Proceedings of the Symposium on Philosophy

Editor
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Pehowa (Kurukshetra)

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This online version of ‘Proceedings of the Symposia on Philosophy” edited by Late Prof.(Dr.) Ajit Kumar Sinha is dedicated to my philosophy teachers at Department of Philosophy, Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra. I am thankful to Dr. Anamika Girdhar, Chairperson, Department of Philosophy, Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra for her continuous motivation towards the work of CPPIS Pehowa (Kurukshetra). Hope our present effort will be successful via it’s vide circulation and positive responses from readers.

Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal (Co-ordinator, CPPIS)
FOREWORD

Philosophy is a fascinating subject which is personally relevant to every human being. There are some characteristics of a philosophical attitude which made difference in regard to the intellectual discipline of philosophy. The philosophical attitude includes a sense of wonder, doubt, criticism, reflection, universality, tolerance, preference to experience and reason. Philosophy affects not only the life of a philosopher, but also effects the civilisation and culture as a whole.

The present book “Proceedings of the Symposia on Philosophy” edited by Late Prof. Ajit Kumar Sinha is a scholarly work, published by the Department of Philosophy, Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra in 1966. It is collection of papers presented by eminent scholars at two symposia held at the Department of Philosophy, Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra on 22nd and on 23rd March, 1965. The symposium "Concept of Philosophy in the mid-twentieth century" was held on March 22, 1965, and the symposium "Critique of the Value-system in India during Post-independence era" was held on March 23, 1965. The ten papers included in this edited work focus on the critique of value system in India as well as the conception of philosophy in the mid-twentieth century. The present online version of this book has a great relevance in the present times as we had the print edition in a limited number. Moreover, online version can reach worldwide readers. So we are publishing this book online in its original form as it appeared in 1966.

Late Prof. (Dr.) A.K.Sinha was an eminent contemporary philosopher of India and the former Chairperson of the Department of Philosophy, Kurukshetra. Under the benign guidance of Prof. Sinha, the Department reached to high mark scholarship. He also contributed near about 20 books in the field of philosophy and allied subjects.

I must congratulate the Centre of Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (CPPIS) Pehowa (Kurukshetra) and its members particularly Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal who took the initiative for this task and completed it successfully. Now this book is in the domain of wide range of readers including research scholars, teachers and readers of philosophy. Hope scholars enjoy the reading of this book.

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of the
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Dr. A. K. SINHA
EDITOR

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PREFACE

The Symposia on Philosophy were held in Kurukshetra University on March 22nd, and 23rd, 1965 under the auspices of the Department of Philosophy. It was felt by me and my colleagues that there is great deal of confusion regarding the concept of 'Philosophy' in the mid-twentieth century in the academic as well as non-academic circles in India. It was felt that the confused notions regarding the concept of 'Philosophy' in the mid-twentieth century must be dispelled from the minds of keen and earnest students of philosophy so that they might take bold strides forward on the intellectual plane. It was also felt that India is passing through a critical stage of anomic in the contemporary period despite repeated emphasis by the intellectual leaders of the country on the ethico-religious norms since the very down of the intellectual history of mankind. It was, therefore, felt that a bold and candid critique of the value-system in India during the post-independence era is urgently needed in order to save the society which seems to be sinking into the morass of normlessness.

Shri Suraj Bhan, M.A. (London), the then Vice-Chancellor, Kurukshetra University, delivered the inaugural address. Dr. N. K. Devaraja, M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt., Professor of Indian Philosophy and Culture, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, delivered the extension lecture immediately after the inaugural address by the Vice-Chancellor. The symposium on the "Concept of 'Philosophy' in the mid-twentieth century" was held on March 22nd, 1965, and the Symposium on the "Critique of the Value-system in India during post-independence era" was held on March 23rd, 1965. There was thorough discussion after the papers were read by the symposiasts. The deliberations of the symposia, however, could not be recorded due to lack of proper facilities.

I acknowledge my thanks to Shri Suraj Bhan, the previous Vice-Chancellor of Kurukshetra University who highly approved of the idea of holding the symposia on Philosophy in Kurukshetra University. I am thankful to Dr. Buddha Prakash, Dean, the Faculty of Indic Studies, Shri K.L. Malhotra, Principal, University College, Dr. V.B. Taneja, Principal, Government College of Education, Mrs. P.P. Azad, Principal, Government Sports College for Women, Miss S. Tandon, Lady Superintendent, Junior Model School, Shri C.L. Bhatia, and Shri P.P. Mehta, Wardens, Boys' Hostels, Miss Raj Chawla, Warden, Womens' Hostel, who whole-heartedly offered their co-operation in making the Symposia a success. I acknowledge my gratefulness to the participants of the
Symposia who came from far and near in response to our invitation. I am thankful to my Departmental colleagues, Miss Raj Gupta, Mrs. P. Chaudhry, Dr. M. Q. Husian, Shri C.L. Jain, and Shri L.K. Mishra, and the student volunteers for their whole-hearted co-operation. I also acknowledge my thanks to Shri Lakhmi Chand Gupta, the Typist-Clerk of the Department, who contributed in his own humble way to the success of the Symposia.

I express my thanks to Dr. Bool Chand, M.A., Ph. D. (London) Vice-Chancellor, Kurukshetra University, who approved of the idea of printing the Proceedings of the Symposia on Philosophy. The publication of the Proceedings would not have been possible without the encouragement of the Vice-Chancellor. I acknowledge my thanks to Miss Raj Gupta, Shri R.D. Mishra, Dr. C.N. Tripathi and Shri L.C. Gupta who went through different portions of the galley proofs. I acknowledge my thanks to Shri T. Philip, Manager, University Press, who took especial care that this publication was brought out in time in fine print and get up.

It is most tragic that Dr. K. Ray-Chowdhury who expired in 1965 at a premature age could not see this publication. He was a highly talented young scholar, and contributed in his own humble way to the advancement of learning. His sad demise is a loss to the country.

It is hoped that the publication of the Proceedings of the Symposia on Philosophy will be welcome by the philosophers of our country.

A. K. SINHA

Head of the Department of Philosophy and the Organiser of the Symposia on Philosophy.

Kurukshetra, March 24, 1966.
Symposium: CRITIQUE OF VALUE-SYSTEM IN INDIA DURING POST-INDEPENDENCE ERA

I. A Psychological Approach to Psychotherapy and Group-Differences

by


I. INTRODUCTION

The present speaker is indebted for various reasons to the Vice-Chancellor, Dr. A. K. Sinha and his colleagues, organizers and participants of the symposium, specially to the students who decorated the function.

Among the reasons, two are worth mentioning. Firstly it is because of their giving visa to the die-hard psychologist like the present speaker to enter into the boundary of philosophy. Philosophers are liberal but psychologists are not. The latter are narrow-minded as they fear all the time that they might lose their scientific precision and may be arrested by philosophers for their being disuaded from their avowed trade. Yet, it is a happy occasion to mention that psychologists procured passport to delve into the realm of values during 1930’s after a long controversy, though Titchener (1915), in his zeal to make psychology scientific, imitated the classical physicist and excluded value along with meaning and utility from the new science based on his concern for fact, his indifference to value, and though Watson (1924), with somewhat antiphilosophic inclinations, considerd behaviourism a foundation for all future experimental ethics. Other schools of psychology conceiving the major problems of their science to centre around Gestalten, purpose, personality or adjustment, rather than around sensation, had in the language of Koheler (1938, 1944), at least some place for value in their world of facts. Still, other psychologists gave a central place to values in their systems and rejected the scientific method. From these rather heterogeneous antecedents there emerged in psychology during 1930’s applications of the scientific methods of various aspects of the value problem. These and succeeding psychological studies of values have been summarised by Dukes (1955) who has classified the research trends under three heads: (i) Measuring
the values of groups of individuals and relating the results to other data concerning the groups (individual differences); (ii) the origin and development of values within the individuals; (iii) the influence of an individual's values on his cognitive life. So, the speaker is satisfied to present the above credentials to the Chairman of the symposium on philosophy and not on psychology. Secondly, it is because the authorities have given the present speaker an opportunity to visit Kurukshetra, the very place where Lord Krishna enchanted Gita, the first and perhaps the last chapter of human philosophy. The exposition of the essence of Gita brought Sidhyarth the name of Gautam Buddha in Ancient India, and Narendra Nath Datta that of Swami Vivekananda in Modern America; the versification of the Gita brought the Nobel Prize to Poet Rabindranath Tagore; the practical demonstration of the essence of Gita made M.K. Gandhi Mahatma or the Soldier of non-violence of the brave; the politico-administrative exposition of non-alignment policy of Lord Krishna as viewed in Gita brought Jawaharlal Nehru the name, of ‘Harbinger of Peace’ in to-day’s world; and the universalization of human philosophy of Gita has made Sir Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan the philosopher of the East and the West. If at all the philosophers or the psychologists are to choose a place for a symposium on value-system, the present speaker is proud to suggest Kurukshetra, especially in the post-independence era when a synthesis is bound to occur in the Psychology of the East and the West and the dynamic conflict between thesis and anti-thesis more prominent to-day in India is sure to forcefully throw the die-hard psychologists to the system of Kuenzli’s (1952) Phenomenological problems.

II. CRITICAL APPRECIATION OF THE IMPORT OF VALUES IN PSYCHOLOGY

(i) Definition:

Here, then arises the need for its definition. There appears to be no generally accepted, simple definition of values. Practically, psychologists have, in the past, borrowed the definitions from sociologists, anthropologists and philosophers, though very recently they have developed some kind of concept for psychiatric treatments and social-psychological problems. Williams (cf. Ginsburg, 1950), a sociologist, defines values as “affectively charged conceptual structures registered by the individual which set as directives. They form an important part of the apprehension of self and set as directional factors in the organisation of behaviour”. Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb (1937) writing from the social psychological point of view, state that a value is simply “the maintenance of a set toward the attainment of a goal, especially when the goal is remote. They tend to relate values to needs, in the sense that objects acquire values as means of satisfying a need. Murphy (1947) later states that “the central fact about values is that they arise from definite wants”, so that a value is
the characteristic of an object which makes it desired or desirable or to be sought after”. If object is defined as including other than material or concrete elements, and wants as including psychological and social desires or needs, perhaps this definition can be accepted, at least as partially definitive. Smith (1954), a social psychologist, states that “by values I shall mean a person’s implicit or explicit standards of choice, in so far as these are invested with obligation or requiredness”. Ginsburg (1953), a psychiatrist, admitting that values are difficult to define, states that “values are preference statements which are related to generalized notions, principles, or conceptual constructs for which we use the noun ‘a value’. In another place, Ginsburg (1950) defines a value as ‘a criterion which helps us to distinguish between alternatives and affords us a base for recognizing ourselves in relation to the rest of the world’. Values reflect needs and interests, but are neither of these. They are criteria against which goals are chosen. On the other hand, they are expressions of wants, interests, desires, and needs; that is, they are preferences. We may, therefore, sum up the definitions like this firstly, values are standards, which are non-objective, in the sense that they represent preferences, which in part socially or culturally determined; secondly, values have a connotation of ‘right’ or ‘should’—they represent the desirable. E. Spranger (1928) is the most acceptable philosopher whose classification of men in terms of 6 values (or interest) types brought new vistas to measurements psychology as found in the works of Allport and Vernon (1931). Since then, many definitions have cropped up in psychology but none is so popular as that of Spranger adapted by Allport and Vernon. Recently, clinical (or psychodiagnostic) and psychometric interpretations of values are found in counselling psychology and psychotherapy on the one hand, and differential psychology—especially connected with group differences in values (cf. Dukes, 1955; Ray-Chowdury 1958a, 1959a, 1959b, 1960) on the other. The present speaker is interested in raising some issues connected with the recent research trends in these two aspects during the post-independence are in India to justify that values change and so their definitions become obsolete. Hence criticism of value systems is often necessary to check up our stand.

(ii) Scope of Values in Psychology:

(a) Philosophy of Counselling and Psychotherapy:

Values cannot be avoided in counselling. Many of the client’s problems involve values or value conflicts (cf. Bergum, 1957; Green, 1946). A philosophy is an integration or system of values, usually resulting in statements of postulates and assumptions, or principles. It is only natural, and to be expected, that philosophies of counselling and psychotherapy should reflect the philosophies of the societies. It is a pity that we teach our undergraduates and post-graduates the literature on psychotherapy manufactured in the West, particularly American. This is harmful both to Indians and to Americans, Indians borrow and Americans lend. Rather,
Americans would be profitted if Indians help them with their materials organized under Western methodology. One example would be sufficient. The prevailing philosophy of the two countries is a democratic one. But is there any difference between the two? With measurement techniques, the present speaker reported the differences in India Science Congress held at Cuttack in 1962. As a common example of our concept of democracy, we selected Gandhian democracy and prepared a scale, namely Nv. Nc. scale, under six value-situations of spranger (1928) which was administered on a group of 192 college students. On the same sample, we administered Adorno’s (1950) ‘F’ scale supposed to measure American democracy. It was possible to observe significant degree of identifiability of Non-violent non-co-operation and Non-violent co-operation of Ray-Chowdhury’s (1958b) Nv. Nc. Scale with Authoritarian aggression and authoritarian submission of Adorno’s (1950) ‘F’ scale, respectively. These differences should open our eyes and we must throw all our energies to do more scientific researches to discover the similarities and dissimilarities between our concepts of values and these of the West while giving counselling service to the needy.

The 1958-edition of Nv. Nc. Scale was prepared by the present speaker with assistance of Ahmad (1963) who carried out his Ph.D. research under the guidance of the speaker. But 1961 revision of the Nv. Nc. scales made by the speaker in collaboration with two other successful Ph.D. students, namely Husain (1963) and Tondon (1965), is more fascinating as the scale is further divided into authoritarian and non-authoritarian situations, thus breaking the (Gandhian) attitudes of four into eight (cf. Ray-Chowdhury and Husain, 1962). Husain (1963), in his factorial analysis of a table of inter-correlation of personality and adjustment scales, observed under the participation of the present speaker that violence (Gandhian) had a significant opposition to Western dominance as measured by Burneuter’s Personality Inventory. Further, Husain (1963) observed that it was the criminals who preferred non-violent attitudes, rather than the normals. Miss Chand Tandon (1965) has observed that these school-leavers who prefer violent and non-violent attitudes under co-operation situation have rated higher in their attitudes towards discipline than those who prefer violent or non-violent attitudes under non-co-operation situation. The researcher have discovered that these school-leavers who perform non-co-operation attitudes either under violent or under non-violent situation hardly maintained discipline at home, outside and inside the class. Are they not very fascinating results for the Indian counsellors and psychotherapists to think again and again before recommending any step prescribed by Western thinkers? The present speaker therefore takes the liberty to call on the younger generation of psychologists to profit out of their association with their philosopher friends and launch heavy research programmes to discover with sound Western methodology the meaning and values of those terms which seem to be misfits in Indian context.
(b) Social Psychological Researches:

Here we shall refer to two main points observed by our researches in India from 1956-1960: Racial or National Difference and Religious Group Differences in values. These two aspects were studied with Allport-Vernon-Lindsey (1951 edition) Study of Values modified by the present speaker in Indian situation in 1958 (cf. Ray-Chowdhury, 1959a). The language of the scale remained English, though made simple for the school-leavers: understanding the instructions. Thus, it was possible for us to study a large sample of 341 college students from 1st year to sixth year Arts and Science of Aligarh Muslim University in 1958-59 and that of 90 under-graduates (Women) of the same University in 1956-57.

1. Racial or National Group Differences: The 1958–59 sample helped us in obtaining the Indian norms which we could compare with those of Americans as reported by Allport-Vernon-Lindsey (1951). Our observations are as follows (cf. Ray-Chowdhury, 1959 b):

(i) In economic and aesthetic categories the correction figures are the same, strongly suggesting that the Indians remaining in close contact with the Anglo-Americans for over two centuries have dissolved their differences with the Anglo-Americans in these areas of interests (or values). Again, in social category our obtained correction figures is 4, where as that reported by Allport and others (1951) is –3. In the social category too, the Indian norms are not far from those of the Anglo-Americans.

(ii) However, the norms of the Indians differ from those of the Anglo-Americans in the theoretical the political and the religious values by 4, 3 and 8 points respectively. These differences suggest that either the study is to be further revised or a verification of the comment by the present writer is to be made by further investigation on a large sample.

(iii) Regarding the high and the outstandingly high scorers, we find no difference between the Indians and the Anglo-Americans in theoretical, economic and political values.

2. Religious Group Differences: From the study of the 1956–57 sample, we have gathered the following (cf. Ray-Chowdhury 1958 a):

"Muslim women have shown greater interest in religious value where as the Hindu women have shown greater concern in social and political values. So far as the social value is concerned; it seems that the Muslim women are a little backward from the standpoint of value is concerned; it seems that the Muslim women are a little backward from the light of Western culture as they wear ‘Parda’ and are more conservative than the Hindu women. Moreover, as the test items were constructed under the Anglo-
American culture pattern, the above explanation seems very plausible due to a great freedom given to the Hindu women by their society. Whereas in the case of Muslim women in general the freedom is very very restricted in their society even today except a few who have different socio-cultural patterns.

Again, the majority of the Indian Christians during the British rule came from the Hindu population, the result being that a large section of the Hindus directly or indirectly influenced by their Christian relatives are nearer to the Western or Anglo-American culture patterns than that of the Muslims.

Regarding their difference in the political value the explanation seems very similar to that offered in connection with their difference in social value.

From the analysis of the 1958-59 sample with reference to religion and castes, the following observations have been made (cf. Ray-Chowdhury, 1960):

The significant patterns of difference are observed only in Social and Aesthetic values and in no other value categories.

(a) Social value:—There are two main sub-castes among the Muslim (cf. Bouquet, 1945) and they have some important differences regarding the observation of their religious rites, with special reference to Moharram. Interestingly enough, they show a significant pattern of difference in social value category where the Shia-Muslims have rated higher than the Sunnis. Although the observations might appear embarrassing to the Sunnis, they only point to the facts obtained with the help of an Anglo-American test, much as Allport-Vernon-Lindzey in the present instance, though modified in the Indian situation. Again, whereas the Shia-Muslims do not differ with non-Muslims in the Social Value category, the latter, having rated higher, have a significant pattern of difference with the Sunni-Muslims in the same Value category.

So far as the present edition of the Allport-Vernon Lindzey Study of Values Test goes, we are, with the limitations of the scale in mind, justified to comment that the Shia-Muslims are socially closer to the Non-Muslims at Aligarh.

(b) Aesthetic Value:—Non-Muslims, having rated higher than both the Shias and the Sunnis, have shown significant pattern of difference with both the sub-Castes of the Muslims in the aesthetic value category.
Summing up all the above observations, we may say that many of our commonly believed prejudices or differences have been drastically rejected by our present investigation. The most useful observations from the angle of our planning for National Integration are: (i) that Non-Muslims and Muslims do not differ either in religious value, or in political value; (ii) that Non-Muslims and Muslims differ in aesthetic value; and (iii) that whereas the Shia-Muslims and the Non-Muslims do not differ in social value, each of them differs with Sunni-Muslims in social value.

III. CONCLUSION:

The very research evidence reported here suggest that we, the psychologists are in the midst of multifarious problems that confront us today both within and outside our society. It is we who can find out the facts more to understand such problems and try to build one World of culture saturated with the same pattern of values all over the world and bring out a successful National Integration in our country from the cultivation of similar value-systems.

Thanks for the patient hearing.

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OUR PRERENT VALUE SYSTEM : INTEGRAL PERSPECTIVE

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Present Cultural Anomie.

The cultural richness of a society is judged by the quantitative and qualitative measures of creativity. The number of creative personalities in a social system alone is not a sound criterion of creativity. It should be judged also by the quality of the work of these creative persons. Now, applying both these tests to the post independence era in India, one finds cultural anomic and stagnation inspite of growing emphasis on cultural institutions in urban areas. This situation explains the root causes of the negligible number of first rate philosophers, scientists, artists, architects, poets and authors in a vast country like ours with such an ancient culture and civilization of which very few nations in the world can boast of. Here lie the deeper causes of the backwardness of our country and unless these causes are removed India cannot occupy a respectable place among her sister nations.

A Probable etiological Hypothesis.

Now, what is the etiology of the present cultural anomie? A probable hypothesis is the incompatibility of the present rural and urban culture systems and congeries. It had been pointed out that while one finds the mimesis of modern Western civilization in urban areas, in rural areas is the mimesis of the norms of hoary past. Now this hypothesis fails to note that in every time and clime there has been a fundamental difference between rural and urban social systems and hence in their cultural systems as well and the abolition of this difference is neither feasible nor desirable because this difference has its morrisings in the ecological distinctions of the two social systems. In the process of acculturation and cultural diffusion the village always lags behind the city. Thus, presence of Western value systems in the urban areas and that of ancient value systems in the rural areas is quite natural.

The Roots of Cultural Anomie.

The diagonal of the etiology of the present cultural anomie requires a more integral perspective. In fact the more integral is our perspective in the understanding of a problem the nearer we are to the truth about it though a perfectly integral perspective is not humanly possible because of man’s serious limitations. This, however, only reiterates the principle
that the more integral is the more true. This is specially so in the present context because value systems are intuitive and their truth cannot be understood piecemeal. Looking at the problem integrally, one may not agree that the present Indian society is sinking in the morass of valuelessness but a chaos in value system is only too obvious. One finds religious, ethical, aesthetic, material and all sorts of value systems scattered or heaped up together as cultural congeries. While some are rushing headlong to a blind imitation of whatever is Western in origin, others sincerely shun this attitude and seek to revive the ancient Indian culture in its full glamour. Both these trends can be equally seen in our urban social systems and in those moral social systems which have come under the influence of the city. There is a third trend of searching some sort of compromise between these two types of value systems. This trend is certainly better than the other two but a compromise is always temporary and transitional, and cannot provide firm ground for the upsurge of creativity. What India needs today is a cultural supersystem of spiritual values which may work as a dominant cultural theme for creative orientation. These spiritual values are truth, beauty, goodness sublimity, bliss and the fullest realization of our inner potentialities.

The Creative Principle.

A sound value system must rest on a sound psychology. If man were a simple being, a particular value system would have been sufficient for him be it material or ethical, religious or secular. But, man is a complex being. He has his physical, vital and mental aspects with their characteristic needs. If the needs of these aspects were contradictory, man’s future is doomed. But then, besides horizontal perspective of human personality, there are vertical perspectives as well. It is in rising to these higher levels be it through art, literature, religion or yoga that one finds that spiritual principle in him which at once satisfies and integrates the seemingly contradictory aspects of his being. This is the real creative principle in man the vanguard of spiritual super-system which integrates all other value systems. To bring this principle to forefront is the aim of man’s cultural and social stirrings.

Value system and Planning—Now, how can this creative spiritual supersystem be made fundamental in social life? The answer to this question lies in the deepest recesses of sociocultural dynamics which no analysis of history may reveal. But social philosophies of history have discovered certain primary and secondary conditions which may help in the growth of this process. The primary condition is cultural and spiritual freedom. This should be absolute and unconditional because on the cultural and spiritual plan enterindividual, individual and social interest are not contradictory but complementary. The secondary, though by no means less important, conditions are political economic social more and religious
liberty and equality. The term liberty in the context of creativity involves sufficient provision of adequate means of expression. It is here that the role of socio-economic planning is important. Planning should provide the means of organizing and utilizing resources to maximum advantage in terms of defined social ends. These social ends must be defined by social philosophers. The social philosophers of our age, both Western and Eastern Danilvshy, Spengler and Toynbee; Berdyaev, Schubert, Schweitzer and Sorokin of the West and Aurobindo, Tagore and Gandhi of the East, among others, have directly or indirectly emphasized the role of creativity in culture. A maximum release of creativity in the society should be the aim of social planning in a country. The means to realise the end are the realisation of cultural freedom, the provision of adequate media for cultural expression and the creation of suitable conditions by realization of liberty and equality in all walks of life. Economic prosperity is the basic minimum for any cultural growth but it is a part of a wider process aiming at an all-round progress of the people. Thus socio-economic planning should be based on an integral social philosophy. Such a philosophical foundation is seriously lacking in Indian socio-economic planning and that is one of the reasons of lack of creativity in our country.

Fundamentals of Integral Social philosophy—Some fundamental tenets of an integral social philosophy may be the following:

1. The ultimate end of all individual and social growth and development is the maximum release of creativity in individuals and groups.

2. The individual and the group separately and together constitute a spiritual whole and exclusive emphasis on either in isolation of the other is a mere abstraction. The same is true of inter-group relations in national and international context.

3. The material, vital and mental value systems constitute integral parts of a spiritual supersystem and the realisation of the former supplies a sound foundation for the realization for the realization of the better. The former, should be realised only as part of the spiritual supersystem and not in isolation.

4. Besides his individual sociocultural field man is influenced by his trans-individual and inter-individual field. Thus man is continuous with the whole cosmos. Hence, while realizing his possibilities as an individual and as part of a social system, man should never forget his cosmic and supracosmic potentialities.

5. Man as a complex being should seek to know through his whole being i.e., through spiritual intuition and also through his physical, vital and mental organs and capacities.
6. Civilizational and cultural growth require man's horizontal as well as vertical development. Physical, vital and mental growth should serve as integrated instruments of spiritual growth which alone may give an integral satisfaction to the individual and his harmony with other individuals.

*Philosophy and socio-economic planning*—Philosophical foundations supply the requisite insight in socio-economic planning. They serve as guiding principles in working out the details. This should be done without any prejudice in favour of any particular cultural system. Each issue should be fearlessly examined from all sides, e.g. physical, biological, psychological, economic, social and moral. This will require a collaboration by experts in these fields. To give only one example, the values concerning male-female relations are subject to a lot of controversy and contradictory views specially between the followers of western value-systems and the supporters of the ancient Indian ideal of Brahmacharya. While sex repression has been a great hinderance in the release of creativity and free expression has done some good, on the other hand, the divergence of sex energy to artistic, literary and even religious forms and its transformation, psychisization and spiritualization thereby, has been a source of much release of creativity. Thus this complex problem should be thoroughly examined by experts in different sciences before a final attitude is adopted towards it.

*Conclusion*—In the end, a word of caution may be said regarding the dominance of the supersystem of spiritual values over different cultural systems. Spiritual growth is against the principle of mechanical uniformity and adherence to fixed principles. Hence, while more and more emphasis should be placed over sincerity of search and integrity of growth and development, maximum freedom should be given to the individuals to carve out their own value systems and realise it in their own way. Liberty on the spiritual level is well compatible with equality and fraternity. A diverse richness of forms is characteristic of spiritual growth. Hence maximum encouragement to and freedom of self-expression is the only condition necessary for a reorientation of our present value system with the purpose of the maximum release of creativity. For the rest the inner principles will take their own course.
"CRITIQUE OF VALUE SYSTEM IN INDIA DURING THE POST-INDEPENDENCE ERA."

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Post-independence period in India is obviously marked by fast changes some of which are rather uneven. Among them are included changes in our attitudes and values and orientations which are eventually affecting our socio-cultural life, both in urban as well as in rural areas, of course, in varying degrees. Sometimes it appears as if the old system of values is completely giving way and no new one is yet taking shape. Our present society seems to be in a state of devolvement and certain signs of a rehabilitation are hardly perceptible.

We are normally used to believe that a social order is sound if it has a sound system of values and we feel secure only in a sound society. At times we think a sound society is a society that is stable. On the other hand we are used to think and, therefore sometimes say that 'change is the law of nature', ("old order changeth yielding place to new"). An exclusive emphasis on the former belief naturally encourages a conservative attitude, while an unbalanced stress on the latter accentuates progressive adventures. Avoiding the two extremes of adventurous progressivism on the one hand and timid conservatism on the other sometimes experience a comfort in the notion that we, as a society, are now passing through a transitional phase and everything would take a normal shape in due course. But the problem remains whether the present transition is a step in some sort of an evolutionary progression of our social and cultural growth or a revolutionary chaos breaking into indefinite possibilities. Both ways the pertinent question would persist. What value-system is likely to emerge in our society now? For any attempt at an answer, naturally, our study needs an objective observation of the value trends which are characteristically new and prominent at the present moment.

To start with, we observe 'individual liberty' as a new value with equal emphasis on 'liberty' as well as 'individuality'. We have almost fully recognised it in the field of thought and speech, and, barring illegal behaviour, even, perhaps, in action. Whereas this liberty has opened the frontiers of our minds for fresh and frank enquiry, it has thrown challenges to traditional norms and beliefs. In certain cases licence in place of liberty is a perceivable version. Whereas reason has now started governing all our intellectual pursuits, individualism has started assuming
authority against social codes and traditional norms. The result is conflict and tension and behaviour-maladjustments since neither tradition can be easily brushed aside in a single stroke nor progressive individuals silenced into obedience. It has essentially become a problem to assess the value of ‘individual liberty’ and its place in the coming value-system.

‘Secularity’ is yet another value gaining ground. Against the traditional background of other-worldly or supramundane values we have started valuing the life of the world as important by itself. Carnal pleasures, economic wealth, social prestige, political power and an active and dynamic organisation of our life on earth are all looked upon as valuable achievements. Secular attitude in life has, no doubt, prompted man to live decently without neglecting anything of the life here and has, in a degree, even inspired us to make our existence on earth rich and beautiful and worth-living. But it has, at the same time, over claimed our attention to all that, and in most cases dulled us into belief that this is the be all and the end all of life. Deeper and finer and higher values for the pursuits of life of the spirit are regarded as either myths or, given a concession, useful means, but nothing more than means for the fulfilment of life here and now. Recognition and leadership in the world, and success and expediency in the field of our endeavour are naturally regarded as valuable. But human nature being what it is, exclusive secular attitude in life has increased problems of ambition and jealousy, competition and strife and an ever growing unrest in our life, though, of course, it might help us in solving the problems of hunger and want and scarcity. We can easily observe that the traditional virtues of service and sacrifice and self-control, inspired by other-worldly values are at a stake, and eventually there is a disharmony not only between the older and younger generations but even within the younger generation itself.

Still another value in vogue seems to be ‘effectiveness’. We find that people value being significant and effective in life much more than being good or pious. It seems effectiveness is valuable as such. Consequently an individual concentrates only on such means as might make him effective. In our traditional culture we have particular emphasis on the value of being good and just. To-day we seem to be more concerned about our social and political affiliations than about goodness or justice. This new value of effectiveness has surely made us more active and tactful and practical in life, but at the same time it has encouraged unscrupulous cleverness and has made us cunningly deceptive, imprudently propagative and foolishly assertive.

The above values and those others which seem to be characteristic of our post-independence period, e.g., modernity, novelty and the like naturally mark a great deviation from our traditional values of Truth and Goodness and Justice and Piety and Holiness and all the religious and spiritual attainments. They at times look to be even against them.
But do they all make a case for valuelessness? Perhaps not. They are neither absence of values nor negation of them. They are values after all, though, of course, we see certain paradoxes in them. Liberty for instance is paradoxical to the restrictions it necessitates on the social scale. We likewise see the paradox of individualism with social congeniality. On the intellectual plane we see the paradox of a free enquiry of reason against faith with an implicit faith in reason itself, rational bias against established belief attempting to establish newer dogmas.

Partly because of these paradoxes and, as it seems, partly due to unadjustability of the newer values with the traditional ones—progressivism vs traditionalism—we experience what may be termed as a ‘value-conflict’ in our society. Since there is want of harmony, the votaries of tradition are likely to regard the moderners as devoid of all value-sense, and the moderners in their own turn are apt to look upon the traditionalist as ‘backward’ and ‘unenlightened’. With this one also observes an element of bewilderment with regard to values since traditionalism and progressivism, because of their inherent limitations, cause want of self-confidence, to whatever degree. The honest traditionalist may, for some time, rest assured that he is rightly oriented for all time, but, since progressivism by its very nature encourages new experiments with a pragmatic attitude, the moderner is likely to suffer from absence of enduring values even though in pursuit of dynamic ones.

With all this observation it is clear that the present state of value in India presents a serious problem: What system of values are we going to evolve if values are evolving at all? It is apparent that new values are occurring, whether they are regarded as emerging from within our own culture or as happening from outside. They are almost challenging, and cannot simply be set aside. For their prospects now, I propose, an analysis of their fundamental nature would be of help, for, then alone may it be possible for us to see their significance and eventually comprehend some value-system, whether of them or with them, that might promise an endurance in this land of great tradition, a land which is said to be “destined to be the spiritual Guru of the world”.

To my way of thinking most of the new values, which are causing an atmosphere of discomfort and uncertainty are perhaps, symptoms of some deeper urges in our society and not merely foreign elements to disrupt our essential cultural character, if, of course, we regard our culture to be constituted of fundamental and enduring values and not merely behaviour-patterns or codical norms. Individual liberty, for instance, may be looked upon as a manifestation, however obscure, of an urge to inner freedom, psychological and spiritual, individuality, being founded in the uniqueness of each soul. Secularity may point to the claims of the long neglected material life which is an integral part of our personality having its foundation
in the Divine Law and purpose in the Divine Plane, as proclaimed by the ancient wisdom of the Upanisads and the Gita. (तत्त्वं खलितं भवतं; थथमं भवतं: वायुदेवं: सर्वंमाति। etc. etc.) Effectiveness, similarly may be looked upon as a sign of our urge to realise our own spiritual power and mastery or lordship. (तेष्वषे). Fondness for novelty and ever-new-values may itself be a vague manifestation of some inner urge for creativity.

In yet another way, I propose, we have a basis for synchronisation of the new values with the traditional ones if we review our Purushartha Chatushtaya (पुरुषार्थं चतुष्टयं) of ‘artha’, ‘kama’, ‘dharma’ and ‘moksa’ as meaning, respectively possession of material wealth, vital pleasure and joy of desire-fulfilment, virtue and value of social harmony and inner freedom. One finds here a legitimate room for almost all the new urges, related to the different levels of our personality, physical, vital, psychological, moral and spiritual.

From the above hypothesis, however, it should not follow that all the present value chaos is perfectly all right for the simple reason of its having some spiritual bearing, for, in fact, symptoms of whatever kind give us only clues to proceed towards a desired regeneration of the aspired goal. No symptom is, by itself, a step. It would, therefore, be imperative that if a hypothesis of the above nature offers a working basis, we not only stop at an analysis of the new attitudes, but give them a right treatment and direction for a healthy accomplishment of lasting values. It would, naturally, be important that lovers of tradition discriminate the husk of culture-forms from kernel-values of the hoary past, give up their conservative considerations and be prepared for the new light and fresh realization of the essential values. It would equally be in the interest of the progressive young men to see deeper into the foundation of their cultural tradition, give up the mirage of mere innovation, avoid imitation and be original, look into the secrets of their own urges and do their best to advance towards higher and lasting values. That would, perhaps, open the way to proceed from ‘past dawns to future noons’ in the words of Sri Aurobindo.

We know that there are some very powerful thought-currents behind our new attitudes, which are responsible for the corresponding change in our values. They may be broadly named as Marxism in our socio-economic life, Freudianism in psychoethical matters, Democracy in socio-political phase, Humanism in religion and education and Psychicism in art and culture. It would neither be possible nor wise to oppose these currents, but it would be sheer foolishness to regard them as the waters of life. And then it should not escape our notice that there are revivistic and not merely reactive forces at work in our land. Besides there are individuals and institutions that are powerfully influencing our attitudes and values-orientations in their own way. One can even see that the advancing humanity in other parts of the world with satiating technological civilization calls upon the
genius of India for a spiritual guidance and thereby indirectly spur in us a rediscovery of our great values. The amount and magnitude of religiously oriented activities in the country and the recent importance given to the powerful cultural media like folk music, dance and drama cannot be brushed aside as futile. They do invite us to be ourselves in an original way.

Then, again, great present-day thinkers of India have enriched our thinking a great deal on values of fundamental significance, and are giving an axiological re-orientation to our society. Secularism has received a humanistic touch at the hands of Jawahar Lal Nehru. Vinoba’s altruism, everybody knows, has a spiritual basis. Radhakrishnan has pleaded for the recovery of faith in harmony with reason and science. Krishna Murthi’s freedom-oriented thought points towards freeing our minds equally from past beliefs as well as present crazes into a ‘choiceless self-awareness’, which is, perhaps, another name for spiritual consciousness. Sri Aurobindo (I mention him particularly because his philosophy and yoga is getting currency in the contemporary period) inspires us for divinisation of the whole of life and existence so integrally well as to leave no part of it—matter, life, mind—unfulfilled and untransformed.

We may now conclude that the present value-chaos is more or less like a storm which, though uncomfortable, yet perhaps has to sweep away the dried up superfluities of our culture, uncover its true nature and character and prepare the ground for a regeneration of spiritual values in which faith of the old and science of the new may be harmonised and mutually fulfilled and promise to us. ‘Illumined Free Joy’.
CRITIQUE OF VALUE—SYSTEM IN INDIA DURING POST—INDEPENDENCE ERA

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From ancient times Indian thinkers have interested themselves in the study of human behaviour both in individual as well as social contexts. Norms of individual and social behaviour were described in detail. Human behaviour was considered largely value-oriented. Only such behaviour as individually and socially trivial was deemed value-neutral. Sneezing and coughing, laughing and giggling, etc. are some illustrations of such behaviour.

This lofty and imposing edifice of human behaviour was raised on the rocky foundations of certain basic assumptions. It was firmly held there there is purpose in life. Man has a goal to achieve. It could be realised through his own efforts alone and only through social milieu. And society per se has no such goal to realise. The social organisation thus has to be subservient to and in consonance with the goal of the individual. The only function society could serve was to provide environments congenial and helpful to enable and individual to achieve this end. As the goal to be achieved was the same for all human beings the world over distinctions of sex, nation or class were not recognised. The whole creation in fact was considered to be striving for the realisation of the same goal. Indian thinkers thus laid foundation of cosmic brotherhood. Dharama, artha, kama are the successive steps to realize moksa—emancipation, self-realization, the final goal of all creatures (पूर्व) Brahmacharwa (ब्राह्मचर्य) grhaishtha (ग्रहिष्ठ) vanaprastha (वानप्रस्थ) and sanyasa (संयास) were the disciplinary schemes an individual was required to observe. Division of society into four orders, viz Brahmana (ब्राह्मण), Kshatriya (क्षत्रिय) Vaisya (वैश्य) and Sudra (सूद्र) was an attempt to have social milieu most effective and efficient to promote realization of this goal.

Indian literature, philosophical and otherwise, is replete with examples of illustrious individuals, institutions, religious sects and organisations who made concerted efforts to pursue it. A continued unbroken procession of zealots who devoted themselves exclusively to translating this scheme of things into practice is writ large on the pages of history. Millions of individuals have ceaselessly struggled and experimented since the dawn of history in search of life's sumnum bonum. The scheme of things outlined
above has exercised tremendous influence on our social and individual behavior in all stages of history. Even the seemingly ignorant of us have been guided unperceptibly by this philosophy of life which percolated into our being all surreptitiously. Thus norms of human behaviour in Indian Society were largely controlled by this teleological end, variously interpreted as emancipation, self-realization or comprehension of ultimate truth.

In recent modern times the long British rule and contact with the West introduced certain factors that tremendously affected the fabric of our thought. To fight against foreign rule and regain political freedom people veered around one flag. An intense national consciousness was aroused. Individuals would cheerfully embrace untold hazards and even lay down their lives for the sake of their mother-land. Nationalism thus emerged as a potent and powerful driving force. The large amorphous human mass, unthinking and impulsive, came to be welded into a Nation. Interests and aspirations of individuals were subordinated and curbed down in preference to those of the Nation. Nation emanated as Super Individual, on whose alter could be sacrificed the individual and all that he stood for. Democracy and various other political isms relegated individual to an inferior position. To-day individual as individual has lost his place in the social set-up. He counts for little. Once for all, it seems, we have lost sight of the fact that the raison detre of society or nation is as an apparatus to help individual unfold and develop his personality. Interests of individuals being fully congruous question of clash of their self-interests does not arise. However it is unfortunate to observe that in India to-day a few unscrupulous self-centred and unthinking people are fully exploiting the situation for their self-interest. In the name of Nation all sorts of anti-social, inequitous and inhuman acts are being perpetrated. It is shame to watch such self-seekers forming into groups-political or otherwise-to promote their self-aggrandizement. There flourish to-day in our country innumerable such cliques with varying range of operation. The so-called democratic set-up has made it possible for these people to capture political power. Advanced technology suberves them to tighten their grip over it and allows them to exploit it to the hilt for their advantage.

Even results of scientific investigations have beclouded our comprehension of reality. Nature is dismembered into pieces by the specialist and his view of reality is presented in bits. Look of synthesized and integrated view of reality of which the pivot could be the individual shattered our tottering faith in purposefulness of life, and has thrown us helter-skelter. Frustration, synicism, defeatism, fatalism etc. have complete possession of us. The enormous human herd appears to be drifting purposelessly in the vast ocean of life. Unthinkingly we cling fast to the material objects in life, since these alone appear to be stable and assuaging, though momentarity, our ennui and feeling of helplessness and thus worth holding on.
Large chunk of Indian populace residing both in the towns and in the countryside continued to live their placid calm existence, outwardly unru-fled and unaffected by what happened on the top. They appear to be holding on to old values. But the political system with universal suffrage has brought him into direct contact with the self-styled leader of the society. Elections to Indian Parliament, State Legislatures and Panchayat Raj organisations afford him opportunities to listen to and deal with this tribe of ubiquitous peregrinator. Watch an election campaign. What happens there. False promises are made (by individual as well as organised groups of them), vain hopes are raised, intimidation; perjury, impersonation, breach of faith, recrimination, mudslinging, etc. are practised. No means are spared to secure success. All efforts are directed to win the election by hook or crook. Nothing succeeds like success. And the wonder of all is that those people who win success through such dubious means are going to legislate and rule the country. They have to be the angel guardian of social justice and work for our moral and spiritual amelioration. The common man finds himself a helpless victim in the whirlpool let loose by these crafty and canny leaders and which now gains momentum through his vain and tactless efforts to get out of it. The more he strives to pull himself out the deeper he sinks. The individual is thus getting crushed under the weight of the mechanism approved by him and supposed to be working for his benefit. He finds hypocrisy, flattery and dishonesty pay and sees evil flourish. He loses faith in cosmic justice. His grip over life is loosened. The ancient proclamation: “Truth alone shall win (सत्यमेव जयः)” has no meaning. Discordant behaviour the people who are leaders of the society bewilders him. He dangles in between the old and new norms of behaviour. For fear of punishment and loss of favours he has not the courage to speak the truth. He has grown a coward. The common man thus to-day in his normal behaviour is constrained to imitate the ways of his leader. Acquisition of material goods is the only goal worthwhile. Even the holiest of the God-inspired ones meditating on God in the mandir, masjid, gurdwara, or synogage, the orthodox inspired by the divine revealed scriptures, the Revivalist planning to establish heaven on earth, the Socialist motived by altruistic Marxism, the Gandhi-aite wedded to ahimsa have all their ranks swelled by rank and rabid opportunists. Frequent desertions of their respective parties demonstrate the respect they have for high ideals. To have easy access to unearned treasures is the motivating force for most of us. We talk of internationalism, one world, Socialism and what not, simply to side-track and camouflage our mean selfish motives.
To mend matters, in the first place, we must strive for a *social order* that provides material bases for full development of an individual. He would have leisure enough to pursue intellectual and aesthetic pursuits so conducive to full blossoming of his personality. Call it democracy, Socialism or Communism. Secondly, the realization must come that there is *purpose* in life. Life has a destiny to fill. Religious beliefs apart, scientific investigations have established beyond doubt that death is not the end of us. Life survives beyond that. To die and be born again and again and go through the same routine in each life is a mean purpose—unless the opportunity afforded is utilised to put an end to this process. That I believe is the consummation life seeks. Call it emancipation, redemption, *moksha*, *nirvana* or by any other name.
THE CONCEPT OF ‘PHILOSOPHY’ IN THE MID-CENTURY

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An intellectual discipline grows, develops and/or progresses in several ways. A science like physics advances by the accumulation and discovery of new factual data, by the invention of new methods and techniques for discovering and analysing its data, by the investigation of new laws or principles for organising the factual material, and through the occurrence of revolutionary changes in outlook necessitating reformulation of basic axioms and postulates. The question may be asked : which of these factors, if any, are involved in the growth and development of the discipline called philosophy? As it happens, during the recent several decades philosophers have sought to accelerate, the pace of their cherished pursuit mainly by redefining its nature, aim and method.

Prima facie definition is an arbitrary convention, or else a proposal or recommendation, to use a concept in a particular sense. And yet, not all definitions are equally good and acceptatable. A definition, indeed, can not claim to be true in the sense in which factual statements are considered to be true; nevertheless a definition may be judged as more or less adequate or good. Logicians distinguish between nominal and real definitions. Real definitions are sometimes regarded as having the status of propositions. ‘A real definition’, according to Messrs. Cohen and Nagel, ‘......is a genuine proposition, which may be either true or false’. In a true definition the ‘two sides of the definition are equivalent in meaning and the right-hand side represents a correct analysis’ of the universal symbolised by the definiendum. The real problem is; how can this equivalence be ascertained ? It is sometimes averred that a definition expresses the essential nature of concept or subject matter; however, when the concept or subject matter exhibits several features, it is not easy to put one’s finger on the essential one.

Historically, the activity called philosophy exhibits a number of peculiarities as regards both its subject matter and its method. Different conceptions of philosophy arise out of differing emphases being placed by philosophers on its different aspects. Thus philosophy has been conceived in the past as the general science of being as on investigation into the nature of reality or ‘ultimate Reality,’ as a rational attempt to define life’s Summum Bonum, as completely unified knowledge, etc. etc. The analytical
philosophers, starting with the logical atomists, have made further additions to the already inflated stock of the definitions of philosophy. This may legitimately raise sceptical doubts as regards the bona fides of those disciplins in the mind of an external observer.

As members of the inner circle of philosophers, however, we know that the situation is not quite as hopeless. Amidst the diversity of problems and methods characterising different systems these can be discovered a deep kinship of spirit which marks out philosophers and philosophical reflections from other types of thinkers and their activities.

It is interesting to note that the problem of defining philosophy is itself a philosophical problem. It can be asserted, indeed that the attempt to define any department of inquiry or branch of knowledge is a philosophical enterprise. Thus, neither the attempt to define physics nor a definition of physics can form part of the science of physics. The subject matter of physics is constituted by different forms of matter or energy accessible to experimental manipulation. The discipline called physics forms no part of the system of energies that make up the material world. The science of physics may more correctly be described as an activity of the human mind; this activity expresses itself in the manipulation of symbols with sharable or communicable meanings.

The philosopher or the reflective physicist may define physics with reference to the context of the several physical disciplines. It is not incumbent on the thinker defining physics indicate the place of physics in the total intellectual enterprise of the human mind. Physics can be adequately defined in terms of its subject—matter and its method; its definition would be perfect if it included a statement of those features of physics which distinguish it from other sciences dealing with the physical world. Nor should the investigator defining physics bother himself about the ultimate significance of the terms 'physical' 'energy' etc. Physics can proceed after having offered workable definitions of these terms, i.e. the definitions that would fit in the total vocabulary of physics itself. Similar remarks would apply to the definitions of such other disciplines as economics, sociology etc.

But a definition of philosophy could not be framed on the above principle. And here, we are driven to recognise an essential trait of philosophical thought. That thought tends to to move synoptically. We have already observed that the business of defining physics does not properly belong to the science of physics, and that it belongs rather to philosophy. When the physicist defines his discipline, he does so rather as a philosopher of science than as a physical investigator. The philosopher, however, has to proceed in one manner while defining physics for the benefit of the physicist, and in a different manner while defining it for the benefit of his
own tribe. In particular, when a philosopher is engaged in defining philosophy he can not do so without taking into consideration the total cognitive enterprise of man. In adequately defining philosophy, the philosopher would have marked out all the areas of experience which admit of qualitative differences; also, he would have characterised all the different approaches and modes of undertaking characteristically adopted and exemplified by different types of inquiry.

This implies that philosophy, in attempting to define itself, should chart the entire field of experience and characterise all the possible approaches to and all the modes of apprehension of the different types of experience or subject-matter.

We shall here assume that philosophical thought has the synoptic function mentioned above. The assumption is expressly entertained by some modern philosophers and implicitly endorsed by others. Thus Dr. C. D. Broad observes: "...philosophy involves at least two closely connected activities which I call synopsis and synthesis, Synopsis is the deliberate viewing together of aspects of human experience which (are) generally kept apart by plain men... Synthesis is the attempt to supply a coherent set of concepts and principles which shall cover satisfactorily all the regions of fact which have been viewed synoptically". In his book Dilemmas Gilbert Ryle records a more or less similar observation. He says:

The kind of thinking which advances biology is not the kind of thinking which settles the claims and counter-claims between biology and physics. These inter-theory questions are not questions internal to those theories. These are not biological or physical questions. They are philosophical questions (p. 13).

Ryle's statement implies that the philosopher somehow constitutes himself as an observer with respect to the different cognitive enterprises of man. This characteristic of the philosophical mind and philosophic thought may be used as a criterion for assessing the adequacy of different definitions of philosophy. A second criterion may consist in the demand that a definition of philosophy should assign to that discipline a role distinct from that of other cognitive enterprises, particularly the sciences, physical, biological and social. It is mainly in the light of these criteria that we shall review the concept or concepts of philosophy formulated during the recent decades.

II

Contemporary philosophy may be roughly identified, for the purposes of this paper, with analytical philosophy. This philosophy started its career with Russell's lectures on logical atomism, delivered in the first
months of 1918. The metaphysics of logical atomism, together with the philosophical practice of such philosophers as Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore, gave rise to the conception of philosophy as analysis. At a later stage, the Logical Positivists were critical of the metaphysical aspects of the philosophy of atomism; never the less, they continued, both in theory and practice to espouse the cause of analytical philosophy. Both the atomists and the neo-positivists thought that (1) the function of philosophy was analysis; and that (2) analysis consisted in the reduction of complex statements into simple, unanalyzable statements called atomic propositions or protocol sentences. While the practice of analysis by the two schools was more or less identical, their conceptions as to the aim and purpose of analysis were quite distinct. The atomists thought that to signify better the structure of facts, described by those sentences; to the logical positivists what analysis aimed at clarifying was the structure of scientific or informative language. Both the schools felt puzzled among other things, in regard to the nature of philosophical discourse. Applying our criteria of synoptic or comprehensive vision and distinctness of aim or purpose as between science and philosophy, we would urge the following objections against these earlier conceptions of philosophy. These philosophers had a narrow view of the nature and range of facts and of the nature and range of cognitive discourse. They uncritically identified facts with those conveyed by informative and scientific discourse. Further, identifying the cognitive enterprise with factual discourse so conceived, they tended to ignore the claims of other significant types of discourse, e.g. the realm of moral discourse. Their failure to define the nature of philosophical discourse was a difficulty of which they themselves became gradually aware; but they failed to realize that philosophy had to be assigned a role and purpose different from those of scientific and informative discourse. In their hands philosophy was virtually degraded to the status of a handmaid of science, or of informative discourse in general. (2) Having failed to appreciate the variety obtaining in man's use of language, they were unable to realize that different kinds of discourse might require different types of analyses for their clarification. Indeed, the definition or definitions of analysis adopted by these philosophers were too narrow in their scope. The analysis of their conception could not be applied at all to moral or aesthetic discourse; not could it render any account of the meaningfulness of philosophical discourse.

These difficulties, some of which were realized by the analysts themselves, led gradually to the rise of the new conception of philosophy as linguistic analysis. Among the factors responsible for the crystallization of the new views was the discovery that meaningful discourse exhibited greater variety than had been suspected by earlier analysts. In his *Ethics and Language* (1944) Stevenson attempted a new analysis of ethical terms and statements; and, later on, in his *Investigations* (1953) Wittgensneti
clearly formulated his doctrine of a plurality of modes of speech or language games, each of which required an individual approach. We shall here briefly comment on the inadequacy of this prevalent view of philosophy and suggest a corrective to the linguistic approach.

We agree with Wittgenstein that human language consists of many varieties of discourse. However, philosophy cannot be permitted to remain satisfied merely with this assertion. Being committed to strive for synoptic vision, the philosopher is bound to find a principle for the classification of the different types of discourse and to specify the relationships in which philosophy stands in respect of those types. Secondly, we believe that philosophy is concerned to illumine the nature of the several kinds of discourse which it considers significant. Philosopher should enable us to have a total view of the mental or spiritual life of man embodied in different types of discourse. And here we should mark one important difference between the sciences and philosophy. Different sciences are concerned to attain generalised knowledge about different departments of facts; philosophy, on the contrary, is concerned, not directly with the facts, but with man's comprehension of those facts. The specific concern of philosophy is to throw light on the conditions and characteristics of this comprehension which make it possible and worthwhile or interesting. Philosophy indeed is interested in the value-aspect of man's cognitive enterprise. Thus understood philosophy may be identified with logic and theory of knowledge. But philosophy is something more than these; it is also concerned with the expressions of other value-pursuits of man, in so far as those pursuits are embodied in language.

Let us dilate on this last point. It is not the function of philosophy to directly create values, either in the cognitive or in aesthetic, moral or religious spheres; but its exclusive business is to critically reflect on man's pursuit of all these values. This critical reflection is itself a type of cognitive activity. Unless philosophy assigns this function to itself, it cannot present a total account of the cognitive activities of man. What exactly is involved in the critical-reflective activity of philosophy directed on the various types of man's value-pursuit?

Wittgenstein has assigned to philosophy the work of finding solutions to linguistic puzzles arising in different types of discourse. We do not accept this limited view of philosophical thought. The solution or the resolution of puzzles may be considered to be the preliminary work expected of a philosopher, but it can not be regarded as being his primary and ultimate concern. That concern is the gaining of insight into different kinds of spiritual activities, cognitive and critical, moral, aesthetic and religious, by which man pursues and/or creates values. And the insight to be gained has two aspects or sides: on the one hand it is to be the
knowledge of the structure of the activities or pursuits under reference; on the other it is to consist in the comprehension of the conditions and standards, which make for the continuance, intensification and qualitative improvement of the said pursuits. We are inclined to assign the aforesaid functions to philosophy, partly because there is no other known discipline which may perform them. The functions do not form any part of the scientist's work. The moment the scientist begins to critically examine the structure of scientific research and the standards involved in the assessment and appraisal of the results of that research, he transgresses into the domain of philosophy and constitutes himself into a philosopher-scientist. The philosopher, however, is something more than a reflective scientist; he is equally concerned to reflect on man's pursuits relating to other fields of value.

In conclusion, it may be pointed out that the activity of the philosopher involves not only analysis but also evaluation. In their application to different fields these activities are to be controlled by the characteristic ideals or values involved in the pursuits relating to those fields. This furnishes us a clue for the understanding of the nature of philosophical analysis. That analysis is bound to assume different forms when applied to different domains of discourse embodying references to different types of value-pursuit. When an activity or pursuit is normative, such as that relating to aesthetic or moral values, its analysis cannot obviously be effected in terms of such value-neutral entities as the sense-data. Indeed, even the cognitive activity of man is not strictly reducible to the receiving and recording of the sense-data. This is amply borne out by the many absurdities into which the positivist attempts at analysis of such common terms as 'nation', 'state', etc. were driven.

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THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY

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Today there is a serious disagreement among the professional philosophers regarding the precise meaning and implications of their own subject. This disagreement is not just a difference of opinion about the way in which particular philosophical problems should be solved, it is a quarrel over just what the proper business of philosophy is. And to our surprise the answers to this fundamental question may not have any thing in common, and hence the need for symposium arises.

Philosophy clearly is polarized. At one end stand those analytic philosophers who sincerely believe that metaphysics in the classical sense should be dropped from philosophy altogether. These thinkers hold that the job of philosophy is critical analysis with the aid of modern logic and linguistic techniques. At the other end are those thinkers (of course, in miserable minority) whose conception of philosophy is close to that of the classical philosophers. They think that analysis, however important it might be, is never more than a tool of philosophy, that the principal task of philosophy is to attempt the achievement of some kind of general world perspective. And in between these two poles there are certain philosophers who are trying to give a new orientation to philosophy by steering mid-way between these conflicting schools of thought.

But the chief and dominant trend in the twentieth century is towards philosophical analysis. Unfortunately, we do not know for certain what the method of philosophical analysis actually implies. Though we find a common conception of nature and purpose of philosophy among the philosophers called analysts, yet the way in which they have practised this method is quite different. Philosophical analysis has sometimes been called ‘Linguistic Analysis’, sometime ‘Logical Analysis’, at one stage ‘Cambridge School Philosophy’, at another stage ‘Oxford Philosophy’ and sometimes it has been called the “philosophy of ordinary language.” The main point, however, is quite obvious that philosophical analysis does not aim at the study of ontological problems, but rather at clearing up the linguistic confusions,. It consists in translating the philosophical problems into linguistic or grammatical terms. For example, the question whether universals exist or subsist is discussed in terms of whether abstract words can function as proper names and similarly the problem of being is
formulated in existential sentences. So the main task of philosophical Analysis is not to make statements of a specific kind but to dissolve the problems or puzzles which arise through misunderstanding of the Logic of our language. They are not simply giving the different solutions to the traditional problems, but according to them the problems themselves do not arise. And it has been claimed by eminent philosophers that this method should form the basis of philosophical activity. There are certain basic questions regarding the nature and function of this methodology which I wish to critically analyse in this paper.

1. There are a number of analysts who think that all philosophical problems are due to linguistic confusions. One may admit that some of the problems are certainly caused in this way (Plato’s problem of negation in the Parmenides, for example). One may equally admit that the influence of language upon our thinking is a great deal more important than had been recognized so far. But this certainly cannot be admitted that all philosophical problems are engendered by linguistic misuse, language understood as the instrument of meaning has philosophical interest. The philosophical analyst is concerned with the true meaning of the proposition and the meaning of proposition is determined by reference to what is meant, that is to say, by reference to extra-linguistic correlates of language. So for the thorough clearing up of the linguistic confusions, the extra-linguistic data would have to be taken into account. To my mind it is very clear that fallacies are not always due to language. To take a hint from Aristotelian classification of fallacies, there are fallacies ‘In Diction’ and fallacies ‘Extradiction’. The whole armoury of linguistic technique cannot in any way cope with the fallacies creeping into our reasoning from extra-linguistic sources.

Language is undoubtedly the most powerful vehicle to express ourselves. But I think the contents which we want to express through language are not wholly expressed. Desire of hunger as a psychic phenomenon is not the same as when we say ‘we are hungry’. “Symbol or word is an unsatisfactory substitute for the experience.” The trouble is not that we do not find the right words, but the trouble is that no words are exactly the right words. They do not exist. So language lags behind both experience and conceptual thought language is incapable of conveying the content. For example, no word ‘colour’ ever conveys the precise colour experience, partly because what is unique in individual experience cannot be shared, and partly because the specificity of experience escapes embodiment in general terms, which we of necessity use. This trouble cannot be remedied through the invention of new terminology. No word fills the need exactly.

Again, if we claim to understand as to what an object or meaning is by analysing language, it is like putting the cart before the horse.
Semantic analysis of language may help us in clarifying our concepts when they are complex and vague, it is only because concepts are complex and vague, not because language was framed first and concepts of objects framed next to suit it, what was language invented for except to express meanings or thoughts about objects? Because, language is meant for expressing meanings of objects, its analysis can help us in understanding the latter, but not in determining them.

2. The main aim of the method of analysis is to reduce the complexities into simplifications for the purpose of understanding. But these so-called simplicities actually turn out to be further complexities on a deeper analysis. To give an analysis of a concept is 'to define' it and to define it is 'to enumerate' the ultimate and indefinable parts of the concept. It is to reduce it to its simplest terms, which can no longer be defined. (4) We see that this method, itself leads us to the realm of 'indefinable' 'un analysables' 'indescribables' and 'incommunicables'. So the method of analysis, in the last resort, remains to be philosophically inconclusive.

Analysis is the breaking up of a material or ideal whole into its parts. It can only break down but cannot build up. It has assumed that the model of Arithmetic may be applied in psychology and epistemology i.e. just as all numbers may be broken down into prime numbers, so all our ideas may be analysed into simpler ideas. Since in psychology and epistemology the whole is always more than its parts, so the overriding meaning disappears in this sort of analysis. For example, the perception of an orange may be analysed into its psychical constituents, i.e., the sensations of its colour, softness, roundness, smell etc., but the perception of an orange is not the mere sum of these sensations i.e. the itself is missed in this analysis. The analysts are inclined to disregard the synthesis altogether, inspite of the fact that analysis and synthesis are strictly correlative.

The method of Analysis leads us to divisions and dissections of concrete phenomenon and the result is mere abstractions which are as for removed from common experience as the realities of the traditional philosophers. (5) for example, in Russell’s theory of 'logical construction' we find that mind and matter are reduced to sense-contents or sense-data. Now this looks like a substitution of one metaphysics for another.

The thickest battle of the contemporary philosophers have been fought in the field of values. The method of analysis fails to give a true account of value-experience. The translation of the value judgments into the factual judgements seems to be quite arbitrary. For example, Stevenson has analysed proposition ‘This action is right’ into ‘I approve of it, do so likewise’. This seems to be completely unsatisfactory because the criterion on which the approval based remains undefined. The danger in all these translations is that they add something else quite foreign to the original meaning. Again, they depreciate value judgements by saying that
they simply express the affective attitude of the particular individual—
towards an act. I would simply question: can we disregard or ignore
the attitudes of human beings in any field? Are the attitudes themselves
not facts?

I would say that Analytic philosophy tends to be very much a
philosophy for philosophy's sake. A great deal of philosophical analysis
concerns itself with matter which do not interest the non-philosophical
readers, or it is conducted in such a way that even the well educated
reader finds it hard to follow. For though the analysts tend to make a
cult of using plain or common sense language, the resultant appearance
of simplicity is very often only on the surface. In reality linguistic analysis
involves a highly sophisticated technique which tends to produce a divorce
between philosophy and life. We had built high hopes on the analytic
philosophy that it would lead to the greater amount of agreement among
philosophers but we find ourselves in greatest possible disagreement we
our experienced before. The whole tradition of the analytic philosopher
is an illustration of the obvious situation in contemporary philosophy
wherein we find nothing but logic-chopping, hair-splitting and words-
wrangling, and miss the essential essence of philosophy which lies in
grasping the very contents of our experience.

In the end, I would simply say that the value of analytic-method
can in no way be underestimated. Undoubtedly, it has performed a useful
function of purging philosophy of some of the useless absurdities, but
side by side even, the useful things have been demolished by this method?
Philosophers have always been analytic and they should be so but at the
same time they must be able to rise above analysis in order to reconstruct
what they have demolished so as to grasp the essential meaning of things.
So we are compelled to questions: Is analysis enough? Should we not
go on to meta-analysis? Is not time to see that analysis without the
corresponding synthesis is condemned to remain barren and fruitless?
No doubt, analysis is a pre-requisite of intellectual creation but not its
substitute.

(1) Wittgenstein: Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
(2) G. Ryle's paper on 'systematically misleading expression' J. Wisdom-
Metaphysics and verifications.
(3) A.N. Whitehead: Adventure of Ideas P. 291.
Alice Ambrose: The problem of linguistic Inadequacy in 'Philosophical
analysis' edited by Max.$\operatorname{Black}$. P. 29.
(4) G.E. Moore: Principles Ethics.
(5) B. Russell: Logical Atomism.
B. Russell: The analysis of mind.
THE CONCEPT OF 'PHILOSOPHY' IN MID—TWENTIETH CENTURY

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It is curious that philosophy unlike other disciplines seems to be indefinite about the contents of its domain. In fact 'what is philosophy?', is itself a philosophical question, and it is not likely to get a concurrent answer from different persons (conventionally) engaged in philosophising. This may explain the need of the present symposium. We start by facing this question by offering a tentative answer, i.e. philosophy is criticism or analysis of ideas or concepts. These concepts need not be confined to any one source, like science or morality or mathematical reasoning. Philosophy analyses the meaning and bases of some of these.

Before we go ahead with our consideration of these questions, this can be parenthetically stated that both in the West and the East several thinkers would not concede only this limited role for philosophy. For some of them philosophy is like the effort that one quite often makes to secure mental equanimity, spiritual liberation or acquisition of some socially desirable personal disposition. Accordingly, philosophy is not primarily an intellectual discipline, but a discipline of living as it were. Here it is contended, that we may do well to note the following distinctions concerning acts of deliberation, their products and various objects of these deliberations.

Deliberation itself can be looked upon as an activity, among other activities, but with this difference that it alone enlightens or to say the same thing results in concepts about all other performances. To that extent, knowledge, i.e. product of deliberation, is an universal activity that is embedded under all the other skills or learning related to other specific acts of living. Philosophy as the most basic deliberation would face all the different acts which constitute in aggregate the life itself, only as content of the different concepts. It may issue in some other concepts that initiate this deliberation and possibly simplify them but philosophy itself cannot be incorporated into those very objective processes or performances that call for deliberation. Acts are lived, but in so far as we think about them we know them through concepts, further our description, analysis or evaluation is carried through some other conceptual operations. Philosophy only attempts to organise these various concepts as simply as it can and as cohesive an order as possible. No single mental state (as an entity) or performance as any spiritual act or otherwise cannot by itself be inherently
of any deliberative value and as such uninteresting to philosophy. Philosophical deliberation has always been concerned with concepts as such a bit abstract. Here we only restate this.

Of course, the philosophical interest in concepts, as stated earlier, need not and has not been limited to any one area such as concepts drawn from common-sense or science, morality or art, mathematics or logic. We propose to uphold this position, still so far as the drawing up of concepts is concerned, that philosophy might deliberate upon, even to-day.

II. Nature of Philosophical Inquiry :—

It is to be noted here that whatever may not be agreed about nature of philosophical inquiry by different exponents, still it may not be objected by anybody that philosophical inquiry cannot lead to any material or substantive addition to knowledge of the specific domain on whose concepts it may happen to draw in order to sustain itself. If this fact alone is enough to repudiate its intellectual validity, it is there. Philosophical inquiry is directed to reveal the order and relations of the concepts. That there is some kind of order in concepts is the very general presumption of every conceptual activity.

To enable us to uphold the various schemes of our knowledge, philosophy has continuously grappled with different groups of concepts relevant to different forms of life like knowledge of material world, morality and art, among others. Philosophy has uncovered the veins of fabrication of these various schemes. The goal of inquiry in philosophy is not to force any a priori logic on concepts but to witness the intellectual operations that conceptual activity involves and pattern them in as simple a scheme as is visualisable.

Above remarks concisely report the fact that philosophy articulated the intellectual conditions under which our normal modes of experience like science, history or art are embodied in a specific body of content. Further, philosophy has to free itself of all that content which is relevant only to the context of any specific discipline; and once it rises to become a review of these several logical and definitional contents or operations with the new level of abstraction it spreads to fabrication of the family of concepts that are envisaged by the family. It also tries to lay explicit those rules that the scheme of concepts may be adhering too. Similarly, philosophical inquiry strives to standardise the norms and articulates their application by reflecting on these appraisals or evaluations that we witness in our ordinary life, (say morality, science or art). Philosophical inquiry as such does not end with the possession of a set of concepts, or by merely huddling them together, but it has got to reveal their different modes of operations and their possible inter-connection.
III. Philosophy as Conceptual Analysis of Language:—

Some philosophers during last few decades have stipulated a radical methodological prescription, that anyone who has any philosophical interests should analyse the language which concepts utilize, and this shall eventually solve all legitimate issues without residue. We shall first review the methods and then the achievements of those who adhere to this prescription and draw our own inferences about it, towards the end.

We start by asking a question about those objects which we are supposed to analyse. Are they merely linguistic?, i.e. Do we analyse words, actual linguistic strings of words in use, sentences in speech or their strings? If yes, then how could we get rid of subjective properties of any one given idiom of the language, that we happen to employ for this purpose. In case this cannot be eliminated could we permit philosophical discovery to be assumed to be relatively biased in favour of the language that is chosen for the purpose of analysing. No. Nothing could be farther from the aim of philosophical analysis than merely acquiring such information about idiom, lexical growth or syntax of one or any group of languages. It is plain that the domain of the science of Linguistics hardly ever overlaps with any of the domains of conceptual-analysis. We, therefore, infer that philosophical analysis is not directed to study the properties, history or growth of spoken or written tokens of any language but analyses their universal semantic mechanisms that enable reference to concepts. These latter by themselves, it should be obvious, do not constitute a single homogeneous domain. However, all of them are correlated with one or the other uses of language. As any one can see words or phrases, besides referring to objects and qualities can also talk about variously ambiguous entities and relations etc. Similarly, sentences can be made to assert statements reporting simple objective state-of-affairs, say facts; as well as language can allow other sentences that make meaningless statements or project spurious entities or only report in different ways about other statements. As such conceptual analysis tries to separate the mixed conventions of thought as preserved in ordinary discourse leading to neat portrayal of these different functions, as well as reveal rules concerning concepts, propositions and their several embedded links.

Conceptual analysis results as it is claimed in clear understanding. Surely, this clarity is not confined to words or phrases or the sentences tokens of the speech or script that are substituted for the originally given ambiguous tokens. Rather this clarity obtains through acquiring univocal notions and clearing our logical operations of imprecision, thus replacing the analysesandum of the given mess of ideas by definite analysans. Thus we see how analysis clears and wipes the conventions of language
mechanisms of its piled up muddles. Conceptual scrutiny would discover that in addition to notions that are definable in terms of objects, properties and relations or statements about the strings of the former, our knowledge also stands in need of some other class of concepts that are introduced into some systems by verbal definition. These definitions assist the articulation of the system in question. Of course, the system as a whole reflects the empirical world that it represents. Long and patient criticism of ideas alone can reveal its different conceptual strands and bring in open the embedded links of these concepts. Conceptual analysis has been facing such tasks from some time, and has led to results in some instances already, say in scientific conceptualization, nature and theory of meaning or propositions or ethics\(^1\). It is not the case that any reflection on usage (how words or phrases are used to refer to any element, say a notion or operation) could be conducive to the object of philosophical inquiry. In fact the examination of the philosophical technique of those who adhere to this precept of analysis would make this patent. Only such words and sentences or their groups are picked up for analysis as have some typical element and could be set up as a paradigm to a whole family of resembling usage. It is claimed that in so far as the paradigm has been genuinely set the operation of the usage seem to come under the governance of an explicit rule for entire family.

A comment may be in order concerning the analytical method of crystallisation of definite content of a concept. It is incorrect to generalize about the different analyses that are obviously conducted on different concepts in specific contexts; however independent they are, all of them involve fixation of sense. This has to be passed through two analytical acts, first, can be called the operation of delineation of attributes of the concept, i.e. enumeration of elements (that are themselves unanalysable) and sketching their order, resulting in intensional idealisation, and the second operation is that of limiting the extensional domain that could be given to the concept under review. The attributes whose enumeration and sketching constitutes sense, it is to be stressed do not fall in one single type, they can be any unanalysable element of sense (such as definition, property, relation or operation may be). In conceptual analysis while fixing the intensional content of any given concept, care has to be taken against any confusion of the element proper and its notational token\(^2\) (name in case of property and relation). The usage of science or for that any other mode of experience ordinarily seems to have lot of intensional ambiguity and indeterminate extension; the philosophical analysis can eradicate these evils.

Some conceptual analysts have often utilised besides the above, methods of formal or symbolic logic whereby economy of argument and the technique of demonstrative proof are added to the virtues of univocal ascription of sense. In formal notation the various contents are represented
by means of symbols, and they sketch their structure as well, abbreviating and shortening the form of most of intricate concepts and strings of propositions while those who have stuck to ordinary usage argue that inspite of logical isomorphism the study of concepts by these means leaves out some residue which attention to usage alone can explicate. To that extent they plead that usage has non-formal flexibility which cannot be passed on to any model without loss that formalist substitutes for actual analysis of usage. At present, we need not evaluate the comparative value of the two techniques.

IV. Achievements of the Analytical Method in Philosophy:—

The following achievements are often claimed by conceptual analysts as issuing from their work:—

A. Cleansing of vocabularies of common-sense leading to avoidance of ambiguity in different universes of discourse shaping the different conceptual-schemes to better degree of coherence.

B. Elimination of conceptual mistakes arising out of wrongful combination of elements that cannot sustain the asserted links; solution of category-mistakes, vacuous descriptions and pseudo-propositions arising out of violation of theory types and other such logico-conceptual errors. It is claimed that as soon as the rules of usage are explicated, the limits of meaningful discourse (statements and their strings) are non-ambiguously demarcated using these very rules as the effective criterion for that given system of concepts.

C. The conceptual analysis has also offered to the student of philosophy tools that help him in studying the structure of different systems of ideas with their different types of relations and properties. It assists him to recognise symmetry in the structure of different articulate schemes of concepts. On the basis of these comparisons of the form of arguments as exemplified in the strings of propositions constituting the different contextual systems one could determine the degree of mutual correspondence of the different systems.

V. Appraisal of these Claims of Analysis:—

We shall make the following observations with regard to achievements of conceptual analysis:—

No one should entertain the false hope that analytical philosophy can render to mankind an ideal language which shall save it from all the redundancies that the diseased languages inevitably force on us at present. Nothing of the kind has happened, nor could any analysis effect this
linguistic therapy resulting in conceptual recovery for everybody, i.e. all those who make statements and understand them ordinarily when made by others. In fact as stated earlier, we reiterate that the analysis of usage has no eye on creating faultless idiom. Surely, it is not explicitly intended by philosophers who practice this method. To that extent it should be remembered that no artificial language can perform the duties of the living usage (Short-hand, Codes etc.) without assuming its effective service. Accordingly, conceptual analysis cannot liberate entire mankind from its mortal coil of conceptual errors that non-appreciation of rules of the language weaves on it. Analysis ties the many rules that are loosely spread over the usage into tight system of strings.

The appraisal of the critic who debunks analytical philosophy as frivolous quibbling, is in its own turn quite pointless. Analytical philosopher intended to protect his tribe from going astray with ideas, and his intention seems to be very fully realized. During last forty years or so, they have piled up considerable number of basic rules governing the use of words (concepts), sentences (propositions) connected strings of sentences (arguments). Further they have explicated higher rules implicit in the working of these first order base rules, and so on. The work is far from complete. Some may even doubt if this could ever be complete—whether this hierarchy of rules is self-enforcing (i.e. logically necessary) we may consider below. But first let the obvious be stressed: That with presently completed part of the project it is possible for one who has grasped these rules to go about concepts, pseudo-concepts, statements, their strings and tangles without equivocation and subject them to explicit operations, leading to proper checking of inferences and evaluations of statements. This consolidation of procedures of explication and testing for different conceptual exercises shall not be deprecated by any one who has followed what philosophy is finally about.

We have noted above that the hierarchy of all the rules that apply to concepts in a single context even, is only partly adumbrated, as yet. Logical linking of these various rules is far too loose and much less than self-enforcing in fact quite often merely conventional. In passing it may be stated that logic provides its own peculiar perplexities, analysis faces them, when it applies certain logical operations that are merely concealed definitions, a good instance of this could be the principle of empirical generalization which practically governs nine tenths of all scientific conceptual thinking. However, owing to the very nature of these problems their solution has to be got only piece-meal. The resort to techniques of mathematical logic, and fixation of usage as stressed by analytical philosophy have broken new ground in these fields.

VI. Upshot:—

After having completed foregoing review of this dominant concept of philosophy of twentieth century, i.e. conceptual analysis, we make
following remarks, that are loosely related to each other and point to how philosophy could strive ahead so as to be worthwhile intellectual performance

A. If there is no one today to dispute seriously Wittgenstein’s pretoratory remark in his *Tractatus*, that ‘What can be said at all, can be said clearly’... have we arrived at sufficiently explicit notion of proof that could be appealed to by every disputant concerning every admissible philosophical dispute? It may be pointed out that there is certain amount of arbitrariness in the notion of admissibility if we are not to commit petitio-principi. For instance no one asks if the ‘gods’ and ‘Golden Mountains’ exit, because the known rules of usage about these words prohibit any such questions. But can not one question such prohibitions? Or are they final that is logically necessary? No. But it could be said that is how we use language; but is the rejoinder, ‘that we could have basically different usage’ logically senseless?

B. The first point forces on us analysis of concepts like proof, rules, and logical compulsion; which are basic elements in any process of argument. We have still to schematise the different logical operations (entailments) and their connection to some successful notion of proof with or without the traditional laws of thought (identity, contradiction and excluded-middle). This should attract the attention of philosophical studies of logic. Can we call them most general rules of language but if this is their character, how could we explain their origin, without any argument in their favour?

C. Then we have to face the significant question of the hierarchy of rules which, as we have pointed out before, is still incomplete. Philosophers ought to develop adequate procedure to decide whether different sets of rules that we know in different contexts, could be visualised as embedded in one logic, or the contrary is true, i.e. Different logics seem to be called for different cluster of rules. (Three-valued logic or Logic of Physics). In other words, philosophy on the evidence of the different sets of rules of different contexts, has to decide for or against the existence of formal isomorphism in different modes of experience. So far it is unclear.

Lastly, philosophy has got to shape the lines of argument more explicitly so that one could go down in the conceptual hierarchy to the very basic rules concerning ideas (for every concept is a rule about an expression and its use) from the very apex wide up of such laws as that
of contradiction (if they are intuitively self-enforcing). While the intermediary steps such as definitions etc. for different modes of life may be knit together and provided for, additionally.

Some of these problems it is hoped shall be tackled by philosophers in this symposium and if nothing can be done about them at least we shall know why this is so.

1. This tradition is spread in wide ramification. See Popper's note in Mace's Philosophy in Mid-Century about Phil. of Sc.; A. Pap's Elements of Analytic Phil. for Meaning and R. Hare's Language of Morals for ethics.

2. Carnap in Logical Syntax of Language uses two sets of symbols for expressions and the elements. See his distinction of Material and the Formal mode.

3. See G. Ryle's Concept of Mind pp. 19, 206-9, and his 'Systematically Misleading Expressions' in Logic and Language—I: Moore's Phil. Papers pp. 120-125 and Some Main Problems of Phil. p. 210 ff; and Bertrand Russell's; Description—Logic and Knowledge pp. 244 ff.

4. See Wittgenstein's Phil. Investigations I. pt. It is now almost a cliche in particular to see his view on language Note 120 and 133.

5. See Karl Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery—Append. IX. Corroboration pp. 315—22.

6. Though recently a few dissenting notes have been struck. See Price's paper 'Clarity is not Enough' Ed. Lewis 1963 and Findlay's—Use, Usage and Meaning—Ibid pp. 430—441 and Blanshard's Reason and Analysis

THE CONCEPT OF ‘PHILOSOPHY’ IN THE MID—TWENTIETH CENTURY

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The twentieth century is pre-eminently an era of revolutions in the realm of knowledge. The very structure of knowledge has been considerably altered during the past two decades. Einstein’s Theory of Relativity and Heisenberg’s Quantum Mechanics have far-reaching epistemological consequences. H. J. Muller’s Theory of Gene Mutation in the field of biology, and Talcott Parsons’ Theory of Social Action in the field of Sociology are also equally revolutionary in their nature, and they are also sufficiently responsible for altering the structure of knowledge.

Two important characteristics of the new changes which have taken place in the structure of knowledge may be briefly stated as follows: First, the discovery of micro-laws in the different phenomena of Nature have revolutionised our knowledge of the universe. Secondly, the quantification of the phenomena under examination and the operational definition of such phenomena have made our knowledge precise. Micro-laws in the realm of nuclear physics and genetics have already been discovered. Discovery of micro-laws in the realm of ‘mental’ or psychic phenomena is still awaited. Discovery of some of the macro-laws in the realm of behaviour and social sciences have been made, and it has been possible to define various types of behaviour operationally. Finally, it even seems that one of the aspects of values can be operationally defined. Since values are the actualizations of ideas by creative persons, they have spatio-temporal location and being so they involve quantification and subsequent operational definition. It is obvious, therefore, that mathematics has been pre-eminently involved in the revolutions which have taken place in natural and social sciences.

The situation now seems to be such in the realm of knowledge that science has attained paramount importance particularly in the mid-twentieth century. It may be even asserted that science is intimately concerned with the development of knowledge. It seems to be doubtful whether branches of knowledge other than sciences can any longer play their part for enhancing knowledge. To be less evasive I may say that the subjects which are included in humanities are getting engulfed to a large extent by science, and giving rise thereby to new sciences, such as economics, political science, sociology, psychology, geography and so on. Classics and modern literature do not usually enhance knowledge. They
merely describe the molar behaviour of persons, things and events. Linguistics and semantics can be regarded as sciences. Likewise history as such does not enhance knowledge. It is merely chronicle of events which take place in society through the passage of time. But archeology and anthropology are sciences. Even philosophy of history is in a sense related to science. In sum, so far as the advancement of human knowledge is concerned science plays the most vital role.

In the mid-twentieth century it may not any longer be regarded as a totally absurd proposal if it is maintained that there are five main branches of sciences which enhance knowledge, viz., physical sciences, biological sciences, behaviour sciences, social sciences and value sciences. But apart from these pure sciences, there are applied sciences which also play a vital role in enhancing knowledge, though indirectly. The corollary of this thesis is that theology, metaphysics, ethics, literature, art and history in the sense of chronicle of events do not precisely enhance knowledge.

As early as in the nineteenth century Auguste Comte pointed out that theology and metaphysics were ineffective in enhancing knowledge. In the first quarter of the twentieth century Logical Positivists sounded the death knell for metaphysics. What, then, is the status of philosophy in the mid-twentieth century? Its status is much more dignified compared to other branches of knowledge even today. Metaphysics is dead, but philosophy still survives and it is destined to survive as long as thoughtful members of the human race continue to exist in the cosmos.

Philosophy in the mid-twentieth century rests on the superstructure of science. It is partly founded on the valid constructs of scientific theories and partly on the yet unvalidated peninsular constructs of such theories. In other words, scientific truths are also philosophical truths. Philosophy also refers to meta-scientific speculations which are supported by peninsular constructs. In other words, philosophy refers to meta-scientific problems of different sciences. Nevertheless, philosophy is something more than mere unity or synthesis of various sciences. It is the theory of Nature which is constructed out of the meta-scientific aspects of various sciences. It is this theory which can give us synoptic view of Nature at a given stage of the development of knowledge. The philosophical theory of Nature has an aspect of uniqueness which is especial to philosophy qua philosophy. This theory of Nature, however, may undergo change as modifications may take place in scientific theories with the discovery of new laws and formulation of new constructs. Consequently, knowledge which we get through science as well as philosophy is always probable and relative in its character, and never absolutely certain, unalterable and final.

Under this situation a philosopher qua philosopher has lost his creative autonomy in the mid-twentieth century. He is at best a weary
chronicler of discarded metaphysical and ethicoreligious doctrines. The
door of the sanctuary of knowledge, as it were, has been closed for ever for
all metaphysicians and theologians.

There is one, and the only way through which a philosopher can
function effectively as a savant of knowledge. And that is through his
direct touch with science. Philosophy has discarded the stage of pure
speculation and it has entered the stage of scientific philosophy. It
is not necessary that a philosopher must know all the details of most of
the sciences. All that is expected of a philosopher of the mid-twentieth
century is that he must be well-acquainted with the methodology of
sciences, and the fundamental conclusions of sciences. Besides this, he
must be sufficiently well-trained in at least one of the sciences. In other
words, a philosopher minus a scientist in him is just a metaphysician; and
his view cannot be expected to be taken seriously in academic circles.

The task of a philosopher in the mid-twentieth century is stupen-
dous. He must have sufficiently clear knowledge of the basic concepts of
the sciences. But more important than that he must be fully acquainted
with the methodologies of various sciences. In fact, the structure of
human knowledge has been primarily revolutionized by the methodology
of sciences. The basic structure of the modern theory of knowledge
has been considerably changed under the powerful influence of epistemo-
logy of science.

In the mid-twentieth century philosophy must have its affiliations
with science and its methodology. Philosophy must have its roots in
science. The construction of a philosophical theory must be aided by
the multiple methodology of various sciences. In 1958 Magoroh
Maruyama emphasized upon one of the functions of philosophy in the
context of empirical sciences. He has defined philosophy as “an open
meta-science of inter-disciplinary cross-induction.” Inductive meta-science
is impossible without meta-scientists who are not only well-acquainted
with the methodologies of physical, biological, and social sciences, but
they have also some experience of empirical research in some of these
sciences. They may evolve new methodology out of the data which
they collect through actual empirical researches. One of the great
contributions of scientific philosophy which has emerged out of meta-
science consists in its departure of ‘multivariate analysis’ from the
principle of controlled experiment of the traditional methodology of
natural sciences. It is hoped that through the adoption of ‘multivariate’
techniques of meta-science philosophy would be capable of accelerating
the advancement of knowledge.

Synthesis of philosophy and science is inevitable, and it is only through
the reunion of philosophy and science that we can hope to have an intel-
ligible world-view. In this synthesis, however, philosophy is on a relatively
higher plan than science from the standpoint of knowledge. Philosophy is the synthetic unity of the metascientific theories. It has a unique character of its own which is not found either in any one of these sciences or jointly in all of them. This seem to be the nature of philosophy in the mid-twentieth century.

The unique character of philosophy which stands supported by metascientific theories, I have tried to outline in my paper entitled: ‘Principle of Individuation’ (Indian Philosophy & Culture, 1956), and later in my book: “A World-View Through a Reunion of Philosophy & Science”, 1959). This philosophical theory has been sufficiently successfully applied to the fields of physics and astronomy which appeared in my papers entitled ‘Philosophical Aspects of Modern Physics’ (Rajasthan University Studies, 1958) and ‘Philosophical Implications of Modern Astronomy’ (Rajasthan University Studies, 1960). This philosophical standpoint was adopted for the meta-scientific explanation of social structures and functions, and which appeared in my books entitled: Social philosophy (1962), Principles of Sociology (1963), and Philosophical Foundations of Society (1965).

The upshot of my philosophical theory centres round the concept of ‘Creative teleology’. The concept of ‘Creative teleology’ seems to be a very versatile concept. The behaviour pattern of human personalities, and the cultural progress of human societies down the ages can be satisfactorily explained from the standpoint of creative teleology. The lower forms of living organisms also exhibit purposiveness in their behaviour pattern.

The phased development of civilization most clearly demonstrates the operation of the principle of creativity. The expression of creative teleology is less diversified in the behaviour of lower forms of living organisms because they represent the primordial forms of living organisms. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the behaviour pattern of lower forms of organisms are also purposive in their nature. Herbert Gutman (Genetic Psychology Monograph; 1961) demonstrated that the root of creative activities of human personalities can be traced from the DNA molecules to the cell replication. Hideo Moriiyama (The Nature of Viruses and the origin of Life, 1955) demonstrated that even viruses have memory which is nothing but a form of structural reversibility of protoplasm protein and which is transmitted from generation through genes. Professor Hyden (Sixth International Congress of Biochemistry, 1959) has found that nucleic acids are the most important components of viruses and that there is relationship between memory and nucleic acid molecules of nerve cells. The processes which take place on a miniature scale in the viruses take place in a more well-defined form in the human brain.

Human brain functions in a most complex fashion as a result of long organic evolution. W.M. Krogmen (The science of Man in the World
Crisis, 1946) demonstrated that in 1200 B. C. the Cranial Index of Man was 76.1, and in 1935 A. D. it was 86.0. The brain is the centre which is intimately connected with the creative process. It is my hypothesis that creative process is intimately related to the metabolic process of the cortical neurons. Adrein and his co-workers found through recordings of electro-encephalography that brain waves are automomons in their origin. According to their findings brain waves originate spontaneously without any sensory stimuli. It is my contention that philosophical activity is the expression of such enhanced metabolic processes in the cortical neurons. Philosophical activity is the highest form of activity. From the purely intellectual point of view the creation of a philosophical theory is a higher form of creative activity than the creation of a scientific theory. It has been found out through psychological study that the IQ score of philosophers is on the average 170 whereas those of scientists is 155.

My contention in this highly unconventional paper is to show that philosophical activity is the expression of Nature itself. Persons who have evolved out of Nature and in whom creative purpose has become sufficiently well-defined create philosophical theories of ever-increasing clarity and complexity with the phased development of the process of knowledge itself. The construction of a philosophical theory is a matter of free choice of one out of alternative possibilities by the philosopher concerned. However, this choice of an alternative possibility is not entirely an arbitrary affair. The choice is partially influenced by the epistemological and valuational necessity, and partially by the creative intuition of the philosopher himself.

The preference for one out of many alternatives and the directional quality which is quite conspicuous in a philosopher are found in less defined from in the DNA processes in the cell and the preferential activities of the subatomic particles. It seems, therefore, that human knowledge advances alongside the growth of Nature itself. The highly complex character of the philosophy of the mid-twentieth century is the expression of the highly complex civilization itself which has evolved out of Nature in course of aeons of years. In sum, Nature comprehends itself through the philosophical activity of creative persons.
THE CONCEPT OF 'PHILOSOPHY' IN THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY

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I want to present in this brief essay a radically new philosophic approach which is almost in the process of cultivation through teaching and discussion, which almost out of situational and logical necessity have forced upon us an onus to present a consistent philosophic theory saving it from stupendous confusions which have grossly intertwined it at the contemporary time. For the presentation of our views, I would divide this paper into two main sections. The first would be concerned with polemical part of the New Philosophy which is fundamental function of this New Philosophy. The second part would be concerned with the hints for the understanding of the new philosophic approach.

PART-I POLEMIC

The Reign of Mysticism:

It would strike to many of us as quite irrelevant and futile when I would make the remark that the history of Western thought right from the times of great Greek philosophers up to the contemporary times is the continuation of the tradition of mystics who cannot be regarded in any way philosophers at all. The fundamental definition of mystic can be given by the mystic desire to know reality for certainty. The category of certainty is only needed to explain the great philosophical superstructures of Plato as well as those of the logical positivists. The basic problem with which all these philosophers with the exception of Kant to some extent, were concerned was the problem as to what can be regarded as the ground of certainty in knowledge. This problem as it stands may be construed mainly as the logical validity in the eduction of conclusions. But this logical version of this problem is only one aspect of this problem which is not so much important in the history of western thought. What is much more important is the ontological ground which should provide the cornerstone of human knowledge. Plato derived the ontological ground of certainty in the realm of eternal ideas with an eternal logical relation of coherence and consistancy. As against this eternal world, there was contrasted the phenomenal universe full of appearances founded on change and falsity. Epistemological considerations of such system of eternal reality present the a priorism of the Rationalists who secured certainty in the a priori origin of
human ideas. Empiricists, however, could not find final solution in the a priorism of the Rationalists and therefore, regarded sense-experience as the foundational ground of human knowledge. This category of sense-experience has been a great boon to all empiricists including the logical positivists of the modern times, who have promised to sacrifice every thing conceptual and theoretical for the sake of certainty which the sense experience provides. Here, then, we find that all thinkers so far have been crazy after the discovery of complete certainty in human knowledge. This quest for certainty in the form of finding out the origin of human concepts is the purpose to which all the Rationalists and the empiricists directed attentions. These philosophers never endeavoured to understand the their significance or insignificance of the problem which they assumed without any difficulty. The assumption of this problem of the discovery of the ultimate ground of human concepts and ideas has produced a great deal of nonsense in the history of human thought and to show it, we can take only the philosophic problem posed by the enthusiastic logical positivists. The only philosophic problem worth consideration by all intellectually earnest minds, according to these thinkers, is the problem of understanding as to, to what extent a statement of language is capable of fulfilling the criterion of empirical meaning. I do not say that this problem is meaningless in the field of semantics but to pose the semantical problem as equivalent to the philosophical problem is sheer confusion generated by ignorance of the levels of language and meaning which are as important as the semantic level. But it is not merely the ignorance of the meanings of different levels of language, but it is at the same time the lingering assumption of the past philosophers, namely that philosophy is concerned with the understanding of reality which is the ground of the logical positivist criterion of meaning.

**Legacy of ontologic fallacy:**

Traditional historians of philosophy have been classifying the different schools of Western philosophy by the conventional names of Rationalism, Idealism and Empiricism as if these trends of thought were quite different from one another. But I want to point out here that the historical method of classifying these schools is quite erroneous; in so far as all the differentiation and distinctions amongst all the various schools of Western philosophy are superficial and almost meaningless as compared to their fundamental underlying unity we which may call ontologism. Ontologism itself is dependent upon the assumption of closed universe. It is this relation between ontologism and closed universe that we can say that the history of Western philosophy is nothing short of history of religion, because it is in the nature of religion to start with the conception of some already realized universe, since such a concept cannot be given any significance through the analysis of human knowledge which is a perpetual process of minimizing errors rather than the process of discovering or approximating to truth and reality. It is for this reason that we propound
the thesis that all metaphysical problems are meaningless. It may be pointed out here that this view is not new at all for even logical positivists have propounded the same thesis. But let it be understood by all that in fact the logical positivists despite their various attempts are not even aware of the problem posed here. Their only effort is to present an alternative ontologic ground of philosophization. The basic assumptions of logical positivist’s philosophization is nothing short of Platonic quest for ultimate reality and certainty.

SECTION-II. CONSTRUCTIVE.

We have presented above a preliminary introduction to the critique of the history of philosophy and now in this section we proceed with our own view of philosophy which makes it completely freed from any possible intellectual vitiations which have been so far relentlessly and grossly terrorizing its frontiers. To start with philosophy is an intellectual attempt to arrest the epistemological principles of ever advancing and dynamic process of human thought. This view, once for all proves the implausibility of the view of philosophy so far adhered to. Philosophy, traditionally has been regarded as an attempt to know complete reality and it is in fact this view of philosophy which the logical positivists endeavoured to attack. But this traditional view of philosophy is one of the greatest dogmas which have been haunting the intellectuals like the mythological ghost. Epistemologically, no reality thrives on the concept of fixity which is merely pragmatic in its function and therefore philosophy cannot afford to waste its valuable time in pondering over what is sheer efficacy. Reality which is ontologically a system of facts is determined by the particular historic epoch of human knowledge and as such any judgement concerning the nature of reality can be passed only and only by the individual descriptive sciences, and not by philosophy. Philosophy endeavours, on the other hand, to understand the laws and principles, which govern the invariable adventure of ideas or the development of human thought.

But to say that philosophy studies the development of human thought should never be meant to imply that philosophy is mere history of ideas. Quite on the other hand it means that philosophy uncovers and discovers those specific laws and principles which historically explain the possibility of the occurrence of such ideas. In this way philosophy simply can be defined by the term ‘meta-thought’. Philosophy is primarily concerned with the understanding of the world as manifested in the streams of diverse human thoughts and thus no practical guidance of any type can be expected out of philosophy. Here we must differentiate between a vision and a philosophy. Vision is the foundation of any human programme of action, but the vision itself cannot be regarded as philosophy, because philosophy is the theoretical study of such vision. Thus, such phrases, as my philosophy and personal philosophy, are meaningless phrases, which have no significance
whatsoever in the actual field of philosophic speculation. It should be pointed out here that philosophy which aims at the understanding of the laws and principles of human thought in the progressive cultural development of human civilization is not a mere speculation quite detached from the concrete situation of human adjustment, but on the other hand philosophy is the final tool which we employ in order to understand our own ways of interpreting universe. Interpreting the universe is a biological necessity which has compelled human beings to construct grandiose systems of thought presented in the form of different diverse theories of the physical sciences. All these grandiose theories of the physical sciences are ultimately dependent upon certain basic conceptual schemes, which different ages created differently according to the different natural and historical situations which can be philosophically called the forced necessity of creativity. These conceptual schemes, which have, so far, unfortunately been regarded as the matters of discovery either from the a priori world of the human mind or from the empirical world in fact, are the creations of the free minds for the sake of the domination of the human minds over nature. This particular concept or domination explains both the history of ideas and the history of man. Philosophy tries to understand then firstly these conceptual schemes by its ramified departments of logic, semantics and philosophy of science. But mere understanding of these conceptual schemes is not the whole of philosophy for at its stage of the interpretation of the conceptual schemes, it is almost one with the conceptual scheme itself. Philosophy becomes completely philosophical when on the basis of these conceptual schemes, it ventures to generalize about the nature of the world which according to the present thesis is nothing short of the human knowledge. But the generalization about the nature of human knowledge cannot be regarded as merely speculative in the general sense of this popular term. This generalization itself becomes the foundation of the construction of the conceptual schemes for the understanding of the world which is the main function of the human knowledge. But this view presents here quite a formidable problem which is this that if philosophy is the foundation of the conceptual scheme of a particular age then philosophy itself becomes different from time to time for the obvious reason that conceptual schemes are different from time to time. Thus philosophy cannot be ultimately final as knowledge is never final. This is quite right in so far as the history of philosophy is concerned for so far we have been getting not the philosophy but philosophies of different types depending upon the nature of physical knowledge at a particular epoch of history, but to say that there is no possibility of attaining the final stage in philosophy is not correct, because even if we do not know about the possible development of the conceptual schemes in the future development of human thought, we can know those laws and principles which govern the development of the conceptual schemes. But as we have pointed out the traditional history of philosophy could not grasp the essential function of philosophy and as a result of this it could not hit the real philosophic
contribution, one of the basic causes for having not hit the real point in philosophy on the part of the traditional philosophers is their knowledge of the static conceptual schemes which, to a great extent, dominated the minds of the traditional philosophers. The traditional philosophers, being not aware of the dynamics of our conceptual scheme raised many problems which are simply futile and meaningless, and which do not contribute anything at all towards the understanding of the world. The problem of ultimate reality, which is the main subject-matter of all metaphysical treatises is one of such futile problems. Leaving aside these meaningless problems in the field of the philosophic speculations if we confine our attention to the different physical theories at our time and their relation to the past phases of different theories then we can comprehend a particular trend of thought which has been deciding the plausibility of one system of thought rather than of the other. This particular trend explains those ultimate philosophic laws which are the foundations of the development of human knowledge. If we are successful in digging out the foundational structures of the human knowledge in the historical context then those fundamental structures would be the final words in philosophy. What are these fundamental structures and how are they to be dug out make, however, different problems which cannot be discussed under the purview of this brief essay and therefore we end this brief introduction to New Philosophy here.
अवधारणात्मक सापेक्षता और वास्तव

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ज्ञान का प्रश्न सत्य और वास्तव से वंगमल्ला रूप से समबंधित है। अथवा हमें 'ज्ञान' की जो परिभाषा की है उनके भावनार्थ किसी स्थिति को तब तक ज्ञान-स्थिति नहीं कहा जा सकता, जब तक विचय की सत्यता की गारंटी नहीं हो। इस बारे के अनुसार, यदि हमारा ज्ञान का दावा कभी भी चुकित होता है तो कम से कम उस अवस्था में हमारी प्रतीतियां, हमारे विचय, वास्तव होते हैं। अन्यथा किसी स्थिति को ज्ञानस्वरूप नहीं कहा जा सकता। यह कहने की आवश्यकता नहीं है कि हमारी कम से कम कुछ प्रतीतियां भावमध्ये होती हैं। किन्तु यदि कुछ प्रतीतियाँ भावमध्ये नहीं हैं तो यह कैसे जाने जाय कि वे सत्य हैं? अथवा मान लें कि हम यह ज्ञान सकते हैं, किन्तु तब इसका दर्शन हुआ कि "यह नज़र है" यह जाने के लिए केवल विद्या निर्मित होना और इसकी सत्यता में विद्यार्थी मात्र प्रवृत्त नहीं हैं बल्कि किन्हीं अन्य प्रशासनिक पर निश्चय होना भी आवश्यक है कि यह विद्या भ्रम-विद्या नहीं हैं।

यहाँ दो प्रश्न बुझता महर्षीसारण यह है—एक यह कि भावित अथवा ज्ञान में स्वयं हमारी मन स्थिति, ज्ञान-अभिव्यक्ति तथा प्रतीतियाँ में ऐसी अथवा विद्विषेषता रहती है कि इन के अवश्य नीति पर विचय को सत्य या असत्य कहा जा सके ? ज्ञान विद्विषेषता में हमारी इस प्रकार पर विचार किया चाहें और इस निश्चय पर पहुँचे के तिस सभी इनमें ऐसी कोई विद्विषेषता नहीं रहती। यहाँ हमारे हैं उसे दर्शन पर भी विचार किया चाहें और इस निश्चय पर पहुँचे या वन मे के विचय के वास्तव रूप का अन्य अवधारणात्मक योजनापट्ट है।

इससे एक प्रश्न बुझता उठ जाता है और इस यह कि "अवधारणात्मक योजनापट्ट का वास्तव के घर समस्या है? उदाहरणार्थ: (Thing outological frame work and sence data frame work) विभूत-अस्तित्ववादी योजना और संवेद अस्तित्ववादी योजना दोनों योजनाएं लें जिनको बर्णिं त की है। इन दोनों योजनाओं में से कोन सी योजना तथ्य है भ्रम तथ्य के निकटतम है? क्यों कुछ और योजनाएं भी हो सकती हैं जो बाहर वात्स्य समबन्धी ज्ञान मात्र को भ्रम वात्स्य बैसा ही कुछ मानती है और एक अस्तित्व, प्रस्तुतिर्वेद और अन्तम सामान्य (Universal) अस्तित्व को वास्तव मानती है। इनमें से कोन सी योजना आवश्यक सत्य या दूसरा सत्य है?

किन्तु किसी योजना को किस दर्शन में सत्य या असत्य कहा जा सकता है, यह स्वयं एक समस्या है। सत्य कोई अवश्य या विश्वास या धार्मिक या धार्मिक (योजना), जो भी कुछ, वास्तव के प्रसंग से होता है। इस प्रकार वह वास्तव के समस्या को हम निम्न छोड़ दारा प्रस्तुत कर सकते हैं—

'व' (वास्तव या विश्वास) सत्य है यदि व वस्त्रस्थिति।

यहां पह भी प्रस्तुत्य है कि सत्य और विश्वास (Verification) एक ही बात नहीं है।
कोई वाक्य या विवेकाद्वार स्थापित हुए, भी सत्य हो सकते हैं। निरंतरता का सिद्धांत (ला ग्राह एक्सलोडिट हिल) स्वीकार करने के लिये यह आवश्यक शाल है।
(२) सत्यपान के लिये यह देखना आवश्यक है कि वह वस्तुस्थिति (State of affairs) है। किन्तु किसी स्थिति में वायार्द और ब्राह्मस्त्र से सम्बन्ध नहीं किया जाय? उदाहरणस्वरूपः एक शरीक की स्थिति में—में समस्त मेजें देखता हूँ। ब्रह्मा वहां सत्य का प्रश्न किस प्रकार से उत्तर देना होता है? इस प्रकार यह ब्रह्मावादः कि प्रस्तावित विश्व बालस्वरूप में मेजें है, सत्य है? 


c) भाषातः, इस प्रकार कि मेजें प्रस्तावित विश्व बालस्वरूप में है? ब्रह्मा यहां सत्य और सत्यपान दोनों के ही प्रश्न आश्वस्त हैं। सत्य की हस्ताक्षर परिभाषा के प्रतिकार, यह विवाद या तो सत्य है या असत्य, चाहे यह सत्यपान किया जा सके या नहीं किया जा सके। किन्तु सत्य के इतिहास में, इस विवाद के सत्य होने का यहां तलाश है? ब्रह्मा यहां स्पष्टतः प्रस्तुत प्रश्न (Presented data) के एक कसोटी पर पूरा उत्तरदाय की मांग है।


d) इस प्रकार के स्थिति वा विवाद रोबिट से सत्य ब्रह्मस्त्र ब्रह्मस्त्र होने के लिये यह आवश्यक है कि सत्यपाक्ष या असत्यपाक्ष वस्तुस्थिति का नियम देखा। यह प्रश्न होना 


c) अर्थातः किसी वाक्य या विवाद धार्मिक से सत्य ब्रह्मस्त्र ब्रह्मस्त्र होने के लिये यह आवश्यक है कि कसोटी


c) अर्थातः किसी वाक्य या विवाद धार्मिक से सत्य ब्रह्मस्त्र ब्रह्मस्त्र होने के लिये यह आवश्यक है कि कसोटी
भी सत्य थी, किन्तु यांत्रिक तथा व्यापक सत्य है?
श्रव्य कोई योजना व्यापक या कम सत्य किस प्रकार हो सकती है?
कम या व्यापक सत्य होने की संबंधितता चिन्ता का कल्पना पर प्रतिपादण प्रतीत होती है, मानो वास्तव कोई सन्दर्भ तल्ल है, योजनाएं जिनके कम या व्यापक अनुप्रयुक्त है। किन्तु यह कल्पना न केवल न्याय-संगत (Logical) नहीं है, बल्कि वैज्ञानिक योजनाओं की प्रविष्टि को भी सततः श्रावण करती है। इसकी व्याख्या अनुसार इस व्यति में है कि यह देखने के लिये कि कोई योजना वास्तव के कितनी अनुप्रयुक्त है, न केवल योजना का जान ही अवश्यक है वास्तव का जान भी अवश्यक है।

इस प्रकार, जो एक योजना के इस्तेमाल का नया योजना होने की बात करते हैं उनका दावा यह लागू करता है कि उनकी योजना, जोकि परीक्षा योजनाएं और प्राप्ति दोनों का समावेश करती है, पुरात: सत्य है। किन्तु जैसा देखा जा सकता है, इस लिखाते से यह योजना अपनी ही क्रिया में एक नये वास्तव की सृजन कर दालती है। जिसके का यह अनुप्रयुक्त है, व्याख्या यह वास्तव उस वास्तव का भी समावेश करता है। जिसके का योजनाएं कम या अवश्यक अनुप्रयुक्त है और इन कम या अवश्यक अनुप्रयुक्त योजनाओं का भी।

यदां वैज्ञानिक योजनाओं की प्रविष्टि की समाबेश में भी भारी मूल है। यह हृदय इस व्यति में है कि वे योजनाएं प्रश्नात्मक भविष्यवाणियों (perceptual forecasts) से श्रीवाण्ड या प्रश्नात्मक होती है। प्रभावात्मक वातावरण के प्रसंवन्ध के बावजूद भी भाग योजना की रचना करते हैं, जैसा कि प्रायः किया भी जाता है। केवल वैज्ञानिक व्यति प्रसंवन्ध उस योजना को योग्य योजना नहीं रहने देते।

किन्तु ये केवल वैज्ञानिक योजनाएं हैं जो इस प्रकार परीक्षण: भी सत्यता या प्रसंवन्ध हो सकती है। वैज्ञानिक योजनाएं और सामान्य जीवन की योजनाएं (common sense frame works) किसी भी प्रकार से सत्यता या प्रसंवन्ध नहीं हो सकती। उदाहरण: भौतिक विषयों समृद्ध हमारी सामान्य योजना हैं, जो हमारी उदाहरण-व्यक्तिविद्या (subject-predicate) वास्तव प्रस्ताव भावास्तव में प्रसंवन्ध होती है। इस योजना में भौतिक विषय देश में स्थानित (localized) और कारण श्रावण (continuous) व्यति हैं और ये चर्चात्मक, प्रश्नों आदि के प्रश्नात्मक हैं। किन्तु वें विषय न केवल छोटी की योजना में ही सामान्य उदाहरण आदि के प्रश्नात्मक हैं। वैज्ञानिक व्यक्तिविद्या में संख्या भनें, जिसका यह योजनाएं संवाहन और डिश करती है। इसी प्रकार जीव मनोवैज्ञानिक ज्ञान में योजनाएं भी व्याख्यात हैं। (३-४) यह इन योजनाओं में किसी को कम या अवश्यक सत्य नहीं कहा जा सकता क्योंकि कोई प्रकार इनका प्रसंवन्ध नहीं कर सकते।

कुछ वैज्ञानिक निर्देश सत्य लक्ष पड़ते हैं किसी के लिये केवल प्रश्न ज्ञान का पत्थर मानते हैं, और इस ज्ञान में उदाहरित वास्तव को प्रतिबन्धन (Ineffable) तथा सत्याकार को प्रतिबन्धन (Ineffable) क्रमशः वास्तव का सत्यता की प्रतिपादण भी है। वास्तव के संवेदन भी कुछ यही प्रतिपादण है। इस दृष्टि से वास्तव और संवेदन में यही प्रतीत है कि संवेदन जबकि किसी सत्याकार को नियुक्त नहीं मानता, बाहर ऐसी सत्याकार के एक स्वर पर मिश्रित बलता है और इस प्रकार इनके उपर न कह मानकर तथ्यात्मक कुछ सत्य की कसोटी हो जाता है जिसके अध्याय पर कुछ सत्याकारों को भ्रम कहा जा सके।
किन्तु लाभात्—संबंध—एक प्रकार की घटनाएं हैं जो जान विवध या प्रमाण हो सकती है, किन्तु स्वयं उन्हें जान नहीं कहा जा सकता। जान के लिये किसी स्पष्टता की किसी जान-किया (Act) (विशिष्ट) के लिये विवधता होना आवश्यक है और साथ ही यह प्रमाण होना आवश्यक है कि वस्तुस्पष्टता वालता में बैठी है। संबंध के जान-विवध होने पर प्रमाण की स्पष्टता नहीं रहे जाती, क्योंकि वह स्वयं वह वस्तुस्पष्टता है जो देख है और जिसके परे या जिसे अभिक जिस प्रलोक आया वह स्पष्ट है। किन्तु तब भी यह आवश्यक है कि संबंध, विवध रूप में जान किया को प्रस्तुत हो। इस प्रस्तुत होने के समय को हम निम्न प्रकार से रख सकते हैं:

यह अवगत है कि रक्त ग्रह। अथवा
यह अवगत है कि कुञ्ज ग्रह।

इस प्रकार, रक्त का साध: संबंध जान-विवध हो सकता है किन्तु हमारे जान के दावे इन स्थगित में नहीं होती हैं। न केवल हम भौतिक किंवदंपति के जान का दावा ही होते हैं प्रस्तुत स्वस्थ्य, वस्तुस्पष्टता, सम्बन्धित और राशि के जानने का दावा भी करते हैं। और हमारे जान के दावे के साथ सत्य के क्षेत्र भी बनते हैं। और हम न केवल लोग और लोग कुसम्बर के जान और सत्य का दावा ही प्रस्तुत परमाणु, तापमान, ध्रुविता, आराध्य ग्रह आदि राशि को जानने का दावा भी करते हैं। परमाणु आरोपित (positis) हैं और इस प्रकार आवश्यकतात्मक वस्तुता है किन्तु उन्हें ही आरोपित नहीं और कुसम्बर भी हैं। इसका शब्द यह नहीं कि भौतिक वस्तुता किसी भौतिक सत्य के उपर निर्भर है, क्योंकि स्थान कहा हम ज्ञात है, हम योजनाओं से बाहर नहीं कर सकते। किन्तु प्रस्तुत स्थल के अन्य योजनात्मक रूप से हो सकते हैं, किन्तु जैसे ही एक योजना पहली योजना के उपर स्थान लेती है वह नये सत्य के दावों को संभव करती है। आरोपितों सम्बन्ध तथा योजनाओं को भी समझना रहता है। ब्रह्म, व्यायामिक ब्रह्म सबिता यूक्लीडियन आवश्यकता तथा है यानि ह्यूमाइड की सरल रेखा सम्बन्धी यूक्लीडियन आवश्यकता तथा है या न आइस्टोइनिव प्रधान रूप चिकित्सा में एलेवेशन का जर्म सिद्धांत सत्य है या बैंडक का शिक्षा सिद्धांत?

भौतिक विवधों के संसार को में। एक समृद्ध विभिन्न गति के लिये भंडार सिद्ध होने में एक तीन वस्थाओं में एक ही 'वस्तु' नहीं है। भंडार में वह स्थान का विनियम है और भंडार के लगभग एक फुट बाहर लगे ही लोटा लाने का विनियम है और उससे बाहर बहुत खाने का विनियम है। उसके लिये 'भंडार' एक स्वतंत्र विवध के रूप में स्थिरता नहीं रखता जैसे इस तीन में स्थिरता ना हो सके। इस प्रकार गति की योजना में वस्तुस्पष्टता उद्देश्य-रचनात्मक दावों द्वारा स्थिरता नहीं होगी। नृसिंह वैज्ञानिकों ने अनेक व्यवस्थापित जातियों की भावनाओं का प्रयोग करके भी बाहर भौतिक विवधाओं सम्बन्धी आवश्यकता योजनाओं में मौलिक प्रेम के अवहारण प्रस्तुत किये हैं। ब्रह्म, समृद्ध गति की आवश्यकता योजना सत्य है या हमारी सत्य है अप्रस्तुत सत्य है वर्गों का वोट समृद्ध गति के पश्चात् होगा, किन्तु
theory does is provide us with a licence to move from statements in the observation language asserting the existence of a certain physical state of affairs at a certain time and place to statements asserting the presence of a group of molecules at that time and place. To know that molecules exist is to be entitled to the observational premises, and to be entitled to the licence to move from this premise to the theoretical conclusion. To be entitled to this licence is for the theory to be a good theory." (P. 68) This is a sentence that highlights the importance of the observational premises in scientific theories. It suggests that the existence of molecules, as observed, provides a basis for assertions about their presence in a specific time and place. This licence, or permission, extends from the observational level to the theoretical level, bridging the gap between what we observe and what we infer about the underlying reality.
श्रीर उन सम्बन्धी वाक्यों की सत्यता की जांच के लिये निश्चित निकाय रहते हैं। एक 
प्राचीन उद्घाटन के मूल में, राष्ट्रीयतावादियों के लिये 'राष्ट्र' एक बास्तव तब है—
सजीव श्रीर समाजात्मा। वे ही बसन्त या शटनाए, जो राष्ट्रीयतावादियों के लिये राष्ट्र का 
प्रमाण होती है, अर्थात राष्ट्रीयतावादी के लिये वे केवल व्यक्ति नहीं रहते हैं और किसी 
प्रत्येक विषय के लिये प्रमाण नहीं हैं। प्रथम से श्रीर के एक देश को रचना कर 
सकती है, किन्तु वे 'राष्ट्र' के लिये सत्यप्रथा नहीं हो सकती। जातुई श्रीर आध्यात्मिक 
विषयों के लिये यह श्रीर भी श्रीरिक सत्य है। इसका एक प्रतिकार यह है कि हम 
बसन्त की बच्चों ही छोड़ दी श्रीर केवल रचनाओं (किस्टिकस) को बात करें, किन्तु तब 
भी जितना उचिततम से में है एक रचना है उतनी ही उचित रूप से आध्यात्मिक विषयों के लिये 
ईश्वर हो सकता है और राष्ट्रीयता के लिये राष्ट्र।

तब फिर, प्रथम ही सकता है, एक या दूसरी आध्यात्मिक योजना को स्वीकार करने 
के पास में कथा कारण ही सकते हैं। इसके बचने कारण ही सकते हैं: प्रथम कारण 
जैसे या आध्यात्मिक हो सकते हैं। उदाहरणार्थ: बाल्य विवेक सम्बन्धी बसन्तक योजना श्रीर 
आध्यात्मिक विकास में निर्माणित प्रत्य योजनाएं। इसके, पत्रों की एक ही समस्ति 
रूप में एक आध्यात्मिक योजना से, कुछ व्यक्ति सम्बन्धी कारणों से आस्वाद व्यक्ति कारणों से, 
किसी का असंविदा होना, श्रीर तीसरा तथा मुख्य कारण है क्या वर्तमान, 
मुख्यता सुधारता तथा सके। इसरा कारण प्रथम प्रकार से प्रस्तुत ही सकता है—
श्रीर बाल केवल दो व्यक्तियों के आस्वाद तथ्यों तथा 
दास की ही इतिहास व्यक्तियों में, श्रीर के बारे में किसी प्रत्य व्यक्ति में किसी नयी 
आध्यात्मिक योजना विकास में भराकर लिखते हैं, उदाहरणार्थ: श्रीर व्यक्तियों का विकास तथा 
नॉवन यूनिवर्सल व्यक्ति (many 
valued logic) का विकास। बहुत सीमाओं तक सार्वजनिक व्यक्ति आध्यात्मिक 
सिद्धान्त का विकास भी इसके अन्तर्गत समाविष्ट किया जा सकता है, यद्यपि यह सार्वजनिक 
के स्तर में नयी दृष्टिकोण के विकास भी के भ्रम भ्रमित हुआ है। ऐसे नये तत्वों के उद्धीपन 
होने से भी यह हो सकता है जबकि उनकी व्यक्ति पुराती योजना में सम्बन्ध नहीं है 
सबसे अधिक को बहुत हानि पहुँचा कर सम्बन्ध हो।

जहाँ तक नये तत्वों का प्रस्तुत ये वे स्वयं भी आध्यात्मिक योजना समेक होते हैं। 
जिन वस्तुस्थितियों ने मनोविश्लेषण के सिद्धान्त को जन्म दिया वे पहले भी थी, श्रीर फिर, 
वे बाल के मूल में ही नहीं थी ग्रंथित भी थी। श्रीर, जब काव्य ने मनोविश्लेषण सम्बन्धी 
आध्यात्मिक योजना दी तब अनेक के श्रीर वस्तुस्थितियों में सम्बन्ध ग्रंथित को पहले कभी 
दिखाई नहीं दी थी। वास्तव में काव्य के लिये भी वे वस्तुस्थितियों मनोविश्लेषणात्मक तत्व 
बहुत जब उसे भी ग्रंथित योजना का निर्माण किया। तब जब नयी नयी आध्यात्मिक 
उद्घाटन हो गया, उस प्रदेश का उद्घाटन जो देखने के साप ही प्रस्तुत में वास्तव। काव्य 
से पूर्व के तत्व कहाँ थे? वास्तव में के पहले कहीं नहीं थे। तब नहीं प्रायः व्यक्ति तत्वों का 
निर्माण किया था, श्रीर जो ग्रंथ उन तत्वों में नहीं जंतु थे वे या तो उपेक्षित रहे 
जाते थे; ग्रंथ की कोटि में रख लिये जाते थे। इसके पास ग्रंथ, (error) कल्पना, मानव सीमा 
(hallucination) शादि के रूप में वे पूरे श्रीर भी थे जो ग्रंथित को तया की 
श्रीरी में ग्रंथि के रूप में रोकते हैं।
अब, मनोविश्लेषण से जो किया बह था धिनकमण और पूर्ववास्तव वस्तुसत्त्वों को एक नयी योजना में, नये परिप्रेक्ष्य में, प्रस्तुत करता, अंतरस ऐसी वस्तुसत्त्वों को परिप्रेक्ष्य बनाने जो पहले प्रतिबिंबित था नाखुश तथ्यों के मूल में स्वीकृत थी, और बहुत से ऐसे अनुभवों (वस्तुसत्त्वों) को बेहतर तथ्यों की धर्मात्मा में लाना, जो पहले तत्त्व न माने जा कर अभिनय माने जाते थे । अब इस नयी योजना को किस दृष्टि से सत्य या असत्य होता जाय । किस दृष्टि में यह भव्य अर्थात् अन्य सत्व का साधन, यथार्थ दृष्टि सत्व नहीं, दिखाई करती कहीं जा सकती है ।

मनोविश्लेषणात्मक चित्र के उपकरण, चेतना अर्थात्, चेतना तथा यथियां (complexes) आदि अभाविकात्मक (hypothetical) वस्तुयं है अभावक एवं, अवधारणात्मक अभाविक हैं । एक-एक करके वे न उपकरण हैं और न अभाविक (हृदयाविभिन्त), किसी में सब मिला कर अवधारणात्मक योजना है । एक वातावरण, जो वस्तुसत्त्वों के चारों दिशा इस प्रकार तालिया होता है कि उसमें वे वस्तुसत्त्वों तत्त्व बनते हैं—एक दृष्टि श्रृंखला करती है । इस प्रकार दृष्टि यह योजना सत्य या असत्य नहीं होती, न ही वह अपने से बाह्य किसी तत्त्व या तथ्यों के सहारे छोड़ी होती है, क्योंकि यह स्वयं तथ्यों का अभाविक में लाती है ।

जैसा कि हमने पीछे कहा, योजनाओं के लिये सरलता और योग्यता आवश्यक शान्त है । योजनाओं की योजना दिखाई होती है—एक तो इस बात में कि वे ऐसे अभाविकों का कम से कम उपयोग करें जो उस योजना के अनुपयुक्त अभाविकाय हों और जो अवधारणा तथ्यों की धर्मात्मा में भी सहायक नहीं हों । जैसा नूतन के विष्ठान्त में इट्टर ऐसा ही अभाविक हो । इसी प्रकार वस्तुनि के तत्त्व में, वहां सत्यात्मा के प्रति अभाविक है, यथार्थ द्वीन के इट्टर तथा नूतन के इट्टर को देखा जा सकता है । नूतन में नूतन और प्रकृति में परस्पर समायोजन के लिये तथा नूतन के नूतन में मानसिक और शारीरिक वस्तुनि में नूतन समायोजन के लिये इट्टर का उपयोग किया गया है । इत्यादि योजनाओं में इट्टर एक योजना यह लिख लिखता है कि यह धीरज—नूतन-नूतन-अभाविक सम्बन्धी प्रकृति की धीरज प्रकृति-नूतन के अभाविकों की धीरज योजना लोजने की आवश्यकता को स्वीकारता करता है । इस प्रकार इत्यादि दोनों योजनाओं की सुभावु-संबंधित के लिये ‘इट्टर’ के प्रकृति-नूतन की आवश्यकता है । अथवा यथार्थ में इट्टर एक धीरज-अभाविक यथार्थ है, यह दिखाई देते हैं इसके लिये इट्टर के नूतन है तथा नूतन यथार्थ है । इत्यादि नूतन के नूतन के नूतन-अभाविकों की आवश्यकता को स्वीकारता करता है । इस प्रकार इत्यादि दोनों योजनाओं की सुभावु-संबंधित के लिये ‘इट्टर’ के प्रकृति-नूतन की आवश्यकता है । अथवा नूतन में इट्टर एक धीरज-अभाविक यथार्थ है, यह दिखाई देते हैं इसके लिये इट्टर के नूतन है तथा नूतन यथार्थ है । इत्यादि नूतन के नूतन के नूतन-अभाविकों की आवश्यकता को स्वीकारता करता है । इस प्रकार इत्यादि दोनों योजनाओं की सुभावु-संबंधित के लिये ‘इट्टर’ के प्रकृति-नूतन की आवश्यकता है ।
योजनाओं की योजना की इससे कसौटी सामाजिक स्वीकृति योजना की सहज स्वीकृति योजना ने आवश्यकता है। यह इससे इस बात सबसे समस्यात्मक है, क्योंकि स्वयं सामाजिक जीवन के तथ्य कभी कभी दो मिले धमनी हो सकते हैं कि इसे परवर विद्वेश तक कहा जा सकता है।

भौतिक वस्तु-विवरण की भी सर्वसामाजिक नहीं माना जा सकता। ऐसी अवस्था में सामाजिक जीवन की योजना को भी प्रभावित नहीं रखा जा सकता।

इस प्रकार इस पन्ने एक क़ान में पड़ते प्रतीत होते हैं। किन्तु वस्तुवर्ग में वात ऐसा नहीं है। जबकि हमारा ज्ञान-विज्ञान अवधारणा सामग्री है, सब योजनाओं के लिये ज्ञान के दोहरे का क्षेत्र सामाजिक प्रौद्योगिकी में निर्धारित किया जा सकता है। यह निर्धारित रूप में बता सकता है कि अभी सामाजिक अवधारणामत्त्व योजना अपने ज्ञान का द्वारा कहाँ बढ़ता है? उदाहरणार्थ: जब में कहता हूँ ‘यह मेज है’ तब उसी वस्तुस्थिति के लिये कहता है ‘यह मेज का एक उदाहरण (instance) है’, जबकि मेज पद मेज सामाजिक के लिये मुख्य है ह्या, अर्थव्य “यह एक मेज-विवरण (Table situation) है”, जबकि ‘मेज’ पद बताता एक मेज के समूह में इतिहास के लिये है मुख्य है सकता है। जब, वे दोनों वातजीवन रूप से सत्य ही हैं और एक ही घटनाएँ, इसे सत्य बनायें।

इस प्रकार यद्यपि इन दोनों विवरणों के ज्ञान-विज्ञान मिलन मिलन होने किन्तु फिर भी इनके ज्ञान के दोहरे उन्नत ज्ञान के कही जान सके।

यहाँ एक बात थी है, ज्ञान-विवरण अवधारणाकृति से ऐंशिक प्रस्तुत ही नहीं होते। उदाहरणार्थ:-“भाषा ‘भ’ का वाक्य ‘ब’ विश्लेषणात्मक वाक्य है” उदाहरण से ज्ञान-विज्ञान हो सकता है।

इस प्रकार “भ” इन्हीं भाषा है” भी है। हमारी स्वप्नागि के अंतराल (इन स्वप्नों के अंतराल) ‘तेज मिलन है’ भी उदाहरण के ज्ञान-विवरण है, जबकि रेसिद विश्व व्यक्ति है और ‘तेज’ यहाँ ‘तेज मिलन व्यवहार’ का पदयोग नहीं है। किन्तु यदि कोई कहता है “हुमारा राज्य अभी है” फ़िल्म वह वाच राज्य पद का प्रयोग किसी ज्ञान-विज्ञान के उपर में कहता नहीं जा सकता। उसके भी अवधारणामत्त्व ज्ञान में यह पद दैनिक सीमाओं, निवासियों और पर्यटकों के अंतर्वित और उपर किसी प्रजानास्तिक (cognitive) विवरण का बाक्य नहीं है। एक स्त्रोत उदाहरण के रूप में प्रायक की पदतली और एक पद जो है जो प्रस्तुत (thingness) का वाक्य करता है - ‘प्रधातन’. अब इस पद का प्रयोग यदि अवधारणात्मक पद के उपर में किया जाय तो इससे सार्थक वाक्य बनाये जा सकते हैं और वे वाक्य ज्ञान के उन्नत विवरण हो सकते हैं। किन्तु यदि इसे किसी ‘मानसिक प्रवृत्ति’ के ‘एक मार्ग’ के रूप में समझा जाय, अर्थात् प्रायक उपर तत्व तत्त्वों से प्रतीत होते हैं, यदि इस पद का प्रयोग सार्थक वाक्यों में नहीं किया जा सकता और वे वाक्य प्रजानास्तिक देखी नहीं कर सकते। इसका कारण है, अर्थात् इसी कोई भी अवधारणात्मक योजना बनायें जिसमें ‘प्रधातन’ पद कमरे के समान किसी प्रदेश का बाक्य हो, तो यह योजना अपने प्रारंभ में किसी भी सुधार ही सकती है, किन्तु इसे तब तक स्वीकार नहीं किया जा सकता। जब तक हम मन समबुधी अपनी पूर्व स्वीकृत योजना को नहीं छोड़ देते। कुछ दर्शकों के ऐसी योजनाएं प्रस्तुत की है जिसमें ‘ज्ञान-विज्ञान’ पद अपना साधारण अवधारणात्मक प्रृथ्वी छोड़ देता है और अभ के के ऐसी योजनाएं प्रस्तुत की है जिसमें ‘ज्ञान-विज्ञान’ पद अपना साधारण अवधारणात्मक प्रृथ्वी छोड़ देता है। अब अभ के के ऐसी योजनाएं प्रस्तुत की है जिसमें ऐंशिक प्रस्तुत विवरण मान
उचित ज्ञान-विवेक नहीं हो। किंतु तब न केवल भाषा 'ज्ञान' पद का प्रयोग सुलतः
भिन्न अर्थ बांधा होगा प्रश्न यह योजना भी कुछ ऐसी-पूर्व्य प्रतिक्षा (pre-suppositions)
पर खड़ी होगी जिन्हें भाषा स्वयं स्थीरकार करने को उचित नहीं होगी।

हमारे कहने का यह भरमायाय नहीं है कि सब ज्ञान-विवेक केवल ऐतिहास प्रस्तुत ही हो
सकते हैं, वास्तव में देशकालावस्थित (location in space-time) स्वयं एक योजना
सापेक्ष पद है। जिस भाषा में 'भेज' पद 'भेज अवस्थाओं' (Table-states) का वाक्य है
उसमें देशकालावस्थित का अर्थ भी भिन्न होगा। फिर 'मैं बिनन हूँ' और 'वाक्य का
विशेषणात्मक है' देशकालावस्थित विवेक नहीं है। किंतु यदि उचित विवेक इसलिए है
कि इन के विवेक विशेषण के लिये भाषा 'भ' में उचित उपकरण रहते हैं। अब एक वाक्य
लें-केवल विचार है कि, अर्थार्थ वेयर्ट के बाद प्रत्येक अर्थ में रहती है।' अब मान
लें कि अर्थार्थों के प्रत्येक अर्थ में रहते अर्थार्थ के प्रारंभीकरण को उचित विचि निरूपित को का जा करती
है ऐसा प्रेतार्थियों के प्रतिक्षाको प्रमार्शए नहीं किया जा सकता। उस अर्थार्थमें
'प्रेतार्थम' पद प्रारंभिक (cognitive) अर्थ युक्त कहा जाएगा, क्योंकि यह प्रारंभिक
है। किंतु यदि यह प्रारंभिक नहीं हो तो भी उस पूर्व्य बाचक स्वतः है, क्योंकि उस पूर्व्य के
बाक्यमें ज्ञान का दावा ही नहीं है। यह दावा केवल विचि बनाने का है।

अब ऐसे विचि बनाने केवल ही सकते हैं जो प्रारंभिक अर्थ युक्त नहीं हों, प्रारंभिक उस
प्रारंभिकात्मक योजना में भी, जिसमें वे स्वीकृति प्रयोग हैं, इस्तेमाल प्रारंभिक अर्थ नहीं
दिया जा सकता है। उदाहरणार्थः म्यूज़िका डिस्कोर के इंडिस्ट्री-ज्ञान का दावा ले। अब, भवत्ता
केबल यह दावा नहीं करते कि इंडिस्ट्री उसके एक प्रकार के प्रारंभ की संख्या है, जैसे हुलाज एक
प्रारंभ की संख्या है, प्रारंभिक इंडिस्ट्री के प्रारंभिक अर्थ है इसका दावा उसी प्रकार के किया जाता है
जिस प्रकार से म्यूज़िक के प्रारंभिक का, उदाहरणार्थः कैबियर उसे 'पुराने षाद ते पात्र सात ऐसा तत हृदय'
कहकर प्रवृत्त करते हैं। बर्गन प्रारंभिक अर्थ की छोड़ते हुए, यस इंडिस्ट्री को प्रारंभिक
अर्थ युक्त जा सकता है? यदि यहाँ अभिरुचि को ही प्रमार्श माना जाय तो इसे एक
अभिरुचि कहा जा सकता है, तदनंतर प्रतिक्षा का वह प्रारंभ किस प्रकार से कहा जा सकता
है? इस प्रकार से भवत्ता को, जिसकी प्रारंभिकात्मक योजना में इंडिस्ट्री एक महत्वपूर्ण
विचि है, ऐसा प्रारंभिक अर्थ है कि जिस अर्थ में इंडिस्ट्री प्रारंभिक से स्वतन्त्र एक विचि है।
यह प्रारंभिक अर्थ निर्वचन है प्रारंभिकात्मक योजना सापेक्ष होगा, किंतु इस योजना को
भी 'इंडिस्ट्री' पद से युक्त वाक्यों के सत्यापन की विचि बनानी होगी।

शायद यहाँ प्राप्ति की जाय कि यह अर्थहीं सत्यापन स्वयं प्रारंभिकात्मक योजनाओं
में सापेक्ष अर्थ रखता है इसलिए प्रारंभ, जोकि अर्थितिक वास्तव है, सत्यापन का विचि
नहीं हो सकता। इस प्राप्ति को समझने के लिये 'अर्थितिक वास्तव' (ultimate
reality) का अर्थ समझना प्रारंभिक है। अर्थितिक वास्तव' उस विश्‌स्थित को कहा जा
सकता है जो हमारे प्रारंभिकात्मक के ठीक से स्वतन्त्र निज हृदय में स्थित है। यह स्थिति-
परिभाषा प्रारंभ है, यथाहृत ज्ञान-विचि इस निर्देश निज स्वरूप में स्थित नहीं होने
देती। अब यह रिस्थित कृपया हो सकती है, वह प्रारंभिक प्रारंभिक, क्योंकि कैथिपन
का निर्देश इसकी निर्देशस्थित का खण्डक कर देगा। किंतु तब भी इतना ज्ञानार्थिति
वास्तव है कि ऐसी वस्तुस्थिति ‘कोन सी’ हो सकती है। किंतु ‘कोत्त सी’ यह भी तब
हमारे उपयुक्त उदाहरण और विबंधन से ऐसा प्रतीत हो सकता है जैसे मानों हम आत्मनिर्भर वास्तव का क्षेत्र निर्माण करने में सफल हो गये हैं। इस ध्येय को हम सुनिश्चित करने के लिए ‘अप्रत्यय’ ऐसी संज्ञा दे सकते हैं। किन्तु क्या यह भी सम्भव है?

मान लें कि एक व्यक्ति अपने सम्पूर्ण चारापार देख रहा है और केवल चारापार ही देख रहा है। यह चारापार उसका एकमात्र विषय है। अब, मान लें कि वह देख रहा है कि वह केवल प्रक्ष-विषय चारापार को ही जानता है और तर्क कुछ नहीं जानता। देकार्ते ने जब ‘मैं हूं’ जानने का तर्क किया था तब इसी प्रकार वह केवल एक विषय जानता था। अब क्या यह देख रहा कर सकता है? किन्तु उसके यह देख अपने ज्ञान विषय और ज्ञान अप्रत्यय का क्षेत्र निर्यात करता है। किन्तु जैसे ही वह देख निर्यात करता है वह लीन दावे कर डालता है—एक तो यह कि वह प्रक्ष-चारापार को जानता है, इससे यह देख कि वह यह जानता है कि वह केवल चारापार को जानता है, और इससे यह कि वह अन्य सब कुछ के बारे में जानता है कि वे उसके ज्ञान-विषय नहीं हैं। इस प्रकार, वह तपासकिर्ति अप्रत्यय के लिये भी ज्ञान का एक दावा कर डालता है क्योंकि इसे वह चारापार से पुरूष कर सकता है। इस तरह से अप्रत्यय की कठिनता वास्तव में अवैध है। किन्तु फिर भी वह कुछ अप्रत्यय देख सकता है और होता है।

उदाहरणः भौतिक शब्दों के लिये द्राइरेस्टन का सापेक्षतावाद अप्रत्यय है। किन्तु यह केवल तब तक अप्रत्यय है जबकि वह शब्द तक उन्हें नहीं गुणा। अप्रत्यय जब तक वह इस प्रकार के उचित वाक्य में प्रयोग करना नहीं जानते। उदाहरणः यदि कोई किसी रसोई में से कहता है ‘आज सापेक्षता सिद्धांत बना लो’ और वह कहता है, मैंने तो यह सब ऊपर कही देखी नहीं, लेकिन तो बना केंद्र’ तो कहा जायगा कि सापेक्षतावाद उसके लिये चारापार है। किन्तु इस तरह से निर्माण कियं अप्रत्यय केवल अप्रत्यय है, उसका वास्तव या वास्तव से कोई सम्बन्ध नहीं है। ‘वास्तव’ पर ‘अभ्य और ‘कल्पित’ प्रार्थ का विषय तारक्षक है और इस प्रकार से वह ज्ञान की पदवामली का अंग है।

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You can read his all works at:

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