

*Intellectual Intuition in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and
Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism
- The Limits of Self-Consciousness -*

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Introduction

In 1781 Immanuel Kant published the first edition of his *Critique of Pure Reason* to determine the limits of human knowledge. Due to the fact that space and time do not exist in the world but merely exist as the *subjective* conditions of experience, the world *independent* of its human experience is therefore non-spatio-/temporal. Consequently our knowledge, or cognition, of things is distinct from how things are in-themselves. There is thus a fundamental dichotomy between knowledge and reality.¹ This dichotomy would be effaced, however, if we could directly intuit things as they are in-themselves; such an intuition would not be therefore *sensible* (spatio-/temporal)² but *intellectual*. Intellectual intuition would be a faculty of knowledge unlimited by the mediation of space and time. However, as we shall see, such an intuition is impossible for the human.

Furthermore, the limits of knowledge advocated by Kant also apply to the knowledge of ourselves. Not merely of the *spatial* body, but of the *temporal* mind – self-consciousness occurs in time and so is not a consciousness of a self as it is in-itself. Kant claims that ‘I therefore have **no cognition** of myself **as I am**, but only as I **appear** to myself’.³ Only if we possessed intellectual intuition, therefore, could we know the self as it is, and not merely as it appears. However, due to the fact that we can understand that our knowledge of ourselves is as an appearance, we can therefore understand that the self is more than this. Thus, as we shall demonstrate,⁴ our self-consciousness is not merely the knowledge of an appearance but the understanding of

¹ *Transcendental* reality to be more precise. This terminology will be explained as we advance.

² I use the *hyphenated* term ‘spatio-/temporal’ because all spatial intuition *must* also occur in time, but temporal intuition does *not* necessarily occur in space.

³ B158, p. 260.

⁴ The explication of the types of self-consciousness appear mainly in the book’s section entitled the *Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding*. However, there are two versions of this, the original of 1781 and a completely revised version in the second, B, edition of 1787. Kant claims that the B edition merely differs in so far as it offers a less obscure presentation of the same content (see Bxxxviii, p. 120). However, there is much controversy regarding this claim with many commentators arguing that the content itself differs. Because I here offer an explication of what Kant says generally, I shall take note of his claim and therefore offer an explication of the B Deduction.

its reality⁵ (though not the knowledge of this reality).⁶ The lack of intellectual intuition as a human faculty denies the knowledge of a self-in-itself.

Nineteen years after Kant's first edition of the *Critique*, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling published his *System of Transcendental Idealism*. Strongly influenced by Kant's *Critique* and its certain reformulation in Fichte's *Science of Knowledge*, Schelling here argued that we *can* in fact know the self as it is. And moreover, we humans do so by intellectual intuition. As we shall find, the self *is* intellectual intuition. Our knowledge of the self is not limited by sensibility for Schelling, and furthermore, our knowledge of the self, intellectual intuition, is in fact the condition of all knowledge whatsoever. In other words, Self-cognition is the condition for human knowledge, human knowledge does not limit self-cognition – the main difference between Schelling and Kant, respectively.

But Schelling's conception of intellectual intuition must therefore either conflict with Kant's conception or present an alternative Kant did not consider. We will consider this in Part Three, the comparative study. Indeed, this text will be divided into Four Parts: Part One on Kant, Part Two on Schelling, Part Three, as mentioned, on their comparison, and Part Four as the Conclusion. The first two parts will offer no criticism as this will be dealt with in the latter parts.

In explicating intellectual intuition as each thinker conceives it, we thereby exhibit the limits of self-consciousness. This text therefore seeks to answer the question of whether we can fully know ourselves, or whether our self-consciousness is restricted by the limits of knowledge in general.

Part 1: Kant⁷

Introduction

⁵ *Reality* in a very specific sense, as we shall discover.

⁶ The difference between knowledge and understanding will be explained as we advance.

⁷ Initially non-terminological for ease of comprehension. As will be explained later, I mean by 'real', not empirical but transcendental reality. 'Knowing', or 'grasping', I here use in a very general sense which will be divided into more particular senses when required. Likewise with all other terms.

The limits Kant sets upon self-knowing are due to the duality he imposes between knowing and reality. That is to say, we do not know things as they really are – the knowledge of something is not equal to how the thing *is*, independent of its being known. Therefore the self, as known (self-consciousness), is not equal to the self as it would be in-itself (independent of its being known).

This first part of the essay shall therefore explain this Kantian epistemology (the duality) in order to demonstrate why Kant believes self-consciousness to be limited and why he has to propose *intellectual intuition* as a *possible* faculty for an unlimited self-consciousness (i.e., knowledge of real self), but as inaccessible to the human. To begin with then, we must explicate the reasons as to why we cannot know things as they are in-themselves (this is equivalent to an explication of *transcendental idealism*).

As an overall preliminary remark, we cannot intuit things as they are in-themselves because we humans, fundamentally, intuit things in space and time. Terms which, moreover, are *not derived* from things themselves (viz., not derived *a posteriori*) but *must* be presupposed prior to grasping (viz., presupposed *a priori*) for grasping to be *possible at all*. Therefore, space and time do not exist in the world independent of our grasping. Therefore, things as they are in-themselves must be *different* from our grasping of them (i.e., in-themselves they cannot be spatio-temporal, whereas our grasping of them must be). Thus does the duality of knowledge and reality occur. This duality is called transcendental idealism – or as Kant puts it, ‘I understand by the **transcendental idealism** of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves’.⁸ Of course, our representation of the self (self-consciousness), claims Kant, is also limited by this inaccessibility to how a thing (the self) would be in-itself.

This is the general theory of transcendental idealism, which limits self-consciousness in this sense of *aesthetic*⁹ self-consciousness (i.e., self as appearance). However, Kant argues, we can have another knowledge of self which is not aesthetic

⁸ A369, p. 426.

⁹ *Aesthetic* meaning spatio-temporal, i.e., apparent. See A21/B35.

but logical. This logical self-consciousness is still limited in the sense that it is a knowledge that a real self, which cannot be aesthetically known, still exists as the *condition* for aesthetic consciousness. We cannot, however, have unlimited (i.e., non-circumstantial) knowledge of this self, and therefore we cannot have knowledge of its real (rather than its merely logical) existence. We could have direct unlimited knowledge of this possible self, however, *if* we humans had a faculty that could intuit things as they are in-themselves, a faculty Kant calls intellectual intuition.

Before actually explicating why Kant believes this, I shall provide a synopsis of the argumentation of this explication so that at any point in reading the explication, one can refer back to this synopsis so to immediately comprehend the relevance of the point to the overall comprehension of intellectual intuition.

Synopsis of *Part I* (Argumentation)

- Why is what appears to us as the self not real?
 - Because appearances are not equal to reality; i.e., the explication of
 - *Sensible Intuition*
 - enabling through
 - Time
 - the self of appearance that is
 - *Inner Sense*.
 - When we determine this appearance by the understanding we derive
 - *Empirical Apperception*.
- But we can have a further understanding of a self which is not an appearance but a synthesis that is
 - *Pure Apperception, and the 'I think'*
 - is the analysis of this synthesis (consciousness of this self).
- We cannot, however, have a knowledge of this understanding unless we possessed
 - *Intellectual Intuition*.
 - which is impossible for the human, due to transcendental idealism.

Sensible Intuition

The *Transcendental Aesthetic* is the first main section of the *Critique* where Kant argues that space and time are forms which remain after one has extracted from a thing all that belongs to the understanding (i.e., concepts; e.g., substance, force, divisibility) and all that belongs to sensation (e.g., impenetrability, hardness, colour). Something which lacks such a concept of the understanding, but which is still represented, hence being an *immediate representation*, is called an *intuition*.¹⁰ Something which lacks sensation is called *pure*.¹¹ Therefore space and time are the pure forms (structures) of human, or *sensible*, intuition.

These forms, therefore, do not exist in the objects themselves: neither as parts of their concepts (for they are intuitions), nor as derived from their being sensed (for they are pure). Moreover, as will be explicated, the pure forms of sensible intuition make *appearances*¹² possible, thereby making their derivation from appearances *absurd*. Knowledge that is acquired by deducing that which makes empirical knowledge possible is called *transcendental*. *Idealism* signifies that a knowledge is conditioned by the subject rather than the object.

For our purposes we need not explicate the transcendental ideality of space because self-consciousness does not lie in space but in time.¹³ The arguments for space are also analogous to those of time, so the following explication should help one to comprehend Kant's spatial arguments were one inclined to read them.¹⁴

¹⁰ '[A]cquiring **immediate representation**, i.e., **intuition**' (B41, p. 176)

¹¹ 'I call all representations **pure** ... in which nothing is to be encountered that belongs to sensation.' (A20/B34, p. 173) Contrariwise, an intuition with sensation is called *empirical*.

¹² 'The undetermined object of an empirical [non-pure] intuition is called **appearance**.' (ibid.) In other words, an appearance is a non-conceptualised object that is sensed via (sensible) intuition.

¹³ One can note, however, that if space is transcendently ideal, i.e., the condition of appearances, then self-consciousness cannot be limited to physiology (specifically neurology) because the brain, being spatial, would be an appearance, and therefore not the condition of appearances.

¹⁴ At A22-A30/B33-46, pp. 157-162, 174-8.

Time

Kant presents six arguments for the transcendental ideality of time in the second section of the *Transcendental Aesthetic*. The first three argue that time is *a priori* (i.e., transcendental: condition of the possibility of its representation), four and five argue for its being an intuition (as opposed to a concept), and the last argues for both.¹⁵ We shall follow this order in the explication.

1) The succession and simultaneity of things could not be perceived at all if time did not ground them *a priori*. Because, as regards succession, if we perceived something at T₁ and then T₂, without the presupposition of time, we would perceive *two* things. Thus there would be no temporal unity in perceived things did we not presuppose time *a priori* as the condition of experiencing time (as succession) – therefore time as such cannot be derived from these perceived things (*a posteriori*). As regards simultaneity, if we did not presuppose time then were we to perceive two things at once we could not say they were simultaneous but merely independent perceptions, which therefore would not contain, *a posteriori* (from experience), time. Thus does Kant first argue that only under its presupposition (*a priori*) can things exist in time; time does not exist in things. ‘[S]imultaneity or succession would not themselves come into perception if the representation of time did not ground them *a priori*.’¹⁶

2) One cannot remove time from appearances, though one can remove appearances from time; therefore time does not exist in appearances, but is rather the condition for them. Now, one cannot remove time from appearances because an appearance takes an amount of time (however small), else there would be no time for anything to appear. One can, however, remove an appearance from time (e.g., by looking away from it). Hence, time is the condition for appearances, but an appearance is not the condition for time (respectively). They are not mutually conditioned; rather, time is the *a priori* condition for appearances.

¹⁵ The sixth argument here was added in the second ([B]) edition of the *Critique* – an edition Kant claims, to the first edition ([A]), is ‘improved here and there’ (Bi).

¹⁶ A30/B46, p. 178.

3) If time were not presupposed *a priori* then axioms of time would not be universal or certain (*apodictic*).¹⁷ If time were derived from experience then its axioms would merely be uncertain *inferences* drawn from particular appearances and thus not universal certainties. For example, that time has only one dimension and therefore that different times cannot be simultaneous, would not be a certain axiom if time were derived *a posteriori*, because we could then only say that one has *so far* never experienced different times simultaneously, but that it *may* happen. Only if time is the *a priori* condition for experience can we say that such axioms must be certain and universal otherwise there would be no experience whatsoever anyway. As Kant says, '[t]his *a priori* necessity [time] also grounds the possibility of apodictic principles of relations of time, or axioms of time in general ... These principles could not be drawn from experience, for this would yield neither strict universality nor apodictic certainty.'¹⁸

4) Time is not a concept but an intuition because, first, different times are *parts of* one time. Different instances of one concept are separate from that concept itself (they are subsumed *under* it), the different instances of time (i.e., particular time stretches) are subsumed *within* a whole time (as parts) – they are *not* separate from the whole.¹⁹ Therefore these times are *immediate representations* of time rather than representations under the mediation of a concept (of time) – in other words, time is an intuition. Secondly, different times are intuitions because the proposition that different times cannot be simultaneous is synthetic *a priori*. The proposition is *a priori* as argued in the third argument above (as the condition for experience). The proposition is *synthetic* because the predicate (non-simultaneity) is not contained under the subject (different times).²⁰ Therefore different times cannot be concepts because these do not contain, *analytically*, the necessary predicate of non-simultaneity. Rather, different times are intuitions whose possibility, *a priori*, contains the certainty of their non-simultaneity (as in the third argument). '[T]he proposition that different times cannot

¹⁷ Apodictic means a certainty of necessity. See A75/B100, p.209.

¹⁸ A31/B47, p. 178.

¹⁹ This argument presupposes the former third argument – i.e., that the axiom of time having one dimension is certain.

²⁰ This is because a concept for a particular time could be theoretically, without self-contradiction, used in two dimensions of time. The concept does not include in-itself the *certain* non-simultaneity of itself.

be simultaneous cannot be derived from a general concept. The proposition is synthetic, and cannot arise from concepts alone.’²¹

5) Time is not a concept but an intuition because time is necessarily infinite. Every determined magnitude (finitude) of time is possible only through the limits of another time, and this other time is finite only in so far as it has another limit *ad infinitum*. Therefore time is limitless, infinite, itself - being the ground of temporal finitudes (particular times). Because of this necessary infinitude of time, the concepts of time (finitudes) cannot entirely *constitute* this infinity, but must presuppose this infinity of time for their *possibility*. Therefore, the presupposition, ground, of these temporally finite concepts must be an *immediate* (non-conceptual) representation, i.e., an intuition. As Kant says, ‘where the parts themselves and every magnitude of an object [i.e., time] can be determinately represented only through limitation, there the entire representation cannot be given through concepts, (for they contain only partial representations), but immediate intuition must ground them.’²²

6) If time were not an *a priori* intuition then the concepts of alteration and motion (as alteration of place) would not be possible. This is because contradictorily opposed predicates of a particular thing could only be encountered under the presupposition of an intuition of time. To use Kant’s example, the predicates of a thing in motion would be the contradictory opposites of being in a certain place and not-being in that same place. If time, as succession, were not presupposed here as an immediate representation, the thing’s concept would annihilate its own possibility²³ (like a ‘square-circle’), making its motion impossible – as Kant says, ‘only in time can contradictorily opposed determinations in one thing be encountered, namely **successively**.’²⁴ Therefore, time (succession) is not derived *a posteriori* from a mobile thing itself, as it were, but must be presupposed *a priori* for a thing to be mobile at all. And this presupposition of time is an intuition (immediate) because it is not contained in the concept of any changing (mobile or alternating) thing.

²¹ A32/B47, p. 179.

²² B48, p. 179.

²³ Succession is also the condition of alteration – i.e., that a thing can be X and not-X only in the successive points T1 and T2, respectively.

²⁴ B49, p. 180.

These arguments constitute Kant's explication of the transcendental ideality of time 'according to which it is nothing at all if one abstracts from the subjective conditions of sensible intuition'.²⁵ Or, more explicitly, '[t]ime is not something that would subsist for itself or attach to things as an objective determination, and thus remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of the intuition of them'.²⁶ Now the fact that time is a *subjective* condition determining the representation of things implies that all representations are, as such, in *me* (rather than existing temporally without me). This type of self-intuition (the immediate representation of our inner state of the manifold of representations) is called the 'I' of inner sense, whose conditions, limits, and relation to intellectual intuition we will now explore.

Inner Sense

'Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner state ... [time] determines the relation of representations in our inner state.'²⁷ This statement clarifies the fact that time, an *a priori* form of intuitions, not only gives form to our manifold representations, but also gives form to the *order* of these representations *as they occur to us* (in our inner state) – i.e., the *successive* order of representations. The intuition of this inner state is therefore the *sensible intuition* of ourselves (temporal), and as such is an *appearance*, the transcendental reality of which is not intuited. As Kant reflects, 'it [the self] can only produce an intuition of itself in such a way, whose form, however, which antecedently grounds it in the mind, determines the way in which the manifold is together in the mind in the representation of time; there it then intuits itself ... in accordance with the way in which it is affected from within, consequently as it appears to itself, not as it is.'²⁸

Although this self of inner sense is mere appearance, and therefore not an intuition of a transcendently real self, or a *soul*,²⁹ Kant is careful to clarify the fact that the appearance of something does not mean that the corresponding transcendental object is *necessarily* an illusion. 'If I say: in space and time intuition represents both

²⁵ A36/B52, pp. 181-2.

²⁶ A32/B49, p. 180.

²⁷ A33/B49-50 p. 180.

²⁸ B68-9, p. 190.

²⁹ '[T]he soul (a name for the transcendental object of inner sense)' A361, p. 422.

outer objects as well as the self-intuition of the mind as each affects our senses, i.e., as it **appears**, that is not to say that these objects would be mere **illusion** [schein] ... Thus I do not say that bodies merely **seem** [scheinen] to exist outside me or that my soul only **seems** [scheint] to be given'.³⁰ The soul is not *necessarily* an illusion, but it still *may* be – because humans only possess sensible intuition, we lack an intuition which could represent and validate this *possible* soul in-itself.³¹

The preceding quote should also make clear the fact that the intuition of our inner state (inner sense) is already an intuition of *objects*. 'An **object**, however, is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is **united**.'³² The form of inner sense is time (the succession of objects), the content however is objects. Objects themselves, of course, require sensible intuition for their possibility (along with the pure concepts of the understanding),³³ but once combined they are sensibly intuited again, in inner sense (in time). '[F]rom the principle of inner sense I can say generally: ... all objects of the senses, are in time, and necessarily stand in relations of time.'³⁴ This point that inner sense is an intuition of objects and not an intuition of mere intuitions, is important for the later explication of the two types of apperception.

Because inner sense is only a sensible intuition, it so far lacks determination. It is not *understood* (or *thought*), it is merely intuited (it being mere appearance). Knowledge proper, or *cognition*, requires both properties: '[t]he understanding is not capable of intuiting anything, and the senses are not capable of thinking anything. Only from their unification can cognition arise.'³⁵ The self of inner sense therefore is not a self-knowledge but a self-intuition, or more precisely, an intuition by a yet unknown self. First we must determine, understand, inner sense, therefore – for a *cognition of the self as appearance (empirical apperception)*. In other words, to make the intuition of objects an object itself. The self of inner self is not known, the

³⁰ B69, p.190.

³¹ Space and time themselves, of course, are definitely *not* illusions. They *necessarily* exist as transcendental ideals for any experience whatsoever.

³² B137, p. 249. The English word 'object' is used indiscriminately in the translations to denote three German terms: *Ding*, *Gegenstand*, and *Object*. I mean it here as the last of these, which means object of cognition (sensible intuition and concept). For a useful discrimination see Caygill, p.306.

³³ Or, the *Categories*. See A76/B102 onwards for how concepts interact with sensible intuition.

³⁴ A34/B51, p. 181.

³⁵ A51/B75-6, p. 194. Famously, '[t]houghts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.' (A51/B75, pp.193-4.)

following acquisition of this knowledge will further explain the limits of a self-consciousness, leading to a full explication of the need to posit intellectual intuition.

Empirical Apperception

‘That which determines the inner sense is the understanding and its original faculty of combining the manifold of intuition, i.e., of bringing it under an apperception’.³⁶ This remark introduces to the reader the idea that the determination of the inner sense by the understanding is done by means of an initial, original, *combining*. We shall see that this combining uses a type of memory which therefore is antecedent to inner sense, for it cannot be derived therefrom. Inner sense will thereby be *determined as* an intuition of a manifold of objects (rather than *being* an intuition of a manifold of objects).

Inner sense alone represents the form of intuitions,³⁷ i.e., in time. However, inner sense *alone*, therefore, cannot be *aware of* (understand) this succession – it is the succession. The understanding is therefore required for this awareness. Further, to be aware of succession means to be aware of the moments in succession – to be aware merely of one moment, and then the next, with no link, is *not to be aware of succession, but of successors*. Inner sense being succession (time) therefore requires an understanding of this *whole*. To be aware of moments *linked*, rather than moments *per se*, would thus be an understanding of inner sense. In other words, the manifold must be combined for the determination of inner sense. Moreover, this combining must be one of memory and synthesis: to link moments means to remember the moments past, and then synthesize them. Kant calls this original action of the understanding on the inner sense the *transcendental synthesis of the imagination* (or *synthesis speciosa*).³⁸

Imagination is the word Kant uses for this type of memory: ‘**Imagination** is the faculty for representing an object even **without its presence** in intuition.’³⁹ *Synthesis* is the *a priori* act of combining representations (i.e., representations are not

³⁶ B153, p. 257.

³⁷ Of objects.

³⁸ Also called the *figurative synthesis* (see B151, p. 256).

combined *a posteriori* – they do not in themselves contain the link to other representations).⁴⁰ *Synthesis speciosa* is transcendental because, first, it is as mentioned *a priori*, second, it is a condition of knowledge.⁴¹ Kant also calls *synthesis speciosa* the *productive imagination* to distinguish it from the merely *reproductive imagination*. The latter is merely the memory of association, or recollection; it does not *produce* the possibility of knowledge but only *reproduces* what has already been known.⁴² Since the latter does not belong to transcendental philosophy, I will henceforth refer to the former when I use the word ‘imagination.’

Now the understanding of the inner sense through *synthesis speciosa* is a ‘**subjective unity** of consciousness, which is a **determination of inner sense**, through which that manifold of intuition is empirically given for such a combination.’⁴³ Kant needs to define this understanding as a subjective unity in order to distinguish it from an objective unity of consciousness. It is *subjective* because the intuition it receives *empirically* (i.e., as the objects of the intuition of inner sense, not the *a priori* forms of intuition which are universal), which it synthesises as its self-determination, are contingent on the empirical circumstances of *each* person. The unity is not one which is universal for every self and thus not objective,⁴⁴ but one which is particular to every self and is thus subjective. *Apperception* means the determination of the self;⁴⁵ the determination that is *synthesis speciosa* is therefore called *empirical apperception*.

It should be noted that although empirical apperception is the everyday self-consciousness that is contingent on empirical circumstance and therefore subjective, its *method*, the transcendental synthesis of imagination, is universal to all. Its *content*

³⁹ B151, p. 256.

⁴⁰ See B129-132, pp. 245-6.

⁴¹ Could we not represent a plurality of objects, even without their actual presence, in a judgement, that judgement would not be possible; it would be a mere heterogeneity of objects without combination. Knowledge would thus be impossible. See B140-2, pp. 251-2.

⁴² As Kant says, ‘[it] contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of cognition *a priori*, and on that account belongs not in transcendental philosophy but in psychology’ (B152, p. 257).

⁴³ B139, p. 250.

⁴⁴ *Objective* specifically meaning the condition of objects, which therefore must be universal to all selves (who all experience objects). This definition will be thoroughly exposed in the following section on pure apperception.

⁴⁵ See B132, p.246.

(of objects) is subjective. Everyone has the imagination, but everyone applies it differently.

The determination of inner sense is therefore an act of the understanding (*synthesis speciosa*) which is empirical apperception. This is the ordinary self-consciousness that is subjective to each person and thus dealt with in psychology. It is a cognition of the self as appearance (as inner sense),⁴⁶ not a cognition of the self as it would be in-itself - its intuition is appearance, inner sense, *not* an intuition of the transcendental condition of appearance (which would not be sensible).⁴⁷ As Kant states, ‘the determination of my existence can only occur in correspondence with the form of inner sense [*synthesis speciosa*], according to the particular way in which the manifold that I combine is given in inner intuition, and I therefore have **no cognition** of myself **as I am**, but only as I **appear** to myself.’⁴⁸ Empirical apperception is a *cognition* of the self as appearance, it is not the appearance itself (as is the undetermined self of inner sense).

This explication of empirical apperception has, however, posed two other questions: what is the *objective* unity of self-consciousness which he draws in distinction to the subjective unity, and can we cognise our self as we are in ourselves? The answer to the first question is, to be concise, *pure apperception*; we will find that its explication answers the latter question, concluding with the necessary exposition of intellectual intuition.

Pure Apperception and the ‘I think’

Empirical apperception is the *subjective* unity of consciousness because its object (the self) is not the condition for objects. If something is the condition for objects it is called *objective* – as transcendental and therefore universal to all selves. The self of empirical apperception is not transcendental but empirical – therefore subjective. Consequently the *objective unity of self-consciousness* must be

⁴⁶ More specifically, the cognition of the self as the appearance of the manifold of objects.

⁴⁷ But *intellectual*. Here we have the beginning of the need to posit intellectual intuition as a possible non-sensible (i.e., non-human) faculty. Its full explication will be brought out in what follows.

⁴⁸ B157-8, p. 260.

transcendental, not being determined *a posteriori* but *a priori* (therefore *pure* as opposed to empirical).

What then is the condition for an object, bar the pure forms of sensible intuition already explained? First, these intuitions must be united under a concept.⁴⁹ But this is not possible without that manifold of intuition already being *presupposed* as *generally*⁵⁰ united. *Per se*, the intuitions are not united. This unity cannot be synthesised by *synthesis speciosa* because, as quoted, imagination is ‘the faculty for representing an object even **without its presence**’.⁵¹ That is to say, *synthesis speciosa* presupposes objects.⁵² Therefore even empirical apperception is conditioned upon a higher synthesis, one which must be pure (it cannot be determined empirically, which empirical apperception is): ‘[a] pure synthesis of the understanding ... grounds *a priori* the empirical synthesis.’⁵³ This pure synthesis Kant calls *synthesis intellectualis*.⁵⁴

‘The **transcendental unity** of apperception is that unity through which all of the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. It is called **objective** on that account, and must be distinguished from the **subjective unity** of consciousness’.⁵⁵ The transcendental unity of apperception, or *pure apperception*, is thus that *a priori* unity which grounds the possibility of objects. Thus it makes empirical apperception possible as the subsequent subjective synthesis of objects. But we shall find that it also conditions it in a more fundamental way.

Pure apperception is a *formal* condition of objectivity. The *sensible* condition of objectivity forms our intuition of an object (spatio-/temporal), the formal condition unites these intuitions for the possibility of their being subsumed under a concept (category). This unity must be prior to a synthesis of the imagination⁵⁶ in us because it must be presupposed that all of the intuitions, which could be synthesised as such, *all*

⁴⁹ See A76/B102 onwards for how concepts interact with sensible intuition.

⁵⁰ I.e., as united prior to the *specific* concept. ‘This unity, which precedes all concepts of combination a priori, is not the former category [concept] of unity ... The category therefore already presupposes combination.’ (B131, p. 246).

⁵¹ B151, p. 256.

⁵² Plus the fact that it would not be able to store an object without it formerly being intuited.

⁵³ B140, p. 250.

⁵⁴ B151, p. 256.

⁵⁵ B139, p. 250.

⁵⁶ If, in theory, it could pertain to intuitions as well as objects.

belong to me. Without this latter possible thought, which posits the *identity* of the self throughout all intuitions, a subsequent synthesis would merely yield representations which, though combined with each other, would not belong to *me*. This apperception is thus pure because I cannot derive *a posteriori* an identical self through the cognition of objects themselves, if I did 'I would have as multicoloured, diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious.'⁵⁷

Empirical apperception must thus presuppose pure apperception for, first, the possibility of objects, secondly, for the identity of the self throughout representations generally. Consequently, *the possibility for objects is also the possibility for self-consciousness*. The self-consciousness, however, is not *equal to* the (necessarily presupposed) identical self. That identity must necessarily be maintained for any consciousness of objects whatever (it is objective). The *consciousness of* that identity is only an *ability*, not a *necessary* consciousness which accompanies every object.⁵⁸ The ability to be conscious of the identity of the self in every representation is expressed by '*I think*' (this or that object). The *I think* is therefore an *analytic proposition* which *can* accompany any represented object, analytic because, as mentioned, an object *contains* the necessary identity of the self for its possibility.

This possible analysis is self-consciousness as consciousness of the identity of the self throughout my representations. This *I think* therefore is also called the *analytic unity of consciousness* as distinct from that identity itself (pure apperception) which is called the *synthetic unity of consciousness*. The former is self-consciousness, the latter is the self. The analysis *I think* presupposes the synthesis pure apperception. The united subjective representations of empirical apperception *can* be accompanied by the *I think* which would determine the identical self that is pure apperception. *I think* is not equal to empirical apperception: the self-consciousness of the latter is necessarily subjective, the self-consciousness of the former is objectively possible.

Pure apperception is an *intellectual* synthesis of sensible intuitions (*synthesis intellectualis*). This means that its synthesis can only be *thought*, it cannot be intuited.

⁵⁷ B134, pp. 247-8.

⁵⁸ 'The **I think** must **be able** to accompany all my representations'. (B131, p. 246).

This is because pure apperception is originally⁵⁹ the identity amongst sensible intuitions and therefore cannot be sensibly intuited itself. If it were, then a contradictory infinite regress would occur whereby one would have to presuppose the *thought* of the identity again for this *intuited* identity to be possible as an object for me, *ad infinitum*. In other words, my intuitions must presuppose my self for the possibility of their cognition, therefore I can never intuit the self which is the condition for any intuitions being cognised. Hence the identity that is pure apperception is strictly *formal*, i.e., it cannot be cognised, only thought, for it cannot be sensibly intuited. This has essential implications for our self-consciousness, as we shall see.

I can have a cognition of the self, but this self is the self as appearance. Empirical apperception is the cognition of the self as appearance. But the *I think* is the thought of another self (pure apperception) which is the condition of the empirical self. Therefore we can *think* that the self is *necessarily* not an appearance, but the condition thereof. But now we cannot have a further *cognition* of this pure apperception because the intuition, which would be necessary, could not be sensible (this would be a contradiction as explained above – the self would be both the condition and the conditioned). Our human intuition can only be sensible and therefore our self-cognition can only be of ourselves as appearance. But we can *think* that we necessarily have an existence behind this as its condition (so we are not mere appearance), though we cannot *know* (cognise) what this existence is. Thus, *I think that I am, but I know not what. I have cognition of my self as I appear, but not as I am; and I am certain that I am because I can cognise.* Or as Kant puts it:

In the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in general [*synthesis intellectualis*], on the contrary, hence in the synthetic original unity of apperception [pure apperception], I am conscious of myself [through the *I think*] not as I appear to myself [as in empirical apperception], nor **as** I am in myself, but only **that** I am. This **representation** is a **thinking**, not an intuiting. Now since for **cognition** of ourselves, in addition to the action of thinking that brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, a determinate sort of intuition, through which this manifold is given, is also required, my own existence is not indeed appearance (let alone mere illusion), but the determination of my

⁵⁹ It also, of course, provides the identity between objects, therefore making judgements possible (see B141-2, pp. 251-2).

existence can only occur in correspondence with the form of inner sense, according to the particular way in which the manifold that I combine is given in inner intuition, and I therefore have **no cognition** of myself **as I am**, but only as I **appear** to myself. The consciousness of oneself is therefore far from being a cognition of oneself'. (B157-58, pp. 259-60.)

Intellectual Intuition

We cannot cognise pure apperception because, as explained, the necessary sensible intuition corresponding to my thought of this self would have to belong to me, and therefore I have posited another self (me) which is not intuited, but thought. However, if, in theory, the thought (*intellectuality*) of my self (pure apperception) could also *immediately represent* (i.e., *intuit*) myself, then I would not require a separate mediating sensible intuition for the cognition of my thought. Such an *intellectual intuition* would, therefore, be the only way in which I could *cognise* my pure apperception. '[The self can] cognize itself merely as it appears to itself with regard to an intuition (which is not intellectual and capable of being given through the understanding itself), not as it would cognize itself if its **intuition** were intellectual.'⁶⁰

Such a faculty, however, is unavailable to humans because we intuit things in space and time, and these forms are transcendently ideal not real - i.e., things for us are *mediated* by space and time. Things cannot be given *immediately*, as would things in intellectual intuition, because space and time are given *a priori* - not therefore given in the immediate intuition of things themselves (*a posteriori*).⁶¹ In other words, because we humans have experience in space and time, intellectual intuition is impossible for us, according to transcendental idealism.

Kant, however, does not say that intellectual intuition is a contradiction, for there may be beings who do not have experience in space and time, and for whom intellectual intuition could therefore be valid. '[An] understanding that itself intuited ... as, say, a divine understanding ... would not represent given objects, but through whose representation the objects would themselves at the same time be given, or

⁶⁰ B159, p. 260.

⁶¹ See the above explication of the *Transcendental Aesthetic*.

produced'⁶² Intellectual intuition is not a contradiction because transcendental idealism is merely a human condition.

Intellectual intuition is thus a faculty of direct knowledge, it knows the thing-in-itself. This is because the thing *is* the intuition, there is no dualism as in transcendental idealism. If I were to think something, that thought would *be* the something; *it would not be a thought the object of which was separate*. If I were to intellectually intuit my self, that intuition/thought would be my self. It is therefore absurd to posit the possibility of intellectually intuiting *pure apperception* (the human self identity) because pure apperception is the identity amongst sensible intuitions, the existence of the latter contradicts the intellectual intuition of the former (due to the mutual exclusivity of sensible and intellectual intuition). Intellectual intuition is impossible for the human, the self of which cannot be known.

F. W. J. Schelling believes that the human self, as the condition of knowledge, can be known; and indeed can do so only through intellectual intuition. In the following part we shall examine how he argues this and thus how he can escape the limits of self-cognition posited by Kant.

Part 2: Schelling

Introduction

The *order* of the previous exposition of intellectual intuition is not found in Kant's text itself, because Kant's purpose is to expose the conditions of knowledge, intellectual intuition is merely a concept which distinguishes the fact that *our* knowledge of the world is distinct from its transcendental reality. Schelling, however, does provide an order to the exposition of intellectual intuition in his *System of Transcendental Idealism*. His purpose is to find a supreme principle of knowledge, which, we shall see, is in fact intellectual intuition.⁶³ Therefore the following text will be an *exegesis* of 'Part One'⁶⁴ of his *System*. Schelling uses many Kantian

⁶² B145, p. 253.

⁶³ And this intellectual intuition is a self-consciousness.

⁶⁴ Of six parts.

presuppositions in his exposition in so far as he presupposes transcendental idealism. We will be concerned with how he can presuppose certain Kantian terms, such as the difference between thought and cognition, but nonetheless conceive intellectual intuition as humanly possible – for in Kant, as we have seen, the difference between thought and cognition implies the human impossibility of intellectual intuition.⁶⁵ In Part Three we will examine whether Schelling’s conception of intellectual intuition presents an advancement on Kant’s conception, an alternative conception, or whether it is in error.

Schelling’s Project: A Supreme Principle of Knowledge

Schelling begins his project by identifying the ‘supreme problem for all knowledge’,⁶⁶ the resolution of which would be a supreme principle of knowledge. The problem derives from the premise that ‘[a]ll knowledge is founded upon the coincidence of an objective with a subjective.’⁶⁷ In other words, if the subjective conditions of our knowledge (i.e., sensibility and thought) did not have a coincidental correspondence with a *given* objective reality, the conditions would merely remain as mere conditions – knowledge would not occur. As Kant posited, knowledge is the coincidence of thought and sensibility with *empirical* (given) intuitions.⁶⁸ Thus, the premise is that knowledge requires the coincidence of subjectivity and objects as given (rather than as solely existing in our subjectivity).⁶⁹ The problem, for Schelling, is that ‘[i]f all knowledge rests upon the coincidence of an objective and a subjective ... the whole of our knowledge consists of propositions which are not *immediately* true, which derive their reality from something else.’⁷⁰ That is to say, the objects of a proposition are derived from something external to the actual proposition; the knowledge of them is therefore not immediate.

⁶⁵ Cognition requires empirical sensible intuition, the existence of which divides an appearance from a thing-in-itself. Intellectual intuition effaces this division.

⁶⁶ *System of Transcendental Idealism*, p. 7.

⁶⁷ p. 5.

⁶⁸ *Pure intuition* cannot afford us cognition alone, as in pure mathematics. ‘The pure concepts of the understanding, consequently, even if they are applied to *a priori* intuitions (as in mathematics), provide cognition only insofar as these *a priori* intuitions, and by means of them also the concepts of the understanding, can be applied to empirical intuitions.’ (B147, p. 254)

⁶⁹ As *solipsism* would maintain.

⁷⁰ P. 15.

It may be objected that this is not a problem, indeed for Kant it *was* the principle of knowledge (transcendental idealism). However, Schelling poses it as a problem under the *hypothesis* that there is a *system* in our knowledge – i.e., that knowledge is *self-sufficient*. ‘It will be assumed as a hypothesis, that there is a *system* in our knowledge ... it can be demonstrated only through the fact itself.’⁷¹ This hypothesis is assumed so that the problem can occur, the resolution of which (if possible) would demonstrate the validity of the hypothesis. Let us therefore examine the problem.

If knowledge is self-sufficient (systematic), the fact that, as quoted, our knowledge consists of propositions which derive their truth from something *outside of themselves* is a problem - our knowledge is not self-sufficient. For knowledge, it is only *sufficient* for a subjective to be conditioned by an objective, it is not sufficient to be conditioned by itself. As Kant states, knowledge requires that the propositional subject has a correlating empirical intuition.⁷² *An object of a proposition is not that object itself* – it is not an *immediate* representation but a representation *mediated* by an outside empirical intuition. Consequently, knowledge is not *self-sufficient* but only sufficient through an *extrinsic* condition.

The resolution of this problem can thus only be found if an object can be given *immediately in* knowledge – which then would be the condition of all mediated knowledge (transcendental idealism). If it can, knowledge generally would be self-sufficient (it would contain its own condition). As Schelling states, ‘every true system ... must contain the ground of its subsistence within *itself*; and hence, if there be a system of knowledge, its principle must *lie within knowledge itself*.’⁷³ Such a condition would be *the supreme principle of knowledge*, for it makes possible knowledge if knowledge is a system. Indeed, the mere hypothesis that knowledge is a system presupposes that its condition must lie within it: ‘The task itself therefore postulates at the same time that knowledge has an absolute principle *within itself*, and

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² See footnote 68.

⁷³ P. 14.

this principle lying within knowledge *itself is likewise to be the principle of transcendental philosophy as a science.*⁷⁴

Conditions of the Principle

Before the actual deduction of this principle itself, Schelling identifies the two major conditions which the principle must exhibit. The second is a consequence of the first. The first is that the principle must not only determine the *content*, but also the *form* of the system. The second is that the principle must be *unconditionally* known. These two conditions cause other minor conditions to occur throughout the deduction itself which we will encounter as we proceed. First we must explicate the necessity of these major conditions.

The first condition emerges as the resolution of a vicious circle that occurs due to the nature of the project. In all sciences, bar this one,⁷⁵ the form for determining the content is presupposed. For example, the content of algebra (the symbols) *presupposes* the algebraic form (the logic of equations); the content does not determine the form. In our epistemological system, however, such a presupposition is not allowed. If the *content* of our system is to be the principle of all knowledge, it cannot presuppose another *form* of knowledge for the determination of this content; otherwise the principle of all knowledge would presuppose another knowledge, and so it would not be a principle for all knowledge (and thus not a system). '[T]his science of knowledge is itself already a *science*, and would thus require a science of knowledge concerning itself; but this too would be a science, and so *ad infinitum*. The question is how we are to account for this circle'.⁷⁶ In sum, the circle is this: to determine the principle as the content means to presuppose the principle as form – thereby making the determination of the principle impossible.

If a supreme principle of knowledge is therefore possible, the circle must be resolved in the following manner. A point must be found, in the intellect itself (for this is the means of knowledge), where both content and form are mutually generated.

⁷⁴ P. 19.

⁷⁵ Which we shall call *systematic epistemology*.

⁷⁶ P. 19.

This is because the content cannot presuppose the form (else the circle), and the form cannot presuppose the content (the content must be the principle for the form). ‘*The principle of philosophy must thus be one in which content is conditioned by form, and form by content* – not the one presupposing the other, but each in reciprocity.’⁷⁷ This point is the principle itself, for it is the only point where knowledge has no further external conditions (so it can be self-sufficient).

From this first condition of the principle, the second is obvious as a consequence: the principle must be *unconditionally known*. If the principle (as content) is *conditioned* (by an external form), it cannot be a principle of all knowledge because of the vicious circle. Before, however, clarifying this direct consequence from the *form/content equation*, Schelling makes a detour to answer a possible objection.

The objection is that in fact *logic* is the highest principle from which knowledge is derived. It runs thus: a supreme principle of knowledge must admit of being expressed in a logical proposition - i.e., one where the object has a logical relation to other objects within the proposition – otherwise it cannot be known (in sum, knowledge must have a propositional structure). Therefore, the expression of the principle must always presuppose the higher laws of logic as its form for its knowledge. To this objection Schelling replies that the possibility of the logical form itself is conditioned by a content, and so the logical form is *not* the highest principle from which all knowledge is derived. For example, in the analytic proposition ‘A = A’, the form determines that A is identical to itself, but whence does A derive? If A exists, it is identical to itself to be sure, but the form (logic) cannot derive the content (A) itself, the knowledge of A is derived *outside* the proposition: ‘The analysis A = A presupposes the synthesis A’.⁷⁸ Consequently, logic itself is not the highest principle of *knowledge*⁷⁹ because as such it presupposes the external synthesis of its contents for its possibility. Therefore, a supreme principle must synthesise its content *by its* form (internal synthesis); it cannot be an external synthesis, for this would presuppose

⁷⁷ P. 20.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ As opposed to mere understanding.

another knowledge for its possibility (the circle inverted).⁸⁰ Likewise, its form must be created by its content, as stated, lest the vicious circle emerge. Hence we now understand that if the principle does not meet the condition of *the form/content equation*, we would first encounter the vicious circle of having to presuppose the form (as external), and then the inverted vicious circle of having to presuppose the content (as external). Form and content therefore must be conditioned by each other.

Schelling reflects that the ‘mistaken assumption of the above argument [the objection] consists, therefore, in taking the principles of logic to be *unconditioned*’.⁸¹ The form of logic is not the ultimate principle of knowledge because it is conditioned by the external synthesis of its contents, which itself is a knowledge *antecedent* to its entrance into logical form.⁸² Although logical form is not therefore unconditioned, the supreme principle Schelling is searching for *must be unconditioned*, insofar as its form/content equation posits that there be *no external conditions* to its knowledge.

These two conditions that identify what the deduction itself must search for are really one chain, but their separation will help in the final summary. It may be further objected that the principle is a contradiction because a *condition* for it is that it is *unconditioned*. But this former condition refers to the principle’s possibility of existence; what must be unconditioned is *not* the principle’s possibility of existence *but its knowledge* (if it does exist). The condition of its existence is that its knowledge is unconditioned by another knowledge – this proposition contains no contradiction.

Deduction of the Principle

‘The question is thus simply, what is it that we unconditionally know.’⁸³ With this simple question - the conclusion of identifying the conditions for a supreme principle of knowledge - Schelling begins his deduction of the principle itself. The initial answer, which will eventually lead to a need for intellectual intuition, is that ‘I know unconditionally only that of which the knowledge is conditioned solely by the

⁸⁰ See below for clarification of the meaning of this inverted circle.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² The antecedent synthesis of an object can be compared to Kant’s *synthesis intellectualis* (above).

⁸³ P. 21.

subjective, not by anything objective.’⁸⁴ Now, only in an *identical proposition* is the knowledge⁸⁵ conditioned solely by the subjective (the subject of a proposition). Thus, an identical proposition is unconditioned knowledge because it is not conditioned by anything external to it. For example, in the identical proposition ‘A = A’, the knowledge that A is identical to itself is unconditioned (by anything external), thus certain. Whether A *actually* has a reality is irrelevant to the proposition’s unconditional knowledge that it would be identical to itself. ‘The proposition is evident and certain, quite regardless of whether A is something really existing ... The knowledge in this proposition is thus conditioned purely *by my thinking* (the subjective), that is, as explained above, it is *unconditioned*.’⁸⁶ I can know, *without external conditions*, an identical proposition – i.e., it is unconditioned knowledge. However, though an identical proposition presents unconditioned knowledge, it does not yield *true knowledge*, as Schelling calls it. A chimera would certainly be identical to itself, but this would not be knowledge of it. Therefore an identical proposition, though unconditioned, cannot yield true knowledge of a supreme principle – it cannot yield its reality.

This, however, introduces a contradiction to our pursuit because knowledge of the principle must be unconditioned but *also synthetic*. In an identical proposition I think, for example, A. Indeed it is unconditionally identical to itself, but how do I know that it exists? If it is a concept freely engendered, it begets no true knowledge (e.g., the chimera); only if it derives from an objective world can it be true knowledge (cognition). Therefore true knowledge requires that the subject of a proposition has a predicate (object) that is distinct from it – i.e., that *knowing* the subject requires a *distinct* (objective) predicate, not an *identical* predicate. Such a distinct proposition is called *synthetic*. ‘[O]ur knowledge consists of nothing but synthetic proposition, and only therein do we find true knowledge ... But now synthetic propositions are not *unconditioned* ... this is the case only with identical or analytic propositions’.⁸⁷ A synthetic proposition is *conditioned* by an object external to the proposition itself, therefore the supreme principle cannot be known in a synthetic proposition (it must be

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Kant would not strictly call this *knowledge* (see footnote 68). Schelling here means by knowledge a *thought that is necessary* (as in mathematics), this is made clear in the following section where he refers to knowledge with an object *true knowledge* (i.e., cognition).

⁸⁶ P. 22.

self-sufficient, unconditioned). An identical proposition is self-sufficient (unconditioned), but yields no true knowledge; therefore the supreme principle cannot be known in an identical proposition either it seems. The contradiction is therefore that knowledge of the principle must be *both synthetic and identical*, if it is to be possible at all.

‘The contradiction would be soluble only *if some point could be found in which the identical and the synthetic are one, or some proposition which, in being identical, is at once synthetic, and in being synthetic, is at once identical.*’⁸⁸ In order for Schelling to find this point, he says, he first has to make the distinction between identical and synthetic propositions more lucid.

In every proposition at least two concepts are compared together. In an identical proposition the *thought* (concept) is compared merely with *itself* (e.g., ‘an apple is an apple). In a synthetic proposition, the thought is compared to an external *presentation* (i.e., intuition). For example, ‘the apple is red’. As such, it is considered true knowledge, as opposed to mere thought. The only way, therefore, that the point can be reached is *if the presentation, which makes a proposition true, were identical to the subject. I.e., if the subject is presentation.* Only thus can a proposition be both identical and synthetic: the object (the presentation) is *identical* to the subject, and the subject is *synthesised* by its presentation.

If A is presentation, then, in the proposition ‘A = A’, the subject is *identical* to the object. But *at the same time* (immediately) the object is a presentation of the subject, and therefore *synthesises* it. If A is presentation, ‘A = A’ is at once an identical and synthetic proposition. ‘This unmediated identity of subject and object can exist only where the *presented* is at the same time *that which presents*, where the *intuited* is also the *intuitant.*’⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ P. 24.

To summarise: knowledge, or cognition, for Schelling, following Kant, can only be expressed in a synthetic proposition where its subject requires a correlating intuition for its truth. However, the intuition is *distinct* from the thought (the subject) and therefore its knowledge (cognition) is conditioned *not upon itself* but upon the intuition. If it is self-sufficient, a supreme principle of knowledge cannot be conditioned by a content distinct from its thought, else the truth of its thought is not conditioned upon itself – and thus the principle is not self-sufficient. Consequently, the only way for the principle to exist - i.e., for its truth – would be for the correlating intuition to *be* the thought (the subject) itself. In its proposition therefore, the subject is an intuition, the object is an intuition of an intuition. Both subject and object are intuition (thus it is identical), yet the object synthesises the subject. As such, the principle is self-sufficient for its intuition is not distinct/external to its thought. However, another problem emerges here: the *intuition* is not even empirical which, for Kant at least,⁹⁰ means that the proposition cannot yield true knowledge.

The subject of the proposition is *thought* as such, we can know that this thought *truly* exists because we immediately represent (i.e., *intuit*) it to ourselves. The intuition of the thought *is* (identical to) the thought, therefore the intuition *equals thought*. In other words, it is not an empirical but an *intellectual intuition*. Furthermore, it is this intellectual intuition which determines the self, and indeed the self as condition of all knowledge (the principle) – a possibility Kant denied. In proceeding to explain how Schelling sought to transgress Kant's limits in this way, we will examine Schelling's notion of self-consciousness (as intellectual intuition) that he implies renders Kant's notions absurd. This following exegesis is therefore important because not only will it specify how intellectual intuition is humanly possible, but it will also thus determine the limits of self-consciousness, determinations which we will critically examine in the next part of our text.

Intellectual Intuition

The supreme principle of knowledge has been deduced by positing that only the proposition where the subject is immediately⁹¹ intuited by itself (thus the thought

⁹⁰ See footnote 68.

⁹¹ Not *mediated* by an external condition.

is intuition, and the intuition is thought) can knowledge be synthetic yet unconditioned. Now, the only place where the intuited is the intuitant is in self-consciousness. If the intuition equals thought, then thought about thought is self-consciousness. Further, Schelling says that, contra Kant, the self is *only* this act of self-consciousness, and does not exist apart from it (as, for instance, pure apperception exists apart from the self-consciousness *I think*).⁹² This is because the concept of the self is identical to its object, and *without the concept there is no object*. Normally the concept of something is not equal to its object (according to transcendental idealism); here, however, the concept of the self *is* the self – because the self *is* the concept of itself (intuition of the intuitant). The self has no external reality apart from its self-conceptualisation. As Schelling puts it, ‘that the *concept* of the self ... and the *self itself* (the object) are absolutely one, is in no need of proof, since *apart* from this act the self is obviously nothing, and exists as such only in this act ... The self simply *has no existence, prior* to that act whereby thinking becomes its own object’.⁹³ The self is nothing but its self-conceptualisation; if it did not conceptualise itself, it would not *be*. The self has no separate object to its concept – i.e., *there can be no self if it is not known*. In clarifying this transgression of Kant⁹⁴ by the exegesis of Schelling’s use of intellectual intuition (the self), we will establish the arguments used by the latter so to compare them to Kant in the following part of our text.

Schelling calls this self-sufficient self the *unending nonobjective*. This is to highlight the fact that the self is indeed an object, but only *for itself* – in other words it is not *originally* in the world of objects. It only *becomes* an object by making *itself* into one (its self-intuition objectifies it for itself). Thus it is *nonobjective* because it is not an object beyond its thinking. ‘Everything else, that is not self, is originally an object, but for that reason is so, not for itself, but for an intuitant outside it.’⁹⁵ It is *unending* because the self has no predicate but itself, and is therefore not limited (*ended*) by some extrinsic object.⁹⁶ Indeed if it was determined by something external

⁹² For Kant, as we have seen, self-consciousness by the *I think* is conditioned by pure apperception (which could be a *self apart from the self-consciousness*).

⁹³ P. 25.

⁹⁴ Viz., in Kant pure apperception is a self that cannot be known.

⁹⁵ P. 26.

⁹⁶ Schelling therefore calls the act of self-consciousness *absolute freedom*: ‘Self-consciousness is an act whereby the thinker immediately becomes an object to himself ... This act is absolute freedom’ (p. 24).

to it, it would not be unconditioned. Thus, Schelling calls the self the unending nonobjective to point out that it cannot be in the world of objects, because the principle of knowledge cannot be an object of knowledge (else it would be conditioned by a higher knowledge – i.e., the vicious circle). The *form* of its knowledge *must* also be the *content* – only in self-consciousness does this occur. As Schelling admits, however, regarding Kant’s epistemology, ‘if the self is absolutely not an object, or thing, it seems hard to explain how any kind of knowledge of it is possible, or what sort of knowledge we have of it.’⁹⁷ That is to say, if *knowledge* requires the sensible intuition of a thing, and the self cannot be a thing as such, how can it be known?

This knowledge, or self-consciousness, is only possible by intellectual intuition. I shall quote this essential explication so to exhibit how self-consciousness is rendered intellectual intuition by Schelling.

The self is pure act, a pure doing, which simply has to be nonobjective in knowledge, precisely because it is the *principle* of all knowledge. So if it is to become an object of knowledge, this must come about through a type of knowing utterly different from ordinary knowledge. This knowing must be ... absolutely free [unconditioned], if only because all other knowledge is *not free*; a knowing, therefore, that is not arrived at by way of proofs, or inferences, or any sort of aid from concepts, and is thus essentially an intuition; ... a knowing whose object is not *independent* thereof, and thus *a knowing that is simultaneously a producing of its object* – an intuition freely productive in itself, in which producer and product are one and the same. In contrast to sensory intuition [empirical sensible intuition], which does not appear as a producing of its object, and where the *intuiting itself* is therefore distinct from the intuited, an intuition of the above type will be called *intellectual intuition*. The self is such an intuition, since it is *through the self’s own knowledge of itself* that that *very self* (the object) first comes into being. For since the self (as object) is nothing else but the very *knowledge of itself*, it arises simply out of the fact *that* it knows of itself; the *self itself* is thus a knowing that simultaneously produces itself (as object).

(p. 27.)

The self can only be known by intellectual intuition, or, more precisely, the self *is* intellectual intuition. If the self, as the supreme principle of knowledge, is itself to be known, the knowing of it (the form in which it is known) must at once produce it

⁹⁷ P. 27.

(the content). In other words, the knowing immediately produces the known – the *form produces the content* and so the known and the knowing are *unconditioned* by anything extrinsic. Thus the conditions of the principle are met. Further, if the intuition of a thought is an *immediate representation* of it, it is an intuition. If the intuition is of a thought, it is as such *intellectual* (as opposed to sensible empirical). Thus the self is an intellectual intuition.

If we compare Schelling's intellectual intuition to Kant's, we can see that it seemingly fits into Kant's classification, but at the same time allegedly becomes possible for the human. However, this comparison necessarily involves a critique for the conceptions are not identical. Therefore, in further explicating Schelling's conception of intellectual intuition we will also thereby enter the critical phase of this text, resulting in an understanding of whether Schelling's conception is valid or not (i.e., being an advance or a misunderstanding of Kant).

Part 3: Comparative Study

The foundational point which separates the two thinkers' belief in the possibility of human intellectual intuition is the identification of the self with self-consciousness. Schelling advocates this identity, Kant denies it. I shall show that Schelling misunderstood Kant's distinction between the subjective unity of consciousness and the analytic unity of apperception, and more importantly, the latter with the synthetic unity of apperception (see Part One), a misunderstanding which enabled Schelling to advance intellectual intuition.

Schelling does not distinguish self from self-consciousness, but he does distinguish two kinds of self-consciousness. The latter distinction explains the reason for the former conflation. Self-consciousness for Schelling is divided into *pure consciousness* and *empirical consciousness*. Pure consciousness is the self as intellectual intuition, it is not conditioned by an external, empirical, intuition and so is *pure*. Empirical consciousness is equated by Schelling with the *I think*. '[W]e assuredly distinguish self-consciousness, *qua act* [pure consciousness], from merely empirical consciousness; what we commonly term consciousness is something that

merely continues along with presentations of objects ... If I reflect upon this identity of the subject among its presentations, there arises for me the proposition '*I think*'.⁹⁸ Thus the *I think* is empirical consciousness because it is conditioned by empirical objects. But, for Kant, the *I think* is fundamentally conditioned by *pure apperception*. In other words, objects themselves are conditioned, made possible, by this transcendental synthesis of apperception; the *I think* expresses the formal existence of a *self* which unites intuitions for the possibility of any experience whatever. In sum, the *I think* is conditioned by empirical objects, as Schelling says, but this empirical consciousness is only possible because objects have been made possible (synthesised) by a higher self (pure apperception). Thus, the *I think* is only the ability to analyse the synthesis that is the formal self – i.e., *I think* is the consciousness of a separate self. Consequently one must ask why Schelling, admitting the existence of the *I think*, insists that '[t]he self simply *has no existence, prior* to that act whereby thinking becomes its own object'.⁹⁹

First, however, it should be understood that Kant, in fact, defined *I think* as a self-consciousness which could accompany representations *by themselves* (for the possibility of *an* object makes possible its analysis), it is not the self-consciousness which 'merely continues along with presentations of objects'.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, the *I think* is only an *ability*, it does not necessarily continue along with representations. It is clear that Schelling erroneously conflated the analytic unity of apperception with the subjective unity of consciousness – the *I think* with *empirical apperception*. This conflation is called empirical consciousness, and shows an ignorance of Kant's subtle yet essential distinctions of self-consciousness. What is more important, and crucial to the success of Schelling's project, is his further conflation of empirical consciousness with pure apperception, self-consciousness with self.

Empirical apperception and the *I think* are both self-consciousness conditioned by pure apperception, as we have explained in Part One. Therefore when Schelling uses the term *I think*, pure apperception should be acknowledged as its condition (whether Schelling mistakenly refers to empirical apperception or not). Thus

⁹⁸ Pp. 25-26.

⁹⁹ P. 25.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

Schelling's crucial error is indicated by the statement that '[i]t is the 'I think' which accompanies all presentations and preserves the continuity of consciousness between them'.¹⁰¹ Now, firstly, if by 'I think' Schelling means the subjective unity of consciousness, he must also thereby posit the objective unity of consciousness, or pure apperception, as its condition. The subjective unity presupposes objects which presuppose pure apperception (*synthesis intellectualis*). In other words, Schelling must distinguish the self from self-consciousness as the condition of the latter. Secondly, if Schelling means by 'I think' *I think* (as Kant defined it), he has further conflated it with pure apperception. As Kant says, '[t]he **I think** must **be able** to accompany all my representations',¹⁰² it does *not* 'accompany all presentations' as that which 'preserves the continuity of consciousness between them', it is only an *ability* to become conscious of one's identity – it does *not* preserve that identity. Rather it is *pure apperception* that necessarily accompanies *all* presentations and preserves their continuity.

By falsely conflating the *I think* with pure apperception, Schelling conveniently discards the distinction between self-consciousness and self. If the *I think* is the self-consciousness that also preserves the continuity, or successive identity, of presentations, then the formal, unknowable, self of pure apperception is not required to do this. This conflation is very conducive to Schelling's project because it removes the *condition* of knowledge that cannot be known – the *system* would fail with pure apperception: the principle of knowledge would be extrinsic to knowledge.

To summarise, the 'I think' for Schelling means the preservation of the identity of the subject throughout presentations, he has therefore mistakenly attributed a synthetic role to the analytic unity of apperception. The *I think* is *made possible* by a non-cognisable synthesis, or the formal self. But if Schelling means empirical apperception by 'I think', he can rightly attribute a synthetic role thereto (*viz.*, the transcendental synthesis of the imagination), though he wrongly names it. But even so, if it is a mere fault regarding the name, empirical apperception still has the

¹⁰¹ P. 26.

¹⁰² B131, p. 246.

condition of pure apperception for its possibility¹⁰³ - what is synthesised by me must belong to me, *synthesis speciosa* presupposes *synthesis intellectualis*.¹⁰⁴ Consequently, regardless of Schelling's mistaken reading of *I think*, pure apperception must be posited as its condition.

By conflating empirical apperception, *I think*, and pure apperception into the term 'empirical consciousness' or 'I think', Schelling discards the need to posit an unknowable self distinct from self-consciousness. *I think* does the work of pure apperception: it synthesises the identity of the subject throughout presentations, and seemingly does so through self-consciousness, so that there need be no self apart from self-consciousness – as far as the condition of empirical reality is concerned. I.e., empirical consciousness for Schelling need not posit an unknowable self distinct from itself as its condition. Neither, of course, does pure consciousness need to posit a distinct self as its condition – it is conditioned by itself as it is allegedly intellectual intuition.

We can now see that the intellectual intuition Schelling advocates as self-cognition is distinct from a theoretical cognition of Kant's self. For Kant, if the formal self is a thing-in-itself, i.e., if it is distinct from our knowledge of it, its cognition could only come about through intellectual intuition - a process whereby a thing-in-itself and its knowledge are one. This, therefore, would be an intellectual intuition of pure apperception. Schelling's intellectual intuition is of thought itself – where thought is identical to the knowledge of itself: pure consciousness as opposed to pure apperception. But because of Schelling's erroneous conflation, pure consciousness does not, in fact, refute pure apperception. Therefore the self *does* exist apart from its act of self-consciousness, at least formally.¹⁰⁵ Therefore self-consciousness as intellectual intuition is *not* the principle of all knowledge - its *form* presupposes pure apperception, as we shall see. We shall also see that Schelling's use of the term intellectual intuition, as pure consciousness, is unjustified.

¹⁰³ As explained in Part One, without the identity within objects, pure apperception, imagination has nothing to synthesise.

¹⁰⁴ '[A] pure synthesis of the understanding ... grounds *a priori* the empirical synthesis.' (B140, p. 250.)

¹⁰⁵ Its existence beyond formality is unknowable, as we shall see when we examine the *Paralogisms*.

The proposition *self = self* expresses pure consciousness for Schelling. ‘[T]he principle of all knowledge ... must be expressed in the proposition *self = self*, since this very proposition is the *only one there can be* that is simultaneously both identical and synthetic.’¹⁰⁶ Self is the content and the form of the proposition: *I think the content, the self thinks the self*. It is identical yet synthesised by me. *However*, the condition that the thought of my self be held within the same subject as that which then intuits this thought immediately, constituting the moments of the *act* of pure consciousness, is the condition of pure apperception. In other words, to think about thought requires an identity which makes their comparison possible. So intellectual intuition, pure consciousness, *self = self*, thought about thought, presupposes a synthesis. To be sure, this synthesis is the self (formally), but it certainly is *not* self-consciousness (which is merely its effect). Pure consciousness presupposes a self which is distinct from what it thinks of itself, thus Schelling is wrong when he says, ‘the self can only be presented *qua act* as such, and is otherwise nothing’.¹⁰⁷ Further, since thought for Schelling, in pure consciousness, is an intuition, the synthesis of intuitions *do not* lie therefrom: synthesis is not ‘*a posteriori*’,¹⁰⁸ as explained in Part One, but *a priori*. If this synthesis of intuitions, pure apperception, did not ground the identity of my thought, then the thought about thought (pure consciousness) would not be possible. Consequently, intellectual intuition, in Schelling’s sense, presupposes pure apperception. Therefore, intellectual intuition is not the supreme principle of knowledge – rather, pure apperception is (though be it unsystematic). As Kant says, ‘[s]ynthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as given *a priori*, is thus the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes *a priori* all **my** determinate thinking ... [this is the] unity of [pure] apperception, which principle is the supreme one in the whole of human cognition’.¹⁰⁹

In summa, one can think about thought, whereby one will produce a self-consciousness; but though the ground of this self-consciousness is the self, it is a self as condition of *the thought* of itself – *not* the condition of itself. Therefore the

¹⁰⁶ P. 30.

¹⁰⁷ P. 25.

¹⁰⁸ I.e., the synthesis of pure thought, in pure consciousness, cannot be *derived from* the thoughts themselves (but by a underlying unity). Just like sensible intuitions cannot *a posteriori* contain their synthesis (see Part One). *A posteriori* in this sense concerning Schelling’s pure consciousness is *non-empirical*, but not *a priori* (for synthesis *derives* from thought *per se*, Schelling implies).

¹⁰⁹ B134/5, p. 248.

intellectual intuition is not of the thing-in-itself, but merely that which it synthesises (thought). But then the question emerges, is thought a thing-in-itself? If it were, this would mean to separate thought from its representation, as it were. This, indeed, is what Schelling does, and thus calls his consciousness *pure*: ‘the act here under discussion is one whereby I am aware of myself, not with this determination or that, but *originally*, and this consciousness, in contrast to the other [empirical consciousness], is called *pure* consciousness’. This separation of thought from a thought of something, as it were, which entitles Schelling to use the term intellectual intuition, is, I shall demonstrate, unjustified. Intellectual intuition for Kant is where thought and thing-in-itself are identical; if thought *per se* is *not* a thing-in-itself, its intuition does therefore not yield intellectual intuition.

Kant uses the term intellectual intuition to distinguish it from sensible intuition. If we could have an intuition that was not spatio-/temporal but intellectual, that intuition would belong to the same faculty as that which thinks the intuition, the understanding, therefore the thought of the object would immediately be its intuition. It would thus be an intellectual intuition unmediated by sensibility which is an intuition separate from its thought. When Schelling uses the term intellectual intuition, however, he simply means that what is *immediately represented* to him is *thought*: in other words, what is an *intuition* to him is *intellectual* – his ‘intellectual intuition.’ In this sense, intellectual intuition is not opposed to sensible intuition because all thoughts are immediately represented *anyway*, only their corresponding intuitions are mediated via sensibility. Thought is intellectual, by definition; and the thought itself is immediately represented (intuited) as a thought *per se* (the *cognition* is not immediately represented, but mediated by sensibility). In this sense, Schelling’s, all thought is therefore intellectual intuition.¹¹⁰ But this intellectual intuition is not cognition (as Kant intended): the thought must be combined with the intuition from the object of the thought. Schelling says this is combined because the object of the thought is thought, which therefore is immediately represented as the thought’s corresponding intuition. Schelling’s error, however, is to suppose that thought can exist as a thought without content¹¹¹ - thereby seemingly making possible a

¹¹⁰ Indeed, as Kant says, ‘the faculty for bringing forth representations itself, or the **spontaneity** [immediacy] of cognition, is the **understanding**’ (A51/B75, p. 193).

¹¹¹ In a specific sense, as we shall see. Not contentless as merely lacking a corresponding intuition.

corresponding/identical intuition to a thought: making intellectual intuition a *cognition*. We shall see that Schelling's intellectual intuition is not a cognition because he hypostatizes thought.

Schelling's intellectual intuition is called *pure* because it lacks the thought of any object bar thought. The thought of intellectual intuition is merely about thought, *and nothing besides*. *Pure consciousness* is thought about thought without corresponding extrinsic object. But what can this 'thought without corresponding extrinsic object' be? Kant says that the 'pure concept [thought] [contains] only the form of thinking *of* an object in general'.¹¹² In other words, even pure thought (prior to empirical application) is always *of* an object, whether it finds the corresponding sensible intuition or not. Schelling does not acknowledge this and falsely separates a thought from a thought of something. He hypostatizes thought as a thing-in-itself, distinct from a thought about something. But a thought is *only* a thought of something, regardless of whether it is cognised. The word 'thought' expresses a commonality, not a specificity. By the same error one could say that an 'animal' is a specific creature, distinct from all the species thereof. Consequently, Schelling's intellectual intuition also fails because its intuition of thought would now have to be a specific intuition of that now specific thought. And that would therefore not be self-consciousness but consciousness of something. If this something were the self, it would have to be in a specific sense, and the intuition (thought) of that would have thereby already presupposed it rather than have created it. Therefore, Schelling's intellectual intuition is not of a thing-in-itself (thought-in-itself) but merely of a specific thought, the cognition of which requires sensible intuition. In sum, if the thought of something was thought about, the latter thought would not be *of that something* but *of the thought of the thought of something*. Therefore they would *not* be *identical* thoughts, and therefore the latter could not provide the corresponding intuition (for cognition). Only if both were *thoughts without content*, as it were, could they be identical and thus provide corresponding intuition for cognition. But a thought without content¹¹³ cannot exist: it is a hypostatisation of the word 'thought.' Therefore, it is not intellectual intuition Schelling speaks of, but intellectual reflection. And furthermore, to compare

¹¹² A51/B75, p. 193. My italics.

¹¹³ As opposed to a thought with content, even if the content is only a specific general pure form, such as the *Categories*.

one's thought with another presupposes an extra ability to synthesise: indeed by the self, but not the self that is allegedly created by the synthesis.

Schelling makes two fundamental errors in his argument for intellectual intuition. First he effaces the distinctions of Kant's forms of self-consciousness, thereby falsely rejecting the necessity of pure apperception as the condition of the *I think*, therefore falsely asserting the isomorphism of self and self-consciousness. Without this isomorphism, his self-sufficient system would not work, since the condition of knowledge would be external to knowledge (as Kant asserted, we cannot *know* the self). Secondly, Schelling could only make his intellectual intuition into a *cognition* by erroneously transmogrifying thought into a thing-in-itself,¹¹⁴ as distinct from a specific thought.¹¹⁵ But this is a *sophisma figurae dictionis*,¹¹⁶ mistaking thought to be substantive. In short, Schelling's project fails. Intellectual intuition is not possible for the human and it is not the principle of all knowledge.

Schelling's ignorance of Kant's distinctions of self-consciousness, and his hypostatisation of thought, also show his ignorance of Kant's paralogisms of Pure Reason. A paralogism consists in the falsity of a syllogism due to its form, i.e., a false inference.¹¹⁷ Kant exhibited the falsity of alleged rational doctrines of the soul through his paralogisms in the *Critique of Pure Reason* precisely to avoid the errors that Schelling committed. Although Schelling's rational doctrine of the self does not fit exactly into any of the four paralogisms¹¹⁸ Kant gives, Kant's reflection¹¹⁹ on their commonality exposes Schelling's error of the conflation of self with self-consciousness. Kant calls this error the subreption of hypostatized consciousness, or *apperceptionis substantiate*.¹²⁰ I shall quote its argument and then comment upon how it applies to Schelling's pure consciousness.

¹¹⁴ One could say he Platonised it (i.e., the form/ideal of thought).

¹¹⁵ Be it a *pure* concept or not. There are twelve pure concepts (*Categories*), and so each is specific.

¹¹⁶ Sophistry of a figure of speech.

¹¹⁷ See A341/B399, p. 411.

¹¹⁸ Although the second, B, edition effaces the plurality of paralogisms, suggesting that they all share common faults. See B406-B432, pp.445-458.

¹¹⁹ His entitled 'Observation on the sum of the pure doctrine of the soul following these paralogism' (A381-A405).

¹²⁰ A402, p. 442.

Now it is indeed very illuminating that I cannot cognize as an object itself that which I must presuppose in order to cognize an object at all; and that the determining Self (the thinking) is different from the determinable Self (the thinking subject) as cognition is different from its object. Nevertheless, nothing is more natural and seductive than the illusion of taking the unity in the synthesis of thoughts for a perceived unity in the subject of these thoughts. One could call it the subreption of hypostatized consciousness (*apperceptionis substantiate*).

(A402, p. 442.)

This passage is really directed toward those who would take empirical apperception to be the condition of its thoughts, or as the soul. So that the perceived unity of objects is taken as the actual perception of that (synthesis) which unites them. As we have shown however, this unity is only an *appearance* and not the synthesis (self) itself – we cannot cognize the self that is the condition of objects; to say that we do would be to hypostatize the consciousness of empirical apperception – i.e., to make self-consciousness as such into the self. Now, we can apply this criticism to Schelling's argument in the following manner. Schelling takes the unity in his pure synthesis of thoughts, pure consciousness, as the perception of the self itself.¹²¹ He conflates, as we have shown, the determining self (the thinking) from the determinable self (the thinking subject, pure apperception),¹²² or self-consciousness from the self, because he neglects the condition of the determining self. *With this neglect*, Schelling then takes the unity in the synthesis of thoughts, pure consciousness, as the perceived unity of the subject of these thoughts – *for there is nothing else the self can be*. However, this is because he has taken the *I think* as synthetic rather than analytic, which has led him to hypostatize pure consciousness: pure consciousness is regarded as the condition of itself. Therefore it is allegedly not an extrinsically conditioned appearance, nor a thing-in-itself (because it does not exist independent of it being known).¹²³ However, because it neglects the condition of its possibility, and then posits itself as its condition, one can rightly call pure consciousness a subreption of hypostatized consciousness.

¹²¹ 'The self simply *has no existence, prior* to that act whereby thinking becomes its own object' (p.25).

¹²² Determinable through thought, not cognition.

Part 4: Conclusion

Kant distinguished two types of self-consciousness corresponding to two types of self. Namely, empirical apperception to inner sense, and *I think* to pure apperception. Inner sense is the self as appearance, empirical apperception is the cognition of the self as appearance. Pure apperception is the self as a formal transcendental reality, *I think* is the thought of the self as a formal transcendental reality. Thus if I think about pure apperception, this thought is identical to *I think*. One self-consciousness is cognition, the other is thought. Self-cognition therefore is limited to appearance; the cognition of a transcendently real self, pure apperception, is impossible without intellectual intuition. But we cannot have intellectual intuition because our cognition is spatio-temporal. Moreover, the fact that pure apperception is the condition of sensible knowledge implies that if we, in theory, did have intellectual intuition, the self as pure apperception would thereby not exist anyway – it is only the formal identity of *sensible* intuitions. So, although intellectual intuition would cognise things-in-themselves generally (the intuition would *be* the thing), a being with this faculty would not have pure apperception, and therefore could not cognise this self. Pure apperception and intellectual intuition are mutually exclusive. Therefore, we humans cannot simply say that we cannot know ourselves because we do not have intellectual intuition, we should say that we cannot know ourselves, regardless of our form of intuition.

A being with intellectual intuition would therefore have a self different from pure apperception. Indeed the thought of its self would *be* its self. This is what Schelling tried to endow upon the human. This endowment was unsuccessful however. As we have shown, for Schelling there are also two types of self-consciousness, of which *one is* the self. What Schelling initially erred upon was the fact that he did not attribute to the other self-consciousness, *empirical consciousness*, a self that was the condition thereof. In truth there should have at least therefore been

¹²³ As we have seen, without knowing itself *qua* act, it is nothing.

two selves. Now, first, because Schelling neglected this second self, pure apperception (the *condition* of his ‘I think’), his project seemingly did not fail – his project required that the *condition* of knowledge was immanent to knowledge. Secondly it implied that the self was nothing more than its self-consciousness. This isomorphism of self and self-consciousness Schelling called *pure consciousness* (Kant would have called it the subreption of hypostatised consciousness). And it was this pure consciousness which Schelling called intellectual intuition (because allegedly the thought of the self *is* the self). However, in truth, this was not intellectual intuition because the thought of the self was in fact not a thought but a hypostatisation of ‘thought.’

Schelling’s argument in sum was as follows. Self-consciousness is where I think of thought. Therefore my (first) *thought* is the object (the second *thought*). Therefore self-consciousness is intellectual intuition (equation of thought and object). However, I cannot think of ‘thought’ *per se*, as if it existed without a content (i.e., as if it were *different* from a *type of thought*).¹²⁴ This is to confuse the word ‘thought’, a genus, with a specific thought. Consequently, a thought about thought does not constitute an equation of thought with object, as is required for intellectual intuition, because the object, a *particular* thought, *must be different from* the particular thought *about* it. Only if ‘thought’ was an actual thing itself could it be said that it was *identical* to another ‘thought’ about it.¹²⁵ It is not, however, and therefore Schelling’s intellectual intuition is conceived through a sophistry of speech.

Consequently, Schelling’s pure consciousness as intellectual intuition is a paralogism,¹²⁶ and his empirical consciousness implies, in fact, the existence of the unknowable self that is pure apperception. Thus we are left with the original limits Kant imposed upon self-consciousness: I have cognition of my self as I appear, but not as I am; and I am certain that I am because I have cognition.

¹²⁴ Be that pure or empirical, so long as it is a specific type of thought.

¹²⁵ The fault is analogous to equating a lion with a lamb, supposing they are identical because they fall under the genus ‘animal.’

¹²⁶ In the general sense of being a false syllogism.

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