

ACCURACY ACROSS DOXASTIC ATTITUDES: RECENT WORK ON THE ACCURACY OF BELIEF

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ABSTRACT

James Joyce's article "A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism" introduced an approach to arguing for credal norms by appealing to the epistemic value of accuracy. The central thought was that credences ought to accurately represent the world, a guiding thought that has gone on to generate an entire research paradigm on the rationality of credences. Recently, a number of epistemologists have begun to apply this same thought to full beliefs, attempting to explain and argue for norms of belief in terms of epistemic value. This paper examines these recent attempts, showing how they interact with work on the accuracy of credences. It then examines how differing judgments about epistemic value give rise to distinct rational requirements for belief, concluding by considering some of the fundamental questions and issues yet to be fully explored.¹

Keywords: Accuracy, Veritism, Credence, Belief, Lockean Thesis

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