoza, simply (albeit abstractly) put, is the actual exercise of our most essential powers, those powers that enable us to live characteristically human lives. One of the powers most expressive of our freedom is that of making friends, producing social life (generositas). Insofar we understand our natures, we know that we only think and act joyfully and capably with and by virtue of others.

But, of course, human life is replete with strife, conflict, domination, and struggle. So, how do we arrive at a freer, more powerful way of being? How do we produce the forms of cooperation, alliance, and sociality that unite our minds into
shared projects of perseverance and knowledge production? How do we form ‘one mind’ through which we affirm, defend, and come to know ourselves? Freedom, for Spinoza, is not a property but a project; it is not a given feature of human being but a collective achievement. Thus, I want to suggest that freedom is often fugitive. It is something we enact imperfectly with whatever is ready to hand. Sometimes, perhaps often, freedom emerges in resistance to whatever opposes the preservation, affirmation, and amplification of our vitality and power.

**Insurgent Freedom**

Spinozan freedom consists in the power to think and act from one’s own nature, or one’s own powers. Yet, what is ‘one’s own’ extends far beyond the skin, the limits of one’s particular body or brain, to include what we share in common with other parts of nature. Given that we have very little power to think and act when isolated, Spinoza claims that there is a universal aversion to solitude, a ‘fear [of] being alone’, that drives us to combine with others, ‘to be led, as if by one mind’. When he describes the origin of civil order, born of the universal aversion to solitude, the desire of the emergent, collective mind mirrors the conatus, the essential striving of individual things. Specifically, he declares that we naturally, inevitably join together in order to oppose whatever threatens our physical and mental vitality. In his words, ‘civil order’ emerges from ‘a common hope, or fear, or a common desire to avenge some harm’.

As several radical interpreters of Spinoza’s political thought emphasise, civil life may be forged in the crucible of collective indignation. According to Alexandre Matheron, Spinoza implies in the Political Treatise that commonwealths typically emerge against a shared source of oppression, birthed by the passion to resist and destroy a common harm. When Spinoza declares that humans ‘naturally agree’ to form a commonwealth by virtue of a common affect rather than due to reason, Spinoza refers his reader to a passage describing the dissolution rather than the establishment of a commonwealth. Spinoza also points his reader to his previous claim that any constituted ‘power or right is diminished to the extent that it provides many people with reasons to conspire against it’. A multitude is driven together to form a system of cooperation and mutual defence by those affects that emerge in and through resistance to domination. Far from being spurred by some enlightened rationalism to perfect our intellectual capacities, we typically unite in our opposition to what we perceive to be harmful, noxious, and menacing. This is not to say that a desire for intellectual perfection does not belong to Spinoza’s political anthropology. He asserts that humans, by virtue of the laws of our nature, resent the depletion, deformation, or thwarting of our mental life. At the same time, he insists that we are rarely united in our understanding of how we want to live. We much more easily agree on what to refuse and oppose with all our might.

Our ability to agree on what we reject poses a problem for political authority, because such authority depends upon violence, coercion, domination, and, as
James Scott emphasises, forced labour. On Matheron’s analysis, Spinoza offers us a portrait of how social and political life is ‘regulated’ and ‘constituted’ by collective indignation and resentment of the harms and evils that ‘civilisation’ necessarily entails. Spinoza thereby foregrounds the threat of insurgency in his political thought. Political power is necessarily, always vulnerable to rebellion and revolt. Even if the proper ‘end’ of a commonwealth is freedom, according to Spinoza, the institution and preservation of any commonwealth is going to be non-ideal. The production and enforcement of laws, norms, and institutions entails violence. The internal threat of collective indignation and conspiracy for revenge, therefore, can never be entirely extinguished, whatever the circumstances. As Spinoza remarks, ‘we’ve never reached the point where a state is not in more danger from its own citizens than from its enemies, and where the rulers don’t fear their citizens more than their enemies’.65

For Matheron, Spinoza’s claim is ‘ontological’ rather than historical.66 The internal, constitutive constraints on the exercise of political authority follow from the laws of human nature and the logic of the passions. Insurgent desire is an inalienable feature of human being, an inextinguishable property of our striving, which structures any and every social order from below. On this interpretation, Spinoza authorises a hermeneutic of insurgency, according to which we can presume an operative power of the multitude to oppose its governing regime, even if we cannot discern it in a particular instance.67

Drawing especially upon Antonio Negri’s recruitment of Spinoza to a notion of insurgent power, James Ford III links Spinoza’s thinking and biography to maroonage. Ford discusses Spinoza specifically in relationship to Palmares, one of the most enduring maroon communities, which lasted for almost the entire seventeenth century (1605–1694) in the Pernambuco of Brazil.68 Spinoza does not comment directly upon colonialism or racial slavery. However, in a much-discussed letter, Spinoza describes an experience of waking from a dream and being unable to shake the image of ‘a certain black, scabby Brazilian’. Remembering this dream from the previous winter, he describes how this apparition ‘remained vividly before my eyes as if the things had been true’. He endeavoured, he writes to his friend, to divert himself from this image by training his eyes on familiar objects in his room, but ‘the same image of the same Black [Aethiopis] man appeared to me with the same vividness, alternately, until it gradually disappeared from my visual field’.69 Because Spinoza refers specifically to a ‘Black Brazilian’ of Ethiopian origin who seems to be wounded or hurt (though scabs may suggest that the man is healing), several commentators connect the imagery from this dream to the expulsion of the Dutch from Brazil ten years earlier. From various points of view, interpreters suggest that the image evokes the violent clashes between Dutch settlers – which included many Sephardic Jews from the Talmud Torah community of Amsterdam into which Spinoza was born – and the Portuguese who were aided by Black mercenary soldiers, maroons, and the enslaved.70 Commentators attribute different meanings to the dream, but they are (mostly) united in the view that the dream
implies Spinoza’s awareness of enslaved Africans in Brazil and the tumult around the contested, colonial settlement.\textsuperscript{71} Given the importance of the colony to the Amsterdam congregation in which Spinoza grew up as well as the fact that the Dutch Sephardim employed Black servants in the metropole, Spinoza could not have been ignorant of racial slavery in his day.\textsuperscript{72}

Ford suggests that we understand the figure of the Black Brazilian in Spinoza’s dream to evoke the Maroon. Rather than seeing the ‘scabby Brazilian’, first and foremost, as suffering from the abuses of colonial servitude, Ford joins this image, in a subversive and creative gesture, to Spinoza’s insistence that human striving invariably seeks connection and sociality, especially under adverse circumstances. Without claiming that Spinoza understood himself to be visited by the apparition of a freedom fighter, Ford poetically links Spinoza’s (perhaps obscure) consciousness of colonial violence in Brazil to Spinoza’s philosophical commitment to the notion that human striving is ineliminable.\textsuperscript{73} To be, for Spinoza, is to desire to exist and to strive to enjoy the kind of being one is.\textsuperscript{74} To be human is to strive to be joined to others who enjoy similar powers, in order to be able to think and act for the common advantage.\textsuperscript{75} The Maroon, Ford suggests, epitomises Spinoza’s picture of human striving against threats and toward socially-generated empowerment. Not without cost, and not without incalculable loss, maroons make social life and establish erotic bonds, driving out slavery and social death. Ford thus draws out a fugitive thread in Spinoza to produce an encounter between Spinoza and the Black radical tradition. Like Spinoza, the Black radical tradition presupposes that where there is domination, there is contestation.\textsuperscript{76}

The idea of marronage, as the analysis in the previous section suggests, is importantly different from insurgent revolt against state power. Maroons may threaten the plantation economy and culture that depends upon slavery, but they typically do not do so through direct confrontation or by voicing a complaint at a public tribunal. The maroon exits and evades colonial rule. Marronage threatens political order by making an order of its own, making a life inaccessible to the masters.

Interpreters of Spinoza in the Marxist tradition(s) highlight how political order emerges through conspiracy and revolt. Indeed, Spinoza often points out the dangers of domestic plots and treachery, citing Quintus Curtius’s observation that ‘Philip was safer on the battlefield than in the Theatre’.\textsuperscript{77} Nevertheless, an oppressed people can conspire (breathe together) to flee as well. The biblical maroons of Exodus did not replace and take down their oppressors; they escaped. The Hebrews, united by hatred of their oppression, fled into the wilderness. In her analysis of Exodus, Jennet Kirkpatrick illustrates how ‘the mere act of leaving does not make the slaves into a people. Rejoicing together, marching together, and enduring together makes them into a people’. And ‘with no Pharoah to fight, the slaves can direct all their political energy to themselves’, enabling them to create, at least for a while, a rather impressive commonwealth of their own to care for one another and defend themselves against those who would harm or enslave them.\textsuperscript{78}
Spinoza highlights how civil order often comes into being against oppression, domination, servitude, and other common injuries. But the new order is not necessarily a direct confrontation with power. It may be an exodus from slavery, which makes possible new forms of commonality and social life.

By linking Spinoza to *marronage*, Ford suggests that popular freedom, for Spinoza, is not only implied in the threat of regicide that haunts all monarchs. Popular freedom is also implied in insurgent solidarity and the irrepressible yearning for social life, free spiritual practice, and a life without servitude. Taking inspiration from Ford’s provocative alignment of Spinoza and *marronage*, I want to suggest that the desire for social life under threat of social death appears also in Spinoza’s well-known claims that domination inspires rebellious, illicit, and unauthorised speech. Although Spinoza certainly advocates honest, confrontational criticism of laws, he also claims that violent suppression of human communication will not stop it. Efforts to silence or outlaw communication will only drive it underground and out of bounds.

**Fugitive Words**

Fugitivity and *marronage* both evoke exit and escape. In the cases of the Biblical Hebrews, the maroons of Palmares, or Spinoza’s ancestors who fled the Inquisition, fugitivity involves leaving the territory of the oppressors. *Marronage*, escape, and diaspora must be preceded by ‘fugitive planning’, unauthorised communication, whisper networks, and other forms of furtive cooperation. When physical flight is difficult or remains a remote possibility, desire for community and communication among the dominated finds a way. Spinoza does not refer expressly to the practice of exit, religious or other refugees, or to subterranean spiritual communities, such as the *Marrano* Jews who found their ways to Amsterdam to live openly. He does insist, however, that there are simply no forms of domination that can silence people or secure their fidelity to a regime. Regardless of what it may cost them, people will talk. People fear and hate psychological isolation. Moreover, they will not only say what they feel and think; they will ‘teach’ it. They will seek to move others to think as they do, or at least to understand their thoughts, even if their thoughts are outlawed, disloyal, and punishable by exile or death. These features of human psychology, I suggest, are irrepressible fugitive impulses that Spinoza inscribes in the heart of our being. When we reflect upon domination and servitude, different aspects of striving and freedom come into focus. If we take the point of view of ‘the free man’ or the actualised freedom of Spinoza’s *Ethics*, we may miss the fugitive struggle against domination and the role it plays in his thinking.

As we saw above, perfect, ethical freedom in Spinoza entails acting from one’s nature, adhering to the dictates of reason, and grasping oneself as a constituent part of nature’s infinite power.80 In his *Theological-Political Treatise*, Spinoza advocates the freedom to philosophise and to openly criticise the laws.81 And in his *Political Treatise*, he asserts that there is a universal aversion to solitude and a desire to ‘be led,
as it were, by one mind’, and these affects propel people to unite around a shared fear, hope, or desire to destroy a common harm. In my view, these ethical and political notions of freedom derive from the same human desire to share minds, to think in common. To be a thinking thing, for Spinoza, is to desire to think with others, to share thoughts, desires, and understandings. We have a profound desire, in other words, to engender social life. The idea of fugitivity gives us a picture of what the yearning for mental community, against the forces of social destruction, can look like. For those who are dominated and enslaved, the striving to share thoughts expresses itself in clandestine communication, which seeks to evade and oppose those forces that try to control, destroy, and sever our ability to bring our powers of thought and action together.

Spinoza, as is well-known, declares repeatedly that the government or social order that ‘denies everyone the freedom to say and teach what he thinks will be most violent’.\(^82\) Regardless of the lengths to which an Inquisition, a slaveholding class, or a tyrant will go to control the speech, thoughts, religious practices, and forms of kinship of those it targets, people ‘have nothing less in their power than their tongue’.\(^83\) Indeed, ‘Not even the wisest know how to keep quiet, not to mention ordinary people. It’s a common vice of men to confide their judgments to others, even if secrecy is needed’.\(^84\) According to Proietti, this remark is one of many allusions Spinoza makes to Terence, a formerly enslaved person who adapted several Greek comedies to vernacular Latin. His comedies feature slaves who felt compelled to deceive their masters in order to bring about good ends.\(^85\) Terence portrayed worlds in which domination made it impossible for the enslaved to declare their ambitions, desires, and sincere thoughts openly, even when their aims were virtuous and wise. Terence’s comedies represent the dynamics of the household, exposing how families structured by domination necessarily involve secrets, ruses, and donning different masks for different people.\(^86\) ‘Terence shows how ruling power that keeps people from communicating their thoughts, feelings, and judgments does not only target threatening beliefs and opinions. It attacks and poisons social relations: the communities, alliances, and friendships that we form through communication. At the same time, domination inspires oppositional social ties, solidarity, and resistance.

Spinoza, in chapter XX of his *Theological-Political Treatise*, seems to be most concerned with the bad consequences of domination for rulers. He warns them to expect rebellious and confrontational speech as well as popular resistance if they do not allow people to speak their minds. He laments that domination will yield a culture of pretence and distortion, which will prevent the collective from acting intelligently. Nothing could be worse for social and political stability than a world in which ‘every day men would think one thing and say something else’.\(^87\) Domination gives the vulnerable, the enslaved, the colonised, and the desperate reason to misrepresent their thoughts and feelings. When people are subject to the arbitrary and menacing power of a tyrant, a master, a manager, or an armed border agent, we say what we must to escape violence and deprivation. We mask our
thoughts and alter our words in the moment, but we cannot entirely suppress the desire to communicate our resentment.

Spinoza’s warnings to rulers about how domination forces subjects to rebel, lie, and conceal their thoughts, feelings, and judgments point at the same time to those underground networks of counter-power that form when we cannot openly share our minds. Although Spinoza and his ‘free-thinking’ friends were harassed, economically deprived, and imprisoned, they continued to circulate their writings in secret. They met to share their ideas and their strategies for safeguarding and preserving their texts. When the Sephardim only one generation removed from Spinoza were forced by the Inquisition to convert to Catholicism or face punishment, many fled or practiced their faith in secret. When they were threatened with torture, death, or captivity for continuing to teach their religion, they did it anyway. The Inquisition did not eliminate Judaism, it produced fugitives, refuge zones, and secret Judaizers. The message of fugitive freedom is that domination and servitude foment whisper networks, clandestine social bonds, alternative modes of kinship, and outlawed spirituality. The dominated, persecuted, and enslaved make a way out of no way. They preserve, transform, and engender religious traditions, invent artistic and cultural practices, and establish forms of internal government and discipline. Although they may lack a firm and secure place to reside, fugitives from domination evade control through migration, escape, or ‘exit in place’. When support for a human existence is negligible or absent, when people are picked out to suffer regular assaults, when their social ties are threatened and attacked, fugitives practice freedom by forming, in the language of Spinoza, ‘one mind’ against their oppressors and for themselves.

Although I have only begun to explore it here, the hermeneutic of fugitive freedom allows us to highlight in Spinoza’s political philosophy how freedom emerges through counter-power, communication, and solidarity. The communities, forms of cooperation, and expressions of spirituality that belong to maronage, maranism (crypto-Judaism), and free philosophising are not mere means to escape slavery or evade social and political domination. They are not only instrumentally valuable for perfecting our individual intellects and protecting our vulnerable bodies. Insofar as they engender collective understanding and shared patterns of mind that enable us to think and act more powerfully, that allow us to preserve and enhance our social lives, the alliances we form in evasion and resistance to domination constitute our power and thus our freedom.

With further investigation, we may find that the notion of fugitivity opens vistas through which to understand freedom beyond the unattainable ethical ideal of consummate self-actualisation and irreducible to the political ideal of non-subjection to arbitrary power through political participation and enlightened education. It offers a critical lens to appreciate the fugitive desires that inevitably strive to coalesce against whatever threatens to dissolve and contain social life.
Notes

4. Roberts emphasises the conceptual and political liabilities of static conceptions of freedom, in Freedom as Marronage.
7. See Epictetus, ‘Enchiridion’, in How to be Free: An Ancient Guide to Stoic Life, ed. A.A. Long (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018). Although the Stoic sage is often represented as masculine and male, they included women and enslaved people into their schools, and thus saw freedom as something one could enjoy independent of sex and social status.
9. For Berlin, as Skinner points out, the danger of positive liberty is that it equates freedom with ‘the true goal of man’ and ‘the realisation of the real self’ (180). See Quentin Skinner, ‘A Third Concept of Liberty’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 117 (2002), 240.
11. Pettit, Republicanism, 22.
13. Orlando Patterson argues that this pattern of freedom emerging as a value in contrast to slavery is at the origin of western culture, in Freedom.
16. The condition of Roman slaves was quite variable, so this is simplified. For a helpful introduction, see Peter Hunt, Ancient Greek and Roman Slavery (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2018).
19. Roberts makes this objection forcefully throughout Freedom as Marronage.
21. Several theorists follow Vincent Brown in describing slavery as a ‘predicament’ rather than a ‘condition’ to call attention to the agency of the enslaved. Although I do not endorse Brown’s
criticism of Patterson’s analysis in *Slavery and Social Death*, I see the advantages of foregrounding the resistant activity of the dominated. See Vincent Brown, ‘Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery’, *The American Historical Review*, 114.5 (2009), 1231–49.


35. Citations of Spinoza will be from Benedict de Spinoza, *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, vols. 1–2, edited by E. M Curley (Princeton University Press, 1985, 2016). Citations of the *Ethics* will follow standard notation (E = *Ethics*; roman numerals indicate the Part; p = proposition; d = demonstration; s = scholium; etc.). This citation is from EIVdef8. Citations of the *Theological Treatise* (hereafter *TTP*) and the *Political Treatise* (hereafter *TP*) will indicate the chapter (Roman numerals) and paragraph number (Arabic numerals).


37. This formula is a bit misleading since Spinoza rejects the view that we resemble God, or that we are modelled on God. *Pari passu* Descartes, he denies that we have any ‘infinite’ faculties, such as an unconstrained will, which render us God-like. Yet, although we cannot become absolute and self-determining as God is, we strive to become as self-determining as ‘our nature allows’. Rather than becoming like God, becoming more powerful allows us to compose more of God or Nature, to constitute more of the total power that makes up all of reality. Our activity and freedom will remain, however, finite and diminutive in quantity compared to the total power of being.

40. Michael Rosenthal, ‘Spinoza’s Republican Idea of Freedom’, in A Companion to Spinoza, ed. by Y. Melamed (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley–Blackwell, 2021). Rosenthal understands Spinoza to be committed to other properties of Republican freedom as well, such as political participation, but I only cite here the one to which he is undoubtedly committed.
41. Spinoza, TTP XVI.33; XIX.24; TP VII.5.
42. Spinoza, TP III.7.
43. Spinoza, TP V.5.
44. Spinoza, E IVp18s; TP II.16, III.2, III.5, III.7, VI.1.
46. Spinoza, E IVp18s.
47. Spinoza, TP III.7.
49. Spinoza, E IIp39c.
51. TP II.13; E IVp35s.
52. Spinoza, E IIIp59s.
53. Spinoza defines ‘good’ as ‘what we certainly know to be useful to us’, E IVdef1.
55. Spinoza, TP VI.1.
57. Spinoza, TP VI.1.
60. As Matheron points out, Politics, Ontology and Knowledge in Spinoza, 126.
62. For example, Spinoza TP V.5.
63. Spinoza frequently remarks on the irreducible diversity of human temperaments and thus the futility of imposing a single idea of God, or other models of what is good. The diversity of human values and perspectives is one of the premises animating his analysis throughout the TTP.
64. Matheron, Politics, Ontology and Knowledge in Spinoza, 131. Balibar argues that there is a dynamic of fear between rulers and ruled that regulates both parties. See Etienne Balibar, ‘Spinoza, the Anti-Orwell: The Fear of the Masses’, Rethinking Marxism, 2.3 (1989), 104–39.
65. TTP XVII.17.
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67. The ontological understanding of the resistant multitude is famously and most comprehensively developed by Antonio Negri throughout his corpus and those works written with Michael Hardt.
73. Ford, ‘Interrupting the System’.
75. Spinoza, E IVp18s.
77. Spinoza, TTP XVII.19.
79. Spinoza, E IVp18s.
80. Spinoza, E Vp36.
81. Spinoza, TTP XX.
84. Spinoza, TTP XX.9.
85. See Curley’s editorial footnote to TTP XX.9.
87. Spinoza, TTP XX.27.