

AUSTRIAN PHILOSOPHY

The
Legacy of
Franz Brentano

BARRY SMITH

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Preface

This book is a survey of the most important developments in Austrian philosophy in its classical period from the 1870s to the Anschluss in 1938. But I hope that the volume will be seen also as a contribution to philosophy in its own right – as an attempt to philosophize in the spirit of those, above all Roderick Chisholm, Rudolf Haller, Kevin Mulligan and Peter Simons, who have done so much to demonstrate the continued fertility of the ideas and methods of the Austrian philosophers in our own day.

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Introduction

For some time now, historians of philosophy have been gradually coming to terms with the idea that post-Kantian philosophy in the German-speaking world ought properly to be divided into two distinct traditions which we might refer to as the *German* and *Austrian* traditions, respectively. The main line of the first consists in a list of personages beginning with Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Schelling and ending with Heidegger, Adorno and Bloch. The main line of the second may be picked out similarly by means of a list beginning with Bolzano, Mach and Meinong, and ending with Wittgenstein, Neurath and Popper.

As should be clear, it is the Austrian tradition that has contributed most to the contemporary mainstream of philosophical thinking in the Anglo-Saxon world. For while there are of course German thinkers who have made crucial contributions to the development of exact or analytic philosophy, such thinkers were outsiders when seen from the perspective of native German philosophical culture, and in fact a number of them, as we shall see, found their philosophical home precisely in Vienna. When, in contrast, we examine the influence of the Austrian line, we encounter a whole series of familiar and unfamiliar links to the characteristic concerns of more recent philosophy of the analytic sort. As Michael Dummett points out in his *Origins of Analytic Philosophy*, the newly fashionable habit of referring to analytic philosophy as ‘Anglo-American’ is in this light a ‘grave historical distortion’. If, he says, we take into account the historical context in which analytic philosophy developed, then such philosophy ‘could at least as well be called “Anglo-Austrian”’ (1988, p. 7).

Much valuable scholarly work has been done on the thinking of Husserl and Wittgenstein, Mach and the Vienna Circle. The central axis of Austrian philosophy, however, which as I hope to show in what follows is constituted by the work of Brentano and his school, is still rather poorly understood. Work on Meinong or Twardowski by contemporary philosophers still standardly rests upon simplified and often confused renderings of a few favoured theses taken out of context. Little attention is paid to original sources, and little effort is devoted to establishing what the problems were by which the Austrian philosophers in general were exercised – in spite of the fact that many of these same problems have once more become important as a result of the

contemporary burgeoning of interest on the part of philosophers in problems in the field of cognitive science.

It is possible to define the concept of ‘Austrian philosophy’ in purely geographical terms, drawing up a list of those philosophers of importance who were born or settled within the borders of the Habsburg Empire from out of which modern Austria evolved. Such a list – which would embrace the philosophers of Prague, Cracow and Lvov/Lemberg as much as those of Vienna, Graz and Innsbruck – would include at the very least Bolzano, Mach, Brentano, Twardowski, Meinong, Ehrenfels, Husserl, Mally, Wittgenstein, Neurath, Carnap, Schlick, Waismann, Gustav Bergmann, Gödel and Popper. On the other hand, however, and more ambitiously, one might seek to lay down the marks or features of a certain way of doing philosophy that could be held to be characteristic of the thinkers on this list, and much of the relevant historiographical literature has pursued a line of this sort. Austrian philosophy, it is held, is marked by:

(i) The attempt to do philosophy in a way that is inspired by or is closely connected to empirical science (including psychology): this attempt is associated also with a concern for the unity of science. In the work of some of the Vienna positivists it is manifested in the extreme form of a physicalistic or phenomenalist reductionism. In the work of Brentano and his followers it relates rather to a unity of method as between philosophy and other disciplines.

(ii) A sympathy towards and in many cases a rootedness in British empiricist philosophy, a concern to develop a philosophy ‘from below’, on the basis of the detailed examination of particular examples.

(iii) A concern with the language of philosophy. This sometimes amounts to a conception of the critique of language as a tool or method; sometimes it leads to attempts at the construction of a logical ideal language. In many cases it manifests itself in the deliberate employment of a clear and concise language for the purposes of philosophical expression and in a sensitivity to the special properties of those uses and abuses of language which are characteristic of certain sorts of philosophy.

(iv) A rejection of the Kantian revolution and of the various sorts of relativism and historicism which came in its wake. Instead we find different forms of realism and of ‘objectivism’ (in logic, value theory, and elsewhere –

illustrated in Bolzano's concept of the proposition in itself and in Popper's doctrine of the 'third world').

(v) A special relation to the *a priori*, conceived not however in Kantian terms but in terms of a willingness to accept disciplines such as phenomenology and Gestalt theory which are, as Wittgenstein expressed it, 'midway between logic and physics'. (The question as to how such apriorism can be consistent with a respect for empirical science will be one of the issues to be addressed below.)

(vi) A concern with ontological structure, and more especially with the issue as to how the parts of things fit together to form structured wholes. In some cases this involves the recognition of differences of ontological level among the entities revealed to us by the various sciences and a consequent readiness to accept a certain stratification of reality.

(vii) An overriding interest in the relation of macro-phenomena (for example in social science or ethics) to the mental experiences or other micro-phenomena which underlie or are associated with them. This need not imply any *reduction* of complex wholes to their constituent parts or moments. Certainly a reductionism of this sort is present in Mach and in some of the Vienna positivists, but it is explicitly rejected by almost all the other thinkers mentioned.

There is much that is of value in this brief conspectus. Unfortunately, however, it is far from being the case that all the given features are shared in common by all the thinkers mentioned. Some philosophers on the list are marked precisely by the ways in which they reacted against one or other of the features mentioned, and some (for example Wittgenstein and Husserl) changed their relationship to these features over time. Moreover, many of the purported marks of 'Austrian philosophy' are exemplified also by thinkers who have nothing whatsoever to do with Austria in any recognizable (geographical) sense.

In what sense, then, can it be philosophically useful and historically legitimate to talk of 'Austrian philosophy' (defined, broadly, in terms of the features listed) as a single and coherent movement of thought? To answer this question it is necessary to refer once more to the German philosophy which served for Austrian philosophy as a never completely forgotten sparring-partner throughout the period of its development. What then springs to mind is the

degree to which the features mentioned have in German philosophy played almost no role at all – a fact which is all the more remarkable given the extent to which successive generations of German philosophers have differed so widely amongst themselves. Simplifying tremendously, we might say that German philosophy is determined primarily by its orientation around epistemology: attention is directed not to the world, but to our knowledge of the world. Moreover, even the latter is conceived largely in abstraction from knowledge actually gained and from the practices of scientists, in a way which can be seen to have thwarted the development of a native German tradition in the philosophy of science. This is sometimes connected further with what we might call the romantic element in German philosophy, a mode of thought which, in stressing the ultimate unintelligibility of the world, is often inimical to scientific theory.

The relation of philosophy to matters of scientifically established fact is in post-Kantian German philosophy therefore not normally a subject for investigation: the philosopher's world is in effect split apart from the empirical world of what happens and is the case. Certainly there are exceptions: for example Bauch, Natorp or Cassirer, but the exceptions, again, are overwhelmingly thinkers outside the mainstream of German philosophy, and in this light it is especially significant that the contributions of philosophically minded mathematicians such as Frege and Hilbert were not by German philosophers but by philosophers in England or Poland.

The main currents of German philosophy have moreover shown little sensitivity to the role of language in philosophy. They have tended to strive for philosophical *depth*, often at the expense of clarity, which they have associated with shallowness of thinking. Even Kant can be charged with some of the responsibility for certain stylistic excesses of his successors in this respect, and Neo-Kantians such as Rickert or Cohen, who attempted to develop a scientifically oriented philosophy in the spirit of Kant, never achieved in their writings the sort of clarity of language and precision of argument which we associate with Bolzano or Brentano.

German philosophy in the nineteenth century was to no small part a philosophy of idealism, more specifically a philosophy of idealism in its immanentistic variants – a doctrine according to which meaning, truth, value, and sometimes even the world as a whole, are seen as being immanent to (as real

constituent parts or ‘contents’ of) the mind or ego. Around the turn of our present century this immanentistic mode of philosophizing was subjected to attack from two quarters: in the Anglo-Saxon world, above all in the Cambridge of Russell and Moore; and in Austria by philosophers in Brentano school. It is in this connection that we shall justify our claim that it is Brentano and his followers who constitute the central axis of Austrian philosophy. This claim rests not merely on the personal dominance of Brentano and his pupils in universities throughout the Habsburg Empire and on the fact that it is Brentano and his pupils who came closest to instantiating those marks which have been picked out in the literature as characteristic of Austrian philosophy as a whole. It rests also, and most importantly, on the role Brentanian philosophers played in breaking through the restrictions of immanentism in philosophy (restrictions which affected also Brentano’s own thinking).

The Brentanian philosophers showed how to deal in rigorous, scientific fashion with mental reference to transcendent objects in a way which proved extraordinarily fruitful for the early development of exact or analytic philosophy on the continent of Europe, as it proved fruitful also in giving rise to movements of thought such as phenomenology and Gestalt psychology. For in working out their ‘theories of objects’, the Brentanian philosophers – in contrast to Frege and his successors – did not abandon psychological concerns. Rather, their work in ontology proceeded always in tandem with work on the cognitive processes in which the corresponding objects are experienced, and it is in thus spanning the gulf between ontology and psychology in non-reductionistic fashion that the members of the Brentano school can be seen to have anticipated certain crucial aspects of contemporary cognitive science.

Chapter One

Austrian Philosophy and the Brentano School

1. *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy*

It was in 1922 that Moritz Schlick – a German physicist-cum-philosopher of aristocratic manners and conservative opinions – arrived in Vienna. Schlick had been invited to take up the chair of philosophy ‘with special reference to the history and theory of the inductive sciences’ that had been created for another physicist-cum-philosopher, Ernst Mach, in 1895. Mach himself had previously served for almost thirty years as professor of experimental physics in Prague, at that time a centre of intellectual activity almost no less important than Vienna herself. The lines of communication between the two cities were still strong, and the same figures were often, at different times, prominent in each.

The two cities shared also the characteristically Austrian predilection for forming clubs, societies, and discussion groups. The cultural and intellectual life of the Habsburg Empire was indeed to a striking extent a matter of ‘schools’ and ‘movements’, and one might pause to reflect on the degree to which such schools and movements have determined the artistic, intellectual, and political world we inhabit today. Thus consider, in no particular order, the Vienna psychoanalytic movement, the Zionist movement founded by Theodor Herzl, the ‘new Viennese school’ of composition around Arnold Schönberg, the school of linguists and psychologists around Karl Bühler, the school of Austrian economics founded by Carl Menger in 1871 and evolving, by degrees, into the Ludwig von Mises circle in the 1920s. Or consider the ‘Prager Kreis’ of novelists and critics around Max Brod and Franz Kafka, the Prague linguistic circle of Roman Jakobson, Jan Mukařovský and Nikolai Trubetzkoy, or, in more recent times, the philosophical discussion group which met regularly in the apartment of Václav Havel and which later formed the nucleus of the Czech Civic Forum.

Schlick, too, had his regular Thursday evening discussion circle. This comprised above all a group of mathematicians around Hans Hahn, himself a former student of Mach and Boltzmann, and included Kurt Gödel, Gustav Bergmann, Karl Menger (son of the economist Carl), and Schlick’s own assistant Friedrich Waismann. The Schlick circle could count among its members also Philipp Frank, Herbert Feigl, Viktor Kraft, Rudolf Carnap, and a

certain sociologist-cum-philosopher, proletarian in manner and socialist in opinions, by the name of Otto Neurath.

Carnap is, apart from Schlick himself, the single native German on this list, and it is remarkable to consider the extent to which not merely logical positivism but also the exact or scientific philosophy of which it formed a part were and are characteristically *Austrian* phenomena. One thinks in this connection not only of Mach, but also of another Prague figure of an earlier generation, Bernard Bolzano. Bolzano was on the one hand a priest and social reformer; but he was also a notable mathematical logician and philosopher of science, though his contributions in these fields were largely ignored until after his death. One thinks of Ludwig Boltzmann, hero of Wittgenstein and contemporary of Mach in Vienna; one thinks of Wittgenstein himself, of Ludwik Fleck, Karl Popper, Michael Polanyi, Paul Feyerabend, Wolfgang Stegmüller and Imre Lakatos – all of them Austrians (or Austro-Hungarians) who have, for better or worse, done much to determine the shape of the philosophy of science as we know it today.¹

Consider, as an example, the case of Ludwik Fleck. Fleck was born in 1896 in Lvov (Lemberg, Lwów or Lwiw), capital of Galicia on the Eastern fringes of the Habsburg Empire. He was the author of some 200 scientific papers in the areas of medicine and microbiology.² But he was also the author of a longer, philosophical work, published in 1935, entitled *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. Introduction to the Doctrine of Cognitive Style and of the Thought-Collective*, a work that is of interest first of all because, as a contribution to the nascent discipline of ‘sociology of science’, it anticipates and perhaps even served to inspire some of the now so influential ideas of Thomas Kuhn. (Kuhn in fact contributed a preface to the English translation of the work.) But it is of interest also because Fleck was one of a number of Lemberg-based philosophers and philosophically-minded scientists and mathematicians who were associated, in different ways, with those developments in scientific philosophy in Central Europe which will here concern us – and it will turn out that Lemberg, like Vienna and Prague, will have a quite special role to play in the story that follows.

The native *German* philosophers who have made serious contributions to exact philosophy or to the philosophy of science in the modern sense are, in contrast, remarkably few, and of these – one thinks particularly of Hans

1. Another native Austrian who deserves mention in this connection is the economist Friedrich von Hayek, a distant cousin of Wittgenstein, who was the author of a Mach-inspired treatise on the foundations of psychology (1952: the initial draft dates from around 1920), as also of a work in the history and philosophy of the social sciences (1952a). One might mention also the Hungarian philosopher and social theorist Karl Mannheim, one of the principal initiators of the so-called ‘sociology of knowledge’.

2. For a complete bibliography of Fleck’s writings see Schnelle 1982.

Reichenbach, Carl Hempel and Kurt Grelling – it can often be asserted that the true flowering of their thought and influence occurred precisely through formal or informal collaboration with their teachers or contemporaries in Austria.³ Of quite specific interest for our own purposes is the fact that almost all such philosophers were based in Berlin, where the ‘Society for Empirical Philosophy’ was established in 1928 as a counterpart to the Schlick circle in Vienna. Why, then, was the new scientific, logically empiricist philosophy, insofar as it found a home in Germany at all, concentrated so heavily in the single city of Berlin? And why, of all the cities in Europe, should this philosophy have taken root so firmly in Vienna, Prague and Lemberg?

2. *Philosophy and Politics*

When A. J. Ayer arrived in Vienna in late November of 1932, spending a protracted honeymoon of just over three months in Austria before returning to Oxford to write *Language, Truth and Logic*, the Schlick circle was at the very height of its activity. It had already organized its first two international conferences, and at the first of these, held in Prague in 1929, it had distributed copies of its manifesto, the “Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung” or “Scientific Conception of the World”. This was written, effectively, by Neurath, in collaboration with Carnap and Hahn (and to a lesser extent other members of the circle), who served to temper some of Neurath’s wilder flights of fancy. The patrician Schlick, to whom the manifesto was dedicated, was less than satisfied with the result. This was first of all because he was not taken by the conception of the circle as a ‘movement’ of any sort, favouring a more modest and more narrowly scientific approach:

Schlick hated everything that smacked of agitation, was against it all: ‘It is not necessary for us to agitate: that we can leave to the political parties: in science we say what we have found, we hope to say the truth; and if it is the truth, then it will win out.’ (Haller and Rutte 1977, p. 31)

But it was also because he was distressed by the political tone of the piece, and more specifically by those portions which suggested some sort of alignment of

3. There are of course exceptions to the thesis expressed in the text, above all Frege (though even here we can point to Wittgenstein’s role in disseminating Fregean ideas). Other exceptions include Helmholtz, Ostwald, Hilbert, Nelson (the latter exerting an important influence on Grelling and on Dubislav), and also Oswald Külpe (who exerted an influence on Bühler, Popper and the Berlin Gestaltists and who was himself influenced by Mach). All of these were, however, on the *fringes* of German philosophy, even if — as in the case of Weyl or Hilbert — they distinguished themselves in other fields. The thinking in the area of the philosophy of science of German philosophers truly belonging to the mainstream German tradition — for example that of Natorp and the lesser Neo-Kantians — has, in contrast, been almost entirely forgotten, or it has been resurrected precisely in investigations of the thinking of philosophers, such as Carnap, who were allied to the Austrian tradition (see for example Runggaldier 1984, Friedman 1987, Sauer 1989, Coffa 1991).

logical positivism with socialism and with the movement for workers' education in Vienna at the time.

The circle had already by 1932 taken over – with the group around Reichenbach in Berlin – the journal *Annalen der Philosophie*, renaming it *Erkenntnis*. And it had published some six volumes of its series of *Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung*, including works by Richard von Mises (brother of the economist Ludwig), and by Carnap, Schlick, Neurath and Philipp Frank, together with a peculiar work, entitled *On the Biology of Ethics: Psychopathological Investigations of Guilt-Feelings and the Formation of Moral Ideals: A Contribution on the Essence of the Neurotic Human Being*, by a certain Otto Kant.⁴

While Ayer does not address the question as to why it should have been Vienna, rather than Königsberg or Tübingen or Marburg, that was enjoying such a peculiar flowering of scientific philosophy at the time, his autobiography does contain one remark on what he saw as the political role of the group around Schlick:

The members of the Vienna Circle, with the notable exception of Otto Neurath, were not greatly interested in politics, but theirs was also a political movement. The war of ideas which they were waging against the Catholic church had its part in the perennial Viennese conflict between the socialists and the clerical reaction. (Ayer 1977, p. 129)

A thesis along these lines has been argued quite seriously by the Viennese sociologist-historian Friedrich Stadler, who provides us with a great mass of documentation to support his case. Stadler suggests that we see the University of Vienna in the interwar period as split into 'two camps':

on the one side, in the realm of scientific philosophy, there dominated democratic (enlightenment, liberal, socialist) tendencies; on the other side there was a spectrum of almost all forms of anti-democratic feeling, from neo-romantic conservatism to fascist-totalitarian outgrowths. Thus it is tempting to see the philosophical life as part of the fierce party-political *Kulturkampf* of the time, between the bourgeois camp and the workers' movement. (Stadler 1979, p. 42)

In regard to Austrian society in general, a 'two camp' thesis of this sort has a certain plausibility. Yet the idea that the flowering of scientific philosophy in Austria can be accounted for by regarding the Schlick circle as a manifestation of Austrian socialism, or of anti-clericalism, seems to be at best the product of a certain sort of over-tidy wishful thinking. Socialist anti-clericalism did not, after all, lead to similar phenomena in France, or Spain, or Italy; but more importantly the thesis in question is not able to cope with the fact that so few important Austrian philosophers of science, and so few of the members of the

4. A complete list of the publications of the circle is given in Soulez (ed.), pp. 346f., which also contains other useful supplementary material on the wider Austrian background of the Vienna circle.

Vienna circle – Neurath, Hahn and Carnap constituting here the principal exceptions – were of socialist persuasion?⁵

Neurath was, it must be admitted, the most vocal and the most ardently propagandistic of the group around Schlick. It was Neurath's conspicuous advocacy of crackpot schemes for 'international planning for freedom' and for an 'economy in kind' as a substitute for prices and markets⁶ which dissuaded Hayek from making overtures to the group after his interest had been sparked by his friend and fellow member of the Mises circle Felix Kaufmann.⁷ And as the case of Schlick himself makes clear,⁸ it would be overly simplistic to see the circle in particular or Viennese scientific in general as in any sense a part of the Austrian socialist movement. Certainly it is interesting that Austrian scientific philosophy (and above all the thought of Mach) exerted some influence upon the Austro-Marxist movement, for instance in the case of Friedrich Adler. And another Austro-Marxist, Otto Bauer, came to value the work of the Vienna circle enough to view logical positivism as pointing the way forward for Marxist materialism itself. But the idea of a two camp theory which would align all honest, scientifically-minded thinkers in Vienna with progressivism, positivism and the Viennese socialist city government, and would have them standing opposed to Catholicism, fascism and other dark forces, breaks down precisely when confronted with liberal or conservative intellectuals like Schlick, Kraft, Waismann, Kaufmann, Mises or Hayek.

But how, then, are we to explain the fact that, as far as achievement and wider influence is concerned, the philosophy of science was the dominant branch of philosophy in Austria?

A more subtle answer to this question, due to J. C. Nyíri, might read as follows. On the one hand one can point to the fact that, while the Austrian Empire was the equal of (for example) Germany in the cultural field, it lagged behind its richer and more developed neighbours to the west in matters of intellect and science. The Habsburg Empire had witnessed a relatively late process of urbanization, bringing also a late development of those liberal habits and values which would seem to be a presupposition of the modern, scientific

5. J. C. Nyíri has argued that there is a conservative and traditionalist current running through the whole of Austrian philosophy of science. See his 1986 and, on the specific case of Wittgenstein, chs. 1 and 2 of his 1992.

6. See Neurath 1973, esp. chs. 5, 8 and 11.

7. Personal communication of Professor Hayek.

8. On Schlick's political opinions see, again, the interview with Heinrich Neider: 'Schlick was a man who had no sympathy at all for politics and the state; he was a liberal in the old sense, for whom the fire brigade and the police were admitted as at best a necessary evil. Otherwise one did not need the state at all.' (Haller and Rutte 1977, p. 24)

attitude. It therefore lacked institutions and traditions of scientific research of the sort that had been established and cultivated especially in Germany throughout the 19th century. On the other hand, as the more liberal and enlightened ways began to be established in Austria – effectively in the second half of the nineteenth century – the desire to enjoy the various trappings of a modern enlightened culture made itself strongly felt. The Austrians were not, however, in a position to summon forth the means to create serious and reputable institutions and traditions of science in the narrow sense. This, as Nyiri puts it, created ‘a vacuum which the *theory* of a practice so attractively pursued elsewhere could then fill’ (1986, p. 143). This thesis is illustrated particularly clearly by the case of Mach, whose lack of funds for serious experiments in physics seems to have constrained him to turn instead to the (cheaper) fields of physiology and psychology as also to work in the history and philosophy of science.

An account along these lines is supported further by pointing to the absence in the Empire of any entrenched national philosophy of the Kantian or Hegelian sort.⁹ This implied that, when the opportunity for the establishment of a scientifically oriented philosophy in Austria presented itself, there was very little of substance against which the new philosophical developments had to compete. Catholic Austria was largely free of that influence of German idealist metaphysics which has done so much to thwart the development of exact philosophy in Germany itself. This was not least in virtue of the fact that the works of both Kant and Hegel, as notorious effluvia of the French revolution, were for a time included on the Papal index of prohibited books. Their place was taken by the German ‘*Popularphilosophie*’, a watered-down and popularized version of enlightenment doctrines derived from Leibniz and Wolff, the canons and textbooks of which were imposed upon the institutions of learning throughout the Empire. This state of affairs was to end only with the educational reforms after 1848, leaving the way clear for more positive developments, some of which will be considered below.

This is in contrast to the German case, where the strength of idealist metaphysics had derived in no small part from the fact that it was closely associated with the development both of German national consciousness and of the German nation itself, so that Kant, Hegel, Fichte and Schelling have come to occupy an entrenched position in German thought and feeling of a sort that is unparalleled in any other culture. Certainly philosophy was at no time rooted in this way in the structure of the Austrian state. An Empire which was at best an accidental compromise, a dynastic convenience of the Habsburg family,

9. Nothing is as simple as one might wish, and there were on both sides exceptions to the general tendencies referred to in the text. For a more rounded picture see Sauer 1982, who makes clear just how much – and how little – was known of Kant in Austria at the time when his influence in Germany was most intense.

seemed indeed to be lacking in all potential for legitimation on the plane of philosophy.¹⁰ The primary legitimacy of the Empire was seen as lying much rather in its role as the last bulwark of Catholic Christianity against the expansionist powers of Russia and Turkey to the east.

There may be a further reason for the absence in Austria of a counterpart to German idealist metaphysics. For it seems that the Austrians, similar in this respect to the English, have tended to react with suspicion in the face of the more grandiose forms of metaphysics popular in Germany. This may explain why those native German philosophers who have favoured painstaking argument and careful empirical work over grandiose speculation were so often able to find a receptive audience precisely in Austrian intellectual circles. It may explain also why philosophers in Germany did not, for the most part, allow themselves to be influenced by Anglo-Saxon ideas (though there were in addition political and economic reasons for the Anglophobia of many Germans in the nineteenth century, as also for certain contrasting Anglophile feelings of the Austrians in this same period). Kant is in this respect something of a special case, since he stands at the beginning of the new developments in German philosophy and thus inherits many of the virtues of his predecessors. Kant, it is true, attempted a reconciliation of empiricism and rationalism. As we shall see, however, this reconciliation was of a quite different sort from that which was achieved on the part of Austrian philosophers such as Brentano.

3. *The Neurath-Haller Thesis*

Much of the previous section consisted in the attempt to provide an explanation of developments in the intellectual or cultural sphere by appeal to underlying social or economic factors. Explanations of this kind have been found tempting by Marxist thinkers and by other advocates of a broadly economic approach to human behaviour. Where, however, we are dealing with complex movements of thought and doctrine, such explanations can be at best only partial. For they cannot give us insight into the precise intellectual content of the movements in question. Why did the Austrians' initial substitute for true scientific development take precisely these (phenomenalist and physicalist) forms, rather than those? What is to account for the peculiar blend of British empiricism and Russellian logic which provided the basic framework within which, in their various ways, the members of the Schlick circle would operate?

Clearly, and for all the dominance of schools and movements in any particular case, we must point to the influence of specific *individuals* if we are to be in a position to provide satisfactory answers to questions such as these.

10. Weiler 1986 is a strong statement of this thesis, and of its implications for an understanding of the peculiarities of Austrian philosophy. For a treatment of alternatives to this thesis see however Grassl and Smith 1986.

And there are a number of candidate individuals who come to mind in this connection, including Boltzmann (whose vision of a unitary science made itself felt not only among physicists but also in the wider intellectual community in Vienna) and Wittgenstein (whose *Tractatus* exerted a not inconsiderable influence on both Schlick and Carnap in precisely the formative years of the Vienna circle). We may presume, reasonably, that no social or economic explanation of the genius of Boltzmann or Wittgenstein (or Gödel, or Einstein) would be forthcoming. Even when all of this is granted, however, it would still be insufficient to look at individuals in abstraction from the wider social and institutional context in which they worked. This is not only because the individual is shaped by his or her surrounding culture. It is also, and more importantly, because his ideas will be able to take root in this culture only to the extent that they strike a congenial chord in the thinking of those to whom they are addressed. More importantly still, however, an individual, even an individual of genius, will be able to exert an influence upon his contemporaries only to the extent that there are *institutions* which can facilitate the dissemination of his ideas.

Hence there is a need, in regard to our own specific problem, to provide a mixed explanation, one that makes room both for institutional and economic factors of the kind so far considered and also for the serendipitous role of individuals. A forceful and coherent explanation along these lines has been provided by Neurath himself, in the section labelled “Prehistory” of the Vienna circle manifesto already mentioned above, and I shall here deal in turn with each of the four main components in Neurath’s account.

First, the fact that Vienna provided especially fertile soil for the development of the scientific conception is, Neurath argues, ‘historically understandable’ as a consequence of the growth of liberalism in Vienna in the second half of the nineteenth century. Indeed Neurath claims that liberalism was in this period:

the dominant political current in Vienna. Its world of ideas stems from the enlightenment, from empiricism, utilitarianism and the free trade movement of England. In Vienna’s liberal movement, scholars of world renown occupied leading positions. Here an anti-metaphysical spirit was cultivated, for instance, by men like Theodor Gomperz (who translated the works of J. S. Mill), and by Suess, Jodl and others. (Neurath 1929, p. 301 of translation, amended slightly)

This liberal atmosphere fostered also, Neurath tells us, the development in Austria of scientifically oriented popular education – leading eventually to the school reform movement of the 1920s, in which Wittgenstein, perhaps inadvertently, participated during his time as a school teacher in Lower Austria.

Secondly, Neurath points out that Mach, too, was a product of this Viennese liberal enlightenment, which was as it were compressed, in Austria, into the short span of a few decades. His formative years as student and *Privatdozent* were spent in Vienna, where his political attitudes – subsequently to reveal themselves in his activities as Rector of the still unified University in Prague –

were shaped. These same attitudes then manifested themselves also, Neurath suggests, in Mach's philosophy of science, and specifically in his attempt to 'purify' empirical science of metaphysical notions:

We recall his critique of absolute space which made him a forerunner of Einstein, his struggle against the metaphysics of the thing-in-itself and of the concept of substance, and his investigations of the construction of the concepts of science from ultimate elements, namely sense data. (*Op. cit.*, p. 302)

The influence of Mach and of his successor Boltzmann, Neurath now argues, 'makes it understandable' why there was in Vienna 'a lively dominant interest in the epistemological and logical problems that are linked with the foundations of physics'. This influence was, certainly, of lasting importance, despite the fact that, after only six years as professor in Vienna, Mach was forced by ill-health to retire. Thus Hayek, for example, reports that he and his contemporaries upon arriving in Vienna to take up their studies in the immediate post-war years 'found in Mach almost the only arguments against a metaphysical and mystificatory attitude' such as was manifested by the dominant philosophers in the University at the time:

from Mach one was then led on to Helmholtz, to Poincaré and to similar thinkers, and of course, for those who went into the matter systematically such as my friend Karl Popper, to all the natural scientists and philosophers of the period (Hayek 1966, pp. 42f.).

The quite special importance of Mach for the Vienna circle itself can be seen in the fact that they gave the name 'Verein Ernst Mach' to the public lecture society which they founded as a supplement to their other activities in 1929.

Thirdly, Neurath mentions a number of Viennese social thinkers, from both the Marxist and the non-Marxist camps, who had 'served consciously in the spirit of the enlightenment' in the late nineteenth century.¹¹ Above all he mentions the work of Carl Menger, pointing out that 'in the sphere of political economy, too, a rigorously scientific method was cultivated by the school of individualist doctrines which Menger had founded in 1871. Menger's methodological individualist doctrines will be shown below to stand in opposition to German historicist and collectivist doctrines in the sphere of economics in a way which parallels the opposition of, say, Bolzano or Mach to Kant and Hegel. Moreover, these doctrines constitute a synthesis of liberal political and economic ideas with the affirmation of the importance of scientific rigour of just the sort that is required by Neurath's thesis.

Fourthly, and most tellingly, however, is the fact that, apart from Mach, the most important individual philosopher mentioned by Neurath in his account of the Viennese prehistory of logical positivism is Franz Brentano. As Neurath himself puts it, the ground was cleared for the endeavours of the Vienna circle

11. *Op. cit.*, p. 303. A comprehensive discussion of this aspect of the development of positivism in Austria is provided by Stadler 1982.

in the direction of a reform of logic and of a concern with problems of foundations also ‘from quite another quarter’:

through Franz Brentano (professor of philosophy ... from 1874 to 1880, later *Dozent* in the philosophical faculty). As a Catholic priest Brentano had an understanding for scholasticism; he started directly from the scholastic logic and from Leibniz’s endeavours to reform logic, while leaving aside Kant and the idealist system-philosophers. Brentano and his students showed time and again their understanding of men like Bolzano and others who were working toward a rigorous new foundation of logic. (*Op. cit.*, p. 302)

Brentano, too, came to be marked to some extent by the Austrian liberalism of the nineteenth century (thus for example he played an instrumental role in commissioning the young Sigmund Freud – who had been for a time a devoted admirer of Brentano’s work – to translate one of the volumes in the already mentioned Gomperz edition of the works of Mill¹²). Of Brentano’s students, Neurath mentions in particular Alois Höfler (1853–1922), who had organized numerous discussions on Brentanian perspectives in logic and foundations under the auspices of the Philosophical Society at the University of Vienna, a forum founded by Brentano and Höfler in which, as Neurath puts it, ‘the adherents of the scientific world conception were strongly represented.’

Neurath mentions also ‘Alexius von Meinong, a member of the circle of Brentano’s Viennese students from 1870–1882 and later professor in Graz, whose theory of objects has certainly some affinity to modern theories of concepts’. (Neurath is presumably referring here to the similarities – pointed out also by Carnap – between Meinong’s work on higher-order objects and Carnap’s own *Logical Structure of the World*.) He mentions also Meinong’s pupil Ernst Mally, who had been one of the first Austrians to work on the logic of Whitehead and Russell and would later play a seminal role in the development of deontic logic.

Brentano was not only sympathetic to a rigorously scientific method in philosophy; he shared with the logical positivists also a certain anti-metaphysical orientation¹³ and his work involves the use of methods of language analysis similar in some respects to those developed later by philosophers in England. Rudolf Haller has indeed argued that it makes sense to point to these features – which were shared in common not only by Brentano and the logical positivists

12. The volume in question is a collection of Mill’s writings on female emancipation, socialism and Plato. On Freud and Brentano see Hemecker 1991. It is worth mentioning here also that Brentano was no less responsible than Mach for the strong reception of the ideas of the British empiricists in Austria. Consider for example Brentano’s work on Reid and on the psychology of Hamilton and the Mills, Bain and Spencer (e.g. in his 1874), and also the work of Meinong on Hume (e.g. his 1882) and of Husserl on Locke and Berkeley (e.g. in the 2nd Logical Investigation).

13. More than 100 pages of his *On Knowledge* (1925) are devoted to a critique of Kant entitled “Down With Prejudices! A Warning to the Present in the Spirit of Bacon and Descartes to Free Itself from All Blind A Prioris.”

but also by thinkers as diverse as Mach and Wittgenstein – as constituting what might be called a ‘typically Austrian philosopher’.¹⁴ Haller’s writings on the history of Austrian philosophy¹⁵ have not merely extended and clarified the Neurath interpretation; they have also contributed to our understanding of German-language philosophy as a whole. For Haller has shown that it is possible to distinguish within this whole a coherent alternative to the speculative idealisms predominant in Germany proper. But now, if this Neurath-Haller thesis can be accepted, if, in other words, it can be accepted that there exists a separate and internally coherent tradition of *Austrian* philosophy within German-language philosophy as a whole, then it follows that the Vienna circle itself comes to be linked, via Brentano, to Catholic scholasticism. And one could go further, and point to the *method* of communal philosophical argument – as philosophizing by means of a sometimes ritualized process of discussion – as something that is shared, not merely by Brentano and the medieval schoolmen, but also by Schlick, with his Thursday-evening discussions, and by Wittgenstein in his cell in Cambridge.

The Neurath-Haller thesis is not without its problems however. Thus while it seems that the works of Meinong and Brentano were mentioned in discussions of the Vienna circle, in the case of Brentano, at least, it is almost certain that his writings were discussed principally because his work on ethics was chosen by Schlick as a special object of criticism. Moreover, J. C. Nyíri has pointed out that there is one group of influential Austrian philosophers – whom he refers to as ‘sociologizing epistemologists’ – in relation to which the Neurath-Haller thesis does not apply. He mentions in particular the names of Ludwig Gumpłowicz and Michael Polanyi, but also Fleck, again, and the later Wittgenstein, in a line extending in our own day to T. S. Kuhn, all of them defenders of a view according to which all ideas, and in particular all scientific ideas, are intrinsically social phenomena.¹⁶

The thesis has been attacked most especially by Viennese sociologists and historians of science who are reluctant to accept the idea that the ‘two camps’ of Catholic reaction and progressive socialist neopositivism should become confused together in the way described. Friedrich Stadler, in particular, has suggested that – in contrast to the picture of the typical Austrian philosopher painted by Neurath and Haller – the influence of logical positivist ideas, or of scientific philosophy in general, was in fact rather small, at least as concerns the official life of the University of Vienna in the period 1918–1938. What

14. Compare also Rutte 1977 and G. Bergmann 1967, esp. pp. 4ff.

15. Collected as Haller 1979; see also his 1981, 1986a, 1988, 1993 and the (in many respects definitive) essay “Zur Historiographie der österreichischen Philosophie” of 1986.

16. Nyíri 1989, p. 602.

predominated, both in lecture courses and in dissertation topics, was the history of philosophy of a rather old-fashioned sort, dealing in Kant, Schopenhauer, Spinoza, Plato, Nietzsche. The circle around Schlick can be seen from this point of view to have consisted largely of philosophical cranks and dabblers, individuals who would be taken seriously only later – and then primarily outside the borders of Austria herself. What is important for our purposes, however, is not the education of the inter-war generation in Vienna, the generation which would come to prominence in the period (say) from 1938 to 1945. Rather, we are interested in those intellectual currents which had shaped and determined the thinking of specific members of the generation already mature in the inter-war period, and in particular given rise to such schools as the Schlick and Mises circles. And to pick out such currents it will not suffice simply to examine the sheer numbers of lectures or dissertations on different themes – for this is to ignore just those differences of individual achievement and wider influence which are here all-important.

4. *The School of Franz Brentano*

Franz Brentano was born in 1838 in Marienberg, near Boppard on the Rhine, of a distinguished Italian-German family whose forbears included Clemens Brentano, Carl von Savigny and Bettina von Arnim. He studied in Berlin under the Aristotle scholar Adolf Trendelenburg, and later in Würzburg, where he took holy orders in 1864 and where, from 1866, he taught philosophy. In part as a result of difficulties in accepting the dogma of Papal infallibility, Brentano withdrew from the priesthood in 1873 and this necessitated also a withdrawal from Würzburg. In 1874 he was appointed professor of philosophy in Vienna, where he taught for some twenty years with great success. Brentano moved to Florence in 1896 and from there to Zurich in 1915, where he died two years later.¹⁷

Brentano remained a quite singularly powerful figure in Austrian philosophy even when, for legal reasons connected with his marriage as an ex-priest, he was effectively forced to resign his chair in 1880. And it is one of the tragedies of Austrian philosophy that, due to the repeated interventions of the Emperor, Brentano was not re-appointed to a professorial post in Vienna after his marriage, despite the fact that, year after year, his re-election to such a post was carried *unico loco* by the faculty itself. Brentano remained in Vienna as a mere *Privatdozent* until 1895. He was thereby able to exert his influence in Vienna as a teacher, but his students and disciples were largely forced to turn elsewhere in order to pursue their philosophical careers. Had Brentano been able truly to

17. On Brentano's life and on the historical context of his thinking see Werle 1989. On Brentano in Italy see Albertazzi (forthcoming).

establish himself and his school in the University in Vienna, then it seems clear that the philosophy of Austria in this century would have been significantly different. It may, therefore, have been one somewhat ironic consequence of the Emperor's veto of Brentano's appointment in the name of Christian propriety that he thereby left the way clear in Vienna for just such positivistic and atheistic movements of thought as were nurtured by Schlick and his circle in the '20s and '30s.

Another consequence was that Brentanian ideas came to predominance in other centres of learning both within and without the Empire. Thus centres of Brentanian or of Brentano-inspired philosophy were established particularly in Prague and in Lemberg, and Brentano's students held chairs also in Graz and Czernowitz, as well as in Berlin, where Stumpf, formerly in Prague, was to serve as professor in the Humboldt University for over thirty years.

Brentano's influence was not restricted to philosophers. Among those who came under his spell were also a number of important thinkers in the Church, as well as such figures as T. G. Masaryk (himself initially a philosopher and later founder and first President of the erstwhile Czechoslovak Republic). What is most remarkable about Brentano, however, is the extent to which his principal philosophical heirs – Kasimir Twardowski in Lemberg, Christian von Ehrenfels and Anton Marty in Prague, Carl Stumpf in Prague and Berlin, as well as Meinong and Husserl – distinguished themselves by initiating new and influential schools and movements of their own, not only in philosophy but also in other fields, movements resting in each case on a more or less radical transformation of Brentanian doctrines. A table of Brentano's students and of his students' students would thus come close to embracing all of the most important philosophical movements of the twentieth century on the continent of Europe.

Thus Twardowski (1866–1938), on the basis of work on logic and psychology inspired by Brentano (and due in no small part to his own brilliance as a teacher), established almost single-handedly that tradition of exact philosophy in Poland which was to include all of the important figures involved in Polish philosophy in the first decades of the present century. Present at different times in Lvov and falling under Twardowski's influence were, *inter alia*, the historian of philosophy Władysław Tatarkiewicz, the phenomenologist and aesthetician Roman Ingarden, the logicians Stanisław Leśniewski, Jan Łukasiewicz and Tadeusz Czeżowski, as well as philosophers later closely allied to the Vienna logical empiricist movement such as Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. Members of the circle around Twardowski were gradually transplanted to Warsaw, where Leśniewski, especially, was dominant, and it was from there that contacts with the Vienna circle were initiated in the spring of 1930 by Alfred Tarski. Carnap in turn visited Warsaw in November 1930. He gave lectures to the Warsaw Philosophical Society and had discussions

with Leśniewski, Kotarbiński and Tarski at just about the time when Tarski himself was developing his semantic conception of truth.¹⁸

Ehrenfels (1859–1932), professor in Prague for more than thirty years, was above all responsible for initiating that revolution in psychological research which is associated with the concept of Gestalt, a revolution to which contributions were made also by Ehrenfels' teacher Meinong in Graz, by Ehrenfel's student Wertheimer in Prague, and subsequently by Karl Bühler and his associates in Vienna. The group around Bühler (to which the young Karl Popper belonged), promulgated a naturalistic philosophy of Gestalten similar, in many respects, to the work of Stumpf. Egon Brunswik, another member of this Vienna Gestalt psychological circle later allied himself with the neopositivist movement newly transplanted to America, serving as one of the advisory editors to the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* founded by Neurath in 1938.

Marty (1847–1914) was a native of Switzerland who, following the example of his teacher Brentano in Würzburg, took holy orders in 1870. He was professor, successively, in Czernowitz and Prague, and was responsible for applying Brentano's ideas in the areas of linguistics and the philosophy of language, where his writings anticipated in interesting ways contemporary work on linguistic universals.¹⁹ Marty played a role also in the early development of Brentanian ideas on language in the direction of a theory of speech acts, and exerted an influence in this respect both on Bühler and his followers in Vienna and on Roman Jakobson and other members of the Prague linguistic circle.

As in Vienna, so also in Prague, the philosophical atmosphere in the first decades of the century had been determined to no small extent by the work of physicists such as Mach, Einstein and Frank. Yet it is clear that a no less important role in determining the scientific orientation of Prague philosophy was played by Marty, Stumpf, Ehrenfels and other Brentanians, as well as by phenomenologically-oriented psychologists such as Ewald Hering. Moreover, while the two groups were often doctrinally at loggerheads, particularly over the theory of relativity itself, which Brentano charged with incoherence, there were examples of amicable collaboration across this doctrinal divide. Thus Einstein was to be a life-long friend of Wertheimer²⁰ and also of Marty's student and assistant Hugo Bergmann, who was in turn a close friend of Franz Kafka. Kafka

18. Carnap 1963, p. 31.

19. See Mulligan (ed.) 1990.

20. The two were colleagues in Berlin and retained their contacts when both had emigrated to America. See the chapter "Albert Einstein and Max Wertheimer: A Gestalt Psychologist's View of the Genesis of Special Relativity Theory" in Miller 1984. All four of the Berlin Gestalt psychologists – Wertheimer, Köhler, Koffka and Lewin – had an interest in physics.

and Bergmann together attended the philosophy lectures of Ehrenfels, Marty and other Brentanists as part of their studies in the German University in Prague,²¹ and Bergmann also initiated Kafka into the mysteries of a Brentanist discussion group which, as Bergmann writes,

called itself the 'Louvre Circle' after the Louvre coffeehouse where we used to gather. Later on, we got together in the drawing-room of my then mother-in-law, Berta Sohr-Fanta, where Einstein was a frequent visitor when we were reading Hegel's 'Phenomenology of the Spirit'. I scarcely remember whether Einstein took part in these readings. Yet I well recall a popular lecture he held before this score of non-physicists on the special theory of relativity. (Bergmann 1974, p. 389)

Bergmann himself was the author of books on Brentano's concept of evidence and on the philosophy of Bolzano, dealing especially with the latter's logic and philosophy of mathematics. On the other hand he was the author of a volume on *The Controversy Concerning the Law of Causality in Contemporary Physics*, dedicated 'In memory of my teacher Anton Marty' and described by Einstein in his Foreword to the book as 'promoting the best in our present-day attempts at merging physical and philosophical thought'. (1929, p. 395 of translation)

Stumpf (1848–1936) was born in the village of Wiesentheid in Lower Franconia (Bavaria) from where he moved to the University of Würzburg in 1865. In 1866 he began a close collaboration with Brentano which extended to 1874 when Brentano left for Vienna. Stumpf himself was professor in Würzburg from 1873, before leaving for Prague in 1879 and going on from there to Halle in 1884, where he would serve for a time as teacher and colleague of Husserl. After a period in Munich, Stumpf was called in 1894 to serve as professor of philosophy in Berlin, charged also with the explicit task of establishing there an institute of psychology. It was in this institute that his most important students and collaborators – Wertheimer, again, but also Wolfgang Köhler, Kurt Koffka and Kurt Lewin – would establish the so-called Berlin school of Gestalt psychology.

Stumpf's influence on his Gestaltist students was two-fold. On the one hand he gave them a rigorous training, especially in the foundations of psychology²² – echoing in this respect the work of his own teacher Brentano. And on the other hand he conveyed to them an understanding of and a respect for philosophy as a scientific enterprise in its own right – as a science of the most general properties (both material and psychological) of what is real. Philosophy, in Stumpf's eyes, stands to the physical and psychological sciences in much the same relation as, say, logic to the sciences of language.

21. On Kafka and Brentano see Smith 1981.

22. See Ash 1982, pp. 30–62 for an extensive treatment of the political machinations in favour of the new 'scientific philosophy' which led to Stumpf's appointment in Berlin.

A clear illustration of the links between scientific philosophy in Berlin and Vienna is provided by the case of the Austrian novelist Robert Musil. Musil studied under Stumpf in Berlin from 1903 to 1908, writing his doctorate on the philosophy of Mach.²³ He enjoyed friendly contacts in this period with Gestalt psychologists such as Köhler and von Allesch, and Gestaltist ideas make themselves felt at a number of places in Musil's novel *The Man Without Qualities*. Musil was in fact tempted, on completing his studies in Berlin, to accept an invitation from Meinong to serve as his assistant in Graz, and he enjoyed contacts with the positivists also, and in particular with Richard von Mises, in whose home in Berlin he was a regular guest.²⁴

Neurath, too, studied in Berlin in the early years of the century, and so also, from 1906 to 1908, did Ludwig Wittgenstein. For our purposes here, however, it is the manifold links between the Berlin Gestalt theorists and a later generation of scientific philosophers in Berlin that will be of importance. Thus we know that Kurt Lewin was involved with Carnap and Reichenbach in the earliest efforts to cultivate a tradition of scientific philosophy in Germany, and both he and Köhler actively participated in the discussions of the Reichenbach group in Berlin.²⁵ Lewin's paper on the transition from Aristotelian to Galilean modes of thought in biology and psychology was published in the first volume of *Erkenntnis*, and a paper by Köhler on Boltzmann appeared in volume 2 of the same journal. Köhler's book on *Physical Gestalten at Rest and in the Stationary State: An Investigation in Natural Philosophy* (1920), an attempt to show that the Gestalt structures given in experience and in the world of organic matter are present also in the purely physical realm, was greeted by many of the neopositivists as a substantive contribution to just that 'unity of science' which they themselves were advocating in their philosophical writings.²⁶

Positivist philosophy had until this time – largely as a result of the efforts of Mach and his British empiricist predecessors – been associated with the view that reality is at bottom composed of meaningless and intrinsically unrelated 'atoms of experience'. Thus Koffka could write at the close of his *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*:

If there is any polemical spirit in this book, it is directed not against persons but against a strong cultural force in our present civilization for which I have chosen the name positivism.

23. See Musil 1908; the work is critical of Mach in particular and of positivist philosophy of science in general; see Mulligan and Smith 1988.

24. On Musil and Husserl see Cellbrot 1988 and Mulligan 1990.

25. Carnap 1963, pp. 14, 30.

26. The work exerted an influence also on the thinking of Popper: see Popper and Eccles 1985, p. 24.

If positivism can be regarded as an integrative philosophy, its integration rests on the dogma that all events are equally unintelligible, irrational, meaningless, purely factual. Such an integration is, however, to my way of thinking, identical with a complete disintegration. (Koffka 1935, pp. 684f.)

Carnap responded to this Gestaltist challenge in his *Logische Aufbau der Welt*, which provides a general theory of how empirical knowledge is built up from a basis of sensory elements via ‘logical constructions’. In part under the influence of Wertheimer and Köhler, Carnap saw that there were reasons to reject the view that the elements of this system should be atoms or absolute simples. Rather he took as basis what he called ‘total experiences’, complex but analyzable instantaneous cross-sections of the content of an individual mind at a given time.²⁷ Ayer, too, is responding to the Gestaltist challenge for example when he remarks that the empiricism of *Language, Truth and Logic* ‘is not logically dependent on an atomistic psychology, such as Hume and Mach adopted, but is compatible with any theory whatsoever concerning the actual characteristics of our sensory fields.’ (1935, p. 122)²⁸

A special role in the attempts by the Austro-German logical positivists to come to terms with this challenge was played by a series of papers by Kurt Grelling and Paul Oppenheim, the first of which, on “The Concept of Gestalt in the Light of Modern Logic” was published in volume 7 of *Erkenntnis* in 1938.²⁹ The paper was designed to defend the Gestaltist position against (not entirely unjustified) charges that much of the then current talk of psychological and other sorts of ‘wholes not reducible to the sums of their parts’ was either meaningless or inherently confused. The aim of the paper was therefore ‘to suggest definitions which accomplish the following: when the concepts thus determined are appropriately inserted into sentences which appear characteristic of the Gestalt theorists, these sentences turn out neither trivial nor empty of sense.’ (Grelling and Oppenheim 1938, p. 211)

27. See Carnap 1963, p. 16, and compare his 1928, pp. 109, 122 of the translation. The Gestaltists could still, however, object that even this concession ignores the fact that our experiences are organized structurally not only within each instant but also across time.

28. A similar thesis as to the compatibility of positivism and Gestalt theory as a research programme in empirical psychology was defended also by Schlick (1925, ch. 34) and by Richard von Mises (1939, ch. 22). The Gestalt problem played an important role in the thinking of Gustav Bergmann, as also in the work of Eino Kaila (see his 1979), a Finnish thinker who is one of the four foreign philosophers (neither Austrian nor German) mentioned in the Appendix to the *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung* as ‘sympathetic to the Vienna circle’ or to the ‘scientific world-conception’.

29. The remaining two papers: “Logical Analysis of ‘Gestalt’ as ‘Functional Whole’” and “A Logical Theory of Dependence”, were scheduled to appear in volume 9 of *Erkenntnis* in 1939, an issue not distributed due to war conditions. These two papers, together with an English translation of the earlier work and a commentary by P. M. Simons, have been published in Smith (ed.) 1988.

Oppenheim was an example of that rare breed, a philosophically-minded banker, rich enough to pay philosophers to serve as his co-authors in a series of works in the philosophy of science published in the period from 1938 to 1978. One of the first such ventures was his paper with Grelling on Gestalt. Oppenheim collaborated also, *inter alia*, with Hempel, their collaboration leading not only to the classical Hempel-Oppenheim schema of deductive-nomological explanation, but also to a peculiar volume entitled *The Concept of Type in the Light of Modern Logic* (Hempel and Oppenheim 1936), an analysis of the work on human typology of psychologists such as Lewin, Kretschmer, and Jaensch. Oppenheim collaborated also with Nicholas Rescher (again in a paper on the “Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts”), as well as writing a series of books and papers of his own on the demarcation and ‘natural order’ of scientific disciplines and on the ‘static and dynamic laws of the formation of scientific concepts’.

Husserl (1859–1938), whose unequalled influence on the philosophy of continental Europe in the twentieth century needs no commentary, was responsible for transforming Brentano’s ‘descriptive psychology’ into his own somewhat more ambitious-sounding enterprise of ‘phenomenology’. Like so many others, Husserl was won for philosophy by the power of Brentano’s thinking and teaching, to which he was introduced by T. G. Masaryk already in 1877.³⁰ As Husserl himself put it in 1932: ‘Without Brentano I should have written not a single word of philosophy.’

The superficial view of the relations between phenomenology and the logical positivists has long centred around Carnap’s attack in the second volume of *Erkenntnis* on the ‘metaphysical nonsense’ of Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit*. Thus it has been readily assumed that phenomenology as a whole appeared to Carnap and his associates as just another example of the bad old metaphysics which the Vienna positivist movement was aiming to destroy.³¹ The two camps were, certainly, at odds with each other in central points of doctrine. Thus it was the phenomenologist Roman Ingarden who presented one of the first formulations of the since much-contested criticism of the Vienna circle verifiability criterion of meaning – that the criterion is itself meaningless by its own lights – at the Prague World Congress of Philosophy in 1934. When one looks more closely, however, one sees that there are a number of respects in which members of the Schlick circle were influenced by Husserl’s phenomenology, even if only in the sense that, as in the case of the Gestaltist movement, phenomenology provided

30. Cf. Schuhmann 1988.

31. This point of view is belied, at least to some extent, by the fact that Carnap, having earlier studied under Frege in Jena, participated for a term in Husserl’s seminar in Freiburg before going on to Vienna in 1925 at the suggestion of Schlick. Carnap was later invited by Frank to come to Prague, where he held a chair in ‘natural philosophy’ for four years from 1931.

a substantive and influential group of problems which the positivists felt called upon to solve (or at least do away with, by whatever means).³²

As has been often noted, the very project of phenomenology – the project of providing a painstakingly adequate description of what is given in experience precisely as it is given – can be regarded simply as a more comprehensive and more radical version of phenomenalism in the traditional sense, so that Hermann Lübbe, for example, finds no difficulty in asserting that ‘Ernst Mach and other critical empiricists, regardless of their “positivism”, belong in the tradition of phenomenology.’ (1960, p. 91 of translation) The two strands of Austrian positive philosophy were at one stage so closely intertwined that Husserl could be considered as a potential successor to Mach in the chair in Vienna.³³ Guido Küng has defended the view that there are quite specific parallels between Husserlian phenomenology and the project of ‘explication’ that is defended by Carnap in his *Aufbau*.³⁴ A view of this sort was advanced already in 1932 by Ernst Polak, a student of Schlick and man about town in Vienna – Polak was *inter alia* the husband of Kafka’s Milena – in a clearly Wittgenstein-inspired dissertation entitled *Critique of Phenomenology by Means of Logic*. The sense of phenomenology, according to Polak, ‘is logic (grammar in the most general sense), clarification of what we mean when we speak; its results are tautologies; its findings not statements, but explications’ (1932, p. 157).

As is seen from Wittgenstein’s own repeated employment of the terminology of ‘phenomenology’, particularly around 1929, it is primarily in regard to the problem of the synthetic *a priori*, of an ‘intermediary between logic and physics’, that Husserl’s thinking is crucial to the development of Austrian positivism. Husserl’s account of the synthetic *a priori* is indeed no less important to the Vienna circle than that of Kant,³⁵ for where Kant – in conformity with his special reading of what it is to be ‘synthetic’ – sees the realm of the synthetic *a priori* as residing in the relatively restricted and cognitively inaccessible sphere of transcendental consciousness, Husserl claims that there is a directly accessible *a priori* dimension across the entire range of experience – so that vastly more propositions turn out to be synthetic and *a priori* on Husserl’s view than on that of Kant – including such homely examples as ‘nothing can be both red and green all over’ to which Wittgenstein and the

32. Cf. Waismann 1979, e.g. pp. 67, 78f.

33. Sommer 1985, p. 13.

34. See Küng 1975.

35. On Wittgenstein and phenomenology in general, see Spiegelberg 1968. On positivism, Husserl and the *a priori*, see Delius 1963, ch. 1, and also Visser 1979.

Vienna positivists devoted a great deal of their attention.³⁶ From the standpoint of the positivists, synthetic *a priori* propositions do not and cannot exist: all true propositions are either tautologies of logic or contingent truths relating to empirical matters of fact. For Husserl, in contrast, there are entire disciplines of synthetic *a priori* truths, including the discipline of phenomenology, and it is fascinating to observe the extent to which the positivists are driven to unsupported claims as to the ‘logical’ character of Husserl’s theses (or to *ad hoc* adjustments of the sense of ‘logical’) in the face of the quite evidently extralogical or ‘material’ character of many of his examples.

5. Brentano’s *Philosophy: A Preliminary Outline*

Our thesis, then, which is to be conceived as a strengthening of the Neurath-Haller thesis presented above, is that the Central-European traditions of logical positivism in particular and of scientific philosophy in general can be understood as a part of the exact or analytic philosophical legacy of Brentano. More specifically, they are a reflection of the interplay of the intellectual and institutional influence of Brentano and his school with developments in logic and in the philosophy of physics and mathematics inspired by Russell and Wittgenstein in Cambridge, by Mach and his successors in Vienna and Prague, and to a lesser extent also by Poincaré, Duhem, Einstein, and others elsewhere. Certainly there is a whole range of doctrines peculiar to the Vienna circle – verificationism, physicalism, behaviourism, emotivism in ethics – which were embraced neither by Brentano and his school nor by Mach or Russell or Wittgenstein. Thus one should take care, in making claims of the given sort, to keep in mind the originality of the members of the circle themselves. Further, there is a range of doctrines or issues – relating for example to intentionality and to axiology or general value theory – which pervade Brentano’s writings and are absent from the official canons of the Vienna positivists. Yet these differences do not affect the main thesis: that it was the influence of Brentano and of his followers in Vienna, Prague, Lemberg and Berlin which provided the crucial presupposition for the rise of scientific philosophy in Central Europe in the early decades of the present century.

As far as Brentano’s own philosophy is concerned, two stages can be distinguished: an early psychologically-oriented stage, when Brentano was concerned with the foundations of psychology as an exact science; and a later, ontologically-oriented phase, when Brentano adopted a doctrine of ‘reism’,

36. Such examples were drawn, too, from the domain of economics (for example the thesis that time preference is always positive), as is shown above all by the writings on economic methodology of Felix Kaufmann (for example his 1937). Kaufmann, initially a devotee of Husserl, published not only on the foundations of economics and on the philosophy of law and mathematics, but also on the foundations of science in general. See Zilian 1990.

according to which only things are properly to be accepted as existing. This reistic doctrine, as also the ‘doctrine of intentionality’ with which Brentano’s name is most commonly associated, will be dealt with at length in later chapters. Neither can be properly understood, however, without some grounding in Brentano’s early philosophy, a synthesis of Aristotelian, Cartesian and empiricist elements in which a new sort of discipline, called ‘descriptive psychology’, plays a central role. This descriptive psychology is in fact seen by Brentano as a Cartesian science providing an epistemologically sure foundation for the entire discipline of philosophy, as also for scientific knowledge of other sorts. At the same time, however, Brentano conceives descriptive psychology as a new sort of empirical science, with its own empirical technique, a technique resting on our capacity to *notice* psychological distinctions between the different sorts of simple and complex mental acts, between the intuitive and non-intuitive components in psychic phenomena, between the various different sorts of phenomenally given qualities, boundaries and continua, and so on, and then also on our capacity to grasp certain necessary and intelligible relations between the elements thus distinguished.³⁷

The training in the discipline of descriptive psychology which Brentano’s students received can be seen to have instilled in them further an attitude of what we might call taxonomical (or ‘Aristotelian’) realism, a way of doing philosophy which will manifest itself repeatedly in the pages that follow. This involves, roughly speaking, the acceptance of five principles:

- (i) that description is prior to explanation, in the sense that an explanation of given phenomena is of value only to the extent that we ‘know what we are talking about’, that we ‘understand ourselves’ when we refer to the phenomena in question; descriptive psychology is therefore prior also to that sort of experimental (or ‘genetic’) psychology which seeks to establish the laws governing the order of mental events as unfolding in time;
- (ii) that the tasks of the philosopher and of the empirical scientist cannot and should not be pursued in separation; philosophy is to be pursued not in abstraction from other disciplines, but as part and parcel of our attempt to come to grips scientifically with the world and thus as forming a continuum with science;
- (iii) that the general traits of reality exist only in whatever are the relevant instances and that it is the existence of *immanent universals* in the things which makes science possible;
- (iv) that given segments of reality can be described by appropriate ‘empirical’ methods in a way that is – at some level of generality – adequate to the matters

37. On Brentano’s method see Baumgartner 1989 and Marek 1989. On Brentano, Aristotle and Descartes see Volpi 1989.

in hand; description proceeds not by the building of abstract models of the phenomena, but by concerning itself directly with the things themselves;

(v) that the appropriate form of description involves the construction of a taxonomy of the different kinds of basic constituent in whatever is the relevant domain and of the different forms of relation between them; hence the ontological theories of relations and of part and whole come to enjoy a uniquely privileged status within the edifice of science.³⁸

Brentano thus embraced a scientific realism in the spirit of Aristotle. This, however, was allied in his work with a Cartesian conception of scientific knowledge as *episteme*, and in consequence Brentano regarded the existence of an external world as at most probable. Like Hume, he denied outright the existence of a world similar to the world of common-sense experience.³⁹ It is, rather, in relation to the structures of our mental acts that Brentano's fundamental realism makes itself felt,⁴⁰ to the extent that his entire philosophy is centred around the *ontology of mind*.

Already in 1866 Brentano had set forth the fundamental elements of his scientific mode of philosophizing in the twenty-five theses which he defended in Würzburg on the occasion of his habilitation. The most influential of these theses, which was chosen by Richard von Mises as a motto for his textbook on positivism, reads as follows:

Vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia nisi scientiae naturalis est. (The true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences.)⁴¹

Brentano held that the method of the natural sciences is common to all the sciences, so that he is, in this respect an advocate of the unity of science and a critic of Dilthey's view according to which the so-called '*Geisteswissenschaften*' or human or moral sciences would somehow call for a special method of understanding or '*Verstehen*', as opposed to the 'explanation' of the natural sciences.

The first of Brentano's theses is a repudiation of (German) metaphysics as a whole:

Philosophia neget oportet, scientias in speculativas et exactas dividi posse; quod si non recte negaretur, esse eam ipsam jus non esset (Philosophy must deny that the sciences can be

38. See Brentano 1982, Pt. I, ch. II, Pt. II, chs. I and II; Stumpf 1873, ch. V; Husserl's 3rd Logical Investigation, and the further developments described in Smith and Mulligan 1982.

39. See his 1982, e.g. p. 14.

40. See, above all, the *Deskriptive Psychologie* of 1982 and the summary by Mulligan and Smith 1985.

41. This is thesis IV. See Brentano 1929, pp. 137ff.

divided into the speculative and the exact; because if this is not correctly denied, then philosophy itself would have no right to exist),

a view which sits neatly – and bravely – alongside the second thesis:

Philosophia et eos, qui eam principia sua a Theologia sumere volunt, et eos rejicere debet, qui, nisi sit supernaturalis revelatio, eam omnem operam perdere contendunt. (Philosophy must protest against the presumption of taking its principles from theology and against the assertion that it is only through the existence of a supernatural revelation that a fruitful philosophy becomes possible.)

Brentano in fact went so far as to protest against the view that universities should contain faculties of theology, precisely because theology cannot live up to the standards of science proper.

The thirteenth of his theses reads:

Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu, nisi intellectus ipse. (Nothing is in the intellect which was not previously in the senses, except the intellect itself.)

It is in the sense of the Aristotelian empiricism that is here expressed that we are to understand the title of Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* of 1874. Brentano took empiricism to be consistent with the view that we can grasp necessary relations (immanent universals) in what is given in experience. He therefore differed from the positivists in his belief that truly scientific knowledge, which means in his eyes an evident knowledge of *general laws*, is possible on the basis of experience.

Scientific induction is understood by Brentano as the process of establishing general laws starting from the observation of particular facts, as opposed to the more familiar kind of induction which attempts to use given particular facts as a starting point for predicting other particular facts. Further, Brentanian induction is not, as it was for Hume and Mach, a matter of habit or of 'thought economy': the intuition of lines and points, and of ourselves as intuiters of lines and points, gives us knowledge through abstraction of the concepts of geometry. The combination of such intuition and abstraction with processes of deductive reasoning then leads to evident, insightful knowledge of the laws holding in the geometrical sphere. The same combination can be employed to yield the basic concepts and associated evident laws also in other spheres of investigation, not least in philosophy, where for example the intuition of ourselves as judges leads to evident knowledge pertaining to concepts such as truth and existence.

Brentano's talk of 'intuition', 'evidence' or 'insightfulness' is alien to the spirit of Viennese positivism. Many of the positivists' critical writings are indeed devoted to the attempted refutation of claims made on behalf of intuition as a means of gaining knowledge, in favour of (public, scientific, repeatable) 'observation'. Schlick, too, in chapter 2 of his *General Theory of Knowledge*, criticizes what he takes to be Brentano's (and Stumpf's, and Husserl's) views concerning intuition and evidence. If, however, one looks more closely at

Schlick's own theory of 'observation statements', one discovers that he has himself presupposed precisely the views that he had earlier criticized.

For Schlick, in contrast to a relativist such as Neurath, believes that there are foundations for knowledge, that there are statements which are self-evident, i.e. not such as to derive their evidence from some other sphere. The process of understanding such statements is therefore 'at the same time the process of verifying them; I grasp their meaning at the same time as I grasp their truth.' (1934, trans. p. 385) Such observation statements are like simple tautologies in that our knowledge of their truth is immediate, so that there is no room for our being deceived. But they differ from tautologies in that they supply us with 'genuine knowledge of reality'.

Schlick's own preferred example of an observation statement is '[There is] yellow here now'. And as Chisholm has pointed out, if this statement is to be immune to deception then it can involve no reference to any external yellow sensum, but must involve reference only to our own present way of experiencing, so that it might best be rendered: 'I am-appeared-to-yellowly'.⁴² But now, as Chisholm also shows, this is to imply that Schlick's observation statements belong to the class of statements expressing experiences which are immediately evident in precisely the Brentanian (Cartesian) sense.

The Brentanian method of intuition and deduction is, be it noted, prior to scientific experimentation. Brentano held that, while experimentation may occasionally lead to new or more adequate intuitions, it must nonetheless be the case that a properly experimental science can arise only when the relevant basic concepts and laws have been established by intuition and deduction in the way suggested. For the experimental scientist who has not first established the nature of the entities with which he deals is in a certain sense experimenting in the dark. Measurement for measurement's sake (which Brentano saw in much of the work of Wundt and his successors) and the blind formulation of purely functional correlations may, by accident, lead to predictions of future particular facts. But it cannot lead to the kind of evidence or luminosity which, as Brentano insisted, is the hallmark of a scientific law in the fullest sense.

There is much in the above account of Brentano's position that is in need of further clarification. What has been said so far, however, should suffice to establish one central feature of Brentano's thinking, namely his high estimation of the importance and of the powers of science – to the extent that he saw science as embracing philosophy itself as a proper part.

42. See Chisholm 1982a.

Chapter Two

Franz Brentano I

On Mind and Its Objects

1. *Intentionality*

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomena includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. (Brentano 1924, p. 124, Eng. p. 88)

Much has been written about this so-called ‘intentionality passage’ from Brentano’s *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. The thesis here formulated has proved to be one of the most influential in all of contemporary philosophy. It gave rise, first of all, to Husserlian phenomenology, but it also lies at the root of much of the thinking of analytic philosophers on meaning and reference and on the relations of language and mind. In addition, the notion of intentionality, and Brentano’s use of this notion as a criterion for the demarcation of the psychological realm, pervades much contemporary philosophizing within the realm of cognitive science. Yet as becomes clear when we take into account the wider corpus of Brentano’s writings from the period leading up to the first edition of the *Psychology* (published in 1874), where the intentionality-passage was first formulated, Brentano’s own original thesis of intentionality has been repeatedly misunderstood.

2. *The Psychology of Aristotle*

Brentano, as we have seen, developed a view of science and knowledge which incorporates aspects of both Cartesianism and British empiricist philosophizing. The overarching context of all Brentano’s writings is, however, the psychology of Aristotle, together with the ontology of material and immaterial substance that goes together therewith. My present remarks will accordingly consist in an account of Aristotle, and more specifically of Aristotle’s conception of the soul, as seen through Brentano’s eyes. I shall be concerned only with the question as to how Aristotle was understood by Brentano; thus I shall not be concerned with the correctness of Brentano’s interpretation or with the coherence of the underlying ideas.

We are to imagine two realms, of soul or mind, and of matter, the two related by what we shall come to call ‘intentionality’. On both sides we are to distinguish further what we might call *raw* and *developed* forms of the entities populating the realms in question. The raw form of matter is called *materia prima*. This can become everything corporeal, and indeed it does not exist

except as something corporeal. In an analogous way, the soul can become everything sensible and intelligible, and does not exist except insofar as it receives the form of something sensible and intelligible. In each case what gets added is of a formal nature, and it is the fixed stock of forms or species which informs both the realm of thinking and that of extended (material, corporeal) substance: these two realms are, as it were, attuned to each other, and it is forms which mediate between them.

Forms or universals exist, accordingly, in two different ways: within the soul, and within corporeal substance.¹ Aristotle, one could say, conceived the link between mind and corporeal substance as a sort of spiritual nourishment. The sensory and intelligible parts of the soul *take in* sensory and intelligible forms, in something like the way in which the body, through the agency of the vegetative soul, takes in matter in the form of food. The basic psychic processes within, whether sensory or intellectual, result in an *extraction or abstraction of forms* from the substances without. ‘By a “sense”’, Aristotle writes, ‘is meant what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter.’² In accordance with Aristotle’s general theory of change as transfer of form, when the soul is affected by what is corporeal, then form is transferred from one to the other, so that agent and patient become to this extent alike. Two senses of affecting must however be distinguished. On the one hand there is affecting in the strict or proper sense, which involves a real alteration of the affected thing, as when a piece of wax takes on the impress of a seal. On the other hand there is affecting in an extended or improper sense, which involves no real action on the side of the agent and no real alteration on the side of the patient, but merely an actualization in the latter of something that is present there already in potency. Sensing and thinking are cases of affecting in this second, improper sense.

When the piece of wax takes on the form of the seal, it acquires a form that is merely *like* the form of the seal. The sense, in contrast, takes in the very same form as is present in the object sensed. Yet sensing red is different from being red, just as feeling warmth is different from having warmth in oneself ‘materially’ or ‘physically’. When I *am* warm, then I am changed, affected in the proper sense, by the thing that warms me. When I *feel* warmth, however – when, in the scholastic terminology, I have warmth in myself not materially but *objectively* or *as an object* – then I am affected only in an extended or ‘modified’ sense. As Brentano himself puts it:

It is not insofar as we become cold that we sense what is cold; otherwise plants and inorganic bodies would sense; rather it is only insofar as what is cold exists within us objectively, i.e. as known, that it is sensed, that is, insofar as we take coldness in, without ourselves being its physical subject. (1867, p. 80, Eng. pp. 54f.; cf. 425^b20)

This affecting in the improper sense involves a mere actualization of what is already present in potency. The reference to ‘potency’, here, reflects an attempt on Aristotle’s part to distance himself from Plato’s view that the soul

1. Soul (potential) plus forms (actual) yield the microcosm; matter (potential) plus forms (actual) yield the macrocosm. Cf. George 1978, p. 254. Brentano was to the end of his life impressed by Aristotle’s doctrine here. (See e.g. 1933, p. 158, Eng. p. 119f.; 1976, Part Two, V.)

2. See *De Anima*, 424^a18. All references to Aristotle in this chapter are to this work, unless otherwise specified.

has within itself the ideas themselves already at birth. For Aristotle, in contrast, the soul has (or is) merely the power (faculty, *Vermögen*) of sensing and thinking. It is, so to speak, only the *possibility* of the ideas. The intellectual soul is in a sense potentially whatever is thinkable. When it is not thinking, it is at best merely the *power* or *capacity* to take on certain forms.³

Everything in external reality, as Aristotle conceives it, both form and matter, both what is sensible (sensible forms) and what is thinkable (intelligible forms), belongs to ‘sensible spatial magnitudes’: ‘the objects of thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects and all the states and affections of sensible things.’ (432^a4) The intelligible forms, insofar as they exist outside the soul, are, that is to say, locked away inside sensible matter. This implies, for Aristotle, that nothing can be thought or learned (no form can be actualized within the soul) except through the assistance of sense. This works, however, through the medium of imagination: thinking goes to work not on sensation directly but on ‘images’ or ‘phantasms’. Our sense experience leaves enduring traces in the sense organs, traces which constitute a new sort of power or disposition: they are able to become re-actualized when once they have been laid down. They can be stimulated through other sensory presentations in such a way that an earlier sensible form returns to sense as image.

Thinking, now, relates to such images or phantasms as sensing relates to the external sensible things:

Sense receives its images, in that it turns to the external objects; the intellect receives its ideas by gazing, as it were, upon images; and just as seeing and hearing are no longer possible when the seen or heard object disappears ..., so thinking is no longer possible when the appropriate images are no longer present in the senses. (Brentano 1867, p. 146, Eng. p. 96)

We acquire knowledge by extracting forms from images, and such knowledge can in turn be understood as a lasting endowment of the soul. Just as actual sensing leaves traces which make possible the actual having of images, so actual thinking leaves traces (what we call ‘learning’), which become actualized in subsequent active thinking.

The thesis that everything in external reality belongs to sensible spatial magnitudes has far-reaching consequences. The world, we might say, is made up of realia (things) and non-realialia (forms): the proper objects of sensing and thinking, respectively. These do not, however, as on Plato’s view, constitute two distinct realms of objects. Non-realialia exist only as immanent to realia: they exist only *in* something else, either in what is mental or in what is material. Normally, as we have seen, non-realialia exist only as bound up with matter and their existence *as* non-realialia is then potential only. Sometimes however non-realialia exist *as* non-realialia actually, namely in the mind. For thinking *is* the actualization of forms as such. And when the mind is actively thinking, then it *is* the universals which it thinks.

This mental actualization is in a certain sense a separation of the forms from the things without. Again, however, it is not a real separation, but a separation in an improper or extended sense: thus for example ‘when thinking

3. Otherwise, Aristotle says, it has no nature of its own: ‘that in the soul which is called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing.’ (429^b22)

the objects of mathematics, the mind thinks as separate elements which do not in fact exist in separation.’ (431^b17) As existing in the thing, forms or universals are tied to matter in what we might conceive as a sort of mutual pervasion. They may, however, exist also as freed or separated, and this either in a proper or in a modified sense. As actualized in sensation, they are separated only in an improper sense from their material complements and thus are still individuated thereby. The resultant actualized universals (the warmth of this fire, the redness of that rose) are still founded on their respective matters, and they are still experienced as *in* the respective things. As actualized in thought, on the other hand, universals are freed from their material complements in a double sense: they are separated *and* independent. Where sensation apprehends what is external and individual, knowledge apprehends free universals, and the latter exist entirely within the orbit of the soul. ‘That is why a man can exercise his knowledge when he wishes, but his sensation does not depend upon himself – a sensible object must be there.’ (417^b24)

But how, more precisely, are we to understand this talk of ‘free’ and ‘bound’ universals? When I see a red object, then I see something that is composed of matter and form. What I take in is the form alone, but it is in fact still connected to (and thus individuated by) its matter. What I know intellectually, on the other hand, is not the object, nor what is individuated by the object, but the form itself, for example the redness.

One must not, however, conclude that what is taken in by sense, and what is taken in by the intellect, relate to each other as numerically different objects. The view of Aristotle and Brentano is that they differ not as one thing from another thing, but as one thing from itself when it stands or behaves or is connected or situated differently (for example when a stick is pulled straight after having been bent).

Plato held that we know flesh and the being of flesh in that we take into ourselves two different things, indeed two things which are separated from each other in their substances, for the idea is for him a thing for itself and subsists in separation from what is material. (Brentano 1867, p. 133, Eng. p. 86)

For Aristotle, in contrast, the flesh which is grasped by the senses, and the being of this flesh, which is grasped by the intellect, are the same thing: merely, in the one case it is still tied to its matter; in the other case it is abstract, a free universal. But the universal that is here free is still the same universal as is there bound. When the universal *flesh* is taken up into the intellect, it is ‘the same sensory-corporeal flesh which is in the senses, but the condition is different in which it is in the one or in the other faculty.’ (Brentano 1867, p. 134, Eng. p. 87)

The job of the scientist is, after all, as Brentano insists, to get to know the crystals and plants and other bodies which he finds here on Earth. Thus, ‘if the intellect knows the being of flesh, then it is not something other and immaterial that is taken into him, but the very same object that is in the senses; only, in the intellect it is abstract, in sense concrete with individual matter.’ (1867, p. 135, Eng. p. 88) A line which was bent is, after having been made straight,

still the line which it was, only it is other, it has become simpler; and so the corporeal object that was in the senses is also in the intellect still one and the same, only its

condition is different. Like the line, it has become simpler, its individual differences have been evened out. (1867, p. 135, Eng. p. 88)

Even in the case of mathematical concepts, then, the intellect does not grasp something more immaterial than what is grasped by sense: it does not take into itself something incorporeal or non-sensory. For the very same thing that is in the intellect is also in the senses, merely, as Brentano puts it, standing now in this and now in that relation (*in anderer und anderer Weise sich verhaltend*).

The forms, then, exist originally as parts (in a modified sense) of of sensible spatial magnitudes. The mathematical concept of a curve is already in my sensory presentation of a snub-nosed thing and thus it is already in the snub-nosed thing itself. Mathematical concepts do not exist outside the mind in separation from sensory bodies. They are *in them*, as also are the physical concepts. The intellect, therefore, when it grasps mathematical concepts, does not know something that is separate from sensible matter: ‘it only knows *in a separated way* something not separated therefrom.’ (Brentano 1867, p. 150, Eng. p. 98) The corporeal thing itself remains something material when it is taken up into the intellect; but it is in the intellect in an immaterial way. Outside the intellect a thing is individually determined; for after all something general without its individual difference cannot exist.⁴ But in the intellect it has lost its individual determinateness. The broken line has been pulled straight, ‘and in this state, alien to its original state, what is bodily can now also be in the intellect.’ (1867, p. 138, Eng. p. 90)

Yet even in the intellect what is bodily retains forms pertaining to what is material; only such things as are free of matter in and of themselves could be free of materiality in the intellect. Only one sort of essence is, as far as Aristotle is concerned, of itself free of materiality in this sense and therefore also supersensory: the essence *mind* or *intellect*. Of this essence, and of the concepts abstracted therefrom, we can have knowledge other than via sensory images.⁵ The intellect is graspable just as it is. The general concept we have of our mind or intellect is also an individual consciousness of self. The essence *mind* or *intellect*, then, is a *haecceitas*, a form that is both intelligible and individuating. And something similar presumably holds of the essence *God*. Mind or intellect is, as Brentano puts it, ‘completely and with the highest intelligibility completely intelligible’. (1867, p. 136, Eng. p. 90) Psychology, accordingly (and in Cartesian vein), enjoys a peculiarly noble status within the system of the sciences.⁶

4. This idea was to remain with Brentano throughout his career. For Brentano’s ontology is from beginning to end an ontology of individuals only; everything that exists is completely determinate, down to lowest differences. Forms or universals exist only as immanent to what is in every case individual through and through.

5. Brentano initially goes along with Aristotle here, and in his later works he even generalizes Aristotle’s view, for example by admitting as non-sensible substances also topoids of four and more dimensions. (See Brentano 1976, where the view is also defended that the soul is a substance of zero dimension.) However he insists at the same time that we can have no positive knowledge of such topoids (just as, for the later Brentano, we can have no positive knowledge of the soul).

6. Corporeal things, in contrast, ‘allow only an indefinite general knowledge and are not knowable equally in all their determinations. We know them the more certainly and the more clearly and thus have them in us the more intelligibly, the more they have become alienated through abstraction from their natural mode of existence. This is why mathematics is more intelligible than physics, and why metaphysics is more intelligible than mathematics; also the more general physical

3. *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*

Sensing and thinking, for a (Brentanian sort of) Aristotelian, is to repeat, a form of taking in. We have reached the point where we are able properly to interpret Brentano's thesis in the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* to the effect that every mental phenomenon is characterized by the 'intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object'. As Brentano himself puts it in the very next sentence: 'Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself'. This thesis is, I insist, to be taken literally – against the grain of a seemingly unshakeable tendency to twist Brentano's words at this point, a tendency manifested for example in the original version of Michael Dummett's book on the *Origins of Analytic Philosophy*. Brentano's 'most familiar positive thesis', Dummett tells us – the thesis that acts of consciousness are characterized by their intentionality – consists in the claim that all such acts are 'directed towards external objects'. Indeed, as Dummett initially reads Brentano, the object of a mental act is on the Brentanian account 'external in the full sense of being part of the objective world independent of the subject, rather than a constituent of his consciousness.' (Dummett 1988, p. 39) This interpretation is quite simply incompatible with Brentano's text (and it is no longer present in the revised English edition of Dummett's work). For one will find no coherent interpretation of Brentano's principle of intentionality so long as one remains within the framework of our usual, commonsensical notions of both the mind and its objects. This is not only because Brentano's principle operates with quite special, Aristotelian ideas. It is also because Brentano's very formulation of the principle was a response to what he saw as a hidden incoherence in these commonsensical notions themselves.

Brentano in fact appends a footnote to the intentionality passage in the *Psychology* to the effect that

Aristotle himself spoke of this mental in-existence. In his books on the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is thought is in the thinking intellect. (1924, p. 124n, Eng. p. 88n.)⁷

It is not only classical sources which spark Brentano's immanentistic views however. Descartes also played a crucial role. But Brentano had been impressed also by Comte's critique of the metaphysics of transcendent substance and had sought, like Comte, a science of the 'phenomena' or

concept is more intelligible than the more special, the genus more than the species, and the higher genus more than the lower.' (1867, p. 136, Eng. p. 90)

7. As if this were not enough, Brentano goes on to remark that 'St. Augustine in his doctrine of the *Verbum mentis* and of its inner origin touches upon the same fact.' On the classical sources of Brentano's terminology and thinking here, see Marras 1976, Hedwig 1978 and 1990/91 and Sorabji 1991.

In the light of what is said in the text it is clear also that Rolf George, the translator of Brentano's *Psychologie des Aristoteles*, has hit the nail on the head when he points out that it is in the context of the discussion of two ways of *taking in* (corresponding to the two senses of 'being affected') in this early work that the notion of intentional inexistence occurs for the first time in Brentano's writing. It is not yet used as a criterion for psychical phenomena, nor does he emphasize or perhaps even notice that one can here speak of an intentional *relation*. He prefers to follow Aristotle's terminology, saying that the intellect (or the organ of sense) *is* what it thinks (or senses). The relational mode of expression is eschewed in favour of qualified predication: 'is-physically', 'is-objectively'. (George 1978, pp. 252f.)

‘*Erscheinungen*’.⁸ He had been impressed also by corpuscular theories of the physical world and of sensation, theories which imply that what is in the act of sensation as object bears no similarity to the putative outer world by which, as we commonsensically suppose, sensation is caused. Brentano wanted to give a *true* description of what is involved in mental directedness, not a merely commonsensical one (which for him would be simply one that is based on prejudice). Colours and so on do not exist in the way we commonsensically suppose. They are more properly to be regarded after the fashion of Lockean secondary qualities: they are contributed by the mind and are such that their being is exhausted by their being in the mind. From this it follows that we can have no presentation of the world as it really is in the sense of a world transcendent to the mind. Certainly we may assume that there are physical objects which cause our sensations. But the thesis that there are such objects can never be a matter of evident knowledge, and such objects could never hope to serve as direct targets of our normal perceptual experiences.⁹ From this it follows, too, that the judgments involved in outer perception are always false. Only inner perception is a *Wahrnehmung*.

It would equally be going too far, however, to assume that the being of immanent objects of ‘outer sense’ is no sort of being at all, that Brentano is simply employing a certain *façon de parler* in his talk of ‘immanent existence’. For at the time of the first edition of the *Psychology* Brentano conceives physical phenomena like experienced colours and sounds as existing in the mind as parts of consciousness, so that the intentionality of outer perception is in fact a relation between two mental entities, the (real) act of sensation and the (non-real, non-causally efficacious, abstract) quality sensed. The latter, for example experienced sounds and colours, have a diminished sort of existence, an existence ‘in the mind’. Certainly they are not *real*, but this does not mean that they are merely nothing. Rather, they are *entia rationis*, non-real parts of a real, mental substance.

Brentano’s intentionality thesis at the time of the *Psychology* may now more properly be interpreted as follows: the mind or soul is windowless; our acts of thought and sensation are directed in every case to what exists immanently within it, i.e. to these acts themselves, or to immanent data of sense, or to immanent entities of other sorts (for example to concepts, the descendants of Aristotle’s forms). As far as the transcendent world is concerned we can have at best only probabilistic knowledge, though we can know with certainty that it bears no similarity to the world that is apparently given in perception. There are, it has to be admitted, similarities between Brentano’s doctrine here and that of Kant: both deny the validity of our normal everyday cognitions as cognitions of any transcendent reality. These similarities are how-

8. Cf. Münch 1989 on the influence on Brentano of Comte’s ‘positivistic’ conception of the development of science and philosophy. Brentano derived from Comte the methodological view according to which science should concern itself exclusively with ‘phenomena’ and not with any associated ‘metaphysical realities’. The view that psychology (and logic) are to be pursued without concern for metaphysics is defended also by Höfler (1890, ‘6). In his 1907, however, Höfler does go on to provide an account of the relation between mental phenomena and metaphysical realities, propounding a variant of the causal theory of perception.

9. As Philipse has rightly pointed out, ‘the idea of their existence is doomed forever to be a hypothesis for us (or a metaphysical assumption, as Brentano says)’ (Philipse 1986/87, p. 298).

ever superficial only. Thus where for Brentano the link between inner activity and putative outer world is constituted by mere (probabilistically supported) hypotheses, Kant calls in aid synthetic *a priori* forms or categories which come down again – or so Brentano argues in his *Versuch über die Erkenntnis* – to nothing more than prejudices. Moreover, where Brentano is admirably clear about the opposition between act and (immanent) object – his doctrine of intentionality is, in the end, nothing other than an account of the relation between these two – Kant is in this respect still subject to just those unclaritys, for example as between quality sensed and act of sensing, which had characterized the thinking of British empiricists such as Locke.

Notice further that Brentano's thesis leaves no room for non-veridical intentionality – i.e. for the sort of intentionality that is involved when I make an error, for example when I go searching for a golden mountain which does not exist, or when I seek to calculate the largest prime number. The acts involved in such cases enjoy, from Brentano's perspective, objects of exactly the same (immanent) sorts as are enjoyed by acts of more normal varieties (for example everyday perceptions). Veridical and non-veridical acts may after all, as the case of hallucination shows, be indistinguishable from the psychological perspective (the perspective of the subject). As we shall see in later chapters, Brentano's disciples adopted different approaches to the issue of non-veridical intentionality, seeking accounts of intentionality which would do justice to the phenomenological indistinguishability of veridical and non-veridical acts while at the same time leaving room for the existence of a real relation of correspondence between certain veridical acts and autonomous, transcendent objects.

4. *The Unity of the Soul*

A literal reading of Brentano's thesis to the effect that every mental phenomenon includes within itself something as object will help us to understand also Brentano's deliberations on the unity of the soul in Book II of the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. Here, too, Brentano is inspired by Aristotle. For while Aristotle recognizes that the soul has different kinds of parts¹⁰ – above all, it has a sensitive and an intellectual part – he recognizes also that it is none the less a unity. Even though the soul is divisible in the sense that one part thinks and another senses, still, there must be something that holds these parts together. But what can this be?

To answer this question we must recall, first of all, that Brentano distinguishes three sorts of ways in which a subject may be conscious of an object in his mental acts (three sorts of intentionality, if one will), corresponding to three fundamental classes of 'psychical phenomena':

(i) *Presentations*.¹¹ Here the subject is conscious of the object, has it before his mind, without taking up any position with regard to it. The object is

10. Aristotle himself offers in different contexts different sorts of partition: metaphysical, functional, logical, ethical, and so on, though it would be unreasonable to see in this any conflict with Brentano's views (*pace* Ando 1965, pp. 91, 97).

11. This term translates the German '*Vorstellung*', more usually rendered into English as 'idea'. 'Presentation' has the advantage that it has convenient verbal and adjectival forms.

neither accepted as existing nor rejected as non-existing, neither loved as having value nor hated as having disvalue. Presentations may be either inner (a presentation of a seeing or a hearing), or outer (a presentation of a colour or a sound). Presentations may be intuitive or conceptual.¹² we can have an object before our mind either in sensory experience (and in the variant forms thereof in memory and imagination); or through concepts – for example when we think of colour or sound in general. Presentations may be either (relatively) simple or (relatively) complex – a distinction recalling the British empiricists’ doctrine of simple and complex ideas. A simple presentation is for example that of a red sense datum; a complex presentation that of a landscape, or of an array of differently coloured squares.¹³

Presentations almost never occur alone, and according to Brentano in some passages¹⁴ they are in fact necessarily accompanied by or exist only in the context of modes of mental directedness of other sorts, namely:

(ii) *Judgments*. A judgment arises when, to the simple manner of being related to an object in presentation, there is added one of two diametrically opposed modes of relating to this object, which we might call acceptance and rejection or belief and disbelief. More precisely, a judgment is either the affirmation or the denial of existence of an object given in presentation. Brentano therefore embraces a theory of judgment according to which all judgments are reducible to judgments of existential form.¹⁵ Thus a positive judgment in relation to a presentation of falling rain might be rendered as: *falling rain exists* or *it’s raining*; a negative judgment in relation to the presentation *unicorn* as: *unicorns do not exist* or *there are no unicorns*. A predicative judgment such as *swans are white* turns out to be a negative judgment resting on the complex presentation of non-white swans, and may be rendered as: non-white swans do not exist. Perception, for Brentano, is a combination of sensory presentation and positive judgment.

(iii) *Phenomena of Interest*. Phenomena of interest arise when to the presentation of an object – particularly one that belongs to a positive existential judgment – there is added one of two diametrically opposed modes of relating to this object, which we might call *positive* and *negative interest* or also ‘love’ and ‘hate’. The dichotomy in question is involved, according to Brentano, in all mental acts and attitudes across the entire gamut of feeling, emotion and will. As in judgment, so also in feeling and desire – which Brentano insists belong to the same basic class of psychic phenomena – the object is ‘present in consciousness in a two-fold way’, both as object of presentation and as object of some *pro* or *contra* attitude.¹⁶ Judgment and interest are analogous further in

12. This division corresponds broadly to Russell’s opposition between ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ and ‘knowledge by description’ (1913), or to Husserl’s opposition between ‘fulfilled’ and ‘signitive’ or ‘empty’ intentions as propounded in the *Logische Untersuchungen*.

13. See 1924, vol. I, pp. 112, 124f., Eng. pp. 79f., 88f.

14. *Psychologie*, vol. II, pp. 127f., Eng. pp. 266f. Cf. Brandl 1987.

15. 1924, vol. II, pp. 56ff., Eng. pp. 213ff. (Brentano later adopted an amended version of this view: see his 1924, vol. II, pp. 164–72, Eng. pp. 295–301.) Cf. Simons 1987a and Mulligan 1988.

16. *Psychologie*, vol. II, p. 38, Eng. p. 201. Cf. Chisholm 1986.

that there is a notion of correctness applying to each: the correctness of a judgment (its truth) serves as the objective basis of logic; the correctness of feeling and desire (its objective rightness) serves as the objective basis of ethics, a view developed at length by Brentano in his *On the Origins of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*.

Return, now, to our question as to what it is which holds the different parts of consciousness together. Surely not the body, Aristotle argues:

on the contrary, it seems rather to be the soul that holds the body together; at any rate, when the soul departs, the body disintegrates and decays. If, then, there is something else which makes the soul one, this unifying agency would have the best right to the name of soul, and we shall have to repeat for it the question: Is it one or multipartite? If it is one, why not at once admit that 'the soul' is one? And if it has parts, then once more the question must be put: What holds *its* parts together? And so *ad infinitum*. (411^b8)

Brentano, too, accepts a version of this argument. And he, too, faces the problem of reconciling the complexity of consciousness with what he sees as its necessary unity.¹⁷ That the activities of mind are always manifold and complex is clear. But this, Brentano insists, should not mislead us into supposing that such activities constitute a mere plurality or heap – as is assumed by those who defend a 'bundle' theory of the mind of the Humean sort. Rather, Brentano insists, it is a quite special sort of unity which marks conscious experience in every instant, however complex such experience might be. Here, two sorts of complexity must be distinguished, with correspondingly different sorts of unifying mechanism. First, is the sort of complexity which arises where a number of psychic activities, for example presenting, judging and desiring, are directed towards a single object. Second, is that sort of complexity which arises where a number of psychic acts, directed toward distinct objects, occur simultaneously within a single consciousness. Both of these two sorts of complexity involve a certain sort of independence: in the one case, as Brentano says, we have a one-sided, in the other a mutual, independence.¹⁸ But neither, Brentano argues, leads to any breaking up of the real unity in which they are involved. If, then, as Brentano claims, these are the only ways in which complexification can occur (the only ways in which we can build up more complex experiences out of simple parts), then it will follow that no matter how complex a given experience is, its unity will be unaffected.

That unity obtains in the first sort of case turns precisely on the fact that presentation, judging and desiring share (and are experienced with evidence as sharing) a common object. This common object of presentation constitutes as it were an axis around which the acts of judging and desiring turn, and must necessarily turn, for it is in every case presentation that provides such acts with their objects. Clearly however the presence of a common object can serve in this way to unify experiences only if the object is immanent to those

17. Thus Brentano, commenting on the just-quoted passage, writes: 'far from it being possible to assume e.g. a plurality of souls in man which are bound into a certain unity as a result of their domicile in the same body. Rather, we must say that it is the human soul which gives unity to the parts of the body' (1867, pp. 54f., Eng. pp. 36f.). This makes explicable why 'it is always only bodies of a certain constitution which have a soul ... [for] it is the soul itself which determines the essence of its body' (1867, p. 47, Eng. p. 32).

18. 1924, p. 224, Eng. p. 158, which however has 'partial' for '*einseitig*'.

experiences. If Jules and Jim in some sense share an object, then this can be by no means serve to unify their acts into a single consciousness. And if two experiences of mine are such as to be directed toward what is merely *per accidens* a single object (as when I see my neighbour and think about the murderer, in ignorance of the fact that they are one and the same), then this is clearly insufficient to guarantee that these experiences belong to the framework of a single consciousness. Rather, presentation, judgment and desire are unified because *the very same object* that is immanent to an act of presentation is judged to exist in an act of judgment and valued positively in an act of desire.

That unity obtains in the second sort of case is seen in the fact that, though the objects of the respective acts are not identical, they and the acts themselves are still in a very strong sense *comparable*. This comparability is not merely accidental; it does not rest for example on any contingent side-by-sideness or accessibility of the acts and objects concerned, for the act of comparison can take place in every case automatically and without further ado. A man can exercise such knowledge when he wishes, where a comparison of the more usual sort does not depend upon himself alone – the objects of comparison must first be sought after. Thus I can for example apprehend automatically that what I now see and what I now hear (the objects currently presented to me in these experiences) are non-identical, and again: this is conceivable only if the objects here are immanent to the act. Their necessary comparability is all of a piece with the necessary comparability of the relevant acts themselves. When, for example, I simultaneously see and hear, then I grasp this simultaneity immediately and automatically, in a way which, Brentano holds, would be impossible if the two acts constituted a mere plurality. This ability to move immediately from one act to another and back again is presupposed also by the making of complex plans, engaging in complex processes of deliberation, and so on. If the acts in such processes were mere parts of a plurality, were such as to exist merely side-by-side, then the given phenomena would be rendered inexplicable.¹⁹

How, against this background, is the unity of consciousness to be understood from the ontological point of view? Conscious phenomena, we can provisionally affirm, are mere ‘divisives’ or ‘partial phenomena’. (1924, p. 221, Eng. p. 155) A divisive is, simply, an entity that is not an entity in and of itself, but only as part of something else. A divisive is, we might say, the result of an abstract division of a whole, i.e. of a division ‘in the improper sense’, a division that is not in fact carried out. (Recall our treatment of ‘separation in an improper sense’ above.) A collective, similarly, is the result of an abstract or improper unification into a whole; and the early Brentano follows Aristotle in the thesis that a real thing and a collective of real things in this sense are never identical. Certainly a collective may become a thing (for example when one thing digests another); but then where there had been parts of a collective are now merely divisives. Similarly, a thing may become a collective through real division or dissolution or parturition; but then where there had been mere divisives within a thing are now things in their own right. The latter take the place of the former.

19. Cf. Brentano 1924, p. 227, Eng. p. 159.

Divisives are distinguishable as it were abstractly *in* the thing of which they are divisives. And it is this common belongingness to a single actual thing of the results of merely abstract division that constitutes the unity of consciousness in Brentano's eyes. The case of simultaneous seeing and hearing shows that we may have a single actual consciousness whose divisives can in principle come to be really separated from each other in the sense that either can continue to exist when the other has ceased. But such mutual separability does not affect the unity of the original whole. This Brentano shows by means of a thought-experiment resting on the supposition that there are physical atoms (entities with no really separable parts) and that these atoms have some finite extension. Within such atoms we can distinguish 'quantitative parts': for example, any pair of hemispheres. Each atom comprehends such quantitative parts, but as divisives only. It comprehends as divisives also certain individual properties (moments, tropes). Many of these, too, may be necessary parts, i.e. they may be incapable of being lost. This holds of the atom's individual shape, for example.

Yet of others clearly this does not hold, although they themselves are not to be regarded as things. The atom goes, for example, from rest to motion and from motion to rest. Yet notwithstanding this, the motion which obtains in the thing is not itself a thing, otherwise it would be conceivable that it should survive in separation from the atom. (1924, p. 230, Eng. p. 162, trans. amended)

One is able to imagine here a plurality of parts which belong to a single actual thing in such a way that there obtain between these parts more and less intrinsic relations. This does not however mean that any of the given parts could exist outside the context of the given whole. For a motion and a rest are always individual properties of and distinguishable only in some specific individual thing. The thing can be separated e.g. from the motion (by being brought to rest). But the motion cannot be separated from the thing. And what holds of motion and rest holds of shape and colour, too.

So it is also, Brentano now argues, in the case of psychic acts and states. The relation of hearing to seeing is less intrinsic than, say, that between desire and presentation. But one cannot derive from this any argument against their belonging to a single real unity, any more than in relation to, say, the motion and temperature of the atom. To affirm the unity of consciousness is to affirm only that all the psychic phenomena that we experience, however different they may be, constitute merely partial phenomena or 'inseparable parts' within the framework of a single whole. Hence unity is guaranteed not by the presence of some extra unifying element: Brentano is at the time of the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* in fact sceptical of any such substantial 'carrier' or supporting substratum, just as he is sceptical of atomism as regards the outer world.

Brentano's view would even be consistent with the possibility that one consciousness might come to be split into two, for example as a result of certain sorts of surgical operations. For at any given time each single soul would still, under these circumstances, form a unity in Brentano's sense. From this it is clear that the unity of consciousness in which Brentano is interested is synchronic only: he is concerned with unity *at a time*. Certainly it is true that, 'as inner perception shows us only one really unified group of psychical

phenomena, so memory shows us directly not more than one such group for every moment of the past.’ (1924, p. 237, Eng. p. 167) That memory shows us always such unified groups is something that we know, Brentano claims, with evidence. But it is not evident that this succession of ‘groups’ – and Brentano’s repeated use of this word in the present context is significant – must have been part of the same unitary thing as that which comprehends our present psychic appearances.

It is not to be denied that, leaving aside occasional gaps, memory shows us a continuum, a temporally progressing series of groups, between the successive phases of which there typically obtains a certain similarity. This makes it understandable that we tend to suppose that it is the same real unity which comprehends all the successive groups of appearances and brings about their similarity. But we cannot affirm this with evidence, as we can, for example, affirm with evidence that our present memories belong to the same real unity as our other present psychic acts, our evidence here resting on the peculiar immediate and automatic comparability discussed above.

Indeed, because in relation to any putative diachronic identity of or involving unified groups, evidence is unavailable, Brentano at the time of his *Psychology* sees it as ‘an open question whether the perseverance of the ego is the survival of one and the same unitary thing or the succession of different things, of which the one would connect itself to the other and as it were take its place.’ (1924, p. 239, Eng. p. 168) The self might even be a special bodily organ, and the stuff of this organ be continuously renewed, so that the unity of consciousness would be, as Brentano says, ‘like that of a river.’

5. *From Psychology to Ontology*

As his rather loose talk of ‘groups’ of psychic phenomena makes clear, Brentano is still at the time of the first edition of the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874) in possession of little more than the germ of an ontological theory of the different types of parts of consciousness and of the ways in which these join together to form larger unitary wholes of different sorts. Certainly he has seen that there are entities – ‘divisives’ or ‘partial phenomena’ – which can exist only in the context of a whole of determinate type. But he does not, at this stage, see the possibility of extending this insight to yield a general account of the relevant types of parts and wholes and of the relations between them.

A theory of this sort is, however, presented by Brentano in his *Deskriptive Psychologie*, a compilation of lectures delivered in Vienna University in 1889/90. Descriptive psychology, as Brentano here understands it, seems to consist precisely in a psychology that will issue in an ontologically sophisticated theory of the different types of parts, of such a sort that the specification of parts will be at the same time a specification of the ways in which these parts are fitted together into wholes.

Wherever there are parts, Brentano holds, there is also a form of separation, or separability.²⁰ As we can see by considering a case of

20. 1867, p. 55, Eng. p. 37; cf. *Met.*, 1023^b12.

simultaneous seeing and hearing, many of the parts of consciousness are really separable, i.e. they are such as to be able to 'be cut loose or separated from one another, in that the part that earlier existed with the second part in the same real unity continues in existence when that other part has ceased to exist' (1982, p. 12). Other examples are: a seeing and a remembering; the thinking of a premise and the thinking of a conclusion, and so on. Inspection now reveals that the relation expressed by 'a is separable from b' can be either one-sided or reciprocal. Seeing and hearing are reciprocally separable, as are the extended parts of a continuum existing side by side. Presentation and desire, in contrast, or presentation and judgment, as well as premise and inference, stand in a relation of one-sided separability only: a desire or judgment, according to Brentano, cannot as a matter of necessity exist without some underlying presentation of the object desired or affirmed as existent, and an inference cannot exist without the thinking of the premise.

The relation of one-sided separability hereby imposes upon consciousness a certain hierarchical order, with ultimate or fundamental acts constituting the ground floor. Such mental elements are one-sidedly separable from other parts of mind, but they are themselves not such as to have any separable parts. The ultimate acts, Brentano now insists, are always acts of sensation, and correspondingly the (primary) objects of ultimate or fundamental acts must be sensible phenomena (immanent objects derived from one or other of the various classes of sensory qualities). Acts of the given kind must 'contain as their primary relation a presentation of a sensible concrete content' (1982, p. 85).

Let us suppose, however, that we have in this way separated out as far as we can go, in such a way as to arrive at ultimate elements of consciousness. Then we can still, Brentano claims, in a certain sense speak of further parts:

If someone believes in atoms he believes in particles that cannot be dissolved into smaller bodies, but even in the case of such particles he may speak of halves, quarters, etc.: parts which, although not really separable, are yet distinguishable. We can call these latter distinctional [*distinktionelle*] parts. In human consciousness, too, there are also, apart from separable parts, mere distinctional parts. (1982, p. 13).

Another example of this phenomenon is to be found in Brentano's later study of boundaries and the continuum.²¹ Imagine a disk with four perfectly symmetrical segments which are coloured, respectively, red, green, yellow and blue. What is the colour of that central point of the disk where these four segments meet? If (as we may assume) the disk is everywhere coloured, then the argument of symmetry will dictate that this point participates equally in all four colours, that it is a *beginning to be red* on one side, a *beginning to be green* on another side, and so on. Distinct parts can in this way be distinguished in what is after all an extensionless point; and there can be no talk of these very special sorts of parts being really separated from each other.

As we distinguished different varieties of separability, so we can distinguish also, and by parallel arguments, different varieties of distinctness. In fact three sorts of distinctional part can be distinguished, the first of which are cases of distinctional inseparability in the fullest possible degree, the

21. See Brentano 1976.

remaining two being analogous, in a certain sense, to one-sided and mutual separability.

The first sort of distinctional part is illustrated by what Brentano calls mutually pervading parts or ‘*sich durchwohnende Teile*’. Consider, for the sake of example only, a blue patch, conceived, whether justifiably or not, as a constituent of external reality. Here a colour-determination and a spatial determination can be distinguished, not as separable, but precisely as distinctional parts and as parts which pervade each other mutually. But could not the blue patch be moved, resulting in a change of spatial determination, without its ceasing to be blue? And would it not then lose its particular spatial determination while its qualitative determination would remain unchanged? And could the blue patch not be transformed into a red patch while its spatial position remains the same? Brentano answers all such questions in the negative. He claims that when the position of an individual blue patch is changed we have an entirely new blue patch, i.e. a patch with a *new* blueness-determination, ‘which is as different from the first as two spatially distinct but simultaneous blue patches are distinct from one another’ (1982, p. 16). Certainly something remains identical when a colour moves. But to suppose that the colour-determination can remain identical *as an individual* through changes of location is to suppose that mutually pervading parts would exist in a merely side-by-side fashion, so that they could, as it were, exchange their partners. In reality, however, ‘they are connected in a quite different way, they are as it were such as to reciprocally or mutually interpenetrate [*sich sozusagen wechselseitig durchdringen*]’ (1982, p. 17). A blueness determination cannot exist without a spatial determination; but equally (for Brentano at this time) a spatial determination cannot exist without some colour-determination (or perhaps determinations of other sorts) that would fill it.

Secondly, we have what we might call one-sided distinctional separability, illustrated most clearly by the case of what Brentano himself refers to as ‘logical parts’. Consider a blue and a yellow patch, side by side. These two items share a common species: they are both *colours*. They are separate instances of species of a single common genus. How are we to characterize the nature of that in which they agree? In terms, Brentano holds, of part and whole. There obtains between the colouredness of the blue patch and its blueness-determination a relation of *logical part* to whole. The two individual colour determinations, which are instances of the species *blue* and *yellow*, each contain logical parts which are instances of the common species *colour*. The individual colouredness here is a proper part of the individual blueness. But there is nothing *in addition* to the former (the logical part), which would be needed to make individual instances of sheer *colour* into individual instances of *blue* or *yellow*, respectively. For there are no individual instances of sheer colour; colour exists *only* as a logical part of blue, or yellow, or red. Colour pervades red or yellow or blue. But this relation is one-sided only: the two determinations – *red* and *colour* – ‘determine the thing as it were *from the same side* (the one more, the other less).’ (1982, p. 20)

That the relation of logical parts to their wholes is analogous to that of one-sided separability can be seen more clearly by considering the relation between a presentation of red and the judging that red exists. The component of

presentation here can be really separated out: a judging can give way to a mere presentation; the former may cease to exist although the latter remains. Compare, in contrast, the relation between a presentation of red and that logical part of this presentation which makes it a *presentation*. There is no way in which the latter can be separated out. A presentation that is not a presentation of this or that is, as Brentano would say, an *Unding*, as would be a colour that was not red or green. And equally, there is no way that that logical part of a judgment which makes it a judgment can be separated out, for a judgment that is not a judgment of this or that is also an *Unding*, and the same applies to all species of conscious act. (This yields a variant, mereological form of Brentano's thesis of intentionality.)

Moreover, the story does not end here; for as the tradition, from Porphyry to W. E. Johnson, was able to take for granted, logical parts are such as to manifest an onion-type structure of successively distinguishable layers: as colour is a logical part of red, so quality is a logical part of colour, and so on, in a sequence which reflects the way in which the entities in reality are divided into species and genera of successively higher levels of generality. The character *mental act* is in this respect a logical part of every presentation and judgment (it is a logical part of second order, as it were).

As concerns the case of two-sided distinctional separability, Brentano's two standard examples are what he calls the 'parts of the intentional correlate-pair' and the 'parts of the intentional directedness'. Every mental phenomenon, Brentano insists, includes something as object within itself. Consciousness *is* an intentional relation (of presenting, judging, willing), and 'as with every relation so also here we have two correlates. The one correlate is the conscious act, the other that towards which it is directed.' (1982, p. 21) But what is the relation between act and object? The act, Brentano says, is real, its object (the horse insofar as it is thought, the redness insofar as it is seen) is non-real – and Brentano's explanations make it clear that he understands 'non-real' here as meaning 'not subject to causality'.²² The conscious act is caused; and then the immanent objectual correlate of this act is thereby of necessity co-present also.

'The two correlates are not separable from one another, except in the distinctional sense.' (1982, p. 21) The objectual correlate is, as Brentano says, 'immanent to' or 'resident in' the act; it need not correspond to anything in the outer world and it makes no claim to belong to the outer world. It pertains exclusively to the domain of consciousness.²³

As concerns the parts of the intentional directedness, Brentano notes that our mental life is a matter of energy²⁴ (it is, as one says, a stream of consciousness). This mental energy is, he claims, the only sort of energy of which we have evident knowledge. Mental energy has, Brentano claims, a two-fold structure. It is made up, first of all, of a *primary* stream of consciousness-of-the-object (i.e. of its immanent correlate, as described above). In addition,

22. See the detailed discussion of the opposition between the real and the non-real in Chapter Four below.

23. Cf. 1924, pp. 129ff., Eng. pp. 92ff.

24. Cf. 1982, pp. 80–83.

however, it is necessary to distinguish a *secondary* stream of consciousness, directed to this very primary consciousness itself; for Brentano holds, familiarly, that the consciousness of an object involves of necessity an accompanying self-consciousness ‘on the side’ (*en parergo*, as Aristotle says²⁵). It will not do to argue against this that we are often so deep in concentrated thinking that we, as it were, lose consciousness of the fact that we are thinking. Even in such circumstances, Brentano argues, we are conscious ‘on the side’ of the acts involved; it is simply that we do not *notice* the relevant acts – but then there are many cases, too, where we do not notice primary objects of which we are conscious, as for example when they fall on the fringes of our visual field. The secondary relatedness is in itself complex, involving both presentation and judgment, so that every consciousness is in fact such as to manifest (at the very least) a three-fold structure: primary energy directed towards an object, together with two sorts of secondary energy – *inner presentation* and *inner judgment* – directed to this primary energy itself.

But what is the ontological relation between the primary and secondary relatedness that is involved in every conscious act? This is clearly not a relation of logical part to whole, nor a relation of pervading parts (parallel to colour and extension). Rather it is to be understood as follows: since the two wings of directedness have different objects, the relation between them is similar, in some respects, to the mutual separability of a seeing and a hearing; because they are not really separable, however, it is most appropriate to speak here of a mutual distinctional separability, as contrasted with the mutual real separability of seeing and hearing.²⁶ The two wings of psychic energy (what Brentano calls the ‘psychic dienergy’) – corresponding to what are otherwise referred to as inner and outer perception – are *really inseparable*. Thus here, as in all other cases, Brentanian ‘distinctional separability’ is in fact always a form of real inseparability.

The types of parts distinguished above are parts in the strict and proper sense. Brentano points out, however, that we often speak of distinctional parts also in a loose or ‘modifying’ sense. Thus as we saw, when someone feels cold, then it might be said that cold is in the one who *feels*; but it is clearly in the one who feels in a different sense from the sense in which it is in that which *is* cold. Only in the latter case, according to Brentano, is cold a genuine distinctional part. In the former case we have to do merely with distinctional parts ‘in the modifying sense’ – which is to say with distinctional parts which are not really parts at all but reflect only a certain improper way of speaking.

We can now raise once more the question of interpretation of Brentano’s doctrine of the ‘intentional inexistence’ of the object of a conscious act. How is this intentionally in-existent object to be understood? What, in particular, is the relation between this object and ‘real’ objects? Suppose, even more particularly, that I see a colour. What is the relation between the seen colour on the one hand and any real colour, on the other? If I see red will I or my act *become* red; will I or my act acquire real redness as parts? Brentano answers all such questions in

25. *Met.*, 1074^b35f.; cf. 1982, pp. 136ff., George 1978, p. 253.

26. Cf. Brentano 1982, p. 25.

the negative. Rather, he tells us, the seen colour contains a real colour ‘not as a distinctional part in the proper sense, but only as a part that may be carved out by a modifying distinction’ (1982, p. 27).

What he means here is that the distinction in question is not a real distinction, carving out *real parts*, not even real *distinctional parts*. As Aristotle expressed it: ‘the one who sees is [merely] in a sense coloured’ (425^b22) – in the sense, namely, in which one can say that a handshake is present in that sort of whole we call a declined handshake.²⁷ Note that this thesis is consistent with our earlier argument to the effect that mental experiences as Brentano conceives them have immanent objects as parts; merely, these immanent objects are not (except in a modifying sense) red or green or warm or cold. For this reason, too, there can be no literal talk of correspondence between the object of thought and objects in the world. Such correspondence could be at best a correspondence ‘in the modifying sense’. Brentano hopes, on the basis of the taxonomy of part-whole relations laid out above, to construct a directly depicting language, a psychological *characteristica universalis*, whose letters and words would reflect the different mental constituents or elements, and whose syntax would reflect the relations between these constituents in larger complex wholes.²⁸ His ideas in this connection can be seen to stand at the beginning of a tradition which results *inter alia* in Husserl’s development of the formal ontology of parts and wholes in the *Logical Investigations*, in the Graz and Berlin schools of Gestalt psychology, and in Leśniewskian mereology and categorial grammar. It is important to note that in the *Descriptive Psychology* – which is to say in a context where Brentano sought to develop explicitly and in detail the ontology underlying the ideas on intentionality presented in the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* – there continues to prevail a resolutely immanentistic view of the objects of our mental acts. As we shall see, the tricky issue as to how mental acts are able, on occasions, to achieve a directedness to transcendent objects in the world was addressed primarily by Brentano’s students, and the fertility of Brentano’s philosophizing shows itself not least in the ways in which it led these students to try out new and interesting solutions to this very problem.

For where Brentano applied his descriptive realist method almost exclusively in the area of psychology, his students extended it in systematic ways to other domains of inquiry. We can in fact distinguish in their work three branches of what might be called ‘descriptive ontology’: the ontology of *things* (or objects in the narrow sense), the ontology of *states of affairs*, and the ontology of *values*, a tripartite division which flows in an obvious way from Brentano’s tripartite division of acts.

The ontology of things or objects arises when one turns from the psychology of presentation to an investigation of the non-psychological correlates of presenting acts. ‘Object’ is then understood as: ‘possible correlate of presentation’. Contributions to object-ontology in this sense were made by Stumpf, with his doctrine of the partial contents (objects) of presentation

27. On the notion of modification that is involved here see Chapter Five (Section 2) below.

28. See 1982, p. x.

(1873), by Ehrenfels and Meinong, with their doctrines of ‘Gestalt qualities’ and ‘higher-order objects’, by Husserl, with his analysis of the different kinds of unity and multiplicity among the objects given in experience (1891), by Marty, with his analysis of the opposition between real and non-real objects (1908), and by the later Brentano himself, with his investigations of the categories of substance and accident and with his work on spatial and temporal continua (1933, 1976).

The ontology of states of affairs arises, similarly, when one moves from the psychology of judgment to the investigation of the ontological correlates of judging acts, a step which was taken with increasing degrees of resoluteness by Marty, Twardowski, Meinong, Husserl and Stumpf, whose work will be subject to more detailed analysis in later chapters.

The ontology of values arises, finally, when one moves from the psychology of interest and preference to an investigation of the ontological correlates of the corresponding acts. Modern value theory is indeed to no small part a creation of the Brentanists, who were inspired to attempt the construction of a general theory of values by Brentano’s wide demarcation of the psychological category of ‘phenomena of interest’ – previous philosophers having tended to deal in terms of the two separate categories of ‘feeling’ and ‘will’.²⁹ Contributions to the ontology of values in Austrian philosophy were made, in particular, by Ehrenfels, as also by Meinong and his school in Graz, by Husserl, by Kreibitz,³⁰ by Kraus, and by a number of other thinkers within the Brentano tradition.

Brentano, too, can be seen retrospectively to have contributed something of his own to these more general ontological investigations, for example in his treatment of the Aristotelian distinction between ‘being in the sense of the categories’ and ‘being in the sense of being true’ in his dissertation of 1862. When not interpreting the views of other philosophers, however, the early Brentano seems to have been reluctant to formulate ontological theses of his own. Thus while he began by accepting a version of the correspondence theory of truth along Aristotelian lines, he has very little to say about the ontology of truth as such. To the question whether there are special entities – ‘judgment-contents’ or states of affairs – to which our judgments would correspond, Brentano responds by pointing out that talk of such entities would be of little use. For to elucidate the notion of *the truth of the judgment* through the notion of *the existence of the object* is to explain what is understood by appeal to something that is no better understood, and ‘nothing would be accomplished thereby’.³¹

29. See Fabian and Simons 1986, p. 39.

30. The Brentanists’ goal of producing a general theory of values was inspired in part also by work on economic value by contemporary economists in Austria. See Eaton 1930, Chisholm 1986, Husserl 1988, and Chapters Nine and Ten below. As is shown by Kraus (1937), the work of the Brentanists on value theory was to some extent paralleled by analogous work by Lotze and his disciples in Germany. One important difference between the Austrian and German axiological traditions is however the lack of any economic dimension in the latter.

31. 1889a, § 57. See also Srzednicki 1965, p. 25. Here we see the germ of Brentano’s later view according to which truth has to be elucidated epistemically. See parts III and IV of his 1930.

It was left to Brentano's students to take the additional step of using his analyses of judgment as the basis for an ontology of truth. The extent to which Brentano provoked this additional step through his lectures and discussions is not, as yet, capable of being ascertained with any certainty. The fact that so many of his most important students made a move of the given sort, just as they all used psychology as the basis of a more or less general ontology, seems, however, to support the assumption that the move in question was in some way anticipated by Brentano. Certainly it was fostered and encouraged by his discovery of the categorial difference between judgments and presentations, just as the Brentanists' work on the general theory of value had been fostered and encouraged by Brentano's wide demarcation of the sphere of phenomena of interest. It may, however, be that a crucial impetus to their work in this respect was provided by the direct or indirect influence of Bolzano, whose thinking on logic and metaphysics was communicated to important members of the Brentano school via the teaching of Robert Zimmermann in Vienna.

In summary, we can say that where, for the early Brentano, intentionality is understood as a relation between an act and an immanent content or 'object of thought' (above all as a relation between acts of sensation and immanent data of sense), in the hands of his students the notion of intentionality is allowed to blossom in such a way that the range of transcendent objects admitted as targets of the intentional relation comes to be conceived ever more widely, so that the discipline of ontology, too, is by degrees magnified in both scope and scientific significance.

Chapter Three

Franz Brentano II

On Substance and Accident

1. *Brentano's Metaphysics*

Much of the literature on Brentano has manifested a certain deflationary tendency, often presenting Brentano as little more than a forerunner of Husserl or of analytic philosophy, and rarely taking account of more than those few passages in which Brentano talks about his doctrine of intentionality. Here, in contrast, I shall seek to do full justice to the metaphysical aspects of Brentano's thinking. At the centre of our concern, as always with Brentano, will be the philosophy of Aristotle, and more specifically Aristotle's theory of substance and accident, which is given detailed treatment by Brentano in the materials collected together as the *Theory of Categories*.

The question as to the nature of substance has notoriously been answered in different ways at different times in the history of philosophy. Kant, for example, conceived substance (or the 'schema' of substance) as that which remains identical through change. Locke conceived it as a 'supposed I-know-not-what', which is inferred as lying behind the phenomena and as linking them together.¹ Hobbes conceived it as that which exists 'without the help of sense', i.e. independently of whether we conceive it or have an idea of it, maintaining that only that which is corporeal can meet this requirement.² For Leibniz, on the other hand, a substance is just a monad, i.e. it is simple (has no parts), it is ingenerable and incorruptible, and it is always mental.

1. In the *Essay* (II, 23, § 2) Locke refers to 'the supposed but unknown support of these qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist *sine re substantie*, without something to support them'.

2. *De corpore*, 8.1.

All of these accounts, and all their many variants, are rejected by Brentano as incompatible with the original Aristotelian theory of substance. As Brentano conceives things, they avoid the very problems which Aristotle was struggling with in developing his theory. Brentano conceived his own theory of substance, in contrast, as a refined and perfected version of the Aristotelian theory, and although one can have some doubts as to the total faithfulness of Brentano's interpretations of Aristotle's texts, he did undoubtedly succeed in grappling with Aristotle's problems, sometimes in surprisingly fruitful ways.

The Aristotelian notion of substance can be understood, Brentano argues, only as correlative to that of *accident*. A substance is that which can gain or lose accidents – as a man may gain or lose a suntan, a headache, or a knowledge of Greek. Brentano's reading of Aristotle seems in this point to come closest to the Aristotle of Porphyry:

Accident is what becomes and passes away without destruction of the subject. It is divided into two: for some accidents are separable, and others are inseparable, e.g. sleeping is a separable accident, but blackness is an inseparable accident of the crow and the negro. Nevertheless we may possible conceive of a white crow or of a negro changing his color without the destruction of the subject. They also define it thus: accident is what may contingently inhere or not inhere in the same, or what is neither genus, difference, species, nor property but is always subsistent in a subject.³

We might say that for Brentano a substance has two jobs to perform: it is a (possible) *bearer of accidents*; and it serves to *individuate* one accident from another (for example one redness from a second, qualitatively exactly similar redness). Here we concentrate exclusively on the first of these two jobs. The second – which we might conceive as making up the difference between primary and secondary substance – brings problems of its own.

We are using the term 'accident' in the widest possible sense, to embrace all of Aristotle's categories of *quality*, *quantity*, *where*, *when*, *action*, *reaction*, *affection*, *position* and *state*. Some accidents are what we might call dynamic accidents – a running, a smiling, a sitting down, the clenching of a fist, the reddening of a cheek – and as such they are reasonably familiar to contemporary philosophers from work on the ontology of events on the part of

3. See Porphyry's *Introduction to the Predicaments of Aristotle* (p. 12 of the translation).

Davidson *et al.* Other accidents are conditions or states: a standing still, a being seated, a smile, the individual redness of Mary's cheek, the individual charge in this conductor, the individual warmth in this pebble – examples of a sort which are less familiar to modern philosophers. The reason for acknowledging the wider class of accidents – and I shall henceforth assume that the acceptance of dynamic accidents is unproblematic – lies first of all in the fact that no sharp line can be drawn between static accidents on the one hand and dynamic accidents on the other.⁴ What is static on one level of analysis may be dynamic on another, as when a state of rest or equilibrium in a structure consists in part in complex processes of interaction. Further, there are a number of properties which conditions or states share in common with events and processes:

(i) Both static and dynamic accidents may be *pieceable*, i.e. they may be extended in space and time in such a way that they are capable of being divided into constituent accidents, both in fact and in our imagination.

(ii) Both static and dynamic accidents may be perceivable: I can see both the reddening of and also the subsequent redness in Mary's face, and then the latter is something no less individual than the former.⁵ This implies further that both static and dynamic accidents may also serve as the objects of other higher-order acts and states such as memories and emotions.

(iii) All accidents, both static and dynamic, require a bearer (or a multiplicity of bearers), as a smile smiles only in a human face. My own mental acts and states are themselves (dynamic and static) accidents which are founded on me myself as bearer

It is requirement (iii) which will take up most of our attentions in what follows.

4. Brentano runs the two together in his theory of 'psychic phenomena', a concept which seems to embrace both static and dynamic examples. See Reinach 1989, pp. 95–108 (= 1911, Part I).

5. On the perceptibility of accidents see Mulligan, Simons and Smith 1984, § 4.

2. *Mutual and One-Sided Separability*

Consider a quantity of pebbles arranged in a line. Each pebble can be separated from the residue, in the sense that it can survive as it is even though the remaining pebbles are destroyed. The pebbles are then mutually separable from each other. Each is independent of the others in the sense that it has no need of them in order to exist. Suppose, however, that the pebbles are warmed by the sun, and consider the relation between a pebble and that static accident which is its specific warmth. A pebble is separable from its warmth in that the latter can cease to exist (when the pebble cools down) while the former goes on existing. A warmth, however, is not in this sense separable from its pebble. We might say that the warmth enjoys an inferior or derivative or qualified being: it can exist only with the support of the substance in which it inheres. There is no way in which the pebble can be destroyed and its warmth remain in existence.

The pebble is, we shall say (echoing the terminology of our previous chapter), *one-sidedly separable* from its warmth – where talk of one-sided separability between two objects is understood to imply also a one-sided inseparability in the opposite direction.

We can define the notions of mutual and one-sided separability between contingently existing objects as follows:

- (D1) a is separable from b \equiv : a is such that it can continue to exist even though b should cease to exist.
- (D2) a and b are mutually separable \equiv : a is separable from b and b is separable from a .
- (D3) a is inseparable from b \equiv : a is such that it can continue to exist only if b also continues to exist.
- (D4) a is one-sidedly separable from b \equiv : a is separable from b and b is inseparable from a .

Two or more objects may also be mutually inseparable, may exhibit what might be called a zero-sided separability:

- (D5) a is mutually inseparable from b \equiv : a is inseparable from b and b is inseparable from a .

This notion of mutual inseparability – also called mutual dependence or reciprocal interpenetration – played an important role in Brentano’s early ontology, and it remained central to the ontologies developed therefrom by Stumpf and Husserl.⁶ Thus for example in the *Deskriptive Psychologie*, space and quality are seen as mutually inseparable: space just *is* what gets filled by quality, and a spatial extension only exists to the extent that there are space-filling qualities which this extension is the extension *of*.⁷

3. Aristotle on Separability

It is the notion of one-sided separability that is at the core of both Aristotle’s and Brentano’s ontologies of substance and accident. Thus when Aristotle conceives substances as ‘beings in the prominent sense’ and insists that accidents exist ‘merely in an analogous sense’, what he means is that the latter can exist only with the support of the former. Accidents are, precisely, *accidental*; they are not necessary for or essential to the further existence of their bearers. Substances, in contrast, can exist perfectly well without the help of the accidents which they may underlie.⁸


It is as if we can snap off the accident and still leave the substance behind, something we might represent by means of a diagram, somewhat as follows:

6. See Smith and Mulligan 1982.

7. 1982, pp. 15 f. This thesis – which has obvious Cartesian echoes – is still maintained in the first part of the *Kategorienlehre*. In the last drafts of this work, however, mutual dependence applies only to boundaries and continua, an aspect of Brentano’s philosophy that is too complex to be dealt with here. See Brentano 1976 and Smith 1992.

8. This is clearly a simplification for certain types of accidents, as is recognized already in the passage from Porphyry quoted above.


[A1]



We shall call this the A-conception of one-sided separability. The solid frame is intended to picture a separable entity, an entity that can exist in its own right. The broken frame pictures an inseparable entity, an entity that is dependent on something else in order to exist. The line connecting the two frames signifies that a relation of inherence, of being *in* or *on* or *of*, holds between the entities depicted.⁹

Of course a given substance can have more than one accident, as when, for example, I have a memory and a feeling of sadness at one and the same time. This we might represent as follows:


[A2]



9. See Smith and Mulligan 1982.

(and similarly for larger numbers of accidents inhering in a single bearer). We can imagine also accidents of accidents, for example:

[A3]




While such higher-order accidents seem to be perfectly admissible within the quasi-Aristotelian framework here presented, they are in fact ruled out by Aristotle's *theory*. This is because Aristotle held to the principle:


(P1) an accident of an accident is always also an accident of the substance.

He could therefore accept at most accidents of accidents of the following forms (with obvious extrapolations where larger numbers of accidents are involved):

[A4]



[A5]




i.e. cases where an accident of a substance is itself inseparable, either one-sidedly or mutually, from another accident of the same substance. (Here a double line connecting two broken frames signifies a relation of mutual inseparability.)

Accident₁ might be Professor Geach's knowledge of Greek, accident₂ some judgment formulated by Professor Geach in that language. Accident₃ and

accident₄ might be the North and South poles of a magnet, or the colour and extension of a spatial fleck, respectively.

We can imagine, finally, *relational* accidents, that is to say accidents with a multiplicity of bearers, which may be represented as follows:

[A6]



again, with obvious extrapolations where larger numbers of bearers are involved, or where we are dealing with relational accidents of a higher order.

Examples of such relational accidents would be a hit, a kiss, a conversation or a promise. Again, accidents of this sort are not admitted within Aristotle's theory, though we can see that they, too, are quite at home within the framework here presented. Relational accidents are not acceptable to Brentano either. Brentano in fact comes close to affirming that all putative cases of relational accidents are capable of being divided, without remainder, into non-relational accidents of their respective bearers.¹⁰

4. *Brentano on Separability*

The relation of one-sided separability was first encountered by Brentano in his investigations of what he called the 'elements of consciousness'. Our mental acts of seeing, remembering, affirming, negating, etc., manifest a complex array of different sorts of relations with each other, and Brentano's descriptive

10. Cf. 1933, p. 57, Eng. p. 50.

psychology has the goal of providing a system of combinatoric laws which would describe how complex mental processes may be built up from lower-order components. Many of the elements of consciousness, Brentano writes,

can actually be cut loose or separated from one another in that the part that earlier existed with the second part in the same real unity continues in existence when that other part has ceased to exist (1982, p. 12).

Thus as we saw, my act of seeing and my simultaneous act of hearing are mutually separable from each other in just this sense. But the thinking of a concept and the making of a judgment to the effect that the concept is realized stand in the relation of one-sided separability only.

Brentano's use of the notion of one-sided separability here is independent of any concern with the problem of substance. He does however recognize that the elements of consciousness can be said to exist on different levels. That is to say, mental acts fall into the categories of fundamental or basic acts and what Brentano calls *supraponierte Akte* (superposed acts), the former being one-sidedly separable from the latter. Thus my wish to take a trip must be based on a presentation of a trip; my pleasure in the fact that cranberry sauce exists must be based on a judgment that cranberry sauce exists, and this in turn on an idea or presentation of cranberry sauce. My fear or hope that Mary will arrive must be based on a presumption that she will arrive, and this in turn on a presentation of her arrival. And now, the category of substance appears in these early discussions in that Brentano affirms that the relation between wish and presentation or between fear and presumption is like the relation all these acts bear to the *subject* who has them (1982, p. 84). Thus we have to do here with more or less complicated variants of the relation depicted in our discussion of the quasi-Aristotelian framework in diagram (A4) above. Brentano came gradually however to evolve a quite different, 'reistic' conception of the relations here involved. For where he had earlier held that mental acts have an inferior being in relation to their subjects, that they exist only in an analogous sense, he later came to believe that all entities exist in the same way, that 'existence' has only a strict and proper sense (that all uses of this term which depart therefrom, like all appeals to vague and spurious 'analogies', are illegitimate). This he formulates by saying that everything that exists is a concretum, a 'real thing'. Hence he has to find some way of coping with what Aristotle wants to say about the relation between accident and substance – and

with what he himself wants to say about mental acts and their subjects – without appealing to special, inferior, dependent entities. Brentano solves this problem by turning Aristotle’s theory (almost) on its head: it is not, for Brentano, that the accident is an inferior entity existing *in* or *on* its substance. Rather, the substance itself, he says, is included within the accident as a proper part. That is, Brentano in his *Theory of Categories* conceives the accident not as an extra entity existing ‘in an analogous sense’ *alongside* the substance. He conceives it rather as the substance itself *augmented* in a certain way. The accident is what he calls a *modal extension* of its substance.

Brentano did not simply pluck this idea from out of the air. There are traces of the idea already in Aristotle,¹¹ and Brentano himself came to it through a series of detailed and gradually maturing reflections on the relation between the elements of consciousness and the mind, self, ego, soul (Brentano uses all these expressions interchangeably) that thinks them. Thus he argues that there is a sense in which, when I have a mental act, then the *subject* of this act is present as a part of the act – an idea which becomes even clearer when we think not of mental acts but of physical actions such as shoelace-tyings or hurdle-vaultings. The act, according to Brentano, is not some extra entity attached to the self; it is the self momentarily augmenting itself, mentally, in a certain way; so that this self comes to serve as a part of that whole which is its accident.

This gives Brentano a new means of explaining how it is, when I am seeing and hearing, that it is the same I that is subject in both acts. That is, it gives him a new means of accounting for the unity of consciousness – for the fact that experience does not resolve itself into a multiplicity of separate bits. The mental acts of a single subject *overlap*, he now holds: both synchronically


11. See *Met.* 1026^b16, where Aristotle mentions the problem raised by Sophists as to whether Coriscus and musical Coriscus are one and the same. Or *Met.* 1024^b30: ‘the thing itself and the thing itself modified in a certain way are somehow the same, e.g. Socrates and musical Socrates’. (Cf. also 1018^a2, 1030^b13). See also Suarez’s discussion of the ‘*accidens concretum*’ in his *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, XXXIX, s.1, n. 10–12 and Cajetan, *In De Ente et Essentia d. Thomas Aquinatis*, “153ff. The idea appears further in Leibniz, though here there can be no question of an influence on Brentano: ‘We shall also accept every term here as complete, i.e. as a substantive, so that “big” is the same as “big entity”’. ‘An entity is either in itself (*per se*) or accidental (*per accidens*); or, a term is either necessary or mutable. Thus, “man” is an entity in itself, but “learned man” or “king” are accidental entities. For that thing which is called “a man” cannot cease to be a man except by annihilation, but someone can begin or cease to be a king, or learned, though he himself remains the same.’ (See “General Inquiries about the Analysis of Concepts and of Truths”, first publ. in Couturat 1903, trans. in Parkinson 1966, pp. 47ff.)

and diachronically they share in common a certain constant kernel which we may call the self:

Among the entities that have parts, there are some whose whole is not composed of a multiplicity of parts; it appears much rather as an enrichment of a part, though not as a result of the addition of a second part. One example of such an entity is a thinking soul. It ceases to think and yet remains the same soul. But when it starts to think again no second thing is added to that entity which is the soul. What we have here, then, is not like what we have when one stone is laid alongside another or when we double the size of a body ... The substance is a thing and the accidentally extended substance is again a thing, but a thing not wholly other in relation to the substance; hence we do not have that kind of addition of one and one that leads to a plurality. (Brentano 1933, pp. 53f., Eng. pp. 47f.)

Brentano continues to follow Aristotle in regarding the accident as existing only with the support of its substance, but now the one-sided separability of the substance in relation to the accident is conceived not as in [A1] but rather as follows:

[B1]



This we can call the B-conception of one-sided separability. The nesting of one box inside another is intended to represent the fact that the object depicted by the nested box is properly contained in, is a proper part of, the object depicted by the nesting box, after the manner of an Euler diagram. But the relation of containment involved here differs from that which we should encounter were the substance a mere piece (extensive part) of the containing accident. For despite the fact that the substance is a proper part of its accident, there is according to Brentano no further part which would make up the difference. Hence the remainder principle:

(P2) if a is a proper part of b then there is some c , discrete from a , which is also a part of b ,

which is a straightforward implication of the axioms of standard theories of extensive part and whole, is here rejected.¹²


It is crucial to the Brentanian theory that there be no extra entity which would make up the difference between substance and accident. For this third entity would be precisely an ‘inferior existent’ of the sort he is now determined to get rid of. An accident is a thing, no less than its substance. There are no jumps and runs, but only jumpers and runners; no thoughts and feelings, but only thinkers and feelers. No qualities and quantities, but only qualified, quantified things.

The substance is *separable* from its Brentanian accidents in the sense that it can survive even should it cease to be accidentally extended in this or that way. An accident, in contrast, is inseparable from its substance, for there is, quite literally, nothing left over when the substance is destroyed.

As we have already seen in our discussion of the unity of consciousness above, Brentano’s idea can be easily extended to deal with cases where a number of accidents inhere simultaneously in a single substance. Thus in place of the Aristotelian [A2], Brentano might have:

12. Cf. Chisholm 1978, pp. 206f. On extensional mereology see Simons 1987, ch. 1. It is easy to imagine part-whole structures in which (P2) does not hold. Consider, for example, a world in which all objects are open intervals on the real line, and consider an open interval which is a proper part of some second open interval. There is, in such a world, no object which can be added to the one to yield the other.


[B2]



The idea can be extended also to cope with accidents of accidents. Brentano, too, accepts the principle that an accident of an accident is an accident of the substance. Since the Brentanian accident is not an entity distinct from its substance, there is no way in which it can have accidents of its own, i.e. accidents which would inhere in it (along the lines of [A3] above), without also inhering in its substance. And indeed all the cases considered by Brentano are counterparts of [A4], though translated into the Brentanian framework:¹³

13. We would have trouble constructing a Brentanian counterpart to [A5], i.e. a relation of *mutual* inseparability between Brentanian accidents, though some cases of this sort are dealt with by Brentano in his theory of boundaries and continua. See, again, Brentano 1976 and my 1992.

[B3]



The diagrams here are intended to be more than mere abbreviatory devices. Not only do they capture in a peculiarly simple way the opposition between our two conceptions of one-sided separability; they also place quite determinate constraints on what can and cannot be allowed within the respective theories – and thereby allow a sort of *diagrammatic experimentation* in the manner of Peirce.¹⁴ Such experimentation, in conjunction with careful analysis of Brentano’s own writings, reveals that it is possible – especially in the negative case – to go some considerable way towards establishing whether Brentano would have admitted structures of given sorts by ascertaining whether or not these structures admit of representation within the diagrammatic framework dictated by the idea which underlies his theory.

The difference between the two readings of one-sided separability can be brought out by defining:

(DA) a is A-dependent on b \equiv : a is such that it can continue to exist only if b continues to exist and b is not a part of a .¹⁵

14. See Smith 1992, §§ 1ff. and the references there given.

15. This definition is central to the formal ontology developed by Husserl in the 3rd Logical Investigation: see the papers collected in Smith (ed.) 1982.

The parallel definition:

a is B-dependent on b =: a is such that it can continue to exist only if b continues to exist and b is a part of a ,

is however unacceptable for our purposes. This is because Brentano accepts a principle – called by Chisholm the principle of mereological essentialism – according to which all parts are essential to their wholes.¹⁶ We might formulate this principle as follows:

(P3) if b is a part of a at some time at which a exists, then b is a part of a at all times at which a exists.

This implies that every whole is willy nilly inseparable from all its parts, since should the part cease to exist, then the whole, too, goes out of existence. Aristotle, as we shall see, maintains no such thesis.

The relation of separability between a substance and its accidental extension is much stronger than that relation between a part and its whole that is guaranteed by (P3). For if the substance is removed from that whole which is its modal extension, then not merely does the latter cease to exist but so, too, do all its parts. This suggests the definition:

(DB) a is B-dependent on b =: a is such that it and all its parts can continue to exist only if b continues to exist and b is a part of a .

Either of the two notions defined in (DA) and in (DB) and represented in [A1] and [B1], respectively, can equally well be employed as a rendering of the one-sided separability of substances in relation to their accidents. Yet each yields a quite different conception of what an accident is. The A-notion yields a view of accidents as additional entities, even if they are entities which exist only ‘in an extended sense’. The B-reading yields a view of accidents as thingly wholes including their thingly substances – but *nothing else* – as parts.

16. See Appendix B to Chisholm 1976.

Once the opposition between A and B has been exposed, it is interesting to speculate on the extent to which a similar opposition might have played a role in the wider history of metaphysics. In regard to the relation between mind and body, for example, one can distinguish on the one hand conceptions which acknowledge the mind (soul, ego, self) as an *extra entity*, perhaps dependent in some sense on the body with which it is associated and one-sidedly inseparable therefrom. And on the other hand there are conceptions centred on the concept ‘*person*’, i.e. on the concept of an entity which is conceived (not always very clearly) as including its body as proper part, without, however, there being any *extra* entity that is conceived as making up the difference.¹⁷

The same sort of opposition is present also in the philosophy of perception, between those who see sense data as dependent in some sense on transcendent things-in-themselves (Locke, Kant), and those who affirm that in experiencing sense data we also experience things themselves, or rather that the phenomena we experience *are* the things themselves, perceived or apprehended in a certain way (Husserl, Daubert, J. J. Gibson).

The opposition can manifest itself also in the theory of truth-making, or in the ontology of that in virtue of which a given sentence or proposition is true.¹⁸ Thus when Aristotle acknowledges the accidental categories of *quantity*, *quality*, *relation*, *spatial* and *temporal location*, *situation*, *having*, *action* and *passion*,¹⁹ he does this in part because he holds that, for true sentences of a range of different sorts, corresponding entities are needed to serve as that in virtue of which these sentences are true. ‘By a *quality*’, as Aristotle puts it, ‘I mean that in virtue of which things are said to be somehow qualified.’ (*Cat.*, 8^b25) Thus for example the sentence ‘Socrates is pale’ is true in virtue of a certain individual qualitative accident of paleness (or in virtue of the inherence of such an accident in the substance who is Socrates).²⁰ ‘Socrates is saluting’,

17. An interestingly complementary view is developed by Nozick 1981, pp. 110ff. This sees the self as what Nozick calls a ‘Fregean property’ – an unsaturated entity that is not capable of existing in separation from whatever are its thoughts or perceptions at any given time.

18. See Mulligan, Simons and Smith 1984.

19. See Ch. 4 of the *Categories*.

20. Qualities, for Aristotle, include not only sensible qualities but also figure or shape, habits, and powers. See *Cat.*, 8^b25–11^a4.

similarly, might be seen as being made true by the inherence (occurrence) in Socrates of an individual salute (accident of action), and so on. From the Brentanian perspective, now, the truth-makers for the sentences mentioned are to be understood exclusively via distinctions between things, for example between *Socrates* and *pale Socrates*. We might think of the latter as a seasonally existing thing: pale Socrates and tanned Socrates taking turns to exist, though in such a way that Socrates himself, their common part, remains unaffected by this alternation. Similarly ‘Socrates is saluting’ is true if and only if there exists that thing which is saluting Socrates.

5. *Mereological Potentialism vs. Mereological Actualism*

There is a sense in which the Aristotelian framework sketched above is more powerful than the framework defended by Brentano. For working within the former we can simply identify Brentano’s augmented substances with those complex wholes which result when we consider substances and accidents of the straightforwardly Aristotelian sort as joined together mereologically to form a single object. All the characteristic theses of the Brentanian ontology can then be re-expressed in Aristotelian terms, and no similar translation is forthcoming in the opposite direction.

Aristotle himself, however, could not have accepted such an attempt to reconstruct the Brentanian position within his own theory. This is because he embraced, in respect of both parts and sums of objects, what we shall call the *thesis of mereological potentialism*.

We said that for Aristotle not all entities are beings in the same sense. Some entities have being only in an analogous sense: they exist, as it were, in an inferior manner. There are however several moments of being-in-the-prominent-sense, the absence of each one of which yields its own special inferior mode of being.²¹ The first such inferior mode of being we have already considered. It is the mode of *being in* of an accident in its substance, and may be said to reflect a cancellation of the moment of *independence*. A second such mode might be the mode of being merely potentially, reflecting a cancellation of the moment of *actuality*. That which exists potentially is such that it can exist

21. See Ingarden 1964/65, vol. I, ch. III, for more details of this terminology of ‘moments of being’.

actually, but only if certain pre-conditions are fulfilled. As a third mode of inferior being one might canvas the mode of being of secondary substances (species, universals), which results from the cancellation of the moment of individuation.

The thesis of mereological potentialism has two parts:

- (P4)(a) a part of something actually real is not itself actually real for as long as it is a part;
 (b) a whole whose parts are actually real is not itself actually real for as long as it is a whole.²²

This thesis rules out the adoption of something like the B-position as a special case of A, for it implies that the substance that would be contained in a Brentanian accidental whole could not continue to be actually real while the accident inheres in it, contravening the most fundamental presupposition of Aristotle's entire metaphysics. As Brentano explains the matter:

Aristotle believes that a thinking substance, when it ceases to think, remains the actual thing that it was. For this reason he cannot conceive the substance with the accident as a real thing, for then this substance would be a real thing both before it begins to think and after it has ceased to think, but not while it is thinking. When the substance thinks, however, it is in Aristotle's opinion not two real things, but *one* real thing, bound up with a bonus of something that exists in an extended sense (1933, p. 104, Eng. p. 83).

The force of (P4a) can be illustrated by considering the example of an earthworm. When we cut the earthworm into pieces, what had been a single actually real whole is transformed into a multiplicity of actually real (ex-)parts, each one of which can be identified as having previously been contained, *merely potentially*, within the original whole.

The force of (P4b), on the other hand, can be illustrated by considering that whole which contained as its parts the two cities of Buda and Pest, as they were, facing each other across the Danube, before 1873. With the formation,

22. The doctrine that two things can never be one thing and that no unitary thing can be a multiplicity of things is set forth by Aristotle in *Metaphysics Z*; see esp. 1039^a3. See also Leibniz' letter to Arnauld of 30 April 1687: 'I believe that where there are only entities by aggregation, there will not be real entities.' 'There will never be found any means of making a true substance out of a number of entities by aggregation.'

out of these two parts, of that single entity we now know as Budapest, a merely potentially existing whole was transformed into something actual.

The primary role of the thesis of potentialism is as part of Aristotle's treatment of the problem of the perseverance of substances. Aristotle wants to insist that substances may endure as one and the same not merely when they gain or lose accidents, for example pleasure or hunger, but also when they gain or lose substantial parts. Imagine a soldier S, whose arm is destroyed in battle. If we avail ourselves of a somewhat misleading shorthand and write 'S₁' for the soldier before the battle and 'S₂' for the genidentical soldier after the battle, then according to Aristotle's theory we have

$$(a) \quad S_1 = S_2.$$

Suppose that the thesis of potentialism is false, and that that proper part of S which is the soldier minus his arm (say S') is, even before the battle takes place, a real or actual substance, as it were locked away inside the soldier as a whole. Then it seems reasonable to suppose that the soldier-minus-arm, too, remains one and the same actual being through the loss of the arm, i.e. that

$$(b) \quad S'_1 = S'_2.$$

But now, before the battle, soldier and soldier-minus-arm are two distinct substances (one a proper part of the other), i.e.

$$(c) \quad S_1 \neq S'_1.$$

After the battle, however, they are one and the same:

$$(d) \quad S_2 = S'_2,$$

which yields a contradiction. It is in part in order to thwart this contradiction that Aristotle embraces the thesis of potentialism. We can then no longer affirm (b) and (c), since, until the battle takes place, there is no soldier-minus-arm. It is merely *possible* that there be such an object (and all that is needed for this possibility to be realized is for soldier S to lose his arm).²³

23. Things are, as usual, not quite so clear in Aristotle: see *Cat.*, 8^a19ff. A similar example has been used by van Inwagen (1981) to argue, in effect, that the soldier's arm, while undetached, does not exist. Compare on these issues also Scaltsas 1990.

Brentano, on the other hand, is able to thwart the contradiction while at the same time affirming a strong mereological actualist position according to which all the parts of an actual thing exist as actual things. This he does by denying that a substance can survive the loss of substantial parts, which means that he cannot affirm (a), since for him the substance S_1 ceased to exist with the loss of the arm. Whenever a soldier loses any part, however small, it becomes a *different substance*. A substance, for Brentano, can survive only the loss of its accidents, not of its substantial parts. Thus for Brentano all substantial parts are essential, a fact which he acknowledges by insisting on the word ‘*Wesen*’ (‘essence’) as a parallel translation with *Substanz* of Aristotle’s *ousia*. From this it follows however that those ordinary things which are susceptible to change of parts – brooms, ships, houses, soldiers – are for Brentano not enduring things at all. They are *entia successiva*.²⁴

Aristotle’s conception of the relation of whole and part is in this respect more commonsensical than Brentano’s, for we do seem to accept that we can lose arms or kidneys or ears, as well as toothaches and bruises, and yet still remain the same (same person, same thing). On the other hand the thesis of actualism, too, has some support in common sense. Thus we may be tempted to suppose of a thing extended in space (a cloud, for example), that its spatial parts exist in the same sense and with the same degree of actuality as does the whole. That is, we do not suppose that their being parts is essential to them, that they would suddenly graduate from potentiality to actuality should the other parts of the thing cease to exist. We suppose, with Brentano, that they ‘would as surely remain unchanged as the earlier part of a motion would remain unchanged if the motion, instead of continuing, should be broken off’ (1933, pp. 106f., Eng. pp. 84f.). From this we can conclude, somewhat lamely, that actualism holds of some sorts of parts, potentialism of others.

The Brentanian picture of the relation between substance and accident can be made to work however only against the background of a universally actualist theory of whole-part relations, a theory which insists that all parts of things and all collectives or multiplicities of things are things in their own right. All parts of things are things, because anything we might be tempted to describe

24. See Chisholm 1976, ch. III.

as a part of a thing which is not itself a thing is for that very reason not acceptable to Brentano as a part.

6. *Places and Times*

Brentanian accidents, as we have seen, may themselves serve as the bearers of further accidents, may be accidentally extended in different ways, in principle without limit. This process must, however, have a determinate starting point; there must be ultimate substances: 'It is inconceivable that anything should contain a subsisting part without containing a first or primary subsisting part [*ein erstes Subsistierendes*]' (1933, p. 150, Eng. p. 114). This is because Brentano excluded as absurd the idea of an actual infinity.²⁵

But what then are the ultimate substances of Brentano's ontology? One group of ultimate substances we have met already: they are the mental substances or souls which become accidentally augmented to form those half-way familiar things we call hearers, thinkers, haters. It is natural to suppose that the remaining ultimate substances in the Brentanian ontology are just material or concrete things, and Brentano's philosophy has often been interpreted along these lines, particularly by those who would see him as having anticipated a reist or concretist doctrine of the sort propounded by Leśniewski or Kotarbiński (discussed in Chapter Seven below). Brentano himself however finds unacceptable the doctrine that material things are ultimate substances. For if a material thing is a substance, then a material thing at a place would have to be an accident. Yet the idea that being at a place – as contrasted with being at some *specific* place (being in Salzburg, being in the Lyceum) – might be a merely accidental property of a material thing is in Brentano's view absurd. Absurdity does not ensue, however, if we regard non-mental substances as being constituted by the very places which material things – as we normally conceive them – occupy. And then, since places themselves inhere in nothing further, nothing will stand in the way of our considering such places as the ultimate corporeal substances.

25. His arguments for this are summarized in Rogge 1935, pp. 106f.

Kastil expresses Brentano's view at the time of the *Theory of Categories* as follows:

The [corporeal] accident – as sensation shows us in the qualitative determinations of its primary object – is not something beside or outside place, but something that includes this as its subject. (1951, p. 182)

Some places are qualified by being red places, hard places, Chisholmy places. Other places are 'empty' in the sense that they are not the substantial bearers of any qualitative determinations.

The totality of places is itself a substance, a certain spatial continuum. Movement within this continuum is not, as we normally suppose, a matter of the perseverance of one thing through a continuum of places which it successively occupies. For any movement of a physical body (i.e. of a certain complex qualitative accident of a place, a 'sensible spatial magnitude') would, on Brentano's account, signify the loss of its substance (its place), and therefore also its ceasing to exist. Movement is rather to be understood as a matter of neighbouring parts of the unitary spatial substance experiencing in succession a chain of similar accidental determinations. A red dot 'moving' across the landscape is in fact a continuum of redness-accidents comprehending a succession of different places (though the apparent unacceptability of such claims may come to be seen in a different light if one takes account of the fact that Brentano treats the external world as in some sense a mere phenomenal 'surface'²⁶).

At the very end of his life, Brentano considers the following hypothetical view of the physical world:


One might go so far as to conjecture that the totality of what is bodily would be to be conceived as a single stationary corporeal substance which, as Lord Kelvin's homogeneous fluid is supposed to contain here and there vortices, would be afflicted here and there with certain particular accidents. In this case the laws of mechanics, as well as those of physics, chemistry and physiology, would pertain to these accidents, to their changes and interactions. This stationary unitary substance would take the place of the aether. And in place of what had been formerly regarded as the substance of corporeal matter, there would be accidents which, attaching to the single substance, would spread themselves from one part of it to another. (1933, p. 298, Eng. p. 209)

26. See the Appendix to his 1933.

With this, Brentano cuts himself free, irreconcilably, from the Aristotelian ontology in which so much of his thinking had its roots. The single most important respect in which Brentano's view of accidents differs from that of Aristotle is however in regard to the treatment of time. For Brentano treats location in time, too, not as an accidental but as a substantial determination. There are no things which are not also temporal things. But further, there are no things which are not also things existing now, in the unique temporal moment which is the present. For Brentano there is only *one* temporal determination, which all things share in common. Thus it is as if, with each successive instant of time, an entire new complement of worldly furniture comes into being to replace the old. This occurs, however, in such a way that there obtains a pre- (or constantly re-)established harmony between the microcosmos of perception and thought and the macrocosmos of qualitatively extended things. Some of the most beautiful – and bizarre – pieces of Brentanian metaphysics are devoted to the subject of that *concursum dei* by which this continuous process of recreation (and continuous re-establishment of the link called 'intentionality') is kept on the road.²⁷

Newton, we might say, sees time and space as mutually separable. Einstein sees time and space as mutually dependent. Brentano, in contrast, sees space as one-sidedly dependent on (inseparable from) time. Time can exist without space, but not vice versa. The obvious implication is that space, and selves, are simply accidents of time, generating something like the following simple and elegant view of the universe of contingently existing things:

27. See e.g. 1933, pp. 247f, Eng. p. 178; Rogge 1935 (pp. 109ff., 192f.), 1939; Seiterich 1936, esp. part 3.



The present moment, on a view of this sort, would be the single contingently existing substance, and all other contingently existing entities would be accidents thereof. I myself would then stand to the present moment in just the same relation that my present act of thinking stands to me.

Brentano himself cannot accept a view of this sort. For a substance, as already mentioned, has not merely the job of providing the *foundation* for its accidents, it must also provide their *individuation*. This is a job which time (the present moment) cannot perform, for it is the same for everything that exists. To build this aspect into our theory would require a treatment of Brentano's complex and difficult theory of species and generality. That, however, is another chapter in Brentano's ontology.

Chapter Four

Anton Marty

On Being and Truth

1. *Brentano and Marty*

Being, for Aristotle, is an analogous term. It is said in many ways. We can distinguish above all between *being in the sense of the categories* and *being in the sense of being true*,¹ a distinction which served as the basis of the early Brentanian bicategorical ontology of *things* or *realia* on the one hand, and *entia rationis* or *irrealia* on the other. While Brentano abandoned an ontology of this sort, the idea was defended and elaborated by Anton Marty, who belonged to the very first generation of Brentano's students, and it is Marty's work which will be the subject of our present chapter.

Entia realia are for example a soul and its real constituents or 'divisives': (the various mental acts of presentation, judgment, love and hate). *Entia rationis* are for example a seen colour, a heard sound, but also entities such as *the existence of A* and *the non-existence of B*.² As we saw in Chapter Two, Brentano embraced in his early writings the doctrine that these and other objects of thought are not merely intentional but in fact immanent in consciousness, after the fashion of Aristotle's conception of the process of cognition as an interiorization of the form of the object cognized. The object of thought is something non-real which dwells in (*innewohnt*) a real substance (a thinker). Each object of thought is therefore sharply to be distinguished from any corresponding actual object (if there is one).

1. *Met.*, 1017^b31ff.

2. On the terminology of *ens rationis*, see e.g. Aquinas, *De Ente et Essentia*, c. 1, *In V. Metaph.*, lect. 9, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 16, 3 *ad* 2.

Brentano's reasoning here may be summarized as follows. At this stage he still agreed with what he took to be the Aristotelian view that a collective cannot be real, because one substance cannot be made of many.³ On the other hand, however, he believed that when we think of an object, then this object is in some sense *in* our consciousness. It follows that the thought object as such must be distinct from any independent substance; it must be merely immanent to consciousness and can be referred to also as the 'content' of the act in question. Thus the content of an act of sensory presentation is an intentionally in-existent datum of sense (a 'physical phenomenon', in Brentano's terms).

With the move to reism of the later Brentano all *irrealia* or *entia rationis*, and all divisives and other non-thingly parts of things, as well as all acts and other events, are dismissed as fictitious.⁴ We should talk, Brentano now says, not of mental acts or mental phenomena but of 'thinkers' or 'thinking things'. Moreover, all thinking things relate exclusively in their thinking to other things (and to themselves) as their objects.

For Marty, on the other hand, 'being' retains its status as an analogous concept. Marty can be said to have refined and extended Brentano's own earlier commitment to this idea, and to have constructed a bicategorical ontology of *realia* and *irrealia* and an associated theory of truth as correspondence out of what, in Brentano's early writings, is little more than matter for passing remarks.

In the strict and proper sense, according to Marty's theory, 'to be' means 'to be real', a notion which we can understand, roughly speaking, as signifying the capacity to enter into causal relations. Here causal relations themselves are understood in such a way that only what is actual – and not mere powers, possibilities or dispositions – can serve as their *relata*.⁵ Mental and physical substances and accidents have real being in this sense. In a wider sense, however, 'to be' means 'to exist'. Everything that exists is either real or non-

3. 1924, p. 222, Eng. p. 156; 1889a, ' 45 and the discussion of mereological potentialism in Chapter Three, Section 5, above.

4. See Kraus in Brentano 1924, vol. II, p. 310.

5. This applies only to the *Untersuchungen* of 1908 – it does not hold of Marty's thinking at the time of "Über subjektlose Sätze". Compare also Husserl's *Ideen* II (1952, p. 44), where the real is identified with what is substantial and able to enter into causal relations.

real. There is no golden mountain; but if there were, if a golden mountain existed, then it would be real. *The existence of an apple*, on the other hand, or *the non-existence of a golden mountain*, are nothing real, even if they do exist: they are non-real *entia rationis*.

Marty's opposition between the real and the non-real reflects the influence in nineteenth century Austria of ideas deriving from Bolzano. But the same opposition can be seen also in the work of Lotze, with whom Marty (like Stumpf and Frege) had studied in Göttingen.⁶ Thus it resembles Lotze's opposition between the 'sphere of being' (*Sein*) and the 'sphere of validity' (*Geltung*), as also Frege's opposition between the '*Wirkliche*' and the '*objektiv Nicht-wirkliche*' in the *Grundgesetze*.⁷

For Marty, as for Brentano, however, and in opposition to Bolzano, Lotze and Frege, everything that exists *exists now*, in the present moment. Thus, according to Marty, the real and the non-real exist in the same time. 'Past' and 'future' are modifying adjectives; they convert the nouns which they modify into merely fictional names,⁸ as in cases like 'cancelled performance', 'averted war', 'dead man' and so on.⁹ The existence in time of a real object typically involves continuous and manifold changes reflecting the manifold of causal relations in which it is involved. The existence in time of a non-real object, in contrast, may involve no change at all, and even where a non-real object is subject to change, this will typically consist merely in its coming into and then going out of existence as a reflection of certain specific changes in the real.

It holds of the real that it has and suffers effects and in this sense has a self-sufficient coming into and going out of existence; the non-real, in contrast, has a mere secondary becoming [*ein blosses Mitwerden*], i.e. it comes and goes only in that the real suffers effects (1908, p. 320).

6. See on this Marty 1884, p. 43n.

7. Frege 1893, p. xviii. Cf. Thiel 1968, p. 145. The term '*wirklich*' is derived from the German '*wirken*', which means: to have effects. See Marty 1908, ' 66.

8. Brentano 1976, n. 10 to the Editors' Introduction; Marty 1916, pp. 198ff.

9. We shall return to this issue of 'modification' in Section 2 of Chapter Five below.

Thus most irrealia undergo only discrete changes (they come into and go out of existence). Moreover, because irrealia cannot enter into causal changes, they cannot serve, either, as objects of intuition (of inner and outer perception) – something which may help to explain why so many philosophers dismiss irrealia *tout court*.

Martian irrealia, accordingly, have something in common with the ‘Cambridge changes’ of the analytic tradition.¹⁰ More precisely, they are analogous to what we might call ‘Cambridge states’ such as *being a father*, *being unheard of in Finland*, *being persona grata in South Africa*, and the like. These, too (if they are admissible entities at all), suffer only discrete changes and are more or less causally isolated from the realia on which they rest. To the class of irrealia in Marty’s sense there belong also such entities as claims, obligations, rights, debts, knighthoods, relations of ownership and authority, and so on, as well as certain abstract artefacts such as works of music and literature.

The non-real is ‘something which, when it comes into existence, is not brought about as an effect and when it goes out of existence does not do so directly in consequence of the ceasing of an effect.’ (1908, p. 321) Irrealia therefore have no history of change *in their own right*; but nor do they stand outside history: *the existence of Jim* begins to exist with the birth of Jim and ceases to exist when Jim dies; the collective class which is the *natio hungarica* begins to exist with the creation of the first Magyar noble and ceases to exist when the last Magyar noble dies. Certain non-real entities – for example the non-existence of the round square – do not come into or go out of existence. These, however, are not timeless; rather they exist *at all times*.¹¹ The non-real is, therefore, to be distinguished from Bolzano’s realm of the ‘in itself’. It is to be distinguished from the ideal, in Husserl’s sense of extra-temporal existence. And it is to be distinguished also from the ‘abstract’, as this term is understood by Frege and other analytic philosophers, for example in application to numbers, directions, meanings or sets. Importantly, the non-real, as Marty

10. See Mulligan and Smith 1986, § 2.4, and the references there given.

11. 1908, p. 328. Cf. Chisholm’s concept of ‘proposition’, as set out in his 1976, p. 123; propositions are distinguished from other events or states of affairs by the fact that they obtain, or fail to obtain, always.

conceives it, is entirely autonomous in relation to the activities of consciousness. It is not, therefore, to be confused with the *intentional* or *mind-dependent*, though there are cases – for example *the existence of Jim's thinking* – where something non-real involves a psychic process *per accidens*.

2. *Stumpf, Cantor and the Doctrine of Immanence*

The early Brentano, as we have seen, took a view of contents or objects of thought as not merely intentional but in fact immanent to consciousness. This immanentist strain in Brentano's thinking was further developed by Carl Stumpf who, among all the heirs of Brentano, remained most obedient to the claims of psychology. Stumpf is of particular relevance here in virtue of the fact that much of what follows will turn on the role, in Marty's (and Brentano's) philosophies, of '*Sachverhalte*' or 'states of affairs', and it is Stumpf who is responsible for having introduced the former expression as a technical term of philosophy. Already the early Brentano had used the term 'judgment-content'. The content of an act of judgment is for Brentano in the narrower sense the immanent content of that act of presentation on which the judgment rests. In a wider sense, however, it is an immanent entity *sui generis*, the correlate of the act of judgment as a whole. We can distinguish further between the positive judgment-content of an affirmative judgment to the effect that A exists, and the negative judgment-content of a negative judgment to the effect that A does not exist: the former might be referred to as *the existence of A*, the latter as *the non-existence of A*, both conceived as special entities somehow immanent to the judging subject.¹² The term '*Sachverhalt*' is introduced by Stumpf to designate the immanent content of a judgment in this wider sense.¹³

For Stumpf, ontology is a branch of psychology. Psychology itself has to do with three sorts of entities: *functions, appearances (Erscheinungen)*, and *formations (Gebilde)*. The latter, as we shall see, will correspond in some respects to the irrealia of Marty. Functions are just mental acts and processes;

12. Brentano 1889a, § 50.

13. See Stumpf 1907, p. 30 and compare Meinong 1910, pp. 101ff., Eng. pp. 76f. The earlier uses of '*Sachverhalt*' by Lotze and by the German logician Julius Bergmann did not, it seems, have any influence. On this whole issue see Smith 1992a.

appearances are, roughly speaking, the ‘ideas’ of British empiricism; formations are (for example) concepts, states of affairs, and values; they are not entities existing of themselves somewhere in the world, but rather the contents of corresponding functions – and only as such, Stumpf holds, can they be described and investigated.

Appearances and formations together make up the totality of what is given in mental acts and processes. They differ in that, as Stumpf puts it, appearances are given to us in ‘logical independence’ of the associated functions, that is, they are given as if they originate autonomously, in some separate sphere. Formations, on the other hand, are given to us only in ‘logical dependence’ on the corresponding functions. Moreover, formations are immanent; they exist only ‘in the context of the living being of the mind’.¹⁴

The peculiarity of this view is seen most clearly in the fact that Stumpf reckons not only concepts to the category of immanent formations, but also both discrete and continuous collectives or sums (*‘Inbegriffe’*). We can begin to make sense of what Stumpf has in mind here, however, if we reflect that his idea of a ‘science of formations’ was almost certainly influenced by the ‘theory of manifolds’ developed by Georg Cantor, a colleague of both Stumpf and Husserl in the University of Halle. Stumpf’s notion of immanent collective seems to have been inspired, more precisely, by Cantor’s definition of a set (*‘Menge’*) as ‘any collection into a whole of definite and well-distinguished objects of our intuition or our thought’, and there is a marked similarity between the examples of ‘set’ discussed by Cantor and the examples of immanent collective discussed by Stumpf.¹⁵

Where sense data as such are given to us as independent of the mind, sense data *qua* organized or collected are, Stumpf argues, taken up into consciousness, so that they are given to us as existing only as immanent parts of the relevant acts. A Stumpfian state of affairs, similarly, can exist only as the immanent content of an actually occurring judgment. On the other hand,

14. 1907a, p. 34; see also 1907, pp. 11, 32.

15. The stars are real, we might say, but the *constellations* exist only in our minds. See Cantor 1895/97, p. 282, 1887/88, pp. 421f. and compare Stumpf, 1907a, § 2. Gestalt qualities, too, belong to the category of immanent formations; they are conceived by Stumpf as special cases of *Inbegriffe*, namely those where there is a network of real relations between the elements summed. For a more detailed discussion see Chapter Eight, Section 2, below.

however, Stumpf wants to insist that the state of affairs itself does not enjoy the merely subjective status of our acts of thinking, feeling or willing. It is difficult to see how to make sense of this idea, as of similar formulations in the early Brentano, but we may suppose that Stumpf saw the state of affairs as being that immanent part of the relevant act which results when we strip away the subject-dependent qualitative moments to reveal, as it were, a common logical core.

Stumpf's coinage of '*Sachverhalt*' does, however, mark a step forward in the ontology of judgment in that it helped to crystalize the search on the part of his contemporaries for something on the side of the things themselves, some 'fact' or 'objective', to serve as that in virtue of which a judgment is true. This idea goes back at least as far as Abelard with his doctrine of the *rerum modus habendi se* developed in the *Dialectica*, and it was pursued especially by philosophers in the fourteenth century.¹⁶ It is, however, only with the turn of our present century that the idea took root to the extent that it was possible to conceive an ontology of *Sachverhalte* and like entities as a special discipline in its own right. The idea is present not only in Stumpf,¹⁷ but also in Husserl and Meinong. And similarly in his *Analysis of Mind* Russell defends on the one hand an immanentist conception of the contents of belief, but distinguishes on the other hand in addition to this content, i.e. to 'what a man is believing at a given moment' (a certain wholly determinate mental event), the 'objective' or 'actual fact that makes the belief true'.¹⁸

Marty agrees with Stumpf in the view that 'states of affairs and values [the contents of phenomena of interest] are not "things" ("*Wesen*")', for one tends to understand by this something real. And certainly they are not in any place, neither sensory nor extrasensory, for they admit of no spatial characterization at all.' (Marty 1908, p. 401) Unlike Stumpf, however, Marty

16. On Abelard see Nuchelmans 1982, pp. 200 f., on fourteenth century doctrines of the *Sachverhalt* see Tachau 1988, Perler 1990.

17. See his 1907a.

18. See Ch. XII, esp. pp. 233f. and 14f. Russell's position is in fact described as the 'Stumpf-Russell view' in a review of Russell's work by Oskar Kraus (1930, p. 59n). Russell's remarks here, and above all his use of the term 'objective', reveal an influence not only of Meinong but also of the other Brentanians. The similarity of Russell's views at this time to those of Wittgenstein has even been held by Kraus (*op. cit.*) to point to an influence of these Brentanian ideas on Wittgenstein, too.

wishes to provide an account of truth on a *Sachverhalt*-theoretic basis, and this rules out the idea that *Sachverhalte* might be immanent formations in the Stumpffian sense. States of affairs and values are, he tells us, ‘something in themselves’, existing independently of the context of the mind. It is not even the case that they are in some way generated by the latter and then ‘left behind as some sort of residue; rather, they are to be seen as materially prior to or as conditions for the possibility of certain special sorts of acts, namely those which in the sphere of judging and interest have the character of correctness.’ (*loc. cit.*) Once again, therefore, the non-real as Marty conceives it is not a matter of psychology: it is not to be confused with the immanent or the purely intentional. But nor is it to be confused with the non-existent. Non-real entities exist, no less than do the real.

The category of existent objects is understood by Marty – as by Brentano – as comprehending everything that can serve as the subject of a true affirmative judgment: it is a matter of being in the sense of being true.¹⁹ How, then, does Marty react to a view such as that of Meinong, according to which non-existent objects, too, may serve as the subjects of judgments of this sort? Certainly it is not possible that we should correctly affirm that the golden mountain exists. But we can, Meinong argues, correctly affirm that it is golden or that it is a mountain. This is Meinong’s famed ‘Principle of the Independence of Being and Being-So’.²⁰ Marty counters this principle by appealing to Brentano’s theory of the structure of judgments of predication.²¹ Just as judging in general is possible only on the basis of a presentation, so Brentano’s theory implies that there can be no judging of a being-so without a judging of being. I can, certainly, *present* a being-so without accepting the associated being. I can for example think of a unicorn as white without believing that a unicorn exists. ‘But whoever affirmatively judges a being-so, judges necessarily and unavoidably a double judgment, wherein, on the basis of the acknowledging of the subject there is built up as second judgment-relation the conferring of the

19. Cf. Brentano 1889a, § 50.

20. See Meinong, 1904, p. 82 of trans., and Lambert 1983, Ch. 2, III.

21. Brentano 1924, vol. II, pp. 163ff., Eng. pp. 295ff.; 1956, § 30.

predicate.²² The true affirmative judgment of being-so is therefore possible, Marty concludes, only in a peculiar (merely one-sidedly detachable) complication with the acknowledging of a corresponding being, that is to say of something which, even if it is not real, is at least existent.

Consider the following univocity argument put forward by the later Brentano in defence of his ontology of things. Brentano holds that that which *is*, in the strict or literal sense of the word, is identical with that which is correctly to be acknowledged. Moreover, that which is correctly to be acknowledged is identical with that which is correctly to be affirmed *in the present tense*. But, Brentano argues, ‘nothing other than a thing can ever correctly be affirmed in this way’: ‘However different the objects of our thinking may be, all of them must fall under the most general concept, namely, that of a *thing*, an *ens reale*. If this were not the case, the name “thinker” (i.e. “one who thinks something”) would be equivocal.’ (1933, p. 18, Eng. p. 24)

Marty can be said, in a sense, to have turned this argument on its head: if whatever can be the subject of a true affirmative judging exists, and if irrealia can be the subjects of true affirmative judgments, then irrealia, too, exist. If we use ‘object’ to refer to anything that can be presented, then, Marty argues, since it does not belong to the essence of presentation that it can apply only to what is real, ‘it follows that – even if only what is real were as a matter of fact presented – the two concepts of “object” and “real” ... would not be identical.’ (1916, p. 152) This shows that Marty is not simply the voice of his master, but a thinker in his own right, one who occupies in his ontology a point that is mid-way between Brentano and Meinong. Thus he agrees with Brentano in rejecting *tout court* the whole motley crew of ideal objects, universal or general objects, immanent objects, intentional objects, abstract and non-existent objects propounded by Meinong, Husserl, Frege, Bolzano *et al.*; yet he disagrees in two-fold fashion with Brentano’s view that only things exist, in that he accepts both non-thingly irrealia and also realia lying outside the realm of causal change entirely. In what follows, then, we must investigate in what sense his ontology may be said to represent a stable and acceptable compromise between the correlative and the lean.

22. Marty 1908, p. 352.

3. *Bases and Operations*

Real entities, for Marty, are:

- in the physical sphere: physical substances and their accidents,
- in the psychic sphere: psychic substances and the psychic processes which are their accidents.

All real entities are therefore either substances or accidents, a thesis which will provide an important instrument for picking out irrealia in the pages that follow. The reader should however beware of understanding Marty's accidents in Brentanian terms, i.e. as thingly entities which comprehend their substances as parts.²³ Marty tells us only, with Aristotle, that accidents 'inhere' in their substances. Hence not all realia, for Marty, are 'things' in the reistic sense.

Non-real entities are:

- collectives (see 4. below)
- relations (4.)
- space (5.)
- states of affairs (*Sachverhalte*) or 'contents of judgments' (6.)
- values (*Wertverhalte*) or 'contents of phenomena of interest' (9.)

This is not, by any means, an exhaustive list. Other examples of non-real objects mentioned by Marty are *lacks* or *privations*, the *merely possible* and the *impossible*. These last examples will exercise our attentions only peripherally in what follows. It is useful to mention them here, however, since they will give us some preliminary insight into the reasons for what initially seems to be a certain lack of discrimination in Marty's ontology.

Consider, first of all, why it is that lacks, as contrasted with surfeits, are picked out by Marty (as by Aristotle)²⁴ for special treatment. This is because, wherever a surfeit exists, there exists also some thing or collective of things with which the surfeit in question can be identified. Where there is a lack or privation, on the other hand, there is *ex hypothesi* no such thing. Yet lacks, like surfeits, may surely be the subjects of true affirmative judgments. In relation to the merely possible and impossible, too, there is lacking any currently existing

23. This is referred to as the 'B'-view in Chapter Three above.

24. E.g. *Met.*, 1019^b6, 1032^a4, 1033^a10ff., 1069^b34. See also Brentano 1862, p. 37f., Eng. p. 25 and Twardowski 1894, p. 36, Eng. p. 34.

real object which could serve as truth-maker for sentences about the (putative) entities in question. And in regard to these entities, too, it is clear that, if they are accepted as existents at all, then only as non-real objects, for they neither have nor suffer effects.

To put some order into the superficial chaos of Martian irrealia, consider a second Brentanian argument against entities of the given sort. This argument was directed specifically against states of affairs, necessities, impossibilities and the like, and thus also against Bolzanian '*Wahrheiten an sich*' and other *entia rationis*. Bolzano, as is well known, believed that 'truths in themselves' are required in order to guarantee the objectivity of knowledge. Meinong, similarly, believed that non-existent and various other special kinds of objects are required in order to guarantee the objectivity of certain sorts of intentional reference. All theories which purport to embrace such supposed classes of *entia rationis* are, Brentano claims, absurd. For let us suppose that we were to hold that there exists not only a thing A, but also the truth that A exists. Then of this latter, too, we could truly say that *it* exists, so that there would exist also the truth that this truth exists, and so on *in infinitum*. Similarly if A were not, then there would exist also the truth that A were not, and also the truth that this truth existed, and so on *in infinitum*. And neither in the positive nor in the negative case would this regress come to an end:

there would exist, from eternity to eternity, infinitely many *entia rationis*, and in particular an infinity of impossibilities, of beings of impossibilities, non-beings of the non-beings of these and countless other impossibilities, further infinite totalities of non-beings of objects, and so on. All arguments against the infinitely many can therefore be turned against this doctrine, which clearly manages only to create invincible embarrassments without performing any sort of service. (Kastil 1951, pp. 104f., paraphrasing Brentano)

We are not concerned here with the validity of this Brentanian argument against irrealia. (We pause only to note that, among Meinong and his associates in Graz, the regress in question was accepted without qualms as entirely non-vicious. Bolzano had earlier used it as the basis of a famous proof that there is an infinity of truths in themselves.²⁵) The argument is of interest, rather, because it suggests the rationale underlying the apparent *pot-pourri* of Martian

25. 1837, § 32; 1851, p. 13.

irrealia. For the latter seem all of them to have in common the possibility of becoming associated with an infinite hierarchy of the given sort. This is most obviously true in the case of collectives (or of sets), where the hierarchy in question is that which results when we admit as objects not only collectives of things but also collectives of collectives, collectives of collectives of collectives, and so on, *in infinitum*. But it applies also to values, where we have the hierarchy which results when we recognize not only the goodness of A but also the goodness of the goodness of A, the goodness of the badness of B, and so on.²⁶ We similarly have a hierarchy of possibilities, of necessities, and even of lacks (lacks of lacks), and so on.²⁷

In each case we have one or more operations O:

- the existence of ()
- the possibility of ()
- the necessity of ()
- the value of ()

applied recursively to a certain class of objects a, b, c, ... – the ‘basis’ of the operation – together with an infinite hierarchy which is generated in virtue of the fact that the results of applying this operation:

$$O(a), O(b), O(c), \dots, O(O(a)), \dots, O(O(O(a))), \dots, \text{etc.},$$

which are assumed to be distinct, are themselves such as to fall within the basis of the operation and therefore capable of serving as starting-point for further applications of O *in infinitum*.

26. This iteration of ethical characters plays an important role in the objectivist ethics defended by Brentano in his 1889, e.g. pp. 84ff., Eng. pp. 90f. See also Chisholm 1986.

27. See e.g. 1930, p. 96, Eng. pp. 86f.; Sziednicki 1965, p. 32. Cf. also 1930, pp. 126f., Eng. pp. 111f., where Brentano’s regress argument is applied to ‘part’ and other related operations.

A regress of this sort is illustrated already by the familiar Bradleyan argument against external relations. If we write ‘ $R(a,b)$ ’ for ‘the relation between a and b ’, and if we allow ‘ $R(a,b)$ ’, wherever it is defined, to refer to an object belonging to the basis B of the operation R , then B threatens to include also what we might call the Bradleyan objects $R(a,R(a,b))$, $R(R(a,b),b)$, $R(a,R(a,R(a,b)))$, etc. – objects of which (if Bradley’s argument holds) it could in truth be said that they ‘create invincible embarrassments without performing any sort of service’.²⁸

When once a regress of the given sort has been set in train, however, then, it seems that we can get off the train at whichever point we please (or can reasonably justify²⁹). The later Brentano, given his rejection of the actual infinite and his new-found abhorrence of all *entia rationis*, chooses in almost every case to disembark before the journey has even started: he typically disallows entirely the capacity of operations of the given sorts to generate separate or categorially distinct objects. There are no values, relations, judgment-contents, but only valuable things, relative things, judging things, etc., and where no suitable thing presents itself (‘possible thing’, ‘lacking thing’, ‘past thing’, etc.), then the associated adjectives are analyzed away as ‘modifying’. Marty, on the other hand, chooses to disarm the regress by stopping it after the first round. This he does by defining, for each operation O applied to realia, a new and separate category of irrealia which is to comprehend the results of applying the given operation to realia as basis. Because the $O(a)$ need themselves no longer belong in the basis of O , the possibility of a harmful iteration may be excluded.³⁰ A bicategorical ontology can in this way forestall an infinite regress.

This is a somewhat speculative reconstruction of Marty’s reasoning. As we shall see, he himself gives distinct arguments to support the recognition of

28. On the Bradley regress argument and its connection to the ontology of facts see Olson 1987.

29. Compare the way in which the different systems of modal logic represent different coherently defensible solutions to the problem of how far the iteration of basic operators like ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’ is to be allowed to go in generating new modal operators.

30. See, on the parallel case of relations, his 1910, p. 66.

distinct classes of putative irrealia in each separate case. The reconstruction will, however, serve to give some overall sense to Marty's apparently disconnected deliberations. Moreover, it will point to certain affinities between Marty's ontology on the one hand and parallel work by his contemporaries and successors on what one might call the theory of object-generation on the other.

We can distinguish two opposed types of attitude to that *embarras de richesses* to which operations of the given sort may seem to give rise. On the one hand are the sceptical-reductionist attitudes of those who seek to call into question the supposed ontological fertility of the operations at issue, or who seek to show that the objects they generate belong to categories already recognized. The later Brentano, as will now be clear, falls squarely within this sceptical-reductionist camp. On the other hand are the attitudes, found particularly among mathematicians, of those who seek to nurture and at the same time to regiment the productive capacities of such operations in ways which will allow them to yield objects of new sorts – not merely at random, but in such a way that the objects in question will be capable of *controlled manipulation* within the framework of a formal theory. The clearest illustration of the latter is provided by the case of Cantor, whose development of the theory of sets rests on a series of powerful strokes of generalization, each involving the stripping away of restrictions on set-formation previously taken for granted by mathematicians, in such a way as to give rise to an ever stronger formal instrument for the manipulation of an ever more comprehensive domain of *sui generis* collective objects.³¹

Cantor's work is however merely one representative of a more widespread ontologizing current in the later nineteenth century, illustrated also in the work of Frege and in Husserl's work on the theory of 'collective combination' in his *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, a work which was itself in part inspired by Cantor.³² Ontologization is illustrated further by the theory of Gestalt qualities put forward by Ehrenfels, by the 'production theory' of the Meinong school in Graz, and also by successively more sophisticated theories of intensional objects (possible worlds, *qua* objects, arbitrary objects, etc.)

31. See the discussion of this aspect of Cantor's work in Dauben 1979.

32. See also Mulligan 1980 on the role of the concept of operation in other early writings of Husserl, and on similar ideas in the work of Wittgenstein.

which have been developed within the province of formal semantics in recent years.³³

In each of the cases mentioned we have some operation or collection of operations, more or less formally specified, giving rise to a family of entities in some new category when applied recursively to some basis of more or less familiar entities. Through his theory of the set-forming operation, Cantor tamed (or thought he had tamed) the notion of collective. Early proponents of the ontology of facts, including Stumpf, Meinong, Russell and Wittgenstein, with their theories of fact-forming operations like *the existence of* or *das Bestehen von*, supposed themselves to have tamed the notion of fact or *Sachverhalt*. Bolzano, Frege and others, with their theories of operations like *the sentence in itself that*, *the judgeable content that*, and so on, held that they had similarly tamed the notion of a proposition or bearer of truth. In this way they set in train a process which gave rise to that special sort of rule-governed object-manipulation we now call ‘propositional logic’.

The importance of the work of Brentano and his followers lies on the one hand in the fact that they contributed in a positive way to the developments in question. Thus Twardowski, as we shall see, exerted a decisive influence in this respect on the early development of propositional logic in Poland. On the other hand however they preserved in relation to the ontologizing tendencies of their day the attitude of the psychologist, seeking to bring the newly unveiled families of objects (propositions, states of affairs, collectives, etc.) down to a level where their role in cognition could become apparent. They asked questions, for example, about the dependence of generated objects upon associated mental acts, striving thereby to hold a balance between a reductionistic psychologism at the one extreme and a formalism or Platonizing objectivism at the other.³⁴

33. See above all in this respect the work of Fine, esp. his 1977, 1982, 1985.

34. See Willard 1984 and the treatment of Husserl and Twardowski in Chapter Six below.

4. *Collectives and Relations*

In his *Theory of Categories* Brentano canvases a way of rendering harmless a regress of the sort described in the case of collectives (*Mengen*, sets, *Inbegriffe*) by identifying the given entities as special sorts of things. The threat of proliferation in *infininitum* is, he argues, averted by identifying all collectives of the second and higher orders with the corresponding first-order collectives obtained by cumulation.³⁵ Thus the first-order collective of all currently existing red things is that dispersed and discontinuous thing whose parts are all and only the red objects now existing in the universe. The harmlessness of first-order collectives is in turn guaranteed by the fact that the latter are not viewed as supernumerary abstracta or ‘sets’ in the technical sense. Collectives are not *extra* entities at all:

It would indeed be a strange kind of arithmetic if one were to add to the two things which are individual oxen that thing which is two oxen, and then speak of *three* things. This would be just as misguided as it would be if, in reflection of the fact that an apple can be halved in arbitrarily many directions, someone were to answer the question ‘How many half apples do I have?’ by saying ‘More than a thousand.’ (Brentano 1933, p. 50, Eng. p. 46.)

Marty, too, sees collectives as behaving differently from sets as conceived by Cantor. Thus both Martian and Brentanian collectives differ from Cantorian sets in being truncated at the first type, in the absence of an empty set, and in the fact that they may be subject to the vagaries of time (may come into and go out of existence in reflection of the vicissitudes of their members – recall, once more, the case of stellar constellations). Marty and Brentano differ from each other, however, in the fact that the former refuses to allow that collectives can be real – and here, paradoxically, Marty exploits just that argument which Brentano had directed against his own earlier commitment to judgment-contents and other irrealia. ‘To be sure’, Marty writes, ‘no one is going to deny that the being together of that which is collected ... is in a certain sense something new in relation to the members’. But it is not a new *reality*, for otherwise ‘one would be led to a multiplication of reality in *infininitum*.’ (1908, p. 320)

35. Brentano’s generalized notion of ‘collective’ thus corresponds to Leonard and Goodman’s ‘fusion’ (1940). His views are similar also to those of Lesniewski and Kotarbiński, dealt with in Chapter Seven below.

Why, then, could Marty not accept collectives as real in the way that this was done by Brentano? As we have noted, all real entities for Marty, fall into one or other of the two interrelated classes of substances and accidents, conceived more or less after the fashion of Aristotle and the Scholastics. A collective of substances cannot be real, since if it were, then it would have to be either a substance or an accident. It is not the latter (for which substance should it be an accident of?); but it cannot be the former, either, for then unified accidents (states or processes) would have to be capable of being ascribed to it, and Marty finds unacceptable the idea that collective substances should have unified accidents. A supposed 'unified will of the people', he insists, is merely a qualitative identity of will on the part of each one of a number of individual persons.³⁶ The case is similar, on Marty's view, with the relation of similarity. That two white horses are similar in colour may certainly be true; but this similarity is, from the point of view of what is real, nothing new in addition to the absolute colour-determinations of each horse – 'otherwise we should once more stand before the impossible assumption that a multiplicity of things should be the carrier of a unified real property'. (1908, p. 332)

It is difficult to know what to make of arguments such as this on Marty's part, arguments which seem to rest on the peculiarities of certain well-chosen examples. (Thus it would be interesting to know how Marty would deal with apparently irreducibly collective accidents such as surroundings, quarrels, battles, and the like.) There may, however, be a grain of truth in what he has to say, in that we do, at least in many cases, have a strong temptation to regard talk of collective things as reducible, in some way, to talk of single parts or members. Collectives are conceived, in this sense, as 'nothing real'. On the other hand, however, we are not disposed to regard collective nouns as merely empty. Collectives, accordingly, might most appropriately be classed as irrealia, a view which may raise echoes of Leibniz's conception of aggregates as non-real *phaenomena bene fundata*. They will then belong neither among the substances nor among the accidents. They will have realia as parts, but will be, as it were, relatively isolated from these parts, being affected only by those changes in the latter which consist in a ceasing to exist (and any such change is such as to bring about the destruction of the collective also). In this sense we

36. 1908, pp. 320, 331f. Cf. Kotarbiński 1966, p. 489.

can say that the Martian collective necessitates the existence of its parts, or, equivalently, that it is existentially dependent on these parts.

Intentionality for the early Brentano is in every case a relation in the genuine sense, relating the act of a subject to an immanent content of this act, both of which exist in the fullest sense, though only one of which is real. Later, Brentano grafted onto this theory of intentionality a theory of two ‘modes’ of directedness towards a thing. On the one hand is the ‘*recto*’ mode, which conforms to the earlier notion of intentionality in the sense that its object must always exist. On the other hand is the ‘*obliquo*’ mode, which may relate us (in the weakest possible sense) even to what does not exist.

To see what is at issue here we must recognize that the later Brentano’s preferred account of relations takes the form of a theory of *relative things* or ‘things with relative determinations’. This theory may be summarized as follows. When we think of one thing in relation to another, this always involves a certain sort of complex of presentations. One thing is thought of directly (*in modo recto*), the other is thought of merely obliquely (*in modo obliquo*).³⁷ When, for example, one thinks of a *thing that is taller than Socrates*, then one has the thing as object *in modo recto*, Socrates as object *in modo obliquo*.

That which is presented *in modo recto* must exist, if that which is relative is to exist. But that which is presented *in modo obliquo* need not exist – except in quite special cases, such as e.g. that of an evident affirmer, who cannot exist unless the thing that is affirmed by him exists. (1933, p. 169, Eng. p. 127)

It is for this reason that it is possible for us to think – though at most *modo obliquo* and in the absence of evidence – about that which (for Brentano) does not exist, for example ghosts, demons, fictional characters, and objects in the past or in the future. This account applies also in relation to colours and tones and to the other physical phenomena described by Brentano in the *Psychologie*, the relative sense. What exist are acts of colour- and tone-sensation. Colours and tones themselves, on the new dispensation, exist neither outside consciousness nor as immanent parts thereof. Thus also they cannot be ‘experienced’. The property of being experienced in fact applies only to the acts (the ‘mental phenomena’) of sensation. These have colours and tones as their

37. The idea goes back to Ockham; see e.g. Adams 1987, vol. I, p. 321.

objects, but the ‘have’, here, is to be understood merely in the sense of a relative determination.³⁸

Marty, in contrast, finds something unsatisfactory in an account of relations purely in terms of relative determinations. It has the effect, he argues, of making relations into something subjective, into a mere special way of treating or presenting the objects involved, objects which might be, in themselves, entirely unrelated. A subjectivist view of this sort was held, again, by Stumpf,³⁹ but it is rejected out of hand by Marty, who holds that nothing could be more wrong than to suppose that relations exist only in and through our acts of presentation or of noticing.

We find them there before us, and if this were not so, if they were a product of our psychic activity, then how would things stand with regard to the objectivity of our entire knowledge of nature? For the latter of course relates only to relations, not to the absolute determinations of place, mass, magnitude, etc. (Marty 1908, p. 468)⁴⁰

Relations must be objective, then, for otherwise science would be impossible.

The elimination of relations in favour of complex presentations provides at best an account of those putatively relational structures captured by relational sentences of which it is not necessary that both termini of the relation exist. Where the existence of both termini is necessary, however – for example in the case of correct judgments (where act and object must both exist) and in the case of causal relations (where cause and effect must both exist⁴¹) – then Marty speaks of *correlations*, insisting that these require a different treatment.

Brentano himself provides the germ of a non-subjectivistic account of relations of this sort in a series of passages in the *Theory of Categories* which seems to contradict his official theory of relative things and of *recto/obliquo* modes. The fact that a plurality of things is itself a thing is taken by Brentano here to imply the possibility of recognizing relations as *accidents of collectives*

38. Brentano 1930, pp. 117f., Eng. pp. 103f. Cf. Marty 1908, pp. 397f., 1910, pp. 66f.

39. See his 1907, p. 37.


40. Cf. also 1916, pp. 150, 165, Husserl LU VI ‘61, Reinach 1989 137ff. (=1911, ‘19 of trans.), and Johansson 1990.

41. For Marty and Brentano cause and effect must exist both at the same time, in the sense that they must border on each other temporally. The two philosophers are at odds, in this respect, with Aristotle (e.g. at *Anal. post.*, 95^b1ff). See Brentano 1976, Part II, Ch. II, Sect. 6.

(in the Brentanian sense of ‘accident’). As we saw, accidents in this sense can be accidents of a collective as such. Such accidents will themselves have parts, each of which holds of some part-substance within the collective as a whole. Thus an egg, for example, has the accident *multicoloured*, in virtue of the fact that one part is red, another blue, and so on.

Whether I say that the egg is multicoloured or say of one of its parts that it is of a different colour from another it comes to the same thing. From this one sees that in the case of relations we are dealing with what might be called collective determinations. We are dealing with a plurality of things which are united into one thing, and where a certain determination applies to the whole in virtue of its various parts. (1933, pp. 57f., Eng. p. 50)

Following the diagrammatic conventions introduced above, a relational accident in this Brentanian sense would look like this:



Such an accident – a Brentanian ‘correlation’ – is a special kind of thing, and is no less real, and no less consciousness-independent, than things of other sorts.

For Marty, on the other hand, correlations, like collectives, are non-real – despite the fact that, as just mentioned, they are such that we ‘find them there before us’. This applies first of all to correlations such as likeness, difference, contrast, etc., whose non-reality may be taken as unproblematic. But it applies also to the correlation of causality itself (which does not change the fact that only what is real can be a cause or an effect).

Consciousness or intentionality, too, is understood by Marty primarily in terms of a correlation. Consciousness, as Marty conceives it, is ‘an actual or possible ideal adequation to something that we call its object or content’. Moreover consciousness is an assimilation whose existence is given with

immediate evidence.⁴² And it must be non-real: ‘For to which class of realia would the ideal conformity between psychic functions and their contents belong? This can, after all, be neither psychical nor physical.’ (Marty 1908, p. 333) We shall have more to say about relations of this sort below.

5. *Space*

According to Brentano’s first theory of space in the *Theory of Categories*, a place is a mutually dependent moment of a quality. There is no quality that is not at some place in space, but also no place that is not also corporeal, i.e. filled with some quality: ‘the determination of place is so intimately unified with the determination of quality, that they individuate each other mutually.’ (Brentano 1933, p. 89, Eng. p. 72)

This first view of space recalls that of Descartes: not only is there no mind that is not thinking, for Descartes, so also there is no place without an extension that would fill it. Descartes’ extension is however filled by quantity – and not by quality as on the Brentanian view – so that Brentano is in fact closer to the doctrine defended, for example, by Berkeley, for whom it is evident

that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in my mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. (Berkeley, *Principles*, Part I, 10)

Similarly on the first Brentanian view: just as the determination ‘red’ contains the determination ‘spatial’, so the determination ‘is at place L’ contains the determination ‘qualitative’, so that:

If we ascend from the concept of that which is red to the concept of that which is coloured and from there to the concept qualitatively-determined, then we come to the same concept – the concept of that which is corporeal, as qualitative *and* spatial, i.e. to the concept qualitatively-space-filling. (1933, pp. 35f., Eng. p. 36)

According to Brentano’s later view of space, in contrast, places are themselves substances which may, but need not, be comprehended by qualities as their accidents. In this way places, as we saw, have the primary job of

42. Marty 1916, p. 166.

individuating the accidental determinations with which they are associated,⁴³ and Brentano took so seriously the view that places individuate things that he was prepared to swallow the consequence that corporeal motion is impossible, as is any change of size or shape.

Here, as elsewhere, Marty seeks a position more straightforwardly commonsensical than that of his master, even at the price of a certain sort of theoretical inelegance. In order to save the view according to which bodies can move from place to place, he develops a conception of space as something non-real, as a ‘non-real possibility of local determinations’. (1908, p. 320n.) Thus for Marty, too, space can exist even in the absence of bodies and of all qualitative determinations. Because, however, substances are both actual (as opposed to merely possible) and real, it follows that the places which make up this Martian space cannot be substantial. They are rather what Marty calls *subsistents*; they are like substances in that they inhere in nothing, but unlike substances in being non-real.⁴⁴

Space, then, on Marty’s view, is a non-real continuum of places. A body does not stand to the place it occupies in the relation of accident to substance: bodies do not inhere in space, and a body and its place are not bonded together, as are a substance and its accident, to make the real unity of a thing. Rather, a body stands to its place in what Marty refers to as ‘the relation of a conditioned continuum to a conditioning continuum’. (1916, p. 182) Which region of the conditioning continuum (space) conditions a given conditioned continuum (a body) is then a contingent matter. Bodies can be conditioned by *different* space-continua, and the change from one conditioning continuum to another is what we call movement. Thus while Marty accepts, with Brentano, that accidents are individuated by their substances, he cannot accept that it is along these lines that we are to understand the relation between body and space. Space does not individuate body, precisely because movement is possible:

The body gets not its *individuation* from space, but the very possibility of being – and more particularly the possibility of manifesting those specific differences which

43. *Anal. post.*, 8^a25, *Met.*, 1030^b10ff., *Cat.*, 2^b1ff.

44. Marty uses the term ‘subsistent’ to characterize that which exists in such a way that there is nothing in which it inheres. He then defines substance as that which subsists and is real, accident as that which inheres and is real. Space thereby belongs to that which subsists but is non-real. (1916, p. 177)

we call quantitative. The latter are only possible through participation in the conditioning continuum and in its analogous quantitative differences. (1916, p. 191)

Now, however, we can see that the cost of Marty's revision of Brentano's theory is the recognition of two sorts of space, the one related to the other by analogy. Marty is prepared to swallow a consequence of this sort. That is, he is prepared to accept that a body possesses a continuum of space-like qualities which is always and necessarily superposed on some structurally isomorphic but non-real continuum of places, the latter having been more or less temporarily filled by the former.

Marty's approach here is not new. It revives a dualistic conception of space (in origin theological), that was developed especially by Augustine in reaction to the monism of the Stoics, a conception according to which space is ontologically prior to the world of bodies.⁴⁵ The dualist doctrine was refined by the Dalmatian philosopher Francesco Patrizi (1529–1597), with his distinction between mathematical and physical space; it was taken up also by Gassendi, and above all by Hobbes (with his distinction between 'imaginary' and 'real' space in chapter VII *De corpore*), influencing also Newton's distinction between absolute and relative space. In this respect, though not in others, Brentano sides with proponents of a relativistic conception of the nature of space, where Marty sides with Newton.⁴⁶ It is, incidentally, in Gassendi that we find an early refined form of the view that 'being is not exhaustively divided into substance and accidents': space and time, too, exist and are neither the one nor the other.⁴⁷

45. See the valuable discussion of "Der Raum und die Weltvernichtung" in Sect. 3 of Schuhmann 1986. Cf. also Bolzano 1851, "40, 63 and Brentano 1976, Part II, Ch. I, Sect. 16.

46. For Brentano's criticisms of the Einsteinian cosmology, especially in regard to the supposed curvature of space, see his 1976, part 3, III.12f., and also part I, I.16f.

47. See *Syntagma*, Bk. 2, Ch. 1, as cited in Schuhmann 1986, pp. 275f. See also Bolzano 1851, '17.

6. *States of Affairs*

Marty's most important reason for embracing an ontology of irrealia relates however not to space but to the category of states of affairs or 'judgment-contents' and to the problem of developing a defensible correspondence theory of truth.⁴⁸ The Martian opposition between reality and non-reality is after all no more than an elaboration of just that Aristotelian distinction between *being in the sense of the categories* and *being in the sense of being true* with which this chapter began.

Marty's theory of states of affairs or judgment-contents – we shall use these terms interchangeably through the rest of this chapter – is similar in many ways to the theory of *Objektive* set forth by Meinong in his *On Assumptions*. Both judgment-contents and objectives are in a certain sense entities intermediate between judgments on the one hand and objects on the other. Moreover, both are divided into the two classes of 'judgment-contents of being' and 'judgment-contents of so-being', the former corresponding to existential judgments, the latter to predications. The theory bears some similarity also to Bolzano's theory of truths in themselves: both judgment-contents and truths in themselves are as it were the measure or standard to which an actual judging, if it is to be true, must conform. Marty's judgment-content differs from the Bolzanian truth in itself, however, in the fact that the former is a *truth-maker*, i.e. it is that in virtue of which a judgment is true, where in Bolzano's case we are dealing with something that is able to serve also or primarily as a *bearer* of truth. Entities cognate with truths in themselves may therefore serve also as bearers of falsehood.⁴⁹ Martian judgment-contents differ from Bolzanian truths in themselves also in that they are not ideal or extra-temporal: a judgment-content, like everything else, exists in time (exists now, or not at all).

48. On the evolution of Marty's theory of judgment-contents see Brentano 1930, p. 209, n. 145, Eng. p. 177, n. 44. In a letter to Kraus of 14 September 1909, Brentano wrote: 'it is true that at one time I treated the contents of judgments, as Marty does now, as though they could be the objects of presentations, judgments and emotions, just as things can be.' (Brentano 1924, vol. I, p. XLV, Eng. p. 383). This remark must, however, be taken with a pinch of salt, since Marty's judgment-contents, unlike those of the early Brentano, are not immanent to the mind of the judging subject.

49. See Morscher 1986 and 1990 for further clarification of this point.

Judgment-contents are, for all that, not real however, for a judgment-content does not have or suffer effects. Further, it is not dependent on any associated judgment. The Aristotelian formula ‘*adaequatio rei et intellectus*’ is to be read always in such a way that it is the *res* ‘which serves as authority or standard [as *das “Massgebende”*]’ for the relevant *intellectus*.⁵⁰ The judgment-content is that which ‘objectively grounds the correctness of our judgments; or, more precisely, that without which such judgments could not be correct or adequate.’ (1908, p. 295) The judgment, therefore, must bend itself to the whim of the judgment-content, which itself exists autonomously, depending only on those realia which form the subject-matter of the judgment. As Aristotle puts it: ‘It is not because we think truly that you are pale that you *are* pale, but because you are pale we who say this have the truth.’ (*Met.*, 1051^b7) Descartes, Spinoza, Locke and Leibniz are all Aristotelians in this respect. It was only with Kant that matters here came to be twisted around, in such a way that it would be as if the mind were somehow prior to (or ‘constitutive of’) its objects.

The concept of reality is for Marty simple. Like *red*, *tone*, *place*, *presentation*, it can be elucidated only by means of examples.⁵¹ The concept of existence, on the other hand, is a complex concept, gained through a special process of what he calls ‘reflexion’ on the concept of *true affirmative judgment*. Marty does, therefore, recognize one sort of relativity of objects to judgments. For while the former are in themselves prior in relation to the latter, in regard to our knowledge of the relevant concepts the dependence is reversed. We gained our concept of existence, Marty holds, ‘only through reflection on the correctness or truth of certain acts of judgment’. Marty sees the principal advantage of the term ‘judgment-content’ – as opposed to Meinong’s ‘*Objektiv*’ or Stumpf’s ‘*Sachverhalt*’ – in the fact that it makes clear that the thought of the judgment-content is impossible without the thought of the judgment (1908, p. 318).

This implies no sort of idealism or psychologism on Marty’s part. It is a *mark* of the concept of the existent that it is that which can be acknowledged in

50. Marty 1908, p. 312. Interestingly the term ‘*Massgebende*’ was employed also by the Munich phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, who developed a correspondence theory of truth similar in many respects to that of Marty; see Schuhmann 1990 for further details.

51. 1908, p. 318.

an evident judgment. But this does not imply that the absence of evident judgment would imply the annihilation of what exists.

Our knowledge of the concept of truth, similarly, is dependent on our knowledge of the concepts of judgment and judge:

When Husserl says that the sentence ‘A is true’ does not speak of anyone’s judging, not even of anyone quite generally,⁵² then this is correct, if what is meant thereby is that it is not at all *asserted* that someone now in fact judges in this way. But the *presentation* of some judge or other is undoubtedly involved in the thought ‘A is true or existent’. (Marty 1908, p. 307n.)

The reason for this priority lies in the fact that presentings, judgments and phenomena of interest are all real mental processes. They can therefore serve as objects of direct, intuitive inner presentations, something which, because we can have intuitions only of what is real, is ruled out for judgment-contents and other irrealia. The general concepts of judging, of phenomena of interest, etc., can thus be grasped through abstraction from intuitions of the corresponding real mental processes themselves. Thus, for example, to gain the general concept of judging we present to ourselves a succession of judging acts and attempt to pick out what they have in common. But how do we explain the origin of concepts like *existing thing*, *thing that is good*, *thing that is preferable*, etc.?

Given the quite general importance of this problem of the *origins* of concepts, not only for Brentano and Marty but also for the other Brentanians, including Stumpf and Husserl,⁵³ it will be useful to look more carefully at what this quest for ‘origins’ comes down to, i.e. at the different ways in which the Brentanians saw general concepts as being derived from the intuitive experiences which form – and this is the core of Brentano’s much-mooted ‘empirical standpoint’ – their necessary basis.

Note, first of all, that the term ‘concept’ itself means different things in the writings of different Brentanians. For the more orthodox Brentanians, talk of concepts is very much an abbreviated form of talk about certain kinds of presentations. For someone like Stumpf, on the other hand, a concept is an

52. LUI, A184, Eng. p. 190.

53. See e.g. Brentano 1889, Stumpf 1873 and Husserl, “The Analysis of the Concept of Number according to Origin and Content” (ch. IV of his 1891).

entity in its own right: it is the immanent content of an act of presentation, as a judgment-content is the immanent content of an act of judgment. Husserl, similarly, regards the concept as an entity, not, however, as an immanent content, but rather as the ideal content of an act of presentation, as a proposition is the ideal content of an act of judgment. Concepts and propositions on the level of ideal meanings are thus clearly distinguished by Husserl both from what is immanent on the side of the act and also from things and states of affairs on the side of the object.

Common to all Brentanian views of concept, however, is the implication that, in order to understand the origin of concepts, it is necessary to look at the various ways in which presentations may occur. Concepts originate via a process of abstraction from sensory presentations. Echoing, in this respect, not only Aristotle, Boethius and the medievals but also Descartes and Locke, the Brentanians point to a hierarchy of different types of presentations of different orders of abstractness or generality.⁵⁴ The process starts, as we have seen, with *intuitive presentations*, i.e. simple sense experiences ('simple ideas', in an older terminology). Intuitive presentations may belong either to external or to internal perception. In the latter case they are directed to our presentations and judgments themselves (as also, for example, to our feelings or acts of will).

Whether intuitive or non-intuitive, presentation is characterized by the Brentanians as a relation not to the object as such, but to the 'what' of an object – to the object *as red*, bulbous, feline, etc.⁵⁵ Hence the close relation between presentations, on the one hand, and concepts, on the other. Thus, once intuitive presentations have been gained, what we called above the process of *abstraction* can take place: we can move from a presentation of some given individual (*as red*, bulbous, feline, etc.), to a general presentation (of something red, something bulbous, something feline, and so on), i.e. to a presentation that is directed equally to many things. All mental acts, as we shall see, are conceived by Marty in terms of a certain kind of similarity between act and object. Presentations gained through abstraction are accordingly such that the act in question is in the relevant sense 'similar' to all objects falling within a

54. 1908, p. 436, n. 3. Cf. Aristotle *De anima*, III, 8.

55. See e.g. Marty 1908, pp. 425f.

certain general class. Such presentations are achieved by fixing on some particular property or properties of the objects in question, in such a way that variations in the other properties of these objects become irrelevant for the ‘similarity’ at issue. Thus we can move by abstraction from the intuitive presentation of a group of differently coloured things to the abstract presentation of a coloured thing as such; we can move from the intuitive presentation of ourselves as currently judging to the abstract presentation of a judging thing as such; and so on.

‘Synthetic’ presentations are gained by putting different presentations together, and then some presentations are ‘individual through synthesis’ – as for example in the case of presentations like *tallest blonde spy*. Clearly, synthetic presentations provide a basis for new sorts of abstraction. Thus we can move from presentations of colours or tones taken together to the abstract presentations of, say, the relations of likeness and difference; from there we can move on to the general concept of relation as such; and so on.

The movement to what Marty calls *reflexive presentations* is skew to the above. Reflexive presentations are presentations of the *contents* of mental acts, which is to say, from the Brentanian point of view, presentations of the relevant objectual correlates. What Marty calls ‘reflexive abstraction’ thus continues to take real mental processes as its (evident) starting point, but it moves not vertically, to the general concepts under which these processes fall, but rather laterally, to their objects. We can form a concept of existence or value, or better: of an existing thing, or of a valuable thing, not as it were directly – by staring out into the object realm, as if objects would present themselves to us of their own accord as falling under concepts of the given sort – but only indirectly, by subjecting to a process of reflexion the acts of true and false judgment or of correct and incorrect emotion that are directed to these objects. We must, in fact, combine presentations of act and object in such a way that we apprehend the former as adequate to the latter; we shall then be in a position to apprehend the object itself as *existing*, as *valuable*, as *preferable*, and so on.⁵⁶

Once reflexive presentations have been gained, then they, too, can join in synthesis with other sorts of presentation to provide the starting point for further processes of abstraction. The concepts of existence and non-existence, of

56. Marty 1908, p. 315.

necessity and impossibility, of truth and falsehood, and the concept of something outside us,⁵⁷ are all gained through abstraction from reflexive presentations founded in this way on intuitive presentations of our own mental processes. In this sense, too, therefore, psychology for the Brentanians, leads the way to ontology.

7. *A Correspondence Theory of Intentionality*

What does all of this imply in regard to the origin of the concept *judgment-content*? This concept is anchored in our ability to present and reflect upon our own mental processes of judging. More precisely, we cannot acquire the concept of judgment-content unless we have a prior adequate concept of ourselves as correct judges. This relativity of judgment-content to judge holds not merely in general, but in each particular case: ‘It is in grasping a given evident judging, and only thus, that we grasp also the judgment-content adequate thereto, and grasp it *as adequate*.’ (1908, p. 314) We have here what we referred to above as a correlation, i.e. a relation both of whose relata must exist. The grasping (intuitive presentation) of the correct judging, i.e. of the real fundament of the correlation, is at the same time a grasping of the state of affairs, i.e. of the non-real fundament, and of the relation between the two.

Presentation, for Marty, can relate either to what is real or – via processes of abstraction and reflexion of the relevant sorts – to what is non-real. The concept of an object is then the concept of anything that is ‘able to stand in the relation of ideal adequation to a presenting.’ (1916, p. 152) Consciousness, for Marty, is itself just a variety of *assimilation* of mental processes to (real or non-real) objects in the world. Moreover it is an assimilation whose existence is given with immediate evidence.⁵⁸ Marty’s doctrine here will recall again the Aristotelian assimilation theory of cognition according to which cognition in general and sensation in particular are processes which consist in making the soul in some way similar to the object perceived:

57. But cf. 1908 p. 447.

58. Marty 1916, p. 166.

What has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object is actually; that is, while at the beginning of the process of its being acted upon the two interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end of the process the one acted upon has become assimilated to the other (*De anima*, 418^a2ff.).

And again:

Within the soul the faculties of cognition and sensation are *potentially* these objects, the one what is knowable, the other what is sensible. These faculties, then, must be identical either with the things themselves, or with their forms. Now they are not identical with the objects; for the stone does not exist in the soul, but only the form of the stone. (*De anima*, 431^b26ff.)

Similarly for Marty, all psychic activity is a process which has as its consequence that the psychic activity comes into a certain *sui generis* sort of conformity with something other than itself.

Presenting is a real process in the mind. In case there exists that which one calls the presented, then as a non-real consequence of the process there follows that the presenting mind stands to this thing in a peculiar relation, which might be described as an ideal similarity or adequacy. (1908, p. 406)

‘Ideal’, here, does not mean ‘abstract’ or ‘extratemporal’. It signifies rather ‘aspiring’ or ‘hopeful’. For the relation of ideal similarity does not of course coincide with what one normally calls similarity or likeness. We have to do, again, with an analogy, with a modified or somehow extended use of ‘similarity’:


What really exists within us is not a peculiar, modified double of the real object, but only the real psychic process to which in certain circumstances there becomes attached as consequence an ideal similarity with something other, existing independently of this process. (Marty 1908, p. 415f.)

This aspiration to similarity is not always fulfilled. Thus explorer Jack undergoes real processes of presentation directed (as he thinks) to the golden mountain which he seeks. In such circumstances there is not a correlation of similarity between Jack’s presentations and a certain object, but a *relative determination* in Brentano’s sense, which lacks an object-pole.⁵⁹

The relation of adequation presupposes for its existence only the co-existence of a presentation and its intended object. The fact that this relation is

59. Cf. Marty 1908, pp. 416, 407.

itself a correlation implies that its existence necessarily brings with it the existence of its termini. Hence the relation of adequation stands to that whole which consists of a presentation and its object in a relation of mutual dependence, which we might illustrate as follows:



The upper and lower halves of the complex represented here are complements: neither can exist except in the context of that sort of whole in which it is bound up with the other.⁶⁰

Intuitive presentation we can now redescribe as a matter of ideal similarity or adequation with a single real individual; abstract presentation we can redescribe as a matter of ideal similarity or adequation with many individuals, which may be either real or non-real. Thus abstract presentation is a matter of what we might call *indeterminate* assimilation. An abstract presentation corresponds not to some single, abstract or general object – as for example on Twardowski’s or Meinong’s theories⁶¹ – but to many real objects. Moreover, its correspondence to these real objects is not that of an arbitrary token or representative, but that of something that stands in a relation of ideal similarity thereto, a condition which Marty sees as a further necessary presupposition of science in the strict and proper sense:

60. The diagram leaves out of account the fact that the given presentation is itself one-sidedly dependent upon some presenting mind or subject.

61. See Chapter Six, Section 3, below.

f it were ruled out in the case of abstract thoughts that they in some sense pictured that which is thought about or conformed to, then this would in my opinion have to hold of concrete intuitions also, and then we would face an extreme nominalism or semanticism which would make out of presentations as a whole something which would be in no way similar to or in conformity with that which is presented but a merely non-similar and in this sense arbitrary sign of the latter. And such a doctrine seems to me – when consistently maintained – to destroy any possibility of knowledge of reality. (1908, pp. 421f.)

Wittgenstein, too, held a doctrine of assimilation of this sort: ‘It is obvious’, he says in the *Tractatus*, ‘that a proposition of the form “*aRb*” strikes us as a picture. In this case the sign is obviously a likeness of what is signified.’ (4.012) Wittgenstein, however, seems content to suppose that a coherent understanding of the pictorial character of propositional signs is provided already by the notion of a structural isomorphism between concatenations of names and of what he calls ‘simple objects’. Thus his principal efforts are invested in working out the way in which an assimilation theory built up on this basis can be extended to cope with logically compound judgments of various sorts, where isomorphism no longer obtains. Marty, in contrast, concentrates his efforts on a concept of assimilation that he sees as being characteristic of *all* activity in the psychic sphere, a concept that is therefore analogous to the concept of ‘fit’ that is used by Searle in his *Intentionality*.

Marty’s treatment of assimilation or adequation is, however, overly metaphorical. For a somewhat clearer understanding of this matter it is necessary to turn to Husserl, who defends a view which could be said to combine and to clarify elements of both Marty’s and Wittgenstein’s positions. What Husserl calls ‘empty intentions’ are intentions which involve mere arbitrary signs of their objects; here any similarity is lacking. Fulfilled intentions of what is real, in contrast, where signs have been substituted by intuitions of the relevant objects, do have a sort of ideal similarity, a similarity which may be understood, for our present purposes, on broadly Aristotelian lines. Where we are dealing with acts directed towards what is non-real, towards such ideal entities as *similarity*, *difference*, *number*, *truth*, *set*, and so on, Husserl then points to a certain higher-level analogue of that perceptual intuition by means of which our intentions towards realia are fulfilled. More specifically, he provides an account of that process by means of which our empty intentions in this sphere are turned into what he calls ‘categorical

intuitions'. Husserl, too, saw the fulfilment of all categorial acts, the movement from signitive intentions to categorial fulfilment, in terms of something like the reflexive turning inward to which Marty adverts.⁶² We fulfil an act of mere reference to a set, for example, by going through an appropriate process of colligation, of bringing together in our minds the several members of the set. Hence fulfilled categorial intentions have a 'similarity' to their objects in the sense that their processes of fulfilment mimic the processes by which ideal or categorial objects are constructed.

In relation to the fulfilment of judgments, Husserl's account implies a two-step process. On the one hand the individual terms within the judgment as signitive act must be individually fulfilled in corresponding intuitive acts. On the other hand the judgment as categorial act directed towards a state of affairs must be fulfilled on this categorial level by a process of *construction* or re-making of the state of affairs as it is in reality. This amounts to a mental fitting together of the relevant intuitively given objects in a pattern (*'Sachverhaltsform'*) of the relevant sort. Where there is a possibility of moving to fulfilment both at the level of individual nominal expressions and at the level of the entire judgment, then we have in Husserl's eyes what is otherwise called 'truth' or 'correctness'.⁶³

8. *The Martian Theory of Truth*

As the early Brentano sees it, true judgments are divided into two groups. On the one hand are judgments which enjoy a direct relation to something real, judgments which are 'such that the presentation which is at their basis has a real content', and whose truth is thus 'conditioned by the existence, the coming into being, or the passing away, of the reality to which the judgment pertains.' (1889a, § 55) On the other hand are judgments whose underlying presentation does not have a real content. Here we have to distinguish between:

62. See Mulligan 1990a, and compare LU VI § 44, where Husserl criticizes the thesis of 'reflexion' as the origin of the categorial concept, defending instead a view according to which the purported turning inwards is in fact part of a special sort of outwardly directed act.

63. See '39 of his 6th Logical Investigation and my 1989.

(a) Judgments which, so far as their truth is concerned, are not at all dependent upon any reality. ‘This holds of all those judgments whose objects are in themselves simply necessary or impossible. Here belong for example the law of contradiction and with it all analytic judgments.’ (*loc. cit.*)

(b) Judgments which are indirectly dependent upon a thing, i.e. judgments which, even though the relevant presentation has no real content, are nevertheless such that their truth is

consequence of the fact that a certain reality (or realities) and not others exist, have existed, or will exist. Consider an empty space, any kind of lack, deficiency, or privation, a capacity, a thought object, or the like; these exist, and come into being and pass away, in connection with and in dependence on real changes. (*Loc. cit.*)

In the course of time, however, Brentano came to embrace an account of truth based on the purely subjective or epistemological notion of ‘evidence’. To say that a judgment is evident is to assert of that real event which is a judging that it has a certain real character – a character whose absence we express by saying that the judgment is ‘blind’. The character of evidence is something ultimate, to be clarified only by means of examples of evident judgments given in one’s own experience. The later Brentano in fact identifies evidence with truth,⁶⁴ so that the truth of a judgment is conceived in such a way that it ceases to involve any relation to anything extra-mental at all. A judgment is true, very roughly, if and only if it agrees with an evident judgment, i.e. is itself capable of being judged with evidence. Evident judgments are then of two kinds: ‘*axiomatic judgments*’ (such as the judgment that $1 + 1 = 2$); and *empirical judgments*, all of which relate to objects given in inner perception (I am judging, I am willing, I am presented to in such and such a way, etc.). The class of empirical judgments so conceived is then all that remains of Brentano’s earlier conception of judgments made true, directly or indirectly, by some reality.⁶⁵ Regarding true judgments about external objects, we are therefore left in the position where we are unable to say how it is that these objects play a role in determining that the given judgments are true – a consequence which can however be swallowed by

64. See above all his 1930, Part IV.

65. Husserl shared the same menu of privileged examples, and thus he, too, was led to propound a theory of truth in terms of purely immanent relations, e.g. in § 51 of the “Prolegomena” of LU. The more important § 39 of the 6th Investigation seems not, however, to support a view of this kind: see my 1989.


Brentano, for whom our customary talk about external objects is in any case at best a fiction.

For Marty, too, truth is a matter of bringing the experiences of the soul into correspondence with the things. Now one might be tempted to suppose that the correctness of a judgment could consist in an ideal adequation to *things*, to objects in the world, as in the case of Aquinas and some other medieval defenders of the correspondence theory. Like Bolzano and Meinong, however, Marty points to the already-mentioned case of correct judgments in which the existence of something is denied. Here there simply is no thing with which the judgment could be said to stand in a relation of the given sort.⁶⁶ Bolzano, Meinong and Marty therefore put forward doctrines according to which the truth or correctness of a judgment consists in an ideal adequation of the relevant act to a certain non-real object, an entity whose existence is independent of consciousness.

It is more than anything else in his defence of a relational theory of truth along these lines that Marty can be said to have surpassed his master Brentano. As Marty himself points out in regard to the possible 'agreement between judgments' on which Brentano's theory rests, this can itself be conceived only as a correlation of irrealia, i.e. as one further sort of assimilation in Marty's sense. Further, when Brentano speaks of possible agreement with a corresponding evident judgment, 'then the question arises: *in what* must one judgment agree with another, evident judgment in order to be marked thereby as correct? If one replies: in its content, then one is after all making just that distinction which leads to the recognition of judgment-contents' (1916, p. 156). Moreover, Marty's theory is to be preferred to the account defended by Brentano, because for Marty even judgments not capable of being made evident may be true (where there is the unfortunate suggestion in Brentano that such judgments can at best be probable).

A judgment is true, from Marty's point of view, where there obtains an *adaequatio cogitantis et cogitati* in the sense of an actual correlation. For the case of a positive judgment affirming the existing of an object A, whether real or non-real, the structure in question may be represented as follows:

66. Brentano responded to this move by denying that '*adaequatio*' or 'correspondence' must designate a correlation in every single case. Indeed the idea of *adaequatio* seems to demand precisely that the object of the negative judgment does *not* exist, in reflection of the fact that the one who judges *denies* its existence. Cf. Brentano, 1930, p. 134, Eng. p. 118.



Here again, the single lines connecting broken to solid walls of adjacent frames signify relations of one-sided existential dependence (a judgment cannot exist unless there exists also an associated presentation, a positive state of affairs cannot exist unless there exists also the associated object). The double lines represent the relation of mutual dependence. The diagram could be extended to include also that assimilation which correlates the presentation of *A* with the object *A* itself, a correlation on which the correlation of judgment and state of affairs would then itself be dependent.

More complicated structures would be obtained in relation to predicative judgments. In order to produce a representation of negative judgments of existence it would be necessary to omit the frame here marked 'object *A*' and to represent the state of affairs *non-existence of A* as an independent entity, as if it were cast adrift in ontological space. For while Marty eschews a Meinongian realm of non-existent *objects*, he is none the less committed to a similarly munificent realm of negative states of affairs (*non-existence of A*, *non-existence of a B which is C*, etc.).

Truth is a *species of correlation* between real processes (judgments) and non-real states of affairs. When this correlation is realized, then we might say that truth itself is *erlebt* or 'lived through', as Husserl puts it. The instances of

the species *truth* exist only intermittently – reflecting the intermittent existence of the judging acts with which they are bound up. And the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such instances is the co-existence of a process of judging and a corresponding state of affairs. A world without judgments is also, for Marty, a world without truth.

A theory of truth and judgment in terms of assimilation to states of affairs is not without difficulties of its own. Problems arise for the theory above all in relation to false judgments, judgments about what is past, judgments of generality and judgments of necessity. With regard to false judgments there is no obtaining state of affairs with which such a judgment would be in conformity. A false judgment on Marty's theory does not, however, correspond to a special 'non-obtaining state of affairs' of the sort that was admitted by Meinong. Only obtaining states of affairs are admitted by Marty into the domain of what exists. One can, however, admit a certain analogous extension of the concept of state of affairs or judgment-content, so that it can be said even of a false judgment that it 'has a content'. This is, however, a 'modified' form of speech, which has its justification only with regard to the fact that the judgment in question enjoys the relative determination that it stands in harmony or conformity with a possible content.⁶⁷ Such talk of 'having a content' boils down, however, to the somewhat trivial claim that if, besides the given psychic process of judging, there existed also that which we could call its content, then the correlation of adequation or correctness would of necessity obtain (i.e. that if the judgment in question were true, then it would be true).

Problems arise in regard to (true) judgments about what is past, since, on Marty's conception, truth is a transitory relation presupposing the simultaneous existence of both judgment and judgment-content. And of course, when I judge that Napoleon won the Battle of Austerlitz, then my judgment is not simultaneous with the occurrence of the relevant event. Marty could get round this problem, however, by acknowledging that past (and future) objects exist *in the present* as irrealia. Hence here, too, as in the case of other true judgments about what is non-real, adequation is possible.

67. Cf. 1908, p. 427. It is not clear how to extend an account of this sort in such a way as to cope with judgments that are necessarily false.

Problems arise in regard to judgments of generality, since all objects are for Marty (as for Brentano) individual – something that applies to non-real objects no less than to realia. Even a general state of affairs such as *cats exist* is a specific individual entity, which began to exist at a certain time and will cease to exist at some time in the future and is fully determinate in all respects. Moreover, even a general state of affairs such as *the non-existence of round squares*, which exists (obtains) at all times, is a specific individual entity. How, then, does Marty cope with the truth of general judgments, for example of the form: *All As are Bs*? It would take us too far from our main purpose to answer this question in full here. One can assume, however, that Marty here follows the official Brentanian theory of general judgments as judgments ruling out certain sorts of conceptual combination. The judgment ‘all As are Bs’, on this theory, is founded on the abstract synthetic presentation *an A that is non-B* and has the form:

An A that is non-B does not exist.

That which makes such a judgment true is then the negative judgment-content: *the non-existence of an A that is non-B*, exactly as in the case of the simple negative judgment.

In regard, finally, to the problem of necessary judgments, here Marty admits special judgment-contents of necessity, in addition to the four kinds of judgment-content – positive and negative objectives of being (*A is, A is not*) and positive and negative objectives of being-so (*A is B, A is not B*) – accepted, for example, by Meinong.⁶⁸ Corresponding to positive and negative evident or apodictic judgments are, then, the positive and negative judgment-contents of necessary and impossible being (*A is necessarily B, A is necessarily not B*). To judge apodictically, Marty now argues, is to take something for necessary or impossible, and only judgment-contents of necessity are, he claims, completely adequate to judgments of this sort. Marty thereby wishes to resurrect the Leibnizian opposition between *verités de fait* and *verités de raison*: ‘there is, among that which is, that which is of such a kind that it is, taken in itself, merely factual, but also that which is such that it is to be acknowledged as a

68. See 1908, pp. 294ff. and compare Meinong 1902, p. 191, 2nd ed., § 9. In his later works Meinong accepted also hypothetical objectives: see the discussion of *Mitseinobjektive* in his 1918, pp. 44ff.

matter of necessity'. (Marty 1908, p. 297) Brentano, in contrast, had accepted a theory of evidence according to which the difference between apodictic and other judgments would lie exclusively on the side of the subject; indeed, there is a tendency in Brentano's thinking to regard all truths as rational truths (so that all truths would in principle be capable of being judged with evidence).

9. *On Value-Contents, Fictions and Linguistic Form*

For Brentanists such as Marty and Meinong the experience of value, too, is an intentional phenomenon, and one test of the adequacy of an ontology of act and object is the extent to which it can deal with this and other more recondite varieties of intentional experience. Here we note first of all that the basis of the fundamental Brentanian division of psychic activities into the three classes of presentings, judgments and phenomena of interest is seen by Marty as lying in the relation of ideal conformity or adequacy discussed above. Just as 'presenting is essentially an adequation to the differences in the *what* of an object', so judging is a conformation 'to its being or non-being, to its being-this or being-that, or to its necessity or impossibility'. But phenomena of interest, too, can be regarded as consisting in the ideal assimilation 'to something which we could also analogously call a content, namely, where it is a matter of love and hate, of the value or disvalue of the object, or, where it is a matter of preference or avoidance, of its greater or lesser value.' (Marty 1908, pp. 425f.)

The objectual correlate of a phenomenon of interest is accordingly a value-content or *Wertverhalt* – a new category of irreal object in the Martian ontology. Just as judgments strive, ideally, to stand in conformity with certain *Sachverhalte*, so we may say that phenomena of interest strive ideally to stand in conformity with certain *Wertverhalte* – the goodness or badness of this, the preferability of this over that, and so on.⁶⁹ Value-contents, like judgment-contents, are not real. But they are nevertheless objective and independent of factually occurring processes of valuing or disvaluing. Value is in this sense an analogue to truth.

69. Compare Meinong's doctrine of *dignitatives* and *desideratives* as objects of feeling and desire set forth in his 1917.

70. See Marty 1908, '84, and cf. Brentano 1889, §§ 22f.

It is only because phenomena of interest involve a relation to something 'objective and generally valid', Marty argues, 'that we can say that such phenomena are phenomena of consciousness at all, in a sense truly analogous to the consciousness of presentings and judgments'.⁷¹ For consciousness *is* an actual or possible ideal similarizing with something.⁷¹ And only thus, also, can we hold on to Brentano's thesis according to which phenomena of interest may be objectively correct or incorrect (or a mixture of the two), irrespective of our beliefs about them, so that Marty is able to give a new account of the ethical objectivism that is defended in Brentano's *On the Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong* in a way which does not rest on the subjective or epistemological notions of 'evidence' or 'insight' or 'correctness' to which Brentano appeals.

A final problem for the Martian theory of language concerns the phenomenon of fictionality. Here it will help to fix our ideas if we consider first the views of Meinong, who in the period from 1905 to 1910 became involved with Marty in a bitter polemic concerning the correct description of assumptions and their objects.⁷²

Meinong's position may be summarized as follows. *Assumptions* are acts of a special, hitherto (according to Meinong) hardly recognized sort, which are in a certain sense intermediate between presentation and judgment. Assumptions share with judgments the properties of being directed towards states of affairs (of having states of affairs as their objectual correlates) and of manifesting the opposition between positivity and negativity. But they differ from judgments in that they lack the moment of conviction or belief: they lack what Frege called *assertive force*. It is assumptions, Meinong holds, which are primarily involved when we read a work of fiction, and he is in this way able to account for the quasi-judgmental character and apparent object-directedness of our fictional acts, and yet at the same time do justice to their peculiar lack of

71. 1908, p. 427. It is this same understanding of intentionality that leads Husserl to his doctrine of objectifying acts as the basis for the theory of linguistic meaning (see e.g. LU VI, ch. 9), and it was the criticism of this doctrine on the part of Husserl's disciples in Munich which led in turn to the development by them of the theory of speech acts. See Smith 1990, which also contains a discussion of Marty's contribution to this development.

72. See Marty 1905, Meinong 1906, Marty 1908, pp. 274ff., and Meinong's final word in § 64 of the 2nd edition of *Über Annahmen*.

seriousness. He is able to account also, as we shall see in Chapter Five below, for the different sorts of real emotions (e.g. of aesthetic pleasure) and of phantasy-emotions (e.g. of make-believe sadness at the death of the heroine) which are involved in our experiences of works of art of different sorts.

Marty, however, can find no evidence for the existence of these peculiar 'assumptions', and he regards the Meinongian theory as contrived and artificial. Moreover, he is unwilling to depart from the tri-categorical psychology of presentings, judgments and phenomena of interest of his master Brentano unless or until it has been shown that an account of fictional and related forms of intentionality is impossible within this framework.⁷³ He himself seeks to provide such an account by means of a piece of revisionary philosophy of language, somewhat as follows.

The three-fold division of psychic phenomena gives rise, Marty holds, to a corresponding division of uses of language, according to the sort of act which a speaker intends to insinuate into the hearer by using a given linguistic form. Uses of language are thereby capable of being divided into three classes of: (1) suggestives of presentings, (2) suggestives of judgments, and (3) suggestives of phenomena of interest. One fundamental presupposition of the Martian theory of language, which we might call the assumption of typicality, is that the different primary intentions are typically or standardly associated with different linguistic forms: presentings with nominal forms, judgments with sentential forms, phenomena of interest with forms such as are characteristic of commands, expressions of wishes, desires, etc. That is to say, it is not only psychic acts in general (and uses of language in particular) that can be classified into three broad categories in this way, but also corresponding linguistic forms. Uses of language in class (2) are also called statements, for it is clear, according to Marty, that in making a statement 'the primary intention on the part of the speaker lies in this: to generate a judgment in the hearer analogous to that judgment which as a rule the statement expresses' (1908, p. 362). Uses of language in class (3) Marty calls 'emotives'. And again, the primary intention underlying an emotive consists in insinuating in the hearer a phenomenon of interest of a certain appropriate sort.

73. Marty's resistance to the doctrine of assumptions follows in part also from the non-propositional account of judging which he had inherited from Brentano: see Mulligan 1988.

The author of a work of fiction is clearly not making statements; his aim is not to insinuate in his readers the judgments which would typically be associated with the sentences appearing on the pages of his work. Nor can we understand the author's intentions as being directed primarily towards the suggestion of feelings, emotions or acts of will in the reader: for if, for example, the reading of a work of fiction gives rise to a feeling of aesthetic pleasure, then this is as a consequence of the fact that the reading has taken place and the text has been understood. Hence the pleasure is founded on the acts involved in the reading, and cannot itself be used to give an account of the intentionality of these very acts.

But now, Marty argues, nothing stands in the way of our concluding that the uses of language in a work of fiction belong to class (1), that the author of such a work is intending to bring about in the reader a special sort of presentation. Marty holds, in fact, that the apparent statements in a fictional work mean not that something is to be judged, but rather that certain judgment-contents are to be presented. It follows, therefore, that names are not the only 'suggestives of presentation', even though they are the standard or typical members of this class. Poetic narrations, too, are suggestives of this sort, as also are all the apparent exclamations, questions, expressions of wishes, commands, etc., introduced by the poet into his works. In each case, as Marty sees it, their principal intention is merely that of awakening in the hearer the *presentations* of contents of the relevant sorts.⁷⁴ This explains also the peculiarly disinterested attitude with which we approach the contents of poetic works, the peculiarly abstract nature of the acts involved. For when reading a work of fiction we are dealing not with (putative) realia, with objects and events in the world of what happens and is the case (heroes and heroines, battles and deaths). Rather, we are dealing with (putative) unreal judgment-contents of a quite peculiar sort. We are, as it were, surveying a gradually expanding network of (putative) judgment-contents, without finding it necessary or possible to penetrate in our thoughts to the point where we might invest these judgment-contents with an attitude of sincere belief. Aesthetic pleasure then derives from the specific qualities of this network as it gradually unfolds itself before us.

74. See 1908, pp. 474f.

Meinong, for his part, could not have accepted a view of this kind, since he held that only objects in the proper sense (*Objekte*) can be presented, a view which bears comparison with Wittgenstein's doctrine in the *Tractatus* according to which only objects can be named. In this light, however, it is a clear advantage of Marty's account that it enables a much simpler conception of the meanings of certain sorts of complex sentences than is available on the basis of the Meinongian doctrine:

The difference between the sense of the sentence 'A is' ... and of the sentence 'that A is, is true' ... can be grasped in a simple and perspicuous manner when one sees that in the one case the presentation underlying the judgment is of 'A', in the other case it is of the judgment-content 'being of A' or 'that A is'. (Marty 1908, p. 484)⁷⁵

If, however, fictional sentences are 'suggestives of presentations', and if the resulting presentations have judgment-contents as their objects, then it is important to stress that, precisely because we are dealing here with *fictional* sentences, there are in fact no judgment-contents which these presentations would be the presentations of. There are no objects of fiction, and there are no judgment-contents of fiction either. Once again we have to do here merely with an analogue of similarizing, with a 'relative determination' in Brentano's sense. As we saw, if that which is relative is to exist, then that which is presented *in modo recto* must exist, though that which is presented *in modo obliquo* need not do so. Thus it is possible for us to think – though at most *modo obliquo* – about what does not exist, by thinking about something in relation thereto. I can present to myself Hamlet-involving states of affairs, or so the Brentanian might hold, by thinking about myself as a presenter of such states of affairs, or by thinking about the relevant text as triggering presentations of the given sort.

One consequence of this sort of view, as of related adverbial views of the intentionality of fictional acts, is that it becomes impossible to identify the objects of such acts, either from subject to subject or from act to act. That integrity or interconnectedness of our acts of reading a work of fiction which seems to be contributed by the objects represented in the work,⁷⁶ comes to be reduced, like these objects themselves, to a mere illusion. Marty is not only

75. Cf. Husserl's 5th Logical Investigation, § 33.

76. Ingarden 1931, § 24.

prepared to accept a consequence of this sort. He also provides a theoretical framework within which the given illusion – an illusion provoked by certain pseudo-objectualizing properties of language – can be investigated. It is here that Marty's central notion of *inner linguistic form* comes into play, a notion by means of which he tries to come to terms with that aspect of our understanding of language in virtue of which all such understanding gravitates towards one or other of a small number of typical forms or structures derived from our experience of what is real:

All names have as their inner linguistic form either the presentation of a substance or the presentation of an accident, i.e. of something real. We always designate the non-real (including the fully fictional) either through a substantive ('the lack', 'the possibility', 'the impossibility', etc.) – when the presentation of a *thing* is what is given figuratively as inner linguistic form – or through an adjective which is attached as predicate or attribute to a real or apparent subject, when it is the presentation of *inherence* which is at work, just as it lies before us in truth with real accidents in relation to their substances. (1908, pp. 354f.)

The theory of inner linguistic form can now be used to explain how, in an ontologically simple world, our experiences can manifest such a wide diversity of modes of intentional reference. For it can happen that language, through the power of the inner forms which its use instils within us, may seem to yield up for us one thing, when in fact it is some other thing that is to be acknowledged.⁷⁷ This conniving power of language, according to which all the objects to which real or apparent reference is made seem to approximate to the condition of reality, is indispensable if the understanding of a work of fiction is to be possible. But it is something against which the ontologist must do constant battle, if he is not to be misled by the forms dictated by the expressions with which he deals.

77. 1908, pp. 355f. This is the basis of Brentano's notion of *Sprachkritik*: see e.g. his 1933, part 3, I.A.

Chapter Five

Alexius Meinong and Stephan Witasek

On Art and Its Objects

1. *Meinong and the Problem of Non-Veridical Intentionality*

Alexius Meinong was born in Lemberg of a Catholic noble family in 1853 and studied in Vienna under Brentano from 1875 to 1878. From 1882 to 1920 he was professor of philosophy in Graz, where he was the first to carry out experiments in Gestalt psychology in a systematic way.¹ Meinong's influence extended also to the English-speaking world, above all through Bertrand Russell, whose theory of descriptions was developed in part in reaction to Meinong's ontological excesses. The influence of Meinong and of his student Ernst Mally can be seen at work also in the development of deontic logic and of the so-called 'free logics' or 'logics without existence assumptions', which have been propagated in no small part as a means for resolving problems of intentional reference bequeathed by Meinong and the members of his school in Graz.²

The central problem of Meinong's philosophy might be formulated as follows: how are we to understand the intentionality of mental acts which lack

1. The results of these experiments are presented above all in writings of Witasek, Höfler, Ameseder and Benussi. See Stock and Stock 1990 for a definitive bibliography of these writings. On Meinong's philosophy in general see Findlay 1968, Grossmann 1974 and Haller (ed.) 1972.

2. See e.g. Parsons 1980, Sylvan 1980, Lambert 1983. On Mally, who of all Meinong's students was closest to the new developments in formal logic, see Poli 1990.

existing objects? Two alternative families of solutions to this problem present themselves, both of which have been inspired by Meinong's work: on the one hand are what we might call 'relational' solutions, which would involve the postulation of special non-existent objects or of objects which are, as Meinong puts it, 'beyond being and non-being'. On the other hand are what we might call 'adverbial' solutions, which would appeal instead to certain special qualities of the given acts themselves in order to explain (away) their apparent intentional directedness.³

Our mental acts have the property that we seem to become related, through them, to objects of all conceivable varieties. This occurs both immediately (in our perceiving of this table, for example) and mediately (when we think about the carpenter who built this table, or about the heaviest table in Smolensk). There is, however, a crucial difference between these two kinds of relatedness. Crudely expressed, we can say that it is only in the former case that it is possible to claim, commonsensically, that a real link or connection to an object is in fact established. In the latter case, the acts in question manifest merely certain internal similarities to properly relational acts. Even here, however, the mere existence of an object will be sufficient guarantee that a relational sentence can correctly be employed to describe the directedness of the acts involved.

What, however, of those anomalous acts which are characterized by the fact that they lack existing objects? Acts of this sort can occur either because we are mistaken in our belief to the effect that a putative object exists, or because we quite deliberately exercise imagination, for example when we have to do with works of art. The exercise of the imagination is of course not always a purely mental affair. It can take the form of real bodily involvement with real objects serving as material props, as for example when the artist imagines how a finished painting will look by squinting at his canvas, or when theatre-goers allow themselves to become entranced by the actions on the stage. In all such cases, however, imagination is performed a special way of being directed towards existing objects.⁴ Meinong's goal, in contrast, is to find a theory capable of

3. See e.g. Rapaport 1979. Immanentistic doctrines of the sort defended by Brentano can be included under this heading also.

4. This point has been emphasized by Ryle in *The Concept of Mind*, and also by Walton, for example in his "Pictures and Make-Believe" (1973), both of whom see imagination as primarily a behavioural matter. Ryle argues that it is our capacity to pretend, or *make-believe*, in overt actions, that is the key to the understanding of the nature of imagination in general.

doing justice also to strictly non-veridical imagining, and to all other sorts of acts which simply lack existing objects. Here the most familiar examples are provided by the acts of apparent object-directedness which are involved in our readings of works of fiction. The acts in which we follow the adventures of Sherlock Holmes do, certainly, involve the use of material props – the printed texts themselves – but not in such a way that these props would serve as objects. Moreover, for all their anomalous status, such acts do bear certain analogies to directly relational acts of perception or of memory, so that their linguistic expression may utilize the same relational forms that are employed in expressing object-directed acts of a more straightforward sort.

Brentano's doctrine of intentionality states, in one form at least, that all acts have a directedness towards an object, and that it is such directedness which marks them out as psychological. This doctrine, as applied to anomalous acts, comes in two characteristic forms. On the first, immanentistic form of the doctrine (the form in which it was accepted by Brentano himself), the object of such an act is seen as residing in some sense in the mind of the imagining subject. In this form, as we saw, the doctrine involved a radical overhaul of our common-sense conception of the veridical intentionality of our normal acts of seeing and thinking. The immanentistic idea can also be associated with a view according to which we enjoy two kinds of intentionality or relational directedness towards the objects of our acts: a transcendent relational contact, where we perceive or remember real, external tables; and an immanent relational contact, where we imagine unreal, internal tables, or 'see' tables 'in the mind's eye'. This option, too, has problems, however, not least in virtue of the existence of cases where the subject clearly does not know what sort of object his act is directed towards.⁵ Both versions of the immanence theory will accordingly be left out of account in what follows.

The second form of the doctrine is most commonly associated with Meinong, though it originated in Twardowski's *On the Content and Object of Presentations* of 1894.⁶ This seeks to preserve the conception of intentional

5. Arguments against the immanence theory are provided e.g. by Husserl in LU V ' 11, by Ryle (1949, ch. VIII), and – with special reference to image-theories – by Sartre (1940). For a defence of the dual-intentionality view see Smith 1984.

6. All presentations, Twardowski says, necessarily have objects, and all objects have properties. However some objects do not exist. See his 1894, ' 5.

directedness as amounting in every case to a relation between an act and some transcendent target. It therefore embraces an ontology which sees transcendent objects as being divided into the two classes of *existing* and *non-existing*. Acts of non-veridical imagining are then seen as being distinguished from ordinary veridical acts of perception, memory, and so on, in the fact that, where the latter are directed towards existing objects, the former are directed towards objects which do not exist.

Meinong's fully developed object theory provides in every case for precisely suitable objects which are capable of serving as the targets not merely of acts such as those involved in reading works of fiction but also of acts directed towards possible and even impossible entities of every conceivable sort. His ideas in this connection have given rise to a number of valuable insights, above all in work on the logic of fiction and on the semantic treatment of sentences involving non-referring (or non-straightforwardly-referring) singular terms. Here, however, our attentions shall be directed to the psychological core of Meinong's work, to the attempt to devise a framework within which it would be possible to do justice to the characteristic features of mental acts and states of all varieties, without prejudice to those not directed towards what exists. Meinong sought to free himself from that 'prejudice in favour of the actual' which had in his eyes been characteristic of all previous metaphysics. Thus when dealing with acts of imagination and the like, he draws particular attention to the fact that such acts are normally distinguished from their veridical counterparts not merely in regard to the ontological status of their (putative) objects, but also in their form and nature *as acts*. This does not hold in all cases: the child's judgments about Santa Claus are not distinguished, in their form or nature as judgments, from his judgments about, say, Captain Cook; and Leverrier's judgments about the planet Vulcan are similarly not distinguished from his judgments about Saturn or Mars. It does, however, hold of those more interesting varieties of non-veridical acts which are involved in our aesthetic experience. For such acts are distinguished from veridical judgments, perceptions, and the like,⁷ not only in the fact that they lack existing objects, but also in themselves.

7. For more on Meinongian aesthetics see McCormick 1990, esp. ch. 10.

2. *The Phantasy Modification*

Consider, then, the family of acts which are marked by the absence or suspension of belief in the relevant (putative) object. These are subject to what Meinong calls the ‘phantasy modification’, his use of the term ‘modification’ serving to draw our attention to the fact that linguistic formulations of the effects of suspension require that one pays careful attention to certain modifying features of the corresponding expressions. These features have been described most succinctly by Twardowski, who draws a distinction between two different sorts of adjective:

An adjective is called attributive ... if it completes, enlarges – be it in a positive or in a negative direction – the meaning of the expression to which it is attached. An adjective is modifying if it completely changes the original meaning of the name to which it is attached. Thus in ‘good man’ the adjective ‘good’ is a truly attributive one; if one says ‘dead man’, one uses a modifying adjective, since a dead man is not a man.⁸

Modifying adjectives are divided further into the two classes of ‘determining’ and ‘abolishing’. Determining adjectives have ‘the function of a partial removal of the content expressed by a given noun’, as for instance in ‘forged banknote’ or ‘artificial limb’.⁹ Abolishing adjectives on the other hand remove all the characteristics which combine to yield a given idea, as in ‘cancelled performance’, ‘declined handshake’, ‘frustrated entry’, and so on.¹⁰

The early Husserl, too, defended a type of modification theory, arguing that acts may or may not have the feature *existence positing*.¹¹ Modified acts are however distinguished for Husserl, at least in certain passages, not by the fact that there are special (‘non-existent’) objects to which they are directed, but by

8. 1894, p. 13, Eng. trans. p. 11 (slightly altered). For further discussion of this passage see Mulligan 1987. Twardowski’s theory was derived in turn from Brentano (cf. 1924, vol. II, p. 62, Eng. p. 220). See also Marty 1884, pp. 179f.; 1895, p. 34; 1908, pp. 60, 345n., 518f.; 1916, pp. 198ff.; Husserl LU V ‘‘ 34, 39; Husserl 1979, p. 309; Leśniewski 1927/31, p. 48, n. 78. There is a remnant of this doctrine of modifying expressions also in Kotarbiński’s notion of ‘substitutive renderings’ or ‘onomatoids’ discussed in Chapter Seven, Section 1, below.

9. Twardowski 1923, p. 28.

10. *Op.cit.*, p. 29. Abolishing adjectives are marked also by the fact that their negations add nothing to the content of the nouns to which they are applied (consider: ‘non-fake’, ‘non-hallucinatory’, and so on).

11. See LU V ‘‘ 34f. and cf. Schuhmann 1990/91.

the fact that they *lack objects entirely*: a fictional object is not a special kind of object, any more than an averted war is a special kind of war. Thus the structure of modified acts is not, in contrast to that of their normal, unmodified counterparts, in any sense relational. It is rather to be understood in terms of special internal qualities which the given acts possess. Certainly we find it convenient to avail ourselves of talk of ‘fictional’ or ‘intentional’ objects in order to describe such qualities, but this fact has no ontological significance whatsoever, since this talk of objects is itself to be understood in a modified (abolishing) sense.

The adverbial view in question, which was worked out by Husserl in his 1894 review of Twardowski’s book and in his paper “Intentionale Gegenstände” from the same period, insists quite commonsensically that to say that the god Jupiter is an intentional object of my act is not to say that there is something, namely Jupiter, which lacks existence but is thought about by me. It is rather simply to say that my act is structured, qualitatively, in a certain way – so that it is (a) describable as a presentation-of-the-god-Jupiter, and (b) such as to lack existence-presuppositions.¹²

But can a position along these Husserlian lines be brought into harmony with our entrenched ways of dealing with literary texts? Or is it not rather the case that our intercourse with works of fiction, not only as readers but also as critics and as literary historians, has implications which dictate a properly ontological treatment of fictional objects and a properly relational treatment of fictional acts? It would seem, above all, to be a presupposition of much of our talk about fiction that we can *identify* fictional objects from one act or context to another. Thus we say, for example, that we have learned to understand David Copperfield on re-reading Dickens’ novel; or that Faust is a character who is dealt with both by Marlowe and by Goethe; or that our conceptions of Ophelia have matured, over the ages, with the development of our understanding of the female psyche.¹³ The most convenient interpretation of such forms of speech is that which appeals to special sorts of non-existent objects which can be

12. Note that to be describable as a presentation-of-the-god-Jupiter an act may have to satisfy also certain external (historical) conditions having to do with its connection to the beliefs and habits of the people of Rome.

13. See on these matters the writings on the ontology and on the cognition of literature of Husserl’s disciple Ingarden, above all his 1931. Cf. also Woods 1974 and the survey by Howell 1979, esp. pp. 151, 159ff.

compared and contrasted from one intentional context to the next. It was the tendency to make such identifications which motivated the initial talk of ‘intentional objects’ on the part of Meinong and other early followers of Brentano.¹⁴

Whether we look at experiences such as those involved in reading fiction in adverbial terms or in terms of special, supernumerary objects, however, we still require an understanding of the psychology of the relevant acts, and in this connection Meinong argues for the application of an analogue of Twardowski’s opposition between descriptive and modifying uses of language to mental phenomena in general. Such phenomena, Meinong holds, are divided into two classes of serious or genuine (*bona fide*) mental phenomena on the one hand and what he calls ‘phantasy phenomena’ on the other.¹⁵

3. *The Marks of Phantasy Phenomena*

A phantasy presentation is distinguished from a *bona fide* presentation by the absence of conviction or belief in the existence of the (putative) presented object. A phantasy judgment is distinguished from a *bona fide* judgment by the absence of conviction or belief in the existence of the (putative) state of affairs which is judged.¹⁶ A phantasy feeling is distinguished from a *bona fide* feeling by the fact that it has as its presupposition not a real judgment affirming the existence of the object of the feeling, but rather a phantasy judgment. The same modification can apply to *all* mental phenomena: the opposition between genuine mental phenomena and ‘phantasy material’ is all-pervasive.

This simple dichotomy can be maintained only for relatively simple acts. Already when we are dealing with future-directed acts we can see that problems

14. The defender of the Husserlian position might however argue that the relevant contrasts and comparisons can be interpreted in terms of the sorts of relations to which the relevant acts stand to each other. Thus our seeming identification of David Copperfield from one reading to the next can be accounted for by appealing to certain dependence relations between the acts involved in the two successive readings, relations which are structurally similar to dependence relations holding between ordinary unmodified acts involving reference to an identical object on two successive occasions.

15. See Meinong 1910, esp. §§ 15ff., 53ff. Parallel ideas are put forward also by the phenomenologist Pfänder; see his 1913/16, Part II, pp. 46ff.

16. Meinong calls such phantasy judgments ‘assumptions’. Compare also the terminology of quasi-judgments developed by Ingarden in his 1931, §§ 25ff., where Ingarden talks of quasi-judgments as being characterized by the ‘absence of a matching-intention’.

will arise in virtue of the fact that even genuine cases of desire, expectation, hope, etc. may lack existing objects and may be experienced as such. Such examples only serve to show however that the two dimensions of having or lacking existing objects and of presence or absence of presuppositions of conviction or belief are in truth independent of each other. Thus we can have a genuine feeling, a feeling accompanied by a belief in the existence of a relevant object, where no such object in fact exists (the child's feelings about Santa Claus); and we can have phantasy feelings directed towards existing objects in which we do not believe (the phantasy feelings I direct towards the objects of an emotionally moving but apparently fictional letter, which I discover only later was in fact addressed to my neighbour's wife). Normally, however, genuine feelings are associated with genuine objects, phantasy feelings with phantasy objects (or with no objects at all), and the departures from this norm will not concern us here.

The terminology of genuine and phantasy feelings (derived from Meinong's talk of '*Ernstgeföhle*' and '*Scheingeföhle*') should not be taken to imply that the latter are in some sense unreal. Phantasy phenomena are not mere images or phantasms of real psychic phenomena. They are simply conscious processes whose bases lack appropriate moments of conviction or belief. Hence they exist in no less real a sense than do their serious counterparts. They differ, rather, in other ways, which it will be our business to describe. The most important such difference is already clear: phantasy phenomena lack the genuine object-concern or object-directedness characteristic of unmodified phenomena, and the Meinongian terminology of 'genuine' or 'serious' feelings captures the sense in which the feeling of pleasure we have in a kindly act or in a sunset is more genuine than a feeling of pleasure e.g. in the fictional apprehension of a fictional murderer. Thus a phantasy presentation is not a special *kind* of presentation, and a phantasy judgment is not a special *kind* of judgment, any more than an imitation horse is a special kind of horse.

Phantasy presentations and phantasy judgments do of course share certain features with their normal, unmodified counterparts. Thus the phantasy feelings which are built up on phantasy presentations and phantasy judgments as their basis are in some (qualitative) respects similar to the corresponding real feelings, so that we are again accustomed to using identical expressions ('sadness', 'fear', 'pleasure') to refer to them both. Both physiologically and phenomenologically,

the phantasy feeling shares certain features with its ordinary veridical counterpart (as a forged signature shares certain features with a real signature, yet is for all that – in virtue of its history – an entity of a different sort). This physiological similarity is illustrated most clearly in our capacity to cry in the cinema, but it is illustrated also in the capacity of the actor to be carried along by his phantasy feelings to such an extent that it is as if he has been taken over by the character he is playing.

The differences between the two sorts of phenomena are however immense. They manifest themselves first of all in the fact that, taken singly, phantasy feelings (and phantasy phenomena in general) are simpler and more plastic than genuine psychic phenomena. The latter are typically not clearly demarcated from their mental surroundings and they may require psychic effort to be apprehended at all. Phantasy feelings on the other hand are clearly delineated and directly and easily apprehended, and they are much more intimately associated with the circumstances in which they arise. Genuine feelings are differentiated further by a quite specific sort of temporal Gestalt. They normally die away slowly, leaving lingering traces for what may be a considerable period even in the absence of their object.¹⁷ Phantasy feelings, on the other hand, are more like intellectual acts of wondering or deliberating, in that they can be interrupted at will and in such a way that they may then disappear immediately and without trace.

Phantasy phenomena *do not go deep*. Our phantasy life is normally cut off almost entirely from the ordinary human world of actions and forebearances, in reflection of the very special causal and relational structures in which phantasy phenomena are embedded. As Hume expressed it, fictional ideas feel ‘very different from the eternal established persuasions founded on memory and custom. They are somewhat of the same kind; but the one is much inferior to the other, both in its causes and effects.’¹⁸ This is seen most clearly in the case of phantasy desires, which involve no effort on the part of the desiring subject to bring about the realization of the content of the desire in question. Phantasy desires are not, of course, found only in the context of aesthetic experiences.

17. Cf. Kenny, pp. 58f.

18. *Treatise*, Book I, Part III, Sect. X and compare Schwarz 1905/06, a dissertation on phantasy feelings written under Meimong which includes a detailed criticism of the views of Hume on the phenomena in question.

They are present whenever we are leafing idly through a magazine full of advertisements, or whenever alternative plans or projects are being contemplated in abstraction from serious intent. Thus clearly they can become transformed, under suitable conditions, into real desires. Yet the differences are for all that unmistakable. We are at least to some extent capable of experiencing phantasy feelings in such a way as to emerge from the experience – virtually – unscathed, a fact which will be called in aid as a means of explaining why we are so ready to allow ourselves to be influenced in our emotional lives by works of art.

The most important mark of phantasy phenomena, however, is that they are *subject to our will* to a much greater extent than is the case with genuine psychic material. The latter must rest in every case on some belief, on a belief in the existence of the relevant object; and the acquisition of belief is not something that lies within the control of the subject in question. It presupposes, in normal cases, that the subject invests effort in engaging himself with given objects, and where this is not possible then the acquisition of belief may depend (as unbelievers know) on something like the grace of God. Phantasy phenomena, on the other hand, dispense entirely with a foundation of belief of the given sort, so that completely arbitrary phantasies can be generated at will and without further ado.

From this, however, it follows that the scope of phantasy phenomena which we are capable of experiencing is vastly greater than that of genuine phenomena. In the production of organized combinations and sequences of phantasy phenomena, however, it turns out that there are complex constraints – laws of development and of compatibility – which have to be observed, so that individuals may find it no less difficult to call forth in phantasy the combinations they desire than to create circumstances where corresponding genuine phenomena become available. The powers of the will to give rise to complex combinations of phantasy phenomena can however be extended by the use of special artefacts called *works of art*. These are artefacts which have been specially constructed to serve as reliable catalysts in the production of complexes of the given sort, in ways which prove to be genuinely enjoyable. What we enjoy when we enjoy a work of art on the view here suggested is then precisely the play of phantasy phenomena that the work sets loose within us.

4. *The Aesthetics of the Graz School*

The task of applying the Graz school philosophy and psychology to the working out of a detailed theory of aesthetic phenomena was carried out not by Meinong himself, however, but by his disciple Stephan Witasek, whose thinking on aesthetics influenced the later work of Meinong in its turn. In his *Grundzüge der allgemeinen Ästhetik* of 1904 Witasek shows in detail how our feelings undergo structural modifications when they are directed towards what does not exist. He follows Meinong in drawing the distinction between genuine mental phenomena and ‘phantasy material’, and asserts explicitly that ‘the job of the aesthetic object, whether it is a work of art or a product of nature, is to excite and support the actualization of phantasy material in the experiencing subject’. Witasek’s aesthetics might then be seen as an elaborate taxonomy of the various different sorts of phantasy material which the subject allows to be stimulated within himself in his intercourse with works of art.

Witasek was born in Vienna in 1870. Little is known of his background, though the name ‘Witasek’ suggests Croatian origins.¹⁹ He studied in Graz, obtaining his Ph.D. in 1895 and his habilitation degree in 1899. In the following years, during which he worked selflessly as an unpaid assistant in Meinong’s laboratory of experimental psychology, he was employed as a librarian in the University of Graz. Only in 1913 was he appointed to the position of extraordinary professor; and only in 1914 was he appointed, as Meinong’s successor, to the position of director of the psychology laboratory. He enjoyed this position for a mere six months, dying in April 1915.²⁰

Witasek is reported to have spent many hours playing music together with Meinong, and it was his passion for music which first brought him to study in Graz. He had been provoked by Stumpf’s *Tonpsychologie* to take an interest in the psychology of music and was attracted by the possibilities promised by the experimental psychology laboratory which had been so recently established by Meinong. At that stage the future of the laboratory was still uncertain, and it is Witasek – who was already the effective head of the laboratory long before 1914

19. Ideas similar to those of Witasek were canvassed by the Slovenian philosopher Franc Veber, another Meinong-student, in his *Esстетika*, published (in Slovenian) in 1925. (See Sajama 1987.)

20. See Ameseder 1916, Mally 1915, Meinong 1915a.

– whom Meinong credits with having done the work that was needed to set it on a secure footing.

The Italian psychologist Vittorio Benussi was one of the first to be initiated into the mysteries of experimental psychology by Witasek. Benussi was influenced in particular by the topic of Witasek's habilitation thesis (1899), which had defended the view that optical illusions cannot be illusions of judgment, since the same illusion can be present even when we deliberately do not allow our judgments to be misled by the appearances (as for example in the case of the Müller-Lyer illusion). Witasek therefore attempts to give an account of the phenomena in question purely on the level of sensations and to separate carefully the contributions of psychology and of physiology in our experience of illusions.

As will become clear in what follows, a central role is played in Witasek's work by the notion of Gestalt structure. Common to all members of the Austrian Gestalt tradition of Meinong, Witasek and Benussi is a two-storey conception of experience according to which experienced objects are partitioned into objects of *lower* and *higher* order: the former are for example colours and tones (which are, it is held, given immediately in sensation), the latter are for example shapes and melodies, complex organized wholes which are 'founded' on the former and require special, intellectual acts in order to be grasped by consciousness.²¹ Part of Witasek's aesthetics is thus a contribution to the Gestaltist tradition of aesthetic value-theory in terms of 'organic unity'.²² Here, however, I shall be interested not in this value-theoretical aspect of Witasek's work but rather in the implications of his ideas in descriptive psychology for the understanding of the structures of aesthetic experience.

Our task in what follows will be to understand precisely how, in Witasek's eyes, aesthetic experiences relate to aesthetic objects. Witasek's approach to aesthetics is a constructive one, building up gradually from simple cases (from experiences and objects of the most primitive sorts), to the point where he is in a position to deal also with those more complicated aesthetic structures which are characteristic of works of art. He begins by setting forth the most basic

21. See, on this 'production theory', Chapter Eight, Section 3, below.

22. See Ehrenfels 1916, Rausch 1966, Nozick 1981, Ch. 5.

ingredients of our aesthetic experiences, which he classifies into five broad classes, as follows:

- (i) Pleasure in what is sensuous,
- (ii) Pleasure in what is harmonious or organically structured,
- (iii) Pleasure in perfection, in what is well-made or fitting,
- (iv) Pleasure in expression, mood, atmosphere, and so on,
- (v) Pleasure in objectives or states of affairs.

This rough and ready classification of experiences then yields also a preliminary classification of the 'elementary aesthetic objects' toward which these elementary experiences would be directed:

Ad (i) Simple objects of sensation: individual colours, tones, tastes, smells, etc. (objects of outer sensation) and individual qualitative elements of feeling and emotion (objects of inner sensation). Clearly, such objects of sensation can themselves be aesthetically pleasing to different degrees, and their power to please is in some sense basic, not capable of being accounted for in terms of other, more primitive phenomena.²³

Ad (ii) Gestalt structures of purely formal beauty. Objects of sensation manifest themselves very rarely, if ever, in isolation. They normally occur in association with each other in such a way as to manifest Gestalt structures of different types, and such structures, too, may be beautiful or ugly. Thus it is melodies, tones, geometrical patterns, blends of perfumes or of tastes, rhythms, colour-harmonies, tactile feelings, etc., which will constitute Witasek's second class of elementary aesthetic objects (pp. 39ff.). Note that structures of this sort are important even where we have to deal with aesthetic pleasure (or displeasure) in what is fragmentary or discordant, since such pleasure presupposes the ability to recognize what is harmonious. As Husserl points out, chaos and fragmentation themselves depend on form and order.²⁴

Ad (iii) Gestalt structures in conformity with norms, Gestalt structures of purposefulness or typicality. The examples listed under category (ii) are all Gestalt structures which possess a purely formal or structural beauty. Some varieties of Gestalten, however, possess aesthetic qualities which are not formal

23. Cf. Witasek, *Grundzüge* (1904), pp. 36ff. All page references in the remainder of the present chapter are to this work unless otherwise indicated.

24. LU VI §§ 34f. Cf. also Rausch 1966.

but material. These are the Gestalten of objects which are peculiarly purposeful or efficient, or peculiarly perfect examples of their type (what Witasek calls *normgemässe Gegenstände*):²⁵

The Gestalt of a well-built horse has special aesthetic qualities not as a Gestalt *as such*, but rather merely as the Gestalt *of a horse*. Here it is more a matter of what kind of object the Gestalt belongs to than of how it is itself constructed. And this can be shown, too, in many other examples. The beauty of the female form lies in its softness and in the swing of its lines, where the same lines in a male body have a non-beautiful effect. (p. 47)

Ad (iv) Gestalt structures of expression. The fourth and most problematic category of elementary aesthetic objects is constituted by what Witasek calls Gestalten of expression, of atmosphere, and of mood (also called – for reasons which will become apparent later – the class of ‘objects of inner beauty’). What gives us pleasure in a piece of music, for example, is typically not just the sound-formations we hear or imagine. We are wont to say that the music *expresses* something, that it points beyond itself in a manner at least analogous to the expression of feelings and emotions e.g. through facial gestures. The sound-Gestalten of the musical work are, Witasek says, ‘the carriers of expression; the expression is not something perceivable with the senses, as it were side by side with the sound-Gestalten, but it is something to be grasped only in and with them.’ (pp. 50f) Thus when I hear a piece of music I in fact experience two Gestalten: the sound-Gestalt as such, which may or may not be beautiful, and the expressive Gestalt, which will turn out to have quite peculiar aesthetic qualities of its own. The same double Gestalt structure makes itself felt also for example in the fact that there are two essentially different types of beauty in the human face: beauty of form, and beauty of expression. It is not, then, the stone or the canvas in the gallery that is beautiful, according to Witasek, but associated objects of sense and higher-order Gestalt structures of different sorts, which stone and canvas help to constitute.²⁶

Ad (v) Objectives or states of affairs. The final category of elementary aesthetic objects is constituted by what Witasek, following Meinongian

25. Compare the use of the notions of standard and non-standard instances of what are called ‘norm kinds’ in the aesthetic theory of Wolterstorff (1980, p. 56).

26. This is also Ingarden’s view in his *Literary Work of Art* (1931). See also the discussions of the physical foundation of the aesthetic object in Ingarden 1985.

terminology, calls ‘objectives’ or states of affairs, which serve as the building blocks from out of which the plot of representational works of art is constructed.

Witasek seeks, now, to do justice in his aesthetics to the total content of our experiences of works of art in terms of combinations of experiences directed towards structures of these given sorts. Following Brentano and Meinong, he divides all mental phenomena into three broad classes of: *presentations*, which are directed towards objects in the narrower sense, *judgments*, and *phenomena of interest*. Acts in these classes may be joined together by relations of ‘presupposition’ (or of one-sided separability in Brentano’s terms). If I am happy about the arrival of a friend, then the presupposition of this feeling is the judgment *that the friend has arrived* and the object of the feeling is, on the Meinong–Witasek view, the corresponding ‘objective’ or state of affairs. If I take pleasure in a nice sound, then the presupposition of this pleasure-feeling is the intuitive (sensory) presentation of the sound and the object of the feeling is the sound itself. Meinong and Witasek differ from Brentano in that they see judgment as comprehending, in addition to acceptance or rejection, an extra feature: the moment of *conviction*. When this moment is lacking we have not a judgment but an *assumption*.

Both Brentano and Meinong see judgments as presupposing, i.e. as being dependent or ‘founded’ on, associated presentations, but they allow also a presupposition or dependence in the opposite direction: a presentation, too, may be dependent on a moment of conviction in the sense that it is associated with the disposition to make judgments of a given type.²⁷ But where in Brentano’s psychology emotional phenomena are founded immediately upon judgments and thereby mediately upon associated presentations (we are sad or happy *that* such and such exists or does not exist), Meinong allows feelings to be founded immediately either on presentations – giving rise to ‘presentation-feelings’ – or on judgments – giving rise to ‘judgment-feelings’.²⁸

27. This was the view adopted by Meinong at the time of the first edition of his *Über Annahmen* (1902). See 1910, § 36. In the second edition a presentation is seen as being a still incomplete intending of an object; this intending becomes complete only when it is bound up with the apprehension of an objective in a judgment or assumption. On similar complexities in Brentano’s theory of judgment see Brandl 1987.

28. See Meinong 1905, Baley 1916.

A presentation is an act or state of mental directedness towards an object conceived in abstraction from any associated judgments or emotional attitudes. As we have seen, this is far from being a homogeneous category. Above all, presentations can be divided into *outer* and *inner*, according to whether the objects presented are external objects or further presentations, judgments, feelings or other mental acts or states of the presenting subject. Presentations can be divided secondly into *intuitive* and *intellectual*: an intellectual presentation occurs, for example, when I present to myself an object purely in the sense that I run through a description of the object in my mind. Witasek's aesthetic theory proper begins now with the claim that,

of the two sorts of presentation, it is *only intuitive presentations that come into consideration as the presupposition of aesthetic feelings*. The shape of the ellipse is aesthetically pleasing to look at; the equation in which analytic geometry presents the same shape to the grasp of the intellect does not excite aesthetic feelings at all (p. 77, my emphasis).

It is not our job here to determine whether this rather strong thesis is correct, but merely to work out its implications in the framework of Meinongian aesthetics. Expressing the thesis in the terminology of *presentation-feelings* and *judgment-feelings*, we can now assert, somewhat pompously, that *aesthetic pleasure is a matter of positive intuitive presentation-feelings*. That is, the feeling of aesthetic pleasure has as its presupposition in every case certain intuitive presentations of objects, the constituent parts or moments of which belong to one or other of the five classes of elementary aesthetic objects distinguished above.

5. *Aesthetic Pleasure*

Matters are still relatively simple where we have to deal with feelings of aesthetic pleasure directed towards aesthetic objects in the first two categories of simple sensations and purely formal Gestalten. For here we have to deal with real, causal relations between perceiving subjects on the one hand and material objects, events or processes on the other. Thus the fact that colours, tones and formal Gestalten such as melodies or rhythms may give rise to feelings of pleasure is easy to understand: what is harmonious without is reflected, in some way – which it would be a matter for empirical psychology to investigate – by harmonious and therefore pleasurable experiences within.

Not all sensations, and not even all harmonious sensations, are however aesthetic. Witasek holds, it is true, that all *aesthetic* feelings presuppose (are founded on) intuitive presentations; but he nevertheless draws a clear line between aesthetic experiences on the one hand, even those relating to objects of sense and to simple Gestalten, and merely *sensory feelings* – for example my feeling of pleasure in the warmth of a wood fire. To follow his reasoning here we need first to recall the standard Brentanian distinction between *acts* and *contents*. The *act* is that component in an experience which characterizes the experience as, say, a memory as opposed to a perception, a phantasy as opposed to a presumption, a judgment as opposed to an assumption, and so on. The *content*, on the other hand, is that component of the experience which a perception and a memory *of* the same object may have in common and in virtue of which they are then *of* the same object and from the same point of view. Equally, the content is that real moment which a judgment and an assumption may have in common and in virtue of which they are then directed towards one and the same state of affairs.

The distinction between act and content now gives rise to a corresponding distinction in the class of feelings between what Witasek calls *act-feelings* and *content-feelings*:

in every presenting we can distinguish act and content. A feeling that has a sensing or a presenting P as its presupposition can either be determined primarily by the act in P and be relatively independent of its content, or it can depend essentially on the content of P and be such that the act is largely irrelevant to it. In the first case it is an act-feeling, in the second a content-feeling. (pp. 195f.)²⁹

As an example of a content-feeling consider what happens when I hear a melody played on a violin:

I have a *perceptual* presentation of the melody mediated by sensation; when I now reproduce it for myself in my mind, after the violin has fallen silent, it appears to me in a memory-presentation. The perceptual presentation and the memory-presentation have the same content, that which distinguishes them so much lies in their act. And the feeling of well-being I experience in relation to the melody arises whether I hear it or merely reproduce it in my mind. (p. 196)

Act-feelings and content-feelings may in certain circumstances come into conflict with each other. Thus I may take pleasure in the content *bright light*

29. Cf. also Husserl 1979, p. 293.

while at the same time experiencing pain in the act of looking into the sun. Normally however the two sorts of feeling are fused together, or the one disappears because it is insignificant in relation to the other.

Aesthetic feelings are distinguished from sensory feelings, Witasek now argues, by the fact that the former are related to the content of a presentation, the latter to the act itself.³⁰ Thus sensory feelings, but not aesthetic feelings, are directly sensitive to the quality and intensity of the act (and all sensations are above a certain intensity, painful). Further, the sensory feeling disappears or is at least reduced to an almost unnoticeable intensity in the passage from sensation (perception) to a reproduced presentation in memory. It is because a melody is ‘already a matter of *content*’ that it need not be affected by the passage from perception to memory or imagination (p. 199).

What applies to aesthetic feelings in the presentation of objects of sense and of simple Gestalten will be seen to apply no less to other, more sophisticated aesthetic feelings. Thus we can imagine an habitu  of art galleries whose pleasure is derived purely from the repetition of the *act* of seeing, regardless of its content. Or we can imagine the lover of difficult Irish poetry, who is interested solely in the bracing mental exercise involved in coming to grips with the grammar of the verses in question, not in any sense with the content of his reading acts. Both are missing precisely what is aesthetic in the objects in question, and we can now assert quite generally that *aesthetic pleasure is that variety of consciousness-state which we can call* (allowing ourselves to speak Meinongian, for the moment) a *Vorstellungsinhaltsgef hl* or presentation-content-feeling (p. 214).

The same sort of treatment can be made to work also in relation to objects in category (iii), i.e. to what is ‘normal’ or *gattungsm ssig*. Thus, according to Witasek, on perceiving certain objects – for example a healthy horse or a healthy human body – we register a value of, say, purposefulness or of perfection, and then our pleasure in the fact that this valuable object *exists* becomes bound up with our intuitive presentation of the object to give rise to that positively modulated intuitive presentation-feeling which is a feeling of aesthetic pleasure. For this reason Witasek calls the aesthetic value of the normal object ‘value

30. There are however content-feelings which fall outside the domain of aesthetics. An example would be, say, pleasure in the victory of a good cause: see, again, Duncker 1941.

beauty' (*Wertschönheit*) (p. 97). It is aesthetic beauty connected, through our real relations to the object, with some non-aesthetic value of healthfulness, vitality, cleanliness, efficiency, economy and so on. But this is not all that is to be said about *normgemässe Gegenstände*: as we shall see below, the recognition of value beauty in an object is closely bound up with the notion of sympathy and with the varieties of aesthetic pleasure associated therewith, and this will imply that objects in category (iii) have a role to play also in those more complex aesthetic experiences which are provoked by serious works of art.

6. *Art and Illusion*

First, however we must deal in general terms with the more problematic examples of aesthetic objects comprehended in categories (iv) and (v). Here it is no longer the case that the subject must be connected in a real relation to some real existing object. Thus his aesthetic pleasure may no longer be conceived as flowing – more or less as a matter of course – from his perceptual experiences of an existing object's parts or moments and of their more or less harmonious interrelations.

Consider the pleasure we experience in watching, say, a silent film. Here the *real thing* with which we are in relational contact – a screen upon which light is projected – is simply not the sort of thing which of itself could give rise to complex aesthetically pleasurable experiences of the relevant sort. For such experiences involve (in some sense) fear, hope, expectation, disappointment, pity, disgust and a wide range of other, more complex phenomena on our part, and such phenomena cannot be induced in any straightforward (i.e. causal) way by a mere play of light.

It will not help to say that the difference is made up, in some way, by *imagination*; the problem before us is precisely that of determining in what imagination might consist. Note, again, that our talk of 'presentation', 'hope', 'fear', etc., is here subject to *modification*; the meanings of these terms are shifted, systematically. That which I experience when I 'see' the sheriff on the screen is accordingly not, strictly speaking, a *presentation* at all, for when I here present to myself a sheriff in the throes of death, there is no (existing) object which is presented to me (and here it is irrelevant whether a certain person – an actor – was involved at an early stage in the creation of the play of light which

gives rise to my current experience or whether I am related, e.g., to a computer simulation). What we have is, rather, a *modified presentation*, which stands to a presentation in the strict sense in something like the relation of a sham to a genuine outburst of temper. Is to imagine something, then, to pretend to oneself that one is perceiving? An account along these lines would be too crude, since it is not clear that one can coherently ‘pretend to oneself’ at all: pretending seems to be associated not with mental acts, but with actions taking place in the public domain. Thus in order to pretend it is necessary that one do something, where an act of imagination can take place even where the subject does nothing at all. Yet we have already noted that there is some connection between imagination and that modification of actions which occurs in games of make-believe or in the behaviour of actors on the stage. Both pretence and imagination are for example subject to the will. A theory of imagination in terms of pretence or make-believe seems, however, to put the behavioural cart before the psychological horse. For it seems that pretence and make-believe can themselves be understood only if we already have a prior theory of the acts of imagination that each involves.

Witasek’s explanation of the phantasy modification follows the Meinongian theory of judgments and assumptions. Every non-modified presentation is bound up with a moment of conviction in the existence of its object (that is: with a disposition to make judgments of a certain sort). In a modified presentation this moment is cancelled. Where the conviction associated with a genuine or authentic presentation invokes on behalf of this presentation an actual or at least a seriously intended *relational contact with reality*, in the case of the modified presentation this intention towards reality has been put out of action.

The sham presentation is thereby cut loose from the constraints reality itself would normally impose, and it is this which explains why modified presentations are subject to our will to a much greater extent than are real or genuine presentations.³¹ Where reality normally has us in *its* control, the phantasy modification gives us a freedom of movement which is exploited in different ways by works of art of different sorts.

31. Saxinger (1904 and 1906) puts forward an account of phantasy desire as characterized by the absence of a ‘tendency towards realization’. For an overview of types of phantasy material see the table in Krug 1929, p. 241.

The notion of a phantasy feeling enables us to throw further light on the distinction between act- and content-feelings introduced above. For as Witasek notes, ‘There are no, or only uncommonly weak, sensory phantasy feelings’:

a pinprick or a toothache which I experience merely in phantasy does not hurt me, and he who is hungry is not helped by the experiencing in phantasy of his being satisfied (p. 199).

This is in contrast to the relatively high intensity of those phantasy feelings – a matter of the *content* of presentation and assumption – that are peculiar to the aesthetic domain.

There is a sense in which what one might call the purely qualitative factor in phantasy feelings is the same as that of real feelings. But phantasy feelings nevertheless differentiate themselves totally from genuine or serious feelings. The difference is a matter of their presupposition. In the case of genuine feeling-material this is a judgment; in the case of phantasy material it is a mere assumption, a ‘fiction’, which has and wants to have nothing to do with reality (p. 116).

Phantasy material is not merely subject to our will, it also has the peculiar property that it can *stand in for* genuine psychological phenomena in different ways (as assumptions can stand in for judgments e.g. in deductive arguments). Thus when a genuine feeling is excluded by external circumstances or by the psychic constitution of the subject, then the corresponding modified feeling can take its place. These two properties of phantasy phenomena are of crucial importance to the understanding of the place of aesthetic experience in our mental lives. As Witasek puts it:

Nobody would go into the theatre to watch a tragedy if the shock, care, sympathy and fear, and all the other, often intensive pain-feelings awakened by our participation in what is going on on the stage were real (Witasek 1904, p. 115).

Consider, as a first, trivial example of the opposition between genuine and phantasy material at work, my contemplation of a drawing of a cat. Here I enjoy a phantasy presentation of a cat, together with phantasy judgments such as ‘that is a cat’. I may also enjoy phantasy emotions of various kinds, for example a phantasy feeling of sadness awakened by the sad expression of the (putative) cat. What I do *not* have is a genuine judgment or belief to the effect that there is a cat (or feline object of any sort) before me. My total appreciation of the drawing rests on the following four presuppositions as its basis:

- the *sensory presentation* of the piece of paper with its marks: an intuitive, complex Gestalt-presentation,
- the *assumption* ‘here is a cat’, a phantasy judgment in which the represented object is recognized and named,
- the *judgment* that it is a drawing and not a cat that lies before us,
- the *judgment* that the drawing represents a cat.

There are a number of problems left open by this analysis. Thus we can ask what, precisely, is the *object* of our feeling of pleasurable appreciation in the given case, recalling that the object of a feeling, on the Brentano–Meinong–Witasek conception, is supplied by its presupposition. Because none of the given partial presuppositions alone can supply an object for the feeling, it will be necessary to understand the latter as being directed to a complex state of affairs to which the several constituents make their separate contribution, the state of affairs *that what is seen appears as a cat, but is only a piece of paper treated with artistic means* (p. 249). But how are the given constituents related together in this total experience? According to the so-called ‘illusionistic theory of art’ advanced by Witasek’s contemporary Konrad Lange, this question is to be answered in terms of a rapid alternation on the part of the observer between his judging that he sees a real cat, suddenly remembering that he has before him only a drawing, suddenly judging once more that he sees a cat, and so on.³² Aesthetic pleasure, according to Lange, is rooted in such a to-ing and fro-ing of psychic phenomena, and the work of art is essentially a vehicle for the production of that peculiar ‘feeling of freedom, completely independent of specific content’ which is bound up with our recognition of successful imitation.

Witasek’s theory also recognizes superficially incompatible elements in experiences of the given sort. The two analyses are nevertheless entirely different. For according to Lange both of the phenomena between which our consciousness oscillates are *actual judgments*: the first asserts that what is seen is a real object (a cat) existing in nature; the second that what is seen is a mere imitation (a drawing of a cat). Not both of these judgments can be true. Thus if Lange is right, the appreciation of successful imitation rests essentially on our repeatedly getting things wrong, on our repeatedly allowing ourselves to be

32. See Lange 1895 and also Möller 1903.

misled by the object, and this account is phenomenologically absurd, gaining purchase, at best, in relation to children's experiences of art, or in relation to initial phases of adult experiences of for example photo-realist works, where quite special conditions apply. Witasek, in contrast,

avoids the psychological impossibility of an arbitrary to-ing and fro-ing between two mutually opposed yet equally genuine convictions (judgments), by recognizing one of the two thoughts not as an actual judgment but as a mere assumption. (p. 253)³³

Certainly it is not to be ruled out that someone may, for example while reading, become momentarily so absorbed that he forgets that he is caught up in phantasy. The moment of belief-suspension then falls away from his acts in such a way that his reading will approximate to the making of common-or-garden-variety mistakes. As Ryle puts it:

Make-believe is compatible with all degrees of scepticism and credulity ... The fact that people can fancy that they see things, are pursued by bears, or have a grumbling appendix, without realizing that this is nothing but fancy, is simply a part of the unsurprising general fact that not all people are, all the time, at all ages and in all conditions, as judicious or critical as could be wished (1949, pp. 258f).

Such phenomena are however at most an ephemeral matter, a product of special circumstances; they are not something which penetrates to the essence of aesthetic experience as such.

7. *Gestalt and Expression*

In regard to the relatively trivial examples of aesthetic objects treated so far, our pleasure rested in each case on an intuitive presentation of something external (on the presentation of 'physical phenomena' in Brentano's sense). We have now, however, reached a point where we must turn inward and consider the feelings of higher-order aesthetic pleasure which are provoked by our presentations of mental, and in particular emotional, phenomena themselves. That is we must turn to those aesthetic experiences which are provoked by what Brentano, Meinong and Witasek called the 'inner perception' of psychic phenomena and by the peculiar modifications to which this inner perception is susceptible.

33. Cf. also Odebrecht 1927, pp. 191ff.

We can distinguish in this connection at least the following four distinct cases:

- the genuine inner presentation of genuine psychic material (as when I present to myself my feeling of pleasure awakened by my pleasant surroundings);
- the genuine inner presentation of phantasy material (as when I present to myself my phantasy judgment that the heroine is about to die);
- the modified inner presentation of what would be genuine psychic material, if it existed (as when I imagine the feeling of pleasure I would feel if I were in pleasant surroundings);
- the modified inner presentation of what would be phantasy material, if it existed (as when I imagine the (phantasy-)feeling of fear I would experience if the heroine were about to die).

Matters are complicated still further by the fact that psychic material may be presented as belonging either to oneself or to some other psychic subject, whether real or imaginary, and by the fact that various different sorts of interplay can be set in train as between one's own feelings and the psychic material of other (real or apparent) subjects that is given in presentation via our apprehension of gestures, etc. It is at this point that we encounter once more the 'Gestalt structures of expression' which make up category (iv) of aesthetic objects in Witasek's original taxonomy. We are now, however, in a position to state more precisely in what such 'expression' consists.

Consider the spectator of a drama. Clearly, if he is to appreciate the drama in the full sense, then he needs somehow to experience the feelings expressed in the actions on the stage. But he does not need to experience the *genuine* material. It would after all be inexplicable that one should choose to visit the theatre in order to watch performances of tragedies and the like if the negative feelings awakened thereby were truly genuine. It is sufficient, however, if the spectator experiences in himself the expressed psychic phenomena as phantasy material – which 'does not after all do us any real harm' (p. 115). The aesthetic enjoyment of expression then rests on a genuine intuitive inner presentation of the phantasy material generated in the experiencing subject when echoes of the emotions of external subjects are set in train within him.

8. *Empathy and Sympathy*

These ‘echoes’ are of two sorts. On the one hand they are what Witasek calls *empathy feelings*.³⁴ An empathy-feeling consists in the subject’s experiencing in a modified way feelings which he grasps as having been *expressed* (e.g.) by a work of art. Of course the normal target of an empathy-feeling is a personal subject: ‘Whoever takes to himself the feeling-content of the scene “Gretchen im Kerker” ... will feel *along with the maid* what she experiences in torment, faith, pious humility and despair.’ (p. 149) But we not only feel *with* Gretchen, we also feel sympathy and compassion *for* the maid, we experience what Witasek calls feelings of involvement (*Anteilsgefühle*). The status of such *sympathy-feelings* is relatively easy to understand, at least in the case where they are directed towards existing objects: they are genuine feelings which the subject himself genuinely has when he presents to himself a given object. Empathy-feelings, in contrast, are experienced in such a way that they are one’s own feelings only in phantasy, though sometimes (where we are dealing with expressive objects having the characteristics of persons) they are presented as corresponding to genuine feelings of the objects which invoke them.

Clearly, we shall not enjoy such feelings of involvement in the face of an object if our attitude in relation to this object is entirely neutral. Sympathy-feelings are in fact distinguished by the fact that they presuppose some primitive relation of fellow-feeling between ourselves and the object which evokes them. ‘For those whom we neither value nor love, neither hate nor abhor, we have no pleasure when they are happy, no pity when they are unhappy, and no concern for their fate’ (p. 155).

Thus there are no sympathy-feelings (no real feelings of involvement) in relation to what is ‘meaningless’ (for example in relation to highly abstract music, or to purely ornamental art). Conversely, however, wherever we do have sympathy for an object, it follows that we register in that object some kind of value – and value in just the sense of category (iii) above. All objects giving rise to sympathy-feelings are to that extent ‘objects of value-beauty’ in Witasek’s sense.

34. On empathy see *inter alia* Lipps 1905, Stein 1917, Scheler 1923 and compare D. W. Smith 1989, ch. III.

How are these remarks to be applied in such a way as to yield an account of our aesthetic pleasure in more sophisticated aesthetic objects such as certain works of drama or opera? We are confronted, first of all, by a manifold of actions on the stage. These provoke involvement: the aesthetic enjoyment of a drama would seem indeed to rest in many cases on a peculiar sort of comfortable sympathy with the characters we perceive. But they provoke also empathy-feelings. These two sorts of phantasy feelings then serve in Witasek's eyes as the presupposition of a further *genuine* feeling, a feeling of aesthetic pleasure which is induced by the drama.

Empathy- and sympathy-feelings cannot however make up the whole psychic presupposition of such a feeling of pleasure. It would be wrong to suppose – as does Aristotle in his doctrine of catharsis – that one emotional arousal in a subject can in itself and without further ado be the cause of a second emotional arousal in the same subject, that a feeling of empathetic displeasure, e.g. pain at the downfall of the hero, already and only because it is there, could trigger the pleasure-feeling of aesthetic enjoyment.

Witasek insists, rather, that since aesthetic enjoyment is a genuine pleasure, it must be related to some genuine object of an appropriate sort. But what could this object be, in cases where our aesthetic pleasure is related to Gestalt structures of expression? Note, first of all, that here the genuine feeling of aesthetic pleasure as it unfolds through time manifests a dependence on and a sensitivity to the empathetic-sympathetic emotional arousal with which it is associated. The latter is a real phenomenon in a certain subject's mind, which also manifests a real temporal unfolding. Witasek therefore suggests that aesthetic pleasure be conceived precisely as pleasure in such (modified) emotional arousal. A new layer of acts of intuitive presentation is however required, which would be directed toward this play of phantasy material within oneself. This is because it is not one's being emotionally affected in this or that way by the content of a drama or of a poem which is the cause of aesthetic pleasure. Rather, according to Witasek, it is one's becoming *aware* of this affect and as it were relishing one's own mental excitation. Sympathy- and empathy-feelings are presuppositions of aesthetic pleasure, then, only insofar as they are *consciously experienced* in intuitive presentation, and enjoyment in the drama on

the stage or in the poem on the page is bound up inextricably with a following with the inner eye of that drama which it sets loose within oneself.³⁵

We can now see how aesthetic pleasure in what we called narrative entities (events, actions, states of affairs, etc.) can be conceived as being related exclusively to objects of the same sort as is pleasure in expression, i.e. to empathy- and sympathy-feelings *within oneself*. For the aesthetic relevance of the events, actions and processes represented in a painting or novel is seen to be confined exclusively to the feeling-material in the spectator to which they give rise. The suffering of Gretchen is aesthetically relevant only to the extent that it is capable of giving rise to our feeling for and with the maid (a modified pseudo-suffering on our own behalf). The skill of the artist here lies in a moulding of the narrative elements of the work – the states of affairs (judgment- and assumption-material) from category (v) – in order to to establish relations between the different objects before our mind in such a way that the latter will constitute a kind of supporting fabric for our presentations and feelings. The proper exercise of this skill will bring it about that the feelings that are yielded by these elements will constitute rich and harmonious Gestalten capable of giving rise to different varieties of aesthetic pleasures on the part of the perceiving subject.

We can now see why Witasek suggested the term ‘objects of inner beauty’ for his category (iv) of aesthetic objects – and we can note in passing that our initial determination of the nature of aesthetic pleasure as a positive intuitive presentation-feeling has proved itself adequate to our experiences of objects in this category also. For ‘presentation’ includes both outer *and* inner presentation, and the play of pseudo-emotions is aesthetically relevant only in so far as it is experienced in inner presentation in an intuitive rather than in an intellectual way.

9. *Musical Presentations*

Considerations of a similar sort can be applied also in relation to our experience of music. Here, too, Witasek argues, it is phantasy feelings which are involved as the presupposition of our (genuine) feelings of aesthetic pleasure. But the

35. Cf. p. 152. This intuitive presentation of feeling-states is, according to Witasek, just what, in traditional Kantian aesthetics, was called ‘contemplation’.

phantasy feelings that are evoked by absolute music dispense with all presuppositions similar to those which one would find in a corresponding serious feeling: such phantasy feelings are in this sense meaningless (are, as Schopenhauer might say, a matter of ‘pure will’). Whoever is sad knows what he is sad *about*, and it is the thought of this which is the presupposition of his feeling of sadness. But when a piece of music ‘expresses sadness’ then the music itself says nothing about the cause of this sadness. And if the hearer sinks into this feeling-content, immerses himself in sadness, however intensely, then it is not the thought of a sad, painful event which awakens this phantasy feeling in him, for such a thought is normally not present in his consciousness at all.

The hearing of tones, or more precisely the intuitive presentation of tones and tone-formations, is certainly not a normal, adequate presupposition of [feelings of pain, sadness, longing, etc.]. *Sadness, for example, is felt in relation to a loss, an unhappy event, not in relation to tones or melodies and certainly not in relation to those tones and melodies which give rise to aesthetic pleasure; it is the actual knowledge of a loss which is the normal presupposition of sadness, not the presentation of tones.* (p. 135, my emphasis)

The cases where genuine feelings do come about on hearing tones – e.g. on hearing a funeral march – are not of an aesthetic nature at all, according to Witasek. The feelings in question are typically founded in personal memories of the hearer or in other non-aesthetic features of the given context. Some individuals may even seek to intensify their experience of music by associating their listening with thoughts of death, or with images of tragic occurrences; but still, Witasek insists,

those critics are usually moving in completely the wrong direction who take it to be their primary task to facilitate the understanding of a musical work by listing and more or less exactly describing the outer experiences and events which it ‘depicts’ and which are therefore to be read out of it (usually struggle, death, victory, triumph, decline, conflict, etc.). (p. 143)

A composer *may*, certainly, have been brought by certain experiences into a given mood which he then reproduces in his work. But it is then the mood that is reproduced – precisely as it is reproduced – that is important to the aesthetic experience of the work, not the external experiences which were the incidental cause of its being composed.

How, then, are we able to experience phantasy feelings in listening to music at all? This is first of all a consequence of the already noted fact that

phantasy material is subject to the dictates of the will. As Witasek notes, we are already in a position to set sounding within ourselves phantasy feelings of the most varied sorts, even without any kind of external aid, though normally we succeed thereby in producing only experiences having a relatively low degree of subtlety and intensity.

Music serves to intensify, to crystallize, such induced phantasy feelings; it serves, if one will, as a pump for the production and intensification of the inner play of phantasy. But it is not as if our own contribution would thereby be merely passive:

the cooperation of the will in the releasing of phantasy feelings ... is in practice indispensable. Where it is lacking, where the good will fails to immerse itself in the expressive content of the music, then the latter will be able to bring about only a minimal effect. The hearer must meet the music half-way, must, as one says, open his heart to it. (p. 137)

From where, then, does this ‘expressive content’ come from in cases of absolute music, where no objects are depicted in relation to which empathy- and sympathy-feelings could arise? Witasek’s answer to this question turns on the existence of a special functional relationship between the sound-Gestalten on the one hand and the feelings we experience on the other: the nature or quality of a given phantasy feeling depends on the character of the music which provokes it. As Mach and James, Ehrenfels and Witasek all in different ways recognized, there is a certain *similarity* between sound-Gestalten on the one hand and the psychical states to which they give rise – a fact which opens up the much wider theme of the role of *physical resonance* in the life of feeling and the relationship between feelings proper and what Mach called ‘*Muskelgeföhle*’.³⁶ For it is not as if, at each turning point in a piece of music, one would need to consult a repertoire of feelings before setting loose the appropriate reactions within oneself by means of a deliberate conscious effort, as it were in time to the accompanying notes. Rather, there occurs an automatic reproduction of physical resonances correlated with what one hears, giving rise through association to a corresponding flow of (phantasy-)feelings. By appeal to such associative links, however, it is possible to extend the Meinongian account of the descriptive psychology of acts and their modifications beyond the narrative and

36. Cf. Witasek, p. 137, Schulzki 1980, Mulligan and Smith 1988.

representational arts in such a way that it can be applied also to those cases where our aesthetic experiences do not rest on emotional elements recognizably derived from object-directed feelings and emotions of the more familiar sorts.

As is clear, therefore, and as will become clearer still from our treatment of Meinongian Gestalt psychology in Chapter Eight, the standard view of the philosophy of the Graz school as a matter of mere profligate ontologies – or in other words as a study of ‘homeless objects’ having modest implications for our understanding of the logic of fiction – must be rejected. Rather, the work of Meinong and his followers on the theory of objects is part and parcel of a more ambitious project that is rooted in the attempt to do full and adequate justice to the phenomenon of intentionality in all its breadth.

Chapter Six

Kasimir Twardowski On Content and Object

1. *Twardowski and Polish Philosophy*

The influence of Kasimir Twardowski on modern Polish philosophy is all-pervasive, and almost all important Polish philosophers in the early decades of the present century went through the hard training of his courses in Lvov. Twardowski instilled in his students a passion for clarity and rigour. He taught them to regard philosophy as a collaborative effort, a matter of disciplined discussion and argument, and he encouraged them to work together with scientists from other disciplines, above all with psychophysics, and also with mathematicians, so that the Lvov school of philosophy would gradually evolve into the Warsaw school of logic.¹

Kasimir Skrzypna-Twardowski, Ritter von Ogończyk, was born in Vienna in 1866, the son of a high official in the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Finance. He was educated at the Theresianum, where, as in all Austrian grammar schools, a course in philosophy (which is to say, psychology plus logic) was compulsory in the final year.² One of the small number of officially approved textbooks for this course for much of the second half of the nineteenth century (and in many cases also later) was the *Philosophische Propädeutik* of Robert Zimmermann, first published in Vienna in 1853. Zimmermann's work,

1. Woleński 1989 is now the standard history of the Lvov-Warsaw school. On Twardowski's teaching see Skolimowski (1967, pp. 26f.), who refers to Twardowski's 'Spartan drill'; see also Czeżowski 1939/46, esp. p. 16, and Czeżowski 1960. On Twardowski's intellectual development see Dąbska 1978 and Twardowski 1991.

2. The teachers at the Theresianum at this time included Alois Höfler, later collaborator of Meinong and editor of Bolzano's works. The records of the Theresianum, however, suggest that Twardowski did not attend any of Höfler's courses.

the logical sections of which are little more than lightly disguised summaries of Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre* prepared at Bolzano's own request, may have been instrumental in bringing about a renaissance of Bolzanianism in Austria in a period when Bolzano's own writings were officially suppressed. Certainly Bolzanian ideas affected not only Twardowski and Höfler, but also Meinong, Benno Kerry, J. K. Kreibitz, Hugo Bergmann, Heinrich Gomperz, and perhaps even Georg Lukács, and the disciples of Brentano were affected by Bolzanianism to such an extent that Brentano is reported to have been dismayed at the extent to which, one after another, they were taking up with a 'logical objectivism' that was for him anathema.³

From 1885 to 1889 Twardowski studied philosophy at the University of Vienna, receiving his doctoral degree in 1891 for a dissertation entitled *Idea and Perception. An Epistemological Study of Descartes*. While Twardowski studied especially under Franz Brentano, his official supervisor was in fact Zimmermann, Brentano having been obliged to resign his chair in 1880. During this time Twardowski made the acquaintance of Meinong, who had been Privatdozent in the University since 1878, and Twardowski played a not unimportant role in the development of Meinong's thinking in the direction of a general 'theory of objects'.⁴ At around this time Twardowski also helped to found the Vienna Philosophical Society (he would later go on to found the first Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov in 1904). On completing his studies, he was awarded a one year travel scholarship, which he used principally as a means of becoming acquainted with new work in psychology. In 1892, he studied in Munich, attending courses by Stumpf, and visited also Leipzig, where Wundt had instituted the world's first laboratory of experimental psychology in 1879. (Twardowski would himself go on to establish the first laboratory of experimental psychology in Poland in 1907.)

In 1894 Twardowski received the *venia legendi* in Vienna for a monograph, much inspired by Brentanian doctrines, *On the Doctrine of the Content*

3. See e.g. Brentano 1946, p. 94; on Bolzano and Zimmermann see the material reproduced in Winter (ed.) 1975. A parallel current of logical objectivism was fostered in Germany at about the same time by Hermann Lotze, whose students included *inter alia* Marty, Stumpf, Frege and Windelband. Cf. Morscher 1972. On the work in value-theory inspired by Lotze among his German disciples see Kraus 1937.

4. See Meinong 1899, Grossmann 1974, pp. 48-53, 106-11.

and Object of Presentations, and it is this work, translated into English only in 1977, which established his credentials as one of the most important promoters and extrapolators of Brentano's philosophy. The principal message of the work may be summarized as follows. Where Brentano had spoken indiscriminately of the 'contents' and 'objects' of mental acts, as though content and object were identical,⁵ Twardowski argued in favour of a strict distinction between the two – a distinction parallel, in many ways, to Frege's distinction between sense and referent, though translated into the psychological mode. Where Brentano had seen content and object as effectively one and the same, Twardowski regarded the content as a mental 'picture' or 'image' of the object of the act. Every act, according to Twardowski, has both a content and an object, though the object of an act need not in every case exist. Even non-existent objects are seen by Twardowski as enjoying properties of their own, a doctrine later transmuted by Meinong and Mally into the 'principle of the independence of being from being-so'.

In the period 1894/95, Twardowski lectured in Vienna as *Privatdozent*. He was then, at the age of 29, appointed professor of philosophy in Lvov, still at this time an Austrian town. This meant that, like the Jagellonian University in Cracow, its university enjoyed a rather liberal and tolerant atmosphere. Thus Poles were allowed to study and to be taught by their own lecturers and professors, where 'in the other parts of partitioned Poland they were engaged in a most savage struggle for national and economic survival.' (Jordan 1945, p. 39) Twardowski retired in 1930, though he continued to hold lectures in Lvov until his death in 1938. After 1894, he published no further major work. He dedicated himself, rather, to teaching, and to the job of establishing a modern and outward-looking tradition of exact and rigorous philosophy in Poland. His success in this can be seen in the fact that by the inter-war period his students held professorships in philosophy departments in all Polish universities with the single exception of the Catholic University in Lublin. Moreover, Twardowski's influence extended not merely to philosophers, above all to phenomenologists such as Roman Ingarden and Leopold Blaustein, and to the members of what might be called the 'analytic school' of Polish philosophy; it can be seen also in

5. Cf. e.g. Brentano 1924, vol. II, p. 39n, Eng. p. 202n. On the history of 'content-theories' see Sajama and Kamppinen 1987.

the teaching and writing of a series of eminent non-philosophers who had attended his courses in Lvov.⁶

It has been suggested that Twardowski's teaching was in some sense philosophically neutral, that the unity of his school was rooted in a common training in methods and habits of work, rather than in the handing down of any shared doctrines. Jordan, for example, asserts that the members of Twardowski's school were not linked by any 'common body of philosophical assumptions and beliefs'. Twardowski led his students, rather, 'to undertake painstaking analysis of specific problems which were rich in conceptual and terminological distinctions, and directed rather to the clarification than to the solution of the problems involved.' (1963, pp. 7f.)

Certainly, Twardowski held no truck with the system-building 'philosophical' philosophies of the past. His work was inspired, rather, by a 'scientific' attitude of precise and careful description – so that, as Jordan puts it, the philosophy he taught was in some ways 'a pedestrian affair, an elaborate and highly specialized technique of thinking, which, being closer than ever before to the hard ground of everyday experience and common sense, could not be followed [by] philosophically untrained amateurs.' (1963, p. 8) It would be wrong, however, to ignore the fact that Twardowski remained throughout his life firmly attached to a quite specific *metaphysical* conception of philosophy, and his attitude in this respect reveals itself in a general metaphysical orientation of the philosophers who came under his influence. This applies even to those – like Ajdukiewicz – who were at certain times attracted by the positivism or reductionism of the Vienna circle.⁷ It applies to Kotarbiński, as we shall see, and it applies also to Łukasiewicz and to philosophers such as Drewnowski and Zawirski who developed a conception of metaphysics as a hypothetical-deductive science to which the axiomatic method should be applied.⁸

6. On Twardowski's influence see, again, Woleński 1989, Ch. 1, Part 2, and also Skolimowski 1967, ch. II.

7. See e.g. Ajdukiewicz 1978, p. 348 and Küng 1989.

8. See e.g. Jordan 1945, p. 38. A similar conception is represented in the work of contemporary Polish philosophers such as Perzanowski.

What, then, was the metaphysics to which Twardowski himself subscribed? The answer to this question is clear from a perusal of his works: it is the metaphysics of Brentano. As Łuszczewska-Rohmanowa puts it, “Twardowski saw as his exclusive task the realization of the ideas of Brentano on Polish soil, ideas with which he himself in a way grew up and which he held to be indubitably correct.”⁹ Twardowski’s influence upon the *content* of modern Polish philosophy can accordingly best be understood in terms of certain Brentanian ideas and attitudes which Twardowski conveyed to his Polish disciples. This influence reveals itself, more precisely, in the fact that modern Polish philosophy is marked on the one hand by an attitude of metaphysical realism and on the other hand by a concern with the notion of truth as correspondence, both of which Twardowski had inherited – with some Bolzanian admixtures – from the early Brentano. Thus while Meinong’s theory of objects is a more widely known example of a generalized ontology built up on the basis of descriptive psychological analyses of the different kinds of mental acts, it was in fact Twardowski, of all the Brentanians, who was the first to develop a generalized ontology in this sense. As Ingarden puts it, Twardowski’s *Content and Object* is, ‘so far as I know, the first consistently constructed theory of objects manifesting a certain theoretical unity since the times of scholasticism and of the “ontology” of Christian Wolff’.¹⁰

In some cases a direct interest in Brentano and his school was inherited from Twardowski by his students. This is especially true of Ingarden, but it holds also of Leśniewski, as we shall see, and Łukasiewicz, too, was subject to the influence of Brentano’s ideas. He studied not only with Twardowski but also with Stumpf in Berlin and with Meinong in Graz, and among his earliest papers are a number of short reviews of works by Husserl, Höfler, Stumpf and Meinong.

It would be wrong to suggest that specifically Brentanian doctrines were taken over whole by Twardowski’s students. Yet the implicit or explicit concern with metaphysics, and especially with realistic metaphysics and with truth as correspondence, is a constantly recurring feature of their work.

9. Łuszczewska-Rohmanowa 1967, p. 155, as quoted in Schnelle, p. 90.

10. Ingarden 1938, p. 258, quoted in Schnelle, p. 99.

Investigations in the ontology of truth, or of those relations between sentences and objects which are constitutive of truth, have been quite peculiarly prominent features of Polish philosophical writings from Twardowski to the present day, and have coloured especially the Polish reception of the philosophy of Wittgenstein.¹¹ Even the early work of Tarski, too, can illuminatingly be viewed in this light, though Tarski did not himself study with Twardowski.¹²

At all events, though, it cannot be denied that an interest in the philosophy of truth has been a highly conspicuous moment of modern Polish philosophy. The idea of realism, on the other hand, may initially be thought to have played a less prominent role. On closer inspection, however, we see that the realist attitude which Twardowski promulgated has in fact been taken for granted by Polish philosophers as something almost universally shared. Realism, even Aristotelian realism, is an unquestioned presupposition of Leśniewski's work, and of that of his principal successors. It governs the work of Ingarden, dictating even the latter's interest in the phenomena of aesthetics.¹³ It has been of repeated concern to Ajdukiewicz, and it has coloured also the work on epistemology of Kotarbiński and his pupils.¹⁴ And in each case, Twardowski has played a role in determining both the terminology and the thinking of the philosophers in question.

2. *On the Absolute Theory of Truth*

Twardowski shared with the early Brentano and with Marty the thesis of the independence of the two dimensions of reality and existence:

An object is said to be something real or not real, regardless of whether or not it exists, just as one can talk about the simplicity or complexity of an object, without asking whether or not it exists. That in which the reality of an object consists cannot

11. From a wide selection of more recent works one might mention: Borkowski 1985, Perzanowski 1985, Suszko 1968, Stonert 1964 and Wolniewicz 1985.

12. Cf. Tarski 1956, p. 155, n. 2, and Woleński and Simons 1989.

13. See the Preface to his 1931; see also Ingarden's critical writings on Husserl's idealism, above all his 1929, and compare Haefliger 1990.

14. Jordan 1945, p. 35.

be expressed in words; but most philosophers seem to agree nowadays that objects like piercing tone, tree, grief, motion, are something real, while objects like lack, absence, possibility, etc. are to count as *not* real.¹⁵ Now, just as a real object may at one time exist and at another time not exist, so, too, can something non-real now exist, now not exist.¹⁶

Moreover, at the time of his *On Content and Object* Twardowski accepted the Brentanian existential theory of judgment according to which the truth of a (positive) judgment is to be identified, simply, with the existence of the relevant object.¹⁷ The divergence between Brentano and Twardowski turns on the fact that what is real may change, and this implies on Brentano's account that there may occur changes in the truth-values of corresponding judgments.¹⁸ As Brentano puts it, the truth of a judgment about what is real 'is conditioned by the existence, the coming into being, or the passing away, of the reality to which the judgment pertains.' Hence: 'Without itself undergoing any change, the judgment will gain or lose its truth if the reality in question is created or destroyed.' (1889a, § 55) Truth, accordingly, is not a timeless property of judgments – a conclusion which is taken by Brentano to imply that God, too, if he is omniscient, must exist in time, since the knowledge of which judgments are true and which false must change from moment to moment.¹⁹

Twardowski, in contrast, rejects any thesis of this sort. In his paper "On Relative Truth" of 1902 he argues forcefully in favour of a conception of truth as something absolute, a conception which would rule out the possibility that the truth of a judgment might change from occasion to occasion or from subject to subject. Brentano's acceptance of the thesis that truth can change and judgment remain the same follows, Twardowski argues, from a confusion of

15. Twardowski refers here to Marty 1884, pp. 171ff.

16. Twardowski 1894, p. 36, Eng. pp. 33f.; trans. here and in what follows amended slightly.

17. Łukasiewicz and Czeżowski both defined truth in this way in papers in 1900–1920. Łukasiewicz however adopted a Fregean definition in his "Two-Valued Logic" of 1921.

18. This thesis was considered already by Aristotle. See *Cat.* 4^a10–4^b19, 14^b12–23. Cf. also *De anima*, 428^b7f., and Aquinas, *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 5 and 6 and q. 14, a. 12.

19. See his 1976, pp. 105f., Eng. pp. 87f. On the issue of relative vs. absolute truth see also Kokoszyńska 1936, 1951 and Kühne 1987.

judgments on the one hand with their *statements* or *expressions* on the other. For a judgment is not always expressed fully by any given verbal statement. A full expression of the judgment made on some given occasion by means of the words ‘it’s raining’ might be something like: ‘at 8 o’clock p.m. Eastern Central European Time on 25 August 1675 according to the Gregorian calendar it’s raining on the High Castle Hill in Lemberg’. Twardowski’s argument here – which again reveals the influence of Bolzano’s *Wissenschaftslehre* – is to be found in different forms also in the work of Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein.²⁰

Nowadays, of course, the idea that there is an opposition between the grammatical structure of a sentence and the logical structure of the corresponding proposition has become a commonplace of analytic philosophy. Twardowski’s own formulation of this opposition is expressed, certainly, in terms of the psychological notion of judgment, rather than in terms of the properly logical notion of proposition. Moreover, his attentions are directed, here as elsewhere, to the understanding of the mental acts involved in judging and of the ontological correlates of such acts. He is not, like Frege, Russell or Wittgenstein, concerned with the building up of an ideal or artificial language in which thought and expression would somehow coincide. True to the Brentanist heritage, his efforts are directed rather to the events and processes that are involved in actual judgments. For all this, however, Twardowski’s emphasis on the notion of absolute truth can be seen to have pointed his students in the direction of a truth-functional conception of logic in the modern sense and in the direction of a semantic conception of truth,²¹ though further steps would have to be taken before Polish philosophers and logicians could establish those sophisticated results, above all pertaining to the logic of propositions, which we now take for granted.

Twardowski replaced Brentano’s own version of the correspondence theory – which conceives truth, for empirical judgments, as a transient relation between an episode of judging and some object of presentation – with a new

20. See Bolzano 1837, § 125; Frege 1918, pp. 101f.; Russell 1905, pp. 45, where Russell criticizes the assumption that ‘denoting phrases stand for genuine constituents of the propositions in whose verbal expressions they occur’; and 4.002 of the *Tractatus*.

21. On the early influence of Twardowski’s views in this respect see Kotarbiński 1913 and Leśniewski 1913a.

theory which sees truth as a *timeless relation* whose first term is a judgment conceived in abstraction from the factual conditions of its utterance or expression. Interestingly, this opposition can be seen to have played a role in Łukasiewicz's development of the idea of a many-valued logic. For Łukasiewicz took the view that truth, for empirical judgments, is absolute only in so far as such judgments are directed to the present and the past; in so far as judgments are directed to the future, their truth is relative.²²

22. See e.g. his 1922/23, pp. 126. This latter idea led some to accuse him of having run together the two separate notions of timeless and time-dependent truth. See Borkowski 1981.

3. *The Theory of the General Object*

Brentano and Twardowski differ further in their conception of general presentations like *lion*, *lexeme*, *hepatitis*, etc., such as are involved, for example, when we judge that the lion is carnivorous, that lexemes are listed in dictionaries, that hepatitis is an inflammation of the liver, and so on. General presentations are not, Twardowski argues, to be understood as relating to concepts or other immanent *entia rationis*, and nor are they to be understood as presentations of a set or list of individual objects falling under the relevant concept (as if a general presentation were some sort of summation of a number of individual presentations). This is seen above all in the fact that, with the aid of a general presentation, we can make judgments which ‘accomplish more than what the individual judgments about the successively presented objects can achieve in their totality.’ Thus the judgment *the lion is carnivorous* has a different ‘logical value’ from the judgments *Leo is carnivorous*, *Simba is carnivorous*, etc., taken together.²³ General presentations refer, rather, to special *general objects*, i.e. to what results when those marks or features common to all the objects of the relevant individual presentations are ordered and combined in presentation in such a way that they are, like the objects of individual presentations, unified as a whole. The general lion, as Twardowski conceives it, shares with any particular lion the features common to all lions, including the feature *is a lion*.²⁴

As Twardowski suggests, a discipline like geometry is concerned precisely with general objects of the given sort, and the same thesis may be extended also to the other sciences. Thus the biologist is interested not in this or that particular gene or chromosome, but rather in the gene in general and its relation to the chromosome in general. The linguist is interested not in any particular consignment of speech, but in the phoneme in general, the morpheme in general, the lexeme in general, as well as in, say, the distinctive features

23. 1894, pp. 103, Eng. pp. 98. Cf. Husserl, 1900/01, Investigation II, §16; Heyer 1985, 1987.

24. See Twardowski 1894, pp. 105, Eng. pp. 100. We might say also that the general lion shares the *form* of any actual lion. This idea was further developed by Meinong, with his doctrine of the incomplete object. Cf. Meinong 1915, §25 and Grossmann 1974, pp. 175ff., 206ff. See also the interestingly parallel work on general objects of G. F. Stout, as presented in Schaar 1991.

labial, dental, velar, etc., and in the combinations of, and interrelations between, these various general objects on different levels.²⁵ Not the least virtue of Twardowski's theory is, therefore, that it is able to do justice to the predominance of general names ('quark', 'electron', 'molecule', etc.) in the language of science.

Certainly it is true that one may, in conceiving of an individual object, conceive also those constituent features which it shares with others. In an individual presentation, however, one normally pays no attention to these shared constituents as such. Could we not, then, regard the general presentation as an individual presentation whose object has been picked out as a 'representative' from the range of available instances and is now presented in such a way that one pays attention precisely to the constituent marks it shares with other members of this range? The general presentation of the lion, on this view, would differ *in its object* not at all from some individual presentation of a lion: it would differ only in the mode of givenness of this object. A view of this sort is often attributed to Berkeley (see the "Introduction" to the *Principles*). Twardowski, however, rejects it out of hand. Taken literally, as he points out, the thesis that the object of a given general presentation was in fact some representative individual object would imply that the same judgments must hold of the relevant general object as hold of this individual – so that the general triangle, for example, might turn out to be two inches high.

There are, however, psychological considerations which serve to explain the attractiveness of the representative individual view. Certainly, 'nobody can conceive intuitively of a "general" triangle, a triangle which is neither right-angled, nor acute-angled, nor obtuse-angled, and which has no colour and no determinate size'.²⁶ And neither may the conception of a general triangle be entirely free of intuitive (sensory, pictorial) components: 'There is', Twardowski argues, 'a psychological law – already advanced by Aristotle – that one can never have a non-intuitive presentation unless it is accompanied by one (or several) intuitive ones.'²⁷ General presentations are, as Twardowski points

25. Compare the similar views of Peirce, as outlined in Smith 1992, Parts 1 and 3.

26. 1894, pp. 106, Eng., pp. 101f.

27. 1894, pp. 107, Eng., pp. 102. Cf. *De anima* 431^a16. This law was accepted also by Brentano, as we saw in Chapter Two, as also by Husserl: see e.g. LU VI § 27.

out, non-intuitive to such a degree that many hold them to be simply ‘non-executable’. Hence they deny their existence, just as they have denied the existence of presentations, such as that of a round square, or of a white horse that is black, whose objects have contradictory characteristics. Twardowski holds, however, that we can, however, form a non-intuitive presentation of such a general triangle (we can conceive it, make judgments about it), just as we can form a non-intuitive presentation of a square that is round or of a rational square root of 2. This is achieved via what he calls an ‘indirect presentation’.²⁸

To say that an object is presented indirectly is to say that its presentation comes about through the intermediary of a certain ‘auxiliary presentation’ of some known object standing in specific relations to the object meant. Consider, for example, my presentation of the height of the Zugspitze. I do not know what this height is; yet I can, for all that, make judgments about it. In order to present to myself this object I must, on Twardowski’s view, form an auxiliary presentation of the Zugspitze itself, and of a certain relation. This presentation is ‘auxiliary’ in the sense that I do not *mean* the Zugspitze, but rather a second and as it were unknown term, determined simply as the terminus of the given relation. Something similar holds when I present to myself, say, the number 1000. Here there is no possibility of a direct intuitive presentation. Hence I must form an auxiliary presentation of another object which stands to this number in a certain relation. Typically, I form the intuitive presentation of the relevant *numeral* ‘1000’, and the indirect presentation of the number itself is then determined uniquely via the relation of sign to thing signified. It is ultimately on this relation, as Twardowski points out, that there rests that kind of thinking which Leibniz called ‘symbolic’.²⁹

But consider my presentation of a country without mountains. Here the term *mountains* is linked to the indirectly presented term *country* by the relation

28. 1894, pp. 106, Eng. pp. 100. Twardowski is here following Benno Kerry (1885/86) on the ‘psychic processing’ of intuitive presentations, who was in turn influenced by Cantor and Bolzano, as also by the doctrine of the indirect presentation of attributes put forward by Meinong (1882, pp. 84, 96) and by Höfler’s theory of ‘psychic work’ (Kerry 1885/86, pp. 437 and Höfler 1890, §§ 15, 26 and 1895). The idea of ‘psychic processing’ is present also in Husserl’s early works and also underlies the so-called ‘production theory’ of Meinong’s psychologist disciples in Graz (see Chapter Eight, Section 3, below).

29. Twardowski 1894, pp. 99, 108, Eng., pp. 94, 103. Cf. e.g. *Discours de métaphysique*, “24ff; Husserl 1979, p. 21 and Kerry 1885/86, pp. 447f.

of privation. And as this case makes clear, we sometimes find it necessary, in order to form a presentation of a given object, to present to ourselves in auxiliary fashion other objects quite explicitly denied as pertaining to the object in question. A still more glaring case of this sort is provided by our presentation of objects with contradictory characteristics. Thus my presentation of a white horse that is black may, once again, be a case of merely symbolic thinking. It may, however, utilize the intuitive presentation of, say, a white horse, but in such a way that the object of this presentation is transformed. This occurs, Twardowski suggests, by means of the simultaneous presentation of certain judgments (for example to the effect that the white horse is black), judgments which are false and presented as such. It is obvious how a view along these lines can be adapted in such a way as to provide an account of what takes place psychologically when we read a work of fiction. Thus we might think in terms of a succession not of judged but of merely presented judgments accompanying the objectual presentations formed in the course of a given reading, a succession whose course is determined precisely by the succession of sentences laid down by the author of the text.³⁰

There are, on Twardowski's view, a number of important similarities between general objects and objects with contradictory characteristics. The former may, indeed, be counted as special cases of the latter (if it is true that there is something contradictory about a triangular figure that is neither equilateral nor isosceles nor scalene). Both general objects and contradictory objects are capable of being presented only non-intuitively and indirectly. And both, according to Twardowski, are such that, in and of themselves, they do not exist. The general object is however in one sense better off than the contradictory object: one can allow (in Scotist vein) that 'it exists in the sense that it can be detected in the objects of the corresponding individual presentations, albeit in a form which is somehow modified by the individual characteristics of these individual presentations.' (1894, p. 106, Eng., p. 101) The general object is as it were held in readiness in concretized form within

30. Cf. Ingarden's theory of quasi-judgments in §§ 25f. of his 1931 and compare Chapter Four, Section 9, above.

each individual instance – an idea developed more fully by Meinong with his doctrine of ‘implective existence’.³¹

What are the consequences of all of this (including the Aristotelian ‘psycho-logical law’ mentioned earlier) for our understanding of what is involved in the presentation of a general object? Here, again, we have two alternatives: either we can provide an account in terms of a merely ‘symbolic’ thinking of the general object – which consists in the employment as auxiliary of an intuitive presentation of the relevant general name; or we can provide an account in terms of the use of an intuitive auxiliary presentation of some individual object standing in for the relevant general object as representative or proxy. Thus for example we might conceive *man in general* via the presentation of some individual man or of a series of individual men. As in the case of our presentation of the white horse that is black, so also here, Twardowski argues, we transform the intuitive presentation by means of accompanying judgments. Here, however, the effect of such judgments is to suspend the individuality of our chosen object: ‘These presented judgments concern the particular size, colour of skin, in short, everything that when taken together constitutes the *individuality* of the individual man. This individuality is not really denied – the judgments are only *presented* judgments in the modifying sense of the word – it is merely presented as denied.’ (1894, p. 108, Eng., p. 104)

Twardowski’s notion of general object is by no means new. General or arbitrary or variable objects have been long accepted in practice by the majority of mathematicians, though admittedly their occasional theoretical reflections on the nature of such objects have rarely seemed clear. Among philosophers, too, the notion of the general object has a long history, and is at least as old as Plato. Different forms of the general object theory were accepted as a matter of course by the majority of philosophers up to and including Locke. Since then, however, the notion of the general object has fallen from favour, and in both contemporary philosophy and contemporary work in the foundations of mathematics the relevant doctrines are almost always overlooked. The revival of the view in Austria at the turn of the century has had little effect in either of these two fields, except in the negative sense that it provoked philosophers such

31. 1915, ‘29. Cf. Grossmann 1974, pp. 206–20. On the relations of this view to the Aristotelian-scholastic doctrine of immanent realism see my 1992, and Chapter Two above.

as Kotarbiński to develop explicitly ‘reistic’ or ‘concretist’ ontologies in which the supposed evils of the general object theory would be avoided.

The Twardowski–Meinong theory has, however, made its mark in the field of probability theory, where it has particular advantages. Here again we must mention in particular Łukasiewicz, whose seminal ideas in probability theory were worked out in Graz in 1909. As Łukasiewicz points out, definite events ‘cannot be probable at all, since they are either *necessary* or *impossible*, either *real* or *unreal*.’ Hence: ‘Propositions which in the probability calculus are considered probable must be formulated not for any *definite* case, but for any arbitrary case *x*.’ This theory of probabilities is, as he himself tells us, ‘objective’: it sees probability as a certain property of propositions determined by the relationships which these propositions bear to the objective world. This does not, however, mean that ‘arbitrary events’ or ‘arbitrary cases’ would themselves exist objectively: ‘probability is a concept invented by the *human mind* for the purpose of scientific treatment of those facts which cannot be interpreted by general judgments’. Thus the arbitrary or indefinite objects are in Łukasiewicz’s eyes introduced by the probability theorist purely as instrumental aids in the formulation of certain special sorts of facts,³² an idea which recalls Meinong’s conception of incomplete objects as auxiliary ‘*Hilfsgegenstände*’, mediating between the relevant complete (real, spatio-temporal) objects and the knowing subject.³³ Ideas similar to those of Meinong and of Łukasiewicz are defended also by W. E. Johnson. Thus consider, for example, the following analysis by Johnson of what it is that changes when, e.g., a continuant (a substance) gets hotter:

On the one hand, it cannot be the continuant itself, nor any of its properties, since these are asserted to be constant throughout the period of time to which the process of change is referred. Neither can it be the manifestations, dated at time-points, which can be said to change, since these merely replace one another from instant to instant. The clue to the problem is to be found in the theory of the determinable. The character of each dated

32. Łukasiewicz 1913, pp. 40, 47 and compare also Łukasiewicz’s discussion of the ‘objective’ in his 1910, dealt with at length by Simons in his 1989.

33. Meinong’s ideas are defended also in an influential book on *The Philosophical Foundations of the Probability Calculus* by the mathematician E. Czuber – the same Czuber who was so scornfully castigated by Frege for the treatment of ‘indeterminate numbers’ which Czuber put forward in his work on the calculus of 1898. See Frege 1898/99, p. 160 and compare Fine 1983, p. 70 and Santambrogio 1992.

manifestation is determinate, and a change implies always that the determinate character of the one manifestation at one instant is replaced at a subsequent instant by a manifestation having a different determinate character under the same determinable. Thus we speak of temperature or colour or size or shape, etc., as changing or remaining constant during a certain period of time; it is therefore the manifestation – not of a *determinate* – but of a *determinable* that may be said to change. (Johnson 1924, vol. III, p. 85)

Why, then, has the theory of general objects been so extensively neglected in recent philosophy? This is first of all for reasons having to do with the hegemony of empiricism and positivism and of the widespread assumption that science proper has nothing to do with general objects – in spite of what one finds when one examines the language used in almost all forms of scientific text. The general object theory has suffered further from a lack of clarity on the part of its original proponents and from the undeniable successes of the Fregean treatment of generality through the device of quantification, a device which dispenses entirely with the need for general objects and general names. One consequence of the success of the quantifier-variable notation as a means of expressing generality is that it has led to the acceptance as canonical of a logical language within which generality (meaning, content) is confined entirely to the level of predicates and of other syntactic forms of higher type – a view which goes hand in hand with Russell's view that the only proper names are 'this' or 'that' or meaningless analogues thereof. Hence proponents of contemporary theories of the logic of science, with their almost exclusive reliance on standard predicate logic as a tool of analysis, find themselves called upon to translate actual scientific usage by *force majeure* into a language in which all generality is carried by predicate expressions and in which names must designate in every case what is singular.³⁴

Twardowski himself points to certain linguistic reasons for the neglect of general objects. For language 'often uses the same name as the designation for the general object as well as for the corresponding individual objects', so that philosophers have too readily assumed that 'a general name is, as it were, the summary designation of all objects which are designated separately by means of the corresponding individual names.' (1894, p. 107, Eng., p. 102)

34. The language of Lesniewski's Ontology, on the other hand, allows some generality to be expressed at the level of names in virtue of the fact that names, for Lesniewski, may be multiply designating. See Ch. 8 of Küng 1967 and Simons 1982.

There are also psychological reasons for this neglect. As has already been pointed out, general presentations standardly involve a certain auxiliary intuitive presentation of something individual, and not just one, but many individual presentations may serve in bringing about the non-intuitive presentation of a given general object. Moreover, these intuitive presentations will enjoy a greater vivacity than the non-intuitive general presentation to which they give rise. Hence it is no surprise that it may appear to some ‘as if it is the individual objects of the psychologically dependent auxiliary presentations which are in reality what is presented through the general presentation ... and this is the psychological cause of the error which consists in ascribing several, even infinitely many, objects to a general presentation.’ (1894, p. 109, Eng., p. 103.)

Moreover, the theory of general objects is not without its ontological problems, too. Thus, as we have seen, general objects as conceived by Twardowski – as also by Meinong and Łukasiewicz – suffer in comparison with at least some individual objects in that they lack the property of existence (though this need not, in Twardowski’s eyes, imply that they would lack all other properties, too). Further, as Husserl argues in his second Logical Investigation (‘11), Twardowski’s general objects are subject to all the defects of Locke’s general triangle – not least the defect of inconsistency – a criticism which was used also by Leśniewski as the basis for an attack on Twardowski’s doctrine, Leśniewski turning the argument also against Husserl himself.³⁵ Leśniewski can accuse Twardowski of inconsistency, however, only because he himself subscribes to a principle – which he calls the *metaphysical* or *ontological* principle of excluded middle – to the effect that *for each property it holds that every object either possesses it or does not possess it*.³⁶ Clearly, to

35. Thus Leśniewski tells us that his argument applies to ‘the “general objects” appearing in various systems, whether as “concepts” in the sense of ancient or “medieval” “realism”, or as Locke’s “general ideas”, or as Professor Twardowski’s “objects of general presentations”, or as Husserl’s “ideal” objects existing “outside of time”’ (1913, p. 319, cited according to p. 46, n. 36 of the translation of Leśniewski 1927/31). Cf. also the summary in Kotarbiński 1920.

36. This is contrasted with the logical principle of excluded middle which asserts that *at least one of two contradictory propositions must be true*, a principle which Leśniewski, in his early works, rejects. Łukasiewicz, too, draws a distinction in his study of Aristotle of 1910 between the *ontological principle of contradiction* (the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect – *Met.*, 1005^b19f.), the *logical principle of contradiction* (contradictory statements cannot at the same time be true – *Met.*, 1011^b13f.), and the *psychological principle of contradiction* (it is impossible for anyone to believe the same thing to be and not to be (*Met.*, 1005^b23f.). Leśniewski appears here to have adopted Łukasiewicz’s terminology: see 1913, pp. 316f.

adopt this principle is to impose a requirement on objects to the effect that they are in every case fully determinate. Yet general objects are precisely indeterminate in regard to those properties which are possessed by some but not all of their individual instances or values.

The theory of general objects has been resuscitated in recent years by Kit Fine in his theory of what he calls ‘arbitrary objects’.³⁷ Interestingly Fine, too, employs a distinction between two versions of the law of excluded middle, and like Twardowski, Meinong and Łukasiewicz he is concerned to stress that general objects do not exist in any ‘ontologically significant sense’. He is concerned, rather, to show that it is possible to develop a consistent and non-trivial formal theory in which such objects play a central role, and in such a way as to throw light for example on the systematic uses of general objects that are involved in even the most simple processes of reasoning. His work offers further an intuitively convincing semantic theory of the ‘let’-clauses by means of which (as Fine sees it) mathematicians cause arbitrary objects to be called into being in their works.³⁸ The theory rests essentially on the insight that there may be certain relations of dependence between the arbitrary objects which such clauses cause to be introduced. Thus when the mathematician says, ‘Let a be a real number and b an integer greater than a ’, then both a and b are arbitrary numbers. There is however a relation of dependence between them, in the sense that the variability of the latter is constrained by that of the former. While Twardowski and Meinong had a philosophically clear and sophisticated theory of general objects, we find nowhere in their writings the working out of the thesis that there are dependence relations among such objects. It turns out, however, that it is precisely this suggestion which is most crucial in the understanding of how the realm of general objects is structured and of how such objects may be manipulated, both inside and outside mathematics.

37. See Fine 1983, 1985, and compare Santambrogio 1987. Santambrogio, in some respects more faithful to Twardowski, begins not, like Fine, with a relation between the arbitrary object and the individuals which are its ‘values’, but rather with the notion of *indefinite description* and with the assumption that to every indefinite description there corresponds some one ‘generic object’. One can then define a partial order relation among generic objects according to their relative ‘degree of definiteness’ (as *bald Polish logician*, for example, is more definite than *logician*). This enables Santambrogio to mimic certain aspects of the old doctrine of *species infimae*, and to define what it is for an object to be individual in terms of the generic objects of which it is in some sense composed. In this respect he comes close to the work on ‘guise theory’ of H.-N. Castañeda (1974, 1977).

38. Compare, on this, Husserl 1894a, §§ 7f.

4. *Sachverhalt vs. Judgment-Content: Immanence and Idealism*

Unity or integrity is, Twardowski argues in his *Content and Object* of 1894, a formal moment of every object given in presentation: ‘in being one, a unified whole, every object sets itself off against all others, as different from all others, and hence as the one it is, as self-identical.’ (1894, p. 88, Eng. p. 86) There is an anticipation here of what Husserl and the Berlin Gestalt psychologists later dealt with under the heading of the ‘figure-ground’ structure of perception.³⁹ As Twardowski conceives it, the unity of objects of presentation extends even to general presentations. In his work of 1894, however, Twardowski insists that a judgment does not have a special objectual correlate of its own, even though it has a special content. What is judged in the strict sense is in every case the object itself, i.e. the object of presentation. Both judging and presenting

relate to an ‘object which is presumed to be independent of thinking.’ When the object is presented and when it is judged, in both cases there occurs a third item, besides the mental act and its object, which is, as it were, a sign of the object: its mental ‘picture’ [‘image’, ‘Bild’] when it is presented, and its existence when it is judged. One says of the mental ‘picture’ of an object and of its existence that the former is presented, the latter is judged. The proper object of the presenting and judging, however, is neither the mental picture of the object nor its existence, but the object itself. (1894, p. 9, Eng. p. 7)

In drawing the distinction between content and object for acts of presentation, Twardowski had broken not only with his teacher Brentano – whose immanence theory he criticizes – but also with philosophical idealists in Germany who had – with greater and lesser degrees of clarity – identified the objects of cognitive experiences with the corresponding immanent contents of consciousness. Objects, for the idealist, in so far as they are experienced and known, are quite literally located ‘in the mind’ of the knowing subject. Being or existence, too, is seen as belonging entirely to the sphere of consciousness. Windelband defines idealism as ‘the dissolution of being into processes of consciousness’ (1900, p. 463n.). And Schuppe, in his *Epistemological Logic*, defines existence variously, as *perceivability*, as *presence to mind as content of*

39. Husserl, LU III § 8, and Köhler 1947, pp. 120f.

*consciousness, as real factual impression, and so on.*⁴⁰ The just-quoted passage from Twardowski suggests, however, that he, too, is still affected by this idealist theory, in so far as judgment is concerned. For the passage seems to tell us that for Twardowski, too, ‘existence’ (or ‘*the existence of the object*’) would refer, somehow, to something immanent in consciousness. It is as if the object would be taken up into consciousness in this form when judged, just as it is taken up into consciousness in the form of an image when presented.

Older than German idealism, though intimately associated therewith, is the traditional, Aristotelian ‘combination of ideas’ theory of judgment against which Brentano’s existential theory had been directed. The total process of judging, according to the traditional theory, is exhausted entirely by what takes place in consciousness. The positive judgment is a conscious combining or connecting of certain concepts or presentations; or it is a consciousness of their connectedness or connectibility within a single consciousness. The negative judgment, similarly, is a conscious separating or dividing of concepts or presentations, or a consciousness of their separation or separability. Here, too, then, there is talk of a kind of ‘unification’. Positive judging is a unifying or synthesizing of a plurality of separate concepts – above all of subject-concepts and predicate-concepts – in a way which generates a ‘unitary positing’ (‘*Inenssetzung*’) of a certain kind. This implies, however, that a positive judging is not essentially distinguished from the entertaining of a complex of concepts or the having of a complex presentation. This view, which had once been accepted as a matter of course by almost all philosophers,⁴¹ began gradually, and especially towards the end of the nineteenth century, to be recognized as problematic. How, for example, is it to account for existential and impersonal judgments like ‘cheetahs exist’, ‘it’s raining’, and so on, for which, because the judgments in question seem to have only one single member, a synthesis or unification would seem to be excluded?⁴² How does it cope with

40. Schuppe 1878, pp. 49f., 79f., 167.

41. See e.g. Aristotle, *De anima* III, 6 (430^a27f.) also: *Met.*, 1051^b, *De int.* 16^a10ff.; Wolff, *Philosophia rationalis sive Logica* (1728), ‘40; Kant, *Logik* (1800), § 19; Herbart, *Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie* (1813), §§ 52f.

42. Cf. from a huge literature, Schuppe 1878, ch. XII; Sigwart 1888; Marty 1884, 1895; Cornelius 1894; Reinach 1989, pp. 347ff. (= Reinach 1911, § 12 of trans.)

hypothetical and other judgment-forms, in which complex concepts or presentations seem to be present as proper parts, without however being judged? How, most importantly, can a conception of judgment as a purely immanent process be made compatible with the needs of the correspondence theory? This last problem had begun to seem urgent only with the gradual rediscovery and rehabilitation of realism in the last decades of the nineteenth century – for the idealist philosophers had been able to conceive correspondence as a relation between different parts of mind.⁴³

In the light of these and related problems even proponents of the traditional theory such as Sigwart and Lotze began seriously to doubt that the essence of the judgment could be exhausted by the idea of a unification or ‘unitary positing’ of different concepts or presentations. As Sigwart puts it, ‘there is contained at the same time in every completed judgment as such also the consciousness of the objective validity of this unitary positing.’⁴⁴ If one wants to understand judgment, therefore, it is not enough to say that in judgment one brings specific concepts together and entertains them as a unity; one must also, if one is to make a judgment, affirm or believe that there is something on the side of the object corresponding to the conceptual unity that has been produced thereby. The theory of conceptual unities must be supplemented, at the very least, by what in Fregean terms would be called a theory of assertive force. But must there not also, if the demands of the correspondence theory are to be met, be some attempt to come to terms with the objectual correlates of judgment themselves? Should the attempt not be made to establish what, exactly, this objectual something is, which gets ‘posited as a unity’ in the act of judging and to which ‘objective validity’ is ascribed?

Sigwart, while recognizing clearly the role of this consciousness of objective validity in distinguishing acts of judgment from mere combinings and separatings of presentations, presents no coherent account of how we could move from this recognition to an adequate relational understanding of what it is for a judgment to be true. Brentano, on the other hand, while conscious of the necessity of regarding the positing of existence as part of the essence of

43. See e.g. Schuppe 1878, pp. 649f.

44. Sigwart 1873, I, p. 77. See also Lotze 1880, pp. 57f.; Ueberweg 1882, p. 189; Marty 1884, p. 162. This idea, too, is present already in Abelard: see, again, Nuchelmans 1982, pp. 200f.

judgment – and in a position to state how this would lead to a coherent account of truth – still operated within a framework which did not clearly differentiate between content and object; he was therefore unable to grasp explicitly the need for a unitary correlate of the given kind on the side of the object.⁴⁵ Twardowski, however, does take the decisive step of recognizing a special *object* of the judging act, in addition to the judgment-content. In a letter to Meinong of 1897, he sketches a view according to which, not only in the case of presentations but also in the case of judgments, there would be something unitary both on the side of the act itself and on the side of the object. More precisely, Twardowski announces his plan of working out a ‘theory of judgment’ – a theory which would bring about a ‘unification of the Brentano–Meinong–Höfler theory with that of Sigwart’ – on the basis of the idea that it is possible to distinguish in relation to every judgment between:

- the *act* (affirmation or denial)
- the *content* (the existing, being present, subsisting)
- the *object* (the judged state of affairs, either an absolute datum, or a relation, or both together).⁴⁶

As example Twardowski gives the judgment ‘two times two are four’. Here we distinguish the *act* of judging – a certain affirmation; the *judgment-content* – the existence (subsistence) of a certain equality; and the *object* of the judgment, which is now referred to as a ‘*Sachverhalt*’ or ‘state of affairs’. The content of the act is in contrast referred to as the *existence* or *non-existence* of the *Sachverhalt*, according to whether the judgment is itself positive or negative, a phraseology which will recall Wittgenstein’s treatment of positive and negative facts in the *Tractatus*.⁴⁷

45. Meinong, too, while drawing a clear distinction between object and objective, drew no unequivocal distinction among objectives between judgment-content on the one hand and judged objectual correlate on the other, and a similar unclarity is present also in the work of Stumpf and Marty. See Smith 1989a and the references there given.

46. Meinong 1965, pp. 143f.

47. See 2, 2.06, 2.062, 2.11, 2.201, 4.1, 4.21, 4.3 and the valuable discussion in Dietrich 1974, § 2.

5. *Process and Product*

Twardowski's own ideas on *Sachverhalte* were never published, and it was in fact only his earlier *Content and Object* which exerted any influence outside the sphere of his most immediate disciples. It was this work, especially, which impressed Meinong, and it caught the attention of Husserl, who prepared a draft review of Twardowski's book in 1896.⁴⁸ Husserl, like Meinong, seems to have been impressed above all by Twardowski's account of modifying adjectives, by his treatment – based on the work of Brentano and Stumpf – of the dependence relations among the marks of a concept,⁴⁹ and by Twardowski's working out of the opposition between the formal and material moments of objects given in presentation.⁵⁰ On the other hand, however, Husserl is critical of the psychologism running through Twardowski's work, and Husserl's arguments against psychologism in fact receive a first run-through in his review of Twardowski.

Twardowski himself was sparked by Husserl's critique of psychologism in the *Logical Investigations* to revise his earlier position. Thus in the paper "On Conceptual Presentations" of 1903, he calls into question his own earlier view of concepts, judgments and theories as purely psychological in nature. From talking of 'contents' of judgments, Twardowski moves to talking instead of 'propositions', advancing a view of propositions as entities relatively isolated from the domain of transient psychological phenomena.

Twardowski's reconsideration of his earlier views in the light of Husserl's criticisms took a further turn in his paper on "Actions and Products" of 1912. Here Twardowski draws back from the tentative Platonism of his 1903 paper to adopt an original form of naturalism, a view according to which not Platonic

48. See Husserl 1894/96. The important paper "Intentionale Gegenstände" (1894a, 1990/91) was also a part of Husserl attempt to come to terms with Twardowski, and it is in this paper that Husserl first puts forward his doctrine – comparable in some ways to Russell's theory of descriptions – of intentional objects of presentation: see Mulligan 1985 and Schuhmann 1990/91.

49. Twardowski 1894, pp. 51, 65, Eng. pp. 49, 61; see also Höfler 1890, § 15.

50. Twardowski's ideas here anticipate many of the most important distinctions made by Husserl in his own third Logical Investigation on the theory of parts and wholes, though Husserl is more sensitive than Twardowski to the dangers resulting from a view of formal relations as 'real moments' of the things. See Husserl 1979, p. 354; LU III ' 22.

abstracta would serve as guarantors of the objectivity of meaning, but rather enduring concrete signs. Here, too, his work can be seen to have had echoes in subsequent Polish philosophy.

Twardowski's aim in this paper is to demonstrate how not merely judgments but all classes of mental phenomena may, in given circumstances, give rise to specific kinds of *products* of their own, products which enjoy a certain durability and transcendence from the domain of transient acts.⁵¹ Twardowski distinguishes two kinds of process and associated product: the *mental* on the one hand, and the *physical* on the other. Thus 'thinking', 'deciding', 'wishing' designate mental processes; 'thought', 'decision', 'wish' the corresponding products; 'moving', 'falling', 'jumping' designate physical processes, 'movement', 'fall', 'jump' the corresponding products.

Among physical processes we can distinguish as special cases what Twardowski calls *psychophysical* processes: these are physical processes, but in contrast, say, to fallings or rotatings, they are shaped and affected by concurrent mental processes in such a way that the latter have a determining effect also on the ultimate products. 'Screaming', 'lying' and 'promising' designate psychophysical processes in this sense, 'scream', 'lie' and 'promise' the psychophysical products to which they give rise.⁵²

Twardowski distinguishes further, among psychophysical products, between what might be called *original* products on the one hand and *substitutive* or *artificial* products on the other. It is as if we can distinguish, for each type of psychophysical product, a type of mental process that is appropriate to govern, shape and motivate the process as a whole. Original products are those whose production has been governed by a mental process of the appropriate type. Substitutive products, on the other hand, are those whose mental process is inappropriate, falls short of completeness, or is in some other way defective or entirely absent. Examples of such substitutive products are familiar from the theory of speech acts – they occur wherever sincerity conditions fail to be met, for example where I verbally promise to do X in the absence of any relevant underlying intentions. Twardowski himself refers to the

51. On the Husserlian influence on this paper see Schnelle, p. 117 and Ingarden 1938, p. 261.

52. Twardowski 1912, p. 15.

example of the posture and gestures of an actor, which seem to express emotions:

an imagined emotion is a product which is a substitute for a genuine emotion, and the posture [of the artist in the drama] is likewise an artificial product, since it is not a real expression of emotion, but merely its assumed, pretended image. (1912, p. 23)

We can distinguish further among physical products between the durable and the non-durable. Examples of the latter – jumps, gestures, screams, etc. – have been mentioned already. Examples of the former would be, say, hoofprints and stalagmites, but also drawings, writings, buildings, sculptures, and so on. Thoughts as such are not durable in this sense (so that when we say, for example, that the thoughts of the sage lived on, then what we mean is more properly that his actions caused dispositions to be inculcated in others which led them repeatedly to produce thoughts in some way similar to those which he himself had produced). Such durable physical products are, in Twardowski's terms, '*expressions*' of the mental processes which produced them, and also of the corresponding mental products. Thus: the sentence expresses the thought, the drawing expresses the image, the building expresses the plan, and so on.

It is at this point that Twardowski introduces his new, non-Platonistic conception of meaning:

Psychophysical products which express certain mental products are also termed 'signs' of those mental products, and the mental products themselves are termed their respective 'meanings'.⁵³ Thus any mental product which bears to a psychophysical product the relation of being expressed by the latter is a meaning. We accordingly speak of the meaning of a cry, the meaning of a drawing, the meaning of a gesture, the meaning of a blush, etc. (1912, pp. 19f.)

A non-durable product may accordingly 'survive' by finding expression in a durable product to whose emergence it has in appropriate ways contributed. This occurs, most obviously and most systematically, when a mental product is the meaning of that sort of durable psychophysical product which is a linguistic sign. The sign then survives as a 'durable partial cause' of the emergence of similar non-durable mental products in the future.

The thought or meaning, on this account, is not a durable item of worldly (or extra-worldly) furniture. It exists, rather, only so long as there exists some

53. Twardowski refers here to the theory of signs and meanings put forward by the Meinongian E. Martinak in his 1901.

mental process which produces it. Even when no relevant mental process is taking place, however, the meaning may still be said to exist potentially, or as we might also say: dispositionally, in the corresponding sign. This is because, providing certain background conditions are met, the sign as cause thereafter enjoys an enduring capacity to bring about in reliable fashion the relevant transient meaning as effect. This, as Twardowski points out, explains our tendency to assert that the meaning is somehow ‘included’ or ‘embodied’ in the sign, and to speak of a ‘fixing’ in the sign of a non-durable mental product in a way that is in some respects analogous to the fixing of a sound by means of a phonograph record. (1912, pp. 21f.) It explains also our commonsense assumption that our thoughts grow in complexity in tandem with our acquisition of successively more sophisticated rules of language. Systematic complexity in the world of signs may contribute to – is quite literally a cause of – a parallel systematic complexity in the ‘subjective’ realm of meanings. For this reason, too, there can normally be no problem of our knowing which thoughts we want to express but in such a way that we would have no comprehension at all of the words we would need to express them. To have a thought is already to have a presentation of the signs used to express it, accompanied by a disposition to express those signs.

The sign is not, then, inert, but has the mental product as it were held in readiness within it. Yet the successive meanings evoked by a given sign in different subjects and at different times are not identical. We can, however – since we all (as speakers of a given language) enjoy a roughly similar bodily constitution and apparatus of perception, roughly similar education, needs, wants, etc. – assume that the causal histories which lead to the production of such successive meanings will be to a large degree similar. This will thereby hold also of these meanings themselves, given that similarity of process leads, *ceteris paribus*, to similarity of product. All of the various products evoked by a given sign will, in Twardowski’s words, ‘reveal a number of common characteristics ... That is why we also say that a given statement evokes in various persons *the same* thought, whereas in fact it evokes as many thoughts as there are persons involved’. (1912, pp. 22f.)

Communication and mutual understanding is possible, on this account, not because our words and sentences relate to Platonic meaning-entities capable of being entertained simultaneously by different subjects, but because our

words are able to evoke in others mental processes which are in relevant respects similar to those mental processes which they were used to express – and our understanding of what is written involves merely a deferred evocation of this sort.⁵⁴

Twardowski, like Brentano, is a psychological realist: he holds that there are mental acts, and that these mental acts have determinate forms and natures which are given in experience and are able to be grasped theoretically by the descriptive psychologist. There are, as it were, *natural kinds*, in the folk-psychological realm of mental acts, and the natural kinds in the world of signs – which are more public, and in some ways better understood – can then be exploited in coming to grips scientifically with these mental natural kinds and also with their associated products.⁵⁵ Naturally, we shall have to distinguish carefully here between those uses of language which are, in our earlier terminology, *original* and those which are merely *substitutive* or *artificial*.⁵⁶ Thus there will be cases where a linguistic expression is merely a sham expression of the corresponding act, cases of dissimulation, cases where language ‘goes on holiday’ in different ways and leaves behind the world of (fulfilled, authentic) acts.

It follows that we are quite right to suppose that we may learn what a person thinks by listening, with due care – for example in taking account of his tone of voice, facial expression, etc., in order to rule out substitutive cases – to what he has to say. And we are justified, too, in supposing that we may conceive of different persons’ thoughts as causally associated with particular signs in a way that allows us to ‘disregard the differences among them’. The term ‘meaning’, accordingly, is ambiguous on Twardowski’s view. On the one hand it means a specific mental product, tied to a given empirically occurring

54. As we saw, the notion of ‘evocation’ was exploited by Marty as the basis of his theory of the workings of language and the idea was taken over also by Karl Bühler in his *Theory of Language* of 1934, which recognizes however ‘expression’ and ‘representation’ as two further primary intentions involved in language use. It is present also in Kotarbiński’s theory of imitation: see Chapter Seven, Section 3, below.

55. See Brentano 1924, vol. I, pp. 51ff., Eng. pp. 37ff.

56. As is almost always the case where we are dealing with natural kinds, we shall have to deal here with both standard and non-standard instances of the relevant kinds. See Marty’s theory of ‘*innere Sprachform*’ discussed in Chapter Four, Section 9, above.

mental process in some given subject. On the other hand it means the ‘meaning of a sign’, and ‘meaning conceived in this sense is no longer a specific mental product, but something we attain by the operation of abstraction performed on given products.’ The ‘meaning of a sign’ is something like a natural kind of which the individual mental products are the instances (as, for Husserl, linguistic meanings are ‘ideal species’ of language-using acts).⁵⁷

Even when allowance has been made for the presence of substitutive uses of language, however, there are difficult problems standing in the way of this conception of linguistic meaning, both on Husserl’s account and on that of Twardowski:

(i) A sign may be, firstly and most trivially, ambiguous, so that it is associated with two or more parallel classes of similar mental products (with two disjoint natural kinds) on the part of those who use it.

(ii) Signs occurring naturally must occur in every case in some context or other. The same sign will yield different mental products in grammatically different sorts of contexts, and it will interact differently with different accompanying signs. Twardowski, we may say, in laying too much stress on what might be called the vertical relations between individual signs and associated mental processes, has ignored the horizontal relations among these signs themselves – relations in virtue of which the associated processes will condition each other mutually. Sometimes, as we have seen, one sign will, when used in combination with another, succeed in abolishing entirely the normally expected meaning of the latter, as in phrases like ‘cancelled performance’, ‘forged banknote’, ‘missing link’, and so on.

(iii) Mutual understanding is of course possible even in the absence of agreement in judgments. B may *understand* what A asserts even when B is not himself disposed to assert it, so that there is no judgment in B at all, and therefore also no straightforward similarity of A’s and B’s respective acts. Husserl solves this problem by recognizing that the *contents* of two acts may be in relevant respects similar even though their *qualities* conflict. The relation between the two respective processes may be understood from a Twardowskian

57. See Twardowski 1912, p. 23. Twardowski refers in this context to the discussion of ‘ideal meanings’ in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, vol. II, B 452ff., Eng. pp. 616ff. (LU V § 30). See further LU VI §§ 16f., 20, and compare Mulligan and Smith 1986 and Smith 1987 for a more detailed treatment.

point of view as follows: B enjoys not a process of judgment, but a process of presentation of A's judgment; at the same time, however, in order to *understand* A, B must grasp what it is like to judge in the way that A is judging; he must, as it were, imagine himself *in A's place* and as judging as A is judging. Understanding another's judgment is therefore in these circumstances an empathetic process – a conclusion which might have been inferred from the importance of such processes in our understanding of, for example, works of narrative art.

(iv) Problems are raised further by indexical uses of language. Thus suppose A says to B, 'I am hungry'. The meaning evoked in B by A's use of 'I' is clearly distinct from that which B invokes in himself by his own use of what is, ostensibly, the same sign. It is not, however, as if there obtained no relation at all in such circumstances between the respective acts (and products) of A and B. Perhaps, again, the notion of empathy can be appealed to here. For it seems that whenever B understands A's 'I', then it is a part of B's experience that he presents himself as *in A's place*, and presents to himself an act as if in A which would be similar to his own straightforward act of meaning 'I'. The meaning of the second person, of 'here', 'now', and so on, might be dealt with along similar lines.⁵⁸

58. See Mulligan and Smith 1986a.

For all its problems, however, the theory of meaning hinted at by Twardowski has a number of advantages as compared with both Platonism and those different sorts of reductionistic theories which would seek to understand language either in terms of specific sorts of overt human behaviour or in terms of publicly observable phenomena such as ‘air-vibrations’ or ‘marks on paper’. Above all Twardowski’s doctrine cuts finer, and more delicately, through the spatio-temporal world than do other, less careful treatments of ‘thought’ and ‘content’. It is preferable to Platonism in that it appeals exclusively in its account of language use and of communication and understanding to perfectly ordinary spatio-temporal entities – speakers, readers, their acts and actions and various different sorts of products of these acts and actions. It is preferable to behaviourism or materialism, on the other hand, in that it is able to cope with the fact that we use language not only in writing or speaking but also in silent thinking – and also with the fact that language so used has a meaning not essentially different from the meaning it has when used overtly.

Twardowski’s theory of process and product has implications beyond the philosophy of language, however. Thus it may be used to generate a new understanding of logic as the science which would investigate precisely the different kinds of products of those mental processes we call judgments, inferences, deductions, etc., where psychology would be confined to the investigation of the given mental processes themselves. The theory can be applied also to actions and products outside the narrowly cognitive sphere. Thus it applies to the sciences of law and of social action in general, and Twardowski’s work here is in some respects parallel to the work on the theory of speech acts and other social acts by Reinach, Austin, Searle and others. There, too, the important step came with the recognition that there are enduring entities of special sorts – for example contracts, claims, obligations – which are produced by certain psychophysical processes of speaking and writing and which are subject to special laws of their own.

Clearly, too, the doctrine of durable psychophysical products and of the systematic ways in which such products may invoke mental processes in others may have implications for our understanding of the nature of works of art and of aesthetic experience. The influence of Twardowski’s theory of actions and products may indeed be detected in the work of his – somewhat estranged –

pupil Ingarden, the phenomenological philosopher who has made the most important contributions to the theory of art.⁵⁹

The distinction of process and product can be applied also to the understanding of science, in a way which will recall ideas subsequently taken up by members of the Lvov-Warsaw school. The disciplines of science were initially conceived by Twardowski in psychological fashion, as collections of judging acts or of dispositions to such acts. His paper of 1912, however, suggests a view of scientific disciplines in terms of the durable products of judging acts,⁶⁰ a notion which finds echoes in Leśniewski's view of his own logical systems as collections of concretely existing marks.⁶¹

Twardowski's mature ontology is, certainly, in the spirit of Leśniewski, Kotarbiński, and their followers in the sense that his concessions to Husserlian anti-psychologism do not involve him in embracing essences, ideal meanings, or other Platonic entities. Twardowski is, however, at odds with some of his successors in the Warsaw school in his strictures – very much in the spirit of Husserl – as to the dangers of exclusive or merely mechanical use of symbolic methods in the solution of philosophical and other sorts of problems. Thus, as we have seen, Twardowski distinguished between 'artificial' or 'substitutive' psychophysical products on the one hand and 'original' products on the other. Logic, too, involves the use of artificial products, products resting not on judgments actually made, but on judgments merely imagined. This occurs for example when the logician wishes to give an example of an inference which is formally correct but involves propositions which are in fact false. It occurs most pervasively, of course, where the logician uses symbols of an 'artificial'

59. The sub-title of Ingarden's 1931: *Investigations on the Border Area of Ontology, Logic and Literary Theory*, clearly recalls the sub-title of Twardowski's paper of 1912 – "Comments on the Border Area of Psychology, Grammar and Logic" – which recalls in turn the title of Marty's "Subjectless Sentences: On the Relation of Grammar to Logic and Psychology" of 1884. Twardowski's view that psychophysical products form the subject-matter of the cultural sciences then find its echo in Kotarbiński's account of institutional objects in his *Elementy*, e.g. at pp. 489f. See Chapter Seven, Section 4, below.

60. Cf. Schnell, pp. 114, 124.

61. See e.g. Leśniewski 1929, pp. 36f., 62; 1930, pp. 115f.; 1931, pp. 115f.

language, i.e. a language in the formulae of which no actual judgments would or could be expressed.⁶²

Of course, much of logic (as also of mathematics) requires in practice the blind manipulation of symbols in order to obtain its results. As Twardowski points out in his paper “Symbolomania and Pragmatophobia” of 1921, however, if such manipulation is to be justified, then it must be established not merely that our symbolism is in conformity with the concepts and objects that we wish to represent, but also that this conformity is preserved through the successive stages of manipulation, so that we do not, in our manipulations, depart from the world of things.⁶³ Otherwise, the formalist logician’s

tendency to place symbols above things may result in bending things to comply with symbols, that is, making statements about things according to what follows from symbol-based assumptions and operations, regardless of what things tell us about themselves, or even contrary to what they tell us about themselves. (Twardowski 1921, p. 5)

Mental processes ought, as it were, by guiding the successive stages in the process of production, to ensure that a meaning of an appropriate kind is capable of being bestowed upon its products and thereby also ensure that these products do not depart from the world of things. Some psychophysical products are produced in the absence of an adequate accompanying mental process (or of any mental process at all). This is the case, for example, when we lie, or otherwise dissimulate. Hence natural languages, too, may be used ‘substitutively’ in Twardowski’s sense. But it is the case also when the logician or mathematician, by operating on the basis of more or less arbitrarily selected hypotheses, succeeds merely in churning out formulae whose value is at best aesthetic.⁶⁴

It might be supposed that Twardowski’s critical article of 1921 was directed against certain apparent excesses of his apostate pupil Leśniewski. Against this, however, it must be said that Leśniewski started using symbolism

62. Twardowski 1912, p. 24.

63. Husserl defended a similar thesis for the case of arithmetic in his 1891. See also ‘9, esp. (f) and (g), of Husserl’s *Crisis* (1962).

64. Cf. Leśniewski’s criticisms of certain practices of mathematicians in his 1927/31, Ch. 2.

in his lectures only in 1920, and in his published work only much later. Certainly there are a number of respects in which Leśniewski might be accused of having gone beyond the bounds of what would normally count as intuitively acceptable (of what would be capable of ‘original’ judgment in Twardowski’s terms). Thus, taken together with the fact that Ronald Reagan and certain red things exist, it is a consequence of the axioms of Leśniewski’s mereology that there is a single object which is the sum of Ronald Reagan and all red things in the universe. Leaving such cases aside, however, we can say that the spirit underlying Leśniewski’s approach to his systems is very much in line with Twardowski’s anti-formalistic exhortations. Thus Leśniewski was from the start suspicious of purely formalistic conceptions of logical systems, and he held that the business of the logician is above all that of producing formal theories which would be true to the world of things.⁶⁵ If, however, the axioms and theorems of a formal theory are to be true, then it must follow that they are capable of expressing judgments which are ‘original’ in Twardowski’s sense. Hence Leśniewski was careful, in constructing his theories, to begin always with formulations of his ideas in ordinary language which would be both generally intelligible and generally acceptable as true. He was careful also, in formulating his ‘directives’ for the manipulation of the resultant formulae, that they should lead always, and evidently, from truth to truth. Hence, even though some of the more complex formulae yielded by the application of these directives might be non-original from Twardowski’s point of view, the manner in which they have been generated ensures, in Leśniewski’s eyes, that they are at least in principle capable of expressing original judgments if the power of our mind were only sufficiently great. This is consistent with Leśniewski’s view that languages, both natural and artificial, are *tools* which may be used to take our thoughts further than they would otherwise be capable of going.

But such thoughts, if they are to be true, must in some sense be *caused* by the things in reality that make them true. In the introduction to his “On the foundations of mathematics”, Leśniewski speaks of the ‘states of intellectual torment when faced with reality’ and of ‘states flowing from an irrefutable, intuitive necessity of believing in the “truth” of certain assumptions, and in the

65. See e.g. Leśniewski 1929, p. 78; Lejewski 1958, p. 123.

“correctness” of certain arguments’.⁶⁶ He clearly held that logic, mathematics and science should begin with such ‘intuitive necessities’, and he rejected the idea that ‘non-intuitive’ or merely manipulative methods might lead to the solution of problems where intuitive methods had failed. On the other hand, however, he did not have a theory of ‘intuition’ and of the way in which our judgments about reality may be evoked (or caused) by this reality itself. As he wrote in his *Foundations of a General Theory of Manifolds*, published in Moscow in 1916:

The psychological source of my axioms are my ‘intuitions’, which simply means that I believe in the truthfulness of my axioms, but I am unable to say why I believe in this, because I am not an expert on the theory of causality. (Cf. CW I, p. 130)

6. *From Psychology to Logic*

As already noted, it was among Twardowski’s students in Poland that some of the most crucial elements of the modern, truth-functional conception of logic were developed. It is one major thesis of this work that these developments can be properly understood only as part of a larger shift from an immanentistic (or psychologicistic) conception of judgment prevalent in the nineteenth century to the later ontological (or objectivistic) conception of propositions and states of affairs. This shift was effected on the one hand in the work of Frege. But it was effected independently in the work of Brentano’s disciples, involving in their case a complex and hard-fought struggle for both ontological and psychological clarification. It will therefore be useful, in concluding our treatment of Twardowski, to lay out the steps which led, on the one hand to Husserlian formal ontology, and on the other hand to Polish theories of propositions and truth, concentrating particularly on the contributions made to both developments by Bolzano, Brentano, Marty, Twardowski and their followers.

(i) Brentano, in 1874, effected what is almost certainly the first clear psychological differentiation of *judgment* and *presentation*. Certainly Bolzano and others had earlier done much of what was necessary to effect a clear *logical* distinction between the two (or rather between what Bolzano referred to as

66. Leśniewski 1927/31, p. 8. It seems to be crucial to Leśniewski’s position here that mental acts can stand in causal relations, an idea which was fundamental also to Brentano’s account of deductive inference (see Rogge 1935), and was stressed in turn by Marty in his *Investigations of General Grammar*.

‘propositions in themselves’ and ‘presentations in themselves’). Bolzano’s account of the underlying psychology is however far from clear, and in this he is no more than conforming to the standards of his psychologist and non-psychologist predecessors.⁶⁷ Contemporaries of Brentano such as Schröder and Peano pointed out the difference between concepts and propositions in their work, but hung on to the parallels in their symbolisms. Frege’s *Begriffsschrift* (‘2), too, still retains elements of the traditional conception of judgment as a matter of the ‘combination of ideas’, though this is outweighed by a sophisticated theory of that moment of assertion or affirmation which is characteristic of the judgment as Frege conceives it. Note that Frege’s moment of assertion, in contrast to the ‘affirmation and denial’ of the Brentanian theory, is always positive, and the view that negation belongs properly to what Frege called the judgeable content, rather than to the quality of the act of judging itself, a view accepted also by Husserl and Reinach,⁶⁸ has at least since Whitehead and Russell established itself quite generally among logicians.⁶⁹

(ii) Stumpf, in lectures of 1888, notes of which are preserved in the Husserl Archives in Louvain, called attention to the need to recognize, in addition to the content of a presentation, also a special *judgment*-content, to which he gave the name ‘*Sachverhalt*’. Hence the latter is, for Stumpf, a special kind of *content* and not, as it later became, a special kind of transcendent *object* (though neither he nor his mentor Brentano would at this stage have recognized a distinction here). This explains why, given the parallels between the Brentanian immanent content and the Bolzanian ideal content or ‘proposition in itself’, the theories of *Sachverhalt* put forward by Stumpf and Marty should have been so readily associated with the Bolzanian theory.⁷⁰

(iii) Twardowski, in 1894, following on from Bolzano, Zimmermann, Kerry and Höfler,⁷¹ pointed out the need to distinguish the object of an act from

67. See ‘19 of the *Wissenschaftslehre* and compare e.g. Hume, *Treatise*, Bk. I, Pt. III, Sec. 7; Kant, *KrV*, B 93.

68. Cf. Husserl, *LUV* § 20; Reinach 1989, p. 125ff. (=1911, § 14 of trans.).

69. But contrast Łukasiewicz 1921.

70. See e.g. H. Bergmann 1909, Morscher 1972.

71. See Twardowski, 1894, p. 17n, Eng. p. 15n.

its (immanent) content. The act of judgment is seen by Twardowski, at this stage, as having a special content of its own, but as inheriting its object from the relevant underlying presentation.

(iv) Three years later, Twardowski went further and pointed to the need to recognize a special unitary judgment-*object*; he thereby effected a generalization of the content-object distinction to include also the sphere of judging acts. Here, too, Twardowski's move was not without its predecessors. It is however clear, that the recognition of a psychological and a logical distinction between presenting and judging has been to a large extent independent of the marking of a corresponding distinction on the side of the object. Not everyone took this separate, ontological step, and some (e.g. Frege and Russell) took it half-heartedly.⁷² With the appearance of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* at the turn of the century, however, the acceptance of the *Sachverhalt* as objectual judgment-correlate found wide acceptance not only among philosophers in Germany but also among psychologists and mathematicians such as Oswald Külpe, Otto Selz and Hermann Weyl.⁷³

When Twardowski introduces the *Sachverhalt* 'as a relation, an absolute datum, or both together', he seems to take it for granted that this notion can be understood without further ado in terms of ontological categories which are already to hand. Husserl, in contrast, argues that the *Sachverhalt* constitutes a *sui generis* category of its own, enjoying a universality of scope no less absolute than that of *object*. The former is instantiated wherever true judgments can be made, the latter wherever there is the possibility of any sort of unity of reference in an act of presentation (so that the ontological universality of *object* and *Sachverhalt* would parallel the linguistic universality of name and sentence – which would parallel in turn the psychological universality of presentation and judgment). Husserl hereby initiates also a new understanding of the discipline of ontology itself, within which the formal concept of *Sachverhalt* would be ranked alongside the formal concept of *object*, each subjected to a theoretical investigation in its own right. This Husserlian discipline of formal ontology was

72. Simons in his 1985 argues that this holds of the early Wittgenstein, too, for whom no clear distinction is drawn between *Sachverhalt* and a mere complex of objects. On the whole issue see my 1989a and 1992a.

73. See Husserl's sixth Logical Investigation, §§ 28, 33, 39. For an instance of Husserl's early and still tentative use of '*Sachverhalt*' see also Husserl 1894a, p. 337 and compare Husserl 1990/91, e.g. p. 143.

developed further by his disciples in Munich, and their work led in turn to a taxonomy of the different types of *Sachverhalte* corresponding, not only to the different types of empirical judgment but also to those other types of mental act – questionings, commandings, desirings, etc. – which are related to the act of judging.⁷⁴

(v) Another distinction anticipated in some degree by Bolzano is that between the immanent and ideal content of a mental act. The immanent content is defined by Husserl in the *Logical Investigations* as that *in the act* which lends it directedness to an object, whether this be an object in the narrower sense or, as when we are dealing with acts of judgment, a state of affairs.⁷⁵ The content is, in Husserl's own words,

that element in an act which first gives it a relation to something objectual, and this relation in such complete determinateness that it does not merely precisely define the object meant, but also the precise way in which it is meant. The [content of an act] ... not only determines that it grasps the relevant object but also *as what* it grasps it, the features, relations, categorial forms, that it itself attributes to it. (1900/01, p. B 415, Eng. p. 589.)

Husserl distinguishes still further between this immanent content and what he calls the ideal content, which is just the immanent content taken *in specie*. Where an immanent content is expressed linguistically, then the corresponding ideal content is called by Husserl the *meaning* of the given expression. Husserl's theory of linguistic meaning and of the structures of meanings is thus part and parcel of his theory of acts. The theory has built into its very foundations the idea of a parallelism of structure between (1) immanent contents on the level of our empirically executed acts and (2) ideal contents on the level of logic. Husserl is thereby able to account in a very natural way for the fact that the laws of logic apply to actual thinkings, speakings, assumptions and

74. Perhaps the most important pre-Tractarian contribution to the literature on *Sachverhalte* is the essay "On the Theory of the Negative Judgment" by Adolf Reinach, a leading member of the Munich group whose lectures in Göttingen were attended *inter alia* by Ingarden and Ajdukiewicz. Cf. Mulligan (ed.) 1987.

75. LU V § 20. Here Husserl extrapolates from Brentano, who had defined the content of an act of judgment as the totality of presentations on which it rests, its quality as the affirmation or rejection of this content. See Stumpf 1924, p. 107. For 'content' Husserl also uses 'matter'. Recall Frege's doctrine of judgment, as also the distinction propounded by Searle between (propositional) content and mode. See e.g. Searle 1983, ch. 1.

inferred,⁷⁶ and his theory may be said to represent a synthesis of logical objectivism on the one hand and act-psychology on the other. The ideal content of an act of presentation might be called a concept; the ideal content of an act of judgment might be called a proposition. Bolzano used the terms ‘presentation in itself’ and ‘proposition in itself’ (as opposed to ‘subjective presentation’ and ‘thought’ or ‘judgment’); Frege spoke of ‘*Gedanke*’ and ‘*Sinn*’, but was unwilling to allow as being of scientific significance the corresponding ‘subjective’ mental episodes.⁷⁷ The significance of this opposition and the importance of the parallelism between the two sorts of content were thus not clearly recognized by Frege, and by those in the analytic tradition who followed the Fregean line, in virtue of the fact that, in leaving aside questions of psychology, they thereby left themselves in a position where they were unable to do justice to the relations between ideal contents and our thinking acts themselves. The applicability of logic to empirical thinkings and inferences is thus rendered all but inexplicable – an outcome which further reinforced the initial aversion to psychology. Brentano, on the other hand, and more orthodox Brentanians such as Marty and Kraus, tended to the opposite error: because they feared the ‘Platonism’ of ideal contents, their treatment of logic was less than successful and therefore so also was their treatment of the specifically logical properties of our mental acts. Interestingly, the more subtle intermediate position worked out by Husserl, Twardowski and others at the turn of the century anticipates much contemporary work on logic and meaning in the field of cognitive science, where the earlier aversion of analytic philosophers to psychology has been abandoned.

The significance of the move to a concept of proposition as ideal or abstract entity, whether in Husserl’s, in Bolzano’s, or in Frege’s sense, will be clear. Above all, it made possible a conception of propositions as entities capable of being *manipulated* in different ways in formal theories – a conception which is not the least important effect of the anti-psychological movement in logic at the turn of the century.⁷⁸ In just the way that Cantor had

76. See Willard 1984, ch. 1.

77. See Bolzano’s *Wissenschaftslehre*, §§ 19, 49 and Frege 1892.

78. Meinong’s theory of assumptions (1902/1910), too, deserves mention in this connection, since it reinforced that detachment of propositional content from assertive force which was so crucial to early developments in propositional

shown mathematicians of an earlier generation how to manipulate sets or classes conceived in abstraction from their members and from the manner of their generation, so the new generation of logicians were able to become accustomed, by degrees, to manipulating propositional objects in abstraction from their psychological roots in acts of judgment.

(vi) Another dimension of importance is that of *logical grammar*. Here the crucial move consisted in the recognition of the fact that acts of judgment are distinguished from acts of presentation not only by the presence of a moment of assertion or belief, but also, on the level of grammar, by a special ('sentential', 'propositional') *form*, just as the *Sachverhalt* is distinguished in its ontological form not only from objects in the narrow sense but also from properties, relations, and so on. That which gets affirmed or asserted in a judgment must have a certain inner complexity, must, as one says, be 'propositionally articulated'. This is marked by the fact that the linguistic expression of a judgment must contain a verb – with all that this implies in the way of tense and aspect modifications. It must be capable also of modification by logical operators such as negation, conjunction, etc., as well as by modal operators such as 'it is possible that', 'it is necessary that', and so on.⁷⁹

Certainly Frege is responsible for some of the most important advances in our understanding of logico-grammatical form. It is ironical, however, that in his conception of sentences as special sorts of names,⁸⁰ he is, as far as the logico-grammatical treatment of the peculiarities of judgment is concerned, no further advanced than was Brentano. Here, again, one has to look to Bolzano in order to find more coherent anticipations of the idea of propositional form in the modern period,⁸¹ but the idea of a logical grammar, of a formal theory of the *categories* of linguistic units and of the categorial laws governing the combination of such units, was first put forward by Husserl in his fourth

logic (and to later developments in the field of natural deduction on the part of Gentzen and others). See Mulligan 1988, pp. 127ff.

79. On the theory of propositional articulation from a Husserlian point of view, see Mulligan and Smith 1986, § 2, and compare Reinach 1989, pp. 120ff. (= 1911, § 11 of trans.)

80. 1892, p. 63 of trans.

81. *Wissenschaftslehre*, § 127.

Logical Investigation. This work influenced in turn the development of the theory of semantic (later ‘syntactic’) categories by Leśniewski and his successors in Poland.⁸²

Husserl, be it noted, pursues his logical grammar not by reading off empirically existing categories from known languages (whether natural or artificial), but by building up his theory on the basis of more abstract considerations relating, for example, to the oppositions between simple and complex, categorematic and syncategorematic, defective and non-defective uses of language. His treatment of the more specific opposition between name and sentence is to be found elsewhere, in the fourth chapter of his fifth Logical Investigation, where he deals with the different modes of intentionality associated with different forms of language use. Leśniewski’s theory, in contrast, takes as its starting point the pre-established opposition between name and sentence, and the same applies also to the logical grammar hinted at by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*, for example at 3.141.

(vii) One further distinction, here mentioned only in passing, is that between an episodic *act* of judgment and an enduring *state* of conviction or belief. Brentano did not see the need to draw this distinction and the same holds for his more immediate disciples, including Twardowski, as also for the British empiricist psychologists who inspired him. Thus Brentano’s term ‘judgment’ comprehends indiscriminately both episodic assertions and enduring attitudes of belief or disbelief, and his term ‘presentation’, too, is subject to a similar ambiguity. It is this ambiguity which allows Brentano to regard the two sorts of phenomena as united together in perception, which he defines as a judgment founded on an intuitive presentation as its basis. A perception, on this view, is the intuitive having of an object, combined with an attitude of belief or acceptance of this object as existing.⁸³ For one might otherwise be disposed to rule out any intimate union of judgment and intuitive presentation in view of the quite different temporal structures which seem to be characteristic of each. The judgment, as we might normally suppose, is an episodic *act*, intuitive presentation, on the other hand, is a *process* stretching out through time.

82. See above all Ajdukiewicz 1935, a presentation of Leśniewskian ideas with the aid of Ajdukiewicz’s own fractional notation, and compare Gobbler 1985 and Schmit 1992.

83. 1924, vol. II, p. 48, Eng. p. 209.

Almost all logicians of the nineteenth century were, however, prepared to identify *judging* with *holding true*, an error that is manifested also in the modern analytic philosophical terminology of ‘propositional attitudes’, as also in the related notion of ‘entertaining’ a proposition. Where, therefore, we have talked above of Brentano’s or Twardowski’s theory of ‘acts’, we ought more properly to have retained a more neutral terminology of ‘phenomenon’ or mental ‘process’ or ‘activity’. True clarity in this respect seems to have been first achieved by Reinach in his “Theory of the Negative Judgment” of 1911. Interestingly, Reinach argues that the Frege-Husserl theory of assertion as a single positive moment of ‘force’ or ‘quality’ common to all judgments is correct for episodic judging *acts*. When we move over to deal with enduring *states* of conviction, then he holds that the Brentanian theory of affirmation and denial is more appropriate, since states of disbelief are equipollent with states of belief, both being capable of being applied to both positive and negative judgment-contents.

All the above developments are of more than merely historical significance: each represents a hard-won conceptual clarification with a systematic importance in its own right. With the passage of time, however, many philosophers have come gradually to take for granted the distinctions in question, with the consequence that they have ceased to reflect on why it is that they are important, and so have succumbed, by degrees, to the temptation to ignore them in their explicit deliberations.

Chapter Seven

Tadeusz Kotarbiński

On Things and their Phases

1. *The Development of Reism*

Our concern in the present chapter will be with the metaphysical or ontological views of the Polish philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbiński (1886–1981). We shall deal also with the criticisms of Kotarbiński's views put forward by other members of the Lvov-Warsaw school of Polish analytic philosophers, paying special attention to the work of the logician Stanisław Leśniewski (1886–1939). As we saw, both Kotarbiński and Leśniewski were students of Twardowski in Lvov, and the influence of Twardowski on Kotarbiński's writings reveals itself most clearly in the fact that the ontological theories which Kotarbiński felt called upon to attack were in many cases just those theories defended either by Twardowski or by other thinkers within the Brentano tradition. Leśniewski, too, inherited through Twardowski an interest in Brentano and his school, and as a young man he had conceived the project of translating into Polish Marty's *Investigations on General Grammar and Philosophy of Language*. As he himself expressed it, Leśniewski grew up “tuned” to “general grammar” and logico-semantic problems à la Edmund Husserl and the representatives of the so-called Austrian School'. (1927/31, p. 9)

The influence of Brentanism on Polish analytic philosophers such as Kotarbiński and Leśniewski has, however, been largely overlooked – principally as a result of the fact that the writings of the Polish analytic school have been perceived too narrowly against the background of Viennese positivism or of Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy. I shall seek in what follows to do something to rectify this imbalance, by presenting a critical survey of Kotarbiński's development from his early nominalism to the later doctrine of

‘temporal phases’.¹ It will be shown that the surface clarity and simplicity of Kotarbiński’s writings mask a number of profound philosophical difficulties, connected above all with the problem of giving an adequate account of the truth of contingent (tensed) predications. I will then examine Leśniewski’s attempts to resolve these difficulties, concluding with an account of the relations of Kotarbińskian reism to the ontology of things or *entia realia* defended by the later Brentano.

We shall be concerned, in the first place, with Kotarbiński’s *magnum opus*, the *Elements of the Theory of Knowledge, Formal Logic and Methodology of the Sciences*, first published in 1929 and hereafter referred to as *Elementy*. The principal doctrine expounded and defended by Kotarbiński in this work is that of ‘reism’, a doctrine according to which all existence is made up entirely of individual things, *realia* or *concreta*. A more specialized version of the doctrine is referred to by Kotarbiński as the doctrine of ‘somatism’ (or sometimes also ‘pansomatism’), which results when one adds the thesis that individual things are to be identified in every case with physical bodies – a thesis which Kotarbiński also accepts. In an essay of 1958 appended to the second edition of his *Elementy*, Kotarbiński speaks retrospectively of seven ‘stages’ in the development of reistic theory, from his own early acceptance of nominalism – which he himself preferred to call ‘concretism’ – to the working out of a full-blown pansomatist ontology in the 1930s.

It is especially in relation to the chronologically earlier stages in this development that Twardowski’s influence is most strongly felt. Stage I consists in the rejection of universals, properties, or general objects. All entities are individuals, on this (‘concretist’) view, though it does not thereby follow that they must all be things. Kotarbiński’s adoption of nominalism in this sense may be attributed on the one hand to the effects of his early exposure to the thinking of the British empiricists at the hands of Twardowski. On the other hand however it can be seen as a reaction against Twardowski’s own thesis that there are *general objects*, objects which result when the features common to the particular objects falling under a given concept are ‘unified into a whole’ (1894, p. 105, Eng. p. 100). As we have seen above, a discipline like geometry is

1. Here I follow in the footsteps of Jan Woleński’s recent work; see above all his 1989, and compare Schnelle 1982 and the papers by Schnelle in Cohen and Schnelle (eds.) 1986.

concerned in Twardowski's eyes precisely with general objects in this sense (*triangle, circle, square*, and so forth), and a similar thesis may be extended to the other sciences. As Husserl points out, general objects as conceived by Twardowski are subject to all the disadvantages of the Lockean general triangle. This suggestion is taken still further by Leśniewski, who offers a proof that Twardowski's theory (together with a range of similar theories, including Husserl's own) is contradictory,² and Kotarbiński would later claim that it was only concerning universals or general objects that nominalism 'succeeded in convincingly proving their non-existence by a *reductio ad absurdum*.' (1966, p. 55)

Stage 2 consists in the rejection of events, processes, states of affairs, and other putative particulars falling outside the category *thing*. This, too, may be interpreted as a reaction on Kotarbiński's part to the Brentanist views of his teacher Twardowski, given that the ontology of states of affairs or *Sachverhalte* was in the first decades of this century on the continent of Europe a quite peculiar preserve of the Brentanist movement.

Stage 3, the rejection of sets or classes, reflects the influence of Leśniewski, and above all of Leśniewski's criticisms of the theory of sets.³ The set-theoretical antinomies had resulted, in Leśniewski's view, not from any inherent contradiction in the notion of set as originally conceived by Cantor, but from a departure from this notion in the direction of a conception of sets as abstract entities. As Cantor's original formulation has it: 'Every set of well-differentiated things can be conceived as a unitary thing in which these things are constituent parts or constitutive elements.' (Cantor 1887/88, p. 379) Thus for example a musical composition is a set consisting of the sounds which are its constituents, a painting is a set consisting of various patches of colour. A set, therefore, on Leśniewski's interpretation of Cantor's views, is a concrete whole made up of concrete parts, not an abstract or immanent *ens rationis* sealed off

2. See Leśniewski 1913, p. 319, and also the summary of Leśniewski's argument in Kotarbiński 1920, and Lejewski 1979, pp. 200f. As Woleński (1988) shows, Leśniewski was influenced here by Marty's criticism of Husserl's Platonism in his *Investigations of General Grammar* (1908), § 71.

3. See Leśniewski 1914, 1927/31. It may be also that Leśniewski's criticism of properties in his 1913 helped to provoke Kotarbiński's initial nominalism.

from changes in the real world of material things.⁴ According to Leśniewski, it would be correct to say, for example, that the Black Forest is just the set of trees now growing in a certain area, and that this set becomes smaller as trees within it die. Clearly, on this view, there can be no empty set, and a set consisting of just one object as member will be identical with that object. Moreover, sets can change, not least in that they can acquire and lose members over time. Further, there can be no sets of higher type, which means also that there is no way in which the more usual antinomies may be generated.

Frege, too, as Leśniewski points out, attacks those mathematicians who introduce into their theories such arbitrary ‘inventions’ as the empty set merely because they prove expedient for certain purposes.⁵ Leśniewski’s own strictures in this respect are directed in particular against axiomatic theories of sets such as were developed by Zermelo. These do not merely lack the sort of naturalness that would dispose one to accept them; they lack also that intrinsic intelligibility which would make their meaning clear, so that Leśniewski can in all honesty assert that he does not understand what is meant by ‘set’ as this term is supposed to be ‘implicitly defined’ by theories like Zermelo’s.⁶

Leśniewski, himself, in contrast, starts not from ‘inventions’ or from axioms or hypotheses selected for pragmatic reasons, but from what he calls *intuitions*, commonly accepted and meaningful to all and relating to such concepts as whole, part, totality, object, identity, and so on.⁷ The language of Leśniewski’s theories is therefore an extrapolation of natural language, a making precise of what, in natural language, is left inarticulate or indistinct. His work forms also part of that strand in the development of logic, represented also by Frege and by the early Russell, which sees logic as a descriptive enterprise, part and parcel of the attempt to produce formal theories adequate to and true of the actual world.⁸ Hence he is mistrustful of the model-theoretic semantics that

4. Leśniewski 1927/31, p. 17, citing Cantor 1887/88, pp. 421f.

5. Leśniewski 1927/31, p. 18, citing Frege 1893, pp. 2f., Eng. p. 31.

6. Leśniewski 1927/31, p. 22.

7. 1927/31, p. 24.

8. Leśniewski 1929, pp. 6, 78, Lejewski 1958, pp. 123f.

has been built up on an abstract set-theoretical basis, and he is opposed also to the work of those who embrace an essentially abstract-algebraic approach to logic, or see logic as having to deal essentially with uninterpreted formal systems.⁹

Stage 4 in the development of reism consists in the rejection by Kotarbiński of mental images and other ‘immanent contents’, and this once again reflects the influence of Twardowski. The status of mental entities was an issue of particular importance to Kotarbiński, since it marked one of the very few areas of disagreement between himself and Leśniewski. For Leśniewski admitted contents and images into his ontology, remaining in this respect faithful to the heritage of Brentano and Twardowski.¹⁰ In this sense, and perhaps also in others, Leśniewski is not a reist. Since, however, he held like Marty that contents are concrete individual items existing in time as a result of being tied, in effect, to specific mental episodes, his acceptance of contents does not imply a departure from nominalism or ‘concretism’.

Stage 5, which consists in the awakening of Kotarbiński’s interest in certain precursors of his own way of thinking, was provoked by the discovery of what he took to be reist tendencies in Brentano’s later work – a matter which will be dealt with in more detail below.

Stage 6 consists in an amendment to the reist doctrine, provoked by criticisms put forward by Ajdukiewicz in his 1930 review of the *Elementy*.¹¹ These criticisms concern in particular the question as to how the negative theses of reism (‘properties do not exist’, ‘events do not exist’, and so on) are to be treated. Are such formulations to be accepted as literal renderings? Certainly not, Ajdukiewicz claims, if ‘exists’ is taken in the literal sense – the sense it has in sentences like ‘rabbits exist’, ‘dinosaurs no longer exist’ and so on. For the

9. Interestingly, Tarski, at least in his early years, up to and including his paper on “The Semantic Conception of Truth”, agreed with Leśniewski in this (see esp. pp. 342f. of Tarski 1944). Tarski, be it noted, was never a formalist: Tarski and Leśniewski parted company rather because Tarski came gradually to accept the use of set theory and infinitistic methods in his work.

10. See Twardowski 1894, §§ 1–2. Leśniewski did not himself develop a *theory* of contents, since he held that the problems involved would be too difficult to allow him to achieve the appropriate degree of theoretical rigour.

11. See the detailed account in Lejewski 1979. Kotarbiński’s initial reaction to Ajdukiewicz’s criticism was in part inspired by Carnap.

subjects of such sentences are in every case the names of things, which is *ex hypothesi* not the case where we have to deal with expressions like ‘property’, ‘event’, and so on. Yet the reist allows no other sense of ‘exists’.

Kotarbiński himself initially responded to this criticism by taking up Ajdukiewicz’s suggestion that the negative theses of ontology be reformulated on the level of semantics, as theses to the effect that certain kinds of apparent statement are nonsensical.¹² This solution is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. Thus as Lejewski points out in his paper “On the Dramatic Stage in the Development of Kotarbiński’s Pansomatism”, it implies that ‘the negative theses of ontological reism fail to say anything about reality’ because they are merely ‘statements about the language of the reist.’ (1979, p. 200) A semantical doctrine in this sense must however, as Lejewski argues, presuppose a prior ontological doctrine: ‘Semantics without ontology is like a house without foundations. It collapses into a set of arbitrary injunctions and prohibitions justified by *ad hoc* considerations.’ (pp. 205f.) Moreover, how, in the absence of some more deep-seated ontological theory, could the reist be assured of the truth of his semantic claim that all nonsensical ‘onomatoids’ or merely substitutive renderings will vanish in ultimate formulations? And how could he account for the fact that, as he will want to insist, translation into the language of things is both natural and clarificatory?

An alternative response to Ajdukiewicz’s criticism would be to accept that the reist’s negative theses make good sense (are in good grammatical order) as they stand, not, however, in the language of the reist but in the language of his opponent, i.e. of someone who accepts both a multi-categorical ontology (accepts categories other than that of *thing*) and the concomitant multicategorical language. For if, as Lejewski puts it, the multicategorical ontologist’s assertions ‘are made in terms of a multi-categorical language, the same language must be used to negate those assertions’. Propositions such as ‘there are no properties’, ‘there are no relations’, ‘there are no events’, etc., are properly

to be understood in the light of the multicategorical idealization of natural language. And on this assumption the nouns ‘property’, ‘relation’, ‘event’, etc. belong to different fundamental semantical categories, which in turn determine the semantical category of the expression ‘there are no’ in each of the conjuncts. (Lejewski 1979, pp. 211f.)

12. Cf. 1966, p. 433.

The reist, we might say, can accept his opponent's multi-categorical language as a ladder, to be thrown away when once it has served its polemical purpose. This response too, however, presupposes an underlying ontological doctrine, for how else could the corresponding negative statements be justified?

Stage 7 sees the re-institution of reism as an ontological doctrine, founded on a recognition of the need to supply non-tautological definitions of notions such as 'thing', 'object', 'body', etc. This development, too, was provoked by a criticism of Ajdukiewicz, a criticism to the effect that, if 'exists' has a literal sense only when used in conjunction with names for things, then the positive statement of reism, to the effect that only things exist, is equivalent to the truism: 'only things are things'.

Here, also, Kotarbiński's initial reaction was one of retreat to semantics. Later, however, he responded to Ajdukiewicz's objection in a more ontologically-minded fashion, by seeking definitions of concepts such as 'thing', 'object', 'body', etc., in a way which he hoped would render non-tautological the fundamental theses of reism and somatism. Since a formal statement of such definitions has been provided by Lejewski in his just-mentioned paper, it will be sufficient if we examine briefly (and critically) the concepts Kotarbiński here employs.

All reality, according to Kotarbiński, is composed exclusively of things, and things are in every case bodies. Kotarbiński initially sought to define body as that which is extended in space and time, as that which is 'bulky and lasting'. Then, however, he saw reason to add the further condition that bodies are 'such as to offer resistance'. Certainly it would be sufficient, Kotarbiński holds, to define 'body' as 'that which is extensive':

But in order to avoid misunderstandings which might lead someone to suppose, on the strength of that definition, that physics is also concerned with 'fragments of empty space' (which in our opinion, do not exist) or 'immanent coloured patches' (which also seems to be a hypostasis), we prefer to narrow the definition as to intension – without thereby, as we think, narrowing its extension – by adopting the formula stating that 'a body is what is extensive and such as to offer resistance'. (1966, p. 330, translation amended)

All is not quite clear, however, about the application of either formula. Thus Kotarbiński is on the one hand keen to insist that the term 'body', as he understands it, embraces not only planets, rocks, etc., but also objects

investigated by physics ‘such as electrons, protons, magnetic fields’. (1966, p. 331) On the other hand, however, he stresses that it excludes for example ‘immanent coloured patches’. Consider, however, a glass cube that is uniformly red in colour. Is the transcendent redness of this cube (an individual three-dimensionally extended moment of colour), a body, on Kotarbiński’s view? Certainly this redness is bulky and lasting and, perforce, such as to offer resistance. Kotarbiński, it would seem, was able to ignore such cases in framing his account of ‘body’ only because his attentions were concentrated on instances of *surface* colour, entities which fall short of three-dimensionality and can be excluded on this count. In order to rule out examples like the cube of colour from the class of ‘bodies’, Kotarbiński would have to add something like a condition to the effect that a body is that which exists (is extended and such as to offer resistance) *in its own right* (has need of no other thing in order to exist).¹³ As we shall see, a condition of this sort is very much in the spirit of Aristotle. Certainly such a condition would capture the sense in which the given example gives grounds for suspicion – that the cube of colour exists merely as a dependent moment of the cube of glass, and enjoys no separate existence. Yet how are we to formulate the condition in question in such a way that it would not rule out other examples which we would wish to count as *bona fide* bodies? Does a human being, for example, exist ‘in his own right’, given that he has need, for example, of nourishment, and processes of breathing and metabolizing (to say nothing of parents and solid ground beneath his feet), in order to exist? How, moreover, are we to make precise the sense of ‘other’ in ‘has need of no other thing’? Simple non-identity will not do, since *everything* may in this sense stand in need of its own proper parts in order to exist. On the other hand spatiotemporal discreteness or disjointness will not serve, either, since the cube and its colour would seem to coincide in space and time. All that can be said here is that considerations such as this have exercised Kotarbiński (and Lesniewski, *et al.*) too little, so that the project of a somatist ontology still

13. Something similar would be required to exclude from the realm of things also certain sorts of events. Consider, for example, a rotation of a metal sphere. This rotation is extended in space and time and, again, it is such as to offer resistance.

leaves much to be desired in terms of a clear statement of what is meant by ‘body’.¹⁴

2. *Reism and Truth*

Kotarbiński’s reism is, as we have seen, a doctrine according to which all existence is made up entirely of individual things. At the same time he defended in the *Elementy* a form of the correspondence theory of truth derived from his teacher Twardowski. Twardowski himself, as we saw, had come to the conclusion that a conception of truth as correspondence requires special ‘states of affairs’, unitary entities which would stand to sentences or acts of judgment in something like the way in which things or objects in the narrow sense would stand to names or acts of presentation. Kotarbiński, in contrast, sought to maintain a correspondence theory of truth and at the same time embrace the view that there are no entities other than things. This he did by rejecting that ontological interpretation of correspondence which would interpret truth in terms of ‘copies’ of reality existing somehow in the mind of the judging subject. He advances, rather, what might be called a ‘weak’ version of the correspondence theory of truth,¹⁵ which he expresses as follows:

The point is not that a true thought should be a good copy or simile of the thing of which we are thinking, as a painted copy or a photograph is. A brief reflection suffices to recognize the metaphorical nature of such a comparison. A different interpretation of ‘accordance with reality’ is required. We shall confine ourselves to the following: ‘John thinks truly if and only if John thinks that things are so and so, and things in fact are so and so’. (1966, pp. 106f.)

He came, in other words, to interpret the correspondence theory in the superficially neutral terms of the Aristotelian ‘to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or of what is

14. Note that the problems raised in the text show only that the canonical reistic notion of *thing* is indeterminate in its application. They do not show that one could not deal satisfactorily with colours (or three-dimensional shapes or masses of sound or heat) within the Lesniewskian framework. As Lejewski has suggested in conversation, just as Chronology and Stereology (theories of time and space) can in principle be obtained from Mereology by the addition of certain extralogical constants, so it would be possible to conceive a discipline of colourology or chromatology, obtained by adding constant terms such as *red*, *blue*, etc., and a relational predicate such as *is the same colour as*.

15. See Woleński and Simons 1989, p. 418.

not that it is not, is true.¹⁶ Conceptions of truth in terms of the copy theory are to be avoided, from Kotarbiński's point of view, not merely because they involve a hypostatization of states of affairs or other special entities on the side of the object; they commit us also, on the side of the subject, to 'immanent contents', 'thoughts', 'judgments', 'propositions' or 'meanings' – and all of these terms are mere *façons de parler*, to be eliminated from any language adequate to the purposes of ontology. When I judge truly, then I judge in accordance with the things, and that is all that need be said.

Can matters really be so simple, however? Certainly in the case of judgments expressed by positive existential sentences such as 'John exists' or 'cheetahs exist', it is plausible to account for their truth or falsehood exclusively on the basis of an appeal to things or bodies as commonly understood. 'John exists' on a view of this sort, is made true by John himself; 'cheetahs exist' by some one or more cheetahs.¹⁷ But how, on this basis, are we to deal with negative existential judgments like 'Ba'al does not exist' or 'there are no unicorns'. It was precisely difficulties in the treatment of judgments such as this which led some Brentanists to the view that what makes a judgment true are special *sui generis* entities designated by expressions of the form: *the existence of A, the non-existence of B, the existence of an A which is B*, and so on, where *A* and *B* stand in for expressions like *a horse, the redness over there, unicorns, God, Ba'al*, and so on. The consideration of sentences like 'John is suntanned', 'John is eating', 'John is a heavy eater', 'John's eating is on the increase', 'John has a bad case of dyspepsia', 'there is a ridge of high pressure over the Atlantic', suggests moreover that the domain of such special, non-thingly truth-makers must be extended even more widely, to embrace complex states of affairs involving events, processes and states as their parts.

16. *Met.*, 1011^b25ff. Less neutral is Aristotle's remark, somewhat later in the *Metaphysics*, to the effect that truth and falsehood depend 'on the side of the objects on their being combined or separated, so that he who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose *thought is in a state contrary to that of the objects* is in error.' (1051^b3, emphasis supplied.)

17. On this terminology of 'making true' see Mulligan, Simons and Smith 1984. The terminology has a number of advantages over the more usual talk of correspondence. It is disembarrassed, first of all, of all connotations of 'copying'. It does not suggest that the relation between a sentence and that in virtue of which it is true would be a symmetrical relation. And it can cope with the fact that there may be more than one entity which makes or helps to make a given sentence true. Thus, in the simplest possible case, 'I have a headache', may be made true by my present headache ('from the beginning to the end of its existence'), or by any phase of this headache overlapping with my present utterance, or by relevant states of nervous tissue upon which my headache supervenes.

How, then, can Kotarbiński cope with cases such as this in a way that will not stretch ontologically beyond the realm of things? Two answers to this question may suggest themselves: firstly, that it would be possible to effect a logical or linguistic analysis of the sentences in question, of a sort that would reveal their underlying form as involving a relation only to things; and secondly, that it would be possible to embrace *special sorts of things* as truth-makers for the given sentences, so that reism would be saved, though only at the expense of our embracing a notion of ‘thing’ which would depart in some degree from common sense. As we shall see, elements of both solutions are present in Kotarbiński’s work.

We might consider, first, the semantic side of Kotarbiński’s doctrine. Consider the sentence ‘John’s jump cleared the hurdle’. This seems to refer to a certain concrete individual event or process – John’s jump – which occurred at a certain time. And it must therefore surely correspond, if true, to a segment of a reality containing this jump as part. We have a strong intuitive disposition to suppose that any account of what makes the given sentence true will be inadequate if it takes no account of this specific jump. According to Kotarbiński, however, this intuition cannot even be properly expressed. For all apparent references to jumps and other events or processes are in his eyes ‘merely substitutive’. A literal rendering of the intentions of one who utters the sentence in question would be: ‘John jumped clear of the hurdle’, a sentence in which the only names that occur are names for things.¹⁸ It is renderings of this sort, Kotarbiński insists, that reproduce ‘the intention of any statement that says something about an event or events.’ For, ‘it is only seemingly (and never in fact) that we can make a true statement about an event, namely if we take that statement in its substitutive, and not literal and fundamental role.’ References to events are mere ‘onomatoids’ or ‘apparent names’. They are terms which merely sound like names. When the attempt is made to establish a literal interpretation, then it becomes clear that the expressions in question belong to a category quite different from that of names in the strict and proper sense.¹⁹

18. Similarly when a person states the fact of London’s lying somewhere on the Thames, ‘he merely states, in a devious way, that London lies on the Thames’ and here – as Kotarbiński conceives it – there is no reference to facts or states of affairs or anything other than things. (1966, p. 429)

19. Kotarbiński 1966, pp. 52, 401, n. 4.

Physics too, along with many other disciplines such as phonology, military history and meteorology, seems to trade largely in sentences of greater or lesser generality about events. Such disciplines are, accordingly, in need of radical linguistic reform, so that, as Kotarbiński points out, ‘one of the most topical but unperformed tasks of concretism is to work out a dictionary of mathematics and physics in the reistic interpretation.’²⁰ It is not difficult to appreciate the obstacles confronting such a project in relation, say, to the physicist’s talk of energy-fields characterizing points or regions of spacetime. Kotarbiński in fact copes with the latter not by semantic means, but ontologically. As we have seen, he accepts into his ontology fields and other creatures of physics. These, too, are extended in space and time and are ‘such as to offer resistance’ (or, at least, they are presumably such as to be involved in causal relations of certain sorts). Reality, as the reist conceives it, is not therefore ‘a “static conglomerate” (“a mere sum”) of “rigid and changeless solids”‘; it is a ‘fabric composed of changing things’, in a new and extended sense of ‘thing’.²¹ No explicit criterion is provided, however, as to what is ‘thing’ and what ‘event’ or ‘change’ on this more liberal dispensation, so that one does not know, for example, whether quarks, neutrinos, or flashes of lightning are to be admitted as (short-lived) things or rejected as events.

Moreover, even where we are dealing with non-scientific sentences of the everyday world, the reist’s literal renderings are not in every case so easy to come by. What, for example, is to count as a ‘literal’ rendering of a judgment like: ‘John’s jump impressed the spectators’? Perhaps: ‘John jumped and impressed the spectators’. Yet it is far from clear that this rendering is even roughly adequate. John’s jump, after all, may have impressed the spectators, but not John himself. Or John may have jumped, and impressed the spectators, without it being the case that it was his jump by which they were impressed.²²

20. 1966, p. 426. Compare Szaniawski 1977.

21. 1966, pp. 330f., 426.

22. Similar difficulties arise for the proposed reistic translation of ‘Justice is a virtue of honest people’ by ‘Any honest man is just’ (Woleński 1987, p. 168). Thus it may for example be that all honest men are as a matter of fact just, though not in virtue of being honest.

Kotarbiński's problem here results from the fact that there is as it were a *selectivity* of intentional verbs like 'see' or 'think about' or 'be impressed by'. It seems that such verbs may relate their subjects to entities such as events, processes, images, contents, meanings, surfaces, boundaries, states of affairs, absences, and so on, in ways not accountable for exclusively in terms of any mere directedness to things. Such selectivity is characteristic especially of memory, which may as it were conceal from our present consciousness the things which serve as thingly supports for events or circumstances remembered. Thus Harry may remember the intonation of Mary's voice, yet he may have forgotten both Mary herself and the voice that had this certain quite specific intonation.²³ There is, notoriously, a parallel selectivity of 'cause'. Consider for example a sentence such as: *The fact that agreement was reached caused universal joy*, which Kotarbiński (somewhat counterintuitively) wants to render as: *All were overjoyed when they agreed.* (1935, p. 491)

Further problems arise for an approach of the sort sketched by Kotarbiński when we consider sentences apparently involving quantification over events or types of event (*John danced the same jig twice*), or when we consider relational or comparative sentences like *Mary's blush was redder than Susan's*, *The beginning of John's jump was more elegant than the end of Jack's*, and so on.²⁴

Kotarbiński himself, since he believes that somatistic reism is true, can countenance neither a selectivity of mind to non-things, nor the possibility of relations involving apparent non-things in ways which could not be cashed out satisfactorily in terms of corresponding things. Hence he is constrained to hold, for example, that when Harry remembers the intonation of Mary's voice, then there is of necessity a sense in which he remembers Mary also, and that the precise content of his memory can be accounted for without loss of content in terms of his relation to this and other *things*.

23. See § 3 of Mulligan, Simons and Smith 1984, for a discussion of this example.

24. See Tegtmeier 1981 for an extended treatment of such cases and of the reasons why they seem to dictate an ontology richer than that of the reist.

Later reists in the Polish tradition take a more relaxed view of such translation problems, conceiving reistic semantic analysis as of value only when confined to theses purely philosophical in character. Outside ontology, as Lejewski would have it, reistic semantics ‘loses its rationale’:

There is not much point in avoiding abstract noun-expressions in disciplines of lesser generality. Elimination of onomatoids from final pronouncements is of paramount importance only if these final pronouncements are meant to be used in ontological arguments.²⁵

Now there is, certainly, some justice to this, if it means that the reist is restrained from embarking on gratuitous attempts to reform the language of his fellows, language which must surely be in order as it is. What Lejewski has to say should not, however, be interpreted as implying that we may properly ignore those forms of everyday and scientific language which pose *prima facie* problems for the would-be reist translator.

3. *Kotarbiński*ian Psychology

As we have seen, Kotarbiński rejects the doctrine of mental contents propounded by his teacher Twardowski. Contents and images are, as Kotarbiński points out, commonly held to come into being when someone recalls something or dreams of something. The subject who dreams or remembers is then ‘ready to formulate various true judgments, allegedly pertaining to those images’. (1966, pp. 430f.) Brentanists such as Twardowski had defended the thesis that such contents or mental images enjoy an immanent existence ‘in the subject’ or ‘in a person’s head’.²⁶ Kotarbiński, however, does not see how this ‘in’ is properly to be interpreted. Surely not spatially, ‘as though it referred to the nervous tissue in the brain?’ (And where, for example, would we locate such mental phenomena as the pain in a phantom limb?) Yet it

25. Lejewski 1979, p. 206. A compromise position is put forward by Wolniewicz in his 1989. Wolniewicz maintains that sufficient support for reism is provided by a demonstration that it is possible to reduce apparently non-reistic theories to theories having a reistic axiomatization. Reism, on this basis, would thereby concern whole theories and not separate sentences.

26. See e.g. Brentano 1874, pp. 124–32, Eng. pp. 88–94; Twardowski 1894, p. 3, Eng. p. 1; Höfler 1890, § 6.

seems equally inappropriate to regard mental images as located outside the brain, for instance where imagined external objects seem to be located. Leśniewski had been prepared to conclude from these difficulties that contents and images exist ‘nowhere’, a conclusion in the spirit of Descartes, with his view of *res cogitans* as unextended, and accepted also among the Brentanists.²⁷ Kotarbiński, however, could permit himself no such radical departure from somatistic realism and concluded that immanent contents and images are not to be accepted as *bona fide* things at all. This conclusion he saw as being supported further by the fact that such putative entities are not three-dimensional. Thus they cannot count as ‘bodies’ as the pansomatist conceives them, and this, for Kotarbiński, rules out their counting as things in any sense.²⁸

But how, then, are we to cope semantically with our apparent references to images and other like phenomena? Here, again, Kotarbiński’s attack is both semantic and ontological. On the one hand he hopes, with Leśniewski, to ‘de-intensionalize’ psychological statements, to find means of converting such statements to extensional forms. On the other hand, however, he hopes to develop a reistic conception of the discipline of psychology itself, a conception according to which psychology would deal not with mental acts of hearing or thinking or desiring and with the contents of such acts, but rather with things of certain sorts – with the sentient person, the hearer, thinker, or desirer.

That which sees and hears and desires is, Kotarbiński holds, identical with a certain organism (or at least with some part of the organism such as the brain or the system of nerve receptors).²⁹ To think, then, is to be a thinking brain or body, a brain or body which, in non-reistic language, enjoys certain special states or processes of thinking. As Kotarbiński is himself careful to stress, this is not a materialist or behaviourist doctrine. For while he certainly holds that physics investigates all that there is, Kotarbiński does not suppose that all scientific statements about what there is will turn out to be statements of physics. As for Spinoza, so also for Kotarbiński, it is as if, in the case of sentient

27. See e.g. Marty 1908, p. 401.

28. Cf. Kotarbiński 1966, p. 342. From this it follows, too, that there cannot be psychic subjects if the latter are conceived as systems or sequences of contents or images: see Kotarbiński 1935, p. 493.

29. 1966, p. 344.

beings, one single substance is able to support two different systems of determinations which might be mutually incommensurable. Physics describes how sentient organisms (and other bodies) move and how their particles are located. Psychology describes how sentient organisms think and feel.³⁰

Suppose, however, that during some given period of time one and the same sentient organism is both thinking and jumping. The *same thing*, in such circumstances, is both a thinker and a jumper. Is not the reist left in such circumstances with no means in his ontology to distinguish between what are, surely, activities of different sorts? Clearly, he cannot solve this problem by appealing to the fact that different (mental and physical) *predicates* are applied to the thing in question, for the issue here is precisely that of establishing *in virtue of what* such different predications are true, and to this end the reist has only things to which he can appeal. The problem cannot be solved, either, by appealing to any special understanding of the material ‘thing that thinks’ (which had been left indeterminate by Kotarbiński himself). For whichever concrete thing is fixed upon by the reist as that which thinks, be it the brain, the central nervous system, or some other proper or improper part of the organism as a whole, there will always be physical truths about the thing selected in relation to which the given problem of distinguishing physical and mental processes and states will recur. Moreover, whatever the nature of the material thing that the reist puts forward as his candidate ‘thing that thinks’, it seems not logically excluded that two parallel consciousnesses should be realized simultaneously within it in pervasive fashion. We might then have occasion to assert that consciousness₁ is thinking this, while consciousness₂ is thinking that, and then it seems that the reist – short of assuming special *immaterial* things – would have no way of doing justice to truths relating to parallel thinking processes in the given case, for there are *ex hypothesi* no separate bodies which might here serve as subjects of the respective predications.

Reism has consequences not only for the subjects of mental experiences, however, but for the objects of such experiences also. As already stated, the reist insists that that to which our experiences are related is in every case a thing. In everyday perception, as also in hallucinations, dreams and memories, we are typically presented with external things which seem to us to be coloured

30. Cf. Kotarbiński 1966, p. 346; 1935, pp. 495f.

and shaped in this or that particular way. And in dreams and memories, as Kotarbiński puts it, we as it were ‘observe, though somehow in a secondary manner, things from our past environment, which seem to us to be such or another’. (1966, p. 431) This account will clearly face problems in connection with iterated reference to what is mental – dreams about dreams, for example – as also in connection with that peculiar selectivity of memory and other acts discussed above. Kotarbiński’s view, nevertheless, is that our mental experiences are in every case a matter of our being related in special ways to things. From this he infers that all (third person) psychological statements must have literal readings of one or other of the forms:

- A feels this: B,
- A experiences this: B,
- A thinks this: B,

and so on – where ‘A’ stands in for the name of some sentient body and ‘B’ for words or phrases which answer the question ‘what?’. ‘What does John imagine?’, ‘What does John think?’, ‘What does John want?’, and so on. ‘B’ will stand, typically, for a ‘summary description of [A’s] surroundings made in extrospective terms’, and is of course supposed in every case to involve reference exclusively to things.³¹

A slightly different analysis may be required for statements like ‘my tooth aches’ or ‘I feel sick’. These may on the one hand be compared to statements like ‘my shoe is pinching’. Taken in this sense, ‘I feel sick’ would be formulated as ‘This is sickening’, where the indicative pronoun would point to a certain region of the alimentary tract and adjacent parts of the body.’ (1966, p. 348) Quite often, however, the sense of ‘I feel sick’ is to signify ‘I experience a feeling of sickness’ and this is a statement which can be read as complying with the original Kotarbińskian scheme. It means ‘I experience this: it (my body) is sickening’ – where again, reference is made exclusively to things.

But in virtue of what are sentences of the form ‘A feels ...’, and so on, true? Perhaps we can express Kotarbiński’s view as follows. It is as if there are

31. Kotarbiński 1966, p. 347; 1935, p. 499. Recall Marty’s treatment of inner linguistic form at the end of Chapter Four above.

certain *sui generis* determinations of sentient bodies in virtue of which such bodies are directed in a quite specific way to things. It is not the case that the determinations in question could be somehow isolated, whether actually or in thought, in such a way that they could be examined in their own right. Yet they are not simply unknowable, either; for there exists the possibility of *imitation*, in the sense that one subject can think in a way which duplicates the thought- and feeling-determinations of another. Such imitation is possible because our mental determinations characteristically express themselves physically in a range of typical and familiar ways. Above all, there is an organic relationship between a subject's thoughts or feelings and the kinds of things he *says*. Hence we can come to know the former indirectly, by coming to an understanding of the latter in a way which amounts to a (more or less perfect) duplication of those mental determinations which they characteristically bring to expression. Here Kotarbiński draws on the work on meaning and expression of his teacher Twardowski, as also on Gestalt-psychological ideas concerning our knowledge of other minds.³² Strangely, he applies these ideas even to reflexive self-knowledge. We acquire knowledge of our own experiences, he holds, only by 'self-imitation',³³ so that there may be a sense in which we do not know what we think until we hear what we say.

Kotarbiński's claim, then, is that we may come to know what another person experiences by allowing ourselves to be guided by his statements or by other overt behaviour in such a way that we come to *imitate* his experiences within ourselves. Reistically expressed, we can make ourselves think or feel (more or less) as the other person thinks or feels, by allowing ourselves to be determined psychically by the things he says.

We try to interpret the word 'experiencing' as follows. It is merely an announcement of the imitation of the individual spoken of by the speaker, and it informs in a summary way in what respect he will be imitated; thus, that the individual spoken of will be imitated as looking, or listening, or exploring tactually, and so on (1935, p. 499).

32. See Köhler 1947, pp. 128ff., Koffka 1935, pp. 655ff.

33. 1966, p. 347. Similar notions are present also in the writings of Theodor Lipps on the notion of empathy: see e.g. his 1905 and also the discussion in Chapter Five above.

For this to make sense in reist terms, therefore, it must be that our utterances themselves are in some extended sense imitations of the very psychic determinations they bring to expression. Thus in the general formula of the psychological statement ‘A experiences this: B’, the ‘B’ may be seen as an imitation in this extended sense by the one who makes the given statement of the relevant experience on the part of A. When I say, ‘John thinks this: $2 + 2 = 4$ ’, ‘John feels this: they are playing badly’, ‘John doubts this: do angels exist?’, ‘John desires this: to be happy’, then I become a samesayer with the way John thinks or feels. And we can even

generalize this formula so that not only a sentence, but any phrase referring to how a given person experiences, could be substituted for ‘B’. It might even be an inarticulate exclamation, so that a given psychological statement would be: ‘John experiences so: Oh!’ (1966, p. 428)

Kotarbiński’s remarks here will remind us of Davidson’s analysis of indirect discourse in his paper “On Saying That”. My assertion of ‘Galileo said that the earth moves’, on this analysis, is an assertion to the effect that Galileo said something, and my immediately succeeding utterance of ‘the earth moves’ makes Galileo and me samesayers:

Galileo said that.
The earth moves.

Here it is only the first sentence, consisting of the name of a speaker, a two-place predicate ‘said’ and a demonstrative pronoun, that is asserted. The second sentence is, as it were, merely exhibited. For Davidson, too, therefore, there is a sense in which the best we can do is to *imitate*³⁴ (make ourself samesayers with) the speaker whose words we are reporting.³⁴ A similar idea was incidentally advanced already by Leśniewski³⁵ who considers an interpretation of expressions of the type ‘ $\vdash p$ ’ in the language of *Principia Mathematica* as meaning:

34. Davidson 1968, p. 108.

35. 1927/31, p. 10.

that which follows is asserted p .

As Küng points out, it is an important feature of such devices that they allow us to talk *about* a sentence while employing to this end not a name of the sentence but (a token of) the sentence itself; that is, they allow us to avoid an ascent into the metalanguage ‘while at the same time obtaining benefits usually associated with such an ascent.’ (Küng 1974, pp. 243f.) A similar device can be used also to avoid an ascent into set-theoretical language: instead of ‘The set of men is identical with the set of featherless bipeds’, we can say: ‘The following two items are extensionally identical: man, featherless biped’. As Küng and Cauty argue, it is a device of this sort that lies at the basis of Lesniewski’s understanding of the quantifiers.

4. *The Aristotelian Concept of Thing*

Kotarbiński started out in the *Elementy* from the common-sense idea of thing as physical body. He drew in particular on the clarification of this idea that was set forth by Aristotle in his treatment of ‘first substance’ in the *Categories* and in the *Metaphysics*. Thus at the beginning of the *Elementy* we read:

it is in Aristotle that we can trace the distinction, within the category of things, namely, of first and second substances. Those second substances, universals, are the first to fall victim to eliminating analysis as carried out by nominalism ... On the other hand, first substances, things in the primary sense of the word, and for us simply things, fared in exactly the opposite way, since the entire reduction of categories [takes] place precisely to their benefit. (1966, p. 55)

But what are the marks of *first substances* as Aristotle conceives them?³⁶

- (i) They are, first of all, individual. A substance is a ‘this’.³⁷
- (ii) They are not ‘predicable of a subject’ nor ‘present in a subject’.³⁸
- (iii) They are that which can exist on their own, where accidents require a

support from things or substances in order to exist. First substances are prior in all senses: in definition, in order of knowledge, and in time.³⁹

36. Compare, for what follows, Novak 1963/64.

37. *Cat.*, 3^b10.

38. *Cat.*, 2^a11–13, *Met.*, 1017^b10–14, 1028^b35–1029^a1.

(iv) They are that which serves to individuate the accident, to make it the entity that it is – the feature seen by Brentano as the most crucial element of the Aristotelian theory.⁴⁰

(v) They are that which, while remaining numerically one and the same, can admit contrary accidents at different times.⁴¹

(vi) They are able to stand in causal relations.⁴²

(vii) They are ‘one by a process of nature’. A substance has the unity of a living thing. Hence it enjoys a certain natural completeness or rounded-offness, both in contrast to parts of things and in contrast to heaps or masses of things.⁴³ Hence also, for Aristotle, a thing is that which has no actual but only possible parts.⁴⁴ A part of a thing, for as long as it remains a part, is not itself a thing, but only possibly so; it becomes an actual thing only when it is somehow isolated from its environing whole. In this sense (and also in others) the substance is the bearer of potentiality, and it is at this point that we should have to list those marks of substance which flow from Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory, and from his theory of act and potency.

There are further marks of *substance*, less easily documented in Aristotle’s texts since they were taken entirely for granted in Aristotle’s day. These are above all:

(viii) A substance is independent of thinking, a part of nature – where no Greek would have understood what is meant by ‘independent of thinking’.

(ix) A substance is that which *endures* through some interval of time, however small. This means, firstly, that things exist continuously in time (their existence is never intermittent). But it means also that there are no punctually existing things, as there are punctual events (for example beginnings, endings,

39. *Met.*, 1028^a30ff.

40. *Cat.*, 2^b1ff. Cf. Brentano 1933, pp. 37, 108, 112, 131, Eng. pp. 37, 86, 88, 109 and Chapter Three above.

41. *Cat.*, 4^a10.

42. *Met.*, 1041^a9.

43. *Met.*, 1040^b5–16, 1041^b28–31, 1052^a22ff., 1070^b36 – 1071^a4, *Cat.*, 1^b5. See also *Met.*, 1042^b15–32, for other kinds of unity.

44. *Met.*, 1054^a20ff.

judgings, decidings, and instantaneous changes of other sorts).⁴⁵ A thing is also typically such as to endure for such a length of time that it may acquire a proper name for purposes of reidentification.⁴⁶

(x) A substance is that which has no temporal parts: the first ten years of my life are a part of my life and not a part of me. As our ordinary forms of language confirm, it is events and processes, not things, that have temporal parts. The parts of things, in contrast, are their arms and legs, organs and cells, etc.

Even leaving aside the passages where Kotarbiński explicitly allies himself with Aristotle,⁴⁷ the focal instances of the concept of *thing* made prominent in the *Elementy* make it clear that he had intended to follow Aristotle in almost all of the above. A body, as we have seen, is bulky and lasting and such as to offer resistance. Further marks of bodies distinguished by Kotarbiński are:

- They are three-dimensional.
- They are all and only those entities that can be investigated by science; every object is 'knowable in principle'.
- They enjoy essential perceptibility, and are further characterized by the fact that they all exert influence upon perceptible objects.
- They are at a definite place (that is, they are at a specified spatial distance from certain perceptible objects), and at a specified time (that is, they are at a specified temporal distance from certain perceptible objects).⁴⁸

Each of these marks is perfectly in conformity with the Aristotelian view expressed above. Kotarbiński's most important departure from Aristotle, in the *Elementy* at least, is in regard to (vii). For Kotarbiński – almost certainly under the influence of the Lesniewskian conception of sets as concrete wholes – rejected the thesis that things must in every case be unitary, so that he counted

45. See Ingarden 1964/65, vol. I, §§ 28f.

46. As is clear also from Aristotle's treatment of (ii), it is possible that the marks of the concept of substance may be established in part through considerations of the language we use to refer to substances themselves. See *Met.*, 1029^b13.

47. See e.g. 1966, pp. 326ff.

48. 1966, pp. 327, 435, 342. Note that, like the feature of being such as to offer resistance, these marks are held by Kotarbiński to be incidental; that is, they do not affect the extension of the concept *thing* or *body*.

as things also masses and quantities of things and even non-detached thingly parts. Bodies of air, swarms of bees, the solar system, are ‘compound bodies’ in Kotarbiński’s terms, as also are society, nation, social class and all other institutions.⁴⁹

While a lack of sensitivity to the distinction between things, masses, and parts seems to have been shared quite widely by Polish philosophers,⁵⁰ one (Austro-)Polish philosopher who did draw clear distinctions in this regard was Twardowski. As we saw, Twardowski follows Aristotle in insisting that what he calls ‘objects of presentation’ are characterized in every case by the fact that they are *integrated wholes*, a thesis he extends even to the objects of general presentations.⁵¹ Leśniewski, in contrast, goes so far in rejecting the idea that to be a thing an object must in some sense form a natural unity, that he accepts in effect what we might call a principle of the *arbitrariness* of thingly boundaries. This principle is built into the axioms of his system of Mereology, which includes a theorem to the effect that if *a* and *b* are objects, then so also is their sum, irrespective of whether *a* and *b* are connected or contiguous or materially related in any way (irrespective, even, of whether *a* and *b* exist at the same time). Leśniewski does not deny that some objects (in his highly general sense) have a natural unity. It is merely that he does not see the need to introduce this concept of natural unity into his theories of Ontology or Mereology. The latter are theories dealing with what he holds to be more primitive notions, notions which would in any case have to be clarified before a rigorous treatment of ‘natural unit’ could be attempted.

How, given his essentially Aristotelian ontology of things, does Kotarbiński cope in the *Elementy* with the problem of accounting in

49. The latter consist of human beings standing in certain relations to each other – which is not to say that there exist entities called relations (of dependence, leadership, authority etc.), in addition to and as it were alongside the human beings themselves. The various elements of a given institution are somehow related one to another in the sense that some of them behave in such a way because the others behave in such a way. A similar treatment is offered by Kotarbiński for terms like ‘function’, ‘disposition’, and so on. As Kotarbiński would have it, “‘X has the function of typist in a bank’ means the same as: X systematically types letters according to the instructions of her superior” (1966, p. 490).

50. Some have suggested that this may reflect the fact that the Polish language, with its lack of articles, makes a less than clear distinction between mass and count nouns or between mass and count uses of the same noun, though it must be admitted that there are clear enough ways to make this distinction in Polish by other means.

51. 1894, pp. 88, 105, Eng. pp. 86, 100. Cf. Ingarden 1964/65, vol. I, p. 219.

correspondence-theoretic terms for the truth of sentences such as ‘John is jumping’? Sentences of the given sort are analyzed, first of all, as what Chisholm has called ‘concrete predications’, expressing relations between things.⁵² Thus ‘John is jumping’ is analyzed as a sentence of the form: ‘John is a jumper’, ‘John is red’ as of the form: ‘John is a red thing’, ‘John desires apples’ as of the form: ‘John is an apple-desirer’, and so on. In each case we arrive at a sentence containing two names of things joined together by the copula ‘is’⁵³ so that the things picked out by the names in question are to have the job of making true the relevant judgment.

Remember, in all that follows, that ‘John is a jumper’ is to be understood as an analysis of the sentence ‘John is jumping’ (‘John is at present executing one or more jumps’). Thus we are to resist the natural tendency to understand nominals like ‘jumper’, ‘swimmer’, ‘bouncer’, as relating to a habitual or professional performance of the relevant activity. This tendency derives from the already mentioned fact that names are in normal circumstances used for purposes of re-identification; thus they presuppose some duration on the part of what they name.

‘John is a jumper’ analyses ‘John is, on this particular occasion, jumping’, where ‘is’ expresses a real continuous present. The thing picked out by ‘John’ seems relatively easy to identify, at least against the background of the broadly Aristotelian conception described above. But what, in the light of this conception, are we to make of the thing picked out by ‘a jumper’? And what is the relation between John and a jumper that is expressed by the copula ‘is’?

Our first port of call, given the strong influence exerted by Lesniewski on Kotarbiński’s (formally much less sophisticated) ontological views, is Lesniewski’s own system of Ontology, a theory built up on the basis of Lesniewski’s system of Protothetic or ‘theory of deduction’ by the addition of the new primitive term ‘is’ and the single axiom:

$$\forall ab [a \text{ is } b \leftrightarrow \exists c (a \text{ is } c \ \& \ c \text{ is } b)].$$

52. 1978, p. 199. Cf. the discussion of Brentano’s ‘B-theory’ in Chapter Three above.

53. More generally we arrive at a sentence containing exclusively logical constants and ‘genuine names’. See Woleński 1987, p. 168.

Colloquially:

a is b if and only if, for some c , a is c and c is b .⁵⁴

Here ‘ a ’, ‘ b ’ and ‘ c ’ are any expressions belonging to the category *name*. This means, as Lesniewski sees it, that they may be either:

- (i) ordinary singular designating names or nominal expressions like ‘Ronald Reagan’ or ‘the British Prime Minister’;
 - (ii) shared or ‘general’ names like ‘philosophers’ or ‘apples in Vermont’;
 - (iii) fictitious or empty singular names like ‘Pegasus’ or ‘the largest prime number’;
 - (iv) fictitious or empty general names like ‘sirens’ or ‘fates’.
- All such expressions belong to a single category, Lesniewski argues, since whether a name like ‘man at the door’ is singular or shared or empty depends on the factually existing state of the world, and so cannot be regarded as basic from the point of view of logic.⁵⁵ From this, however, it follows also that we must admit as ‘names’ expressions like ‘jumper’, whose number is in a certain sense indeterminate.

The axiom of Ontology lays down simply that for ‘ a is b ’ to be true, it must be the case that every a is b and that exactly one object is a . It is not difficult to show, on these terms, that if both ‘ a ’ and ‘ b ’ are singular and designating, then ‘ a is b ’ is deductively equivalent to ‘ $a = b$ ’. Applied to what has now become the Polish-sounding sentence ‘John is jumper’, however, this analysis of ‘is’ tells us only that, if this sentence is true, then ‘John’ must be a singular designating name and ‘jumper’ a designating name designating (possibly *inter alia*) what ‘John’ designates.

From this point of view it becomes clear that the system of Ontology is in fact not an ontology at all (a theory of the different types of being). Rather, it is a theory of *names*, as is reflected in Kotarbiński’s use of the expression ‘calculus of names’ for what Lesniewski called ‘Ontology’. More precisely, it is a theory of the relations of designation that hold between singular, shared and empty names on the one hand and objects (of whatever variety) on the other. It

54. We here leave out of account peculiarities arising from Lesniewski’s special reading of the quantifiers.

55. Küng 1967, p. 111. Such apparent logico-grammatical distinctions as that between common and proper names, marked in English by the presence or absence of articles, were consistently overlooked by Lesniewski.

reflects a concern, therefore, not with problems of ontology, or metaphysics, but with the issues that arise when one allows ‘*a*’ and ‘*b*’ to stand in not merely for singular terms as straightforwardly understood but also for any expressions within the wider category thus defined. To put the matter another way, Ontology may be seen simply as an extension of the theory of identity to cope with a somewhat liberal view of what may count as ‘name’, so that the absolute universality of ‘=’ is inherited by the new Ontological ‘is’. This makes it supremely tolerant, being compatible with *any* ontology formulable by means of expressions belonging to the given category. As Woleński puts it, ‘Ontology is metaphysics free.’ (1987, p. 175)

If we return to our sentence ‘John is jumper’ in the light of the Lesniewskian analysis of ‘is’, then it would appear that two alternative readings present themselves, according to whether we take ‘jumper’ as singular or plural. On the first alternative, ‘John is jumper’ will be equivalent to the more English-sounding ‘John is identical with a jumper’, so that the referents of ‘John’ and ‘a jumper’ will be one and the same. ‘John’, as we normally suppose, designates an enduring object, subject at different times to contradictory determinations (he is now jumping, now not). If, therefore, the referent of ‘a jumper’ really is to be identical to the referent of ‘John’, then ‘a jumper’, too, must designate something that endures, so that ‘John’ and ‘a jumper’ would be merely two different ways of referring, now, to one and the same ordinary continuant. On this account, however, the truth-maker of ‘John is jumping’ would differ in no wise from the truth-maker of ‘John is John’, and this is an outcome which surely flies too blatantly in the face of our intuitions to the effect that one or more *present jumps* must somehow be involved in making true the former sentence. If ‘John’ and ‘a jumper’ are two different ways of referring to the same thing, then surely, our intuitions tell us, they refer to this same thing ‘under different aspects’. It is unclear, however, how Lesniewskian Ontology could be made able to take account of such ‘different aspects’.

What, then, as regards the second alternative, which would make ‘John is jumper’ equivalent to: ‘John is one among the jumpers’. Since from any sentence of the form ‘*a* is one of the *bs*’, one can infer within Ontology a sentence which might be rendered colloquially as ‘*a* is this *b*’, where ‘this *b*’ is a singular name for that individual *b* which *a* is, this second reading might seem to bring us back once more to the first alternative, which we have seen reason to

reject. We may, however, be able to infer from ‘John is one among the jumpers’ also that there are jumpers to which John himself stands in the relation of similarity. And since John’s circle of similars *qua* jumper is different from his circle of similars *qua* thinker, this may enable the reist to distinguish separate truth-makers for ‘John is thinking’ and ‘John is jumping’ even in those cases where the two activities are performed simultaneously. From this it would follow, surprisingly, that the family of jumping things contributes in some way to making it true that John, in particular, is jumping – a consequence which certainly goes beyond what Leśniewski himself had to say on these matters, but which nevertheless has advantages from the reist point of view (to the extent that it has been found acceptable by Lejewski). In particular, it enables the reist to distinguish the truth-makers of ‘John is jumping’ and ‘John is thinking’ by tacit appeal to those other jumpers, who contribute to making true the former sentence in a way in which they do not contribute to making true the latter.

5. *Time and Tense*

This is not quite all that can be said on Leśniewski’s behalf, however, and before returning to our discussion of Kotarbiński’s ontological views it will be useful to look at the Leśniewskian treatment of the phenomena of verbal tense. Recall that the ‘is’ in ‘John is jumping’ is intended to express a real present tense. The Polish ‘jest’, on the other hand, for example in ‘Jan jest skaczący’ (John is jumping) – a form which sounds odd due to the absence in Polish of the continuous aspect – does not express a present tense, and this holds too of ‘Jan skacze’ (John jumps) and ‘Jan jest skoczkiem’ (John is a jumper).

In and of itself the Polish ‘is’ is timeless. In order to mark the fact that the jumping is taking place *at the moment*, the speaker of Polish must add an explicit temporal index and say, for example, ‘Jan teraz skacze’ (John jumps now) or (more stiltedly) ‘Jan jest teraz skaczący’ (John is now a jumper). This timelessness, we see, must be characteristic also of the ‘is’ of Leśniewski’s Ontology. This is first of all because Leśniewski, again under the influence of Twardowski, insisted that the sentences of Ontology should be absolutely true, i.e. true independently of time and occasion of utterance. But it is also because, as already noted, the ‘is’ of Ontology is to enjoy absolute universality of scope; it is to be applicable to abstracta as much as to concreta, to objects past and

future as much as to objects of the present. It is in fact the same timeless 'is' as that which we customarily employ when we say, e.g., '3 is a prime number' or 'whales are mammals'.

Ontology is not, however, restricted to 'timeless' sentences of the given sort. Return, for the moment, to 'Jan jest teraz skaczący' (John is now jumping). We should normally interpret the temporal index ('now' or 'teraz') in such a sentence as governing the verb. Given the universality of scope of Ontology, however, and of the category *name* with which it deals, it is open to us to allow such temporal indices to govern not the verb but the subject of the sentence.⁵⁶ This yields sentences of the form 'John_{teraz} jest skaczący' or 'John_{now} is a jumper' – sentences of a sort which make possible a new Leśniewskian reading of our original 'John is a jumper'.

'John_{now}' is a name, like any other; but a name of what? We shall think of it, for the moment, as designating a *phase* of John, remaining neutral as to what exactly this might mean and presupposing only (1) that some of the phases of John are jumping phases, some not; and (2) that phases exist only for some (normally relatively short) interval of time.

Someone who asserts that John is a jumper may be seen as asserting that a present phase of John is a jumping phase of John – with a timeless 'is', exactly as dictated by the conditions laid down by Leśniewski on the sentences of his Ontology. The notion of a present phase of John may be elucidated in turn as: a phase of John that is simultaneous with the utterance in question, i.e., in reist terms, with the relevant phase of the speaker.⁵⁷ The advantage of a reading of this sort is that we now have no need to regard 'a jumper' as the name of an enduring object. The identity of the referents of 'John' and 'a jumper' is assured, rather, by the fact that 'John' itself has come to refer to an entity which enjoys a merely transient existence.

Does this really help, however, in understanding what it is that makes true the sentence 'John is a jumper'? For what is this 'phase' of John that is both John and a jumper? There are, it will turn out, a number of crucial difficulties

56. Bolzano, too, in '45 of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, sees time-determinations as part of the subject, so that, as he puts it, 'a pair of propositions such as "Caius is now learned" and "Caius was not learned ten years ago" turn out to have different subjects.'

57. Compare the similar ideas expressed by Brentano in his 1976, Part II, Ch. VIII.

which we face in establishing what such phases might be. Most importantly, as already remarked, it seems that, however this issue is decided, the phase ontology will dictate a departure from the broadly Aristotelian conception of ‘thing’, in spite of Kotarbiński’s apparent assumption that this ontology represents a natural and inconsequential extrapolation of his own reistic ontology, which was in turn seen by him as a natural extrapolation of the Aristotelian ontology of substance.⁵⁸

There are, be it noted, no phases in Kotarbiński’s *Elementy*, and that Kotarbiński held to a strictly Aristotelian view in this work is seen above all in the fact that – as his examples show – he takes it for granted that things may *change*, in the sense that what is true of a given thing at one time may be false of *that same thing* at another. In his paper of 1935, “The Fundamental Ideas of Pansomatism”, in contrast, Kotarbiński embraces the phase ontology seemingly without a second thought. Every object, he writes,

is something corporeal or something sentient (or a whole consisting of such components).

An example of something corporeal is: a watch of the trademark Omega No. 3945614 from 1st January, 1934 to 31st December, 1934, inclusive (or any of its parts – for instance, the minute hand from 5th March, 1934 to 7th April, 1934, inclusive). And an example of something sentient: I, from 8 o’clock to 1 o’clock on 20th March, 1935 (or any temporal portion of this object, e.g., I, from 9 o’clock to 10 o’clock inclusive on the same day). (1935, p. 488)

From this, however, it follows that at least one further stage needs to be added to the list of ‘stages’ in the development of reism given above. This consists in the transition from an essentially Aristotelian ontology on Kotarbiński’s part in the period up to 1931, to a quite different ontology of phases (or mixed ontology of phases and substances) in the years thereafter.

How this apparently unconscious change of mind on Kotarbiński’s part came about can be seen if we look at the final section of Leśniewski’s work “On the Foundations of Mathematics” (1927/31). Here Leśniewski begins by expressing his gratification that so many of his own views, especially in connection with the system of Ontology, had found support in Kotarbiński’s work. Leśniewski goes on to quote extensively from the *Elementy*, including the

58. A similar suggestion is implicit also in Leśniewski’s work. See e.g. Sinisi 1983, pp. 57ff., quoting from the final section of Leśniewski 1927/31. Cf. also Lejewski 1982.

famous passage in which Kotarbiński compares Leśniewski's work to that of Aristotle, thereby providing a retrospective justification for Leśniewski's use of the term 'Ontology' – a justification which Leśniewski himself was only too willing to accept.⁵⁹ For a long time, Kotarbiński writes, the term 'ontology'

has come to designate investigations of the 'general principles of being' conducted in the spirit of certain parts of the Aristotelian 'metaphysical' books. However, it should be noted that if the Aristotelian definition of First Philosophy, perhaps the main concern of these books, is interpreted in the spirit of a 'general theory of objects', then both the word and its meaning are applicable to the calculus of names as conceived by Leśniewski. (1966, pp. 210f.)⁶⁰

In the paragraphs which *follow* this discussion of Kotarbiński, however, Leśniewski goes on to consider a certain difficulty for Ontology posed by the colloquial reading of Ontological sentences of the form '*a* is *b*', and it is in this context that he first introduces his notion of phase or 'temporal segment'.

Let us suppose, Leśniewski writes, that someone were to assert:

- (a) Warsaw is older than the Saxon Gardens
- (b) Warsaw in 1830 is smaller than Warsaw in 1930
- (c) Warsaw in 1930 is Warsaw
- (d) Warsaw in 1830 is Warsaw.

Then, taken together with the axiom of Ontology, we can derive from these sentences the following assertion:

- (e) Warsaw in 1930 is smaller than Warsaw in 1930, which is absurd.

In his response to this objection Leśniewski insists, first of all, that the expression 'Warsaw' be used consistently throughout. Either, he claims, it should be used to refer to 'only one object having a definite time span, which at present we do not know', in which case it has the sense of 'Warsaw from the beginning to the end of its existence'. Or it should be used in such a way that it refers to indefinitely many different objects, so that it would be possible to assert 'of "Warsaw from the beginning to the end of its existence" as well as of "Warsaw in 1930" and of "Warsaw in 1830" ... that they are Warsaws.'

59. See Woleński 1987, pp. 170f.

60. It should go without saying, in light of the discussion of Ontology above, that I do not share this estimation of the nature of Leśniewski's achievement.

Moreover, ‘it would be possible to say with complete generality that if some object is Warsaw, and some other object is a temporal segment of the first object, then the second object is also Warsaw.’⁶¹

On the first reading, which sees ‘Warsaw’ as a singular name, ‘it is not possible to call by the name “Warsaw” any temporal segment or temporal “section” of the unique Warsaw referred to’. In this case we shall be able to assert neither (b) nor (c) nor (d). On the second reading, on the other hand, ‘Warsaw’ is a plural name, which means that we shall find it impossible to assert any sentence of the form (a). Only on the basis of some such sentence, however, given Leśniewski’s logic, can we infer the consequence (e). Whichever alternative is chosen, therefore, the supposed absurd implication can be avoided.

We may be inclined to suppose that Kotarbiński, wishing to keep in step with Leśniewski in this, as in other matters of Ontology, simply took over the notion of temporal phase, going so far as to accept arbitrary temporal phases of an object as of fully equal status with that object itself. Closer examination of the relevant passage reveals that Leśniewski himself is here more circumspect. Thus he accepts the greater appropriateness of talking not so much of *the temporal segment of the rector of the University of Warsaw in January, 1923* but rather of *the man* (‘from the beginning to the end of the existence of this man’) *who was in January, 1923 the rector of the University of Warsaw*. Further, he has ‘the inclination to use the expression “Warsaw” as a name denoting one object only’. Since, however, he is using ‘man’ and similar expressions to designate simply the relevant maximal phase (‘man, from the beginning to the end of his existence’), it seems that even here Leśniewski is embracing the phase ontology, though in a form which seeks to come to terms with the fact that the ontology in question threatens conflict with our ordinary usage.

Certainly we refer quite naturally to: Napoleon in his youth, Nixon during the period of his presidency, the later Wittgenstein, and so on. Normally, however, we take such expressions in their sentential contexts, as signifying for example that Napoleon himself was such and such in his youth. That is, we treat expressions like ‘in his youth’ as adverbial modifications of the relevant verb.

61. Simisi 1983, p. 58, quoting Leśniewski 1927/31.

The phase ontologist, in contrast, takes such forms of speech as modifying nouns in such a way as to sanction the view that there are special objects, Napoleon in his youth, Nixon during the period of his presidency, and so on, which are temporal parts of Napoleon and Nixon respectively ('from the beginning to the end of their existence'). Objects are therefore seen as having temporal parts in just the way that they have spatial parts like arms and legs. Thus where common sense and Aristotle prefer a view according to which things (for example people) exist *in toto* in any given moment of their existence, the phase ontologist seems to condone a view according to which only the relevant temporal parts of things would exist in any given moment. He may thereby be driven to the view that temporal parts must be in every case instantaneous, for any temporal part of duration longer than a single instant would have just as little claim to exist in that instant as would the relevant temporal whole. Adoption of the phase ontology may thereby lead to a view of ordinary things as mere *entia successiva*, the separate 'momentary slices' of which would exist in successive instants of time (as, according to some philosophers, the world as a whole has to be recreated anew by God in each successive instant). An enduring thing, on this view, is a mere logical construction upon the various instantaneously existing entities that may be said to do duty for it.⁶²

Alternatively the phase ontologist may seek to understand 'John_{now}' as signifying John himself, exactly as understood within the Aristotelian theory, but restricted to some interval of time (t,t') which includes the present moment.⁶³ If, however, as is required by the Aristotelian theory, John exists *in toto* in every moment of his existence, then it must surely follow, according to a process of reasoning encountered already above, that John_(t,t') is in fact identical with John himself. To get round this problem the phase ontologist might seek to regard 'John_(t,t')' as referring to John as he would have been had the universe (conceived as being in other respects identical to the actual universe) begun at t and ended at t'. ('Napoleon in his youth', on a view of this sort, might be

62. Woodger, who independently developed a phase ontology similar to that of Leśniewski, comes close to a view of this sort in his 1939. Cf. also Chisholm 1976, pp. 98f., Wiggins 1980, pp. 24f. and Lewis 1983, pp. 76f.

63. A natural language reading of 'John_{now}' may involve a necessary indeterminacy in the precise extent of the relevant interval; since this indeterminacy can in principle be eliminated, however (for example by utilizing the resources of a formal theory such as the 'Chronology' proposed by Lejewski in his 1982), we can ignore the matter here.

understood as referring to Napoleon as he would have been had he ceased to exist on the point of reaching maturity.) This, however, would make of phases merely possible existents. It would leave us in the dark as to the referent of ‘John_(t,t')’ in this, the actual world and it would tell us nothing as to the relation, if any, between John_(t,t') and John himself.

Leśniewski’s own motivation in introducing the notion of temporal segment seems to have derived on the one hand from his timeless conception of truth, and on the other hand from those cosmological theories (of ‘spacetime’, ‘world lines’, and so on) which have grown out of the idea that there is a certain analogy between the spatial and temporal dimensions of the entities treated of by physics.⁶⁴ We shall assume, then, that on the Leśniewskian view we are to regard each object as a four-dimensional whole, capable of being cut up into parts in any of its four dimensions. Phases result when objects are sliced in the temporal dimension. Why must such a view embody a conception of the way in which the spatiotemporal world is parcelled into separate entities that is in conflict with the Aristotelian ontology of things? To answer this question we must understand what it is for an object to *change* (to admit contrary accidents at different times). Consider, to this end, the following passage from Zemach’s important paper “Four Ontologies” of 1970:

An ontology may construe its entities as either *bound* or *continuous* in time and in space. An entity that is continuous in a certain dimension is an entity that is not considered to have *parts* in the dimension in which it is continuous. It can be said to *change* or *not to change* in this dimension, but what is to be found further along in this dimension is the *whole* entity *as changed* (or unchanged) and not a certain part thereof. The opposite is true of an entity’s being bound. If an entity is bound in a certain dimension, then the various locations along this dimension contain its parts, not the whole entity *again*. (Zemach 1970, pp. 231f.)

The Aristotelian substance ontology is an ontology which sees substances as, in Zemach’s terms, continuous in time and bound in space. We see the same

64. This analogy is very restricted (see e.g. Mellor 1981, pp. 66f., 128ff.). The acceptance of the concept of a world line in a four-dimensional continuum is moreover fully consistent with a continued belief in the ontology of things (Sellars 1962, p. 578). One might indeed go further, and argue that the concepts of the four-dimensional ontology themselves presuppose the thing ontology for their coherent formulation, that, for example, the idea of a world line makes sense only if there is some identical *thing* that is tracked from one time-point on the line to another. See Simons 1987, pp. 126f., and also Brentano, 1976, pp. 296ff., Wiggins 1980, p. 25, and Runggaldier 1992 who offer further criticisms of the view of time as a ‘fourth dimension’ of space. But compare Heller 1992 for arguments against such criticisms.

substance *again* on successive occasions, not a different slice thereof.⁶⁵ The four-dimensionalist phase ontology, in contrast, is one which sees entities as bound both in space and in time, i.e. as having both spatial and temporal parts. Entities so conceived are excluded entirely from change. That a four-dimensional whole has red phases and green phases no more signifies a change than does the fact that my pen is at one end red and at the other end green.

Interestingly, the term proposed by Zemach for the four-dimensional wholes that are accepted by Leśniewski is the term *event*:

An event is an entity that exists, in its entirety, in the area defined by its spatio-temporal boundaries, and each part of this area contains a *part* of the whole event. There are obviously indefinitely many ways to carve the world into events, some of which are useful and interesting (e.g. for the physicist) and some of which – the vast majority – seem to us to create hodge-podge collections of no interest whatsoever. Any filled chunk of spacetime is an event ... When philosophers and physicists talk about spatiotemporal worms, about point-events, or about world-lines, when they describe material things as ‘lazy processes’ and refer to spatial and temporal slices of entities, they are using the language of this [event] ontology. (Zemach 1970, p. 233)

Now it is no mere terminological matter to suggest that the phase ontology brings us close to an ontology of events. Leśniewski himself, while critical of the specific formal treatment of the event ontology that is given by Whitehead,⁶⁶ seems to have been not too negatively disposed to the idea that objects and events may constitute a single category. The whole tone of Kotarbiński’s *Elementy*, however, is precisely counter to an outcome of this sort, and there is not a little irony in the fact that Kotarbiński (like Lejewski in our own day) sees no incongruity in doing away with events via ‘onomatoids’, and then (apparently) resurrecting them via temporal parts.

Certainly Leśniewski does not countenance anything like the dissolution of things into events or processes that was envisioned by, say, Heraclitus, Schopenhauer or Bergson. For not every four-dimensional whole is such as to count as a ‘thing’ from Leśniewski’s point of view. His reasoning seems to have been, rather, that it is possible to restrict the totality of four-dimensional wholes in such a way that the resulting ontology will remain more or less in

65. See also the discussion of ‘existence in the present’ in Ingarden 1964/65, ‘ 30.

66. Simisi 1966, summarizing part of ch. IV of Leśniewski 1927/31.

harmony with our presuppositions concerning things or concreta and aggregates thereof. Thus, we might say, a four-dimensional whole, before it can be admitted by Leśniewski into his ontology, must satisfy the two-fold condition that it be (1) 'bulky and lasting' (i.e. extended in all its four dimensions) and 'such as to offer resistance', and also (2) such that all its (bulky and lasting) parts are resistant in the relevant sense.⁶⁷ It is, however, far from clear that such conditions can of themselves suffice to transform an ontology of four-dimensional wholes into an ontology of 'things' in the sense of the consistent realist. Indeed, there is a suspicion that they involve a surreptitious smuggling in of the goal to be achieved (not least because the phrase 'offers resistance' seems to belong still to the language of continuants or substances).

Not merely does the phase ontology have no room for change. It precludes also any account of what we might refer to as the 'stability' of enduring substances. As W. E. Johnson points out, the ontology of four-dimensional wholes springs from that post-Humean doctrine which regards change as fictitious and substitutes for it 'merely differently characterized phenomena referred to non-identical dates.' It may be that for most scientific purposes 'no more transcendental conception than that of a whole constituted by the binding relations of time and space is required; and hence the philosophers who reject the conception of a continuant are satisfied to replace it by the notion of such an extensional whole.' What, however, is to explain, on this account, the stability of that spatiotemporal nexus which connects, for example, the successive 'phases' of a living organism? As Johnson argues, a mere succession of processes 'offers no explanation whatever of what in objective reality determines the stability of any given nexus.' (Johnson 1924, pp. 100f.)

6. *In Defence of a Bicategorical Ontology*

There is an assumption running through the thought of Leśniewski, Kotarbiński and their followers, as also through that of Zemach, to the effect that the most worthy aim of the ontologist is that of producing a monocategorical ontology –

67. This is to exclude, for example, the case where a *bona fide* bulky and resistant whole is aggregated with, say, an empty volume of spacetime.

and more generally of demonstrating that one or other sort of eliminative reduction can be achieved. A more natural resolution of the problems raised in our reflections on time and change, and on tensed predications like ‘John is jumping’, is achieved, however, if we abandon this concern with reduction and embrace instead a shamefacedly bicategorical ontology of things and events or phases, the latter being conceived as changes in things, as dependent particulars (after the fashion of, say, accidents in the category of action as these are conceived in the Aristotelian ontology).⁶⁸ Events, we can say, occur *in* or *between* things, and are no less individual than these things themselves. They may be instantaneous or extended in time, and in the latter case they have temporal parts which are themselves events. On this basis we can go on to distinguish clearly between a thing, on the one hand, as something that is given *in toto* from the very first moment of its existence, and the ‘life’ or ‘history’ of this thing on the other hand, as a certain type of complex event, bound up inseparably with the thing whose history it is. The purported temporal parts of things will then turn out to be parts of such complex events, so that the cleavage between John as child and John as adult can be recognized, commonsensically, as a cleavage not in John, but in his life or history. Note, incidentally that there is no comparable move in regard to spatial parts. We cannot say that these are really parts of a substance’s shape, for example, or of the space a substance occupies.

Clearly, the bicategorical ontology of things and events provides a peculiarly simple account of what makes ‘John is jumping’ true in terms of states of affairs as hybrid wholes, containing both things and events as parts. This same ontology can account also for certain properties of the linguistic phenomena of verbal aspect,⁶⁹ properties which are important for us here in that they reflect a parallel on the side of the verb to the opposition among nouns between ‘mass’ and ‘count’ (as for example between ‘sugar’ and ‘snow’ on the one hand, and ‘tiger’ and ‘ox’ on the other). The former correspond to verbs of progressive and continuous aspect (‘John knows how to jump’, ‘John’s been jumping all day’), the latter to verbs of achievement (‘John jumped over the ridge’, ‘John just jumped to victory’).

68. See Simons 1983 for a formal treatment of a view along these lines within a Lesniewskian framework.

69. See Mourelatos 1981; Galton 1984, Appendix II; Hoeksema 1985, ch. 6.

What this tells us in ontological terms is that the opposition between what is 'unitary' and what is 'mass' or 'collective' is to be found not merely in the realm of things but in the realm of events, too, though in an interestingly more complex form. For while events of reddening or exploding or whistling, as well as institutional affairs such as weddings, funerals and runnings of races, are all such that they have or could have temporal parts, they may also – by inheritance from the (moving and extended) things which support them – be extended in space. Hence they may participate in the opposition between 'unity' and 'mass' in two distinct dimensions: events may be spread out in time, in space, or of course in both.

Consider, for example, the process of jumping. This is made up, we may suppose, of minimal unitary temporal parts – which we may call 'jumps' – comparable to substances in the world of things. Each jump may then be analyzed in turn as a continuum of bodily movements of a certain sort.

We can distinguish, in the world of things, not only what might be called 'substantial' parts (lumps of sugar, molecules of water), but also atomic parts, which are marked by the fact that they have no parts of their own. This distinction, too, can be drawn in the realm of events, where we can distinguish on the one hand unitary events which take time but have no homogeneous sub-events as parts, for example judgments, decidings, and so on, and on the other hand events which are strictly punctual, such as beginnings, endings and instantaneous changes.⁷⁰ Leśniewski's Ontology and Mereology have shown themselves adept at coping in a formally rigorous way with some aspects of the opposition count vs. mass as this is manifested in the realm of things. Truth, however, is a relation which involves not only things and the names of things. It involves also verbs and that in reality to which verbs correspond, which is typically an event of one or other sort. Hence we can begin to understand why it is that the bicategorical ontology may be particularly suited to the task of giving an account of what makes sentences (particularly empirical sentences) true. For it allows us to take account of just those differences in reality which are reflected in language in the differences of verbal aspect (differences which are preserved, incidentally, even if we move over to a language shorn of tenses of the sort that was favoured by Twardowski, Leśniewski, and other proponents of the 'absolute' theory of truth).

70. Ingarden has contributed most to the ontological analysis of these distinctions. See his 1964/65, ch. V.

Return, however, to the properly reistic ontology and to our original pair of questions: what is the referent of ‘a jumper’ in ‘John is a jumper’, and what is the relation between John and a jumper that is expressed by the copula ‘is’? Is it possible to provide answers to these questions in monocategorical terms, i.e. in a way that would tell us what *things* make ‘John is a jumper’ true? Kotarbiński’s *Elementy*, at a number of points, suggests an answer to this question that comes interestingly close to simulating the effects of the bicategorical ontology of things and events discussed above. This answer, which is nowhere to be found in Leśniewski, rests on the idea that ‘is’ in the given sentence expresses a special kind of relation of part to whole. ‘A jumper’ – or what might now be called ‘jumping John’ – is, on this reading, the name of a special sort of transiently existing thing, in which John himself is included as part.⁷¹ The idea here is that things may at certain times exist as it were in a raw state, but that they may on occasions extend themselves qualitatively, or become modified in certain ways (by what the tradition called ‘accidents’ or ‘modes’) so that John, for example, may on occasions become jumping John or cursing John or sleeping John, and so on. John himself will survive in each of the latter – though, because of the semantic restrictions imposed by Kotarbiński, we cannot isolate that which gets added to John to yield the various self-extensions in which he may partake.

It is more than anything else Kotarbiński’s *examples* that suggest this qualitative extension view. Thus he tells us that ‘it is obvious that only things are stimuli: burning flames [!?!], sounding strings, pressing solids, etc.’ (1966, pp. 434f.), and these are examples which seem to imply not only that Kotarbiński is intending to refer to things that can survive and acquire and lose accidental determinations in something like the Aristotelian sense, but also that the result of a thing’s acquiring an accidental determination may be a new thing, qualitatively extending the thing with which we began: a string becomes a sounding string, solids become pressing solids, a match becomes a lighted match, and so on. The qualitative extension view allows, moreover, a particularly simple interpretation of Kotarbiński’s views on psychology: a thinker is a body that is qualitatively extended in a special (deliberating,

71. See again the discussion of Brentano’s own ideas in this direction in Chapter Three, Section 4, above.

worrying, deciding) sort of way. There is not only jumping John, but also thinking John, hoping John, dreaming John, and so on.

Even after the *Elementy* there are hints of this qualitative extension view in Kotarbiński's treatment of words and sentences as things. Thus consider the following passage from a piece first published in 1954:

a linguistic sign is for us a physical body, whether it is a graphic sign or an acoustic sign (in the latter case it is a *certain amount of air vibrating in a specified way*); thus it is a thing, and not a process in the sense of a specified changing of something. (1966, p. 399, emphasis added)

The same amount of air, considered as enduring thing, is vibrating now in this way, now in that, and it is a different 'acoustic sign' in the two successive cases. As such passages reveal, however, there are certain consequences of the qualitative extension view that run counter to our common-sense understanding of 'thing'. For things, now, include not only Tom and Dick, but also Tom-the-jumper, Dick-the-thinker; not only quantities-of-air but also quantities-of-air-vibrating-in-a-certain-way. Note, however, that while qualitatively extended things may exist for a very short time, so that they typically do not acquire special (proper) names of their own for purposes of re-identification, it seems that all the qualitatively extended things seemingly admitted *en passant* by Kotarbiński do have some duration, however short (so that their existence is never punctual, though it may be intermittent). This reflects, perhaps, the greater acceptability of nominal phrases like 'dying Jim', 'racing Tom', etc., as contrasted with 'ending-his-process-of-dying Jim' or 'beginning-to-run-a-race Tom', which are ungrammatical.

Clearly, not all complex names of the given sorts need be given the qualitative extension interpretation. Thus it may be that Leśniewski can entirely avoid this interpretation by means of his 'phases' (though again, it is difficult to see how this ploy will allow us to distinguish for example 'jumping John' from 'cursing John' when jump and curse are simultaneous). Moreover, there are cases of expressions of the form '-ing N' or '-ed N' where 'N' is a *bona fide* name but the '-ing' or '-ed' a merely modifying adjective which brings about a diminution or cancelling of the content expressed by 'N'.⁷²

72. See again the discussion of expressions like 'missing arm', 'assassinated president', 'shattered vase', etc. in Chapter Five, Section 2, above.

As we saw in Chapter Three, the qualitative extension view does suggest an elegant account of what makes sentences like ‘John is a jumper’ true in a way that involves reference exclusively to things. John himself and his qualitative extension are not identical; the former is a part of the latter. Note, however, that there is for the reist no third thing which, when added to the former would yield the latter. Hence the usual mereological remainder principle fails to hold. The idea of a mereological theory in which the remainder principle is weakened, or even suspended, is far from incoherent, as a number of algebraic parallels testify.⁷³ This failure of the remainder principle will however suffice to render the qualitative extension view unacceptable in the eyes of Leśniewski’s more devoted disciples.

7. *Kotarbiński and Brentano*

Return, for the moment, to our list of ‘stages’ in the development of reism. Stage 5 in this development was provoked by a letter Kotarbiński received from Twardowski in 1929 on the publication of the first edition of the *Elementy*, in which Twardowski pointed out that the doctrine of reism had been propounded already some years earlier in a series of pieces dictated by Brentano towards the end of his life and appended to the second edition of his *Psychologie*.⁷⁴ Kotarbiński, in response, came to see the need to add to his reflections on reism a certain historical dimension. Above all he began to stress the difference between his own pansomatist views and the reistic views he attributed to Brentano. In his paper on “Brentano as Reist” of 1966, Kotarbiński points out further that Leibniz, too, could be viewed as a precursor of reism, not only in the light of his monadology but also in reflection of his principle that all formulations containing names of abstract objects should be avoided. Kotarbiński sees himself, however, as the only ‘consistent and conscious’ somatist reist. He describes Leibniz as a ‘spiritualist reist’, i.e. as one who accepts souls or spirits as the only type of things. Brentano he describes as a

73. Thus, for example, just as we can have a pseudo-Boolean algebra with pseudo-complements (see e.g. Rasiowa and Sikorski 1963, pp. 52f.), so also we might distinguish a family of pseudo-mereologies in which the remainder principle fails.

74. Cf. Kotarbiński 1966a, p. 461, Eng. p. 195; Brentano 1924, pp. 228-77, Eng. pp. 330-68.

dualist reist who accepted into his ontology both bodies (*res extensa*) and souls (*res cogitans*): ‘As a former priest, [Brentano] stopped at the threshold of somatism and never crossed it.’ (1966, p. 428.) We shall investigate below the extent to which this is an adequate account of Brentano’s reism and of its relation to that of Kotarbiński.

Brentano, as we have seen, distinguishes three sorts of ways in which a subject may be conscious of an object in his mental acts: in presentation, in judgments and in what he calls ‘phenomena of love and hate’ and what Marty calls ‘phenomena of interest’. A judgment arises when, to the simple manner of being related to an object in presentation, there is added one of two diametrically opposed modes of relating to this object, called *acceptance* and *rejection* or ‘belief’ and ‘disbelief’. A judgment is in effect either the affirmation or the denial of existence of an object given in presentation, so that all judgments are reducible to judgments of existential form.⁷⁵

According to Brentano’s earlier view, there exist non-real objects of various kinds – mental contents or ‘objects of thought’, universals, states of affairs, possibilities, lacks and so on – all of which can be given in presentation and affirmed or denied in judgment. This points to a distinction, accepted by the early Brentano and his followers, between the existence or non-existence of an object of presentation on the one hand, and its reality or non-reality on the other. Thus what exists (for example values or universals) need not be real, and what is real (for example centaurs or chunks of wooden metal, and even the objects of simple acts of sensation) need not exist. These two oppositions are independent of each other, and only the former is involved directly in the correctness or incorrectness of a judgment.

Later, however, Brentano moved to a view according to which ‘reality’ and ‘existence’ would be equivalent, so that everything which exists is an *ens reale*. Brentano’s change of mind occurred, in fact, during the period when Kotarbiński was studying in Lvov, though it was initially made known only to

75. The topic of existential judgments was taken up by a number of philosophers in the years around the turn of the century and seems to have played a role also in inspiring the subject of Lesniewski’s dissertation under Twardowski in 1911. This includes a discussion not only of Brentano’s *Psychologie* but also of Twardowski’s *Content and Object* and of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*. Lesniewski may have been influenced also by the *Sketch of a Theory of Existential Judgments* of Hans Cornelius, with whom he studied in Munich in 1909/10, attending also courses given by the phenomenologists Alexander Pfänder (Logic and Theory of Knowledge) and Moritz Geiger (Seminar on the Philosophy of Mathematics).

Brentano's closest associates, so that we can rule out any influence of Brentano's later view on Kotarbiński via his teacher Twardowski. Kotarbiński's and Brentano's thing-ontologies may however have a common source. Thus it is noteworthy that both views arose, in part at least, in reaction to certain apparent ontological excesses of Brentano's students, not least of Twardowski himself, a reaction which led in both cases to a reversion to an ontology rooted more narrowly in the Aristotelian conception of thing or 'first substance'. Moreover, as Ingarden pointed out already in the early thirties, there is a sense in which the roots of both Brentano's and Kotarbiński's reism are present already in Brentano's own earlier existential theory of judgment, since – when once '*Sachverhalte*' or 'facts' have come to appear suspicious – this has the effect of reducing each judgment to a form which asserts either the existence or the non-existence of some object.⁷⁶

It is not that the being of A must come into being in order for the judgment 'A is' to be transformed from one that is incorrect to one that is correct; all that is needed is A. And the non-being of A need not come into being in order for the judgment 'A is not' to be transformed from one that is incorrect to one that is correct; all that is required is that A cease to be. And if only this happened and nothing else ... would there not be in this fact alone, which relates to what is real, everything that is needed for the correctness of my judgment? Without doubt ... And thus the doctrine of the existence of such non-things has nothing whatever in its favour. (Brentano 1930, p. 95, Eng. p. 85)

It is important, however, to be clear as to the precise nature of the respective views of Brentano and Kotarbiński. Brentano came to believe that all objects belong to a single category of *ens reale*.⁷⁷ The fact that he sometimes uses the word 'thing' to refer to the entities in this category of itself tells us little as to the extent to which he shared with Kotarbiński tenets of the latter's reism.

Certainly there are a number of sometimes striking similarities between their respective philosophies. They agree, first of all, on negatives: for both philosophers, only concrete individuals exist. There are no abstracta, no universals or general objects, no properties, sets or classes, meanings or

76. Ingarden put this view to Kotarbiński around 1935 when the latter came to Lvov to give a talk on Leibniz as a precursor of reism. (Personal communication of W. Bednarowski.)

77. He was followed in this by his later disciples, above all Oskar Kraus, Alfred Kasil and Georg Katkov, who took over from Kotarbiński the word 'reism' to describe the later Brentanian view. See Kraus 1937, pp. 268ff.

concepts,⁷⁸ Brentano's motive for rejecting all such entities being rooted in his conviction that all that exists is completely determinate, down to lowest differences. Secondly, they agree as to the importance of the dimension of semantic or linguistic analysis as a complement to ontology: the apparent grammatical form of an expression is not always its actual or ultimate form. They agree also in the view that this actual form is to be achieved by translation into the language of things.⁷⁹

Thirdly, and most importantly, Brentano agrees with Kotarbiński and Leśniewski (and against Aristotle) in allowing collectives of things to count as things. Organisms, for Brentano, are collectives in this sense. Thus neither philosopher takes seriously the requirement that things should form a unity:

By *that which is* when the expression is used in *the strict sense*, we understand a thing ...; a number of things taken together may certainly also be called a thing, though one must not suppose that the two parts of a thing taken together constitute an additional third thing. For where we have an addition, the things that are added must have no parts in common. (1933, p. 4, Eng. p. 16)

Similarly they agree in allowing parts of things to count as things. Hence both are 'mereological actualists', in the sense that they believe that a part of something actually real is itself actually real even when it is still a part. Aristotle, in contrast, we referred to as a 'mereological potentialist', in the sense that he holds that parts of things are as such only potentially real.⁸⁰ Neither in Brentano nor in Kotarbiński do we find any trace of the Aristotelian theory of act and potency and of the hylomorphic conception of substances to which it led.

The points of disagreement between the two philosophers derive especially from the fact that Kotarbiński starts out with the idea that physical bodies are the prime examples of things, and sees 'resistance' or the ability to stand in causal relations as a distinguishing mark of the concept *thing*. For Brentano, on the other hand, this concept does not essentially have to do with the concept of causality at all. And even though things as Brentano conceives

78. Brentano 1924, vol. II, p. 162, Eng. p. 294.

79. Cf. Brentano 1930, pp. 87–97, Eng. pp. 77–87; 1956, pp. 38–48; Srzednicki 1965, p. 48; Chisholm 1978.

80. See the discussion in Chapter Three, Section 5, above.

them are not, except in special cases, psychological entities, there is nevertheless a sense in which even on this latter doctrine the term ‘thing’ is a psychological term; it signifies still: ‘object of presentation’.

This is shown most clearly in the different arguments the two philosophers bring forward to defend their respective views. Brentano’s argument for the ontology of *ens reale* rests on the fact that the univocity of ‘presentation’ implies the univocity of ‘thing’.⁸¹ Kotarbiński’s argument for his own reistic ontology, in contrast, is negative in form, resting on the unacceptability (for a variety of reasons) of theses to the effect that there exist universals, facts, classes and the like.⁸²

The Brentanian concept of thing is, we might say, a *formal concept*. It is, in other words, a concept capable of applying without reservation to objects in all material categories – since, for Brentano, objects in all material categories may serve as objects of presentation.⁸³ And then:

It doesn’t matter at all what word we use to refer to the concept which is common to all that is to be presented. Whether we speak of ‘thing’ or ‘entity’, it is enough that it represents a highest universal to which we attain by means of the highest degree of abstraction no matter where we look (1930, p. 108, Eng. p. 96).

Aquinas, too, sees the concept of a thing or of what is real as the most general concept to which reason can attain, and a broadly similar view is present for example in Husserl’s *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, where the purely formal concept of an *Etwas* or ‘something’ lies at the basis of Husserl’s theory of number-predications.

For Kotarbiński, on the other hand, ‘thing’ is a term of material ontology, to be understood by reflecting on specific sorts of examples of thing and on the meanings of terms like ‘bulky’, ‘extended’, ‘resistance’, and so on, whose significance is confined to the region of physical bodies.

81. 1924, vol. II, pp. 162, 213f., Eng. pp. 294, 321f.; 1933, p. 18, Eng. p. 24; 1956, p. 38.

82. These negative arguments are supplemented by an appeal to the fact that the language of things is psychologically more natural. Thus one natural way of explaining the meanings of words is to eliminate substitutive terms: ‘Should we wish to explain to a child what the word “similarity” means, should we not show him in turn several pairs of objects which look alike?’ (1966, p. 423)

83. On Brentano and formal concepts see Műnch 1986; on formal vs. material ontology see Ingarden 1964/65, esp. § 9.

Marty is in this respect closer to Kotarbiński than he is to Brentano, since he pursued energetically the idea that the concept of thing or *ens reale* should be confined to those entities which participate in causal relations.⁸⁴ However, Brentano argues, in transforming the concept of *thing* into the concept of what is capable of standing in causal relations, Marty has ‘permitted himself to deviate from long-established usage’:

a term which has traditionally been the most simple and the most general of all our terms has hereby been transformed into a sophisticated thought-combination which has been a matter of controversy since the time of Hume. Given Marty’s sense of the term ‘thing’, we would have to say that according to Hume and Mill and many others, there are no things at all! (1930, p. 108, Eng. p. 96)

The opposition between physical and psychological things, too, is an opposition formulated in material-ontological terms, so that to describe Brentano as a ‘dualist’ is to misunderstand the formal nature of his views. Certainly Brentano accepts spiritual substances (souls) as possible objects of presentation. And he accepts three-dimensional bodies also. However, the (Cartesian) psychological origins of Brentano’s views imply that it is not at all clear that he accepted as objects of presentation physical bodies in Kotarbiński’s sense. Thus material things, for Brentano, are not restricted to the realm of what exists in three-dimensions. They embrace first of all ‘topoids’ (thing-like entities of higher dimension), which conceivably exist as it were alongside the more familiar three-dimensional bodies given in perception. Brentano’s concept of thing embraces further things of lower numbers of dimensions, above all boundaries (points, lines and surfaces). Note, however, that while Brentano does not rule out topoids of higher numbers of dimensions, he rejects the idea that three-dimensional bodies might turn out to be boundaries of four- or more dimensional topoids. This is because a boundary can exist only as the boundary of the thing which it bounds. Thus spatial and temporal *points*, on Brentano’s conception, never exist in isolation from the things, extended in time and space, of which they are the boundaries. A body, on the other hand, is a thing in its own right, which requires no other thing (except possibly God) in order to exist.⁸⁵

84. 1908, § 66.

85. See Brentano 1933, p. 108, Eng. p. 96; 1976, pp. 38, 95.

Kotarbiński, in contrast, reflects not at all on the nature of boundaries. More generally his work, like that of Leśniewski, lacks any topological dimension; things are seen as being arbitrarily divisible and as arbitrarily conjoinable (without even the topological requirement of connectedness in the latter case). This is despite the strong tradition of topology in Polish mathematics, and despite the fact that topological axioms can be added very easily to the axioms of Leśniewski's Mereology.⁸⁶

Brentano accepts also certain *sui generis* zero-dimensional things, which he calls souls. These have the capacity to comprehend intentionally things of all higher dimensions,⁸⁷ a notion which recalls Aristotle's dictum to the effect that the soul is somehow everything, for its nature is to be able to know everything and therefore in a certain sense to include everything within itself.⁸⁸ Like the Leibnizian monad, so also the Brentanian soul is unextended, and therefore not continuously *many*; yet it is for all that continuously *manifold*, comparable in this respect to the midpoint of a disc divided radially into segments of continuously varying colours, an entity which exists only as a boundary but in such a way as to inherit manifold complexity from that which it bounds.⁸⁹

The two philosophers differ further in virtue of the fact that, for Brentano, not all things need be perceivable. Thus souls are not perceivable, or at least not directly: we can apprehend intuitively at most the activities of the soul (the soul as accidentally extended in certain ways).⁹⁰ Further, topoids of greater numbers of dimensions would not be perceivable; and nor, either, would the empty spaces which Brentano came to accept at the end of his life as the very stuff of the universe.

Another difference between the two philosophers turns on the fact that Brentano *takes tense seriously* in the sense that for him 'exists' is in every case

86. See Grzegorzczak 1977.

87. See Brentano 1933, pp. 158f., Eng. pp. 119f.; 1976, pp. 20, 120f., Eng. pp. 15, 99f.

88. *De Anima*, 429^b25ff., 430^a14f.

89. See Brentano 1976, pp. 41ff., Eng. pp. 32ff.

90. Aristotle, too, seems to exclude immaterial substances from the realm of sensible substances. Cf. *Met.*, 988^b26, 1040^b31ff.

synonymous with ‘exists now, in the present moment’, so that everything exists for Brentano only *according to a boundary (einer Grenze nach)*. This means that every existing object is as it were punctual from the point of view of its temporal extension, though always in such a way as to depend for its existence on that which has just existed or on that which will exist (or on both) as supplying the continuum which it bounds.⁹¹

For Brentano, it is as if the world of things is continuously annihilated and recreated anew with each successive passing instant. ‘Past thing’ and ‘future thing’ do not, therefore, refer to special kinds of things, but are modifying expressions, to be compared with ‘hoped for thing’, ‘imagined thing’ and so on. Our apparent references to the past and future are in fact in every case references to what exists in the present as set apart temporally either as future or as past from something else. This ‘something else’ refers, however, merely *modo obliquo* and embodies no ontological commitment (in much the same way that our reference to a believer in demons or in fates involves no ontological commitment on our part to demons or fates).⁹²

Brentano’s world is, therefore, in this respect, too, entirely different from that of Kotarbiński, for it is a world in which there exists only one instant of time (even if this time is continuously changing). Brentano in fact identifies what is real with what is subject to a certain continuous temporal transformation which is simultaneously a matter of *existing in the present, ceasing to be future and becoming past*.⁹³

Kotarbiński certainly holds that all things exist in time. Yet he reflects very little on the peculiar ontological features of things not yet and no longer existing – though from his discussion of the ‘things of history’ we can infer that he accepts into his ontology also past and future things.⁹⁴

91. See Brentano 1976, e.g. p. 37, Eng. pp. 28f.

92. Brentano 1976, Part II, Ch. III.

93. Brentano 1976, Part I, Ch. V.

94. See 1966, pp. 369f. Strictly speaking there are no ‘instants of time’ in Brentano’s ontology, not even the present instant. Rather, there are only *things existing now* or *presently (instantaneously) existing things*. Contrast *Elementy*, p. 191, where Kotarbiński denies the suggestion that ‘is’ would be an abbreviation of ‘is now’.

The ontological views adopted by Brentano at the very end of his life take him even further from reism in the Kotarbińskiian sense. For things, as we saw in Chapter Two, came to be conceived by Brentano as falling into two groups, which we might refer to as *places* and *souls*. Places may be ‘empty’ (lacking in all qualitative determination), or they may be qualitatively extended or enriched (filled by qualities) in different ways.

A somewhat counterintuitive consequence of this view, as we also saw, is that any change of place or shape brings about the annihilation of the ‘body’ in question, so that bodies cannot move. Movement is, rather, the becoming accidentally extended in appropriate ways of a continuum of different places in continuous temporal succession, rather like a ripple which appears to move across the surface of a medium even though no molecule of the latter is displaced in the horizontal. There is no Red Rum (*qua* material object), but only a continuous sequence of Red-Rum-y places, so that Brentano’s later ontology implies just that view which is at the basis of Leśniewski’s logical grammar – that there is a sense in which we need not distinguish between proper names and predicates.

We can come to some better understanding of the reasons why the later Brentano came to choose places as the ultimate non-mental substances if we examine again the list of the marks of substance set out above. Places are (i) individual and (ii) neither ‘present in a subject’ nor such as to ‘require a support from things or substances in order to exist’. (iii) They can exist on their own, i.e. without being filled or qualified in any way. If, further, substance is identified with place, then it becomes clear why substances underlie accidents and do not themselves need accidents in order to exist (where it would seem that the organic substances canvassed by Aristotle would depend for their existence on processes of breathing, of metabolizing, etc.). Places, from this point of view, come to appear similar in this respect to the later Aristotelian *materia prima* – both are infinitely plastic in the sense that they can take on qualities *ad libitum*. They come close also to the undifferentiated Lockean I-know-not-what which would serve as the ultimate support for the qualities given in experience.

Most importantly, as Brentano insists, places are (iv) the best possible candidate for the role of that which *individuates* the accidents by which they are

filled. We can say that for the later Brentano a body is the accident (qualitative extension) of a place, and that a place is that which individuates one body from another. Two qualitatively identical things at different places are distinct, as Brentano sees it, only because their location is distinct. Further, (v) places can admit contrary accidents, being now filled by something red, now by something black, and they are also (viii) ‘independent of thinking’, and (ix) such as to endure through time.

Only (vi), (vii) and (x) – involvement in causal relations, natural unity, and absence of temporal parts – are less easily applied to the concept of place. As we have seen, however, the mismatch in regard to (vi) can be explained by pointing to the psychological origins of Brentano’s views, and in regard to (x) there is in fact no essential disagreement, since while Brentano accepts that things/places exist *as a whole* at all times at which they exist, his view that they exist merely *according to a boundary*, a view quite different from the phase ontologist’s view that they exist only *in one or other temporal part*, is in keeping with the views of Aristotle.⁹⁵ Which leaves only (vii), which is rejected with great force by Brentano – as also by Kotarbiński – since as we have seen, neither philosopher imposes on things a requirement of unity. From this point of view, however, the concept of place recommends itself still more strongly as that in terms of which an account of material (non-mental) substance is to be provided, since to regard things as merely (differently qualified) places is precisely to guarantee that arbitrary divisibility and conjoinability of things on which both philosophers insist. So strongly does Kotarbiński identify the divisibility of things into parts with their extension in space and time, that we may argue that Kotarbiński, too, ought properly to have accepted the idea that things are ultimately four-dimensional volumes of spacetime – a view that has been found attractive by not a few contemporary philosophers.

Note again how important are the psychological origins of Brentano’s views. Brentano had tended from the very start to view the world of transcendent objects as something like a sensory surface (like, say, the surface of the visual field). Objects come thereby to be seen as similar in many respects

95. E.g. his view of the now as boundary at *Physics*, 220^a22, 221^a25, 234^b1f., 251^b20-28.

to the images on a screen.⁹⁶ They are capable of being demarcated as things and as parts of things, and they are capable of being presented as moving, yet in both cases we have to do not with autonomous properties on the side of the objects themselves, but with mere ascriptions of properties to the images we experience. It would take us too far afield to give a precise account of Brentano's views of autonomous reality. His thinking is however at least in this respect comparable to that of Mach and Einstein, that all of them sought to cast off 'metaphysical' assumptions such as that of independent substance.

8. *The Varieties of Reism*

For all the divergences between Kotarbiński's pansomatist reism and the later formal ontology of Brentano, there is a clear sense in which they are proponents of a common approach to ontology. This approach is shared also by Leśniewski and his followers, as also by Quine, Goodman and other modern nominalists. It can be characterized as an approach which takes as its starting point in the construction of its ontology a view of things drawing equally on examples of *quantities, masses* or *homogeneous collectives* as on the unitary substances of the tradition. Thus it is contrasted with the approach to ontology of Aristotle, Leibniz, Twardowski and Ingarden, which takes its cue primarily from the unitary substance and from the individual accidents which may inhere therein.

There are, interestingly, a number of different routes taken by the philosophers mentioned to the homogeneous collective view of things ('homogeneous' because the distinction between thing and mass is held to reflect no fundamental ontological division). Thus Quine, for example, seems to have been inspired particularly by those physical phenomena (energy fields, liquids, gases) where arbitrary delineability does seem to hold, as also by related considerations deriving from the semantic treatment of mass terms in natural language. Quine, like Brentano and Kotarbiński, sees masses as full-fledged even though possibly scattered individuals. Thus he regards as of no importance the difference between what is spatially continuous and what is

96. Some clues as to Brentano's views are provided by the argument for the *a priori* impenetrability of bodies in his 1976, pp. 180ff., Eng. pp. 151ff. Brentano's views in this respect seem to have been stimulated by the positivism of Auguste Comte: see Műnch 1989.

spatially scattered,⁹⁷ and his general approach is to view every object as a four-dimensional section of the world, after the fashion of what Zemach calls ‘events’.

Field-theoretic physics played a role also in inspiring the later Brentano’s view of things as accidents of places, as also in securing Brentano’s acceptance of topoids of higher numbers of dimensions.⁹⁸ Brentano’s acceptance of the homogeneous collective view was however motivated principally by his early work on the psychology of sensation, and for this reason he may have resisted the idea that ‘thing’ involves as one of its marks the concept of resistance or inertia. Goodman, too, was provoked by considerations deriving from the psychology of sensation in developing his ontology of ‘individuals’ in *The Structure of Appearance*, and Quine was to some extent led to the homogeneous collective view by psychological considerations concerning ostension.⁹⁹

Leśniewski, on the other hand, was brought to his version of the homogeneous collective view of things by formal considerations deriving from the general theory of part and whole and from his critique of the set-theoretic paradoxes, formal considerations which played a role also in the work of Whitehead, Goodman and Quine.

Both the homogeneous collective ontology (mereological actualism) and the Aristotelian substance ontology (mereological potentialism) are contrasted with ontologies allowing general, abstract and non-temporal entities of various kinds. Thus they may be contrasted with the positions of, for example Bolzano and Frege, or with Platonist ontologies of sets or classes. Bolzano, Frege and the set-theoretical Platonists are, we might say, maximally liberal in the sense that they impose on the entities admitted into their ontologies none of the conditions of temporality, inertia, perceivability and so on that have concerned us in the foregoing. Marty and the early Brentano are one degree less liberal than this, in that, while they admit into their ontologies *entia rationis* of various

97. Quine 1960, pp. 90–110.

98. See the “Appendix” to Brentano 1933: “The Nature of the Corporeal World in the Light of the Theory of Categories”, and also Brentano 1976, p. 184, Eng. p. 154f.

99. Cf. e.g. Quine 1960, p. 52.

kinds, they insist that all such entities enjoy a strictly temporal existence. They thereby recognize a division among temporal entities between the real and the non-real. The bicategorical nominalist ontology sketched above imposes the further restriction that all entities be not only temporal but also real. The bicategoricalist does not, however, insist that all real objects must also count as things, since he holds that events in his sense may enter into causal relations. The later Brentano did however impose this further restriction, though at the same time he abandoned the requirement that all things must be real in the sense of being such as to enter into causal relations.

Kotarbiński can be said to have gone one step further than Brentano in insisting that all things are physical bodies. Neither Brentano nor Kotarbiński however lays any requirement of *unity* on the objects in their respective ontologies, as contrasted with Aristotle – *qua* ontologist of first substance – who does impose a requirement of this sort. All of which implies that there is a spectrum of gradually more restrictive positions, from the Platonism of abstract objects at the one extreme to the Aristotelianism of unitary substances at the other, a spectrum which may be represented as follows:¹⁰⁰

All entities are:	Plato Bolzano Frege	Marty	Bi-categorical Nominalism	Later Brentano	Kotarbiński	Aristotle <i>qua</i> Ontologist
Temporal	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Real	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Things	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Physical bodies	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Unitary	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

100. The reader should bear in mind that it is by no means clear where Aristotle would have to be posted on this spectrum if the whole of his ontology were taken into account. Here we concentrate exclusively on Aristotle's philosophy of first substance.

We could go further, and extend this chart by taking into account oppositions of other sorts, relating for example to the issue as to whether entities are or are not general,¹⁰¹ independent of mind,¹⁰² atomic,¹⁰³ or such as to have temporal parts.¹⁰⁴ In addition we could think more carefully about the different meanings of ‘unitary’, distinguishing for example the requirement of connectedness of parts, the requirement of spatial separateness from other entities, the requirement of functional interdependence of parts, and so on.¹⁰⁵ We could investigate further the extent to which things may have parts which are themselves things – as an organism may include cells, chromosomes, genes, etc. as parts.¹⁰⁶

Already as it stands, however, the chart will enable us to see the inadequacy of any simple-minded opposition between ‘reism’ on the one hand and ‘Platonism’ on the other. Thus it would be wrong to go along with Lejewski in his view that ‘Ontologists who oppose reism are believers in so-called abstract entities’,¹⁰⁷ a view dictated no doubt by the fact that the principal enemies of the homogeneous collective view in recent philosophy have been advocates of ontologies based on the theory of sets or of a more or less Platonistically oriented semantics.¹⁰⁸ More recently, however, and especially

101. See again Twardowski 1894, § 15, and also Ingarden 1964/65, vol. I, p. 219.

102. Ingarden admitted both autonomous and dependent things, examples of the latter being creatures of fiction. See 1964/65, § 12 and ch. IX.

103. Is the ultimate furniture of the universe itself atomic? Do all entities have atomic parts? See Sobociński 1971; see also Bunt 1985, for an interesting treatment of these issues from the point of view of the semantics of mass and count expressions.

104. See Zemach 1970.

105. See, on this, Simons 1987, ch. 9.

106. See Woodger 1937, for an experiment in this direction.

107. 1979, p. 210. Compare Lejewski’s assertion in his 1976 to the effect that events are non-material objects, so that anyone who admits events into his ontology would be a ‘Platonist’ on Lejewski’s reading of this term. This reading is no doubt derived from the fact that events, for Lejewski, are the referents of abstract nouns like *swimming*, *falling*, *talking*.

108. See Wolenski 1987, p. 170.

with the bringing to light of hitherto neglected aspects of the Brentanian and Husserlian ontologies, it has become clear that reism has other, non-Platonistic opponents. Thus for example it would not be to move into the realm of abstract entities were one to embrace in one's ontology events as well as things. For events may be accepted – as for example on Davidson's account, and on that of Whitehead – as *bona fide* individual entities existing in time and space and entering into causal relations with other events. More controversially, we may say that Brentano (and Husserl) have shown how we may cope in a non-Platonistic framework with those kinds of dependent, inseparable, divisive, interpenetrative parts which fall outside the purview of mereology as standardly conceived but which yet seem indispensable to an understanding of the structures of *minds*, and of the different sorts of relations between minds and other concrete objects. Contemporary discussions of intentionality, for example in the literature of the so-called 'cognitive sciences', have neglected such mereological considerations at their peril, though it is interesting to see how ideas derived from topology and other branches of formal ontology, as also from the theory of Gestalt, are beginning to be taken seriously in artificial intelligence circles and elsewhere.

Chapter Eight

Christian von Ehrenfels I

On the Theory of Gestalt

1. *The Theory of Gestalt Qualities*

In the present chapter we shall deal with the birth of the theory of Gestalt, and particularly with the essay “On ‘Gestalt Qualities’” by Christian von Ehrenfels, published in 1890. It will become clear in the course of this chapter that the Gestalt psychologists of the Berlin school, above all Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Köhler and Kurt Koffka, were part of a wider Gestalt tradition whose roots lie in developments in Austrian philosophy in the last part of the nineteenth century.

Ehrenfels was born in Rodaun (near Vienna) in 1859 and died in Lichtenau in 1932.¹ He studied in Vienna under Brentano and Meinong, and was Professor in the German University in Prague from 1896 to 1929, where he continued to teach until his death in 1932. His circle of friends, students and acquaintances during this time included a number of important writers and thinkers, among them T. G. Masaryk, Max Brod and Felix Weltsch, as well as the economist Friedrich von Wieser and linguists of the Prague circle such as Nikolai Trubetzkoy. Ehrenfels figures, too, in Kafka’s diaries, for example in an entry for 1912:

1. On Ehrenfels’ life see Fabian 1985. Like many of the leading figures in the Gestalt movement, Ehrenfels was a passionate musician. He took lessons in composition from Bruckner, and made a name for himself as the librettist of a number of Wagnerian music-dramas. Ehrenfels made a name for himself also as an exponent of the evolutionary theories of Darwin. He corresponded with Sigmund Freud, and gave lectures on his own peculiar views concerning sexual ethics and related subjects to the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society: see Rug and Mulligan 1986.

Amusing scene when Prof. Ehrenfels, who grows more and more handsome and who – with his bald head sharply outlined against the light in a curve that is puffed out at the top, his hands pressed together, with his full voice, which he modulates like a musical instrument, and a confident smile at the meeting – declares himself in favour of mixed races.

Of greater importance for us here, however, is the fact that Ehrenfels' students in Prague included the young Max Wertheimer, the most innovative thinker in what would later become the Berlin school of Gestalt psychology.

Psychology in the nineteenth century was at least officially elementarist in nature. It sought to understand the nature of mental processing in terms of 'atoms' of mental experience and of certain laws of combination which would govern the behaviour of these atoms. The Gestalt movement amounted, in effect, to a campaign designed to overthrow this atomistic orthodoxy in psychology, in a fashion which culminated in the work of the Berlin school in a radical doctrine which made psychological parts derivative of psychological wholes, so that 'atoms' would have the status of abstractions or mere theoretical entities. Ehrenfels' paper is the first sorry from the holistic side of this campaign. The paper addresses our experience of complex structures of different sorts. How, from an elementarist perspective, are we to understand what is involved in our apparent perception of complex formations such as spatial figures? The relevant experiences are after all distinct from all experiences of mere aggregates or sums of separate data. But what can account for the unity which they seem to involve? In order to answer this question Mach had assumed the existence of a new sort of simple element called a 'muscular feeling' (*Muskelgeföhl*), which would be associated with the other elements involved in such experiences and give rise, via 'thought-economy', to the illusion that the experiences in question would be directed towards complex objects. Feelings of this sort might be correlated e.g. with specific movements or adjustments of the eyes and associated muscle-tissue.

Ehrenfels' answer, too, involved the postulation of a new sort of element, yet in a fashion which presupposes the discoveries of Brentano in the field of the ontology of mind, discoveries pertaining above all to the dependence relations between psychic constituents. Brentano's seminal ideas in this area had formed the substance of lectures in Vienna which were attended not only by

Ehrenfels, but also by Meinong, Husserl and Stumpf.² And as we have repeatedly insisted, the power of Brentano's philosophy consists precisely in its having set forth a means by which psychology and ontology can be developed in tandem with each other in fruitful ways. (It is this which is the theoretical core of his doctrine of intentionality.)

The fact that our experience is structured is, according to Ehrenfels, a matter of certain special '*Gestalt qualities*' which are given in special experiences, superadded to our experiences of sensory elements. A two-level theory of this sort was, as we shall see, characteristic of that 'Austrian' approach to complex experience which was developed by Ehrenfels, Meinong, Witasek, Benussi, Bühler and their followers. According to the later, 'Berlin' approach, in contrast, a collection of data (or any other psychological formation) does not *have* a Gestalt on a second level. Rather, it *is* a Gestalt, a whole whose parts are themselves determined as being such that they can exist only as parts of a whole of this given kind. The significance of this distinction, or of the transition from the Austrian theory of Gestalt as *quality* to the Berlin theory of Gestalt as *whole*, cannot be overestimated. The distinction can be seen as parallel, in some respects, to that between dualistic conceptions of man as composed of body and superadded *mind* or *soul*, and conceptions of man as *person*, or in other words as a special sort of structured whole with both mental and physical aspects.

The essay "On 'Gestalt Qualities'" consists, first of all, in a terminological proposal. Ehrenfels suggests that the German term 'Gestalt', which means 'shape', 'figure', 'form' should be subject to a certain generalization.³ A

2. See Brentano's own notes to these lectures in his 1982, and also Mulligan and Smith 1985. On the theory of dependence in general see Smith and Mulligan 1982. Note that Brentano himself did not accept Ehrenfels' doctrine of Gestalt qualities, nor any of its manifestations, and Kraus 1921 is a critique of Gestalt psychological from this orthodox Brentanian perspective.

3. More or less extended or metaphorical uses of this term have a long history. There is a common use of the term to mean 'external or visible form' (e.g. of the devil, or of a ceramic pot), as also a family of uses allied to English expressions such as 'cut a figure', 'Great Figures in Styrian Philosophy', and so on. The term signifies also quite generally an integrated structure or complex, so that Clausewitz, for example, can speak of a war as an 'absolute Gestalt', an 'indivisible whole, whose elements (the

spatial shape or Gestalt is perceived – or, as Ehrenfels and his fellow Brentanians would say, is ‘given in visual presentation’ – on the basis of a complex of sensations of individual elements having ‘distinct spatial determinations’. In sensing the elements and their spatial determinations we are able to apprehend the shape as an additional object (quality, attribute) as it were side by side with its associated elements. Our total experience is therefore something dis-

tinct from the experience of a mere sum or aggregate of sensory elements. This is clear from the fact that we can apprehend *the same* shape (same spatial quality) in association with determinations and elements which, taken individually, have nothing in common: we can recognize a given shape, for example, by looking at an enlargement or reduction of the shape, or by examining a shadow or imprint.

Ehrenfels’ idea is that a similar notion can be applied not merely in the realm of spatial complexes but also in relation to temporal wholes such as melodies. For we can recognize a melody as one and the same even though it has been transposed into a different key or has been played on a different instrument or at a different speed. Ehrenfels’ proposal is that wherever we have a relation of this sort, between a complex of experienced elements on the one hand and some associated unitary experience of a single invariant structure on the other (a structure invariant *through transpositions* of different sorts), we are to conceive the given unitary experience as structurally analogous to the experience of a spatial shape. Spatial and temporal complexity (and in principle also experienced complexity of other kinds) are henceforth to be treated not as separate groups of phenomena correlated with different faculties of mind. Rather, they are to be treated as a unified species, in which Gestalt-oriented mental processes of the same sorts are involved in every case.

Again, the air of simplicity about this proposal should not mislead. For given the comparatively developed status of our intuitions concerning visual phenomena and the quite general manageability of spatial as opposed to temporal structures (manifested, for example, in the comparatively developed state of the science of geometry), Ehrenfels’ proposal has considerable

individual victories) have value only in relation to the whole’. (*Vom Krieg*, sketches of Book 8, Part I, quoted in Metzger 1975, pp. 7f.)

theoretical power, which turns on the fact that it was able to explain the possibility of our perceiving not only spatial complexes but also complexes that are extended in the temporal direction. The Machian theory is unable to do justice to the latter – for example to our perception of the melody – because there is here no point in time at which the putative elementary *Muskelgefühl* could reasonably be said to occur.

Ehrenfels' essay is, therefore, more than a mere terminological watershed and it gave rise to a veritable explosion of empirical and theoretical research on 'Gestalt qualities' long before Gestalt psychology was established as an independent movement of thought. Almost all of the theoretical and conceptual issues which came subsequently to be associated with the Gestalt idea are treated at some point in the work, at least in passing. Its specific interest here, however, lies in the generality with which Ehrenfels formulated his proposal. For even though he himself applied his idea of a generalized geometry of Gestalten in greatest detail to the specific case of our perception of melodies and similar formations, he recognized that the idea is applicable, in principle, to all varieties of experience, both perceptual and non-perceptual. Indeed, once the nature of Gestalten has been coherently established, the notion is in principle applicable to objects of all sorts and categories, irrespective of whether or not they serve as objects of experience on the part of actual conscious subjects.

The Gestalt concept can be generalized further to embrace also complex objects of experience founded on *inner* perceptions, that is to say, on one's presentations of one's own elementary feelings, acts or mental states. Moods, emotions and complex feelings are or involve Gestalt qualities on this view (where some of the followers of Mach had wanted to eliminate the notion of Gestalt as a separate category by translating all talk of structure on the side of the objects of experience into talk of *sui generis* moods or feelings – *Muskelgefühle* – with which groups of elementary sensations would be accompanied). Further, sensory data from different sensory modalities may combine together in such a way as to provide the foundation for mixed Gestalt qualities of specific sorts. Thus our perception of wetness is in fact the perception of a Gestalt quality founded on simultaneous sensations of pressure and temperature;⁴ the phenomena of complex tastes involve an 'intimate fusion' of

4. Schapp 1910 contains an extensive treatment of qualities of this sort.

pure taste sensations with sensations of temperature, touch and smell, and it seems plausible to suppose that truly subtle tastes will involve in their foundations also complex memories and other data given in inner perception.

Yet Ehrenfels allows not merely Gestalt qualities spanning different sensory modalities and Gestalt qualities built up on the basis of the data from both inner and outer perception. He allows also Gestalt qualities themselves to combine together in specific ways. Having identified spatial shapes, melodies, chords and complex tastes as first-order Gestalt qualities founded on given elementary sensations, Ehrenfels recognizes that these qualities, too, may combine together in such as way as to found new, second-order qualities which are themselves capable of founding third-order qualities, and so on, in principle without limit. The most complex products of the most sophisticated civilization, including all the complex structures of language and art, are hereby comprehended, Ehrenfels holds, within a single theory.

At the very end of his paper, Ehrenfels considers the possibility of an extension of the concept of Gestalt structure in the contrary direction, that is to say downwards from the level of the mesoscopic elements given in perception into the micro-region. 'Is it not conceivable,' he asks, 'that each tone is the fusion of a sum of still more primitive elements with the Gestalt qualities bound up therewith?' He goes on to conclude that,

no conclusive argument can be brought forward even against the possibility that we may not, penetrating ever more deeply in this manner, finally arrive at a single proto-quality, or at least at a single quality-continuum, from out of which distinct contents (colours, tones, ...) are generated by the fusion of distinct combinations with the Gestalt qualities bound up therewith, [so that] one can no longer shrink from the idea that tones and colours might be exhibited as the products of a much higher degree of complication of proto-elements as yet unknown. (Ehrenfels 1988, pp. 115f.)

Already the language of this passage suggests that Ehrenfels shared with Mach a fundamental elementarism not just in his psychology but also by way of an ontological credo. Both held that the world as a whole is ultimately atomic in structure and that a coherent account of the structure of consciousness would have to be formulated in terms of elementary acts and objects of experience. Unlike Mach, however, Ehrenfels drew a distinction between unitary objects of experience on the one hand and absolutely simple constituent units of worldly furniture on the other. As already noted, Gestalt qualities, for Ehrenfels, are not wholes embracing their fundamenta – the associated tones, colours, tastes or

smells – as parts. They are additional unitary objects, existing alongside the unitary elements with which they are associated. The Gestalt quality is not a combination of elements but ‘something new in relation to these, which exists together with [their] combination, but is distinguishable from it’. It is a special sort of structure, ‘a positive content of presentation bound up in consciousness with the existence of complexes of mutually separable (i.e. independently presentable) elementary presentations.’ (Ehrenfels 1988, p. 93)

For Mach, the only satisfactory story of the universe and of all its parts and aspects is one which is told exclusively in terms of atoms, of absolute elements which are to be counted as phenomenal or physical according to the ‘combinations’ in which they occur.⁵ All other putative entities, including not only melodies and shapes but also bodies and selves, are merely auxiliary aids introduced ‘for purposes of thought economy’. For Ehrenfels, in contrast, there are also unitary entities at successively higher levels, objects which, even though they do not belong to the ultimate worldly furniture, are yet given to consciousness in a unitary way and have to be recognized as such by any adequate theory.

Thus the doctor, in observing the temperature chart, perceives the *shape* of the chart on the basis of sensations of its constituent points and lines; the shape is a unitary object of his experience and we falsify this experience if we fail to acknowledge it as such. By calling into account in perception or in imagination the associated states and symptoms of the patient, the doctor can now go on to perceive that peculiar mixed quality which is the patient’s condition; this, too, is a unitary object of the doctor’s experience, though of a greater degree of complexity. From there he may go on, by calling into account details of the patient’s past, to imagine, say, the quality of decrepitude in the life of the patient that has given rise to a condition of this sort. Here again the quality in question is a unitary object of the doctor’s experience, associated with, but not reducible to, complexes of points, lines, symptoms, etc. Clearly, although the doctor’s awareness of the relevant quality is in each case direct and immediate, the quality itself is such as to inherit a certain complexity from the

5. Mach’s views in this respect are discussed in more detail in Mulligan and Smith 1988.

underlying data with which it is associated: like all Gestalt formations it is, in a certain sense, a case of unity in diversity.

There is a whole series of problems internal to the Ehrenfels theory that are left unresolved by the paper of 1890. Thus Ehrenfels describes the Gestalt quality as a ‘positive content of presentation’. Is such a content something individual and spatio-temporal? Or is it rather an ideal or abstract universal, multiply exemplified in the acts of different subjects directed towards the same foundational elements? What is the nature of the ‘complex’ that serves as the foundation or carrier of the Gestalt quality? Matters are made worse by the fact that Ehrenfels employs the terminology of ‘content’, which is notoriously vague in leaving open the question whether one is dealing with something internal to the act or with its transcendent object. Moreover, Ehrenfels leaves open whether the Gestalt that is the ‘content’ of a given act is existentially dependent on the act or such as to exist independently of it. Attempted resolutions of these problems are provided by Husserl, Meinong and Stumpf, and it is to their work that we must now turn.

2. Husserl, Meinong, Stumpf

Husserl developed ideas very similar to those of Ehrenfels in his *Philosophy of Arithmetic* of 1891. In chapter XI of this work, Husserl points to certain ‘figural’ or ‘quasi-qualitative moments’ whose existence is implied e.g. in our talk of a *line* of soldiers, a *heap* of apples, an *avenue* of trees, a *swarm* of birds, and so on:

In each of these examples we are referring to a sensory collection (*Menge*) of like objects, whose genus is also named. It is not only this that is brought to expression however – for that it would be sufficient to use the plural of the generic name. It is rather a certain characteristic quality (*Beschaffenheit*) of the unitary total intuition of the given collection, capable of being grasped in a single glance ... which comes to expression in the given expressions (1891, pp. 203f. Cf. also 1900/01, A633n., Eng. p. 799n.).

Thus as for Ehrenfels, so also for Husserl, we grasp the configuration and its quality *in one glance* – not by collecting together in intuition a sum or sequence of objects or relations of the sort which occurs in those higher-order articulated acts of counting and calculating which are the principal subject-matter of Husserl’s early work.

Husserlian figural moments come in many shapes and sizes, and melodies, for example, manifest complex qualities of this kind. Moreover, it may be that different figural moments can be picked out in the same underlying complex according to the direction of our attention:

Whenever a manifold of separate objects are given together in an intuition, the figural moments that belong to all the conceivable sub-manifolds compete with each other. When we set into relief a specific collection in intuitive unity, that figural moment steps forth which exerts the strongest stimulus on our grasping. But this victory is sometimes only momentary – we grasp now this, now that collection within the total intuition to which they all belong, according to whether it is this or that figural moment which predominates. (1891, p. 210)

Husserl did not, in this early work, go as far as Ehrenfels in recognizing the generality of the Gestalt concept, e.g. in comprehending mixed qualities embracing elements from different sensory modalities and from both inner and outer sense. He did however manage to get clearer than Ehrenfels as to the ontological status of Gestalt qualities or figural moments, i.e. in regard to the question whether they are most properly to be regarded as individuals or universals. Such moments, Husserl argued, constitute a family of *species*, analogous to the different species-families (of colours, tones, smells, etc.) constituted by the various sensory qualities. Each such family can be understood as amounting to a tree of sub-species of greater and lesser generality. Thus in relation to colour, for example, we have the species *red*, *blue*, *green*, etc., and below these we have sub-species such as *dark red*, *light red*, and so on, on successive levels. So also, Husserl argues, we have in relation to figural moments families of cognate species at successive levels on a tree of species and genera moving from, say, *line*, *swarm*, *star-shaped array* to e.g. *line of such and such objects configured together in such and such a manner*, and so on. At the very bottom of the tree are *lowest species* in which all variable dimensions have been made determinate. Necessary laws or principles – in many ways analogous to the principles of geometry – will then govern the species at the different levels in this hierarchy, determining their possibilities of mixture and combination and their compatibility with different species of underlying elements.

What we actually see or hear on a given occasion, however, is not the species but some particular *instance* thereof, an *individual* figural moment. This we apprehend as an instance of this or that figural species, in some cases in

virtue of the similarity (or, in the ideal case, qualitative identity) which it bears to individual figural moments apprehended on other occasions and with other associated elements.

From this it follows, however, that there are two distinct respects in which we can apply the universal/singular opposition within the theory of figural moments, so that our consideration of figural moments is subject to two distinct dimensions of variation. We have on the one hand a dimension of variability reflecting qualitative differences among the figural moments themselves, taken *in specie* (differences of position upon the tree of greater and lesser generality). And on the other hand we have also a dimension of variability reflecting differences in the species of the underlying elements (and therefore also of the associated perceptual acts).

Husserl's theory of species and of moments is further refined in the *Logical Investigations* of 1900/01, especially in the context of the theory of dependence or foundation put forward in the third Investigation.⁶ The Gestalt problem is, in effect, a problem of unity, and Husserl here argues that unity can come about in two distinct ways. Either given objects are such that – like nuts and correspondingly tooled bolts, or adjacent pieces in a jigsaw – they do not need any additional objects in order to fit together to make a unified whole. Or they are such that – like two pieces of wood which need to be nailed together – they are not in themselves sufficient to make a unity but can be unified only given the presence of some additional object. Such unifying objects may be of two sorts: on the one hand they may be independent objects like a nail or a mass of glue, capable of existing in separation from a whole of the given sort. On the other hand however, and more interestingly, they may be *dependent* objects, capable of existing only in consort with the objects they serve to unify.⁷ Husserl calls such dependent unifying objects 'moments of unity' (a term suggested by Alois Riehl), at the same time he moves beyond his own earlier position – dictated, again, by the confusing term 'content' – according to which

6. See Smith 1987 for more details of Husserl's Aristotelian theory of species and identity in the *Logical Investigations*.

7. Cf. Schaar 1991 on the relations between Husserl's ideas in this connection and parallel ideas in the work of G. F. Stout.

unification takes place always on the side of consciousness. Moments of unity, he now says, are

nothing other than those contents which were referred to by Ehrenfels as ‘Gestalt qualities’, by me as ‘figural moments’ and by Meinong as ‘founded contents’. But there is needed here the supplementary distinction between the *phenomenological* moments of unity which give unity to the psychical experiences or experience-parts, and the *objective* moments of unity, which belong to the intentional and non-psychical objects and object-parts. (1900/01 A230f., Eng. trans. p. 442.)

This distinction between phenomenological and objective moments of unity is important: it signals the fact that Husserl has cut himself free from the unclarity dictated by the terminology of ‘content’. Examples of unifying moments in the objective sense might be the copula of a sentence; the treaty of an alliance; the current flowing through a computer (without this flow, the various pieces of the computer would be just so many separate constituent bits).

But we may consider also moments of unity which bridge the ‘phenomenological’ and ‘objective’ spheres. Consider, for example, the anger underlying a complex facial gesture (it is this which gives unity to what would otherwise be a heap of simultaneous muscular contractions). Or consider the intended or entertained end or purpose underlying some chain of actions on the part of one or several persons (actions which would, in the absence of such an end, resolve into just so many separate pieces of behaviour). Our mental acts themselves, for example our acts of perception, may also be regarded as moments of unity, serving to constitute a transitory but nevertheless real unity between a subject and a perceptual object.⁸ Clearly, when John is thinking, abstractly (or abstractedly), about, say, elephants, then there is no real unity constituted by him and any members of the elephant population. But when, in contrast, John sees some *specific* elephant by which he is confronted, then we may say that he is unified with the object of his act – he and the elephant do not simply co-exist, but are in fact related together in a single unified whole.

A somewhat different step in the direction of a coherent general conception of the ontological status of Gestalten was made by Alexius Meinong in a series of works written in the 1890s, in part in response to Ehrenfels’ paper of

8. A conception of perceptual acts along these lines is defended in Smith 1984. See also Mulligan and Smith 1986.

1890. Meinong embraced, first of all, a conception of the Gestalt as *above* the founding elements: in his 1891 he talks of Gestalten as ‘founded’ and ‘founding’ contents, and of a difference of level between the two.

He then moves one stage further, in part under the influence of Twardowski, from talk of ‘founded contents’ to talk of ‘objects of higher order’ (see especially his paper of 1899). The examples which played the most important role in motivating Meinong’s discussion here were the different sorts of relations, above all relations of comparison, identity, difference, similarity, and so on. We cannot, Meinong argued, see the ‘difference’ or the ‘similarity’ between two colours in the same sense in which we can see the colours themselves. Similarly, we cannot see higher-order objects such as geometrical shapes, velocities, distances, but most rather grasp them in higher-order intellectual acts. This reflects a dichotomy running through the whole of Meinong’s thinking, between entities which *exist*, and entities, which *subsist*. The experience of higher-order objects, including facts or states of affairs, is thus a hybrid experience, relating to both existents and subsistents simultaneously.

In the paper of 1899 Meinong extends the idea of objects of higher order in the direction of an all-embracing stratified ontology. For Meinong, however, as also for Ehrenfels, it remains the case that the world of experience is divided into two categorially different sorts of entity, each correlated with its own peculiar sort of mental act. We might compare this dichotomy with the classical division between matter and form. The *matter* of experience is conceived as being constituted by the data given in supposedly simple sensory acts, all of which are discrete and independent, i.e. are such that each can exist in principle in isolation from all others. The *form* of experience is conceived as being constituted by special categorial objects given in non-sensory intellectual acts.

9. It is worth noting in passing that the world of experience thus conceived has much in common with the world of Brentano’s mature ontology. Brentano, as we saw, has no room for physical things in the standardly accepted sense. He sees the world rather as a kind of sensory surface, capable of being partitioned into constituent sub-surfaces more or less *ad indefinitum*. To some of the sub-surfaces thereby generated a certain ‘thing-character’ may then be subjectively imputed. A Gestalt-theoretical view of substance along these lines was developed also by the Meinongian philosopher J. K. Kreibitz in his 1909.

Only with the Berlin school will this two-storey ontology be seriously questioned.

Finally, we need to mention the ideas on the philosophy of Gestalt of Carl Stumpf, the teacher of Edmund Husserl.¹⁰ The idea of phenomenal fusion, central to the work of Stumpf, we have met already. Stumpf's account of Gestalt phenomena is characterized by an anti-reductivist, descriptive attitude, which represents an attempt to produce what we might call a natural philosophy of the entire gamut of complex experiences, including not only the phenomena of fusion and purely aggregative phenomena or '*Und-Verbindungen*' but also a range of different sorts of Gestalt phenomena considered as lying between these two extremes.¹¹

A complex, for Stumpf, is a whole of (e.g.) sense contents. A Gestalt is a special kind of complex, in which there obtains a network of relations between the contents involved which is such as to satisfy certain special conditions (1939/40, p. 229). The network must be, first of all, unitary and it must be experienced as such: when we hear a chord or a melody then we hear a relational whole and not e.g. a succession of dyadic relations. Gestalten are moreover 'transposable', so that the network of relations must be such that it can, under certain conditions, be transferred from one complex of relations to another, different complex. But now, Stumpf argues, this implies that there is something *cognitive* in our awareness of that specific structure which is a Gestalt, in the sense that to grasp a Gestalt is to grasp not merely a complex individual as such but also that abstract net of relations which is its essence (*op. cit.*, p. 242).

10. That Husserl was heavily influenced by Stumpf is seen in the dedication of the *Logical Investigations*. The influence manifested itself above all in the third *Logical Investigation*, where Husserl's treatment of dependent parts is clearly inspired by Stumpf's work in his 1873 on partial contents. On the influence of Brentano on Stumpf see McAlister (ed.) 1976, pp. 42f.

11. Our exposition here is taken from Stumpf's two-volume *Theory of Cognition* of 1939/40, which still manifests a continuity with his earlier thinking. Note that the Stumpfian conception of Gestalt structure is shared also by Karl Bühler in his writings on Gestalt (see esp. his 1913), as also for example by Brunswik 1929.

Gestalten in this sense can never be perceived of themselves but always only in and of some given *formed material*. More precisely, a Gestalt, in Stumpf's terminology, always presupposes some articulated whole in which there are distinct parts which are capable of being grasped as such. A unitary fusion, an amorphous datum lacking all articulation or phenomenally recognizable internal boundaries, is not capable of serving as foundation for a Gestalt relational network as Stumpf conceives it. Thus a tone or phoneme or timbre may involve physical or physiological complexity, but it is phenomenally (psychologically) non-articulated, and therefore has no Gestalt. This implies a distinction between 'whole-properties' such as 'smooth', 'rough', 'cloudy', 'trumpety', 'percussive' etc., which can apply to wholes in general, and 'Gestalt-properties', which can apply only to articulated wholes.¹²

Stumpf also accepts a dichotomy between Gestalten and founding elements. Hence he cannot go along with the later Berlin Gestalt psychologists in conceiving sensations reductionistically, as mere abstractions from Gestalten given in experience. This is first of all for ontological reasons: the Stumpfian Gestalt presupposes an articulation into parts between which there may then exist relations of an appropriate sort. But it is also for reasons of phenomenology: we do not hear the melody or see the figure in the same way that we hear an individual tone or see a coloured fleck, for in the latter there are no differentiations at work and no intellectual awareness of articulation (*op. cit.*, pp. 246f.)

Stumpf does, however, admit that, as a result of inadequacies or other special conditions on the side of the subject, the awareness of articulation demanded by his theory need not in fact be realized in every case. Thus he is prepared to accept that we often see Gestalten without recognizing parts, that sometimes it takes effort to delineate figures and to discriminate constituents. He is prepared to accept also that a musical tone sounds different when isolated from the way it sounds when occurring in a specific position within the context of a melody, e.g. as the dominant or leading note. But he insists that the fact that

12. This restrictive notion of Gestalt proves to be of some importance in the treatment of aesthetic phenomena, since it seems that value, in the aesthetic field, is always such as to involve just that articulate complexity which is here at issue. See Smith (ed.) 1988, pp. 61ff.

a sensory element changes from one context to the next cannot at all count against the thesis that such elements exist, that a melody consists of tones, a landscape of colour-patches, and so on. The effect of much music consists precisely in the fact that the *same* tone in a different context can suddenly gain a quite new significance. Then, however, it is the *role* or *function* of the tone in the given context that is changed, not the tone itself (and from Stumpf's point of view it is characteristic of the later Berlin school that they were tempted to run these two together).

A Gestalt is a whole of relations, but in certain circumstances only part of this whole may be perceived – and this part may be a Gestalt in its own right. Indeed it is only in certain simple cases, for example simple visual patterns, that the entire Gestalt can be perceived in one intuitive glance. In more complicated cases this is not possible, and the greater the manifold of relations between the parts of a given field the less is it possible to grasp all relations simultaneously. We can grasp the Gestalt only if we are somehow able, by a cumulative process involving the operations of memory, to unify everything in one *intellectual* glance, and a discursive process of this sort is indispensable if we are to grasp a melody or any other Gestalt involving any sort of temporal succession.

As one would expect from a philosopher-psychologist who was responsible, with Helmholtz, for establishing the scientific credentials of the nascent discipline of the psychology of music, it is to the case of auditory Gestalten that the Stumpfian natural philosophy of Gestalten is applied in greatest detail. Stumpf considers, in particular, the conditions which must be satisfied if a sequence of tones is to possess that specific sort of Gestalt which we call a melody. Such a sequence must, first of all, have a *sense* for the hearer, a notion which Stumpf explicates by developing a comparison between that system which is a given tonality and analogous systems of a linguistic sort, for example in the sphere of phonology. It must, secondly, have a more or less definite rhythm (and this is for certain melodies more characteristic than the mere interval-sequence). It must be a relatively self-contained whole or formation, not part of any continuation. And it must be non-decomposable: its parts must be dependent entities, not themselves capable of existing as musical categoremata in their own right. A melody is then 'an intelligible, discrete-successive, non-decomposable auditory Gestalt having a determinate rhythmic structure and capable of existing on its own' (p. 270). 'Intelligibility' here

involves not only surveyability of rhythm, but also recognition of dominant, tonic, leading note etc., in a process parallel to the recognition of the different parts of speech in a spoken sentence. This in turn presupposes the interiorization of the relevant tonal system, for hearing a melody is hearing with the contribution of intellectual functions. Who, Stumpf asks, would say that someone had *heard* a sentence who did not speak the language in which it was expressed and therefore grasped only a sequence of sounds? (p. 272)

Stumpf distinguishes also however between *understanding* or apprehending a melody and the somewhat different processes which are involved in its aesthetic *enjoyment* (as understanding a sentence is somewhat different from the enjoyment of a poem). One can apprehend the Gestalt of a melody only when one has heard the entire sequence of tones in such a way that a total impression has been gained through a discursive process. But the effect of the melody on our feelings does not begin only after it has been completed: we follow the melody in its development from the very beginning, accompany this development with expectations, surprises, tensions, releases, for which the foundation is provided by repetition, similarity of strophes, *crescendi* and *diminuendi* etc., and these experiences then serve as the foundation for movements of feeling whose colouring is further determined through the purely sensual feeling-sensations (*Gefühlsempfindungen*) by which they are accompanied. ‘How the past hereby works together with the present, how every new tone is co-determined in its character by all its predecessors, this is something the psychologists have to be left to determine, if they are capable of this at all.’ (p. 273)

3. *The Graz Production Theory*

We have so far left open the question of the genesis of Gestalt qualities. Is the Gestalt quality such as to appear spontaneously as an object of experience when once an appropriate complex of elements is present, as Ehrenfels (and Mach) believed?¹³ Or is the appearance of the Gestalt quality in perception the result of special intellectual activity, as if the quality would have to be *produced* by the perceiving subject? It was above all the psychologist followers of Meinong who took this second line, identifying our experiences of higher-order Gestalt formations as *products* of cognitive or intellectual processing. They thereby gave birth to what has been called the ‘production theory’ of Gestalt perception, to which we must now turn.

In insisting that Gestalten owe their existence as objects of experience exclusively to a specific activity of ‘production’ on the part of experiencing subjects, the members of the Graz school of psychology drew on Meinong’s earlier division of objects of experience into ‘existent’, and ‘subsistent’ objects, arguing that only the former can be experienced directly in sensation. If we have presentations of the latter, which are outside space and time, then the source of these presentations cannot be an affection of the senses; hence there must exist some other, non-sensory psychic activity which makes such presentations possible: this is precisely the activity of production.

It is in the work of the Austro-Italian psychologist Vittorio Benussi (1878–1927) that the production theory receives its most detailed exposition and its most elaborate experimental support, even though Benussi himself, in his later writings, saw reason to distance himself from the idea and terminology of production.¹⁴ For Ehrenfels human ingenuity can invent ever new and more complicated types of Gestalt qualities by finding new ways of combining together elements and complexes of elements on successive levels. When once the elements are combined together, however, when once they are juxtaposed, whether spatially or temporally, then the corresponding Gestalt quality simply

13. The views of Ehrenfels and Mach on this matter are considered in detail in Mulligan and Smith 1988.

14. See Stucchi 1988.

exists, in entirely determinate fashion, and in such a way that the relevant sensory presentations cannot occur together in consciousness without there occurring also a presentation of the associated Gestalt. For Benussi, in contrast, Gestalt presentations are brought about indirectly on the basis of stimulus-presentations; they are therefore characterized by a certain *ambiguity* in relation to the stimulus, are underdetermined by the lower-level experiences on which they are founded:

the totality of that which comes to be apprehended internally through the mediation of the eye, i.e. through a certain organ of sense ... does not unambiguously determine those phenomena, objects, appearances, or whatever one wants to call them, which are grasped, presented or taken hold of with and in part through the awakening of all these impressions. (1914, p. 399)

Thus consider for example our experience of a succession of tones. It seems that, through a little intellectual effort, we can hear the relevant sequence as divided into phrasal clusters now in this way, now in that. Or consider our experience of ambiguous patterns such as the Necker cube, Rubin's vase/faces figure, the duck-rabbit, and so on. The same founding elements here give rise to different Gestalt qualities at different times, sometimes in such a way that the qualitative experiences produced alternate in a manner over which the subject has no control. This 'Gestalt-switch' phenomenon is perhaps the one concern most generally associated with the Gestalt tradition, though it is less commonly recognized that it was Benussi who was the first to subject it to detailed treatment, both theoretically and experimentally (and indeed that the notion of Gestalt ambiguity is at the very centre of the Graz production theory).

For Benussi, it was not the 'ideal' nature of Gestalt objects which was of principal concern, but much rather their ambiguity – a characteristic which is lacking, he held, in purely sensory phenomena. It was the fact that on the basis of the same stimulus conditions different presentations of Gestalt qualities can be won which led to the conclusion that there must exist a special kind of non-sensory mental process, an 'extra brain level', which could explain the sometimes complex and subtle resolutions of Gestalt ambiguity which occur from case to case.

Experience has its roots in sensory presentations which are 'without remainder bound to the stimulus'.¹⁵ When, according to Benussi, an act of

15. 1911, p. 391.

production is carried out on the basis of sensory presentations, the contents of the latter are somehow collected together or ordered, are ‘brought in real relation to one another’¹⁶ in such a way as to give rise to the experience of a new ‘extra-sensory’ object, the object of a higher level of Gestalt presentation.

This new position was given support by the fact that – as the Meinongians were able to establish in a number of detailed experiments – our capacities to grasp Gestalten may differ over time, the facility to perform acts of production may be affected by experience and by training. Sensory experiences, too, may suffer from a characteristic

sensory inadequacy of their own, as is illustrated for example by the case of colour-blindness. Sensory experiences may, in other words, suffer a departure from the normal, law-governed dependence relations between stimulus and sensory presentation, and such sensory inadequacy may lead to illusions in virtue of the fact that we will tend, on any given occasion, to make judgments on the basis of the assumption that our current sensations conform to law. Sensory inadequacy is however (or so Benussi argues) involuntary, objectively conditioned, and such that it cannot be eliminated via education or experience – all features in which it differs from the inadequacy involved in our presentation of Gestalten. The latter can be affected, e.g., by the exercise of attention; it depends on *inner* conditions, and can be mitigated through practice. Further, Gestalt presentation on the basis of a given structure may sometimes not take place at all.¹⁷ The subject can deliberately *suppress* the process of production, so that, as Benussi’s colleague Witasek especially emphasized, processes of production are *subject to the will*.

Benussi holds that quite definite sorts of inadequate presentation of Gestalt qualities can occur even where the founding elements are brought to presentation in a way that is perfectly adequate. The inadequacy of Gestalt presentations is related in every case to different sorts of anomaly in the production process. That is to say, variations in our experience of Gestalten are conceived purely as a result of our intellectual activities. Only gradually, as we shall see, was it recognized that the variations in question may be accounted for,

16. 1904, p. 394; 1914, p. 407.

17. Cf. Benussi 1904, pp. 307f., 410.

in whole or in part, in terms of the state of the perceiving organism and in terms of other conditions of an environmental sort.

Benussi himself gradually adopted a different and more subtle view of complex perception, a view which is comparable in some ways to the position of the later Husserl. According to this later view, presentational experiences can no longer be divided sharply into sensory and non-sensory. Rather, we have a spectrum which extends from cases of perception in which the influence of non-sensory factors ('central conditions') is very strong, to cases of high influence of 'peripheral conditions' in which such influence is negligible. In investigating these phenomena Benussi established a tradition of experimental psychology in Italy which, through the work of Musatti, Metelli, Kanizsa, Bozzi and others, is still alive today, producing valuable results especially in the investigation of perceived plurality, of transparency and of subjective contours.¹⁸

4. *The Berlin School*

In a series of classic experiments on phenomenal motion carried out in 1912, Wertheimer discovered that when subjects – his subjects in the present case were a certain Dr Köhler and Dr Koffka – are exposed to two alternately flashing lights a short distance apart, then under certain conditions they have an experience of movement back and forth from the one to the other. That is to say, they *see* a movement: the movement is an object of direct visual experience, rather than the spurious creature of some special, purely intellectual act of production. In certain determinate circumstances one can experience *pure* phenomenal movement, that is movement without objects moved, what Wertheimer called the 'phi-phenomenon'.

The phi-phenomenon is clearly and repeatedly observable. It is no less manifest than for example a colour or shape. Yet clearly, what is visually

18. See especially the work on vision carried out by Gaetano Kanizsa and collected in his 1979. This represents a refined and modernized variant of the old Graz two-storey model, though from a perspective dictated both by influences stemming from the Berlin school and also by opposition to those present-day cognitivist views on perception which assimilate seeing to judging.

experienced is not here a matter of any discrete and independent sensory data: what one perceives is, as Wertheimer says, a certain *sui generis* dynamic character of 'across'.

Wertheimer's own initial understanding of the phi-phenomenon was neurological: phi-phenomena are to be explained in terms of certain functional connections or integrations at the cortical level, functional connections held to be sufficient to provide an explanation in and of themselves, without any appeal to an 'extra brain level' of intellectual processing as on a Graz-type production theory. This idea of cerebral integration signifies a final break with the elementaristic sensualism which had still dominated the work of Mach, Ehrenfels, Meinong, Benussi and their followers, as also of Brentano. Wertheimer's experiments make it clear that it is not the case that to every part of a perceived structure there corresponds one or more sensory data which could in principle be experienced in isolation. What we directly and immediately perceive are, rather, complex Gestalten, only some of whose parts bear a certain analogy to the putative discrete and independent data of sense which had played such a central role in the earlier theories.

Wertheimer does not express this theory in any systematic way in his paper on motion of 1912. He merely 'sketches a hypothesis' (' 21). Nor does he exploit his theory as a starting point from which to criticize in detail other work on phenomenal motion in such a way as to set into relief the peculiarities of the new approach. Rather, it is in a paper by Koffka of 1915, a paper which has been described as 'the birth piece of Gestalt theory as a psychological system' (Ash 1982, p. 338), that this theoretical and critical work is first laid bare. The paper in question is an extensive critique of the views on phenomenal motion built up on the basis of the Graz production theory, particularly as presented in the work of Benussi, together with the presentation of the new, alternative theory put forward in outline by Wertheimer.

Benussi, as we have seen, holds that Gestalt perception involves sense-activity plus a special intellectual operation. Different Gestalten can be founded on the basis of the same inferiora, the latter being the same both as stimulus and as conscious content.¹⁹ But in order to counter the objection that the operations

19. Benussi 1914, pp. 399f. See however 1904, p. 394 and also Ameseder 1904, pp. 495, 506.

of production are not themselves manifested in conscious experience, such operations are held by Benussi to occur *automatically* with the experience in sensation of the underlying foundations.²⁰ To this extent the very existence of these operations eludes introspective verification and so, Koffka argues, they threaten to become theoretically idle.

Koffka's principal challenge however relates to the putative 'purely sensory experiences' to which appeal is made in Benussi's theory. Koffka argues that there are no such pure sense experiences. Thus for example it is impossible merely to see individual points in an array of colour in such a way that the particular order or configuration of the points would not be included in the seeing. From this, however, it follows that the very idea of Gestalt ambiguity, the idea that there can be a multiplicity of Gestalten on the basis of constant sensory data, must also be rejected. For what could be the evidence that sensory data is constant, given that the sensory material is in every case present only within and as affected by the surrounding total Gestalt? What could be the evidence of 'constant' material of sensation when the supervenient Gestalt is itself allowed to change? Koffka concludes that it is a mere assumption of constancy – of the constancy hypothesis – on Benussi's part which justifies the given claim.²¹ Only if the process of Gestalt formation were suppressed could one observe whether the underlying material stays constant – but then no Gestalt would have been formed.

Koffka argues further that ambiguity cannot be a criterion of Gestalt perception, as Benussi had argued. For even simple sensory data, e.g. a simple patch of redness, can be more or less dark or light, more or less warm or cold, more or less penetrating, more or less tinged with yellow or tinged with blue, and so on, in the sense that the same observer might see it under the same external conditions now in this way, now in that.²² These are fine differences

20. Benussi 1914, p. 403.

21. Koffka 1915, pp. 24ff. The constancy hypothesis consists in the thesis that what is given in sensation is determined exclusively by the relevant objective conditions and that, from occasion to occasion, qualitatively similar objective conditions give rise to qualitatively similar sensations.

22. *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

compared to the differences involved in Gestalt perception, but this shows only that – as Benussi himself was later to accept – the distinction between univocity and ambiguity is a gradual one. It does not mark any categorical difference between different species of experiential object.

Most important from our present point of view, however, is Koffka's analysis of the relation between stimulus and observer. Benussi, and the entire Ehrenfels-Meinong tradition, had seen stimuli as something objective, an external given of psychological theory. Koffka, however, insists that that characteristic of a real object or physical process which consists in its being a stimulus is not any absolute property of the object or process itself, but rests always on its relation to the perceiver. More precisely, it rests on a specific state of readiness or *mental set* or *Einstellung* on the latter's part.²³ But if a real object is a stimulus only in relation to an organism and some specific mental set, then it may turn out that it can serve either as sensory stimulus or as Gestalt stimulus from case to case.

For Benussi, the act of production and the experienced Gestalt stand in a relation of mutual dependence. The act of production is unilaterally dependent on the sensory presentations which underlie it, as the experienced Gestalt is itself unilaterally dependent on the sensory data which these presentations are presentations of, presentations and data themselves being such as to stand to each other in a relation of two-sided dependence: neither can exist without the other.²⁴

In Koffka, on the other hand, there is no additional entity alongside the sensory data to which appeal would be made in order to account for the fact that the relevant sensory presentations contribute to the experience of a structured phenomenon. For Koffka holds that the manifold of sensory data themselves, as these are reticulated together in the given context, is itself the Gestalt. Moreover, the reticulation of these data reflects – and is a consequence of – an (isomorphic?) interdependence among the corresponding sensory presentations on the side of the subject. In place of Benussi's extra brain level – the process of production – the Gestalt experience is here constituted by a short-circuiting, a

23. *Op. cit.*, pp. 33f.

24. Cf. the diagram and further elucidation in Smith (ed.) 1988, p. 40.

mutual integration, on the primary level of sensory experience, with a parallel integration on the side of the successively given data.

The interdependence of the successive presentations is, like these presentations themselves, dependent moreover on the state of the organism in question. For the precise nature of the integration that occurs in any given case will be dependent on the relevant mental set. This is itself not a bloodless abstractum but a complex of physiologically grounded states exhibiting dimensions of variation of its own. Such states will reflect materially determinate knowledge and habits of mind acquired through time by the organism in question, which may be further dependent on social factors, institutions, authorities, language, and so on.

When dealing with the Wertheimer-Koffka position we should conceive ‘sensory presentations’ or ‘sensory data’ always – in the spirit of modern-day connectionism²⁵ – in relation to activity at the cortical and peripheral ends of sensory nerves. The various mutually dependent factors are here only abstractly distinguishable, so that we ought most properly to speak of one single physiological-perceptual total process (of holism all the way down). Certainly this process manifests contours and dividing lines within itself; but it can be abstractly delineated into part-processes in a number of different ways. Thus we might take the state of the organism together with the organism itself as constituting one single whole, intervening between perceived data and acts of perception. We could then interpret Koffka’s view as one according to which the organism is a mediator between perceptual process – itself an inextricable fusion of sensory and intellectual part-processes – and perceived Gestalt, in such a way that perception, organism, and percept would be *gestaltet* together into a single (though temporary) unity.

But what is the perceived Gestalt on a theory such as this? It is, first of all, an integral whole which includes among its parts the putative sensory data experienced ‘integrally’ together. But this perceived Gestalt can be conceived also as including certain parts, surfaces or moments of the relevant *object*. Hence the latter need not be confined to the status of an optional extra beyond

25. See for example the material collected in Horgan and Tienson (eds.) 1991. On the intriguing anticipation of connectionist ideas in Hayek 1952, in part under the influence of Mach and Gestalt psychology, see my 1994.

the domain of what can be experienced, as on the Brentano–Meinong–Benussi approach. Koffka, like Wertheimer, is quite clear that perception is a matter of relations to reality. The Gestalt concept belongs not to the abstract level of idealities, as on the Graz theory, but is rather a concept which, like causality, is basic to the sciences of the real:

To apply the category of cause and effect means to find out which parts of nature stand in this relation. Similarly, to apply the gestalt category means to find out which parts of nature belong as parts to functional wholes, to discover their position in these wholes, their degree of relative independence, and the articulation of larger wholes into sub-wholes. (Koffka 1935, p. 22)

This does not, however, imply a Spinozism à la Mach.²⁶ Koffka does *not* claim that the universe forms a single ‘organic whole’. For ‘just as the category of causality does not mean that any event is causally connected with any other, so the gestalt category does not mean that any two states or events belong together in one big gestalt.’ (Koffka, *loc. cit.*)

There are, then, separate, distinguishable Gestalten *in reality*. It had been an implication of the Graz view of production that everything that is complex in reality would be a matter of merely summative wholes or ‘*Und-Verbindungen*’. Koffka rejects this view resoundingly. (1915, p. 35) He himself is primarily interested in Gestalt processes and structures in the physiological domain; indeed he argues that intellectual acts of production would themselves have to be processes of this sort. He recognizes, however, that there are Gestalt processes also in the realm of human action, above all in motor actions, speaking, writing, singing, sketching. These are not step-wise sums of behavioural elements, but unified Gestalt processes whose structures can be adequately understood only as such.²⁷ The thesis that there are real Gestalten

26. See § 8 of Mulligan and Smith 1988.

27. *Op. cit.*, p. 37. Ehrenfels, too, recognized the Gestalt character of human actions. Actions are, for example, transposable: Fritz can *chase the cat* either by running *uphill*, or by running *downhill*. The most philosophically sophisticated treatment of the Gestalt character of actions is however to be found in the writings of the French phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty. See especially his 1942, Ch. II and 1945, Part One, Ch. 3.

was later refined and generalized in Köhler's work of 1920 on physical Gestalten, which defends in detail the view that there are Gestalten (soap-bubble-patterns, patterns of magnetic or electric charge, etc.) even in the world of inanimate nature.

In summary we can say that the content of a perceptual presentation, for Koffka, is a function of various factors, including both objective (stimulus-like) and subjective (set- or *Einstellung*-like) factors. And 'ambiguity' for Koffka, signifies merely: dependence on many rather than on a few such factors.

It has sometimes been assumed that Koffka simply got the better of Benussi, and that his review constituted the nail in the coffin of the Graz theory. This is first of all to belie the continuing influence of Grazist ideas in the work of Fritz Heider, Albert Michotte, Karl Bühler, J. J. Gibson and others, as well as in the work of Italian psychologists such as Kanizsa and Bozzi. Secondly however there are a number of ways in which Benussi might still reply to Koffka's challenge. Thus for example Koffka criticizes Benussi's theory by arguing that the idea of acts of production is a spurious one: it is not open to us simply to subtract what is yielded by the senses from what is yielded in total Gestalt perception and then baptize the not introspectively available remainder as a special, non-sensory act. Yet Benussi can point out that the acts to which he himself appeals are at least no more mystical than the hidden states of Koffka's theory. Benussi himself, it is true, cannot *exhibit* an act of production, since he is concerned to stress that there is no phenomenological difference between Gestalt presentations and sensory presentations (1914, p. 403): production is in effect a purely functional notion. This is not the only possible approach however. Thus acts of production involve, for example, collection, articulation, completion, comparison, and phenomena of this kind have been investigated in detail by Husserl, especially in his sixth Logical Investigation, which deals with higher-order intellectual operations of the given sorts.

Further, as can be seen in the work of Kanizsa, the opposition between perceptual and intellectual operations which lies at the heart of Benussi's theory can still yield interesting and fruitful empirical results, and we should be no more willing to accept that running together of these two types of operation (in favour of perception) which is favoured by the Berlin theory than to accept the opposite running together – the assimilation of perception to cognition – which

is favoured by empiricists and also by some modern-day proponents of a computational 'cognitive science'.

Wertheimer, Köhler, Koffka and Lewin, the four principal members of the Berlin school, all studied with Stumpf in Berlin, and all but Wertheimer received their doctorates for experimental work done under his direction. It has sometimes been suggested that Stumpf had a very minor part in the development of the Berlin Gestalt theory. As Ash makes clear however, Stumpf did not merely play an important institutional role in fostering the careers of his various Gestaltist students (thereby exerting a not always discrete influence on the nature and content of their work); he also provided a thorough initiation into psychological methods and a hard training which were meted out to his students always with an explicit philosophical intent, Stumpf seeking always to link experimental work to 'theoretical exercises in philosophy'. (Cf. Ash 1982, p. 47)

This attitude to experiment had been derived by Stumpf from his teacher Brentano and especially from the latter's insistence on the secondary status of genetic psychology in relation to the fundamental discipline of descriptive psychology. Stumpf however went much further than Brentano in the direction of Gestalt theory. Thus already in 1873 Stumpf had been ready to conceive individual mental acts as mere abstractions from total conscious processes, and he had from the very beginning laid great emphasis on the phenomena of fusion (insisting, for example, that simultaneous tone sensations are never mere sums, but always wholes manifesting only gradual phenomenal differences). Further, he saw the fusion that exists in the auditory sphere not as the result of any deliberate act of unifying together but rather as an immanent structural relation on the side of the tones themselves.

All of these aspects of his work cannot but have been conducive to the development of a theoretical integrationism on the part of his students. Stumpf did not, however, greet all the integrationist ideas of his students with equal enthusiasm. He insisted that his Gestaltist students tended to ignore the discursive, cognitive aspects of Gestalt perception and to concentrate too much on those cases where Gestalt perception occurs spontaneously and 'in one glance'. (1939/40, p. 237) Further, he objected to their idea that Gestalten can have effects on their parts. It is a mistake in ontology to suppose that the whole can exert a causal influence upon its parts, Stumpf insisted, and the parts can

just as little effect the whole: it is always only parts which effect parts. (*Op. cit.*, pp. 245f.)

It is above all Wertheimer who, of all the members of the Berlin school, had the most philosophically interesting ideas. Wertheimer also constitutes an important link between Austrian philosophy and German psychology, having grown up in Prague, where he attended the lectures of Ehrenfels and also of the Brentanians Marty and Emil Arleth. There were other influences on Wertheimer's early thinking, and some of these may have played a role in his development of the Gestalt idea. Prague, as is well known, has a distinguished tradition of Jewish scholarship and there is a suggestion that Wertheimer himself is descended from a line of Talmudists, including among them the Talmudic scholar Rabbi Samson R. Wertheimer (1651–1724), who was factor in the Austrian Imperial court.²⁸ Part and parcel of Wertheimer's non-orthodox Jewish background in Prague was his youthful enthusiasm for Spinoza, and it seems likely that Spinoza had an influence on Wertheimer's ideas on non-additive wholes and on his objections to 'psychological theories in which will and feeling were opposed to thinking, and in which the mind was a separate entity and was opposed to the body'.²⁹

The unity of mind and body in Wertheimer's thinking is well illustrated by the following passage from Fritz Heider's autobiography, in which Heider comments on a seminar of Wertheimer's dealing with expression, another notion central to Spinoza, in which Wertheimer defends the view that each person has a certain quality, called his *radix*, which will express itself in different ways: in his physiognomy, in his handwriting; in the way he dresses, moves about, talks, and acts; and also in the way he thinks'. (Heider 1984, pp. 46f.) Wertheimer developed in this connection what he called a 'physiognomic game': 'he would play a melody, and the rest of us would try to guess which of the group his melody portrayed'. (*Op. cit.*, p. 89) The thoroughness of Wertheimer's holistic contextualism is then revealed in the fact that, in

28. See Luchins and Luchins 1970, vol. III, p. 271, and the (unpublished) note 2 to Luchins 1982.

29. Cf. the unpublished n. 10 to Luchins 1982; see also (and more reliably) Ash 1982, p. 247.

extemporizing the music which would represent the character ('radix') of a particular person, he would take into account not merely the physiognomy and other qualities of the person in question, but also the contrastive relations in which he stood to other persons in the room. Thus the musical representation of some averagely quiet and withdrawn character which would enable one to pick him out in, say, a room full of extroverts, will be quite different from that representation which would be needed were he surrounded by people still more withdrawn than himself.

The German University in Prague could look back on a rich psychological tradition, beginning with the phenomenological work on colour vision of Purkinje and Hering and extending through Stumpf himself (who was professor in Prague from 1879 to 1884, before moving to Halle where he came into contact with Husserl).³⁰ Mach also belonged to this tradition, having been professor of experimental physics in Prague for 27 years to 1895. It included Ehrenfels and the orthodox Brentanians Marty, Arleth and Oskar Kraus, together also with Kafka's friends Hugo Bergmann and Emil Utitz.³¹ And Einstein, too, held a chair in Prague for a time, becoming friendly with Hugo Bergmann³² and later with Wertheimer himself, their interactions being manifested above all in Wertheimer's book *Productive Thinking*.

Wertheimer was caught up to a greater or lesser extent in all of these currents. There is evidence in his papers that he became interested also in the writings of Husserl, particularly of the latter's third Logical Investigation on the theory of part, whole and dependence,³³ and he maintained throughout his life a characteristically Husserlian interest in the realist foundations of logic and in the

30. Boring 1929 (ch. 17 of 2nd ed.) sees the moment of unity of this tradition as lying in the fact that its members embraced one or other form of nativism, as contrasted with the empiricism of Wundt and his followers. Contrast, however, Pastore 1974.

31. See my 1981 on Kafka, Marty and Ehrenfels. Cf. also Brod and Weltsch 1913. To the wider intellectual community in Prague there belonged also the linguists Trubetzkoy, Mathesius, Jakobson, and others. See Holenstein 1975.

32. See Bergmann 1974, esp. pp. 388ff.

33. See Ash 1982, pp. 165, 225.

relations between logical laws and the flux of actual mental events involved in thinking.³⁴

5. *On the Parsing of Ontological Structure*

From the Austrian perspective, the Gestalt is a special *quality* of underlying elements; from the Berlin perspective it is a whole which includes these elements as only abstractly distinguishable parts. The apparent conflict between these two views must find some sort of resolution however. For the holism of the Berlin school must find a way to do justice to the evident fact that melodies and similar phenomena are experienced as being constituted out of separate tones. And similarly the proponents of the Graz production theory must find ways to do justice to the fact that tones and similar phenomena are experienced differently according to the contexts in which they appear. In a paper published in German in 1966 entitled “The Problem of Properties in the Gestalt Theory of Perception” the German psychologist Edwin Rausch set out to establish precisely the needed sort of compromise between the Graz and Berlin theories, on the basis of a subtle reconsideration of the ideas put forward by Ehrenfels in his essay of 1890, in a way which amounts to a sort of generalization on the plane of ontology of the idea of Gestalt ambiguity discussed above.³⁵

Like Stumpf, Rausch takes ‘complex’ as a determinable concept with ‘Gestalt’ as one of its determinates: a Gestalt is, as always on the Berlin theory, *a special kind of whole*. Ehrenfels’ idea of a Gestalt quality is not simply abandoned hereby however. For a complex, in order to be a Gestalt, must have certain special characteristics; that is, it must possess precisely certain ‘Gestalt qualities’ – which now, however, are not supernumerary entities, as on the


34. Wertheimer was influenced also by the Würzburg school and in fact took his doctorate with Külpe in 1905. See Ash 1982, pp. 250ff., who also provides details of the later careers of Wertheimer, Köhler and Koffka in universities outside Berlin, before their successive emigration to the United States.

35. All references in this section are to Rausch’s paper of 1966, unless otherwise stated. It must be stressed that Rausch there limits his remarks to phenomenally given properties.

Ehrenfels view, existing alongside or above the separable *fundamenta*. Gestalt qualities are rather conceived by Rausch as being in a certain sense intrinsic to the Gestalt which has them. Moreover, such Gestalt qualities are conceived as being merely one special type of whole- or complex-quality. Other complex-qualities might be, for example, the quality of being a one-dimensional continuum, the quality of being a purely summative whole, or some other formally or materially specific quality between these two extremes.³⁶ We shall indeed talk in what follows not of complex-qualities but rather of (non-distributive) properties of wholes in general (of properties which are such that they hold only of wholes *as wholes*: they do not distribute to the several parts, as does, say, the property of being extended, or of being made of inorganic material).

Armed with this general view of Gestalt qualities as special kinds of whole-properties and of Gestalten as special kinds of wholes, we can begin to see that Ehrenfels' own original theory already contains within itself the material for this generalization along Rauschian lines. For consider a simple Gestalt structure consisting of, say, three elements e_1 , e_2 , e_3 and some quality g . This we can represent as follows:


[A]



36. Rausch 1937 shows that there are more than one thousand formally different types of summative and non-summative wholes, even when only relatively simple formal criteria of 'summativity' are taken into account. See Smith and Mulligan 1982, '6.

We can also, as Ehrenfels (and Stumpf and Husserl) acknowledged, conceive the property g as a three-term *relation* ('unifying moment') holding *between* the given elements, somewhat as follows:

[B]



with correspondingly more complex transformations where we have to deal with higher-order Gestalt structures, with structures involving phenomenal fusion or continuity, and so on.

Here the *matter* of [A] has been re-parsed, formally, in something like the way in which a complex sentence can be parsed in different ways into saturated and unsaturated parts in Frege's grammar.

Exercises in ontological parsing of the sort here illustrated are at the basis also of Brentano's theory of substance and accident discussed above. Rausch in fact argues that the capacity to submit to such re-parsing, to be transformed from a (1-place) *property* to an (n -place) *relation*, is a *criterion* of Gestalt-connection in the classical sense (pp. 871f.). It is absent, e.g., in those cases where a continuum serves as underlying complex.

The possibility of transition from property to relation and back again shows itself not only when we go from wholes (and their properties), to parts (and the relations between them), but also when we remain with the parts. For under certain circumstances – namely when some one given part overwhelms its relata – we can describe a relation between parts as a property of some one given member. Suppose, for example, that light is reflected by the surface of an

object *a* in the direction of an observer *b*. We may in certain circumstances choose to describe this relation simply as a property – of shininess – in *b*. Similarly there are cases where some given agent is described as being ‘powerful’ or ‘threatening’, when he is in fact powerful or threatening only *in relation to* one or other group of his fellows. Considerations such as this, when carried over into the material sphere, will allow us to generate, wherever relations of the given sorts exist between ego and environment, a corresponding taxonomy of whole-properties which arise whenever such relations are re-parsed in the given fashion and the relation to the ego is as it were suppressed. Thus we can distinguish, for example,

- structure-properties (properties of order and construction) such as *symmetrical, rising, falling, closed*;
- texture-properties such as *soft, rough, matt, transparent*;
- expression-properties such as *proud, peaceful, domineering*; and so on.³⁷ Value, as we shall see in what follows, represents a particularly important sphere in which such ontological re-parsing takes effect, reflecting the fact that relational and objective theories of value each capture an important grain of truth.


Ehrenfels saw Gestalt qualities as constituting a fixed class of all those entities satisfying given criteria. From the Rauschian point of view, however, whether a complex is or is not a Gestalt is a *gradual* matter. Thus a sequence of tones constitutes a Gestalt to the extent that a melody can be heard in it, and different tone-sequences may have melody qualities to differing degrees.³⁸

Return, however, to our figures [A] and [B] above. We can cut the pie again, and conceive quality and elements as together constituting a single whole, complex or Gestalt, whose parts are (again to different degrees from cases to case) only potentially discriminable within it:

37. See Rausch 1966, pp. 873f., 902f., Metzger 1975, Pratt 1962.

38. ‘A complex is the more a Gestalt ... the *clearer* is the complex quality belonging to it. A complex quality is the more a Gestalt quality ... the *clearer* it is.’ (p. 879)

[C]



It is this possibility, of moving from elements plus property to a single all-embracing whole, which explains why there are cases where we use the same term for both Gestalt wholes and their qualities. Thus we commonly use the same term for both the melody (as transposable Gestalt) and the specific tone-sequence (as the doctor, again, will refer to *the case of influenza* in the sixth bed on the right).³⁹


Whether we view the matters in question as a complex of elements with its quality ([A]), or as elements bound together by a unifying relational moment ([B]), or as a whole within which elements and qualities/relations are distinguishable only abstractly ([C]), is in the end a matter of convenience. Some sorts of examples will call for one description, some for another, in the light of given contexts and purposes. This should not, though, be understood as implying that there is no truth of the matter in any given case (as though the structures of Gestalten could vary in reflection of the way in which the theorist chooses to describe them). Rather, each of the given alternatives are merely

39. Note that the transformations which take us back and forth between [A], [B] and [C] can be applied wherever we have a group of objects unified together, some one of which is relatively insignificant in relation to the whole. Thus we say that the button is on the one hand a *part of* the coat, and on the other hand *on* the coat. There is no contradiction here, since two different oppositions are at work. On the one hand 'coat' means the object to whose constitution the button belongs, on the other hand it means an object which is made exclusively of textile material (p. 898).

different ways of formally articulating strictly identical material. The fact that the material in question is intrinsically non-aggregative will however imply that distinct but mutually complementary accounts are obtained when its structure is projected diagrammatically in the manner indicated.

Things do not stop here however. For even in relation to the relatively simple structure so far treated, there is yet another parsing which results when we abstractly imagine the whole [C] as having been once more prized apart, in such a way as to yield three new, qualitatively determined moments, somewhat as follows:

[D]



For just as we can conceive the complex in [A] as possessing a certain characteristic whole-property, so we can conceive the different parts of this complex as possessing their own characteristic *part-properties* in virtue of which they come to make up that total whole which is the original Gestalt. Consider for example the distinction between two descriptions of an orchestra, one of which lists the separate players and describes the total effect of their playing together, the other of which lists the individual instruments and groups of instruments and describes how each contributes to this total effect.

Ehrenfels and the Meinongians did not recognize such part-properties (properties holding of given elements in virtue of their serving as foundation for a Gestalt). The crucial ontological step was taken by Wertheimer in his discussions of phenomenal ‘roles’ or ‘functions’ which can be predicated exclusively of parts *qua* parts, just as whole-properties can be predicated exclusively of wholes *qua* wholes.⁴⁰

Part-properties may on occasion be entirely trivial. If I see the structure:

* * *

then I have before me part-properties of *being extremal*, of *being in the middle*, and so on.⁴¹ Even in relation to such simple cases, however, we can see that where, according to Ehrenfels, the only dependent properties – i.e. the only properties which can gain existence through unification and lose existence through isolation of their carriers – are whole-properties, part-properties, too, are existentially sensitive in just this sense.

But they are existentially sensitive to different degrees. For part-properties include not only the properties of dependent, integrated parts (the character of ‘across’ in Wertheimer’s phi-phenomenon, for example); they include also properties characteristic of *natural* parts, of parts which manifest a (relative) insensitivity to isolation. One can indeed imagine a morphological theory – analogous, perhaps, to René Thom’s theory of catastrophes – which would classify part-properties according to their stability and instability when the corresponding wholes are subjected to certain kinds of change.

40. Similar ideas are to be found in the 3rd of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* which may have influenced Wertheimer here. Among psychologists the concept of part-property had been introduced before Wertheimer by F. E. O. Schultze in 1906 as the concept of what he called *effect-accents* (*‘Wirkungsakzente’*). Schultze did not see, however, that such properties can be treated in correlation with whole-properties: he contrasted the theory of effect-accents with that of Gestalt qualities, but did not integrate the two (cf. again Rausch 1966, p. 894). Ideas like those of Wertheimer on functions and roles have recently been given new life in the doctrine of *qua*-objects developed by Fine (1982).

41. Cf. Nicod 1969, p. 65.

A whole made up of natural parts is a weak Gestalt.⁴² The weak coherence *between* parts is balanced by strong coherence *within* parts (and clearly we have to deal here again with a complex spectrum of cases). One particularly interesting variety of weak Gestalten are dependent Gestalten which depend for their existence on our subjective articulations.⁴³ As Koffka puts it:

We find the field organization under certain circumstances dependent upon attitudes, i.e., forces which have their origin not in the surrounding field at all, but in the Ego of the observer, a new indication that our task of investigating the surrounding field alone is somewhat artificial, and that we shall understand its organization completely only when we study the total field which includes the Ego within its environment. (Koffka 1935, p. 149)

Weak dependent Gestalten are most prominent in the sphere of social wholes. Here, however, the job of articulation and integration is carried out not by some external observer but from within, by the members themselves, i.e. by those natural parts of the relevant social whole who are human beings. Such articulation from within will be effected to different degrees by different persons, reflecting the relative predominance of the groups to which they belong within the whole in question. All government and law presupposes Gestalt articulation in this sense, which manifests itself for example in feelings of respect or loyalty on the part of the constituent subjects: they see these and these actions as legitimate *actions of state* and not for example as the posturings of usurpers. Clearly here, too, there is a spectrum between weak and strong Gestalten, reflecting the extent to which the relevant articulating and integrating habits are well-entrenched among the people or merely imposed upon them from above.

We must return, however, to our more homely, perceptual examples. Clearly each sequence of notes that is a melody possesses a certain whole-

42. Cf. Köhler 1920.

43. We could say that for Ehrenfels it is in every case the personal unity of consciousness which is the properly integrating moment of a Gestalt. For when elements are divided among different consciousnesses their unity is lost. (Cf. Rausch 1966, pp. 888f.) Benussi, too, investigated the properties of different kinds of dependent Gestalten: see especially his 1904.

property, each single note (and segment) possesses its own part-property (role, function), the latter being not restricted to those cases for which we have names (tonic, dominant, leading note, cadence, trill, etc.). (Rausch, pp. 892f.) More important still, however, is the fact that – as Ehrenfels comes near to recognizing – the discipline of linguistics deals precisely with whole- and part-properties in this sense: properties such as *sentence*, *intonation pattern*, *subject*, *verb*, *object*, *phoneme*, *fricative*, and so on, and with the relations between them.⁴⁴

From Ehrenfels' point of view, a Gestalt quality (whole-property) disappears when we isolate its parts. A thesis of this sort can be formulated also for part-properties, and we can see that it holds (to a degree) only for certain quite specific kinds of 'natural' part (for example of stones in a heap, where the property of being for example at the top of the heap simply disappears when the heap is taken apart). Rarely, however does isolation of parts lead to a mere loss of properties: neither whole-properties nor part-properties are simply added extras which spring into existence at the moment of unification and disappear on isolation. For isolated parts *qua* isolated have peculiar characteristic features of their own, which depend on the one hand upon the peculiar features of their new environment and on the other hand upon what they bring with them from the old.⁴⁵

Suppose, for example, that we isolate a group of tones that had previously been a part of a melody. The tones are not simply poorer by the part-properties they had in the melody. They exchange these part-properties for new 'isolation-properties', for example the property of being given as figure, alone, against a ground of silence, of being in need of completion (for example where the group in question ends on a leading note), and so on. Or consider an isolated coloured fleck. This, too, must appear in some specific way against a background of some sort, and then it may manifest itself either as incomplete, as

44. The conception of linguistics as a study of successive levels of interrelated part- and whole-properties has been canvassed by Roman Jakobson (see e.g. Holenstein 1975 and the references there given). Compare also Harris 1951 for similar developments within American structural linguistics.

45. See Rausch 1966, p. 899 and compare Husserl, LU VI § 9.

'lost' or 'homeless', or as an alien body smuggled into an environment in which it does not belong, as a disturbance in or defect of its environment, or alternatively as independent and self-contained. A true isolation in the phenomenal sphere, an elementary sensory experience pure and simple, does not exist.

But what applies in the sphere of phenomena applies also to (naturally occurring) parts in general. A part does not, on being separated, exist merely *in vacuo*, but always in some context in which it contributes to new Gestalten and thereby undergoes various functional changes within itself. A Japanese glass pyramid appears in one context as a fitting, proper part of its environment; translate it to a different context, and it will stick out as an alien body.

The problem of part- and whole-properties should not, however, be treated from a purely synchronic point of view. Parts which have been subject to isolation may grow into unified wholes in their own right, or they may become merged into their new environment in such a way as to lose their properties of isolation. Wholes may come to manifest a high degree of inter-partial unity because their parts have grown together, for example as a result of sharing historically a common fate. And such diachronic factors may manifest themselves also on the subjective side: the experiencing subject learns to accept the belonging together of parts which had previously seemed to be merely separate or indeed incompatible. This subject may himself be changed by what he experiences, so that he begins to see a whole because he himself has become, as it were, caught up in its web.

This may suggest the idea of a refined production theory which would operate not at the level of the single act but at the level of whole sequences of acts and actions spread out in time. The fact that one may not grasp the structure of a complex directly, but that it may take time and effort, would not however support the Graz thesis of productive activity at the expense of the Berlin theory. For the fact that Gestalt phenomena arise as objects of experience as a result of intellectual-cognitive processes of certain sorts is precisely emphasized by the Berlin Gestaltists – they insist only that such processes do not go to work on fundamenta which remain invariant: process, initial material and final result are themselves *gestaltet* or reticulated together, in ways which can be understood by us only abstractly.

6. *Conclusion*

Both the Austrian and the Berlin Gestalt psychologists distinguished themselves by a high degree of concern for the philosophical implications of their work. In the end, however, it must be accepted that this concern did not go far enough. As is seen above all from the lack of any substantial and formally fruitful logical treatment of the wealth of notions clustering around the Gestalt idea, a truly adequate mastering of the philosophical difficulties which surround this idea has never really taken place. And while the brilliance and experimental ingenuity of Wertheimer, Köhler and Koffka led to many empirical advances over the earlier work of their colleagues in Graz, even the proponents of the Berlin theory lacked a wider philosophical framework of the sort that had been provided for the Graz psychologists by Meinong and by Brentano.

As Brentano himself stressed, philosophical clarification of this sort is needed in virtue of the fact that, without an awareness of the nature and interrelations of the objects with which it deals, an empirical science is in a certain sense performing experiments in the dark. I do not claim to have provided the needed ontological clarification of the Gestalt concept here. I do however claim that it is as much as anything else in virtue of the lack of such clarification that the Gestalt idea has failed to establish itself securely within the mainstream of psychology.

This is a strong thesis, and it will be useful if I break it down into a number of weaker constituent theses, making it clear that I do not feel equally strongly about all of them:

There is first of all the assumption that the Gestalt idea, in any of its variants, has in truth failed to establish itself within the mainstream of recent psychology. There was, especially in the '40s, much talk of a 'convergence' of (e.g.) behaviourism and Gestalt theory, or of the absorption of Gestalt insights by one school of psychologists or another. And it is clear that certain elements of the work of Wertheimer, Köhler, Koffka, *et al.*, and indeed of Mach and Ehrenfels, have come to be absorbed into the science of psychology as a whole. Thus it may be correct to suppose, with Helson in his paper of 1969, that it was Köhler who first evolved a conception of psychic activity which made possible a serviceable physiological approach to the workings of the mind in the modern sense. It may be correct to suppose that workers in the Gestalt tradition such as

Wertheimer, Bühler, Duncker and Selz anticipated and indeed influenced modern debates on the possibility of a computational or information-theoretic approach to psychic processing. And it is certainly correct to suppose that many of the empirical facts about the perception of movement and contour and about perceptual constancy and perceptual illusions - facts we now take for granted - were discovered in the classic experiments performed by Benussi, Wertheimer, and other Gestaltists. But none of this changes the fact that the central ontological idea of Gestalt structure has all but vanished from psychology.

Secondly, there is the claim that there is a lack of ontological clarification on the part of Gestalt psychologists of the notions they employ. Now there is, certainly, interesting philosophical work within the Gestalt tradition. The writings of Rausch, above all contain philosophical investigations of a high order, and what has been offered above is only a sample of the wealth of ideas within his works. Rausch combines the insights of an experimental psychologist with a grasp of the techniques of modern logic, and he has succeeded in addressing many of the most pressing ontological issues surrounding the notion of Gestalt in ways that have proved also empirically fruitful. Yet Rausch has been an isolated figure, his work has remained practically unknown and entirely untranslated, a fate he has shared with the earlier Austrian writers on the ontology of Gestalt, including Ehrenfels himself. The work of Meinong, too, has been little read by psychologists, and Meinong is today remembered principally for his contributions to pure ontology. Stumpf, on the other hand, has suffered the opposite fate: he is treated with respect as a seminal figure in the psychology of music, yet his posthumous philosophical masterpiece on the theory of cognition remains unread.

There is, thirdly, the assumption that, if the appropriate ontological clarifications of Gestalt were forthcoming in an accessible form, then the present unhappy state of affairs would come to be rectified and Gestalt notions would once more play a significant role in psychological inquiries. I am not sure about this at all, and not only for reasons having to do with the gratuitous and serendipitous character of scientific change. For I am not sure that such clarifications *can* be provided. Moreover, it seems that even if they were provided, there may still be reasons why the nitty gritty of perceptual psychology would have to be centred around problems skew to a Gestalt-theoretical treatment. There are, however, areas outside perceptual

psychology - above all in linguistics and in cognitive science, above all in work on connectionism - where ideas and issues similar to those found in the Gestalt tradition seem once again to be playing an important role.

Finally, there is the thesis to the effect that the attempt to provide such clarification is worthwhile. And here I should like to insist very strongly that the ideas of Mach and Ehrenfels, of Meinong, Benussi, Witasek and Bühler, of Wertheimer, Köhler and Koffka, of Lewin, of Musatti, Metzger, Rausch, Kanizsa and Bozzi, of Heider and Michotte, contain the germ of an important idea, an idea which - if it can be stripped of the exaggerated claims which were sometimes made on its behalf - can help us to achieve a deeper and more adequate understanding of both psychological and non- psychological complexity. There is, in other words, more than a merely historical reason for studying the works of the Gestalt psychologists.

Chapter Nine

Christian von Ehrenfels II

On Value and Desire

1. *Foundations of a General Theory of Value*

Do we desire something because it has value? Or is the value of a thing a consequence of the fact that it is desired? To adopt the former alternative is to involve oneself in the task of providing a theory of value which would make value a property things have as it were prior to their serving as objects of desire. Theories of this sort have been developed *inter alia* by Meinong, Nicolai Hartmann and Max Scheler. The latter alternative was formulated by Christian von Ehrenfels in a series of writings on value whose publication followed immediately upon that of his classic paper “Über ‘Gestaltqualitäten’”, and it is this latter alternative which will occupy us here.

Ehrenfels’ views are of interest not least because of their relation to the subjectivist approach to economic values initiated by Carl Menger, Ehrenfels’ teacher, in his *Principles of Economics* of 1871.¹ Menger founded what has since come to be known as the ‘first’ Austrian school of value theory, the first-generation members of which included also Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Friedrich von Wieser, with both of whom Ehrenfels had significant exchanges.² Later members of the school included Ludwig von Mises, F. A. Hayek and Ludwig Lachmann, and the school is today represented by, among others, M.

1. For discussions of this and other influences on Ehrenfels’ value theory see Eaton, Grassl 1982, and Fabian and Simons 1986. I shall concentrate in what follows exclusively on value theory in the narrow sense, avoiding conjectures as to the ways in which this theory might be supplemented by ideas from the theory of *Gestalten* to produce an account which would be more adequate e.g. to the dimension of aesthetic value. The reader is invited to compare the conception of value as organic unity set forth by Nozick in ch. 5 of his 1981 with ideas sketched by Ehrenfels, e.g. in the fragment “Höhe und Reinheit der Gestalt” (1916). Cf. also Smith (ed.) 1988, pp. 61ff., 118ff.

2. Grassl 1982 is now the definitive survey of these exchanges.

Rothbard and I. M. Kirzner. I shall discuss below some possible lines of comparison between Ehrenfels' thought and that of Hayek.

Together with Meinong and other pupils of Brentano, Ehrenfels belonged to what has been called the 'second' Austrian school of value theory.³ In contradistinction to the economists, the members of this school were concerned to develop a *general* theory of values. They regarded economic value as only one special sort of human value, and they urged that economic values could be properly understood only to the extent that their connection with the entire range of 'phenomena of interest' had been made clear.

The members of this second school did however look up to the economists as having achieved a theoretical depth and rigour in their analyses which was at that time lacking in work on values on the part of their fellow philosophers. Ethics, in particular, Ehrenfels conceived as having hardly advanced beyond its beginnings with the Greeks:

it sets as its goal ... an extraneous and often arbitrary listing and ranking of ethical and other value-objects, from which one might at best glean those lessons inherited from past ages which we call "worldly wisdom", which we normally learn to understand and to appreciate only when we have acquired it for ourselves and at our own cost (pp. 214f.).⁴

But how is the desired *theoretical* understanding of values to be achieved? Here Ehrenfels turned on the one hand to the task of *generalizing* laws of valuation which had been discovered by the economists, above all the law of marginal utility, a law to the effect that the $n+1$ st sample of a good which I receive is *ceteris paribus* less valuable than the n th (imagine that the goods in question are, for example, a series of identical ham sandwiches). And on the other hand he turned to psychology. This he conceived broadly in the way Brentano conceived it in the *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, i.e. as a descriptive psychology of different kinds of acts and of interrelations between

3. See Eaton 1930 and, on the wider membership and influence of the school, Grassl 1981 and 1986.

4. References in this chapter are to Ehrenfels 1897/1898, as repr. in Ehrenfels 1982, which includes also reprints of Ehrenfels' other writings on value from the period in question.

acts.⁵ These two strands in Ehrenfels' work, and in that of Meinong, who must be credited with having taken the first steps in this direction, support each other mutually: the same laws hold for moral values as for economic values *because* the two sorts of values have the same psychological foundations.

2. *The Relation between Desire and Feeling*

Ehrenfels' psychological foundation of value-theory conceives the value of things as dependent upon human valuing acts, which are in turn conceived as being dependent upon acts of desire. Thus for Ehrenfels 'we do not desire things because we grasp in them some mystical, incomprehensible essence "value"; rather, we ascribe "value" to things because we desire them' (p. 219).

The immediate suspicion awakened by a view of this kind is that, in spite of the detour through desire, it must amount to some form of hedonism, i.e. to the view that the value of an object is ultimately a matter of the pleasure (feeling) it will bring. But Ehrenfels is not a hedonist in the sense that he does not hold that one's own feelings constitute the ultimate goal of all desiring. To see why not, it is necessary to consider his account of the relationship between desire and presentation. Desire, we can provisionally assume, is directed always towards some desired object (the word 'object', here, being understood in the widest possible sense, to include also properties, relations, processes, etc.). And this desired object, according to Ehrenfels, must be presented in some way by the one who desires it. Some idea of it must be present as a constituent of the act of desire. The question of hedonism amounts, therefore, to the question whether, when we desire, we also necessarily present to ourselves our own pleasure or our own pain, or the removal of the same. And the answer to this question is that in many cases we do, but *not in all*.

This is the case first of all because:

In the most common circumstances of our everyday life our desiring goes directly to certain routine external tasks such as eating, drinking, waiting, sitting, sleeping, etc.,

5. The most important difference, from our present point of view, is the sharp distinction drawn by Ehrenfels between the two categories of *feeling* and *desire*. These were run together by Brentano, as we have seen, into the single category of 'phenomena of love and hate'. Brentano is criticized on this point also by Anscombe in her 1978. Note that it is the common indebtedness to a Brentanian act-psychology which, more than anything else, makes it appropriate to regard Ehrenfels, Meinong, Kraus, Kreibitz and others as members of a single school.

without there being presented thereby the state of feeling which corresponds to these tasks (p. 236)

The role played by *routine* or *habit* in Ehrenfels' theory is indeed a central one: we are trained to desire even where feelings of pleasure are not involved. That desire does not always involve a presentation on the part of the desiring subject of his own feelings follows also from the fact that some desires relate to periods of time of which the subject will not or could not have experience, or to the feelings of individuals with whom he could have no conceivable contact. I might, for example, desire that my remote descendants should have the opportunity to acquire a taste for oysters; or I might wish that the Spanish Inquisition had never taken place; and a range of other cases can be brought forward to demonstrate that the concept of an act which is directed towards goals other than one's own feelings does not contain any sort of contradiction.⁶

While the desiring subject does not in every case desire his own happiness, there is *some* relation between desire and happiness or, more generally, between desire and feeling. But this relation is a complex one, involving both the *dispositions* of the given individual and the relative promotion of happiness which he experiences as being associated with given acts.

We can say, very roughly, that the disposition to desire on the part of a given individual is dependent upon the dispositions of that individual to have certain feelings. To say more than this, we have to recognize that acts of desire, according to Ehrenfels, are divided into three categories of wishing, striving, and willing. These three categories are ordered by the intensity of the experienced tendency in each to exert a causal influence on the surroundings of the subject in such a way as to bring about the desired object. They are related also in such a way that, just as every desire incorporates a presentation of the desired object, so every striving incorporates a wishing and every willing incorporates a striving.⁷ In relation to the latter pair there holds what Ehrenfels calls the *law of the relative promotion of happiness* (*Gesetz der relativen Glücksförderung*) to the effect that:

6. Complementary arguments to the same effect are to be found in Duncker 1941.

7. Cf. pp. 367f; see also Ehrenfels 1887. Recall that in Brentano's terminology, a presentation is an inseparable part of every desire, a wishing is an inseparable part of every striving, and so on.

Every act of striving or willing, at the time at which it takes place, furthers the state of happiness [of the desiring subject] in comparison with that state which would have obtained in the case of the absence of the given act (p. 239).

Each individual is held to have, at any given time, a certain repertoire of dispositions to behave in different ways; and then:

Every act of desiring is conditioned, both in its goal and in its intensity, by the relative promotion of happiness which it brings – in the light of the feeling-dispositions of the individual in question – at its time of entry into the consciousness of this individual and during the time it remains therein (p. 245).

This (relative) increase in happiness is however not itself something which is *aimed at*. Rather, the law expresses one aspect of a complex relation of dependence involving dispositional properties of an individual, in something like the way in which the law of marginal utility expresses one aspect of a complex relation of dependence involving the dispositional properties of a good to yield utility.

Note, too, that it would be unreasonable to assert any law of *absolute* increase in happiness. One might, for example, do continuous battle against an evil (for example *relatively* healthier), which is nevertheless continually worsening, and still be always *relatively* happier than one would otherwise have been. It is necessary, for given acts of striving and willing to take place, only that, should one have been condemned to abstain from them, one would have been still more unhappy.

3. *The Objects of Desire*

The proposition that we ascribe value to things because we desire them was, we said, a first approximation. For there are things to which we ascribe value without our being able to desire them. Thus for example I cannot desire the possession of a material good which I already possess, yet I can perfectly well ascribe value to this good. Similarly, I cannot desire that I be alive, and yet I place a value on my being in this state. Ehrenfels expresses this point in a way which is at first paradoxical. He says that it is only of things which do not exist that we can say that they have value at all. Of other things we have to say strictly speaking that they *would* have value if they did not exist (p. 252). A better approximation to a 'law of value' is then:

We ascribe value to those things which we either in fact desire, or which we would desire if we were not convinced of their existence. The value of a thing is its desirability ... The stronger we desire or would desire an object, the higher value does that object possess for us (p. 253).

Some of the air of paradox is removed from such formulations when Ehrenfels points out that, while there is, certainly, a way of speaking according to which we desire material things, processes, states (e.g. states of mind), and even relationships and possibilities, our desirings and valuings in fact never relate directly to an object, but always to its *existence* or *non-existence* (or, more generally, to our owning or losing it, to our being in or lacking control of it, to our consuming or failing to consume it, and so on), or in other words to a *Sachverhalt* or *state of affairs*:

To desire an object is to desire either the existence of the thing or its possession, and then in the latter case the desire also relates to an existence, not of the thing itself, but of our power of disposing over it, and at the same time it is directed to a non-existence: the absence of all disturbances which would inhibit this power of disposal. Similarly we desire the existence or non-existence, or occurrence or non-occurrence, of certain changes of place, processes, or states (p. 254).

Note that ‘existence’, here, is not an abstract notion, as it is, for example, in the ontology of Meinong. Rather, it relates to the realm of real causality which played such an important role also in the philosophy of Anton Marty. For Ehrenfels insists that the presentation of existence or non-existence which is involved in an act of desire relates always to existence within the causal order (and to the same causal order as that to which the subject himself belongs).

There is no special psychic basic-element ‘desiring’ (wishing, striving, willing). What we call desiring is always nothing other than the presentation, founding a relative promotion of happiness, of the inclusion or exclusion of an object in or from the causal network around the centre of the present concrete I-presentation (p. 386).

We can now see that the remark that wishing, striving and willing represent different orders of experienced causal involvement of the desiring subject applies, more precisely, to the ways in which the subject’s own actions are presented by him as associated with an inclusion or exclusion of the object of desire within this causal network. This association is most attenuated in the case of the wish, yet even here there is some residual causal involvement: however highly we might value the replication of events of the given sort, we

do not wish that such events should take place in parallel universes with which we could have no possible causal contact.

That the object of desire is always presented as set causally in relation to the surrounding reality of the subject is clear where the object of desire is a future state of the self (an effect of what he himself will *do*). But Ehrenfels insists that even in regard to far distant past or future times, for example if I desire that Socrates had been acquitted, or that Beethoven had heard his 9th Symphony, then I present these processes as brought into causal connection with things, processes and events which I regard as real. I consider the given processes always

either as co-determining causes of present realities in which I, too, am involved (as in the two given cases) or as effects of shared causes, or as possible shared causes of future effects, all understood as related to my present reality (*in bezug auf die gegenwärtige subjektive Wirklichkeit*) (p. 266).

This moment of causal involvement is reflected in the way in which desire has a real ‘muscular’ effect on one’s body, the way in which objects of desire, as soon as we desire them, ‘cease to float around as an insubstantial play of light and shadow in the region of phantasy—and win, as it were, embodiedness and weight’ (p. 366).

4. *On the Nature of Values*

Ehrenfels dismisses out of hand attempts, such as the Marxian labour theory, to answer the question as to the nature of value by appeal to notions like cost or sacrifice. Certainly I may decide practically which of two objects is more valuable to me by asking myself for which object I would be prepared to make the greater sacrifice (pay the higher price). But this, as Ehrenfels points out, is nothing more than a useful practical expedient. It has no theoretical consequences:

it could never help to throw light on the content of the concept of value, since of course it consists just in measuring one value against another, more specifically in measuring a positive against a negative value (p. 267).

The tradition of Austrian philosophy to which Ehrenfels belonged sought not to *reduce* one sort of object to another, but rather to describe as faithfully as possible our experiences of given objects in such a way as to allow these

descriptions to throw light on questions as to their nature and mode of existence. In regard to values, Ehrenfels points out that they cannot be properties, dispositions or capacities of objects, for then their existence would be bound up with the existence of the objects involved. Such a conception would imply, for example, that the value of the victory of the Normans in 1066, for example for present-day Frenchmen, ceased to exist in 1066. Value is, rather, according to Ehrenfels, a certain sort of *intentional relation* between a subject and an object, a relation which can however be re-conceived (re-parsed ontologically) for certain purposes also as a property of its object, along exactly the lines described in Chapter Eight above. The relation is intentional because its existence does not depend upon the simultaneous existence of the two relata. In this respect it is comparable to the relation between presentation and presented object, or between judgment and object judged about, but it is comparable also to relations such as similarity and difference. All of these relations, Ehrenfels argues, can be awarded a kind of ‘supertemporal existence’.⁸

The relation of value consists in the fact that ‘the subject either actually desires the object or would desire it were he not convinced of its existence’. This relation exists

wherever the most intuitive, vivid and complete presentation of the existence of the given object conditions in the subject a state which lies higher on the feeling-scale of pleasure-displeasure than the corresponding presentation of matters given the non-existence of the object. The magnitude of the value is proportional to the intensity of the desire, as also to the distance between the two feeling-states so characterized (p. 261).

Thus value is ‘subjective’ in the two-fold sense that it depends for its existence on a specific valuing subject and for its internal constitution (intensity and directedness) upon the dispositions of that subject. Value is not however *reduced* to dispositions to feeling. For value is not an automatic reflection of feeling-dispositions, as if we could read off the value a thing would have for each given subject from a knowledge of the way that subject is disposed to feel. Value relates to feeling always through the mediation of *desire*, and this introduces an element of voluntarism into Ehrenfels’ account. The presence of

8. Ehrenfels 1897/98, p. 261. On relational theories of value in general see Ingarden 1984, pp. 119ff.

this element reflects the fact that, at least in certain circumstances, desire must come in advance of associated feeling, and this in turn has great significance for Ehrenfels' conception of the motor of human evolution, which for him is a variety of excess energy of desire.

I may desire something either for its own sake, or because of the effects which I conceive it as having in bringing about something which I desire for its own sake. This yields for Ehrenfels a division into *intrinsic values* (*Eigenwerte*) and *effect values* (*Wirkungswerte*) and following Menger we may divide effect values in turn into effect values of first order, which yield intrinsic value directly, effect values of second order, which yield effect values of first order, and so on.⁹

An object may have intrinsic value for me only in virtue of the value of some part or moment. Ehrenfels gives the example of the intrinsic value of a man in virtue of his good character. Intrinsic values may therefore be divided into the two types of *immediate* and *derivative*. The value (of good character) in the given case is an immediate value,¹⁰ the value of the man himself derivative. Effect values are non-summative in the sense that the effect value of a whole is normally not simply the sum of the values of the parts. (Consider the respective effect values of two pairs of shoes, one a normal pair, the other a pair consisting of two – independently perhaps more valuable – left shoes.) This non-summative character of effect values reflects what the Austrian economists called 'complementarity' amongst material and other resources, and Ehrenfels' discussion (in Part I of the *System der Wertheorie*) of the "Calculation of Effect Values" is in essence an exposition of the main outlines of the Austrian economic theory of complementarity and of the associated notions of imputation and substitution. With regard to these last, both Menger and Ehrenfels share the view that we assign effect values to objects to the extent that we believe intrinsic values to be dependent upon their existence. (The proposition that the value of goods of higher order derives solely from the value of the consumer goods in whose manufacture they serve has come to be called 'Menger's law' by present-day proponents of Austrian economics.) The

9. See Menger 1871, Ch. 1, § 2.

10. It attaches to its object 'immediately' in the sense of Husserl (LU III § 18).

problem of ‘imputation’ is just the problem of calculating effect values given this dependence on intrinsic values. (How, in a complex process of production of some consumer good, is the value of the factors used in this process to be imputed from the value for consumers of the expected end-product?) Central to the economists’ solution to this problem, and also to Ehrenfels’ account, is the notion of substitutability, the idea that the magnitude of an effect value is the cost of substituting some other means of bringing about the same effect. The value of the water on board a ship is the cost of a detour to replenish stocks, and this changes, from day to day, with the distance from the nearest port.

Effect values, for Ehrenfels, divide into material goods on the one hand and human beings (or more particularly ‘human actions and qualities’) on the other. The former he conceives as the subject-matter of economics, the latter fall within the domain of ethics, though human beings, too, can be treated as material goods, for example when they are used as slaves. But this implies a rejection of the more usual classifications of the sciences of values: for now economics and ethics, conceived as sciences of effect values, stand over against, for example, aesthetics, logic, medicine, hygiene, and other disciplines dealing with intrinsic values:

Art, science, health – when these words are understood in a particular way – all belong to that great complex of intrinsic values which lend existence to effect values not only in the economic but also in the ethical sphere (p. 400).

How, then, do we solve the imputation problem? How, for example, am I to decide whether to spend my fortune on religious or on political purposes, or on some mixture of both, or on wine and feasting? For this purpose it is necessary that the individual valuing subject have some implicit notion of a *common measure* of the intrinsic values which might be yielded by the resources at his disposal. Classically, the term ‘utility’ has been employed for this concept, but Ehrenfels finds this term too narrow. This is because something is normally said to be of utility for a subject only to the extent that it leads to a result which is of intrinsic value *for him*, i.e. of intrinsic value in the narrow, egoistic sense:

Thus, according to common conceptions, the money which I give out for my own pleasure is of utility; not, however, that which I give to the beggar – which gives *him* utility (p. 271).

In order to leave 'utility' with its customary meaning Ehrenfels therefore employs as a technical term the archaic '*Fromm*', which has connotations of piety and which will here be translated as 'avail' (as in 'what doth charity avail me?'). By 'avail' is meant, quite generally, the magnitudes of intrinsic values underlying effect values, so that utility then appears as a sub-class of avail. Courage in battle, duteous service for the sake of truth, honour, charity, loyalty, marriage, and so on, may all be lacking in utility for given individuals in given circumstances; but this does not mean that they are *without avail*. Ehrenfels even goes so far as to formulate a 'law of diminishing marginal avail' (p. 274), and in this he is, with Böhm-Bawerk, one of the first to recognize the possibility of generalizing the point of view of economic theory – in a way which has become almost commonplace – to areas of morality where it had hitherto been held to be entirely alien.¹¹

A further problem for the general theory of values is that of comparing or relating the valuations of different individuals (and of the same individual at different times). One might, for example, reason that to affirm that Mary places more value on object A than does Norma is to affirm that Mary is ready to relinquish more than is Norma for the realization of A. But then we have no means of comparing their respective valuations of what it is that each is prepared to sacrifice in order to attain the desired goal. In certain circumstances we can appeal to some common standard. Mary might, for example, be prepared to sacrifice her life and entire fortune for some given end, where Norma is prepared to offer no more than, say, an old raincoat. And because, in the case of values such as life, liberty, health, the life of one's family and the like, we can assume a fair amount of uniformity across a normal population, we can reasonably conclude in such circumstances that, other things being equal, Mary's valuation is the higher. But a clear-cut conclusion of this sort will in general not be available.

Ehrenfels therefore considers also the possibility of effecting an independent comparison of different subjects' valuations by appeal to the intensities of their respective acts of feeling and desire, so that the two types of comparison may serve as some sort of check on each other. Intensities of

11. Cf. Böhm-Bawerk 1881, Becker 1976, and, for a general introduction, Grassl 1986, McKenzie 1977, and McKenzie and Tullock 1978.

feeling and desire are, after all, correlated, at least to some extent, with physiological phenomena which can be measured. He notes, however, that the comparison of such *absolute* intensities does not yield a valid measure for value-comparison:

For suppose the two subjects M and N are of a completely identical mental disposition, with the single exception that all feeling reactions in M are one and a half times more intensive than in N. In this case M and N would behave identically in all identical situations; indeed one would have no means at all, and no clue, as to how to identify the difference in their feeling-reactions or even to presume that there is such a difference ... If two subjects behave identically in all conceivable cases of conflict, then they also value identically (pp. 282f.).

In the comparison of the valuations of different subjects what matters is, therefore, the *direction* and the *relative* intensities of the decisions of their will and of their impulses to action, not the absolute intensities of their feeling states.

5. *The Struggle for Existence among Values*

Values are, as we have seen, in every case relative to valuing subjects, and since there is competition among those subjects for valued objects of various types, so, derivatively, there arises a competition among values themselves. It is as if the material of value were itself a scarce resource, and subject to all of the characteristics of scarce resources, including the liability to degenerate through overuse or to be used up, and to be affected e.g. by climatic or technological change or by growth in knowledge. As Ehrenfels is aware, his account of the mechanisms governing value-change suggests at certain points parallels with materialist interpretations of history. But the latter go too far, he claims, in seeing the superstructural dimension of value as being determined exclusively by underlying material developments. His account, in contrast, sees a complex system of dependence relations between dispositions and tendencies on the two levels, in such a way as to leave room for even large-scale consequences of individual acts, including sometimes gratuitous acts of desire.

Crucial to Ehrenfels' account – which suggests also a comparison with Nietzsche – is his belief that *intrinsic values, too, may change*. Thus Ehrenfels criticizes economics for concerning itself with effect values exclusively under conditions of stable intrinsic values. Change in intrinsic values is brought about

above all in response to changes in effect values, and then the new intrinsic values,

in calling forth new strivings on the part of human beings, transform the relations of man to man, and therefore also transform for the valuing individual the circumstances of his surrounding world, thereby setting in train once more new motion in the effect values (p. 333).

Thus from the Ehrenfelsian perspective the intrinsic value which Western cultures have come to award to ‘self-development’ on the part of women, reflects at least in part changes which have occurred for example in the effect values of home services (brought about by technological developments in the fields of cooking and cleaning), and also changes in the effect values used up in generating ‘self-development’ (as education, for example, has become cheaper, relative to other goods).

It is clear from all of this that there is no trace, in Ehrenfels’ thinking, of the sort of value-absolutism or value-objectivism which we find in Plato or Nicolai Hartmann or Karol Wojtyła.¹²

Neither is there a trace in Ehrenfels of ethical formalism such as we find in the ‘metaphysical-mystical dogmatism’ of Kant (p. 215): the principle of universalizability Ehrenfels would reject as the result of an insensitivity to the ways in which even intrinsic values may differ from individual to individual according to age, sex, or personal disposition, e.g. because of the different repertoire of effect values which each will have at his disposal.

Ehrenfels’ approach to values is built around a respect for the kaleidic shifts in the totality of values, the motor of which he sees as an extraordinarily subtle and complex system of the most manifold effects and counter-effects, where ‘one step disturbs a thousand leaves’ (p. 333). Ehrenfels’ views here are not merely a form of social organicism in the general sense of, for example, Burke. They are, rather, the result of a theoretical recognition of the importance of the marginal principle – of the principle that you can have too much of a

12. Values, for Ehrenfels, either exist or they do not exist: they cannot be true or false. He does however recognize certain sorts of *error of valuation*. The value of quack remedies, for example, comes into being only through the mediation of a false judgment about an object. He recognizes also the possibility of making a false judgment about a value, e.g., when someone assumes, incorrectly, that he knows what is best for another. Cf. *System der Wertheorie*, Part I, Ch. IX and Part II, Ch. VII. A full treatment of these matters would require a detailed comparison of Ehrenfels’ views with those of Brentano (1889), for whom the role of (correct and incorrect) *judgment* in the theory of values is much more prominent.

good thing – in governing the movements of value in a society. Classical utilitarianism ignores this principle in affirming, flatly, that the general utility of given feeling-dispositions will guarantee their high ethical value. For it thereby fails to account for the cases where, precisely as a result of such high valuation, a given feeling-disposition is replicated to the extent where it begins to have negative consequences for the common good. For Ehrenfels, in contrast, ‘Only those dispositions are valued highly for which an *increase* in the factually existing stock would be such as to promote the general good’ (p. 438). Only those feeling-dispositions are valued highly for which the demand is greater than the supply, and a large part of Ehrenfels’ ethics is concerned with the social ‘regulators’ which stimulate individuals to optimal levels of production of feelings such as guilt, regret, compassion, caution, enthusiasm, respect for authority, and the like.

Ehrenfels’ account of the evolution of values rests on a distinction between *cultural* development on the one hand, i.e. the accumulation of products of material and intellectual labour, i.e. of capital in the widest sense, including acquired human capital, art, language, religion, law, traditions of child-rearing, etc., and what he calls *constitutive* development on the other, i.e. the evolution of inborn physical and psychological characteristics of the organism.¹³ It is indeed one principal theme of Ehrenfels’ later writings that cultural evolution may have a negative effect on constitutive evolution.¹⁴ It is not this aspect of Ehrenfels’ thought which is of interest to us here, however, but rather the details of the ways in which, on his account, cultural and constitutive factors interact with each other *in the individual subject*. We shall seek specifically to answer the question as to how the individual can acquire or learn to perceive cultural values as values at all.

Before we can answer this question, however, another detour is necessary, in order that we may set forth the outlines of a strain of

13. As will become clear, there is much in Ehrenfels’ writings to suggest the further distinction, emphasized by Hayek (1979), between cultural values which are the product of deliberate human creation or design, for example the value of an electro-turbine, and cultural values which exist as a result of human action but as its *unintended consequences*, for example values pertaining to the common law, language and many other undesigned and undesignable social institutions. Not everything that is not natural is therefore also ‘artificial’ in the normal sense of this word.

14. Cf. Grassl 1982, pp. 13ff.

Herbartianism in Ehrenfels' thinking. Herbart conceived the mind as consisting, in effect, of two levels: a strictly confined level of *consciousness*, and a deeper, sub-conscious level, within which it is as if there is unlimited space and freedom of movement.¹⁵ Elements are exchanged continuously between the two levels, their passage being governed by quasi-mechanical laws of attraction and repulsion ('laws of association') and subject to different sorts of forces and pressures ('inhibition', 'suppression', etc.).

The details of Herbart's view need not concern us here. The version which Ehrenfels accepted was, in any case, toned down by elements of the more sophisticated act-psychology of Brentano. The following passage from the *System der Werththeorie* will, however, give a flavour of the view in question:

Immediately after we receive a vivid impression, the image of the latter floats before us with great clarity, and even if it is for a time suppressed from our consciousness through subsequent experiences, still, it reasserts itself without any exertion on our part as soon as there is, so to speak, a free space – somewhat as a submerged piece of wood will rise to the surface of water as soon as one leaves it to itself (pp. 341f.).¹⁶

Let us assume, if only for the sake of argument, that there is at least some grain of truth in what Herbart, Ehrenfels (and Freud) have to say in this and similar passages about the 'narrowness of consciousness' (*Enge des Bewusstseins*). What is the relevance of this notion to our present concerns? Actions normally take place only to the extent that there are associated desires (acts of striving and willing). But such desires, together with the presentations which they involve and the feelings with which they may be associated, *take up space*, to the extent that the execution of even a relatively unsophisticated system of actions would be impossible if the presentations and desires associated with each of its various component parts would have to remain in consciousness simultaneously. The narrowness of consciousness would seem to imply that it would be possible for man to form desires relating only to relatively simple tasks, ordered at best in a linear fashion, leaving no scope for the nesting of ends and means, for planning or preparation or for the performance of complex cumulative tasks. How, then, can the sometimes

15. It may be worth pointing out here that Herbart had a powerful influence also on the thinking of Freud. See Hemecker 1991, Ch. 3.

16. The passage occurs in the context of a discussion of Herbart's theory.

massively complicated systems of higher-order actions characteristic of artistic creation and of all even modestly sophisticated human activities come about at all?

It will not suffice to seek a solution to this problem by pointing to what might be called a *division of the labour of desire* in society (though such certainly exists), for there are many higher-order actions which involve one individual only, and even in cases of collective action the problem would remain of giving an account – other than by an appeal to some kind of pre-established harmony – of how the respective desires of the participating subjects should reticulate with each other in just the ways which are necessary to yield the appropriate results.

Ehrenfels' solution to this problem consists in the idea that even complex systems of higher-order actions, as they manifest themselves in the life of the individual, are broken down into constituent, relatively routine tasks, in such a way that the desires necessary to call forth each particular task in the appropriate context enter into consciousness *automatically*. This comes about in virtue of the fact that the objects whose realization is the goal of the given constituent micro-actions have become, in different ways, stamped with value in their own right. Or more precisely, since for Ehrenfels value is itself just the relation of desirability of an object for a subject, the subject himself becomes affected in such a way that desire for the realization of the given object arises automatically within him, without his having to recall or work out rationally in each successive instance why it is that he finds the given object valuable.

The mechanisms by which the subject is affected in the relevant ways are certain highly general feeling-dispositions 'which enable us to carry through a system of actions once started with relatively little expense of presentational activity in our desiring' (p. 372). These are portmanteau feeling-dispositions, effective, in principle, in relation to all spheres of life, dispositions which we have just because we are normally developed acting, desiring subjects. Thus, at least within certain limits, we possess a disposition to feel more comfortable in doing *what we have done before* (the mechanism of *habituation*). We possess a disposition to feel uneasiness at an interruption of a system of actions once initiated, or at the giving up of a decision once made.¹⁷ It is as a result of these

17. The parallel suggests itself between these phenomena and the phenomena of time-preference and risk-aversion discussed by economists (and in particular by the members of the Austrian school). All the given dispositions occur to

and related dispositions that objects which we have once conceived as means towards some desired goal thereby quickly acquire the characteristic of goods in their own right. Thus we are spared the constant regard to the end-result or ultimate goal of our actions, *or to any goal at all*. In the course of the execution of the overwhelming majority of our actions we proceed *mechanically*.

The student, for example, does not need to recall, as he buys his train ticket at the station, that he is doing this because it is necessary to reach the mountains; he has already qualified the ticket – or the possession of the ticket – as a ‘good’ in the considerations which preceded his decision. And he desires this good, now, for as long as the given considerations are not put out of action – not as means, but as end, just as he desires the view from the mountains (p. 373).

Where we imagine that a given system of actions is running its course in a way which implies that it is coordinated by a determined ego or self, characterized by resolution and single-mindedness, there is in fact a continuous and somewhat haphazard switching of desire from end-result to mediate goal, from present action to subsequent action, interspersed, for the far greater part of the time (or, in cases of total routinization, usurped entirely), by periods without any sort of desire at all. And we can hereby begin to understand how it is possible that the specific material dispositions appropriate to given higher-order actions should become inscribed on the individual, and how the associated systems of cultural values should come into being and should thereafter be preserved and respected. Consider, for example, the complex networks of values which are involved in the respect we have for good manners, or for good grammar, or for legal or political institutions, including that tacit respect which is involved in our performance of everyday tasks of speaking or eating or driving a car. The dispositions to feeling which these values reflect are not, except in small degree, innate; and nor are they acquired as a result of rational insight on the part of individuals into the truth or falsity of given laws or maxims. Rather, they are the cumulative effects of the workings of mechanisms of habituation, etc., of the kind referred to above.¹⁸

different degrees in different individuals, and in different types and classes of individual. All can be affected by (and have an effect on the success of) education and training.

18. Similar ideas are defended in Hayek 1962. They can be detected also in the thinking of Hume, for whom the notion of *habit* played a central role, not least in his conception of the workings of political and religious institutions. (See Ehrenfels, 1887, pp. 554, 576.)

In the vast majority of cases, these mechanisms are brought into play and the relevant dispositions thereby become inscribed on the subject, as a result of the fact that an individual is constrained by another to execute a given higher-order action *against his will*. Individuals acquire culture above all through training and education and through the mutual adjustment of behaviour in social groups at different levels. Ehrenfels' work on value might thus best be summarized as an attempt to describe the ways in which values are thereby formed, of the ways in which the world itself becomes marked by patterns of salience, as part of that necessarily collective or collaborative process which we call cultural evolution.

Chapter Ten

Carl Menger

On Austrian Philosophy and Austrian Economics

1. *The Intellectual Background of Austrian Economics*

Carl Menger, the founder of the Austrian school of economics, was born in 1840 in Neusandez (Nowy Sącz), 50 miles south of Cracow in the Carpathian mountains. He died in Vienna in 1921. From 1859 to 1865 he studied and worked in Vienna, Prague and Lvov, and in 1867 he received the Doctor of Laws from the University of Cracow. For much of the period leading up to the publication in 1871 of his *magnum opus*, the *Principles of Economics*, Menger was employed as a financial journalist, and his observation of the detailed day-to-day workings of the markets can be seen to have contributed significantly to the micro-economic and subjectivistic orientation of his economic thinking.¹ The school which he founded has been influential of late above all in virtue of its emphasis on the unsurveyable complexity of economic phenomena and on the consequent unfeasibility of macro-economic planning. Some contemporary Austrian economists see their work as providing a theoretical alternative to mainstream neo-classical economics and they have criticized especially the use of the concept of market equilibrium as a central tool of economic theory. Market phenomena are from the Austrian perspective to be conceived not in terms of static equilibria but rather as a matter of processes constantly in flux, processes which turn above all on changes in the perceptions and expectations and subjective evaluations of economic agents. The members of the Austrian school have accordingly devoted much effort to the analysis of the role of knowledge and error and of processes of reason and appraisal in economic life.

1. See Boos 1986, ch. II.

Menger himself contributed not only to economics but also to the foundations of the social sciences in general, above all in the clarification of the notion of a ‘spontaneous order’ or in other words of the ways in which social formations may represent the consequences of human actions without being the products of human design. It is especially Hayek who has exploited Menger’s thoughts in this respect, applying them to phenomena such as language, law, religion, politics and morals in a way which Hayek sees as providing a new foundation of the social sciences in general. Here, however, we are concerned not with the economic and social theories of the Austrian school, but rather with the philosophy which underlies their work, a philosophy which will prove to be an integral part of Austrian philosophy in general.

Austrian philosophy is marked, as we saw, by the absence of entrenched Kantian and Hegelian elements, philosophical education in the Habsburg lands having been dominated instead by textbooks whose content was drawn from Catholic school-philosophy and from the Leibnizian-Wolffian ‘*Popularphilosophie*’ that had been current also in Germany until the time of Kant. It is against this background that both the Brentanian movement and the Austrian school of economics grew up and became established. Machian positivism, too, was a product of this same intellectual environment, and it is interesting to note that both Mach and the Brentanists share with Menger the use of what we might call a composite method, consisting in the analysis of a given subject-matter into simple and basic elements together with an investigation of the systematic ways in which these elements may be combined together into wholes. Where for Mach, however, the repertoire of available wholes is limited to always provisional and continually changing aggregations with which at best quantitative measures and provisional hypotheses concerning functional relations can be associated, Brentano sees the composite method as leading to apodictic knowledge of qualitatively different sorts of structured wholes built up in intelligible ways out of different sorts of parts. Both Mach and Brentano were ‘empiricists’, but there is a striking difference between the phenomenalist empiricism of Mach and what we might call the qualitative and structuralist empiricism of Brentano and his circle.

Many later philosophers of science have embraced a view of science as an essentially predictive enterprise, conceiving the scientific method as bound essentially to what is capable of being expressed numerically and as being

concerned primarily with the building up of quantitative ‘models’. For thinkers in the Brentanist tradition, in contrast, empiricism is consistent both with the idea that the scientist may have insight into the structures with which he deals (in a sense to be explained below), and with the idea that mere description is a scientific enterprise worthy of pursuit, even if such description leads to the conclusion that predictive laws in certain spheres are unobtainable. It is not least for this reason that the Austrian economists will be seen to be allied with Brentano and his heirs.

Menger stands out from other economists of his day most of all in that he affirms the possibility of a quite specific sort of theoretical rigour in economic science. More precisely, he argues that ‘exact theory’, a theory resting on a small number of evident axioms, is possible in economics.² There are, he holds, certain simple economic categories which are *universal* (in the sense that they are capable of being exemplified in principle in every economy) and which are capable of being grasped as such by the economic theorist. Propositions expressing the relations among such categories are called by Menger ‘exact laws’. Such laws may be either static or dynamic – they may concern either the co-existence or the succession of corresponding individual instances. It is knowledge of exact laws, as Menger sees it, which constitutes scientific knowledge and scientific theory in the strict sense. The general laws of essence of which such a theory would consist are subject to no exceptions. In this respect they are comparable to the laws of geometry or mechanics, and contrasted with statements of fact and with inductive hypotheses. The aim of the ‘exact orientation of research’ is, as Menger puts it,

the determination of strict laws of the phenomena, of regularities in the succession of phenomena which not only present themselves as exceptionless, but which, when we take account of the ways in which we have come to know them, in fact bear within themselves the guarantee of their own exceptionlessness (1883, p. 38, Eng. p. 59, translation corrected).

2. Compare Husserl’s treatment of ‘exact science’ in his *Ideas* I, §§ 72f. An exact science, in Husserl’s sense, is a theory built up logically from a small number of primitive concepts and axioms which together suffice to determine completely a given domain of research. (Husserl is thinking here above all of Euclidean geometry.) It is essential to this domain that the totality of all its possible constituent formations is determined ‘completely and unambiguously on lines of pure analytic necessity’.

The scientist must from Menger's point of view learn to recognize the general recurring structures in the flux of reality. The theoretical understanding which he seeks cannot be achieved via any mere inductive enumeration of cases. It is attained, rather, only by apprehending the phenomenon in question as

a special case of a certain regularity (conformity to law) in the succession, or in the coexistence of phenomena. In other words, we become aware of the basis of the existence and the peculiarity of the essence of a concrete phenomenon by learning to recognize in it the exemplification of a conformity-to-law of phenomena in general. (Menger 1883, p. 17, Eng. pp. 44f.)

Theoretical research, for Menger, 'seeks to ascertain the *simplest elements* of everything real, elements which must be thought of as strictly typical just because they are the simplest.' (1883, p. 41, Eng. p. 60) The theorist must therefore learn to penetrate through the dross of ephemeral detail. He must seek to determine the elements

without considering whether they are present in reality as *independent* phenomena; indeed, even without considering whether they can at all be presented in their full purity. In this manner theoretical research arrives at *qualitatively* strictly typical forms of the phenomena (*loc. cit.*).

Exact theory results, then, at least in part, when means are found for mapping or picturing the composition of such simple and prototypical constituents into larger wholes. Or as Brentano puts it, the theoretical science of psychology,

seeks to display all the ultimate psychic components from whose combination one with another the totality of psychic phenomena would result, just as the totality of words is yielded by the letters of the alphabet (quoted in Brentano 1982, pp. xf).

Menger is critical of those 'historicist' economists in Germany who had insisted on a relativization of the content of economics to particular times and cultures, and he is critical also of a purely quantitative economics. He will thus be seen to stand in opposition to German historicist economics in a way which parallels the opposition of Brentano to for example Hegel, just as he stands in opposition to merely quantitative theorizing in a way which parallels Brentano's opposition to Mach and Wundt.³

3. Compare also the structuralist opposition to historical linguistics defended by Marty and de Saussure.

As we have seen, the two movements of Austrian philosophy and Austrian economics are historically linked in virtue of the fact that both Meinong and Ehrenfels, founders of the ‘second’ Austrian school of value theory, were students of Menger in Vienna. But Prague too was a centre of Austrian economics, and the first and second Austrian schools of value theory were closely associated there also, above all through the acquaintanceship of Ehrenfels and Wieser and through the activities of Brentano’s disciple Oskar Kraus. Böhm-Bawerk in his three-volume work on capital theory (1909–14) takes explicit account of the work of Brentano and Kraus in his attempts to establish a psychological foundation for his theory of the role of time in interest-rate formation, and Kraus (1905) attempted in his turn to lay bare what he saw as the Aristotelian roots of Austrian economic theory – thereby demonstrating also its affinities to certain Brentanian ideas.

The two movements are linked together by their common relationship to English philosophy,⁴ and they are linked further by a common ‘subjectivist’ concern to relate all macro-phenomena to the underlying beliefs, decisions, expectations, preferences, habits, tastes, etc. of individuals and thus also by a more or less explicit orientation around psychology. There are links also between Austrian economics and phenomenology. Thus Husserl, too, attempts to develop a general theory of value on a subjective (‘phenomenological’) basis. He propounds his own version of the compositive method and he defends a qualitative empiricism relying in no small part on the evidence of introspection. Moreover, in his doctrine of the *a priori* of the *Lebenswelt*, Husserl adopts as the basis of his philosophizing just those phenomena of everyday human action which, from a different perspective, form the starting point of Austrian economics.⁵

Of all the phenomenologists, however, it is Adolf Reinach who is most important for our present purposes, Reinach having in some respects achieved for legal science what Menger and his school had sought in the field of economics. Thus in his ‘A Priori Foundations of Civil Law’ of 1913 Reinach seeks to develop a categorial ontology of the legal sphere as a first step towards

4. See Shearmur 1986 and the references there given.

5. On Husserl’s value theory see the materials collected in Husserl 1988. On his compositive method see Smith and Mulligan 1982, esp. §§ 3f. On the *Lebenswelt* or ‘life world’ see Husserl 1962.

what he calls an *a priori* ontology of the social world.⁶ As Reinach puts it, when I predicate something of a particular legal formation, for example of a claim, obligation, relation of ownership, etc.,

then the predication applies to the entity not as this individual but rather as a formation of this specific kind. But this means that the predication is valid for *absolutely everything* which is of this kind, and that it *necessarily* belongs to every such thing ... That certain objects lie next to each other in the world is an individual and accidental state of affairs. That a claim lapses through being waived is grounded in the essence of a claim as such and holds therefore necessarily and universally. *A priori statements hold of legal formations.* This *a priori* does not mean anything dark or mystical, it is based on the simple facts which we just mentioned: every state of affairs which is universal and such as to obtain necessarily in the sense explained is what we shall call *a priori*. We shall see that there is a vast realm of such *a priori* statements, which can be rigorously formulated, have an evidence enabling them to be known by insight, and are independent of the consciousness which grasps them (Reinach 1913, p. 689, Eng. p. 5).

In his account of the relations between such basic legal phenomena as contract, obligation, promise, etc., Reinach goes on to deal explicitly with the ways in which the corresponding *a priori* structures may become modified in their instantiation in given contexts, for example through the acts of legislators and judges.⁷ Reinach's work in this connection bears comparison with that of Friedrich von Wieser, who sees economic theory analogously as beginning with the description – based in part on introspection – of the simplest structures of economic reality, this description being then supplemented and to some extent corrected by empirical research into the various ways in which these simple structures may come to be affected contingently in different historical contexts.⁸

It will be important in what follows further that there exist affinities between the second generation of Austrian economists and Austrian philosophers of science. Thus for example the mathematician Karl Menger, son of Carl, was an active member of the Vienna circle and the author of a number of works in ethics and decision theory. Hayek (a distant cousin of Wittgenstein

6. Reinach 1913, pp. 690ff., Eng. pp. 5ff. See also the papers collected in Mulligan (ed.) 1987. On Reinach's general apriorism see his 1914.

7. Reinach 1913, §§ 8f.

8. See Wieser 1927, pp. 5ff.

and friend of Popper) had himself seriously considered joining the Vienna circle, and phenomenologists such as Alfred Schütz and Felix Kaufmann, themselves close friends of Hayek, who sought to apply Husserlian ideas in the social sciences, also maintained friendly relations with the logical positivist movement. Ludwig's brother Richard we have already met as a member of the Vienna circle and author of a tract on logical positivism. And even though the Mises brothers were methodologically at odds with each other, ideas accepted by the Vienna circle did, as we shall see, influence Ludwig's economic thinking, though the major influence of Viennese positivism on contemporary economics has been in helping to determine the methodological ideas of the neo-classical mainstream, most conspicuously through the work of Milton Friedman and the Chicago school.

2. *A Priori and Analytic Truths*

My concern, however, is not primarily with the historical links between the two traditions of Austrian economics and Austrian philosophy, but rather with the affinity between their respective methods and doctrines. For an awareness of this affinity can help us to understand both certain peculiarities of Austrian economics as this has developed from the time of Menger, and also the precise nature of that Austrian philosophy which is the subject of this volume. More precisely, I want to argue that it is a certain non-Kantian account of the *a priori*, first formulated explicitly by Husserl and Reinach,⁹ which underlies the work of Menger and of the school that he founded.

From the Kantian perspective (which for present purposes we need offer only in a heavily simplified form), the world as it is in itself is – from the point of view of the cognizing subject – an unintelligible chaos. There arises an *a priori* dimension in our knowledge of this world only as a result of the fact that we ourselves ('transcendentally') impose an order on this chaos, an order which reflects the structures of the human mind. (Recall, here, Hume's doctrine of the causal relation as something that is superadded to what is given in sensation.) The logical positivists, too, started out from this Kantian conception of the *a*

9. The germs of this account are present already in Leibniz's doctrine of the *disparatae* (see e.g. Burkhardt 1980, pp. 134ff.), and in Hume's treatment of colour-relations (see, again, Reinach 1911 and the discussion in Smith (ed.) 1982).

priori. They went further than Kant, however, in embracing the thesis that propositions are capable of being known *a priori* if and only if they are ‘analytic’ in the sense that they are capable of being reduced to substitution instances of truths of logic by a process of successive elimination of defined terms. ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is analytic in this sense, as can be seen if we replace ‘bachelor’ by ‘unmarried man’ in such a way as to yield a sentence of the form: ‘all As which are B are B’. In order to defend this view, the logical positivists sought to show how candidate examples of ‘synthetic’ *a priori* propositions can be reduced to analytic truths via demonstrations of a sort which, especially through the work of Frege and Russell, had already been obtained with some success in the sphere of mathematics. When it came to driving home these (partial) successes in extra-mathematical spheres, however, the results obtained were much less convincing, often involving *ad hoc* shifts in the meaning of ‘analytic’. What is not usually recognized in this respect is that the most problematic examples were precisely those taken over from the aprioristic tradition of Husserl, Reinach and other early phenomenologists.¹⁰ Thus the members of the Schlick circle were especially concerned with propositions like ‘nothing can be both red and green all over’, ‘if something is red then it is not green’, ‘all colours are extended’, and so on, examples of candidate synthetic *a priori* propositions which would not have been at home in the framework of Kant and his successors.

Husserl and Reinach, in contrast, regarded such examples as giving rise to the necessity of holding on to a more traditional view according to which the division of propositions into *analytic-necessary* and *empirical-contingent* is not exhaustive: a third class of irreducibly synthetic *a priori* propositions must be recognized also, embracing not only propositions relating to colour-relations and like phenomena but also propositions drawn from disciplines relating quite generally to the territories of phenomenology, value theory, Reinachian legal theory, phonology, universal or categorial grammar, speech act theory, and that proto-science of human action we call Austrian economics. The claim of Husserl and Reinach is indeed that there is an *a priori* dimension across the entire range of both science and everyday experience, so that vastly more

10. See, on this, especially Delius 1963, Chs. 1 and 2, Visser 1979, and Zilian 1990, Ch. 10.

propositions turn out to be synthetic and *a priori* from their point of view than from that of Kant.¹¹

The realm of what is knowable is thereby seen as embracing not only contingent regularities knowable *a posteriori* (by experiment and induction) and analytic truths knowable *a priori* (by analysis of words or concepts), but also truths synthetic and *a priori* which reflect corresponding structures or relations in the world. These structures are universal or multiply exemplifiable, and they are typically a matter of how simple elements are bound together in intelligible ways into larger wholes. It is, as Husserl puts it:

not a peculiarity of certain sorts of parts that they should only be parts in general, while it would remain quite indifferent what conglomerates with them, and into what sorts of contexts they are fitted. Rather there obtain firmly determined relations of necessity, laws *determinate in their content* which vary with the species of dependent contents and accordingly prescribe one sort of completion to one of them and another sort of completion to another. (1900/01, vol. II, A244f., Eng. p. 454)

Such structures are ‘intelligible’ in the sense that they can be grasped immediately and without experiment or inductive inference, in much the same way that we grasp, for example, the validity of a mathematical proof. How, after all, could we go about verifying the proposition that red is not green, or that nothing can be red and green all over? It is clearly not conceivable that propositions such as this should be verified by induction or experiment.

Perhaps, though, we can show that propositions of the given sort (for example the propositions holding in the sphere of colour-relations) are analytic. The issue as to whether this is possible comes down, first of all, to the question whether we can re-express the given propositions in such a way that at most one single primitive non-logical concept would be employed. For suppose that two such concepts were required, neither definable in terms of the other. Then we shall have to address the issue as to the nature of those propositions which express the non-trivial relations between these concepts. These cannot, *ex hypothesi*, be analytic, for there are no defined non-logical terms which could be eliminated in such a way as to reveal the corresponding statements as truths of logic, and no substitution instance of a truth of logic contains a plurality of

11. Cf. again Reinach 1913, p. 689, Eng. p. 5. In his “Origins of Geometry” (published as Beilage III to Husserl 1962), Husserl presents the outlines of a theory of the *a priori* of history (of tradition, culture, historical evidence and historical time).

non-logical terms in other than trivial ways (of the sort that are illustrated, for example, in a case like ‘ $\forall x(Fx \ \& \ Gx \ \rightarrow \ Gx)$ ’). But nor can the relations between such primitive concepts (for example brightness and saturation in the sphere of colours) be merely factual (*synthetic a posteriori*). Yet no alternative remains, so that the original assumption that there are two or more such concepts must be rejected. In a domain like that of colour-relations, however, the thesis that there should be only one such concept can be ruled out also, in reflection of the degree of complexity that is manifested by the phenomena in question.

An argument such as this helps to make intelligible why logicist philosophers of mathematics sought so strenuously to prove that all propositions of mathematics were analytic by showing how they could all be derived from axioms governing the single non-logical primitive concept of *set*. But the same argument serves also to make intelligible one peculiarly controversial feature of Austrian economics in the formulation that was given to it by Mises, the leading figure in the twentieth-century renaissance of Austrian economics in the United States. For Mises held that there is but one single non-logical concept (or ‘category’ or ‘essence’) of that general theory of human action which he calls ‘praxeology’:

All that is needed for the deduction of all praxeological theorems is knowledge of the essence of human action ... The only way to a cognition of these theorems is logical analysis of our inherent knowledge of the category of action ... Like logic and mathematics, praxeological knowledge is in us; it does not come from without. (1966, p. 64; see also Rothbard 1957)

Mises, as we shall see shortly, has here drawn together in illegitimate fashion the two concepts of the *a priori* and the analytic.

Even a discipline whose axioms are constructed on the basis of only one non-logical primitive need not be analytic however. Consider, for example, the case of mereology, the theory of part and whole, which we can assume to have been built up from the single primitive concept *part*. The latter is a formal concept, in the sense that it can be applied, in principle, to all matters without restriction. But it is not treated as a logical concept in the standard textbooks, and nor can it be defined in terms of the logical concepts which are standardly recognized as such. Thus it seems that the concept *part* is a non-logical primitive. Consider the proposition

If *a* is part of *b*, and *b* is part of *c*, then *a* is part of *c*,

which asserts that the corresponding relation is transitive. This is, to be sure, a ‘trifling proposition’ in the sense of Locke.¹² Yet it is not analytic, for there is no law of logic to which, when defined terms are removed, it would correspond as a substitution instance. But it is surely also *a priori*.

Kantians and positivists conceive the *a priori* as a matter of relations between concepts which enjoy a purely mental existence and as being in some sense a contribution of the knowing subject. The Husserlian, in contrast, conceives the *a priori* as a matter of intrinsically intelligible relations between species or structures of objects in the world, relations which would obtain even if there were no minds to apprehend them. And where Kantians and positivists hold that a *priori* knowledge is either empty (‘analytic’) or a reflection of the fact that we see the world through ‘conceptual spectacles’ which somehow allow us to make sense of that world, the Husserlian holds that a *priori* knowledge is read off the world, reflecting the fact that certain structures in reality are intrinsically intelligible.¹³

When once they are properly understood, however, the two conceptions of *a priori* judgments or propositions need not be irresolvably in conflict. It may very well be that, even in a world which manifests structures of an intrinsically intelligible sort, there might still be room for certain dimensions of non-contingent (conventional?) structures that are read into the world in the way the Kantian would require. Moreover, it may be that the Kantian notion of an epistemological *a priori* itself requires a foundation in an ontological *a priori* of the sort here defined. For if Kantian *a priori* formings and shapings are read into reality, then we know at least that reality must be dispositionally such that it can bear such forms, and the *fundamenta* of the relevant dispositional properties would then constitute something like the *a priori in re* that is

12. *Essay*, Book IV, Ch. VIII. Apparent counterexamples (obtained for example by setting A = my finger, B = me, C = the human race) turn on equivocations in the meaning of ‘is part of’.

13. I have spoken here rather loosely of ‘Kantians and positivists’, but Kant’s own views are rather special, and it is a simplified version of these views which has influenced the debate on the synthetic *a priori* in the last hundred years. Thus there are no *a priori* propositions in Kant, but rather *a priori* ‘forms’; these allow *a priori* judgments, which are held in turn to provide the ‘conditions of the possibility’ of science. Mathematics, for example, is based on the *a priori* forms of intuition (space and time), physics on causality and on other *a priori* categories of the understanding.

admitted by Husserl and Reinach. Moreover, even if the world in itself were infinitely elastic in the sense that it would be capable of bearing any and every sort of forming and shaping, then it seems that there must still be some residual *a priori* structure in the Husserlian sense on the side of the mind that is responsible for this forming and shaping. For if the latter is not itself entirely random, then the mind itself must possess some structures of its own, and these cannot themselves be the result of forming and shaping in the Kantian sense, on pain of vicious regress.

This brings us to a further central argument against the Kantian view, which we might call the argument from arbitrariness, an argument which incidentally applies also to Mach's doctrine of the *a priori* as a matter of 'thought economy'. Let us suppose, for the moment, that the Kantian is correct in his view that the *a priori* quality of laws or propositions is entirely a matter of impositions. Imagine that the totality of all laws or propositions is laid out before us. Is it to be completely arbitrary which of these laws or propositions are to enjoy the 'imposed' quality of apriority? A positive answer to this question of the sort that is favoured by Carnap is belied by the extent to which there is wide agreement across times and cultures as to which the candidate *a priori* laws or propositions might be. A negative answer, on the other hand, implies that there is some non-arbitrary quality on the side of certain laws or propositions themselves, in virtue of which precisely those laws or propositions do indeed serve as the targets of imposition. Clearly, however, this special quality must itself be prior to any sort of mental imposition which might come to be effected, which means that the original assumption, to the effect that the *a priori* quality of laws or propositions is a matter of imposition, turns out to be self-refuting.

One poignant illustration of the opposition between the views described is to be found in the metaphysics of Schopenhauer. In the second volume of *The World as Will and Presentation* we find a table of what Schopenhauer calls "Praedicabilia A Priori".¹⁴ These are *a priori* truths divided by Schopenhauer into three groups of 27 propositions each, relating, respectively, to time, space and matter. Under 'Time', for example, are listed:

- There is only *one* time, and all different times are parts thereof.

14. 1966, vol. II, p. 46.

- Different times are not simultaneous but successive.
- Time cannot be thought away, yet everything can be thought away from it.

- Time has no permanence, but passes away as soon as it is here.

Under 'Space', similarly, Schopenhauer has:

- There is only *one* space, and all different spaces are parts of it.
- Different spaces are not successive but simultaneous.
- Space cannot be thought away, yet everything can be thought away from it.
- Space can never pass away but endures forever.

And under 'Matter' he has:

- There is only *one* matter, and all different stuffs are different states thereof: as such it is called *substance*.
- Different matters (stuffs) are not so through the subject but through their accidents.
- The annihilation of matter cannot be conceived, yet the annihilation of all its forms and accidents can.
- The accidents change, the substance endures.

How does Schopenhauer suggest that we are to interpret these and the remaining seventy or so different *a priori* propositions on his list? Two alternatives are available, he tells us, and these turn out to correspond exactly to the Kantian and Husserlian alternatives presented above. We can, he says,

regard this table at our discretion either as a collection of the eternal, basic laws of the world, and consequently as the basis of an ontology; or as a chapter from the physiology of the brain; according as we take up the realistic or idealistic point of view (*loc. cit.*).

It is the second view which is, Schopenhauer goes on, 'in the last instance right'

- which means that, for a philosopher of Schopenhauerian bent, the *a priori* sciences turn out to be branches of neurophysiology: each has to do with the ways in which the *brain* forms or shapes experience according to its own requirements (in a way which makes Schopenhauer very easily susceptible to the argument from arbitrariness presented above).

3. *Linguistics and Economics*

We can begin to make more sense of the Husserlian doctrine if we consider briefly the more recent ‘universals of language’ research programme in linguistics.¹⁵ Here the assumption is made that there are structures in (linguistic) reality which are universal to all languages. There are different ways in which this universality might be understood. One might, for example, be able to demonstrate that (some of) the structures in question reflect the hard wiring of the human brain or the make-up of the organs of speech and hearing. Alternatively, one might seek to show that they are structures manifested (in principle) by every natural language because they are indispensable to every utterance as such, or to every act of communication, to every promise, and so on. The given structures are, in any case, at least tacitly familiar to everyone who has dealings with the objects concerned (i.e. to every speaker of a language). Yet this does not by any means imply that it is a simple matter to discover what such structures are and to formulate workable and realistic theories about them. Nor does it imply that the issue as to which sorts of linguistic structures are universal is a matter of the ‘conceptual spectacles’ of the language-using subject. Nor, finally, does it imply that this issue is merely a matter for arbitrary legislation by the linguistic theorist. Universals of language are not created by the linguist. They are discovered through painstaking theoretical efforts.

And so, too, in the case of Husserlian phenomenology. Here, also, we are dealing with universal structures of experience (of perception and judgment, feeling and imagination) which are at least tacitly familiar to every individual. Yet this does not imply that it is a simple matter to discover what such structures are and to formulate workable theories about them. Nor does it imply that the issue as to which structures of experience are universal is a matter for arbitrary legislation by the phenomenologist, or that it is a matter of the ‘conceptual spectacles’ brought to bear on his experience by the experiencing subject. Universals of experience are not created, either by the phenomenologist or by the experiencing subject. They are discovered through painstaking theoretical efforts.

15. See Holenstein 1975, 1986 and the references there given.

And Austrian economics, similarly, is built up on the basis of the thesis that there are in the sphere of economic phenomena structures which are universal in the sense that – because they are indispensable to every economic action as such, or to every instance of exchange, barter, rent, profit, price as such – they are manifested (in principle) in every economy. The given structures are also at least tacitly familiar to everyone who has dealings with the objects concerned (i.e. to every economic agent, to every observer of the behaviour of markets). Yet this does not by any means imply that it is a simple matter to discover what such structures are and to formulate workable theories about them. Nor does it imply that the issue as to which sorts of economic structures are universal is a matter for arbitrary legislation by the economic theorist or of the ‘conceptual spectacles’ of the economic agent. Universals of economic reality are not arbitrary creations of the economist. They are not created in any sense. They, too, are discovered through painstaking theoretical efforts.

Menger quite clearly believes that there are *a priori* categories (‘essences’ or ‘natures’) existing autonomously in reality and that *a priori* propositions reflect structures or connections among such essences. Thus he insists that economists study not concepts or other creatures of the mind, but rather the qualitative essences or natures of and the relations between such categories as value, rent, profit, the division of labour, money, and so on:

Theoretical economics has the task of investigating the *general essence* and the *general connection* of economic phenomena, not of analyzing economic *concepts* and of drawing the conclusions resulting from this analysis. The phenomena, or certain aspects of them, and not their linguistic image, the concepts, are the object of theoretical research in the field of economy. (Menger 1883, p. 6, n. 4, Eng. p. 37)

Or again:

The goal of scholarly research is not only the *cognition*, but also the *understanding* (*das Verständnis*) of phenomena. We have *gained cognition* of a phenomenon when we have attained a mental picture of it. We understand it when we have recognized the reason for its existence and for its characteristic quality (the reason for its *being* and for its *so-being*). (*Op. cit.*, p.14, Eng. p. 43)

Menger, in fact, seeks to develop a categorial ontology of economic reality in just the sense in which Brentano sought a categorial ontology of psychological reality. He seeks to establish how the various different sorts of building blocks

of economic reality can be combined together in different sorts of structured wholes, and to establish through the application of what he himself called a genetical-compositional method how such wholes may originate and how they may develop and become transformed over time into other kinds of wholes. Indeed, because the essences and essential structures are intelligible, the corresponding laws are capable of being grasped by the scientific theorist in principle on the basis of a single instance. As Menger puts it:

There is one rule of cognition for the investigation of theoretical truths which is not only, as far as this is possible, verified by experience, but is verified in indubitable fashion by our very laws of thinking ... This is the thesis that *whatever was observed in even only one case must always come to appearance again under exactly the same factual conditions* ... This rule holds not only of the essence of phenomena, but also of their *measure* (1883, p. 40, Eng. p. 60, translation amended).

Clearly none of the above allows that the economist's understanding might flow from the fact that the propositions of economics reflect structures that have been imposed upon the world – in Kantian fashion – by either the economic theorist or the economic agent. Rather, Menger's view implies precisely that economic reality is such as to manifest certain simple intelligible structures in and of itself, structures which the economic theorist is able to grasp in virtue of the fact that he is in a position to put himself into the shoes of the individual subjects in whose processes of thought and action they are exemplified.

4. *Ludwig von Mises and the Synthetic A Priori*

An apriorism of this sort does not mean (any more than in the case of linguistic universals) that economic theory is free of any empirical components. As we shall see, it is a difficult matter to sort out what, precisely, the appropriate role for empirical investigation in economics (and in related disciplines) might be. It is insisted upon by apriorists of whatever hue, however, that quantitative investigations and quantitative theorizing can be carried out coherently only on the basis of at least some prior categorical understanding of the natures of the entities to be measured and compared. Not only for Kant, but from the Husserlian perspective, too, the dimension of *a priori* structures has an important role to play in the foundation of the sciences. All scientists, the apriorist holds, bring with them descriptive presuppositions of different sorts, presuppositions which are usually tacit in nature, which will often seem trivial when made explicit, and which will therefore no less often lend sanction to the view that they are merely empty or analytic. The ontological grammar of economic reality that is sketched by Menger can be seen in this light as providing a pre-empirical qualitative framework of this sort in whose terms specific empirical hypotheses in the social sciences can be formulated.

Ludwig von Mises, too, was aware of this necessary role of *a priori* propositions at the basis of economic science. The propositions of praxeology, as he himself points out,

are not derived from experience. They are, like those of logic and mathematics, a priori. They are not subject to verification or falsification on the ground of experience and facts. They are both logically and temporally antecedent to any comprehension of historical facts. They are a necessary requirement of any intellectual grasp of historical events. Without them we should not be able to see in the course of events anything else than kaleidoscopic change and chaotic muddle. (1966, p. 32)

But what, then, was the precise doctrine of the *a priori* that was accepted by Mises? On the one hand it is clear that Mises sees his methodology primarily in terms recalling Kantian doctrines. This is seen, for example, in his oft-repeated remarks to the effect that: ‘The a priori sciences – logic, mathematics, and praxeology – aim at a knowledge unconditionally valid for all beings endowed with the logical structure of the human mind’ (Mises 1966, p. 57). But Mises insists in addition that the theory of human action is a purely analytic

discipline whose principles would flow from the logical analysis of certain concepts. Praxeology, he tells us, is like logic and mathematics in the sense that its content is a matter of empty tautologies: ‘Aprioristic reasoning is purely conceptual and deductive. It cannot produce anything else but tautologies and analytic judgments.’ Thus for example: ‘In the concept of money all the theorems of monetary theory are already implied.’ (1966, p. 38)

Consider, however, the veritable plenitude of non-logical concepts which praxeology involves. As Mises himself informs us,¹⁶ action involves *apprehension of causal relations and of regularities in the phenomena*. It presupposes *being in a position to influence causal relations*. It presupposes *felt uneasiness*. It involves *the exercise of reason*. It is *a striving to substitute a more satisfactory for a less satisfactory state of affairs*.

Acting man transfers the valuation of ends he aims at to the means he anticipates utilizing. Action *takes time*, which like other *scarce factors* must be *economized*. Action presupposes *choosing between various opportunities offered for choice*.

Action involves *the expectation that purposeful behaviour has the power to remove or at least alleviate uneasiness*. It presupposes *the uncertainty of the future*. It involves *meanings which the acting parties attribute to the situation*. A thing becomes *a means* only when reason *plans to employ it for the attainment of some end and action really employs it for this purpose*.

Certainly some of the concepts involved in the above may reasonably be counted as logical concepts; others may no less reasonably be conceived as being introduced by definitions formulated in terms of more primitive concepts. Consider, however, the concepts *causation, relative satisfactoriness, reason, uneasiness, valuation, anticipation, means, ends, utilization, time, scarcity, opportunity, choice, uncertainty and expectation*. The idea that one could simultaneously and without circularity reduce every one of these concepts to the single concept of action, that they could all be defined by purely logical means in terms of this one single concept, is decisively to be rejected. Indeed Austrian economics seems to be like other *a priori* disciplines in that it involves a multiplicity of concepts connected together not hierarchically but rather in a

16. Mises 1966, Chs. IV and V. Consider also Mises 1981, p. 24.

dense holistic network of mutual connections whose order is not capable of being antecedently established.¹⁷

As in Menger, therefore, so also in Mises, we are dealing with a family of *a priori* categories and categorial structures which are – in contradistinction to Mises’ self-interpretation but still in concordance with his actual practice in economics – not analytic but synthetic. The laws governing such structures can almost all of them be expressed in the form of what linguists call ‘implicative universals’, which is to say principles to the effect that, if instances of some given species or category K_1 exist, then as a matter of necessity these and those other categories K_2, \dots, K_n must be instantiated also. Instances of the necessitating category K_1 are then said to be one-sidedly dependent upon instances of the necessitated categories K_2, \dots, K_n . The formal ontological theory of such dependence relations has been worked out in some detail.¹⁸ It is illustrated in the account of the essence of goods at the beginning of the *Principles*, where Menger tells us that a good exists as such only if the following prerequisites are simultaneously present: a *need* on the part of some human being; *properties of the object* in question which render it capable of being brought into a causal connection with the satisfaction of this need; *knowledge of this causal connection* on the part of the person involved; and *command of the object* sufficient to direct it to the satisfaction of the need.¹⁹ If a good exists, then as a matter of *de re* necessity, entities of these other sorts exist also. And the formal ontological theory of dependence relations is to be found at work also in the context of Misesian praxeology, for example in laws such as:

- If instances of the species *action* exist, then there exist also instances of the species *choice of means, choice of ends, etc.*
- If instances of the species *choice of ends* exist, then so also do instances of the species *apprehension of causal regularities, felt uneasiness, etc.*

17. The discipline of naive physics, too, a discipline which is in many respects comparable to that of praxeology, is marked by a similar network of conceptual connections. See Hayes 1985, pp. 18f., Smith 1993.

18. See Smith (ed.) 1982, Simons 1987, Part III, and Johansson 1989, Ch. 9.

19. Cf. Menger 1871, p. 3, Eng. p. 52 (section 1, “On the Essence of Goods”).

Similar laws are formulated by Reinach for the *a priori* necessitation structures exemplified by speech acts of the various different types and of the associated legal formations, and the same idea can be extended also to the structures of entrepreneurial perception analyzed by Israel Kirzner.²⁰

5. *Two Kinds of Subjectivism*

A priori knowledge is on the Kantian conception a matter of our reading certain conceptual connections into reality. On the Husserlian conception it is a matter of our reading off certain structures in reality which are intelligible in themselves. A parallel opposition applies in the sphere of *value*, and an understanding of the affinities between Austrian philosophy and Austrian economics can help us to find our way also in regard to the issue of subjectivism in the value-theoretic sphere.

The opposition in question is clearly illustrated in the different attempts by Ehrenfels and Meinong to construct a general theory of value on the basis of Brentano's and Menger's ideas. Such a theory, as they conceive it, would establish the laws that govern value as such, wherever it might be realized. Meinong sought in this respect to defend an objectivist theory of value: desire,

20. On Reinach see Mulligan 1987. On Kirzner see my 1986, pp. 18f. Marx, too, utilized necessitation structures of exactly this sort, for example in his analysis of human work in chapter 5 of Book 1 of *Capital*. See, on this, my 1988.

Hoppe has put forward an interesting defence of a purportedly Kantian reading of Mises which seeks to break through the opposition between Kantian and Husserlian apriorism as this has been set out above. This, Hoppe affirms, can be effected by acknowledging the extent to which 'the gulf between the mental and the real, outside, physical world is bridged' through *actions*. Of Mises' 'axiom of action' Hoppe writes:

This axiom, the proposition that humans act, fulfills the requirement precisely for a true synthetic *a priori* proposition. It cannot be denied that this proposition is true, since the denial would have to be categorized as an action – and so the truth of the statement literally cannot be undone. And the axiom is also not derived from observation – there are only bodily movements to be observed but no such things as actions – but stems instead from reflective understanding. (1988, pp. 19f.)

There is much in this with which one can concur, though it has to be noted that a denial of the proposition that human beings act need not in every case be self-refuting: the given proposition might be quite consistently denied by an extraterrestrial being. The approach copes well with a number of *a priori* truths (for example: 'One cannot argue that one cannot argue') at the borders of logic and pragmatics. Yet there would seem to be many propositions classically accepted as synthetic and *a priori* which would not be classified as such on Hoppe's criterion that their truth 'literally cannot be undone' because their denial would be self-refuting as a result of the fact that a denial is an action. Consider, for example, the propositions 'nothing can be red and green all over', 'orange is lighter than red', 'a promise gives rise to mutually correlated claim and obligation', 'given any three distinct tones, one lies intermediate between the other two'. The most worrying feature of Hoppe's account is indeed the suggestion that many of the most central propositions of praxeology will themselves fall outside the scope of the synthetic *a priori* as he conceives it.

he held, is derivative of value, which rests on a capacity of an independent object to awaken positive feelings within us. Value is thus an objective property of the valued object; it is something that is *read off* reality by the valuing subject. Ehrenfels, in contrast, followed Menger in holding that value is in every case a function or product of individual valuing acts. Thus he defended a subjectivist theory, arguing that value must be something that is *read into* the world. For if Meinong were right, Ehrenfels argued, then only existing objects could be desired (since only existing objects can have the capacity to awaken positive feelings). Most desires seem, however, to be directed precisely towards objects which do not exist (or to states of affairs which do not obtain). Desires, therefore, are the more primitive phenomenon, and Ehrenfels accordingly defended a conception of both value and positive feeling as founded on appropriate desires as their presuppositions. It is not that we desire something because it has value. Rather is it as if, through education and experience, we have had inculcated within us a certain repertoire of desire-dispositions and it is in reflection of the latter that the things in our surrounding world appear to have value. As we saw, Ehrenfels seeks to provide an evolutionary theory of the ways in which historical forces may motivate changes in patterns of desire-dispositions over time, and therefore also motivate changes in patterns of value. As he points out, even such ethical phenomena as chastity, honesty, and conformist behaviour may be subject to such principles as the law of diminishing returns, and the relative values accorded to them may therefore change over time.

In a second sense of ‘objectivist’, however, Ehrenfels is no less objectivist than his teacher Meinong. For Ehrenfels certainly believed that it is *true* (objectively) that values and desire-dispositions may change over time and that the former are dependent on the latter. Almost all Austrian philosophers are objectivists in this sense, even those who place the experiences of the human subject at the centre of their philosophies. And the same applies also, I want to claim, to the practitioners of Austrian economics, not only as this was classically conceived, but also in its Misesian, Rothbardian and Kirznerian varieties. Austrian economists themselves have, it is true, rarely felt the need to draw attention to this fact. This is because the discoveries of the Austrian school have derived principally from the application to economic phenomena of insights which derive from subjectivism in the first of our two senses (that value

is dependent on human valuations), and thus Austrians have wanted to emphasize the central role in their theory of the *acting, valuing, human subject* (as opposed to abstract equilibrium models and the like). The very possibility of economics as a theoretical science rests in Menger's eyes on the thesis of subjectivism in this sense, for it is this which implies that one can *understand* the workings of an economy by coming to an understanding of how the value of goods at earlier stages in the process of production is derived from the value to actual consumers of the products of the later stages.

Clearly, however, Austrian economics is in the second sense of the term 'subjectivism' as objectivistic a discipline as any other. It holds that there are *facts* of economic reality – for example that there are acts of entrepreneurial perception, that value is a function of individual valuing acts that is subject to the law of marginal utility, that there are unintended consequences of human action, that time preference is positive, and so on. Austrian economists believe that economic reality is constituted out of highly complex structures of human acts and actions interacting together over time in complex ways – that it is objectively thus. They believe that there are difficulties of principle in gaining access to the detailed contents of such acts on the part of the economic theorist. And, because of the complexity of the relevant interactions (having to do, for example, with the interdependence of our separate beliefs and expectations), they believe that the given reality is – like all psychologically-based phenomena – subject to unforeseeable changes over time. Hence, also, they believe that there are limits to the economist's powers to grasp this reality in theoretical terms. Economic theories may indeed influence and shape economic reality, in the sense that economic agents may have beliefs about such theories which can to some degree influence their own expectations and behaviour. But the Austrian economist does not (and if it is to retain its status as a scientific discipline cannot) maintain that economic theory in any sense 'creates' the economic reality to which it is directed.²¹

21. Subjectivism in the second of our two senses has raised its head among the so-called hermeneuticists of the Austrian school. Thus the principal message of the hermeneutic philosophy that has been embraced of late by D. Lavoie and others is that the 'problem of interpretation' as between one culture and another or between one time and another calls for an overhaul of our familiar ('objectivistic') notions of truth and scientific objectivity in a way which seems to issue in a sort of cultural relativism. See, on this, the material collected in Lavoie (ed.) 1990 and the critical remarks in Steele 1987 and 1987a. Above all, one must reject Lavoie's quite astonishing claim to the effect that:

The roots of modern hermeneutics trace to precisely the elements of German philosophy in which the original Austrian school was immersed ... Hermeneutics is in my view the missing link in the modern American Austrian

6. *Austrian Aristotelianism*

As the Austrians differed from their German contemporaries in their understanding of the *a priori*, so they differed also in what they made of the doctrine of Aristotelianism. For like Brentano, Menger, too, was an Aristotelian in a very broad sense of the term, which it will be our task in what follows to specify more precisely. It is above all the intellectual background against which Menger's ideas were developed which makes inevitable an interpretation along Aristotelian lines,²² even though Menger's writings are not always explicit as concerns the philosophy which underlies them.²³ This, however, turns on the fact that the tacit intellectual background of educated Austrians in Menger's day was Aristotelian through and through – to the extent that Menger himself would have had to draw attention to this background only when attempting to explain his ideas to those, such as Walras, who did not share it.

movement. It reconnects Austrians to their roots in the German language from which their English language training in economics had been artificially disconnected. (1986, p. 25)

A similarly muddled confounding of the distinct intellectual traditions of Austria and Germany is manifest also in McCloskey 1985, p. 39.

22. Thus Aristotelian elements played a crucial role not only in the textbook literature of economics in the nineteenth century (and not least in the work of Mischler, under whom Menger had studied – see Streissler 1990), but also in textbooks of history, legal theory and for example in the writings on political householding of the cameralists (discussed by Silverman in his 1990).

23. Menger's *Investigations* are, as Alter rightly stresses (1989), a critique of the methodological views of the German historicists. They are not the positive statement of Menger's own thinking in this respect announced in 1883, p. 43n (Eng. p. 62). Valuable source-material on these issues has been assembled in Milford 1988 and 1989, who however draws different conclusions from the texts he treats, above all because he is concentrating on the implications of Menger's work for economic *methodology*. Here, in contrast, I am concerned with more basic matters of general philosophy.

The Aristotelian reading of Menger has, it is true, been resisted by some (including his own son Karl²⁴). Such resistance, however, reflects in many cases a desire on the part of advocates of Menger's thinking to divorce his ideas from what is held to be an unfashionable residue of metaphysics.²⁵ Those who have defended the Aristotelian reading have in addition often left much to be desired in the way of precision and detail. Here, therefore, I shall do my best to set out the precise form of the Aristotelianism that is relevant to the thinking of Menger, by seeking to define that basic doctrine of Austrian Aristotelianism that was shared in common by Menger, Brentano and their immediate followers.

I shall confine myself hereby to general philosophy: the ways in which Aristotle's ethics and politics filtered through into the thinking of the Austrian economists will not be of concern.²⁶ As will become clear, it is a highly refined and purified version of Aristotle's general philosophy that is at issue when we are dealing with nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Austrian thought, both in philosophy and in the social sciences, amounting to a doctrine which (at the risk of a certain degree of painful obviousness) can be said to embrace the following theses:

(i) *The world exists, independently of our thinking and reasoning activities.* This world embraces both material and mental aspects, and while we might shape the world and contribute to it through our thoughts and actions, detached and objective theorizing about the world in all its aspects is nonetheless possible.

24. Personal communication. Silverman, too, points to certain flaws in standard Aristotelian readings of Menger's work (e.g. in Kauder 1957), arguing that 'one ought to take seriously Menger's own claim that his method accorded with the dictates of the modern natural sciences, disciplines that he surely understood arose out [of] a centuries-long development propelled in part by criticism of Aristotelian scholasticism' (Silverman 1990, p. 75). Against this, however, there has to weighed Menger's own criticism of the use in economic science of precisely those mathematical sciences which are otherwise seen as being characteristic of modern natural science.

25. Such misplaced charity is illustrated for example in the decision of Menger's translators to translate the technical (and in Menger's usage Aristotelian) term '*Wesen*', normally and correctly translated as 'essence', with the more colloquial 'nature'. (The translations given here have been adjusted accordingly.)

For an illuminating discussion of a parallel case of misplaced charity in interpretation, see Meikle 1985 (esp. pp. 8ff), which rightly lays stress on the Aristotelianism at the core of Marx's thinking.

26. See the material collected in Grassl and Smith (eds.) 1986 for a treatment of this issue. For a survey of the views of the Brentanists on ethics and value theory see Kraus 1937.

(ii) *There are in the world certain simple 'essences' or 'natures' or 'elements', as well as laws, structures or connections governing these, all of which are strictly universal.* They are universal both in the sense that they do not change historically, and also in the sense that they are capable of being instantiated, in principle (which is to say: if the appropriate conditions are satisfied), at all times and in all cultures.

(iii) *Our experience of this world involves in every case both an individual and a general or universal aspect.* As in Aristotle himself, so also in Menger and in the work of other Aristotelians such as Brentano, Husserl and Reinach, radical empiricism goes hand in hand with essentialism, or with what comes down here to a belief in the knowability of general laws. The general aspect of experience is conceived by the Aristotelian as something entirely ordinary and matter-of-fact. Thus it is not the work of any separate or special faculty of 'intuition' but is rather involved of necessity in every act of perceiving and thinking – a fact which makes itself felt already in the ubiquitous employment of general terms in all natural languages. Thus the general aspect of experience is as direct and straightforward as is our capacity to distinguish reds from greens, circles from squares, or warnings from congratulations.

For Menger, as for Aristotle and Brentano, what is general does not exist in isolation from what is individual. Menger is, in other words, an immanent realist.²⁷ He is interested in the essences and laws manifested in *this* world, not in any separate realm of incorporeal Ideal Forms such as is embraced by philosophers of a Platonistic sort. The goal of research is 'the determination of the general essence and the general connection of economic *phenomena*.' (Menger 1883, p. 7, n. 4, Eng. p. 37) The job of the scientist is, after all, to get to know the crystals and plants and other phenomena which he finds here on Earth.

(iv) *The general aspect of experience need be in no sense infallible (it reflects no special source of special knowledge), and may be subject to just the same sorts of errors as is our knowledge of what is individual.* Great difficulties may be set in the way of our attaining knowledge of essential structures of certain sorts and of our transforming such knowledge into the organized form of a strict theory. Above all we may (as Hume showed) mistakenly suppose that we have grasped a law or structure for psychological reasons of habit. Our

27. See the discussion of universals *in re* in Johansson 1989, e.g. pp. 11, 147, and also Mäki 1990.

knowledge of structures or laws can nevertheless be exact. For the quality of exactness or strict universality is skew to that of infallibility.

(v) *We can know, albeit under the conditions set out in (iv), what the world is like, at least in its broad outlines, both via common sense and via scientific method.* Thus Aristotelianism in the sense that is relevant for us here embraces not only common-sense realism but also scientific realism, though Aristotle himself ran these two positions together in ways no longer possible today.²⁸ The common-sense realism of Menger (as of all Austrian economists) is seen in his treatment of *agents, actions, beliefs, desires*, etc. In regard to these sorts of entity (as also to ethical and other values) there is no opposition between reality as it appears to common sense and reality as revealed to scientific theory. Menger's (and the later Austrian economists') scientific realism, on the other hand, is revealed in the treatment of phenomena such as spontaneous orders and invisible hand processes, where common sense diverges to some degree from the fine structures disclosed by theory.²⁹

Taken together with (iii), this aspect of the Aristotelian doctrine implies that we can know what the world is like both in its individual and in its general aspect, and our knowledge will likely manifest a progressive improvement, both in depth of penetration and in adequacy to the structures penetrated. Menger points at the very beginning of the *Principles* to a correlation between 'the higher culture of a people' and the extent to which 'human beings penetrate more deeply into the true essence of things and of their own nature' (1871, p. 4, Eng. p. 53).

(vi) *We can know what this world is like, at least in principle, from the detached perspective of an ideal scientific observer.* Thus in the social sciences in particular there is no suggestion that only those who are in some sense part of a given culture or form of life can grasp this culture or form of life theoretically. The general structures of reality are not merely capable of being exemplified, in principle, in different times and cultures; like the basic laws of geometry or logic they also enjoy an intrinsic intelligibility which makes them capable of

28. On the opposition between common-sense and scientific realism from the point of view of contemporary philosophy and cognitive science see Devitt 1984, Smith 1993. Compare also the illuminating discussion of 'level ontologies' in Johansson 1989, pp. 26ff.

29. Cf. Mäki 1990, pp. 301ff.

being grasped, again in principle and with differing degrees of difficulty, by knowing subjects of widely differing sorts and from widely differing backgrounds.

(vii) *The simple essences or natures pertaining to the various different segments or levels of reality constitute an alphabet of structural parts.* These can be combined together in different ways, both statically and dynamically (according to co-existence and according to order of succession). Such ‘combination’ or ‘composition’ is not simply a matter of heaping or gluing together. It is a matter of ‘implicative universals’, of entities or features or properties of entities existing in reflection of the existence of special sorts of combinations of other sorts of entities.

Many of the above theses might seem trivially acceptable. Taken together, however, they do have a certain metaphysical cutting power. It is thesis (v), above all, which establishes the line between the Aristotelian doctrine and that of Kant (for whom there looms behind the world we know an inaccessible world of ‘things in themselves’). Theses (i) and (v) mark off Austrian Aristotelianism from all idealist doctrines of the sort which embrace the view that the world of experience or of scientific inquiry is somehow created or constituted by the individual subject or by the language or linguistic community or scientific theory. Theses (ii) and (vi) distinguish the doctrine from all sorts of historicism, as also from hermeneuticist relativism and other modern fancies. And theses (ii) and (v) tell us that, for the Aristotelian, scientific or theoretical knowledge is possible even of the structures or essences of the social world, a view shared in common by both Menger and Brentano, and denied (in different ways) by historicists and relativists of differing hues. Further, when the Austrian apriorist doctrine is combined with a cancellation (for the social sciences) of thesis (vi) then there result theories like those of Dilthey, whose doctrine of *Verstehen* amounts to a denial of the possibility of detached scientific theory in relation to social and human phenomena. Dilthey insists on a radical opposition as between the sciences of what is ‘inner’ and what is ‘outer’. The method of explanation characteristic of the natural sciences he then sees as being appropriate only to the former. The latter is, as far as our scientific

explanations are concerned, unintelligible: it requires a special method which, as Brentano saw, has something mystical about it.³⁰

Most importantly, however, the doctrine is distinguished via theses (iii) and (v) from the positivistic methodology which has been dominant in philosophical circles for the bulk of the present century and which until recently enjoyed a position as the unquestioned background of almost all theorizing amongst scientists themselves. Positivism has its roots in atomism, the view that all that exists is atoms associated together in accidental and unintelligible ways and that all intelligible structures and necessities are merely the result of thought-constructions introduced by man. The origins of the struggle between atomists and Aristotelians in ancient Greek thought are well summarized by Meikle:

On the one hand there were Democritus and Epicurus, who thought of reality as atomistic small-bits that combine and repel in the void, and who had a hard job accounting for the persisting natures of things, species and genera on that basis. On the other hand there was Aristotle, who realized that no account of such things could be possible without admitting a category of form (or essence), because what a thing is, and what things of its kind are, cannot possibly be explained in terms of their constituent matter (atoms), since that changes while the entity retains its nature and identity over time. (1985, p. 9)

Where the atomist sees only one sort of structure *in re*, the structure of accidental association, the Aristotelian sees in addition intelligible or law-governed structures that he can understand. Where the atomist sees only one sort of change, accidental change (for example of the sort which occurs when a horse is run over by a truck), the Aristotelian sees in addition intelligible or law-governed changes, as, for example, when a foal grows up into a horse. Just as for the Aristotelian the intelligibility of structure can imply that there are certain sorts of structure which are intelligibly impossible, for example a society made

30. Dilthey's influence made itself felt especially in the movement of *Ganzheitspsychologie* or 'integral psychology' founded by Krüger, Jaensch, and others in Leipzig, which developed in parallel to the Gestaltist movement in Berlin. (For the relevant bibliographical information see Smith (ed.) 1988.) The *Ganzheitspsychologen* shared with the Gestaltists a rejection of psychological atomism, but the two schools diverged radically in their views as to what ought properly to take its place. The members of the Leipzig school embraced what we might call a mystical holism, a thesis to the effect that the wholes (*Ganzheiten*) of psychological experience are *sui generis*. The Berlin Gestaltists, in contrast, embraced what we might call an intelligibilist holism: the very same types of wholes as are to be found in mental experience are present also in the physical realm; the methods of physical and psychological science thereby form a single continuum, though in a way which importantly does not imply any reduction of the one to the other.

up of inanimate objects, so for the Aristotelian there are intelligibly impossible *changes*, for example of a horse into a truck, or of a stone into a colour. The presence of intelligible changes implies, moreover, that there is no 'problem of induction' for a thinker of the Aristotelian sort. When we understand a phenomenon as the instance of a given species, then this understanding relates also to the characteristic patterns of growth and evolution of the phenomenon and to its characteristic modes of interaction with other phenomena.

7. *Aristotelianism in the Social Sciences*

We are not yet done, however, in our effort to make precise the doctrine of Austrian Aristotelianism. For Aristotelianism played a crucial role also in the philosophy of German social thinkers such as Marx,³¹ and many other German political economists and legal theorists of the nineteenth and even of the twentieth centuries could have accepted at least the bulk of what has been presented above.³² This opposition between German and Austrian modes of thinking should not, in this respect, be exaggerated. Above all it is worth pointing out in the light of (vi) above that Marx embraces also the assumption that science is able to penetrate through the ideological obfuscations by which the commonsensical mind is (as he conceives things) of necessity affected, and Brentano's Aristotelianism was itself decisively influenced by the thinking of the German metaphysician F. A. Trendelenburg, who was also the teacher of Dilthey, Kierkegaard, Feuerbach and Marx. Equally, however, it would be wrong to ignore the crucial differences, above all as between Marx's methodology on the one hand and the basic doctrine of Austrian Aristotelianism on the other. Thus Menger's doctrine of the strict universality of laws is denied by Marx, for whom laws are in every case specific to a given social organism. Moreover, while Marx and Menger share an Aristotelian antipathy to atomism, the holism and collectivism propounded by Marx is in this respect radically more extreme than anything that could have been countenanced by Menger.

31. Cf. Gould 1978, Wood 1981, Sowell 1985, and above all Meikle 1985.

32. The survival of Aristotelian ideas in contemporary German legal theory is illustrated for example by Karl Larenz's textbook of legal methodology (1983), e.g. in his discussion of the 'legal structural types' which the legal theorist 'discovers in reality' (p. 338).

Hegel, too, is correctly described as an Aristotelian in many aspects of his thinking. His case is somewhat different from that of Marx, however, since it seems that he denied thesis (i). More precisely, Hegel failed to draw the clear line between act and object of cognition which (i) requires, and he refused to acknowledge any sort of independence of the latter from the former. As he himself writes (in dealing with Aristotle): ‘thought thinks itself by participation in that which is thought, but thought becomes thought by contact and apprehension, so that *thought and the object of thought are the same*.’³³ Or as Allen Wood expresses it: ‘Marx parts company with Hegel precisely because Hegel makes the dialectical nature of thought the basis for the dialectical structure of reality, where Marx holds that just the reverse is the case.’ (1981, p. 215)

To specify, therefore, the exact nature of the Austrian Aristotelian view, it will be useful to add to our basic doctrine a number of additional theses – specific to the domain of social science – which are formulated in such a way as to bring out as clearly as possible the opposition between the Austrian view and views shared by the principal German social theorists who had been influenced by Aristotelian ideas:

(viii) *The theory of value is to be built up on ‘subjective’ foundations, which is to say exclusively on the basis of the corresponding mental acts and states of human subjects.* Thus value for Menger – in stark contrast to Marx – is to be accounted for exclusively in terms of the satisfaction of human needs and wants. Economic value, in particular, is seen as being derivative of the valuing acts of ultimate consumers, and Menger’s thinking might most adequately be encapsulated as the attempt to defend the possibility of an economics which would be at one and the same time both theoretical and subjectivist in the given sense. Among the different representatives of the philosophical school of value theory in Austria (Brentano, Meinong, Ehrenfels, etc.) subjectivism as here defined takes different forms. All of them share with Menger however the view that value exists only in the nexus of human valuing acts.

(ix) *There are no ‘social wholes’ or ‘social organisms’.* Austrian Aristotelians hereby (leaving aside the rather special case of Wieser) embrace a

33. *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. by E. Haldane and F. Simson, London, 1894, vol. 2, p. 147, emphasis mine.

doctrine of *ontological* individualism. This goes hand in hand with a concomitant *methodological* individualism, according to which the economist or social scientist is exhorted to build up his theories from the analysis of the individual acts of individual subjects whose processes of thought and action are seen as being similar to his own. Taken together the two doctrines imply that all talk of nations, classes, firms, etc., is to be treated by the social theorist as an in principle eliminable shorthand for talk of individuals. That it is not entirely inappropriate to conceive individualism in either sense as ‘Aristotelian’ is seen for example in Aristotle’s own treatment of knowledge and science in terms of the mental acts, states and powers or capacities of individual human subjects.³⁴

Economics is methodologically individualist when its laws are seen as being made true in their entirety by patterns of mental acts and actions of individual subjects, so that all economic phenomena are capable of being understood by the theorist as the results or outcomes of combinations and interactions of the thoughts and actions of individuals. Note that neither ontological nor methodological individualism need imply any sort of atomistic reductionism: the individual of which the social theorist treats is, as a result of different sorts of interaction with other individuals, a highly complex entity. He might more properly be conceived as something like a node in the various spontaneous orders in which he is involved, an idea which extends back at least as far as Aristotle.³⁵ As the Hungarian philosopher Aurel Kolnai puts it:

society is not only composed of various parts – it is composed of various parts in a multiplicity of ways; and consequently its component parts cannot but *overlap*. In other words, it consists ultimately of individuals, but only in the sense that it divides into a multiplicity of individuals across several social subdivisions, such that it comprehends the same individual over and over again in line with his various social affiliations (1981, p. 319).

34. See the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*. On methodological individualism in Aristotle see Kraus 1905.

35. See Menger’s discussion of the view attributed to Aristotle to the effect that the state is a phenomenon co-original with the existence of man, in his 1883, pp. 267–270, Eng. pp. 220–222 and compare Aristotle’s *Politics*, I, 1–2, which presents a socio-political version of the doctrine of mereological potentialism outlined in Chapter Three, Section 5, above.

Every individual therefore ‘embodies a multiplicity of social aspects or categories’, and these play a crucial role in determining which sorts of essential and intelligible structures he might exemplify.

(x) *There are no (graspable) laws of historical development.* Where Marx, in true Aristotelian spirit, sought to establish the ‘laws of the phenomena’, he awarded principal importance to the task of establishing *laws of development*, which is to say, laws governing the transition from one ‘form’ or ‘stage’ of society to another. He ‘treats the social movement as a process of natural history governed by laws’,³⁶ and he sees the social theorist as having the capacity to grasp such laws and therefore also in principle to sanction large-scale interferences in the social ‘organism’. Marx himself thereby accepted both methodological and ontological collectivism; he saw social science as issuing in macroscopic laws, for example to the effect that history must pass through certain well-defined ‘stages’. The Aristotelianism of the Austrians is in this respect (ontologically) more modest: it sees the exact method as being restricted to certain simple essences and essential connections only, in ways which set severe limits on the capacity of theoretical social science to make predictions. The methodological individualism of the Austrians has indeed been criticized by Marxists as a form of atomism, though such criticisms rest always on the incorrect assumption that methodological individualism trades in mere ‘sums’.

What, now, of the German historical economists Roscher, Knies and Schmoller, against whom Menger is standardly held to have rebelled?³⁷ From our present perspective this standard conception must be somewhat modified. For as already noted, and as Streissler has shown in detail in his 1990, Aristotelian doctrines played a role also in German economic science, not least as a result of the influence of Hegel. Thus for example Roscher not only accepted many of the tenets of the basic Aristotelian doctrine listed above, he also developed a subjective theory of value along lines very similar to those later taken up by Menger.³⁸ Such subjectivism was accepted also by Knies.

36. From a passage cited by Marx himself in the Afterword to the Second German Edition of vol. 1 of *Capital* and adopted as a motto to Meikle 1985.

37. See e.g. Bostaph 1978.

38. See esp. Streissler 1990.

Moreover, Knies and Schmoller agreed with the Austrians in denying the existence of laws of historical development. In all of these respects, therefore, the gulf between Menger and the German historicists is less significant than has normally been suggested. Most of the German historicists are still crucially distinguished from the Austrians, however, in remaining wedded to a purely inductivistic methodology, regarding history as providing a basis of fact from out of which laws of economic science could be extracted. For an Aristotelian such as Menger, in contrast (cf. thesis (iii) above), as also for Brentano and his disciples, enumerative induction can never yield that sort of knowledge of exact law which constitutes a scientific theory.

8. *Fallibilistic Apriorism*

Neo-classical economists accept the positivistic thesis to the effect that no non-trivial part of economic theory could be *a priori* in any of the senses distinguished above. The propositions of economics are mere inductive hypotheses, and the method of economics consists in their eyes in the building of testable models, selection among which is effected, at least in principle, on the basis of relative predictive strength. Realism hereby falls out of account as a criterion of selection, so that the models in question are threatened with becoming shorn of their relation to those basic everyday categories in which the science of economics has its roots. Austrian economics, in contrast, is marked by a willingness to sacrifice both the goal of predictive power and the mathematical tools associated therewith precisely in order to come to an understanding of these basic categories themselves and in such a way as to avoid the fallacy of misplaced quantitative exactitude.

From our present perspective, it might begin to appear as if the principles underlying both sorts of economic methodology might possess some grain of truth. For Austrian economics might be conceived not as an alternative to the economics of model-building and prediction but as a preliminary activity of establishing this missing connection to ground-level economic realities. Austrian economics might, in other words, be conceived as a safe harbour for a practice which at present takes place among neo-classicists only surreptitiously and unsystematically – a practice sometimes referred to under the rubric of

‘taking subjectivism seriously’.³⁹ This practice might also be conceived as part of an attempt to exert control – in the direction of greater commonsensical realism – over the model-building activities of mathematical economists. But then, as noted already by Wieser, it may also be the case that empirical economics will in certain circumstances lead to results which constrain a revision of Austrian economics itself.⁴⁰

The analogy I have in mind here is one according to which Austrian economics would be seen as providing a part of the foundations for empirical-mathematical economics in something like the way in which geometry provides a foundation for the discipline of physics. This idea can help us to resolve the question as to how the apriorism of Austrian philosophy is to be understood in such a way that it will be seen to be consistent with a willingness to be influenced by empirical research. The answer to this question lies, I want to suggest, in the special character of the doctrine of the *a priori* that is here at issue. For this doctrine implies that, in relation to each of a range of empirical sciences, there exist certain underlying structures with which we are pre-theoretically familiar, and that it is our (sometimes merely tacit) knowledge of such structures which yields the preliminary framework for that activity of measuring and calculating and establishing of functional correlations which (as we normally suppose) forms the heart of empirical research.

Euclidean geometry constitutes one such *a priori* proto-discipline⁴¹ of the science of physics. As the case of geometry makes clear, however, empirical research, measuring and calculating, may in certain circumstances come to exert an *ex post* control on the relevant proto-discipline, so that we may come to

39. Compare Hayek’s remark to the effect that ‘it is probably no exaggeration to say that every important advance in economic theory during the last hundred years was a further step in the consistent application of subjectivity. That the objects of economic activity cannot be defined in objective terms but only with reference to a human purpose goes without saying’ (1952a, p. 31).

40. A view of this sort is less at home in Menger’s own thinking, since for Menger the idea of testing the exact theory of economics empirically ‘is simply a methodological absurdity, a failure to recognize the basis of presuppositions of exact research’ (1883, p. 54, Eng. p. 69). Examining Menger’s account of the ways in which exact types are painstakingly extracted from the realm of economic phenomena by the economic theorist suggests however that he, too, might have assented to something like the retroactive control that is here described. See, on this whole issue, Menger’s promissory note on p. 43 (Eng. p. 62) of the *Investigations*.

41. The term is derived from Stumpf 1907a.

regard the propositions of the latter in a new light; the results of empirical research may even lead us to reject as false propositions hitherto accepted as *a priori* true. For while, on the view here at issue, a proposition's being *a priori* signifies that it (or the structure which makes it true) enjoys some degree of intelligibility, it does not follow from this that our knowledge of such a proposition must be in any sense incorrigible or infallible.

This does not mean that the opposition between what is empirical and what is *a priori* is itself undermined. No single *a priori* proposition of a proto-discipline may be falsified by empirical means: even the possibility of direct logical contradiction is here ruled out, in virtue of the fact that it is on the basis of an acceptance of our pre-theoretical ('commonsensical') view of reality that empirical research itself is carried out. That such control is possible even in isolated instances, however, shows that we have only partially trustworthy access to the *a priori* structures in the world, so that apriorism, surprisingly, becomes to this extent divorced from epistemological concerns of a Cartesian-Kantian sort. For if *a priori* structures exist independently of the mind (or independently of what the mind reads into reality), then we have no good cause to expect that our knowledge of such structures will in every case have that sort of absolute evidence with which the Kantian *a priori* is normally associated. It thereby becomes possible to conceive a doctrine of what we might call fallibilistic apriorism, parallel in some respects to doctrines of fallibilistic intuitionism in ethics.⁴²

When the above considerations are taken into account, then many of the unfortunate connotations of the term '*a priori*' will be seen to fall away. Thus one common objection to the notion of an *a priori* proto-discipline turns on the fact that different individuals (or different cultures) may have different intuitions as to what counts as *a priori*. The possibility of indirect empirical control does much to render this objection harmless. The thesis that the *a priori* is a matter of what can be read off from intelligible structures in reality may indeed serve to make understandable the fact that such different intuitions exist. Certainly it tells us that the acquisition of *a priori* knowledge may be no easy matter, where *a priori* knowledge on the Kantian conception ought in some way to be both incorrigible and immediately accessible to all.

42. See Shearmur 1988, and compare Schlick 1925, trans. pp. 167f.

Austrian Aristotelianism is first and foremost a doctrine of ontology: it tells us what the world is like and what its objects, states and processes are like, including those capacities, states and processes we call knowledge and science. More generally, it tells us what sorts of relations obtain between the various different segments of reality. Austrian apriorism, on the other hand, concerns the matter of how knowledge is acquired. The two doctrines are brought together in a thesis to the effect that the world is organized, to no small part, in intelligible fashion, so that philosophical investigations (in formal and material ontology, in the ontology of nature, mind and society and in other areas ‘midway between logic and physics’) can serve as a natural complement to work in the empirical sciences. The thesis implies further that we are all of us already in possession of substantial portions of knowledge of the way the world is, and of the way its parts and moments hang together. Intentionality is a form of relational contact with reality. It is this thesis which lies at the heart of Austrian philosophy as this was developed by Brentano’s disciples.

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