Chapter 3

The Pure and Empty Form of Time: Deleuze’s Theory of Temporality

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Deleuze argues that a fundamental mutation in the concept of time occurred in Kant. In antiquity, the concept of time was subordinated to the concept of movement: time was a ‘measure’ of movement. In Kant, this relation is inverted: time is no longer subordinated to movement but assumes an autonomy of its own, becoming the pure and empty form of everything that moves and changes. In what follows, we will examine how the inversion of the relation between time and movement came about, and how Deleuze’s own theory of time builds on Kant’s revolution and extends it further.

Originary, Aberrant and Ordinary Time

1. Originary time: the ancient coordination of extensive and intensive movement

For the ancients, the concept of time was subordinated to the concept of movement. Aristotle, in the Physics, writes that time is the measure or ‘number of movement’.¹ A day is a unit that measures a single revolution of the earth on its axis (the movement from sunset to sunset); a month measures a single revolution of the moon around the earth (a cycle of the moon’s phases); a year measures a single revolution of the earth around the sun (a cycle of the seasons). But since there is a plurality of movements, there is necessarily a plurality of times. When a lion chases a gazelle, the different movements of each animal cannot be said to unfold in a homogeneous time. Each movement has its own duration, its own articulations, its own divisions and subdivisions; in subduing the gazelle, the lion incorporates the gazelle into its own movements, its own time. This heterogeneity of movements is equally true of celestial bodies, and the complex history of the calendar is a history of attempts...
to coordinate and impose order on these heterogeneous movements (see Aveni 1989). Given the heterogeneity of movement, the ancients were led to ask the question: Is there something immobile or invariant, outside of movement – or at least a most perfect movement – through which all other movements could be measured? Is there a movement of movements in relation to which all other movements could be coordinated – a great celestial schema, or what Leibniz might have called a kind of ‘metaschematism’? This question wound up being answered in two different ways because there existed two fundamental types of movement: the extensive movements of the cosmos and the intensive movements of the soul. In antiquity, Plato and Plotinus provided the paradigmatic conceptions of time for these two kinds of movement.

In the *Timaeus*, for instance, Plato sought to incorporate the extensive movements of the cosmos into a vision of a ‘planetarium’ comprised of eight globes, with the immobile earth at the centre, surrounded by a sphere of ‘the fixed’ (the stars) turning on its axis, following a circuit that, by some calculations, was thought to last 10,000 years. It was precisely this movement of movements that provided a reference point by which all other extensive movements were to be measured: an invariant, a permanence. Time, in this manner, was subordinated to eternity, to the non-temporal. In Plato’s famous formula, time was ‘the moving image of eternity’ (*Timaeus*, 37d).

But Aristotle observed that time not only measures the extensive movements of cosmic bodies, but also the intensive movements of the soul, that is, *the passage from one internal state to another*. ‘If any movement takes place in the mind’, he wrote in the *Physics*, ‘we at once suppose that some time also has elapsed’ (IV.11.219a5). Husserl’s celebrated study of *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* would later become the classic analysis of the structure of these internal movements, such as protention and retention (Husserl 1964).

But the shift from the cosmos to the soul entails a profound change in the nature of movement, since intensive quantities are very different from extensive quantities. Suppose I have twenty bottles each filled with a litre of water whose temperature is 50 degrees. I can pour the water of all these bottles into a separate container: though the volume of water will now be 20 litres, its temperature will remain 50 degrees. This is because volume is an extensive quantity, whereas temperature is an intensive quantity. Extensive quantities are additive, but intensive quantities are not. If they were, as Diderot quipped, you could simply add snowballs together to produce heat. Extensive quantity is a *parts–whole* relation: the parts are external to each other (the exteriority of
relations), and one part does not contain another part; what contains parts is always a whole, even if this whole is itself a part in relation to another whole. Intensive quantity, by contrast, is a zero–unit relation. What distinguishes two intensive quantities is the variable distance through which one comprehends their distance from zero intensity, although these distances are non-decomposable. The distance of 40 degrees from zero is ‘greater’ than the distance of 30 degrees from zero, but neither of these distances is divisible into parts (though the function of thermometers is to convert intensive qualities into extensive units) (see Knowles Middleton 1966). If time is the measure of movement, then time becomes something different when it measures intensive movements rather than extensive movements.

Plotinus’ analysis of the soul, Deleuze argues, was modelled on the concept of intensive quantity, and his greatness was to have incorporated the intensive movements of the soul into his vision of the movement of the ‘One’, with its emanative processes of procession and conversion. Plotinus’ dialectic proceeds in terms of a series of powers, beginning with the One, and proceeding through thought, the soul, nature, phenomena and so on (Plotinus 1991: 213–32). Intensive movement is an ordination of non-decomposable distances, that is, an ideal fall (French: chute, ‘decrease’ or ‘drop’) that marks the relation of a series of powers to zero. Time emerges as the measure of intensive movement in two ways. Eternity (aeon) designates the fact that all ‘powers’ are each internal to the other insofar as they are ‘One’. The ‘now’ (nun) is a privileged point in the internal movement of the soul that is intrinsically distinguishable from other points thorough their differing degrees of power, dividing into a pure past and a pure future, while nonetheless remaining united in the One. This act of distinction is thus at the same time a synthesis, and Deleuze argues that the Neo-Platonists were the first to see that time is inseparable from an act of synthesis.

What one sees in both Plato and Plotinus, then, is the formation of an originary time that serves as a measure for movement, whether it is derived from the extensive movements of the cosmos (Plato) or the intensive movements of the soul (Plotinus). In both cases, the result was a hierarchisation of movements depending on their proximity to or distance from the eternal, an originary time marked by privileged positions in the cosmos or privileged moments in the soul. The discovery of this invariant was itself the discovery of the true, since truth required a universally commensurable time and space over which it could govern.

One should note that the common distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ time does not mark a break with the ancient subordination
of time to movement. Objective ‘clock time’ (or physical time) and the subjective experience of ‘time consciousness’ both measure movement, the sole difference being the type of movement. Objective movement measures the extensive movement of objects in the cosmos, whereas subjective movement measures the intensive passage from one state to another, even though the extensive object and the intensive state are only artificial ‘snapshots’ or ‘cuts’ extracted from the transition or passage of time. Moreover, it is clear that modernity no less than antiquity still subordinates time to movement: the International System of Units (SI) defines a second in terms of the motion of a caesium atom (Crease 2011: 252, 264). In physics, special relativity had its roots in the problem of the synchronisation of clocks, and if ‘time moves more slowly’ for an object moving faster than another object, it is because the clocks on each object are measuring different movements. In this sense, special relativity remained tied to the ancient conception of time and might even be said to have completed it.

Despite these practical exigencies, the fundamental issue in the theory of time is not the distinction between objective and subjective time but rather the relation between time and movement.

2. Derived time: aberrations of movement

The Kantian revolution was prepared for by the fact that both these domains – the extensive movements of the cosmos and the intensive movements of the soul – were haunted by fundamental aberrations of movement, where a derived time increasingly tended to free itself from the posited originary time. The closer one came to the earth – what the Greeks called the ‘sublunar’ domain – the more the extensive movements of the cosmos tended to become anomalous: the unpredictability of meteorological movements, for instance, or the movement of what comes-to-be and passes-away (becoming). Scientists can precisely predict the time of a solar eclipse, for instance, but they cannot predict whether or not they will be able to see it, that is, they cannot predict with precision the ‘sublunar’ weather. The entire corpus of Aristotle shows how anomalies of movement, with their accidental causes, were already marking a new form of time that could no longer simply be defined as a measure of movement.

In short, the invariant provided by the ‘movement of movements’ was threatened by crises when cosmic movements became increasingly aberrant. Similarly, the intensive movement of the soul became marked by a fear that its restless movements in derived time – a real fall – would
take on an independence of their own and would cease to be submitted
to the originary time of the One, and the ‘now’ of the soul would fall
into its double, the non-being of ‘instant’, a pure disappearing. In the
doctrine of the Fall developed later in Christian theology – notably by
Augustine – this Neo-Platonist notion of a real fall, and its correspond-
ing fear, would take on enormous proportions.\footnote{11}

Aberrant movements provoked crises in the extensive movements of
the cosmos and fear in the intensive movement of the soul. It is not by
chance that, in French and many Latin languages, the same word is used
for time and weather – *le temps* (from the Latin, *tempus*) – and the term
has various cognates that are used to describe the aberrant motions
of the cosmos (*tempest, temperature, temperate*) as well as aberrant
motions of the soul (*temper, temperament, tempestuousness*) (see Serres
2000: 67; 1994: 100). The question then became: Does the sublunary
world, with its *tempests* and *tempestuousness*, obey the metaschema-
tism, with its proportional rules? Or does it enjoy an independence
from it, with its own anomalous movements and disharmonies? The
Pythagorean discovery of irrational numbers had already pointed to a
fundamental incommensurability between the speed and position of the
various cosmic spheres, and the search for ‘universals’ in philosophy is,
in a sense, a remnant of the fear provoked in the intensive time of the
soul: the very term is derived from the Latin word *universus*, meaning
‘turned toward the One’ (*uni-‘one’ + versus ‘turned’, the past participle
of *vertere*).

In Deleuze’s interpretation, these aberrant or derived movements
– marked by meteorological, terrestrial and spiritual contingencies –
remained a downward tendency that still depended on the adventures of
movement. They too posed a problem, a choice: either one could try to
‘save’ the primacy of movement (‘saving the appearances’, in the Greek
phrase), or one could not only accept but will the liberation of time with
regard to movement. In effect, there were two ways in which movement
could be saved. The extensive harmony of the world could be saved by
an appeal to the rhythms of work in the *rural time* of the countryside,
with the seasons and harvests as privileged points of reference in the
originary time of Nature (‘works and days’, in Hesiod’s phrase; or the
rhythm of ‘autumn’ and ‘spring’ in China). The intensive harmony of
the soul could be saved by an appeal to *monastic time*, with its privileged
moments of prayers and vespers (the clock was initially invented to
mark the hours of prayer of the monasteries); or more generally, by an
appeal to a spiritual life of interiority (Luther, Kierkegaard). By contrast,
the liberation of time would take place in the city, an ‘enemy’ that was
nonetheless engendered by both the rural communities and monasteries themselves. The time of the city is neither a rural life nor a spiritual life, but the time of everyday life. There is no longer either an originary time or a derived time, but what might be called an ordinary time or an everyday time: an abstract, uniform and homogeneous time.\textsuperscript{13} Although Newton may have provided its initial scientific expression in his theory of absolute space and time, ordinary or everyday time has above all become the conventional time of our quotidian banality: the time of clocks, watches, calendars, time zones and daylight savings.\textsuperscript{14}

3. Ordinary time: toward the liberation of time

The sources of this liberation of time from movement were multiple, having socio-cultural roots in the Reformation as well as the development of capitalism. Max Weber, for instance, showed that the Reformation became conscious of this liberation of time by joining together the two ideas of a ‘profession’ – one’s profession of faith and one’s professional activity – so that mundane professions like that of a cobbler were deemed to be as dignified as any sacred calling. Unlike the monk, whose duty was to be otherworldly, denying the self and the world, the fulfilment of one’s duty in worldly affairs became the highest form that the moral activity of individuals could take. There was only one time – everyday time – and it is in this time that we would now find our salvation.\textsuperscript{15}

Likewise, Marx showed that this vision of temporal activity (‘What do you do with your time?’), which is no longer grounded in a cosmic rhythm or a spiritual harmony, would eventually find a new model in the ‘abstract’ time of capitalism, which replaced the privileged moments of agricultural work with the any-instant-whatever (l’instant quelconque) of mechanised work. Time became money, the form under which money produces money (usury or credit); and money itself became ‘the course of time’: the abstract time of capitalism became the concrete time of the city.\textsuperscript{16} It was Heidegger who would ultimately produce a prodigious philosophical concept of the everyday and its relation to time, though to some degree he still maintained the old distinction between a derived (inauthentic) time and an originary (authentic) time (Heidegger 1962a).\textsuperscript{17}

This liberation of time resulted in a fundamental change in the relationship of philosophy to the thought of everyday life (opinion). Up until the seventeenth century, one could say that, philosophically, everyday life was suspended in order to accede to something that was
not everyday, namely, a meditation on the eternal. By contrast, the ordinary time of urban everydayness would no longer related to the eternal, but to something very different, namely, the production of the new. In other words, given the flow of average everydayness, I can either raise myself vertically toward the transcendent or the eternal, at least on Sundays (or Saturdays, or Fridays), through understanding or faith; or I can remain at the horizontal flow of everydayness, in which temporality moves toward the new rather than the eternal. The production of the new will be the correlate of ordinary time in exactly the same way that the discovery of the true was the correlate of originary time with the ancients. The aim of philosophy would no longer be to discover pre-existent truths outside of time but to create non-preexisting concepts within time.\(^{18}\)

The Kantian Revolution

1. The pure form of time: ‘the time is out of joint’

Deleuze argues that Kant was the first philosopher to give expression to this new conception of time.\(^{19}\) In the anomalies of motion, time had begun to free itself from its subordination to movement. What Kant did in the Critique of Pure Reason was to derive the necessary consequences from these anomalies, whether cosmological (the movements of the universe) or psychological (the movements of the soul), in order to reverse the movement–time relation definitively and to render time independent and autonomous. Deleuze finds a poetic expression of this first aspect of Kant’s revolution in Hamlet’s phrase, ‘the time is out of joint’.\(^{20}\) The ‘joints’ are the privileged positions of the cosmos or the privileged moments of the soul that characterised originary time. Ordinary time, however, brings about a rectification of time: time ‘out of joint’ becomes a straight line that imposes its determination on every possible movement (Deleuze 1997: 28). On the surface, this is a surprising claim, since the common and simple image of time as a succession of instants on a line (the ‘timeline’) is an image that most philosophers of time have attempted to break with. (The word ‘succession’ is derived from an old French term meaning ‘inheritance’, and the presumption that time is successive was initially derived from the practice of measuring time though the succession of kings or dynasties, where time would begin again with each new reign.\(^{21}\) Paul J. Kosmin has shown that the Seleucid Empire was the first to introduce a uniform and linear calendar that did not restart with each successive dynasty, which became the
condition for the appearance of the first apocalyptic eschatologies of the ‘end times’. But for Deleuze, the straight line indicates, paradoxically, that time has become a ‘simple, terrible, inexorable’ labyrinth that can only be comprised of the abstract and ordinary positions and instants irreducible to both bodies and souls (Deleuze 1997: 28).

The consequence of Kant’s revolution was that time was freed entirely from cosmology and psychology, as well as the eternal. Such is the conclusion Kant draws in the Transcendental Dialectic, where the Self (the soul), the World (the cosmos) and God (the eternal) are all shown to be transcendent illusions of reason that are derived from our new position in time. Time is no longer dependent on either extensive movements (the cosmos) or intensive movements (the soul), and it thereby ceases to be a measure of movement. Instead, all movements – whether originary or derived, anomalous or aberrant – are now seen to take place within the labyrinth of time.

Deleuze summarises these analyses by saying that Kant reconceived time as the pure and empty form of everything that changes and moves. Deleuze is here giving the concept of ‘form’ a new sense, since the form of time is not an eternal form, in a Platonic sense, but rather the pure form of what is not eternal (Deleuze 1997: 29). When time is liberated from movement, it ceases to be a cosmological or psychological time in order to become a formal time: a pure deployed form. The pure form of time is necessarily static, since time is no longer subordinate to movement. Time is the most radical form of change, but the form of change does not itself change: ‘the a priori determinations of time are fixed or held, as though in a photo or a freeze-frame’ (Deleuze 1994: 89, 294). If the form of time itself was changing or successive, it would have to succeed in another time, to infinity (Deleuze 1997: 28).

2. The pure form of time: ‘I is another’

But there is a second aspect to Kant’s revolution, which can be seen clearly in the ‘Analogies of Experience’ section in the Critique of Pure Reason. Before Kant, time had largely been defined by succession, space by coexistence and eternity by permanence. In Kant, succession, simultaneity and permanence are all shown to be modes or relations of time itself. Succession, as extensive movement, presupposes a plurality of times: empirical time (within the pure form of time) is composed of different times, and succession is the mode of relation between the different parts of time. Simultaneity, as intensive quantity, is what exists at the same time, it is the determination of the content of time (every
sensation that fills time has an intensive quantity) (Deleuze 1994: 38). Permanence, finally, is the rule of what endures for all times (substance), which constitutes the ground of both successions and simultaneities. Put summarily, succession is the rule of what is in different times; simultaneity is the rule of what is at the same time; and permanence is the rule of what is for all times. As an individual, for instance, I exist in time as something permanent that has simultaneous states and that successively passes from one state to another.

Yet succession, simultaneity and permanence are all modes or relations of time; they are not time itself. When Kant defines time as the immutable form of what changes, he tells us repeatedly that ‘time cannot by itself be perceived’. Because I exist in time, I am eaten away and worn down by a time that I cannot perceive. Time is ‘no less capable of dissolving and destroying individuals than of constituting them temporarily’ (Deleuze 1994: 38). In a sense, the form of time dis-integrates: it devours succession, it devours simultaneity, and it devours permanence. From the viewpoint of succession, time is a straight line which the parts of time are unmade at the moment they are made (elles se défont à mesure qu’elles se font). From the viewpoint of simultaneity, time is an instant that, in terms of content, is emptied out at moment it is being filled (un instant qui se vide à mesure qu’il se remplit). From the viewpoint of permanence, time decomposes an enduring substance into something that is ceaselessly undoing and emptying itself (ne cesse pas de se défaire et de se vider). Proust would later write, ‘Time, which is usually not visible, in order to become so seeks out bodies and, wherever it finds them, seizes upon them in order to project its magic lantern on them’, quartering the features of an aging face according to its ‘distorting perspective’ (Proust 1993: 342, 344; translation modified; cited in Deleuze 2000: 18, 160).

The only way to extract ourselves from the disintegrating power of time is through the power of synthesis. As Kant shows in the first Transcendental Deduction, synthesis is a triple operation – apprehension, reproduction and recognition – that is carried out by the activity of the ‘I think’ or consciousness (1929: 129–38, A98–110). Since every sensation that appears in time is a manifold and has a multiplicity of parts, consciousness must synthesise these parts in an act of apprehension; it must also reproduce or remember preceding parts when the following ones appear if a synthesis is to take place; and this sensible complex of parts can only be recognised if it is related to the form of the object (the ‘object = x’, which is the objective correlate of the ‘I think’). Synthesis is an activity – or in Kant’s language, a spontaneity – that is exercised by the mind on both the parts and the content of time.
But what Kant’s analysis makes clear is that the new status of time introduces into the individual a profound ‘fracture’ (fêlure) – a scission between the disintegrative and synthetic aspects of time that Deleuze summarises in a second poetic formula taken from Rimbaud: ‘I is another’ (Rimbaud 1975: 101, 103). On the one hand, my existence is that of a passive, receptive, phenomenal subject appearing within time, a time that is being undone at the moment it is constituted (Deleuze 1994: 86). On the other hand, the unity of my experience in time depends on the active and spontaneous temporal syntheses carried out by the a priori categories of the transcendental ‘I think’. For Deleuze, this fracture between the passive self (intuitions in time) and the active self (the categories of the understanding) marks ‘a precise moment in Kantianism, a furtive and explosive moment that is not even continued by Kant, much less by the post-Kantians’ (58). Whereas Kant himself, as well as post-Kantians such as Fichte and Hegel, would tend to focus primarily on the ‘I think’ and the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’, Deleuze’s analyses will attempt to penetrate the passive self and the pure form of time. In other words, Deleuze will ultimately carry the Kantian revolution in a different direction than Kant himself.

3. From Kant to Heidegger to Deleuze

In moving beyond Kant, Deleuze was no doubt influenced by the ‘ecstatic’ conception of temporality developed by Heidegger in Being and Time (1927), and Heidegger would himself highlight the importance of the Kantian revolution in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929). Heidegger, however, had focused his analysis on the role of the transcendental imagination, that is, on the activities of synthesis and schematisation. Yet in Kant, the imagination only synthesises and schematises under the legislation of the understanding. If Deleuze goes beyond Heidegger, it is because he shows that the ‘source of time’ (1997: 28) in Kant must be found, not in the activity of the transcendental imagination, but in the discordant relation between all the faculties (sensibility, imagination, understanding, reason) that are freed from the legislation of any particular faculty, and the theory of Ideas that grounds them. In the third Critique, Kant had analysed the breakdown of the activities of synthesising (in the sublime) and schematising (in symbolisation), recognising that there is a constant risk that something formless (time) will emerge from beneath the ground to break or dis-integrate the synthesis and schemata. At such moments, there is a presentation of Ideas in sensible nature, of which Kant analyses four aspects: the
sublime (a negative presentation), the symbol (a positive but indirect presentation), genius (a positive but secondary presentation, requiring the creation of an ‘other’ nature), and finally teleology (a positive presentation, primary as well as direct).

Deleuze will carry this Kantian analysis in the Critique of Judgment a step further by inverting it: whereas for Kant, Ideas are totalising, unifying and transcendent, Deleuze will develop a theory of Ideas that are differential, genetic and immanent (this is the theme of the fourth chapter of Difference and Repetition). As such, Deleuzian Ideas are pure forms of time, and conversely, the pure form of time is itself an Idea. As Deleuze will put it, time ‘does not go from one actual term to another [chronology] . . . but from the virtual [the Idea] to its actualization’ (1994: 251). For Deleuze, the secret of time in Kant must be found neither in the transcendental aesthetic nor in the transcendental imagination, but in the doctrine of Ideas.

The Pure and Empty Form of Time: The Three Syntheses

1. The form of time as the idea of pure change (chaos)

In What is Philosophy? (1991), published more than two decades after Difference and Repetition (1968), Deleuze and Guattari proposed the concept of chaos to characterise the pure form of time, which might also be characterised as the Idea of pure change (as a differential and immanent Idea): ‘Chaos is characterized less by the absence of determinations than by the infinite speed with which they take shape and vanish. This is not a movement from one determination to the other but, on the contrary, the impossibility of a connection between them since one does not appear without the other having already disappeared’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 42). Chaos is a regime of continuous variation which retains determinations that nonetheless appear and disappear at an infinite speed with no relation to each other, neither temporally (no ‘before’ or ‘after’) nor spatially (no ‘above’, ‘below’, ‘from’, ‘toward’, ‘between’, etc.). There is no time – or more precisely, no modalities of time – but ‘only its constantly aborted moment of birth’ (Deleuze 1994: 70).

How can the modes of time be constituted within this chaos of pure change? Bergson had succinctly posed this problem in his 1922 book, Duration and Simultaneity, and outlined its solution:

Consider a moment in the unfolding of the universe, that is, a snapshot that exists independently of any consciousness. Then we shall try conjointly to
summon another moment brought as close as possible to the first, and thus have a minimum of time enter into the world without allowing the faintest glimmer of memory to go with this. We shall see that this is impossible. Without an elementary memory that connects the two moments, there will be only one or the other, consequently a single instant, no before and after, no succession, no time. (Bergson 1965: 48)

In other words, for the modalities of time to appear, there must be a third thing that retains a ‘first’ determination when the ‘second’ determination appears – in other words, that synthesises the two determinations. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze will outline three different syntheses of time, and it is this first synthesis that constitutes the foundation of time under the modality of succession.

2. The first synthesis: the variable present

For many philosophers, this ‘third thing’ is linked to the operations of the mind: for Kant, it is the faculty of the understanding that carries out the synthesis; for Hume, it is the imagination and habit. In appealing to an elementary memory, Bergson was willing to posit the existence of an elementary consciousness in matter itself. Using a similar argument, Leibniz defined matter as a ‘momentary mind’ (mens momentenea) that retains one moment when the next one appears, although he considered this mind to be ‘without consciousness, sense, or memory’ (1976: 141).

Deleuze, for his part, constructs two concepts to characterise the first synthesis of time: contraction and contemplation. Both these terms emphasise the passivity of the temporal synthesis, that is, the fact it is not undertaken actively by the mind but rather is a synthesis that constitutes the body passively, as when we say the body ‘contracts’ a habit. Deleuze’s concept of ‘habit’ here is derived as much from Samuel Butler as it is from Hume, and it refers less to the sensory-motor habits that we have than to the primary organic habits that we are: ‘We are made of contracted water, earth light, and air . . . Every organism, in its receptive and perceptual elements, but also in its viscera, is a sum of contractions, retentions, and expectations’ (Deleuze 1994: 73). Where Husserl spoke of the temporal retentions (past) and protentions (future) of consciousness, Deleuze points to the temporal syntheses of the organism: need is the organic form of expectation, just as cellular heredity is the retention of the past in the present. The contemporary discipline of chronobiology has gone far in exploring the complex coexisting contractions and rhythms that are present in living organisms: heartbeats,
reproductive rhythms, sleep patterns, reaction times, migrations and so on (see Palmer 2002).

The first synthesis produces a variable present of which the past and the future are only dimensions. A teacher focused on an hour-long lecture inhabits a different present than the inattentive listener in the back row, and both their bodies integrate numerous rhythms. ‘The duration of an organism’s present, or of its various presents, will vary according to its natural contractile range’ (Deleuze 1994: 77). Augustine suggested that it would be possible for the present to encompass the entirety of time, a present of the future, a present of the present, and a present of the past, all implicated in a single event (‘the eternal now’).38

Although in The Time-Image Deleuze discusses cinematic explorations of what he calls ‘peaks of the present’ (pointes de present), in Difference and Repetition he argues that a perpetual present or eternal now ‘is not physically possible’, since the present necessarily passes: fatigue and exhaustion are real components of an organism’s present, marking the point where a contraction loses its capacity to sustain itself (1994: 76).

3. The second synthesis: the pure past

This leads to the second synthesis of time. If the present is the foundation of time, it does not provide us with the ground of time, since the present does not explain why the present passes. Indeed, Deleuze argues that the concept of the present is marked by a kind of illusion: we tend to think of the present as that which is, that which has being; and we think of the past as that which is no longer, that which has ceased to be, that which is not. But as Bergson showed, we have to reverse our ordinary determinations. It is the present which is not; it is pure becoming, always outside of itself, always passing, whether we consider the present as an instant or as the ‘thick’ present of lived experience. By contrast, it is the past which is, in the full sense of the word; the past is identical with being itself. ‘Of the present, we must say of every instant that it “was”, and of the past, that it “is”, that it is eternally, for all time’ (Deleuze 1988: 55). That Caesar crossed the Rubicon is, for all time. The non-being of the present implies the being of the past.

More profoundly, the past is the form under which being is preserved in itself. The question, ‘Where are memories preserved?’ is a badly posed problem, as if the brain were capable of preserving them. Bergson argued that memories do not have to be preserved anywhere other than ‘in’ duration: an ontological memory rather than a psychological memory (Deleuze 1988: 54). This claim is not as strange as it might initially seem.
In the realm of perception, we need to go to where things are in order to perceive them: to see the table in the next room, I do not need to look inside myself, but simply need to walk into the room. The same is true in the realm of memory: we have to look for memories, not in ourselves, but in the place where they are preserved – in duration. When we seek out a memory, we must first ‘leap’ into the being-in-itself of the past, and the recollection will gradually take on a psychological existence, passing from a virtual to an actual state. ‘We should have no more difficulty in admitting the virtual insistence of pure memories in time’, Deleuze writes, ‘than we do for the actual existence of non-perceived objects in space’ (1989: 80).

The notion that the past preserves itself entails three paradoxes, which Deleuze develops in *Difference and Repetition*. The first is the *contemporaneity* of the past with the present. ‘If a new present were required for the past to be constituted as past, then the former present would never pass and the new one would never arrive. No present would ever pass were it not past “at the same time” as it is present’ (Deleuze 1994: 81). The moment must be still present and already past, *at one and the same time*. This is what Deleuze considers to be the fundamental operation of time: ‘since the past is constituted not after the present that it was but at the same time, time has to split itself in two at each moment as present and past, which differ from each other in nature’ (1989: 81). The experience of *déjà vu* (paramnesia) makes this obvious point perceptible: there is a recollection of the present that is contemporaneous with the present itself, as closely coupled as a role to its actor.\(^{39}\) In *The Time-Image*, Deleuze argues that, in film, it is ‘the crystal-image’ that makes perceptible this splitting or dividing of time in two: ‘the actual image of the present which passes and the virtual image of the past which is preserved: distinct and yet indiscernible’ (1989: 81).

A second paradox follows: the paradox of *coexistence*. ‘If each past is contemporaneous with the present that it was, then *all of the past coexists* with the new present in relation to which it is now past’ (Deleuze 1994: 81–2). Each present, in other words, is the entirety of the past in its most contracted state, although the concept of ‘contraction’ takes on a new sense here. In the first synthesis, the present is the contracted state of successive elements that are, in themselves, independent of each other. In the second synthesis, the present designates the most contracted state of the past, which is itself like a coexisting totality, though this totality itself is variable and open (the whole is the open) (Deleuze 1994: 82).\(^{40}\) Genetics provides a concrete example of the coexistence of the past with the present: if my organism exists in the present, it is because there is a
The line of continuity between the first single-celled organism and myself, and that entire genetic history coexists with my present.

The final paradox completes the others: the paradox of pre-existence. The past does not cause one present to pass without bringing forth another, but the past itself does not pass: it is non-chronological. For this reason, we can say that the element of the past pre-exists the passing moment. Far from being merely a dimension of time, the past is the synthesis of all time, of which the present and future are only dimensions. This is what Deleuze will call the ‘pure past’, that is, a past that has never been present but rather forms a virtual coexistence, ‘a pure, general, a priori element of all time’ (1994: 82). What we live empirically as a succession of presents in the first synthesis is also the ever-increasing coexistence of the levels of the pure past in the second synthesis.

In the second synthesis, the non-chronological temporal mode of coexistence replaces that of succession. Capitalism and Schizophrenia provides the most obvious example of Deleuze’s use of non-chronological time, since the typology of social formations that the book proposes – ‘primitive’ societies, States, capitalism and nomadic war machines – are not successive stages in a historical or evolutionary development, but concurrent formations that occupy a global field of coexistence. Deleuze’s political philosophy turns the de facto problem of chronological succession into a de jure problem of topological coexistence, which becomes the condition for political transformation. This field of coexistence is what Deleuze would call the ‘plane of immanence’, a field where all the powers of the social machine coexist virtually, in constant becoming, enveloped and implicated in each other in a stratigraphic time.41

4. The third synthesis: the new (becoming)42

The third synthesis, finally, takes us to the heart of Deleuze’s own philosophy. The modality of the third synthesis is no longer succession or coexistence but rather the new: it concerns the genesis of the heterogeneous or the production of difference. Deleuze tends to use the phrase ‘the pure form of time’ in two senses: often, he explicitly links the pure form of time to the third synthesis, but in many contexts he uses the phrase more generally to refer to the three syntheses taken together and to the conception of time introduced by the Kantian revolution.43 But ultimately the two senses are the same, since it is the new (difference) that constitutes the ‘essence’ of time. As Bergson said, ‘the more we study the nature of time, the more we shall comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of
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the absolutely new’ (1911: 13). The absolutely new entails what Anti-Oedipus calls ‘a rupture with causality’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 377–8). If effects pre-exist in their causes, then causal processes can only give rise to things that are new in number, but not new in kind – the future is already contained in the past. The third synthesis, by contrast, requires a break with the past, since it concerns the conditions for the production of genuine novelty (Bergson) or creativity (Whitehead). The third synthesis constitutes a ‘pure’ future that breaks with its grounding in the past and its foundation in habit: Nietzsche’s untimely or Butler’s erewhon (Deleuze 1994: xx–xxi, 285).

Compared to the concise analysis of the second synthesis provided in the third chapter of Difference and Repetition, the discussion of the third synthesis can seem somewhat disjointed and unfocused, moving from Descartes and Kant to Hölderlin’s analysis of Greek tragedy to Nietzsche’s concept of the eternal return. But in fact it is the entirety of Deleuze’s oeuvre that constitutes an analysis of the third synthesis. In Difference and Repetition, for instance, Deleuze argues that we need to replace the possible–real opposition with the virtual–actual couple in order to account for the form of time. In the possible, everything is already given, and the possible simply has existence added to it when it is ‘realised’: the real resembles the possible and does not produce the new. But the virtual is constituted by difference, and in becoming ‘actualised’ it differentiates itself: the actual differs from the virtual, and the actualisation of the virtual is the production of difference (Deleuze 1994: 211–12). What Deleuze calls simulacra are ‘excessive systems’ in which the different is linked to the different in order to produce the different (115). Similarly, A Thousand Plateaus is an analysis of manifolds or multiplicities, and Deleuze argues that it is the relation between manifolds that is an act of becoming that creates the new.44

Although Deleuze’s entire philosophy can be seen as an exploration of the third synthesis of time, it is nonetheless worth examining the quite different presentations of the third synthesis that appear in Difference and Repetition and The Time-Image (the latter book does not in fact utilise the term ‘synthesis’).

5. The third synthesis in Difference and Repetition

In chapter three of Difference and Repetition, Deleuze initially explicates the third synthesis through an appeal to tragedy and a text by Hölderlin called ‘Remarks on Oedipus’ (Hölderlin 1988).45 Hölderlin showed that, in Greek tragedy, Aeschylus’ tragedies unfold in an originary time where
the beginning and end ‘rhyme’ with each other, atoning for injustice, whereas Sophocles is the first tragedian to un-curve time in an aberrant movement in which the beginning and the end no longer rhyme but unravel in a straight line: Oedipus’ long wandering is the incessant march of a slow death. But it is Shakespeare’s Hamlet who is the first hero that truly needed the pure form of time in order to act: the action (avenging his father) marks a ‘caesura’ within the form of time between a before and an after that is productive of something new. The before appears in the form of an act that is ‘too big’ for Hamlet, and he remains in a past disconnected from the present (second synthesis); the caesura is the moment of metamorphosis, where Hamlet finally becomes capable of the act and equal to it (first synthesis); but the after (third synthesis) is revealed to be the production of something new that destroys both the condition (the past) and the agent (the present): Hamlet must die.

Yet Deleuze, following Blanchot, notes that death has two aspects: the first is the disappearance of the person, but the second is ‘the state of free differences when they are no longer subject to the form imposed on them by an I or an ego’ (1994: 113). The latter ‘death’ is the object of the third synthesis: a domain of singularities and events that are both pre-individual and impersonal, and thus and irreducible to the self (Deleuze 1990: 177). Life, in this sense, is coextensive with death: life is traversed by ‘states of free differences’ that destabilise the organisation of the organism as well as the identity of the self, while at the same time producing a new self and a new body (Deleuze 1994: 113; Somers-Hall 2013: 95–6). This ‘death of the self’ is the correlate to the ‘death of God’. If the order of God can be defined in terms of the identity of God as the ultimate foundation, the identity of the world as the ambient environment, the identity of the person as a well-founded agent and the identity of bodies as the base, then the third synthesis entails the death of god, the destruction of the world, the dissolution of the self and the dis-integration of the body – but always in terms of a new self (affects and percepts), a new body (intensities and becomings) and ultimately the creation of a new world, a chaosmos (singularities and events) (Deleuze 1990: 292).

Difference and Repetition presents Nietzsche’s concept of the eternal return as the highest expression of the third synthesis, but Deleuze interprets the eternal return not as a return of the same but as the repetition of the different. Zarathustra went through a transformation similar to that of Hamlet. In the before, Zarathustra is incapable of an act, the death of god (‘The Convalescent’); in the during – or the caesura – he becomes equal to the act (‘On Involuntary Bliss’), though he feels the
hour has not yet come and still conceives of the eternal return as a return of the Same; but in the after, which would have been presented in the unwritten part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra must die, because ultimately the eternal return only allows the return of differences, and mercilessly eliminates the identity of the hero (the second sense of death) (Deleuze 1994: 298–9). In the third synthesis, the form of time is characterised by a totality that is divided into a series (before, caesura, after) that produces a pure order that is constitutive of the new. The eternal return, Deleuze writes, ‘is present in every metamorphosis . . . It is related to a world of differences implicated one in the other, to a complicated, properly chaotic world without identity’ (1994: 57).

6. The powers of the false in The Time-Image

In The Time-Image, by contrast, the third synthesis appears in a chapter entitled ‘The Powers of the False’. Though this chapter seems to bear little resemblance to the analyses in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze’s definition of philosophy as ‘the creation of concepts’ (the production of the new) is an expression of the third synthesis in thought and is a direct consequence of the theme of the powers of the false. If the discovery of originary time was one and the same as the discovery of the true, then the freeing of time puts the concept of truth in crisis and leads to the establishment of an autonomous and immanent concept of the false. But what does it mean to say that the liberation of time from its subordination to movement entails the liberation of the powers of the false from the form of the true?

Since Aristotle, the form of the true has meant the universal and the necessary: the true is that which is universal and necessary, always and everywhere, in all times and in all places. The false, by contrast, is effectuated in error. The false has no form, and error consists in giving the false the form of the true, although error itself does not itself affect the form of the true as universal. Deleuze’s claim is that it is the form of time the puts the form of truth in crisis. A simplistic interpretation of this claim would be to say: truth changes with time. But the truth is never put in crisis if it is a question of a simple change in its content, since a change in content does not affect the form of the true. We can say that we once ‘believed’ that the sun revolves around the earth, but now we ‘know’ that the opposite is true and has always been true. Error affects the content of the true, but neither error nor changes in content affect the form of the true. Deleuze’s thesis is that what puts the form of the true in crisis is the form of time independent of its content,
independent of what is in time – that is, what is true at one moment and then ceases to be true the next moment. This is why Deleuze speaks of the form of time as being both pure and empty, ‘having abjured its empirical content’ (1994: 89). The form of time thus cannot be confused with chronology, which affects the content of what is in time. But what then is this ‘non-chronological’ form of time that undoes the concept of truth?\(^5^2\)

Not surprisingly, the confrontation between the form of truth and the form of time had already taken place in antiquity under the classical form of the problem of contingent futures. This problem was encapsulated most succinctly in what came to be known as the ‘Master Argument’ of Diodorus Cronus.\(^5^3\) The argument goes like this: If it is true that a naval battle may take place tomorrow, two logical paradoxes seem to follow. The principle of non-contradiction says that, of two contradictory propositions – ‘there will be a naval battle tomorrow’ and ‘there will not be a naval battle tomorrow’ – one is necessarily true and the other is necessarily false. If the naval battle indeed takes place, we can say that it was the first proposition, and only that proposition, that was true. But this is where the paradox emerges, in a double form. On the one hand, we began with two possible propositions, each of which changes modality once the event takes place: the first becomes necessary, while the second is now rendered impossible. In this case, the principle of non-contradiction is saved only at the price of contravening a second logical principle, namely, that the impossible cannot be derived from the possible. On the other hand, while the proposition ‘there will be a naval battle tomorrow’ was true yesterday, it was not necessarily true, since yesterday it was still possible that the naval battle could have not taken place. In this case, the principle of non-contradiction is saved by denying that a true proposition of the past is necessarily true.\(^5^4\)

The paradox of contingent futures thus takes on two forms: the impossible proceeds from the possible and what is true in the past is not necessarily true.\(^5^5\) It is easy to regard the paradox as a sophism, and philosophy has been marked by numerous attempts to resolve it.\(^5^6\) It nonetheless shows the difficulty of conceiving a direct relation between truth and the form of time, which is what obliged philosophers to keep truth in the eternal rather than in time. But the Master Argument allows Deleuze to paint a picture of what he will call the ‘falsifier’ (le faussaire). If the ‘truthful person’, as a conceptual persona, is someone who allows their being to be in-formed by the form of the true, we could say that the falsifier is someone who, from the possible, makes the impossible emerge, or who, from the past, makes something that is not necessarily
true. The falsifier ‘imposes a power of the false as adequate to time, in contrast to any form of the true that would control time’ (Deleuze 1989: 132). Readers of Deleuze know the classic examples he provides of works that are, to a certain degree, ‘falsifying’ in this manner, such as Jorge Luis Borges’ story ‘The Garden of the Forking Paths’, or Robbe-Grillet’s screenplay for Alain Resnais’ film Last Year at Marienbad, or even Leibniz’s narration of the bifurcating possibilities in the life of Sextus in his Theodicy – all of which make a non-chronological time appear directly in the form incompossible presents and not-necessarily-true pasts.

What prevented Leibniz’s God from making all these possibilities, and even incompossibilities, pass into existence is the fact that such an operation would turn him into a mendacious God, a trickster God, a deceiving God, an ‘evil genius’ – something Descartes and Leibniz both saw very clearly, but shrank from with a kind of horror. For it is precisely here that the truthful God would be replaced by a falsifying God, and the concept of the false would achieve its autonomy. The false becomes independent and autonomous when it is no longer subject to the form of the true. In other words, to say that something is false no longer means that it is ‘not true’. But when it is freed from the form of the true, the false takes on a power, which is the power of metamorphosis, that is, the power of creation. What stands opposed to the form of the eternal is the production of the new or the power of metamorphosis (becoming).

But to say that the concept of the false assumes an autonomy is not to say that ‘everything is false’. Rather, what distinguishes the eternal form of the true from the temporal powers of the false is that the false always appears as a plurality or multiplicity of powers ($x^1$, $x^2$, $x^3$ . . .). To ask ‘What is a falsifier?’ is a badly posed question, since the falsifier exists only within a series, in a plurality: behind every falsifier there is always another falsifier, like a mask behind every mask. But not everything is ‘equal’ in this chain of falsifiers. Even the truthful person is a falsifier: Plato was being a falsifier when he created the concept of an ‘Idea’, and one could say that the truthful person is the first of the powers of the false. Nietzsche called the powers of the false the will to power, though the will to power has two extremes, two powers: at one end, the falsifier is the ‘higher man’, the ‘truthful person’, someone who wants to judge life in the name of values higher than life; at the other end, the falsifier is a ‘form of life’ that is capable of changing itself, inventing, creating, where the powers of the false are no longer effectuated in ‘judging life’ but in ‘assuring metamorphoses’, in other words, creating the new.
7. What is Philosophy? *The pure form of time in concepts*

As an example of the power of the false, we need look no further than to Deleuze’s own philosophical concepts. One could say that the ultimate aim of the analytic of concepts developed in *What is Philosophy?* was to introduce the *pure form of time* into concepts, even though the word ‘time’ hardly appears in the book. To introduce time into concepts means that concepts do not have an *identity*, but they do have a *consistency*, that is, a *becoming* or a *metamorphosis*, but this consistency must have as its necessary complement the internal *variability* of the concept. Deleuze analyses these two temporal aspects of concepts under the rubrics of exo-consistency and endo-consistency: every concept links up with other concepts (exo-consistency) but each concept also has its own internal components (endo-consistency). Consider Deleuze’s concept of intensity: in *Difference and Repetition*, the concept of intensity is primarily related to the dimension of depth, while in *The Logic of Sense* the concept of intensity is retained, but is now related primarily to the dimension of surface – same concept, different components. In *Anti-Oedipus*, the concept undergoes a third metamorphosis in which it is no longer related either to depth or surface; rather, rising and falling intensities are now events that take place on a body without organs. Even within Deleuze’s corpus, the concept of intensity has a temporal power that undergoes internal mutations and metamorphoses.

If *What is Philosophy?* is a book on time, or more precisely, a book on the third synthesis, it is because it a study of the determinations of thought that take place within the pure form of time. What Hume called the association of ideas (resemblance, contiguity, causality) links together our ideas in time with a minimum of constant rules, thereby forming a realm of *opinion* that protects us from chaos. But philosophy, science and art do more than this, and Deleuze describes their respective activities using his own (created) vocabulary. From the infinite and continuous *variability* of time (chaos), philosophers extract *variations* that converge as the components of a consistent concept; scientists extract *variables* that enter into determinable relations in a function; and artists extract *varieties* that enter into the composition of a being of sensation (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 202).

The power of the false can thus be said to be creative. But creative of what? At this point, Deleuze suggests that there is no reason not to use the word ‘truth’: the power of the false is creative of truth. But this implies the creation of an entirely new concept of truth: the truth as something to be created (namely, the power of the false) has nothing to do with the
truth of the truthful person, or with the form of the true. If one makes these modifications in the concept of the truth itself, one could say that philosophy, science and art, as powers of the false, are nothing other than enterprises in the creation of truth within the pure form of time.\textsuperscript{61}

This is only a brief overview of the three syntheses that constitute the pure and empty form of time.\textsuperscript{62} When time is freed from its subordination to movement, its \textit{a priori} determinations of time are fixed or held, as though in a photo or freeze-frame. The first synthesis provides the \textit{foundation} of time in the passing present, while the second synthesis provides its \textit{ground} in the pure past. In the third synthesis, however, the ground is superseded by a groundlessness, a \textit{sans-fond}, a universal un-grounding in which the freeze-frame begins to move once more. The extreme formality of the form of time, in other words, is there to produce the formless, that is, the new, difference-in-itself. The system of the future is ‘the deployment and explication of the multiple, of the different, and of the fortuitous’, it concerns ‘excessive systems’ (simulacra) that link the different with the different (Deleuze 1994: 115). But this is where time forms a circle again, for the third synthesis affects a world that has rid itself of the condition and the agent, a \textit{chaos} – even if these singularities are taken up by the first two syntheses, and the singular is rendered regular and ordinary. ‘This is how the story of time ends: by undoing its too well centred natural or physical circle and forming a straight line which then, led by its own length, reconstitutes an eternally decentred circle’ (115).

Notes

1. Aristotle, \textit{Physics}, Book 4, Chapter 11, 219b5–8: ‘time is the number of movement in respect of before and after’.

2. See Leibniz, Letter to Arnauld, 30 April 1687, where Leibniz faults the ancients for substituting a concept of ‘metempsychosis’ for a ‘metaschematisym’ [\textit{metempsychosis pro metaschematismis}].

3. One of the classic analyses of intensive quantities is the ‘Anticipations of Perception’ section of Kant’s first critique, which recapitulates a long tradition. See Kant 1929: 201–8, B207–18. Deleuze takes up the distinction in chapter four of \textit{Difference and Repetition}, ‘The Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible’ (1994: 222–61).

4. See Duhem 1954: 112. ‘Diderot used to ask jokingly how many snowballs would be required to heat an oven.’ Deleuze refers to this anecdote in his seminar of 20 March 1984. Deleuze’s seminars can be accessed at ‘The Deleuze Seminars’ project, deleuze.cla.purdue.edu.

5. On the notion of an ideal fall, see Plotinus 1991: 236. ‘Nature, asked why it brings forth its works, might answer (if it cared to listen and to speak): . . . “Whatever comes into being is my vision, seen in my silence, the vision that belongs to my character who, sprung from vision, am vision-loving and create
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vision by the vision-seeking faculty in me. The mathematicians from their vision draw their figures: but I draw nothing: I gaze and the figures of the material world take being as if they fell from my contemplation’” (emphasis added). The rejection of ‘drawing’ marks Plotinus’ distance from Plato’s dialectic, since the latter entails a ‘real’ fall of the intelligible into the sensible.

6. Deleuze discusses the Platonic and Neo-Platonic conceptions of time in a remarkable series of seminars from 7 February 1984 to 27 March 1984, which include analyses that have no correlate in Deleuze’s published texts.

7. See Bergson 1965: 6. ‘If we go looking in time for features like those of space [or movement] . . . we shall not have pushed on to time itself.’

8. See Gallison 2004, chapter 5, ‘Einstein’s Clocks’. Einstein’s work in the Swiss patent office put him in a position to seize clock coordination as the principled starting point of relativity’ (260).

9. Rovelli suggests that, in physics, it was general relativity that finally brought about ‘the destruction of the notion of time’ as a measure of movement in favour of pure change or pure ‘events’ (2018: 96–7).

10. Deleuze suggests that the entirety of Aristotle’s corpus – metaphysics, physics, ethics and so on – could be read from the viewpoint of aberrant movements; see the seminar lecture of 28 February 1984.

11. For a helpful discussion, see Paul Krause, ‘The Fall of the Soul from Plotinus to Augustine’, online at Voegelin View (voegelinview.com/the-fall-of-soul-from-plotinus-to-augustine).

12. On Chinese conceptions of time, see Hui 2016: 210–11, and his references to the works of Marcel Granet and François Jullien.

13. In Catholic missals, the term ‘ordinary time’ (tempus per annum) refers to the part of the liturgical year that falls outside the two primary seasons of Christmastide and Eastertide, with their respective preparatory seasons of Advent and Lent.

14. Newton noted his own inversion of the movement/time relation: ‘Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything external, and by another name is called duration: relative, apparent, and common time, is some sensible and external (whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration by the means of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time; such as an hour, a day, a month, a year’ (1934: 6; 77 in the original Motte translation).


17. Book Two of Being and Time recapitulates, in temporal terms, the analysis of ‘everydayness’ provided in Book One.

18. Deleuze elucidates these themes in his seminars of 17 April 1984 and 4 May 1984.

19. Deleuze’s most complete analysis of Kant’s contribution to the theory of time can be found in his seminar of 17 April 1984, to which the following analysis is indebted.

20. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 5.

21. For instance, the Gospel of Luke famously dates the beginning of the preaching of John the Baptist by contextualising it in a nexus of reigning officials in civil and religious institutions: ‘In the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Caesar, Pontius Pilate being governor of Judaea, and Herod being tetrarch of Galilee, and his brother Philip tetrarch of Iturae and of the region of Trachonitis, and Lysanias the tetrarch of Abilene, Annas and Caiaphas being the high priests, the word of God came unto John the son of Zacharias in the wilderness’ (Luke 3:1–2). In the ‘Christian’ calendar, time begins with the reign of Christ.
22. See Kosmin 2018. There were no ‘end times’ until the constitution of an ordinary linear time in the Seleucid empire (312 to 63 BCE), and Kosmin shows that apocalyptic eschatologies – such as the biblical Book of Daniel (c. 165 BCE), which was fiercely anti-Seleucid – can be seen as subversive attempts to contest the imperial institution of ordinary time.

23. Kant 1929: 76, A32/B48: ‘The concept of motion, as alteration of place, is possible only through and in the representation of time.’

24. See Kant 1929: 214, A183/B226: ‘If we ascribe succession to time itself, we must think yet another time, in which the sequence would be possible . . . Without the permanent there is therefore no time-relation.’

25. See, for instance, Leibniz 1956: 15. ‘I hold it [space] to be an order of coexistences, as time is an order of successions.’

26. See Kant 1929: ‘Time cannot by itself be perceived’ (213, A182/B225); ‘time cannot be perceived in itself’ (214, A183/B226; 219, A189/B233).

27. These three formulations of the disintegrating power of time appear in Deleuze’s seminar of 14 April 1984.


29. Nonetheless, even Kant recognises that ‘I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being; all that I can do is to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought’ (1929: 169, B158n). In other words, I can never truly recognise the spontaneity of thinking as my own: the passive self ‘represents the activity of thought to itself rather than enacting it, it experiences its effect rather than initiating it’ (Deleuze 1994: 86). For a penetrating commentary, see Kerslake 2005.

30. Bernard Stiegler, in his three-volume Technics and Time – especially in the third volume, Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise – already went beyond Heidegger’s analysis by rightly arguing that the temporal activity of schematisation, which Kant labelled a ‘mystery’, should be located in the ‘tertiary retentions’ of technics (the externalisation of memory) (see e.g., Stiegler 2011: 56–7).

31. For an analysis of the role of the formless in the third critique, see Smith 2012: 222–34, esp. 228–30.

32. We are here summarising Deleuze’s important reading of Kant’s Critique of Judgment in his 1963 article ‘The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Aesthetics’ (trans. Daniel W. Smith, in Angelaki, 5 (3), 2000, 57–70), which is an elaboration of themes developed in Kant’s Critical Philosophy, published in the same year. See, for example: ‘The theme of a presentation of Ideas in sensible nature is, in Kant, a fundamental theme. There are several modes of presentation . . .’ (Deleuze 1984: 66).

33. For an analysis of how Deleuze transformed Kant’s theory of Ideas, see Smith 2012: 106–21.

34. In Difference and Repetition, the concept of the ‘white nothingness’ plays a similar role and is characterised by what Deleuze calls ‘the rule of discontinuity or instantaneity in repetition’: ‘one instance does not appear unless the other has disappeared’ (1994: 28, 70).

35. ‘We place consciousness at the heart of things for the very reason that we credit them with a time that endures’ (Bergson 1965: 49).

36. Though Leibniz held that the temporal synthesis of a body only lasts for a ‘moment’, he developed a theological theory of ‘traduction’ to account for the propagation of minds. See Mercer 2004: e.g., 163, 223. The quote, from a letter to Oldenburg, is cited in Mercer 2004: 164.

37. Deleuze would later speak of his affection for these analyses of fatigue and contemplation in Difference and Repetition. See Deleuze 2006: 65.

39. See Bergson 1920: 109–51. ‘Our actual existence duplicates itself all along with a virtual existence, a mirror-image. Every moment of our life presents two aspects, it is actual and virtual, perception on the one side and memory on the other’ (135). See also Deleuze 1989: 79.

40. For an analysis of Bergson’s claim that ‘the whole is the open’, see Smith 2012: 256–67.


42. For an analysis of the components of the third synthesis as presented in *Difference and Repetition*, see Voss 2013.

43. For the first sense, see Deleuze 1994: 88: ‘the pure form of time or the third synthesis’. For the second sense, see 299: ‘What, however, is the content of this third time, this formlessness at the end of the form of time?’ The phrase ‘form of time’ appears only three times in *The Time-Image* (1989: 130, 273, 274), and each seems to be used in the second sense.

44. See Deleuze and Guattari 1987: plateau 10, ‘1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible ...’


46. For analyses of Deleuze’s use of Hamlet, see Somers-Hall 2011 and Plotnitsky 2015.

47. See Deleuze 1994: 6 on what lies beyond the laws of nature.

48. For an elaboration of these themes, see Smith 2012: 189–221.

49. See James Mollison’s chapter in this volume.


51. To my knowledge, the phrase ‘power of the false’ appears once in both *Difference and Repetition* (1994: 128) and *The Logic of Sense* (1990: 263), but never in either *Anti-Oedipus* or *A Thousand Plateaus*. It is only in *The Time-Image* that Deleuze develops the theme of the power of the false in detail.

52. The term ‘non-chronological time’ appears throughout *The Time-Image*, usually with regard to the second synthesis (Deleuze 1989: 99), but in certain cases also with regard to the third (129, 181).


54. For analyses of the Master Argument, see Vuillemin 1996 and Schuhl 1960. Vuillemin presents Epictetus’ summary of the argument: ‘It is contradictory to hold any two of the following propositions together with the third: “Every true proposition about the past is necessary. The impossible does not logically follow from the possible. What neither is presently true nor will be so is possible”’ (1996: 3). For Deleuze’s discussion, see the seminars of 8, 22 and 29 November 1983, as well as Deleuze 1989: 130–1.

55. See Deleuze, seminar of 29 November 1983, as well as Deleuze 1989: 130.

56. Aristotle, for instance, was a partisan of a solution which said that what is
necessary is only the alternative between the two propositions. See On Interpretation, 19a 24–25, 30–31: ‘It cannot be said without qualification that all existence and non-existence is the outcome of necessity... A sea-fight must either take place tomorrow or not, but it is not necessary that it should take place tomorrow, neither is it necessary that it should not take place, yet it is necessary that it either should or should not take place tomorrow.’ Leibniz analyses the Master Argument in Theodicy, III, §§169ff. The problem is also taken up by Kierkegaard in Philosophical Fragments, in the ‘Interlude’ entitled ‘Is the past more necessary than the future? Or, When the possible becomes actual, is it made more necessary than it was?’ (Kierkegaard 1936: 89ff.).

57. For analysis, see Deleuze, seminar of 29 November 198.

58. See Deleuze 1989: 130–1, as well as the seminar of 6 December 1983.

59. On these themes, see Deleuze, seminar of 12 June 1984.

60. See Deleuze 2006: 65–6. The concept of the ‘affect’ undergoes a similar metamorphosis. The concept first appears in Deleuze’s work on Spinoza, where it designates the passage from one intensity to another in a finite mode that is experienced as a joy or a sadness. In A Thousand Plateaus and What Is Philosophy? the affect is no longer ‘the passage from one lived state to another’ but assumes an autonomous status – along with percepts – as a static becoming that exists between two multiplicities. ‘The affect is not the passage from one lived state to another but the nonhuman becoming of humanity’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 173).

61. For further analysis, see Smith 2019.

62. The fullest analysis of the three syntheses can be found in Williams 2011.

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