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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

GILLES DELEUZE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF DIFFERENCE:
TOWARD A TRANSCENDENTAL EMPIRICISM

VOLUME ONE

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

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INTRODUCTION

"I believe in philosophy as a system," writes Gilles Deleuze. "For me, the system must not only be in perpetual heterogeneity, it must be a heterogenesis, which is something, it seems to me, that has never been attempted."¹ The aim of this dissertation is to present a reading of Deleuze's philosophical work, and to sketch the broad outlines of what I take to be his philosophical "system," which is by nature open and heterogeneous. As guiding threads, I have made use of two interrelated themes, one conceptual, the other historical. The first is the notion of "difference," one of the key concepts of Deleuze's philosophy, and one that has become increasingly important in many areas of humanistic inquiry (cultural difference, sexual difference, and so on). What is difference as a philosophical concept? And what consequences does a principle of difference entail for philosophical analysis? The first thesis of the dissertation can be stated simply. Difference is normally conceived of as an empirical relation between two terms each of which have a prior identity of their own ("x is different from y"). In Deleuze, this primacy is inverted: identity persists, but it is now a secondary principle produced by a prior relation between differentials (dx rather than not-x). Difference is no longer an empirical relation but becomes a transcendental principle that constitutes the

¹Preface to Jean-Clet Martin, Variations (Paris: Plon, 1993), p. 7.

sufficient reason of empirical diversity as such.² Deleuze's philosophy can thus accurately be described as a transcendental philosophy--a "transcendental empiricism," as he himself puts it. The elaboration of his thesis is a much more complicated matter. The second thread of the dissertation therefore concerns the historical relationship of Deleuze's philosophy to Kant. My second thesis is that Deleuze's philosophy can be read as both an inversion and a completion of Kant's philosophy, a resumption of the critical project on a new basis and with new concepts (even if he frequently makes use of traditional philosophical terminology, while nonetheless defining it in a new manner). Though Deleuze has written that everything in his work "tends toward the great Spinoza-Nietzsche identity,"³ he frequently couches his analysis in Kantian terms, and I have made use of the figure of Kant as a point of reference by which to assess and evaluate Deleuze's own contributions. Each chapter of the dissertation considers a philosophical domain that parallels one laid out in the architectonic of Kant's three Critiques (dialectics, aesthetics, analytics, ethics, politics), and in each case attempts to examine the implications of the positing of a principle of difference in that domain. Taken together, the five chapters may be taken to present the broad outlines of a systematic philosophy of difference as it appears in Deleuze's work, and to indicate the nature of its demands in each of these domains.

²Difference and Repetition, p. 222: "Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is given, that by which the given is given as diverse."

³Negotiations, p. 129.

The attempt to elaborate a concept of difference has been a central concern of French philosophy over the past quarter-century, and the influence of Gilles Deleuze's work in this regard has been immense. Vincent Descombes, in his study Modern French Philosophy, wrote in 1979 that Deleuze's thought represented "that remarkable point of modern metaphysics which all preceding discourse [in France] had indicated like a flickering compass."⁴ Already in 1970, Michel Foucault had gone so far as to predict, famously, that "perhaps one day, this century will be known as Deleuzian," and frequently admitted his own debt to Deleuze.⁵ Deleuze's philosophic corpus is now, belatedly but deservedly, receiving increasing attention from the Anglo-American philosophic community. The reasons for this belated reception are complex, and extend beyond the divergence between the so-called "Continental" and "Analytic" traditions. The labels most frequently used to interpret contemporary French philosophy are inapplicable to Deleuze, since he is neither a phenomenologist, a structuralist, a hermeneutician, a Heideggerian, nor even a "postmodernist". Nor has he made any grand gestures announcing "the end of metaphysics" (Derrida) or "the end of the great narratives" (Lyotard). Many of his books are dry monographs in the history of philosophy that conform to the stringent requirements of a French University thesis. And while many of his contemporaries began their careers with studies of Husserl (e.g., Ricoeur, Derrida,

⁴Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, trans. L. Scott-Fox and J. M. Harding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 136.

⁵Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," in Language, Counter-Memory, and Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 165. In Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Random House, 1977), Foucault had written, "I could give no notion by references or quotations what this book owes to Gilles Deleuze and the work he is undertaking with Félix Guattari" (p. 309).

Lyotard, Levinas). Deleuze wrote his first book on Hume, and has always considered himself an empiricist. He has never taken up an academic position in the United States, as many of his peers have done; indeed, he travels little, rarely attends conferences, and by his own account has led a highly uneventful life as a typical French academic. Yet at the same time, Deleuze enjoys, for better or worse, a notorious reputation based largely on a series of highly original works coauthored with Félix Guattari, a militant anti-psychiatrist, whose very titles--Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Anti-Oedipus, A Thousand Plateaus--bear witness to the idiosyncrasy of both their content and style. Small wonder, then, that although Deleuze's importance is almost universally recognized--"the only philosophical mind" in France, Foucault used to say--the bewildering diversity and scope of his published works have led few to undertake a systematic analysis of his oeuvre as whole.⁶

But what is difference? And how can it serve as a guiding thread through the "rhizomatic" labyrinth of Deleuze's thought? Deleuze himself has written that, from the point of view of the history of philosophy, everything in his work "tended toward the great Spinoza-Nietzsche identity."⁷ But in elaborating his philosophy, the most frequent historical point of reference is the work of Immanuel Kant. Though no philosopher would seem to be farther from Deleuze than "the great Chinaman of Königsberg," the ubiquity of the references to Kant is less surprising that it might seem at first sight. For

⁶Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, trans. Betsy Wing (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 262: "In the years that followed [1977] he [Foucault] frequently spoke of Deleuze to his friends, particularly Paul Veyne. He often said that Deleuze was "the only philosophical mind" in France...."

⁷Negotiations, p. 135, translation modified.

Kant's genius, in Deleuze's own interpretation, was to have conceived of his philosophy as a purely immanent critique of reason. The critical project, Kant had argued, must not be a critique of reason by feeling, experience, or any other external instance; nor can what is criticized be external to reason: we must not seek, in reason, errors that have come from elsewhere (the body, sense, or the passions) but illusions that come from reason as such. Caught between these two demands, Kant concluded that the critique must be a critique of reason by reason itself. But is this not the contradiction inherent in Kant's philosophy, making reason itself both the tribunal and the accused, the judge and the plaintiff?

Already in 1789, Salomon Maimon, in his Essay on Transcendental Philosophy, had addressed a incisive criticism against Kant that seems to have had a decisive influence on Deleuze. Kant, Maimon argued, had simply presumed the existence of certain "facts" (the fact of knowledge, the fact of morality), and then sought the conditions of their possibility. The only object of Kant's critique, in other words, is justification: it begins by believing in what it criticizes. To truly achieve its immanent ambitions, the critical project required a genetic method that would give a purely immanent account of the genesis of knowledge, morality, and reason itself. It is not enough for the critique to be brought to bear on false claims to knowledge and morality: to be complete it must be brought to bear on knowledge and morality themselves, on true knowledge and true morality, and indeed on truth itself. Kant's transcendental philosophy simply discovered conditions of possibility that still remained external to what they conditioned: his principles always have too broad a mesh in relation to what they claim

to capture or regulate. What is required, Maimon insisted, is a principle of internal genesis, a principle that would be no wider than what it conditions, that in each case would determine itself along with what it conditions--a principle, in short, that would constitute the condition of real and not merely possible experience.

Maimon found a solution to this problem in a principle internal difference: if identity constitutes the possibility of thought in general, he argued, it is difference that constitutes the genetic condition of real thought. These two Maimonian exigencies, the search for the genetic conditions of real thought and the positing of a principle of internal difference, reappear like a leitmotif in almost every one of Deleuze's books. It is only on their basis, in Deleuze's view, that the critical philosophy can fully achieve its immanent ambitions. The thesis of the dissertation, then, is that Deleuze's philosophy of difference can be read as an inversion and completion of Kant's critical project. What Deleuze says of Nietzsche, I believe, applies equally to his own philosophy: "He seems to have sought a radical transformation of Kantianism, a re-invention of the critique which Kant betrayed at the same time as he conceived it, a resumption of the critical project on a new basis and with new concepts."⁸ This new basis is that of a principle of difference: in Deleuze, "difference" refers, not to an external or empirical difference ("x is different from y"), but to a genetic principle that constitutes the sufficient reason of diversity as such (transcendental empiricism). If Deleuze's work tends toward the "Spinoza-Nietzsche identity," it is because they are the two thinkers who came closest to realizing a purely differential and immanent philosophy. But if Kant nonetheless remains a point of reference in Deleuze's

⁸Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 52.

constructive work, it is because he often begins with a summary statement of the Kantian position, in order to then push it to its immanent conclusions. It is true that this is not a strategy that Deleuze pursues explicitly in his works; but I have nonetheless found it a useful means of organizing the dissertation and presenting Deleuze's philosophy in a systematic fashion. Each chapter considers a philosophical domain that more or less parallels one laid out in the architectonic of Kant's Critiques (dialectics, aesthetics, analytics, ethics, politics) in order to examine the implications of the positing of a principle of difference in each of them.

1. The first chapter examines Deleuze's theory of the Idea, contrasting it with those put forward by Plato and Kant. The first section shows how Deleuze interprets Nietzsche's call for a "reversal of Platonism": Plato posited Ideas as transcendent instances capable of distinguishing between true and false copies; but even in the Dialogues, the persistence of "simulacra" already contests the distinction between the model and its copies, and points to the possibility of a purely differential theory of the Idea. The second section examines Kant's theory of the Idea, which he posited as regulative notions that serve to unify and systematize the operations of the understanding. I here examine Maimon's claim that the Kantian duality between concept and intuition can only be overcome by the positing of Ideas of difference within sensibility itself. In third section, I show how Deleuze takes up these Nietzschean and Maimonian initiatives by developing a differential and genetic theory of Ideas. Ideas, he argues, are problematic structures that are immanent to experience. They do not simply exist in our heads, but are

encountered here and there in the constitution of the actual historical world, so that the history of humanity can be conceived of as a history of problematizations.

I conclude by summarizing what Deleuze takes to be the formal criteria for a problematic Idea. In sum: 1. The transcendental field must be defined as a differentiated topology (a pure spatium or multiplicity). 2. This field in turn is defined by three dimensions: differential elements (determinability), the differential relations between these elements (reciprocal determination), and singularities produced by these relations (complete determination). 3. These singular points are necessarily prolonged or extended in series of ordinary points, until they reach the vicinity of another singularity. 4. Such series are in turn placed in communication by a paradoxical element or "aleatory point" (perpetuum mobile) that establishes various types of passive syntheses between them: connection, convergence, and disjunction. (One of the essential questions I address here is Deleuze's claim that disjunction can be a type of synthesis.) 5. These passive syntheses form pure spatio-temporal dynamisms within the structure, modes of individuation that Deleuze terms "events" or "hacceties," which precede the formation of subjects or things. 6. The real is the actualization or integration of this virtual domain. These criteria (multiplicity, singularity, series, event, etc.) do not form a list of categories, but rather "empirico-ideal notions" that constitute conditions of real, and not merely possible experience, and thus fulfill the post-Kantian demands of a "transcendental empiricism."

2. What are the implications of a principle of difference for aesthetics? Kant himself had separated the theory of sensation (aesthetics) into two isolated parts: in the

"Transcendental Aesthetic" of the Critique of Pure Reason, aesthetics designates the theory of sensibility as the form of possible experience (the objective element of sensation as conditioned by the a priori forms of space and time), while in the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" in the Critique of Judgment, aesthetics designates the theory of art as a reflection upon real experience (the subjective element of sensation as incarnated in the feeling of pleasure and pain). The second chapter examines the way in which a principle of difference overcomes this duality in aesthetics. On the one hand, Deleuze reformulate the Transcendental Aesthetic by locating the genetic conditions of sensibility in an intensive conception of space and a non-chronological conception of time, which are actualized in a plurality of spaces and a complex rhythm of times. (Given its importance for Deleuze, I consider the theory of time separately in the second half of the chapter). On the other hand, these genetic principles of sensation are at the same time revealed to be the principles of composition of the work of art, and conversely, it is the structure of the work of art that reveals these conditions. Deleuze's "logic of sensation" in this way reunites the two dissociated halves of aesthetics: the theory of forms of experience ("the being of the sensible") and the work of art as experimentation ("a pure being of sensation"). If Deleuze's numerous writings on the arts are, as he says, "philosophy, nothing but philosophy," it is precisely because they constitute philosophic explorations of this transcendental domain of sensibility. Indeed, the greatness of twentieth century art lies in the fact that it had already achieved the project Deleuze envisions for philosophy: it abandoned the domain of representation in order to penetrate into the genetic conditions of representation, and made these the object of the work of art

itself. "The work of art quits the domain of representation in order to become 'experience,' transcendental empiricism or the science of the sensible."⁹

3. The third chapter examines Deleuze's analytic of concepts. For Deleuze, philosophy is a discipline that is concerned with the creation of concepts. For Deleuze, concepts are neither universals nor generalities but singularities, and the aim of philosophy is to uncover the conditions under which new and singular concepts are created, and to critique the effect these concepts have on the production of knowledge once they are created. Here again, Deleuze will propose a novel definition of concepts based on a principle of difference. I begin by examining the table of categories in Kant's Analytic (sedentary distribution) and the taxonomic table of concepts in Aristotle (arborescent scheme), contrasting this with the nomadic distribution and rhizomatic structure which for Deleuze constitutes the problematic conditions under which concepts are created. I then take, as a case study of Deleuze's "symptomatology" approach to concepts, his analysis of the concepts of "masochism" and "sadism." From this analysis one can isolate the three criteria by which Deleuze defines concepts: endo-consistency, exo-consistency, and self-referentiality. I then show how Deleuze distinguishes philosophical concepts from scientific and logical "functions," arguing strongly against the reduction of philosophy to an image derived from either of these domains. I conclude by showing the relation between concepts and what Deleuze terms an event.

4. Michel Foucault, in his preface to the first volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, wrote that "Anti-Oedipus is a book of ethics, the first book of ethics to be

⁹Difference and Repetition, p. 56.

written in France in quite a long time." This chapter examines the type of differential ethics that is proposed in Deleuze's work. There are two aspects of this ethic that need to be distinguished. First, Deleuze uses the term "morality" to define, in very general terms, any set of "constraining" rules (e.g. a moral code) that consists in judging actions and intentions by relating them to transcendent values (this is good, that is evil...). What he calls "ethics" is, on the contrary, a set of "facilitative" rules that evaluate what we do, say, or think according to the immanent mode of existence that it implies. It is this conception of ethics as an evaluation of modes of existence that Deleuze develops explicitly in his studies of Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Foucault. One says or does this, thinks or feels that: what mode of existence does it imply? Nietzsche, for instance, puts forward the idea that there are things one cannot do or think except on the condition of being weak, base, or enslaved, unless one harbors a vengeance against life (ressentiment); and there are other things one cannot do or say except on the condition of being strong or noble, unless one affirms life, harbors an excess of life.

Second, such modes of existence are defined by their capacity for affecting or being affected, a capacity that is not simply a logical possibility but is necessarily actualized at every moment, thus fulfilling the Deleuzian demand for a genetic principle of the real. The first two sections of the chapter analyze, respectively, the process of "becoming reactive" outlined in Nietzsche theory of nihilism, and the process of "becoming active" proposed in Spinoza's Ethics. These two processes coexist in any mode of existence: "In the beginning, at the origin, there is the difference between active

and reactive forces."¹⁰ For Deleuze, the aim of ethical theory is to determine, not universal grounds or normative foundations, but rather the conditions under which the attainment of active affections, and more generally, the production of new modes of existence or forms of "subjectivation," is possible. Foucault coined the term "subjectivation" to define the means through which such modes of existence are produced: there is no universal or transcendental subject, he argued, but only variable and extraordinarily diverse processes of subjectivation, and his later work analyzed the variable forms these affective processes took in the Greek, Roman, and Christian periods. It may be that the creators of new modes of existence are the "nobles" (Nietzsche), or the aestheticized existence of the "free man" (Foucault); under different conditions, however, they may also be the excluded, the minorized, the marginalized (Deleuze). The study of variations in the process of subjectivation is one of the fundamental positive tasks posed by this differential conception of ethics.

5. This final chapter is a continuation of the chapter on ethics. I begin by examining the relation between desire and power in Deleuze's thought: desire (the difference between active and reactive forces in a given mode of existence) never exists in a spontaneous or natural state, but is always "assembled" in variable ways in concrete social formations, and what assembles desire are what he calls "relations of power." If the ethical task concerns the attainment of active affections, the formation of new forms of subjectivation that it implies always follows the relations of power actualized in a given social formation. The political philosophy proposed in Capitalism and

¹⁰Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 55.

Schizophrenia outlines a typology of four abstract formations--"primitive" societies, the State, the nomadic war machine, and capitalism--and the bulk of the chapter analyzes the various components Deleuze and Guattari assign to each of these "abstract machines." These abstract machines never exist in a pure state, but rather provide conceptual tools for analyzing the manner in which concrete social formations synthesize, integrate, and stratify desire in differing but determinable ways.

The aim of the dissertation is to present the outlines of a systematic philosophy of difference as it appears in Deleuze's work, and to indicate the nature of its demands in each of these domains. Throughout the dissertation, I attempt to address some of the criticisms that have been leveled against it, many of which boil down to its inability to put forward normative criteria in any domain. Does not a differential ethics, for example, amount to a kind of moral nihilism or aestheticism, reducing ethics to a private search for autonomy or self-invention (Rorty)? And how can a "logic of sensation" imply a theory of art without first addressing the question, "What is art?"--a question Duchamp's works threw down like a gauntlet to the twentieth century? In reply to such objections, I offer as a preliminary reply what seem to be two important consequences of a philosophy of difference such as Deleuze's: the repudiation of universals in favor of singularities, and the repudiation of the eternal in favor of the discovery of the conditions under which something new is produced.

CHAPTER ONE

DIALECTICS: THE THEORY OF THE IDEA

§ 1. Introduction. It may seem strange to some readers to begin a study of Deleuze with a chapter entitled "Dialectics." His philosophy has rightly been characterized as an anti-Hegelian and hence anti-dialectical philosophy. Nietzsche and Philosophy is in its entirety an anti-Hegelian tract, and its final chapter bears the title, "Against the Dialectic."¹ But Deleuze's obvious anti-Hegelianism risks hiding from us a less obvious point concerning dialectics. "Today it is said that systems are bankrupt." Deleuze and Guattari write in What is Philosophy?, "but it is only the concept of system that has changed."² The concept of system that is bankrupt is that of a system that would be unifying and totalizing, that would relate the concept of system to the coordinates of identity, analogy, resemblance, opposition, or contradiction. If Deleuze nonetheless retains the notion of the system, it is because he assigns to it a completely different concept. "I believe in philosophy as system," he writes. "For me, the system must not only be in perpetual heterogeneity, it must be a heterogenesis--something which, it seems to me, has never been attempted."³

¹Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 147.

²What is Philosophy?, p. 9.

³"Lettre-préface de Gilles Deleuze," in Jean-Clet Martin, Variations: La philosophie de Gilles Deleuze (Paris: Payot 1993), p. 7.

The same must be said for the concept of dialectics. Aristotle defined Dialectics as the art of posing problems as the subject of a syllogism, while Analytics gives us the means of resolving the problem by leading the syllogism to its necessary conclusion. Dialectics in general thus concerns the nature of problems, and its concept changes with the notion of the problematic that is associated with it. "Whenever the dialectic 'forgets' its intimate relation with Ideas in the form of problems," writes Deleuze, "whenever it is content to trace problems from propositions, it loses its true power and falls under the sway of the power of the negative, necessarily substituting for the ideal objectivity of the problematic a simple confrontation between opposing, contrary, or contradictory propositions. This long perversion begins with the [Platonic] dialectic itself, and attains its extreme form in Hegelianism."⁴ It is thus wrong to say that Deleuze is simply "against the dialectic": what he is against is a concept of the dialectic that would trace problems from pre-existent propositions, and that would evaluate them according to their solvability. What is missed in such characterizations of the dialectic, for Deleuze, is the internal character of the problematic as such, "the imperative internal element which decides in the first place its truth or falsity and measures its internal genetic power, that is, the very object of the dialectic or combinatory, the 'differential.'"⁵

For Deleuze, in short, the dialectic is a theory of immanent problematic structures as they are expressed in differential Ideas. In this chapter, we will approach Deleuze's own dialectic by first examining his analyses of the two great theories of the Idea in the

⁴Difference and Repetition, p. 164.

⁵Difference and Repetition, pp. 161-162.

history of philosophy, those of Plato and Kant. It is from the point of view of these classical conceptions of the Idea that we will be then be able to measure the importance and novelty of the differential, genetic, and problematic theory of the dialectical Idea that Deleuze develops in the fourth chapter of Difference and Repetition.

I. PLATO'S THEORY OF THE IDEA: Ideas and Images, Copies and Simulacra

§ 2. The Overturning of Platonism. Nietzsche defined the task of the philosophy of the future as the overturning of Platonism. In an early sketch for his first treatise (1870-71), he wrote: "My philosophy an inverted Platonism: the farther removed from true being, the purer, the finer, the better it is. Living in semblance as goal."⁶ But what exactly does it mean to invert Platonism? Could not every philosophy since Aristotle be characterized as a reversal of Platonism? Plato, it is said, opposed essence to appearance, the original to the image, the sun of truth to the shadows of the cave, and to overturn Platonism would initially seem to imply a reversal of this standard relation: what languishes below in Platonism must be put on top, the supersensuous must be placed in the service of the sensuous. But such an interpretation, as Heidegger showed, leads only to the quagmire of positivism, an appeal to the positum rather than the eidōs.⁷ More profoundly, the phrase would seem to mean the abolition of both the world of essence and

⁶Nietzsche, Grossoktavausgabe (Leipzig, 1905 ff.), Vol. 9, p. 190. Quoted in Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche Vol. I: The Will to Power as Art (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 154.

⁷Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol. I: The Will to Power as Art, pp. 151-52. Heidegger himself analyzes Nietzsche's anti-platonism in terms of the "raging discordance" between truth and art (see pp. 151-220).

the world of appearance. But even this project would not be that announced by Nietzsche: Deleuze notes that "the double objection to essences and appearance goes back to Hegel, and further still, to Kant."⁸

To discover "How the 'True World' Finally Became a Fable,"⁹ Deleuze argues, one must go back even further, to Plato himself, and attempt to locate in precise terms the motivation that led Plato to distinguish between essence and appearance in the first place. In Deleuze's interpretation, Plato's singularity lies in a delicate sorting operation that precedes the discovery of essence, and that turns to the world of essences only as a criteria for its selective procedures. The motivation of the theory of Ideas lies initially in the direction of a will to select, to sort out, to faire la difference (literally, "to make the difference") between true and false images. To accomplish this task, Plato utilizes a method that will master all the power of the dialectic and fuse it with the power of myth: the method of division. It is in the functioning of this method that Deleuze uncovers not only the sense of Nietzsche's "inverted Platonism," but also what will turn out to be a decisive problem for a philosophy of difference, namely, the problem of "simulacra." For Deleuze, what is at stake in each of these problems ultimately concerns the nature of dialectics, or more precisely, the theory of Ideas.

⁸The Logic of Sense, p. 253.

⁹Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. Walter Kaufman, in The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Viking Press, 1954), pp. 485-486.

§ 3. The Method of Division as a Dialectic of Rivalry (Amphisbetesis). The modus operandi of Plato's method is most apparent in two of Plato's three great dialogues of division, the Phaedrus and the Statesman, each of which attempts to isolate, step by step, the "true lover" or the "true statesman" from the claims of numerous counterfeits. In the Statesman, for example, the statesman is defined as "the shepherd of men," but in the course of the dialogue, numerous rivals--merchants, laborers, bakers, gymnasts, doctors, warriors--come forward to say, "I am the shepherd of men!" In the Phaedrus, similarly, an attempt is made to define madness, or more precisely, to distinguish well-founded madness, or true love, from its false counterparts. Here again, all sorts of rivals rush forward to claim, "I am the possessed! I am the lover!" Vernant and Detienne, in their work on the origins of Greek thought, have shown that such relations of rivalry constituted an essential component of the Athenian city. The path from myth to reason was not some sort of inexplicable "miracle" or "discovery of the mind," but was conditioned by the social structure of the Greek polis, which "laicized" the mythic forms of thought characteristic of the neighboring eastern empires by bringing them into the agonistic and public space of the agora.¹⁰ In Deleuze's terminology, imperial states and the Greek cities were types of social formations that "deterritorialized" their surrounding rural territories, but did so according to two different models: the archaic States

¹⁰See, above all, Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), as well as Marcel Detienne, Les maîtres de vérité dans la grèce archaïque (Paris: Maspero, 1967), esp. ch. 5, "Le procès de laïcisation," both of whom link the advent of "rational" thought to the structure of the Greek polis, and explore the complex relations of philosophy to its precursors. Pierre Vidal-Naquet provides a helpful overview of the debates in "Greek Rationality and the City," in The Black Hunter: Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World, trans. Andrew Szegedy-Maszak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 249-262.

"overcoded" the territories by relating them to a superior arithmetic unity (the despot), by subordinating them to a transcendent mythic order that was imposed upon them from above, whereas the Greek cities adapted the surrounding territories to a geometric extension in which the city itself became a relay-point in an immanent network of commercial and maritime circuits.¹¹ They formed a kind of international market on the border of the eastern empires, organized into a multiplicity of independent societies in which artisans and merchants found a freedom and mobility that the imperial states denied to them.

This geometric organization was in turn reflected in the internal civic space of the cities. Whereas the imperial spatium of the state was centered on the royal palace or temple, which marked the transcendent sovereignty of the despot and his god, the political extensio of the Greek city was modeled on a new type of geometric space (isonomia) which organized the polis around a common and public center (the agora), in relation to which all the points occupied by the "citizens" appeared equal and symmetrical.¹² In short, what the Greek cities invented was the Agon as a community of "free men" or citizens, who entered into "agonistic" relations of rivalry with other free men, exercising power and exerting claims over each other in a "generalized athleticism." This new and determinable type of human relation (agonistic) permeated the entire Greek assemblage: agonistic relations were promoted between cities (in war and the games).

¹¹What is Philosophy?, pp. 86-88.

¹²On the spatial organization of the Greek polis, see Jean-Pierre Vernant, Myth and Thought among the Greeks (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), Part 3, esp. chap. 8, "Space and Political Organization

within cities (in the political Assembly and the legal magistratures), in family and individual relations (erotics, economics, dietetics, gymnastics), and even in the relation with oneself (for how could one claim to govern others if one could not govern oneself?).¹³ What made philosophy possible, what constituted its historical condition of possibility, in Deleuze's view, was precisely this milieu of immanence, which opposed itself to the imperial and transcendent sovereignty of the State, and implies no pre-given interest, since it on the contrary presupposes rival interests.¹⁴

These agonistic relations of rivalry, and the social conditions that produced them, problematized the image of the thinker in a new way. Whereas imperial empires or states had their Wise Men or priests, possessors of wisdom, the Greeks replaced them with the philosopher, philo-sophos, the friend or lover of wisdom, one who searches for wisdom but does not possess it formally, and who is therefore able, as Nietzsche said, to make use of wisdom as a mask, and to make it serve new and sometimes even dangerous ends.¹⁵

This new definition of the thinker is of decisive importance. With the Greeks, writes

in Ancient Greece." pp. 212-234. On relations of rivalry, see Jean-Pierre Vernant, "City-State Warfare," in Myth and Society in Ancient Greece (New York: Zone Books, 1990), esp. pp. 29, 41-42.

¹³This is the theme of Michel Foucault's The Use of Pleasure, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985). Foucault argues that, within this agonistic field of power relations, the Greeks invented a new form of power relation which he termed "subjectivation" (the relation of oneself to oneself), whose historical variations constituted the object of his research in last two volumes of The History of Sexuality.

¹⁴We are here drawing on the political theory that Deleuze and Guattari develop in Capitalism and Schizophrenia, in which they sketch out a typology of different social formations ("primitive" societies, cities, states, capitalism, war machines) and the correlative "images of thought" they imply. See Anti-Oedipus, pp. 139-271, and A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 351-473.

¹⁵Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 5-6, 107. See also Alexandre Kojève, "Tyranny and Wisdom," in Leo Strauss, On Tyranny (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 156. Nietzsche adds that although the early philosophers could not help but adopt the mask of the wise man or priest, this strategy proved decisive for philosophy, since the philosopher increasingly came to adopt that mask as his own.

Deleuze, the friend becomes "a presence internal to thought": the "friend" is no longer simply related to another person, but to an Entity or Essence, an Idea, which constitutes the object of its desire.¹⁶ "I am the friend of Plato," says the philosopher, "but even more so, I am the friend of Wisdom, of the True, of the Concept." If the philosopher is the friend or lover of wisdom, it is because wisdom is something he lays claim to, something he strives for potentially rather than possessing actually.

But in this way, friendship was made to imply as much jealous distrust of one's rival claimants as it did amorous desire for Wisdom (Eros). This is what makes philosophy Greek and connects it with the formation of cities: the Greeks formed societies of friends or equals, but at the same time promoted relations of rivalry between them. If each citizen lays claim to something, he necessarily encounters rivals, so that two friends inevitably become a claimant and his rival. The carpenter may claim the wood, as it were, but he clashes with the forester, the lumberjack, and the joiner, who say, "I am the friend of the wood!" These agonistic relations would also come to determine the realm of thought, in which numerous claimants came forward to say, "I am the true philosopher! I am the friend of Wisdom!" In the Platonic dialogues, this rivalry culminates famously in that between Socrates and the sophists, who, says Deleuze, "fight over the remains of the ancient sage."¹⁷

¹⁶What is Philosophy?, p. 9.

¹⁷This concept of the "friend" is developed by Deleuze in his introduction to Qu'est-ce que la philosophie. See also Pourparlers (Paris: Minuit, 1990), p. 153; Foucault, trans. Sean Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 100-103; Périclès et Verdi (Paris: Minuit, 1988), p. 16.

The "friend," the "lover," the "claimant," and the "rival" constitute what Deleuze calls the "conceptual personae" of the Greek theater of thought, whereas "wise Men" or "priests" were the personae of the State and religion, for whom the institution of sovereign power and the establishment of cosmic order were inseparable aspects of a transcendent drama, imposed from above by the despot or by a god superior to all others.¹⁸ While it is true that the first philosophers may have been sages immigrating to Greece in flight from the empires, what they found in the Greek city was this immanent arena of the agon and rivalry, which alone provided the milieu for philosophy.¹⁹ It is in this context that Deleuze places the Phaedrus and the Statesman. In confronting such situations of rivalry, whether in the domain of love, politics, or thought itself, the Greeks confronted the question, How can one separate the true claimant from the false one? It is in response to this problem that Plato will create the Ideas as philosophic concepts: the Idea is used as a criterion for sorting out these rivals and judging the well-foundedness of their claims, authenticating the legitimate claimants and rejecting the counterfeits, distinguishing the true from the false.²⁰

¹⁸Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?, pp. 45-46. The important notion of "conceptual personae" is developed in chapter three of this work. See also Vernant, Origins, pp. 102-118.

¹⁹Jean-Pierre Faye, La raison narrative (Paris: Balland, 1990), pp. 15-18: "It took a century for the word 'philosopher,' no doubt invented by Heraclitus of Ephesus, to find its correlate in the word 'philosophy,' no doubt invented by Plato the Athenian. The first philosopher were foreigners, but philosophy is Greek."

²⁰The word "claimant" translates the French prétendant, which can also mean "pretender," "suitor," or even "candidate." Its translation as "claimant" emphasizes the relation of the prétendant to its prétention ("claim"), but loses the connotations associated with the words "pretender" and "pretentious," which are also present in the French.

From this point of view, Deleuze argues that Aristotle's later criticisms misconstrue the essential point of Plato's method. Aristotle interprets division as a means of dividing a genus into opposing species in order to subsume the thing being investigated under the appropriate species--hence the continuous process of specification in search for a definition of the angler's art. He correctly objects that division in Plato is a bad and illegitimate syllogism, because it lacks a middle term that could, for example, lead us to conclude that angling belongs to the arts of acquisition, and to acquisition by capture, and so on.²¹ But the goal of Plato's method of division is completely different. It does not consist of dividing genera into species, but of selecting a pure line from an impure and undifferentiated material, distinguishing the authentic and the inauthentic from an indefinite mixture. Plato likens division to the search for gold, a process which likewise entails several selections: the elimination of impurities, the elimination of other metals "of the same family," and so on. The method of division, in short, is not a dialectic of contradiction or contrariety (antiphrasis), but a dialectic of rivals and suitors (amphibetesis).²²

§ 4. The Platonic "Idea" as a Criterion of Selection. How does the concept of the "Idea" carry out this selection among rival claimants? Plato's method of division, argues Deleuze, proceeds by means of a certain irony. For no sooner has division arrived at its

²¹See Aristotle, Prior Analytics, I, 31, and Posterior Analytics, II, 5 and 13, along with Deleuze's comments in Logic of Sense, p. 254 and Difference and Repetition, pp. 59-60.

²²Plato, Statesman, 303 d-e. On the distinction between antiphrasis and amphibetesis, see Difference and Repetition, p. 60, and Logic of Sense, p. 293.

actual task of selection than Plato suddenly intervenes with a myth: in the Phaedrus, the myth of the circulation of souls appears to interrupt the effort of division: so, in the Statesman, does the myth of archaic times. Such is the second trap of division, the second irony: the first is the sudden appearance of rival claimants: the second, this sudden appearance of evasion or of renunciation. The introduction of myth seems to confirm all the objections of Aristotle: division, lacking mediation, has no probative force, and must thus allow itself to be replaced by a myth which could furnish it with an equivalent of mediation in an imaginary or narrative manner. Once again, however, this Aristotelian objection misses the sense of Plato's method. For the myth, says Deleuze, interrupts nothing but is, on the contrary, the integrating element of division itself. If it is true that myth and dialectic are two distinct forces in Platonism in general, it is division which surmounts this duality and integrates, internally, the power of dialectic with that of myth, making myth an element of the dialectic itself.

Myth, in Deleuze's interpretation, functions in the Platonic dialogues as a narrative of foundation. The myth, in accordance with an archaic tradition, constructs a model of circulation by which the different claimants can be judged: it establishes a foundation which is able to sort out differences, to measure the roles and pretensions of the various rivals, and finally to select the true claimants.²³ In the Phaedrus, for example, Plato describes the circulation of souls prior to their incarnation, and the memory they

²³Difference and Repetition, pp. 61-62. See Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954). Eliade characterizes archaic religion by "the repetition of mythic archetypes" and the "symbolism of the Center," and noted its explicit parallels with platonism: "It could be said that this 'primitive' ontology has a Platonic structure; and in that case Plato could be regarded as the

carry with them of the Ideas they were able to contemplate. It is this mythic contemplation, the nature and degree of this contemplation, and the type of situations required for its recollection, that provide Plato with his selective criterion and allow him to determine the value and order of different types of madness (i.e. that of the lover, the poet, the priest, the prophet, the philosopher, etc.). Well-founded madness, or true love, belongs to those souls that have seen much, and retain many dormant but revivable memories. True claimants are those that "participate" in contemplation and reminiscence, while sensual souls, forgetful and narrow of vision, are denounced as false rivals. Similarly, the Statesman invokes the image of a god ruling both mankind and the world in archaic times. The myth shows that, properly speaking, only this archaic god merits the definition of the statesman as "king-shepherd of men." But again, the myth furnishes an ontological measure by which different men in the City are shown to share unequally in the mythical model according to their degree of participation--from the political man, who is closest to the model of the archaic shepherd-god: to parents, servants, and auxiliaries; and, finally, to charlatans and counterfeits, who merely parody the true politician by means of deception and fraud.²⁴

outstanding philosopher of 'primitive mentality,' that is, as the thinker who succeeded in giving philosophic currency to the modes of life and behavior of archaic humanity" (p. 34).

²⁴It is here that we can see the importance of Deleuze's insistence that philosophy is a discipline that consists of the creation of concepts: Plato says that one must contemplate the Ideas, but it was first of all necessary for him to create the concept of the Idea. In this sense, writes Deleuze, Plato teaches the opposite of what he actually does: "Plato creates the concept of the Ideas, but he needs to posit them as representing the uncreated that precedes them. He places time in the concept, but this time must be the Anterior. He constructs the concept, but as testifying to the preexistence of an objectivity, under the form of a difference in time capable of measuring the distance or proximity of the possible constructor. This is because, in Platonic plane, truth is posited as presupposed, as already there." What is Philosophy?, p. 29.

The Platonic conception of "participation" (metachein, lit. "to have after") must be understood in terms of the role of this foundation: an elective participation is the response to the problem of a method of selection. "To participate" means to have a part of, to have after, to have secondhand. What possesses something firsthand is precisely the foundation itself, the Idea: only Justice is just, only Courage is courageous. Such statements are not simply analytic propositions, but designations of the Idea as the foundation that possesses a given quality firsthand: only the Idea is "the thing itself," only the Idea is "self-identical" (the auto kath' auto). "It is what objectively possesses a pure quality, or what is nothing other than what it is."²⁵ The foundation then allows its possession to be shared, giving it to the claimant (the secondhand possessor), but only insofar as the claimant has been able to pass the test of the foundation. In Plato, says Deleuze, things are always something other than what they are: at best, they are only secondhand possessors. They can only lay claim to the quality, and can do so only to the degree that they participate in the Idea.²⁶ The famous Neo-Platonic triad follows from this: the unparticipated, the participated, the participant. One could also say: the father (the foundation); the daughter (the object of the claim); and the suitor (the claimant). The triad produces a series of participations in length, a hierarchy (the "chain of being") that

²⁵What is Philosophy?, pp. 25-30.

²⁶Cf. QP, 33-34.

distinguishes different degrees and orders of participation depending on the distance or proximity to the foundational principle.²⁷

How does the Idea judge this degree of elective participation? If the foundation as essence is defined by the original and superior identity or sameness of the Idea, the claimant will be well-founded only to the degree that it resembles or imitates the foundation. This resemblance is not merely an external correspondence, as the resemblance of one thing with another, but an internal and spiritual, "noetic," resemblance of the thing to the Idea. The claimant conforms to the object of the claim only insofar as it is modeled internally on the Idea, which comprehends the relations and proportions that constitute essence. The act of founding endows the claimant with this internal resemblance and, on this condition, makes it legitimately participate in the quality, the object of the claim. The ordering of claimants or differences (classification) thus takes place within the comparative play of these two similitudes: the exemplary similitude of an original identity, and the imitative or "mimetic" similitude of a more or less similar copy. This in itself marks a philosophic decision of the greatest importance to Deleuze: Platonism allows differences to be thought only by subordinating them to the principle of the Same and the condition of Resemblance.²⁸ The concept of the Idea, in Deleuze's analysis, consists of three components:

²⁷For Deleuze's interpretation of the Neo-platonic heritage, see "Les plages d'immanence," in L'art des confins: Mélanges offerts à Maurice de Gandillac, ed. by Annie Cazenave and Jean-François Lyotard (Paris: PUF, 1985), pp. 79-81; and "Immanence and the Historical Components of Expression," in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, pp. 169-186.

²⁸Difference and Repetition, p. 127.

1. The differential quality that is to be possessed or participated in (e.g., being just):
2. The preexistent foundation or Idea that possesses it firsthand, as unparticipatable (e.g., Justice itself);
3. The rivals that lay claim to the quality (e.g., to be a just man) but can only possess it at a second, third, or fourth remove...or not at all (the simulacrum).²⁹

For Plato, then, "pretension" is not one phenomenon among others, but the nature of every phenomenon. The claimant [prétendant] appeals to the foundation, and it is a claim [prétention] that must be founded (e.g., the claim to be just, courageous, or pious: to be the true shepherd, lover, or philosopher), that must participate, to a greater or lesser degree, in the object of pretention, or else be denounced as without foundation. If Platonism is a response to the agonistic relations of power in the Greek world, the foundation is the operation of the Platonic logos: it is a test that sorts out and measures the differences among these pretensions or claimants, determining which claimants truly participate in the object of the claim.

§ 5. The Counter-Method of the Sophist. A profound implication follows from this: does there not lie, at the limit of participation, the state of an unfounded pretention? The "truest" claimant, the authentic and well-founded claimant, is the one closest to the foundation, the secondhand possessor. But is there not then also a third- and fourth-hand

²⁹What is Philosophy?, p. 30.

possessor, continuing to the nth degree of debasement, down to the one who possesses no more than a mirage or simulacrum of the foundation, and is itself a mirage and a simulacrum, denounced by the selection as a counterfeit?³⁰ If the just claimant has its rivals, does it not also have its counterfeits and simulacra? This simulacral being, according to Plato, is in fact none other than the "sophist," a Protean being who intrudes and insinuates himself everywhere, contradicting himself and making unfounded claims on everything.

Thus construed, Deleuze considers the conclusion of the Sophist to be one of the most extraordinary adventures of Platonism. The third of the great dialogues on division, the Sophist, unlike either the Phaedrus or the Statesman, presents no myth of foundation. Rather, it utilizes the method of division in a paradoxical fashion, a "counter-utilization" that attempts to isolate, not the true claimant, but the false one, the sophist himself. From this point of view, Deleuze suggests that it is possible to distinguish two spatial dimensions in Plato's thought. The dialogues of the Phaedrus and the Statesman move upward toward the "true lover" or the "true statesman," which are legitimated by their resemblance to the pure model and measured by their approximation to it: Platonic irony is, in this sense, a technique of ascent, an upward movement toward the principle on high (the ascetic ideal).³¹ The Sophist, by contrast, follows a downward movement of humor, a technique of descent that moves downward toward the vanity of the false copy, the self-

³⁰In Augustine, "absolute" dissimulation implies nothingness: thus the last of beings, if it is not nothingness, is at least an illusory simulacrum. See Etienne Gilson, Introduction à l'étude de saint-Augustin (Paris: Vrin, 1929), p. 268.

contradicting sophist. Here, the method of division can make no appeal to a foundational myth or model, for it is no longer a matter of discerning the "true sophist" from the false claimant, since the "true sophist" is himself the false claimant.

This paradoxical usage of the method of division leads the dialogue to a remarkable conclusion. "By dint of inquiring in the direction of the simulacrum," writes Deleuze, "Plato discovers, in the flash of an instant as he leans over its abyss, that the simulacrum is not simply a false copy, but that it calls into question the very notion of the copy...and of the model."³² In the final definition of the Sophist, Plato leads his readers to the point where they are no longer able to distinguish the Sophist from Socrates himself: "The dissembling or ironical imitator, ...who in private and in short speeches compels the person who is conversing with him to contradict himself" (Sophist, 268b). The sophist appears in Deleuze as a particular "type" of thinker, an "antipathetic" personae in the Platonic theater who haunts Socrates at every step as his double: the sophist is, precisely, the one that pushes all things to their simulacral state, who is himself a simulacrum.³³ This is the third moment of irony in Plato, irony pushed to its limit, to the point of humor, and gives us another indication of what the "overturning of Platonism" entails. "Was it not necessary that irony be pushed to this point? And that Plato be the first to indicate this direction for the overthrow of Platonism?"³⁴

³¹On height, depth, and surface as orientations of thought, see The Logic of Sense, Series 18, "Of the Images of Philosophers," pp. 127-133.

³²The Logic of Sense, p. 294.

³³Difference and Repetition, pp. 66-68, 122-128.

³⁴The Logic of Sense, p. 295.

The essential Platonic distinction is thus more profound than the speculative distinction between model and copy, original and image. The deeper, practical distinction moves between two kinds of claimants or "images," or what Plato calls eidolon.³⁵ (1) "Copies" (eikones) are well-grounded claimants, authorized by their internal resemblance to the ideal model, authenticated by their close participation in the foundation: (2) "simulacra" (phantasmata) are like false claimants, built on a dissimilarity and implying an essential perversion or turning away. "It is in this sense that Plato divides the domain of image-idols in two: on the one hand the iconic copies, on the other the phantastic simulacra."³⁶ The great manifest duality between Idea and image is posited only to guarantee the latent distinction between these two types of images, to provide a concrete criterion. Plato does not create the concept of the model or "Idea" in order to oppose it to the world of images, but rather to select the true images, the icons, and eliminate the false ones, the simulacra. In this sense, says Deleuze, Platonism is the Odyssey of philosophy: as Foucault comments, "with the abrupt appearance of Ulysses, the eternal husband, the false suitors disappear. Exuent simulacra."³⁷

³⁵Plato, Sophist, 236c: "These then are two sorts of image-making [eidolopoiike]--the art of making likenesses [eikones], and phantastic or the art of making appearances [phantasmata]." See also Sophist, 264c-268d; and Republic, Book 10, 601d ff.

³⁶The Logic of Sense, p. 296. Jean-Pierre Vernant has questioned the importance Deleuze ascribes to this distinction in "The Birth of Images," in Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays, ed. Froma I. Zeitlin (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 164-185, esp p. 169. But he nonetheless supports the thrust of Deleuze's reading when he says that the problem of the Sophist is "to articulate what an image is, not in its seeming but in its being, to speak not of the seeming of appearance but of the essence of seeming, the being of semblance" (p. 182).

³⁷Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 167. Deleuze employs the Homeric image in The Logic of Sense, p. 254.

In Deleuze's reading, then, Platonism is defined by this will to track and hunt down phantasms and simulacra in every domain, to identify the sophist himself, the diabolical insinuator (Dionysus). Its goal is "Iconology," the triumph of icons over simulacra, which are denounced and eliminated as false claimants. Its method is the selection of difference (amphisbetesis) by the institution of a mythic circle, the establishment of a foundation, and the creation of the concept of the Idea. Its motivation is above all a moral motivation, for what is condemned in the simulacra is the malice by which it challenges the very notion of the model and the copy, thereby turning us away from the Idea of the Good (hence Plato's condemnation of the poet along with the sophists). Finally, Platonism inaugurates a domain that philosophy would come to recognize as its own, which Deleuze terms "representation." Though representation will take on various avatars in the history of philosophy, Platonism ascribes to it a very precise meaning: every well-founded pretention in this world is necessarily a re-presentation, since even the first in the order of pretensions is already second in itself, in its subordination to the foundation.³⁸

§ 6. The Concept of the "Simulacrum." With this portrait of Platonism in hand, we are in a position to understand what Nietzsche's "inverted Platonism" means for

³⁸On the use of the term "representation," see Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), which identifies a "classic" world of representation in the 17th-century and outlines its limitations. Deleuze's characterization of Platonism bears certain affinities with this statement of Richard Rorty's: "Philosophy's central concern is to be a general theory of representation, a theory which will divide culture up into areas which will represent reality well, those which represent it less well, and those which do not represent it at all (despite their pretense to do so)" (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature [Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1979], p. 3).

Deleuze: it implies the denial of the primacy of the original over the copy, of the model over the image (the "twilight of the idols"), and the affirmation of simulacra. What then is the difference between a copy and a simulacrum? Plato saw in the simulacrum a "becoming-unlimited" (Philebus 24d), pointing to a subversive element that perpetually eludes the order that Ideas impose and things receive.³⁹ But in subordinating the simulacrum to the copy, and hence to the Idea, Plato defines it in purely negative terms: it is the copy of a copy, an endlessly degraded copy, an infinitely slackened icon. To invert Platonism means that the difference between copies and simulacrum must be seen, not merely as a difference of degree, but as a difference in nature. The simulacrum, in other words, must be given its own concept and be defined in affirmative terms. In creating such a concept, Deleuze is following a maxim that lies at the core of his philosophical methodology: "What is the best way of following the great philosophers, to repeat what they have said, or to do what they have done, that is, to create concepts for problems that are necessarily changing?"⁴⁰

We can define the Deleuzian concept of the simulacrum in terms of the following three characteristics, which stand in contradistinction to the three components of the Idea summarized above.

a. First, Deleuze claims that whereas "the copy is an image endowed with resemblance, the simulacrum is an image without resemblance."⁴¹ How are we to

³⁹On this theme, see The Logic of Sense, Series 1, "On Pure Becoming, pp. 1-3.

⁴⁰What is Philosophy?, p. 28, translation modified.

⁴¹The Logic of Sense, p. 257.

understand this rather strange formula?⁴² Deleuze suggests that the early Christian catechisms, influenced by the Neoplatonism of the church fathers, have familiarized us somewhat with the notion of an image that has lost its resemblance: God, it is said, created man in His own image and to resemble Him (imago Dei), but through sin, man has lost the resemblance while retaining the image. We have lost a moral existence and entered into an aesthetic one; we have become simulacra. The catechism stresses the fact that the simulacrum is a demonic image; it remains an image, but, in contrast to the icon, its resemblance has been externalized. It is no longer a "resemblance," but a mere "semblance" If the resemblance of an icon is like the internal and engendered resemblance of a son to the father, stemming from the son's participation in the father's filial line, the semblance of the simulacra, on the contrary, is like the ruse and trickery of an imposter: though his appearance may reflect the father's, the relation is purely external and coincidental, and his claim to inheritance a subversion that acts "against the father," without passing through the Idea.⁴³ The simulacrum still simulates the effects of identity

⁴²Stanley Rosen has criticized Deleuze's reading of the Sophist, noting that "an image that does not resemble X cannot be an image of X." But Rosen here collapses Deleuze's distinction: an "image" can be either a resemblance (a true copy or icon that participates internally in the model) or a mere semblance (a false simulacrum or phantasy that feigns a merely external reflection). Though their usages overlap, these English terms nonetheless indicate the essential distinction between an icon and a simulacrum that Deleuze is attempting to establish. The Oxford English Dictionary defines resemblance as "the quality of being like or similar....A likeness, image, representation, or reproduction of some person or thing" (and several of the historical examples in the OED refer, significantly, to the prelapsarian state of creation); semblance, on the contrary, is defined as "the fact of appearing to view....An appearance or outward seeming of something which is not actually there or of which the reality is different from its appearance." Rosen's comment, it seems, would tend to collapse such terms as "image," "resemblance," "semblance," and even "mimesis" into mere synonymy. See Stanley Rosen, Plato's Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 172-73.

⁴³Following the assumption that Platonism "sets up the whole of Western metaphysics in its conceptuality" (p. 76), Jacques Derrida, in his essay "Plato's Pharmacy" (in Dissemination [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981], pp. 61-171), locates a similar trinity at the heart of platonism: the

and resemblance, but these are now completely external effects (like "optical effects"), divorced from any internal principle, and produced by completely different means than those at work in the model.⁴⁴

[Deleuze's theological references here are not fortuitous, for there was a whole range of Christian experience that was familiar with the danger of the simulacrum. In On Christian Doctrine, for instance, Augustine developed a highly Platonic semiotic aimed at "making the difference" between true signs and false signs, or rather two modes of interpretation of the same sign. He located his criterion of selection, not in an Idea, but in God himself, the only "thing" that can (and must be) enjoyed in itself. What he called caritas is the interpretation of signs as "iconic copies" that propel the restless movement of the soul toward the enjoyment of God (for his own sake, as the first-hand possessor) and the enjoyment of one's self and one's neighbor (for the sake of God, as second-hand possessors). Cupiditas, on the contrary, is the interpretation of signs for their own sake, the enjoyment of "one's self, one's neighbor, or any corporeal thing" for the sake of something other than God. Augustine was explicit about the aim of his theology: "the destruction of the reign of cupidity" (simulacra).⁴⁵ But if simulacra later became the

father of logos, logos itself, writing. Much of Derrida's early work focused on the Platonic conception of "writing" for precisely this reason: writing is a simulacrum, a false claimant in that it tries to capture the logos through violence and trickery without going through the father. In The Logic of Sense (p. 297), Deleuze finds the same figure in the Statesman: the Good as the father of the law, the law itself, constitutions. Good constitutions are copies, but they become simulacra the moment they violate or usurp the law by evading the Good.

⁴⁴The simulacrum, in short, is a differential system, "a system where difference is related to difference through difference itself" (p. 277), and it is such systems that Deleuze analyzes in Difference and Repetition.

⁴⁵Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1978), esp. pp. 88-89.

object of demonology in Christian thought, it is because the simulacrum is not the "opposite" of the icon, the demonic is not the opposite of the divine, Satan is not the Other, the pole farthest from God, the absolute antithesis, but something much more bewildering and vertiginous: the Same, the perfect double, the exact semblance, the doppelgänger, the angel of light whose deception is so complete that it is impossible to tell the imposter (Satan, Lucifer) apart from the "reality" (God, Christ), just as Plato reaches the point where Socrates and the Sophist are indiscernible. The demonic simulacrum thus stands in stark contrast to the theological "symbol" (Tillich, Eliade), which is always iconic, the analogical manifestation of a transcendent instance. Foucault suggests that the concern over simulacra continued through the Baroque period, and did not finally fall into silence until Descartes's great simulacrum: the Evil Genius of the third Meditation, who simulates God and can mime all his powers, decreeing eternal truths and acting as if $2 + 2 = 5$, but is expelled from any possible existence because of his malignancy.⁴⁶

b. Second, if the iconic copy is built upon the model of the identity of an ideal Sameness, one could say that the simulacrum is based upon another model, a model of Difference, from which the dissimilitude or "internalized difference" of the simulacrum is derived. Deleuze shows that Difference and the Dissimilar (Becoming) occasionally

⁴⁶On these themes, see Michel Foucault's essay on Pierre Klossowski, "La Prose d'Actéon," in La Nouvelle Revue Française 135 (1964), pp. 444-459. Klossowski, from whom Deleuze adopts the concept of the simulacrum (the Latin term for statue or "idol," which translates the Greek phantasma), retrieved the concept from the criticisms of the church fathers against the debauched representations of the gods on the Roman stage. See Pierre Klossowski, Sacred and Mythical Origins of Certain Practices of the Women of Rome, trans. Sophie Hawkes (Boston: Eridanos Press, 1990), pp. 132-138, as well as Jean-François Lyotard's commentaries on Klossowski in Economie Libidinale (Paris: Minuit, 1974), pp. 84-89.

appear, in several important texts of Plato, not only as an inevitable characteristic of created copies, as a defect that affects images, but as a possible model that rivals the good model of the Same.⁴⁷ Plato raises these possibilities only to quickly conjure them away, but they bear witness to the persistent though subterranean activity of simulacra even within Platonism itself, and to the possibility of their own domain. Put differently, with the simulacrum, it is the notion of repetition that assumes an autonomous power.

Platonism proposes a "naked" model of repetition as the repetition of the Same (representation): the copy repeats the identity of the ideal model as the first term in a hierarchical series (just as in archaic religion, ritual is said to "repeat" myth). With the simulacrum, one finds a "clothed" notion of repetition as the repetition of the Different: there is no original term or first element that would remain in place throughout all its repetitions, but rather a virtual or "differential element" that is constantly displaced and disguised in relation to itself, and thus which is itself already a repetition.

[Deleuze's parallel critique of Freud's Platonism provides a useful example of these two contrasting notions of repetition ("naked" and "clothed"). In Freud, it is the primal scene that functions as the original term. Our adult loves "repeat" our childhood love for the mother, but are later repressed and disguised by various mechanisms of

⁴⁷In the Theaetetus, for example, Socrates speaks of "two patterns eternally set before humanity, the one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched" (176e); and the Timaeus (27d-28d) similarly sets before the demiurge two possible models for the creation of the world, and before humanity two possible models for science ("Which of the patterns had the artificer in view when he created the world--the pattern of that which is unchangeable, or of that which is created?"). In A Thousand Plateaus (pp. 361-374), Deleuze analyses various "minor" sciences (Archimedean geometry, the physics of the atomists, the differential calculus, etc.) that were based on such a model of becoming. They replaced the hylomorphic model (the static relation of form-matter), which searches for laws by extracting constants, with a hydraulic model (the dynamic relation of material-forces), which placed the variables themselves in a state of continuous variation.

condensation (metonymy) and displacement (metaphor): I repeat because I repress, and it is the task of therapy, through transference, to recover this hidden origin in order to be freed from its power. But the question is: are these disguises and variations, these masks and costumes something secondary added "over and above," or are they on the contrary "the internal genetic elements of repetition itself, its integral and constituent parts"?⁴⁸ In this case, there would be no first term that is repeated: my parents are not the ultimate terms of my individual subjecthood, but the middle terms of a larger intersubjectivity. The series of my loves do not refer back to my mother, for even our childhood love for the mother repeats other adult loves with regard to other women. The mother simply occupies a certain place in relation to a differential element operating within the series, and which will necessarily come to be filled by another character, incorporating minor differences and contrasting relations. The variations, in other words, do not come from without, but express differential mechanisms which belong to the essence and origin of what is repeated. There is not an originary "thing" (model) behind the disguises and displacements of repetition (copy): disguise and displacement are the essence of repetition itself, which is in itself an original and positive principle. "The only illusion," writes Deleuze, "is that of unmasking something or someone."⁴⁹]

Simulacra, in short, point to the fact that there is something that contests both the notion of copy and that of model. As a simulacrum, the false claimant can no longer be

⁴⁸Difference and Repetition, p. 17.

⁴⁹Difference and Repetition, p. 106. On these themes, see pp. 16-19, 102-107, as well as Proust and Signs, pp. 65-81.

said to be false in relation to a supposedly true model; rather, the false assumes a positivity of its own. Pseudos, in Nietzsche's sense when he speaks of "the high power of the false."⁵⁰ The order of participation is rendered impossible, since there is no longer any possible selection, any possible hierarchy, no second, no third.... Sameness and resemblance only persist as effects of the machinery of the simulacrum: the simulacrum simulates the father, the fiancée, and the claimant all at once in a superimposition of masks, for behind every mask there is not a true face, but another mask, and another mask behind that.... Far from being a new foundation, the simulacrum swallows up all foundations, it assures a universal collapse, an "un-founding" [effondement], but as a positive event, a "gay science." There is no longer a thread to lead us out of Plato's cave, to inaugurate our ascent toward the Idea: "Behind every cave," writes Nietzsche, "there is, there must necessarily be, a still deeper cave--a more comprehensive, stranger, richer world beyond the surface, an abyss beneath every bottom, beneath every 'foundation.'"⁵¹

c. The third characteristic of the simulacrum concerns the mode by which it is apprehended. In the famous passage of the Republic (X, 601d-608b) where he expels the artist from the City, Plato appeals to the user-producer-"imitator" triad in order to preserve an "iconic" sense of imitation (mimesis).⁵² The user is at the top of the Platonic

⁵⁰Cf. Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 96. Klossowski writes that "Deleuze's audacity lies in his having transferred the norms of this science of the 'false' into the sphere of the 'true' and of the 'real'" ("Digression à partir d'un portrait apocryphe," in L'Arc, pp. 11-22: p. 13).

⁵¹Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §289. Cf. The Logic of Sense, pp. 129, 263.

⁵²The notion of mimesis appears not to have been used in discussions of art prior to the fifth-century. Until that time, following Gorgias, the fifth-century founder of the theory of artistic prose, the art of the poet had been regarded as one of "deception" (apate), and it is precisely this form of image-making that Plato aims to send into exile. See Vernant, "The Birth of Images," p. 165, and note 2.

hierarchy because he makes use of true knowledge, which is the knowledge of the model or Idea. Copies then produced by the craftsman (demiourgos) are iconic to the degree that they reproduce the model internally: though the craftsman cannot be said to operate by true knowledge, he is nonetheless guided by a correct judgment or opinion of the user's knowledge, and by the relations and proportions that constitute essence. Imitation will finally take on a pejorative sense in Plato when it is only a simulation and is applied to the simulacrum, when it does not reproduce the eidos but merely produces the effect of resemblance in an external and unproductive way, obtained neither through true knowledge (the user) nor right opinion (the craftsman), but by trick, ruse, or subversion, an art of encounter that lies outside of knowledge and opinion (the artist or mimetes).⁵³

The simulacrum can only appear under the mode of a problem, as a question, as that which forces one to think, as what Plato calls a "provocative."⁵⁴ Plato does not attack art per se: he attacks art that is "phantastic" and not "iconic." Perhaps the genius of Pop Art in our century lay precisely in its ability to push the multiplication of images to the point where the mimetic copy changes its nature and is reversed into the simulacrum (which is the originary model for Warhol's series of Campbell soup cans?).⁵⁵ The model is plunged into difference, at the same time as the copy is submerged into dissimilitude, so that it is no longer possible to say which is the model and which is the copy.

⁵³The Logic of Sense, p. 265. On these points, see Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol. 1: The Will to Power as Art, trans. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 162-199.

⁵⁴Plato, Republic, VII. 523b ff.

⁵⁵For an analysis of Warhol in this context, see Paul Patton, "Anti-Platonism and Art," in Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy, ed. Constantin V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 141-156.

Deleuze summarizes these three contrasts between the copy and the simulacrum by inviting us to consider two formulas: "Only that which resembles differs" and "Only differences can resemble each other." The first is an exact definition of the world as a icon: it bids us to think of difference only in terms of similarity, or a previous identity, which become the conditions of difference (Plato). The second defines the world of simulacra: it posits the world itself as a phantasm, inviting us to think of similarity and even identity as the result of a fundamental disparity, products or effects of a primary difference, or a primary system of differences (Nietzsche). "What we have to ask," writes Deleuze, "is whether these two formulas are simply two ways of speaking that do not change much; or if they are applied to completely different systems; or if, being applied to the same systems (at the limit, to the system of the World), they signify two incompatible interpretations of unequal value, one of which is capable of changing everything."⁵⁶ For Deleuze, the simulacrum is what constitutes the problem of modernity. "Modern thought," he writes in the preface to Difference and Repetition, "was born out of the failure of representation, as the loss of identities, and the discovery of all the forces that were acting under the representation of the identical. The modern world is one of simulacra....All identities are only simulated, produced like an 'optical effect' by a more

⁵⁶The Logic of Sense, pp. 261-262; the two formulas are derived from Lévi-Strauss, Totemism, p. 77. See Arthur Danto, The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 171: "The paradigm of a philosophical difference is between two worlds, one of which is sheer illusion, as the Indians believed this one is, and the other of which is real in the way we believe this very world is. Descartes' problem of distinguishing waking experience from dream experience is a limited variation of the same question....A world of sheer determinism might be imagined indistinguishable from one in which everything happens by accident. A world in which God exists could never be told apart from one in which God didn't....Carnap would have said that such a choice is meaningless precisely because no observation(s) could be summoned to effect a discrimination...Whatever the case, it is plain that philosophical differences are external to the worlds they discriminate."

profound play [jeu] which is that of difference and repetition. We would like to think difference in itself, and the relation of the different with the different, independent of the forms of representation that lead it back to the Same.⁵⁷ Although the concept of the simulacrum more or less disappears from Deleuze's work after 1969 (in favor of the concept of the agencement or "assemblage"), Deleuze's entire philosophical project can nonetheless be seen as an explication of this declaration of intent.⁵⁸

§ 7. The Form of the Question. For his part, Deleuze will pursue this anti-platonic theme by carrying out his critique at the level of what he calls the "question-problem." Plato's appeal to the foundational realm of essence (the Idea) as a criteria of selection appears in the dialogues as the response to a particular form of question. "The idea," writes Deleuze, "the discovery of the Idea, is not separable from a certain type of question. The Idea is first of all an 'objectivity' [objectité] that corresponds, as such, to a way of posing questions."⁵⁹ In Plato, this questioning appears primarily in the form, "What is...?" [ti estin?].⁶⁰ Plato wanted to oppose this major form of the question to all other forms (such as "Who?" "Which one?" "How many?" "How?" "Where?" "When?"

⁵⁷Difference and Repetition, p. ix, translation modified: cf. p. 301: "The history of the long error is the history of representation, the history of icons."

⁵⁸See Deleuze, "Lettre-préface," in Jean-Clet Martin, Variations: La philosophie de Gilles Deleuze (Paris: Payot & Rivages, 1993), p. 8: "It seems to me that I have completely abandoned the notion of the simulacrum."

⁵⁹Deleuze, "La méthode de dramatisation," p. 91.

⁶⁰On the question "What is...?" in Plato, see Richard Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), esp. chapter 5, "Socratic Definition," pp. 49-60.

"In which case?" "From what point of view?"), which are criticized as being minor and vulgar questions of opinion that express confused ways of thinking. When Socrates, for instance, asks "What is beauty?", his opponents--which are sometimes famous sophists and skillful rhetoricians, sometimes ignorant children and old men--almost always seem to answer by citing "the one that is beautiful." Socrates triumphs: one cannot reply to the question "What is beauty?" by citing examples of the beautiful, by noting who is beautiful ("a young virgin"), just as one cannot answer the question "What is justice?" by pointing to where or when there is justice, and one cannot reach the essence of the dyad by explaining how "two" is obtained, and so on. To the question "What is beauty?" one must not point to beautiful things, which are only beautiful accidentally and according to becoming, but to Beauty itself, which is nothing but beautiful, the one that is beautiful in its being and essence. Socrates ridicules those who are content to give examples rather than attain Essences. The question "What is...?" thus presupposes a particular way of thinking that points one in the direction of essence, it is for Socrates the question of essence, the only question capable of discovering the Idea.⁶¹

One of Deleuze's most constant themes is that the critique of philosophers must take place at this level of questions or problems. "A philosophic theory," he wrote in his first book, "is a developed question, and nothing other. By itself, in itself, it consists not

⁶¹"Antifoundationalism" implies the rejection of this platonic form of questioning, of this search for a foundational essence. "I cannot characterize my standpoint better," wrote Wittgenstein, "than to say it is opposed to that which Socrates represents in the Platonic dialogues. For if asked what knowledge is (Theatatus 146a) I would list examples of knowledge, and add the words 'and the like'.... whereas when Socrates asks the question 'What is knowledge?' he does not even regard it as a preliminary answer to enumerate cases of knowledge." Ludwig Wittgenstein, manuscript 302, ¶14, as quoted in Garth Hallett, A Commentary to Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 33-34; see also Philosophical Investigations, ¶65.

in resolving a problem, but in developing to its limit the necessary implications of a formulated question. It shows us what things are, what they would have to be, supposing that the question is a good and rigorous one. To place in question means to subordinate, to submit things to the question in such a way that, in this constrained and forced submission, they reveal an essence, a nature. To criticize the question means to show under what conditions it is possible and well-posed, that is, how things would not be what they are if the question were not posed in that way. Which is to say the these two operations are one and the same: or if you prefer, there is no critique of solutions, but only a critique of problems."⁶² Thus the reversal of Platonism necessarily implies a critique of the question "What is...?" For while it is certainly a blunder to cite something beautiful when asked "What is beauty?", it is less certain that the question "What is...?" is a legitimate and well-posed question. even and above all for discovering essence.

Indeed, already in Plato himself, the Socratic method only animates the early "aporetic" dialogues, precisely because the question "What is...?" prejudges the Idea as a simple and abstract essence, which is then obliged to comprehend the non-essential, and to comprehend it in its essence, which leads these dialogues into inextricable aporias. This is perhaps because the primary purpose of these early elenchic dialogues is preparative--their aim is to silence empirical responses in order to open up the region of the Idea in general, while leaving it to others to determine it as an Idea or as a problem. For when Socratic irony is no longer taken à la lettre, when the dialectic is no longer confused with its propaedeutic, it becomes something serious and positive, and assumes

⁶²Empiricism and Subjectivity, p. 119.

other forms of questioning: Which one? in the Statesman and the Phaedrus, as we have seen: How many? in the Philebus: Where? and When? in the Sophist: In what sense? in Parmenides.⁶³

One of the aims of Deleuze's philosophy is to elaborate an "anti-Platonic" (as well as an "anti-Kantian") theory of the Idea.⁶⁴ The questions of the sophists, Deleuze suggests, were the result of a worked out method, a whole sophistic art that was opposed to the Platonic dialectic and that implied an empirical and pluralistic conception of essence, no longer as a foundation, but as an "event" or a "multiplicity." Here again, Deleuze will assign new components to the concept of "essence." "One can conserve the word essence, if one wishes, but only on the condition of saying that essence is precisely the accident or the event."⁶⁵ For the question "What is...?" in fact poses these very questions in a blind and confused manner. Nietzsche wanted to replace the question "What is...?" with "Who is...?": rather than posing the question, "What is truth?" he asks,

⁶³Deleuze suggests that if one considers the history of philosophy, one will in fact search in vain for a philosopher (apart from Hegel) who was satisfied with the question "What is...?" Aristotle's questions "ti to on?" and "ti s' a ousia?" do not signify "What is being?" or "What is substance?" but rather "Which [things] are beings?" ["Qui. l'étant?"] (DR, 244n). Kant asked "What is an object?" but only within the framework of a more profound question, "How is this possible?" (ES, 92). When Leibniz was content to ask "What is...?" he only obtained definitions that he himself considered nominal; when he attained real definitions, it was because of questions like "How?" "From what point of view?" "In which case?" Even Heidegger, when he formulated the question of Being, insisted that we can gain only access to Being by asking, not "What is Being?" but rather "Who is it?" (Dasein) (see Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter [Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988], pp. 119-120). On all these points, see "La méthode de dramatisation," esp. pp. 91-92, 105-106, 115; Difference and Repetition, p. 188; Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 75-78.

⁶⁴This theory is developed in detail in Difference and Repetition, chapter 4, "Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference," pp. 168-221.

⁶⁵Difference and Repetition, p. 191. Deleuze suggests that, even in Plato, such a conception is prefigured by the sophist Hippias, "he who refuses essences and yet is not content with examples." See Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 76.

"Who is in search of truth? What does the one who asks 'What is truth?' really want? What type of will is being expressed in him?"⁶⁶ Similarly, when we ask "What is beauty?" we are asking, "From what viewpoint do things appear beautiful?"--and something that does not appear beautiful to us, from what viewpoint would it become so? Where and When?⁶⁷ If the sophists must be reproached, Deleuze suggests, it is not for having utilized inferior forms of questioning, but for their inability to determine the conditions within which they take on their transcendental significance and their ideal sense, beyond empirical examples.⁶⁸

"To reverse Platonism is first and foremost to remove essences and to substitute events in their place."⁶⁹ The pluralist art does not deny essence, but it makes it depend in all cases upon the spatio-temporal and material coordinates of a purely immanent Idea, which can only be determined by questions such as Who? How? Where and When? How many? From what viewpoint? and so on. These "minor" questions are those of the accident, the inessential, of multiplicity, of difference--in short, of the event, as opposed to the question of essence. The overturning of Platonism, in short, involves a new

⁶⁶Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Random House, 1967), § 556, p. 301: "The question 'What is that?' is an imposition of meaning from some other viewpoint. 'Essence,' the 'essential nature, is something perspective and already presupposes a multiplicity. At the bottom of it there always lies 'What is that for me' (for us, for all that lives, etc.)."

⁶⁷Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 75-79.

⁶⁸Deleuze, "La méthode de dramatisation," p. 92.

⁶⁹The Logic of Sense, p. 53. Cf. Negotiations, p. 25, translation modified: "Philosophy has always been concerned with concepts, to do philosophy is to try to invent or create concepts. But concepts have several possible aspects. For a long time one made use of them in order to determine what a thing is (essence). On the contrary, we are interested in the circumstances of a thing: in what case, where and when, how, etc.? For us, the concept must express the event, and no longer essence."

determination of the nature of Ideas. But although we have used Deleuze's reading of Plato to set out this problem, it is primarily in relation to Kant that Deleuze will develop his own theory of the Idea. The reason for this is simple: against Plato, Kant attempted to provide an immanent conception of the Idea which would expose the illusion of assigning an transcendent object that would correspond to the Idea. Deleuze does not think Kant went far enough in this direction, but we must first examine Deleuze's interpretation of the Kantian theory in order to see why.

II. KANT'S THEORY OF THE IDEA: Problems, Unity, and Totality

§ 8. The Idea in Kant. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant first defines reason by a certain manner of treating the concepts of the understanding: "Reason has as its sole object the understanding and its effective application."⁷⁰ When a concept is given by the understanding, reason searches for another concept which, taken in the totality of its extension, conditions the attribution of the first to the object to which it refers. This is the nature of the syllogism. The attribution of the concept "mortal" to Socrates, for instance, can be derived from experience by means of a judgment in the understanding. But reason goes further: it searches for the concept whose full extension conditions this attribution ("All men are mortal"). Now this deployment of reason would pose no particular problem if it did not run up against a difficulty: the understanding has at its disposal a

⁷⁰Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan Press, 1929), A644/B672, p. 533.

priori categories that are already applicable to all objects of possible experience. So when reason encounters a category, how can it find another category capable, in its full extension, of conditioning the attribution of the category to all objects of possible experience? Reason is here forced to invent supra-conditioning concepts that go beyond the possibility of experience, and it is precisely these concepts that Kant terms "Ideas." "Just as we have entitled the pure concepts of the understanding categories, so we shall give a new name to the concepts of pure reason, calling them transcendental Ideas."⁷¹ An Idea is a concept taken in its full extension that represents the totality of conditions under which a category of relation (substance, causality, community) is attributable to all objects of possible experience.⁷²

Kant characterizes the peculiar status of Ideas of reason by saying that they are necessarily "problematic," or conversely, that problems are Ideas. One of the aims of the Critique of Pure Reason, as is well known, is to show that Ideas of reason lead us into false problems and give rise to illusions. But if reason poses false problems and leads us into illusion, this is first of all because it is the faculty of posing problems in general. In its natural state, however, reason lacks the means to distinguish what is true or false, what is founded or not, in any problem it poses, and the aim of the critical operation is to

⁷¹Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A311/B368, p. 309.

⁷²Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A326/B383, p. 318: "Reason concerns itself exclusively with absolute totality in the employment of the concepts of the understanding, and endeavors to carry the synthetic unity, which is thought in the category, up to the completely unconditioned." On these points, see The Logic of Sense, pp. 294-295.

provide this means."⁷³ Kant therefore raises two questions with regard to Ideas. The first is: How does reason, as the faculty of Ideas, pose or constitute problems? Only reason is capable of drawing together the operations of the understanding into a systematic unity. Kant responds, and it posits this unity as a problem. By itself, the understanding would remain limited to its separate and divided operations aimed at this or that object, and would never be able to raise itself to a "problematic" conception capable of giving a systematic unity to all of its operations. The understanding would only obtain results or responses here and there, but they would never constitute a "solution." Every solution presupposes a problem, that is, the constitution of a unitary and systematic field that orients and subsumes the separate researches of the understanding in such a way that the responses in their turn form cases of solution. When Kant says that Ideas are "problems to which there is no solution," he does not mean that they are necessarily false problems, and therefore insoluble: on the contrary, this means that true problems are Ideas, and that these Ideas do not disappear with "their" solutions, since they are the indispensable condition without which no solution would ever exist.⁷⁴ An Idea of reason has no legitimate use except in relation to the concepts of the understanding; but conversely the concepts of the understanding can only ground their experimental use if they are related to an Idea. Kant proposes two images to describe the problematic status of an Idea: it constitutes an ideal focal point outside of experience toward which the concepts of the

⁷³Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B23, p. 57: the science of metaphysics "has to deal not with the objects of reason, the variety of which is inexhaustible, but only with itself and the problems which arise entirely from within itself." Quoted in Difference and Repetition, p. 168.

understanding converge (maximum unity), or a superior horizon that reflects and embraces all the concepts of the understanding (maximum extension).⁷⁵

Kant summarizes the nature of Ideas in three interrelated characteristics. First, the object of an Idea, since it lies outside of experience, can neither be given nor known, but must be represented in problematic form without being determined. This does not mean that Ideas have no real object, but rather that problems as problems are the real objects of Ideas. The object of the Idea, says Kant, is neither a fiction, nor a hypothesis, nor a being of reason: it is an object must be represented without being able to be directly determined. This indetermination, however, refers neither to an imperfection in our subjective knowledge nor to a lack in the object: on the contrary, it is an objective and positive structure that acts as a limit (a focus or horizon) within experience. Kant likes to say that the Idea as problem has a value that is both objective and undetermined. It is this undetermined object in the Idea which allows us to represent the objects of experience, to which it bestows a maximum of systematic unity. Second, the object of the Idea is nonetheless determinable in an indirect manner, that is, by analogy with the objects of experience on which it confers unity, since they in return offer it a determination "analogous" with the relations it establishes between them. Third, the object of the Idea bears within itself a complete infinite determination, since it assures a specification of the

⁷⁴Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A328/B384, p. 319, as quoted by Deleuze in Difference and Repetition, p. 168.

⁷⁵For Kant's use of these images, see Critique of Pure Reason, "Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic," A644/B672, p. 533 ("focus") and A658/B686, p. 542 ("horizon").

concepts of the understanding, through which they comprehend more and more differences on the basis of a properly infinite field of continuity.

Kant's concept of a problematic Idea, in Deleuze's interpretation, thus has three components, which can be compared with the Platonic components:

1. Ideas are indeterminate with regard to their object;
2. Ideas are determinable by analogy with the objects of experience;
3. Ideas imply an ideal of infinite determination in relation to the concepts of the understanding.⁷⁶

The second question that Kant poses with regard to Ideas is: How and why does reason pose false problems and give rise to illusions? His answer is famous: instead of applying itself to the concepts of the understanding (immanent or regulative employment), reason may claim to be directly applicable to objects, and wish to legislate in the domain of knowledge (transcendent or constitutive employment). Now Kant's genius was to have shown that these three moments are incarnated in three distinct Ideas: the Soul is above all indeterminate, the World is determinable, and God is the ideal of determination. The Soul is the Idea that corresponds to the category of substance, since it conditions the attribution of this category to the phenomena of sensibility. The Soul is revealed as the universal principle of the categorical syllogism, insofar as this relates to a phenomenon determined as a predicate to a subject determined as a substance. The World is the Idea that conditions the attribution of the category of causality to all

⁷⁶On these three components, see Difference and Repetition, p. 169, and Kant's Critical Philosophy, p. 21.

phenomena, as the universal principle of the hypothetical syllogism. And God, finally, is the Idea that assures the attribution of the category of community, as the universal principle of the disjunctive syllogism. The Self, the World, and God are thus the three great terminal points of metaphysics. The entirety of Kant's "Transcendental Dialectic" is directed toward exposing the internal illusions engendered by their illegitimate employment in the speculative domain, in rational psychology, cosmology, and theology (the paralogisms, antinomies, and ideal of pure reason). It is in this sense that the Critique of Pure Reason deserves its title: Kant exposes the speculative illusions of reason, the false problems into which it leads us concerning the Soul, the World, and God. Kant here substitutes the notion of false problems and internal illusions for the traditional concept of error, for if error is produced in the mind as the result of an external determination (such as the body or the passions), illusions are said to be inevitable and to result from the nature of reason itself. All the Critique can do is to exorcise the effects of illusion on knowledge itself, but it cannot prevent its formation in the faculty of knowledge.

What is at issue for Deleuze is the precisely nature of this "critical" point, the nature of the problematic horizon or focal point posited by Ideas: in Kant, writes Deleuze, "the 'critical' point, the horizon or focal point at which difference as difference serves to unite, has not yet been assigned."⁷⁷ The problem with Kant is that he defined two of the three moments of the Ideas as extrinsic to the Idea itself, subordinating them to the speculative demands of representation and the practical demands of the moral law: "if

⁷⁷ Difference and Repetition, p. 170 (translation modified).

Ideas are in themselves undetermined, they are determinable only in relation to objects of experience, and bear the ideal of determination only in relation to the concepts of the understanding."⁷⁸ What Deleuze proposes in chapter four of Difference and Repetition, is a differential theory of the Idea in which the undetermined, the determinable, and determination are all brought together in the Idea as an internal problematic objective unity.⁷⁹ Deleuze argues that it is only a principle of difference that can determine in a precise manner the problematic nature of Ideas as such. Put simply: in Kant, Ideas are unifying, totalizing, and conditioning, whereas for Deleuze they are multiple, differential, and genetic. But before turning to the theory of the Idea presented in Difference and Repetition, I would first like to trace out part of the trajectory through which Deleuze arrived at this new formulation of the transcendental field.

§ 9. Deleuze's Trajectory: From Kant to Maimon, Bergson, and Nietzsche.

There are three names that stand out as shining points in this trajectory--Bergson,

Maimon, and Nietzsche--and in what follows I would like to examine what I take to be their fundamental contributions that led Deleuze toward a direct confrontation with Kant.

⁷⁸Difference and Repetition, p. 170. The ambiguities of the Kantian critique reappear in the Critique of Practical Reason, where Kant resurrects the Ideas of reason as the necessary conditions under which the object of practical reason is posited as possible and realizable: freedom is the cosmological Idea of the suprasensible world, which presupposes the psychological Idea of the Soul (infinite progress) and the theological Idea of a supreme being (as the "moral cause of the world"). The three great Ideas of reason, which are problematic and indeterminate from the viewpoint of speculation, receive a practical determination from the moral law.

⁷⁹In Deleuze, differential Ideas repeat the three aspects of the fractured cogito: "the 'I am' is an indeterminate existence, time is the form under which this existence is determinable, and the 'I think' is a determination" (Difference and Repetition, p. 169). From this point of view, Ideas are the thoughts of the cogito, the differentials of thought.

Deleuze's earliest articles, dating from the 1950's, are concerned, in part, with Henri Bergson's theory of the "problematic," which Deleuze formulates in the following way. The activity of thought is frequently conceived of as the search for solutions to problems, a prejudice whose roots, Deleuze suggests, are both social and pedagogical: in the classroom, it is the schoolteacher who poses ready-made problems, the pupil's task being to discover the correct solution, and what the notions of "true" and "false" serve to qualify are precisely these responses or solutions. At the same time, however, everyone recognizes that problems are never given ready-made but must themselves be constructed or constituted--hence the scandal when a "false" or badly-formulated problem is set in an examination. This is not to imply that solutions are unimportant: on the contrary, it is the solution that counts, but, as Deleuze says at several points throughout his work, a problem always has the solution it merits in terms of the way in which it is stated, and the means and terms we have at our disposal for stating it, that is, in terms of the conditions under which it is determined as a problem. But "while it is relatively easy to define the true and the false in relation to solutions whose problems are already stated," writes Deleuze, "it is much more difficult to say what the true and false consist of when they are applied directly to problems themselves."⁸⁰

One of Bergson's great virtues, in Deleuze's reading, is precisely to have attempted an intrinsic determination of the true and the false at the level of problems. False

⁸⁰Bergsonism, pp. 16-17. Deleuze continues: "This is how many philosophers fall into circular arguments: conscious of the need to take the test of the true and false beyond solutions into problems themselves, they are content to define the truth or falsity of the problem by the possibility or impossibility of its being resolved."

problems are those that contain a confusion of the "more" and the "less" and ignore difference in kind. Bergson's analyses of this point are famous, and consists in showing that there is not less but more in the idea of the possible than in the real, just as there is more in the idea of nonbeing than in being, or more in the idea of disorder than in order. "In the idea of nonbeing, there is in fact the idea of being, plus a logical operation of generalized negation, plus the particular psychological motive for the operation (such as when a being does not correspond to our expectation and we grasp it purely as the lack, the absence of what interests us). In the idea of disorder, there is already the idea of order, plus its negation, plus the motive for that negation (when we encounter an order which is not the one we expected). And there is more in the idea of the possible than there is in the idea of the real: 'For the possible is only the real with the addition of an act of the mind that throws its image back into the past once it has been exacted,' and the motive of that act. When we ask 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' or 'Why is there order rather than disorder?' or 'Why is there this rather than that (when that was equally possible)?' we fall into the same error: we mistake the more for the less, we behave as though nonbeing existed before being, disorder before order, and the possible before existence. As though being came to fill in a void, order to organize a preceding disorder, the real to realize a primary possibility. Being, order, and the existent are truth itself: but in the false problem there is a fundamental illusion, a 'retrograde movement of the true,' in which being, order, and the existent project themselves back into a possibility, a disorder, a nonbeing which are supposed to be primordial."⁸¹ This theme is a central

⁸¹ Bergsonism, p. 17, quoting from Bergson, The Creative Mind, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (Westport,

one in Deleuze's philosophy: it sums up his critique of the negative and of negation, in all its forms, as sources of false problems.⁸²

Bergson's contention that the notion of the possible is derived from a false problem is of particular importance to Deleuze. When we think of the possible as somehow "pre-existing" the real, we think of the real as something more than possible, that is, as the possible with existence added to it. We then say that the possible has been "realized" in the real. This process of realization, Deleuze suggests, is subject to two rules, one of resemblance and one of limitation. On the one hand, the real is supposed to resemble or to be "in the image of" the possible that it realizes; the concept of the thing is already given as "possible," and simply has existence or reality added to it when it is "realized."⁸³ On the other hand, since not every possible is realized, the process of realization involves a limitation by which some possibles are supposed to be repulsed or thwarted, while others "pass" into the real. But this is where the slight hand becomes obvious: if the real is supposed to resemble the possible, is it not because we have retrospectively or retroactively "projected" a fictitious image of the real back into the possible? In fact, it is not the real that resembles the possible, it is the possible that

Coonn: Greenwood Press, 1946), p. 118.

⁸²It is true that, in the sense that one calls possible what is not impossible, it stands to reason that this non-impossibility of a thing is the condition of its realization. But in this case, the possible is not understood as something pre-existent; even more, it simply indicates that something is logically possible, not really possible. See Bergson, "The Possible and the Real," in The Creative Mind, p. 102.

⁸³Furthermore, the means by which the possible is realized in existence remains unclear: see Difference and Repetition, p. 211: existence always occurs "as a brute eruption, a pure act or leap that always occurs behind our backs."

resembles the real.⁸⁴ Deleuze later writes in the Logic of Sense, "the error of all determinations of the transcendental as consciousness is to conceive of the transcendental in the image and resemblance of what it is supposed to found."⁸⁵

Now it is not difficult to see how Deleuze could extend this Bergsonian critique of the possible to a more specific critique of Kant's definition of transcendental philosophy as a search for the "conditions of the possible." Deleuze here appeals to the second figure I would like to consider, the now-forgotten Salomon Maimon. In his Essay on Transcendental Philosophy, which was published in 1790, one year before the appearance of Kant's third Critique, Maimon laid down some of the basic objections against Kant that would come to preoccupy the post-Kantian philosophies of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.⁸⁶ Maimon's basic objection was this: Kant, he said, had ignored the demands of a genetic method. This criticism means two things.

First, Kant relies on "facts," for which he simply searches for conditions. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant does more than simply claim that reason implies a priori

⁸⁴Bergsonism, chapter 5.

⁸⁵Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 105.

⁸⁶Salomon Maimon, Versuch über die Tranzendentalphilosophie (Berlin: Vos, 1790). An analysis of Maimon's work can be found in Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy From Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 285-323; Deleuze relies heavily on the work of Martial Guerault, La philosophie transcendente de Salomon Maimon (Paris: Alcan, 1929). Maimon's neglected work lies at the root of much post-Kantian philosophy; as Beiser notes, to study Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel without having read Maimon is like studying Kant without having read Hume (p. 286). Kant himself, in his letter to Marcus Herz of 26 May 1789, wrote of the Essay on the Transcendental Philosophy: "But one glance at the work made me realize its excellence and that not only had none of my critics understood me and the main questions as well as Mr. Maimon does but also very few men possess so much acumen for such deep investigations as he" (Kant, Philosophical Correspondence, ed. and trans. Arnulf Zweig [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967], p. 151). In a letter to Reinhold, Fichte later wrote: "My respect for Maimon's talent is limitless; I firmly believe, and am willing to prove, that the

knowledge; he adds that the so-called "universal" knowledges of pure sciences such as mathematics are the knowledges in which reason necessarily manifests itself. they are a priori "facts" of reason. The second Critique similarly takes as its point of departure the "fact" of the judgment of value and moral action. Kant assumed these "original facts" of knowledge and morality as givens, and simply sought their "conditions of possibility" in the transcendental--a vicious circle that makes the condition (the possible) refer to the conditioned (the real) while reproducing its image. Maimon, by contrast, argued that Kant's claim to ground the critique uniquely on reason would be valid only if these a priori knowledges had been deduced or engendered from reason alone as the necessary modes of its manifestation.

Second, Maimon argued that even if the concepts of the understanding, for example, are applicable to possible experience or objects in general, the concept itself can never specify which object in particular it applies to in real experience. By confining himself to possible experience, Kant was unable to give the faculty of judgment a rule for determining when a given category was applicable to real experience. The concept of causality may indeed be applicable to certain irreversible temporal sequences, as Kant argues in the Second Analogy (fire causes smoke because fire always precedes smoke in the order of time); but the concept gives us no means of distinguishing, within experience, between necessary and universal connections between events and contingent constant connections. Hume's skepticism remains unanswered, and Kant's famous duality between concept and intuition remains unbridgable. Maimon, by contrast, was the first to

critical philosophy has been overturned by him" (Fichte, Briefwechsel, III/2, p. 282, as quoted in Beiser, p. 370, note 2).

argue that this duality could only be overcome through the formulation of a principle of difference: whereas identity is the condition of possibility of thought in general, it is difference that constitutes the genetic condition of real thought.⁸⁷

These two exigencies laid down by Maimon--the search for the genetic conditions of real thought, and the positing of a principle of difference--reappear like a leitmotif in almost every one of Deleuze's books up through 1969, even if Maimon's name is not always explicitly mentioned.⁸⁸ The reason for this is not difficult to ascertain. The post-Kantian philosophers all took up Maimon's challenge, but in some fashion each of them still subordinated this principle of difference to the principle of identity. In Fichte, for example, identity is posited as the property of the thinking subject, with difference appearing only as an extrinsic limitation imposed from without (the non-self). Hegel, against Fichte, attempted to give a certain autonomy to the principle of difference by placing difference and identity in dialectical opposition; but even in Hegel, contradiction always resolves itself, and in resolving itself, it resolves difference by relating it to a

⁸⁷Maimon's arguments concerning a "genetic" transcendental philosophy are examined in more detail in the chapter on Aesthetics.

⁸⁸Deleuze, for instance, applies this Maimonian formula at various instances to the work of Schelling, Bergson, Nietzsche, Foucault, and even Pasolini: (1) "One must not raise oneself to conditions as to conditions of possible experience, but as to conditions of real experience: Schelling had already proposed this aim and defined his philosophy as a superior empiricism. The formula is valid for Bergsonism as well" ("La conception de la différence chez Bergson," p. 85). (2) "The Nietzsche and the Kantian conceptions of critique are opposed on five main points: 1. Genetic and plastic principles that give an account of the sense and value of beliefs, interpretations and evaluations rather than transcendental principles which are conditions for so-called facts...." (*Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 93). (3) "Foucault differs in certain fundamental respects from Kant: the conditions are those of real experience, and not of possible experience" (*Foucault*, p. 60 [the final phrase of this sentence is inadvertently omitted from the English translation]). (4) "If it is worth making a philosophical comparison, Pasolini might be called post-Kantian (he conditions of legitimacy are the conditions of reality itself) while Metz and his followers remain Kantians (the falling back of principle upon fact)" (*The Time-Image*, p. 286, note 8, translation modified).

ground.⁸⁹ If Deleuze frequently returns to Maimon, it seems to me, in order to take up the one option that was not pursued as such by post-Kantian philosophy (though its closest precursor is perhaps Schelling). In Deleuze, the principle of "difference-in-itself" is made to function as the genetic element of real experience: difference is the principle from which all other relations (identity, analogy, resemblance, opposition, contradiction, negation, and so forth) are derived as secondary effects.⁹⁰

Nowhere is this strategy more evident than in the central chapter of Deleuze's 1962 book Nietzsche and Philosophy, which is entitled, quite simply, "Critique." For Deleuze, Nietzsche's philosophy does not represent a rejection of Kant: on the contrary, it is Nietzsche who was finally able to fulfill the immanent aims of the critical project, precisely because he brought critique to bear on, not merely false claims to knowledge and morality, but on knowledge and morality themselves, on true knowledge and true morality, and indeed, on the values of truth and reason themselves. Nietzsche was not content to discover transcendental principles that would constitute the condition of possibility for the "facts" of reason (knowledge and morality); instead, he was intent on discovering immanent principles (which he thought he had found in the will to power and the eternal return) that were truly genetic and productive, that is, differential principles

⁸⁹See Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), Vol. 1, Book 2, Section 1, II, "Determinations of Reflection" (Identity, Difference, Contradiction).

⁹⁰Martial Guerout, in L'Evolution et la structure de la Doctrine de la Science chez Fichte (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1930), vol. 1, pp. 126-127, shows that in Maimon himself the relationship between difference and identity remains highly ambiguous, oscillating between all these positions. Maimon described his own transcendental philosophy as a "coalition system" that incorporated elements of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hume, and in this sense he functions as a true precursor to Deleuze, who has written important studies on each of these thinkers.

that were capable of giving an account of the genesis or origin of knowledge and morality.⁹¹ Deleuze in this way establishes a "secret link" between Maimon and Nietzsche that leaps over the idealist tradition: Maimon's call for a genetic method and a principle of difference, Deleuze argues, found its fulfillment in Nietzsche's method of genealogy.

Why then does Deleuze return to a more or less direct confrontation with Kant in Difference and Repetition (1968). Michael Hardt has shown, in detail and with remarkable subtlety, how the early works we have been considering also contain a strong anti-Hegelianism that Deleuze, of necessity, always pursued obliquely and indirectly, since to oppose Hegel is a dialectical move already anticipated by Hegel's system.⁹² Deleuze's recourse to Maimon is part of that strategy: rather than attacking Hegel directly, he instead returns to the very problematics that generated the post-Kantian tradition to which Hegel belongs, precisely in order to propose a different and divergent solution to those same problematics. But this is why, it seems to me, armed with the critiques of Bergson, Maimon, and Nietzsche, a direct confrontation of Deleuze with Kant was inevitable. Deleuze states the aim of that confrontation in no uncertain terms: "We seek to determine an impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field," he writes.

⁹¹See Nietzsche and Philosophy, esp. pp 51-52, which summarizes Maimon's theses without naming him. For Nietzsche's "problematization" of knowledge and morality, see Nietzsche's comments in the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufman and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967): "We need a critique of moral values, the value of these values must first be brought into question" (Preface, § 6, p. 20). "The will to truth requires a critique--let us thus define our own task--the value of truth must for once be experimentally called into question" (Essay III, § 24, p. 153).

⁹²Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

"which does not resemble the corresponding empirical fields."⁹³ In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze does not simply dismantle the Kantian architectonic: instead, he retains many of Kant's notions, but in accordance with his own project, he assigns to them entire new functions and variables, and inserts them into an entirely new field: no longer the universalizing field of the possible, but the multiple and variable field of the virtual.⁹⁴

Deleuze himself has provided a useful map for deciphering this project in a short article entitled, "On Four Poetic Formulas That Might Summarize the Kantian Philosophy." He there describes what he calls four "reversals" brought about by Kant's Copernican revolution, though in fact what these reversals serve to mark out are four "pressure points" or "fault lines," as it were, at which Kant himself hinted at a differential or virtual conception of the transcendental field without, however, developing its consequences. It is the pressure points of the first and third critiques that are most germane to our purposes here.

The first hint of a virtual field appears in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first Critique. In Kant, the spontaneity of which I am conscious in the "I think" is no longer understood, as in Descartes, as the attribute of a substantial and active being: rather the activity of thought is applied to a passive being that is affected from without by objects in space, and that itself exists in time, constantly modified, varied, changing. The introduction of time as the form of interiority effectively "fractures" the self, according to

⁹³The Logic of Sense, p. 102.

⁹⁴ See Deleuze, "A Philosophical Concept...." in Who Comes After the Subject?, ed. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, Jean-Luc Nancy (New York and London: Routledge, 1991), p. 94: "It is never very

Deleuze, splitting the cogito into the active I of the understanding and the passive ego of sensibility, which are now related to each other only under the condition of this fundamental and internalized difference.⁹⁵ The "I = I" identity of the "I think" here gives way to Rimbaud's differential formula "I is another." Kant's first error, however, was to have filled in this fissure with a new form of identity, that is, with the active syntheses of the understanding: Kant reserves the power of synthesis exclusively for activity, for the "I think," and assigns to passivity a purely receptive role with no synthetic power.

Deleuze, by contrast, revives the Kantian project by proposing a completely different analysis of the passive ego, uncovering an entire realm of passive syntheses that necessarily condition and precede the activity of the understanding. (The Freudian and Nietzschean projects, for instance, are located entirely on the side of the passive ego.)

This analysis of the passive ego finds its fullest expression--first sketched out in

Difference and Repetition and then developed more fully in The Time-Image--in

Deleuze's theory of the pure form of time and the various types of syntheses that it entails.

interesting to criticize a concept: it is better to build new functions and discover new fields that make it useless or inadequate."

⁹⁵This is what Michel Foucault, in the Order of Things, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1970), pp. 330-335, called the "perpetual relation of the cogito to the unthought": as a finite subject, I am immersed in the "non-me," an unthought element that conditions me and which I do not control. Three fundamental sciences develop from this, which correspond to the three fundamental regions of the unthought: Biology responds to the fact that I am always already alive, caught in the chain of the living, which always precedes my consciousness and surpasses me; philology analyzes a language that pre-exists me, without my being able to do anything other than discover what is already at work in it; economics corresponds to the field of work that I will be plunged into, which is already organized and structured by history.

an extremely rich virtual theory of time whose only parallel can be found in some of the recent works of Michel Serres.⁹⁶

The second pressure point, which is the one I would like to develop here, appears in the Critique of Judgment, in the analytics of the beautiful and the sublime. In the first two Critiques, Kant made the faculties converge and contribute to the common project of "recognizing" an object (common sense). What he discovers in the third Critique is a free and indeterminate accord between the faculties--a discordant accord, what Deleuze calls a "disjunctive" relationship between the faculties--that serves as the ground of the harmonious and proportional accords between the faculties that were established in the first two Critiques. But here again, Kant betrays this insight by resolving these discords, by making them converge on the Ideas of Reason as their principle or focal point: the beautiful and the sublime. Kant tells us, are manners through which Ideas of Reason can be presented in sensible nature. And since reason is the faculty that legislates in the practical domain, Kant concludes that the supra-sensible "union of all our faculties a priori" is the predestination of a moral being.⁹⁷ For Kant, Ideas are both unifying and totalizing: they systematize the operations of the understanding, and serve as the focal

⁹⁶See, for example, Michel Serres, Eclaircissements: Entretien avec Bruno Latour (Paris: Flammarion, 1992), pp. 88-95; and Le système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques (Paris: PUF, 1968), pp. 284-286. We examine the consequences of this reformulation of the theory of time in the chapter on Aesthetics.

⁹⁷Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1928), § 57, p. 209 (see also § 42, p. 160: "One who takes an interest in the beautiful in nature can only do so insofar as he has previously set his interest deep into the foundations of the morally good"). For Deleuze's analysis of Kant's third Critique, see his important article, "L'idée du genèse dans l'esthétique de Kant," in Revue d'esthétique, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1963), pp. 113-136, a recapitulation of which can be found in Kant's Critical Philosophy, pp. 46-67.

point or horizon that unites all the faculties in a "common sense," and culminates the a conception of Nature as a system of ends.

Now what Deleuze does in the fourth chapter of Difference and Repetition is to develop a theory of the Idea that, against Kant, is neither unifying nor totalizing, but rather differential and genetic, and which alone can provide a sufficient reason for the disjunctive relations among the faculties. In Deleuze, the faculties are "unhinged": rather than having the faculties converge on a common project, each faculty is violently compelled to confront the differential limit that is peculiar to it--a limit that is ungraspable from the point of view of its empirical exercise, but which it alone is able to grasp from the point of view of its transcendental exercise: something unimaginable in the imagination, something unrememberable in memory, something unthinkable in thought, and so on. There is indeed a "critical point," a focus or horizon at which thinking, imagining, remembering, speaking, sensing, and so forth are the same thing, but what this "thing" affirms is not the convergence of the faculties in a common sense, but rather a violent divergence of the faculties in their transcendental and disjoint exercise: a para-sense rather than a common sense. The limit-elements of this para-sense are differential Ideas, pure multiplicities which animate and describe the disjoint exercise of the faculties from a transcendental point of view: sensibility grasps differences in intensity as the limit of the perceptible (the sentiendum); sensibility transmits its constraint to the imagination, which is compelled to grasp that which is empirically unimaginable in the disparity of the phantasm (the imaginandum); memory grasps the dissimilar in the pure form of time which constitutes the immemorial of a transcendental

memory (the memorandum): and it is the I fractured by this form of time that finds itself constrained to think that which can only be thought but is at the same time unthinkable (the cogitandum). These unsensed, unimagined, unremembered, and unthought elements constitute the differential and genetic limits that traverse the fragments of the fractured I or the dissolved Cogito, and no longer form the common sense of the transcendental subject.⁹⁸

Deleuze's aim in Difference and Repetition, however, as he himself says, is not to establish a disjunctive doctrine of the faculties, but only "to determine the nature of the its requirements."⁹⁹ This requirement is that of a differential theory of the Idea. There is no faculty that is the faculty of Ideas in particular, whether this faculty is reason (Kant) or the understanding (Maimon): rather, Ideas traverse all the faculties and render possible both their differential object and the transcendental exercise of the faculty. Yet Deleuze also writes that "despite the fact that it has become discredited today, the doctrine of the faculties is an entirely necessary component of the system of philosophy." What does he mean by this? "Its discredit," he continues, "may be explained by the misrecognition of this properly transcendental empiricism, for which was vainly substituted a tracing of the transcendental from the empirical."¹⁰⁰ The theory of the faculties, in short, was compromised by the projection of the empirical notion of common sense into the transcendental: freed from this constraint, the faculties, along with the Ideas that

⁹⁸On the disjunctive theory of the faculties, see Difference and Repetition, chapter three, "The Image of Thought."

⁹⁹Difference and Repetition, p. 144.

constitute their limit. take on an objective rather than subjective determination. Ideas, writes Deleuze, "do not exist only in our heads but occur here and there in the constitution of an actual historical world."¹⁰¹ "The history of man, from the theoretical as much as from the practical point of view, is that of the construction of problems."¹⁰² In other words, though Deleuze develops the differential theory of the Ideas in the context of Kant's theory of the faculties, he gives Ideas a much broader extension than the system of the faculties. An Idea in any domain (and not just the system of the faculties) is an internal multiplicity, a virtual and variable system of multiple and non-localizable connections between differential elements, and a distribution of the singularities and series corresponding to these relations which trace the space of the Idea.

III. DELEUZE'S THEORY OF THE IDEA: Differential and Genetic

§ 10. Deleuze's Differential Theory of the Idea. We turn then, finally, to Deleuze's own theory of the Idea. We have examined Deleuze's reading of the two most important philosophers of the Idea, Plato and Kant, in order to show how in each case they pointed to the possibility of what we have called a immanent, differential, and genetic conception of the Idea. In developing his own theory of the Idea, however, Deleuze's own points of reference are taken not only from the history of philosophy, but

¹⁰⁰Difference and Repetition, p. 143.

¹⁰¹Difference and Repetition, p. 190.

¹⁰²Bergsonism, p. 16.

also from what is today known as the "structuralist" movement. In 1967, Deleuze wrote an important article entitled "How to Recognize Structuralism," which analyzed the work of numerous authors who were then considered to be "structuralists" (Jakobson, Lacan, Foucault, Lévi-Strauss, Althusser, Barthes), and attempted to isolate a certain number of abstract criteria by which one could define a "structure in a given domain."¹⁰³ The essay is important for our purposes because in it Deleuze defines a "structure" in exactly the same manner as he defines an "Idea" in Difference and Repetition. The convergence of these two terms, however, is less surprising than it may seem at first sight. "'Structuralism,'" Deleuze writes, "seems to us the only means by which a genetic method can realize its ambitions."¹⁰⁴ But Deleuze defines a structure neither as an atemporal code nor as a formal axiomatic system; on the contrary, his definition is derived from the analysis of mathematical structures (the calculus) given in the work of Jules Vuillemin and Albert Lautman. This definition, as we will see, entails two important consequences: in Deleuze, there is no opposition between structure and difference, since a structure is itself a multiplicity of differential elements; nor is there any difficulty in reconciling structure and genesis, since the time of genesis is always goes from the virtual to the actual, from

¹⁰³Deleuze, "A quoi reconnaît-on le structuralisme," in Histoire de la philosophie, vol. 8. Le XXe siècle, ed. François Châtelet (Paris: Hachette, 1972-1973), pp. 299-335. This essay takes up themes developed in particular in Difference and Repetition, chapter four, "The Ideal Synthesis of Difference," pp. 168-221.

¹⁰⁴Difference and Repetition, p. 183: "An Idea is defined as a structure." Albert Lautman, in Le problème du temps (Paris: Hermann, 1946), p. 42, and Essai sur les notions de structure et d'existence en mathématiques (Paris: Hermann, 1938), vol. 2, p. 138, discusses the difference in kind between the distribution of singularities, which indicates a dialectical problem, and the specification of these same points in a solution-element. Jules Vuillemin, in La philosophie de l'algèbre (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1962), vol. 1, pp. 213-221 and pp. 229-233, proposes a determination of structures in mathematics, insisting on a theory of problems (following Abel) and principles of reciprocal, complete, and progressive determination (following Galois). He shows how structures, in this sense, provide the only means of realizing a truly genetic method.

the Idea to its actualizations, and not from one actual term to the other. The term "post-structuralist" is thus, strictly speaking, inapplicable to Deleuze, since the notions of a differential multiplicity, a multiple internal temporality, and a static ordinal genesis are all inseparable from the very concept of an ideal structure (even if the criteria enumerated below are those typically associated with the so-called "post-structuralist" turn in France).¹⁰⁵

Deleuze's aim is to provide a purely intrinsic or immanent determination of the Idea that is not traced, as in Kant, from the objects of experience or the concepts of the understanding. Deleuzian Ideas remain limit concepts, but in accordance with modern interpretations of the calculus, he conceives of this limit as a differential (dx, dy): "Just as we oppose difference in itself to negativity, so we oppose dx to not-A, the symbol of difference [Differenzphilosophie] to that of contradiction."¹⁰⁶ It is the differential that allows Deleuze to define the Idea intrinsically as a structure immanent to experience that is simultaneously undetermined, determinable, and determination. The three components of a Deleuzian Idea can be contrasted point by point with the Platonic and Kantian components:

¹⁰⁵See What is Philosophy?, p. 9: "Today it is said that systems are bankrupt, but it is only the concept of system that has changed."

¹⁰⁶Difference and Repetition, p. 170. On the modern interpretation of the calculus proposed by Cauchy, Weierstrass, and Russell, see Carl B. Boyer, The History of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development, chapter 7, "The Rigorous Formulation," pp. 267-309: The concept of the limit no longer presupposes the notion of infinitesimals or infinite approximation, but is a genuine "cut" (in Dedekind's sense) that implies a purely static definition of continuity in terms of a pure logic of relations. On the role of dialectical Ideas in mathematics, see Albert Lautman, Nouvelle recherches sur la structure dialectique des mathématiques (Paris: Hermann, 1939); and Jules Vuillemin, La philosophie de l'algèbre (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), vol. 1, pp. 213-221 and pp. 229-233.

1. The elements of an Idea (dx, dy) are completely undetermined:
2. These elements are nonetheless determinable reciprocally in a differential relation (dx/dy);
3. To this reciprocal determination there corresponds the complete determination of a set of singularities (values of dx/dy).

To understand the significance of Deleuze's theory of the Idea, we propose to set forth several criteria that Deleuze uses to define them, drawing on numerous examples drawn from various non-philosophical domains.

§ 11. First Set of Criteria: Elements, Relations, Singularities. Consider first the nature of the differential. An Idea is composed of a multiplicity of abstract differential elements that enter into relation with each other so as to determine a set of singularities. What is the nature of these elements? "The elements of the multiplicity," explains Deleuze, "must have neither sensible form nor conceptual signification, nor, therefore, any assignable function. They are not even actually existent, but inseparable from a potential or a virtuality. In this sense, they imply no prior identity, no positing of a something that can be called one or the same. On the contrary, their indetermination renders possible the manifestation of difference freed from all subordination."¹⁰⁷ These elements must then be determined reciprocally in a differential relation that allows no independence to subsist. These relations are what Deleuze terms "non-localizable ideal connections," whether they characterize the multiplicity globally or operate through the juxtaposition of neighborhoods. An Idea as a multiplicity is in this way defined in an

¹⁰⁷Difference and Repetition, p. 183.

intrinsic manner, without any reference to a uniform space, and the nature of the multiplicity changes if the relations change. These differential relations will be actualized in diverse spatio-temporal relationships, just as the differential elements will be actualized in a variety of terms and forms.

There are thus Ideas that correspond to mathematical realities and relations; others that correspond to physical facts and laws; and still others that correspond to organism, languages, psychic states, societies, and so on, each according to the conditions that determine their fluent synthesis. For a given Idea, then, we must ask: what are the elements, differential relations, and singular points that are proper to it? The linguistic Idea, to take a now-classic example, is, from the viewpoint of the faculty of speech, a virtual system of reciprocal relations between phonemes, which is the smallest linguistic unit capable of differentiating two words with diverse meanings, such a bat and cat. It is clear that phonemes are incarnated in letters, syllables, and sounds, but they are not reducible to any of these: in themselves, phonemes do not exist independently of the reciprocal relations into which they enter, and by which they are reciprocally determined (b/c).¹⁰⁸ The biological Idea, as presented in the works of Jacques Monod and François Jacob, is defined at the molecular level in terms of differential elements (nucleic acids and proteins) whose relations constitute the double series of the genetic code. In genetics, genes can be seen as differential elements that appear in the chromosome as a complex

¹⁰⁸Saussure's error, Deleuze notes, was to have reduced this differential relation to a relation of opposition. For Deleuze's critique of Saussure, see Difference and Repetition, pp. 203-205, where he invokes Gustave Guillaume's principle of "differential position." Roman Jakobson examines the status of the phoneme in his Essais de linguistique générale (Paris: Minuit, 1963), chapter 4.

space of proximity.¹⁰⁹ The social Idea, as presented in Althusser's interpretation of Marx, expresses a system of multiple ideal relations between the abstract differential elements of labor and capital.¹¹⁰ Modern atomism constitutes a physical Idea, whose conditions lie in the differential relations that determine the laws of Nature, the types of "multiple and non-localizable connections" established between particles, and the character of "potentiality" attributed to these particles.¹¹¹ In each of these cases, it is the elements and their relations that determine the nature of the beings and objects that will incarnate the Idea in its actuality (linguistic, physical, social, etc.).

What, secondly, is a differential relation? If Deleuze's theory of the Idea finds its model in the calculus rather than in formal logic, it is precisely because its relational structure is very different from that presented in an axiomatic. Mathematics can be said to distinguish between three general types of relation: real relations are those established between elements that are themselves independent or autonomous (such as $3 = 2$ or $2/3$), while imaginary relations are those established between elements whose value is unspecified, but which must in each case have a determined value (such as $x^2 + y^2 - R^2 = 0$, the algebraic equation for the circle). Axiomatic systems such as formal logic take as their object the relations between such non-specified elements, and in this sense be said to deal with imaginary relations. But the type of relation presented in the calculus has a

¹⁰⁹On the differential structure of the genetic code, see Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity, trans. Austryn Wainhouse (New York: Vintage Books, 1971); and François Jacob, The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity, trans. Betty E. Spillmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).

¹¹⁰Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1970).

¹¹¹Difference and Repetition, p. 184.

completely different status: differential relations are those that are established between elements that themselves have no determined value, but that nevertheless are determined reciprocally in the relation (such as $dy/dx = -x/y$, the expression of a curve and its trigonometric tangent). The elements of these relations are undetermined, being neither real nor imaginary: dy is completely undetermined in relation to y , dx is completely undetermined in relation to x . But these elements are perfectly determinable in the differential relation: the elements do not exist apart from the non-localizable ideal connections of the differential relation into which they enter (dx/dy) and by which they are reciprocally determined. It is the status of the differential relation that allows Deleuze to define an Idea as a structure in which difference is related to difference through difference.

To the reciprocal determination of the differential relation, thirdly, there corresponds the complete determination of a set of singularities, which together constitute the problematic space corresponding to these elements.¹¹² Albert Lautman has shown that the theory of singular points in the calculus implies two distinct entities: the "problem-instance" implies a purely nomadic distribution of singularities in a topological field, to which no direction is attached; and the "solution-instance" implies the formation of figures that take on a form in the neighborhood of these singularities, which now take on a sedentary and fixed form (a triangle, for example, has three singular points, whereas

¹¹²Difference and Repetition, p. 171: These each of these three aspects there corresponds a principle that together form the figure of sufficient reason: "a principle of determinability corresponds to the undermined as such (dx, dy); a principle of reciprocal determination corresponds to the really determinable (dx/dy); a principle of complete determination corresponds to the effective determined (values of dx/dy)."

curves and tangents derive from more complex distributions).¹¹³ Which is another way of saying that an Idea for Deleuze, as for Kant, is always a problematic. But whereas in Kant the problematic field of Ideas concerned the unification of the field of the concepts understanding: in Deleuze, the conditions of a problematic are determined by a differential field of singular points. The problem is not resolved by the determination of these singularities, but rather is determined as a problem. The distribution of singular points that corresponds to the elements and relations of the Idea trace out the space of a problematic field, which will be incarnated in diverse spatio-temporal relationships and a variety of terms and forms as instances of solution.¹¹⁴ It is in this sense that Deleuze can consider his theory of the Idea to be a "Dialectic." "Whereas Analytics gives us the means to solve a problem already given, or to respond to a question, Dialectics shows how to pose a question legitimately...Problems are always dialectical: the dialectic has no other sense, nor do problems have any other sense. What is mathematical (or physical, biological, psychical or sociological) are the solutions."¹¹⁵ It is here that the anti-Platonic aspect of the Idea outlined above becomes clear: the coordinates of the Idea can never be determined by the question "What is?" (since the Idea does not refer to an essence), but

¹¹³ Albert Lautman, Le problème du temps (Paris: Hermann, 1946), pp. 41-42: "The geometrical interpretation of the theory of differential equations clearly places in evidence two absolutely distinct realities: there is the field of directions and the topological accidents which may suddenly crop up in it, as for example the existence of the plane of singular points to which no direction has been attached: and there are the integral curves with the form they take on in the vicinity of the singularities of the field of directions."

¹¹⁴ Difference and Repetition, p. 177: "The complete determination of a problem is inseparable from the existence, the number, and the distribution of the determinant points which precisely provide its conditions."

¹¹⁵ Difference and Repetition, pp. 160, 179.

rather by questions such as "Who? How? Where? When? How many? From what point of view? and so on."¹¹⁶ Whereas the solutions are qualified by the notions of the "true" and the "false," the distribution of singularities in the problem is rather qualified by the notions of the "ordinary" and the "remarkable."

An Idea, for Deleuze, is defined by these three criteria of elements, relations, and singularities. We must make two fundamental points about the status of such Ideas. First, a structure is a virtual multiplicity in which all the elements, all the relations and their values, all the singularities coexist. This coexistence does not imply any confusion or indetermination: the differential elements and relations coexist in a completely and perfectly determined ensemble. But this ensemble is never actualized as such: what is actualized here and now, are these relations, these values of relations, this distribution of singularities; others are actualized elsewhere and at other times. There is no total language, for example, incarnating all possible phonemes and phonemic relations, which would be a chaos: the virtual totality of language is actualized following exclusive directions in diverse languages, each of which incarnates certain relations, certain values, and certain singularities. There is no total society, but each social form incarnates certain elements, relations, and values of production (Capitalism and Schizophrenia proposes a typology of social formations according to the elements and relations they incarnate, and the threshold of consistency they attain between these elements and relations). Ideas, in other words, are never actual; what is actual are the relationships and terms in which the

¹¹⁶The Logic of Sense, p. 103: "Only when a world teeming with anonymous and nomadic, impersonal and preindividual singularities, opens up, do we tread at last on the field of the transcendental....Singularities constitute the real transcendental field."

structure is incarnated. Deleuze proposes the term virtuality to designate the modality of an Idea. A virtual Idea has a reality that is proper to it, but which must not be confused with an actual reality, past, present, or future; it also has an ideality that is proper to it, but which must not be confused with any possible image or abstract Idea. Real without being actual, ideal without being abstract: Deleuze often uses this Proustian phrase to characterize the nature of the virtual.

Deleuze therefore distinguishes between the total structure of a domain as an ensemble of virtual coexistence, and the sub-structures that correspond to the diverse actualizations of the domain. An Idea in its virtuality is a structure that is not yet differentiated, not yet actualized. Yet it is in no way undetermined: it is, on the contrary, completely differentiated, in accordance with the criteria we have just outlined (elements, relations, singularities). A differentiated structure is actualized by differentiating itself. "The greatest importance must be attached to the difference between these two operations, marked by the distinctive trait t/c: differentiation and differentiation."¹¹⁷ For Deleuze, this distinctive trait t/c is the symbol of difference: it marks the internal difference between differentiation, as the determination of the virtual content of an Idea, and differentiation, as the actualization of this differentiated virtuality. This is how Deleuze resolves the traditional tension between structure and difference: for Deleuze, a structure or Idea is independent of any principle of identity.

¹¹⁷ Difference and Repetition, p. 279. See also "A quoi reconnaît-on le structuralisme?" p. 314, and "La méthode de dramatisation," p. 98.

The second point concerns the status of time, and on this point Deleuze's position is clear: time is always a time of actualization, in which the virtual coexistence of the Idea is actualized according to diverse rhythms. This is how Deleuze resolves the question of genesis, which never consists in determining a historical origin. In the biological Idea, for instance, the actualization of a given organism, starting from the determinations of the transcendental field (the elements and relations of the genetic code distributed in the intensive space of the egg), entails the progressive temporal construction of an internal milieu, and is made up of multiple spaces that must be locally integrated and connected, and which are constantly in contact with external movements that preside over its distribution in extensity. There is thus a "lived reality" of the embryo that it alone can experience, and which would tear apart an adult organism: the stretching of cellular layers, invagination by folding, regional displacement of groups, and so on. The time of genesis, in other words, always goes from the virtual to its actualization, from the Idea or structure to its actualizations, and not from one actual form to another. The "monstrous" appears when this movement of actualization in an individual organism diverges from the norm of its species. More importantly, the great taxonomic units--genera, species, families, classes--themselves have only a statistical status that is derived the differential relations of the transcendental field.¹¹⁸ Species do not resemble the

¹¹⁸See Georges Canguilhem, et. al., "Du développement à l'évolution au XIXe siècle," in *Thalès* (1960), p. 34, as quoted in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 48: "It is possible to tell from the parents, anticipating the outcome of the process, whether a pigeon or a wolf is developing....But here the points of reference themselves are in motion: there are only fixed points for convenience of expression. At the level of universal evolution, it is impossible to discern that kind of reference point....Life on earth appears as a sum of relatively independent species of flora and fauna with sometimes shifting or porous boundaries between them. Geographical areas can only harbor a sort of chaos, or at best, extrinsic harmonies of an ecological order, temporary equilibriums between populations."

differential relations that are actualized in them, and evolution always occurs in the movement from the virtual to its actualization, and never from one actual term to another. (We analyze the consequences of this virtual conception of time in the chapter on Aesthetics.)

An Idea, from the point of view of genesis, is a condition of real experience and not merely of possible experience. Ideas are never larger than the actuality they condition, since the conditions are determined along with what they condition. Deleuze frequently insists that the virtual must not be confused with the possible. Whereas the possible resembles the real, the virtual Idea differs from its actualizations; and whereas the real imposes a limitation upon the possible, the actual differentiates the virtual. The actualization of the virtual Idea always takes place by difference, divergence, or differentiation: actualization breaks with resemblance as a process no less than it does with identity as a principle. An Idea, in short, is a system of differences, which produces effects that are themselves differences. Ideas can only be recovered by their products or effects, but the actual forms and relationships that actualize the Idea are, as it were, "scramblings" of the Idea rather than clear expressions of it. If we call the state of a completely differentiated Idea distinct, and the forms of an actualized Idea clear, then we must break with the rule of proportionality between the clear and the distinct: Ideas in themselves are by nature distinct (completely differentiated) but obscure (not yet differentiated), and effects are by nature clear (because they have reached a threshold of actualization) but confused (because its component elements and relations remain obscure). This is how Deleuze resolves the tradition tension between structure and

genesis: genesis always goes from the virtual to its actualization, and is independent of any rule of resemblance that would tie it to an identifiable origin.

§ 12. Second Set of Criteria: Series, Aleatory Point, Metastability. The characteristics we have just outlined (elements, relations, singularities), however, are incapable of functioning on their own. This is because they only constitute half of the Idea: an Idea begins to move and become animated if we restore the other half. The determination of an Idea is not only made by the choice of basic abstract elements and the differential relations into which they enter: nor simply by the emission of singularities that correspond to them: but also by the development of series (as the function of a variable). A singularity is the point of departure for a series which extends over all the ordinary points of the system, as far as the neighborhood of another singularity which itself gives rise to another series, which may either converge with or diverge from the first. A mathematical curve, for example, is characterized by a set of singularities or singular points, as is a physical state of affairs. Furthermore, a single series is never enough to form an Idea, which requires the simultaneity of at least two series: every structure is serial, multi-serial, and would not function apart from this condition. "There are therefore singularities which are themselves ordinary because of the convergence of series, and singularities which are remarkable because of their divergence."¹¹⁹ The latter type of singularity marks turning points or points of inflection in the structure:

¹¹⁹Difference and Repetition, p. 190.

"bottlenecks, knots, foyers, and centers: points of fusion, condensation, and boiling: points of tears and joy, sickness and health, hope and anxiety, 'sensitive' points."¹²⁰

Here again, we can cite examples from diverse domains: in linguistics, a phonemic series is always related to a series of morphemes (Jakobson), the syntagmatic is always related to the paradigmatic (Benveniste); in history, notably in the Annales school, one constructs series from the neighborhood of a singular point, searches for other series that prolong it in other directions, in order to see, finally, at which places and at which moments the obtained series are made to diverge, forming new spaces and marking new historical formations (Braudel);¹²¹ in law, jurisprudence operates by means of singularities, and the prolongation of singularities as precedents, which is very different than the axiomatic codes of law (Ewald).¹²² This is the mathematical determination of what Deleuze and Guattari term a rhizome: a multiplicity in which heterogeneous elements are connected to each other serially according to complex relations of convergence and divergence (or bifurcation).¹²³ As in musical serialism, what counts is not only the material element (sonority), nor simply the relation between the terms (melody), but the relation of each series to the other (counterpoint).¹²⁴

¹²⁰The Logic of Sense, p. 52.

¹²¹Ferdinand Braudel, On History, trans. Sarah Matthews (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). For a summary and critique of the serial method of the Annales school, see Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 1, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 99-110, 208-225.

¹²²François Ewald, in his L'Etat providence (Paris: Grasset, 1987), develops such a conception of jurisprudence: see Deleuze's comments in Negotiations, pp. 169-170, and The Fold, p. 67.

¹²³See A Thousand Plateaus, chapter 1, "Introduction: Rhizome," pp. 3-25.

¹²⁴See Jean-François Lyotard, Economie libidinale (Paris: Minuit, 1974), p. 58.

This serial organization of the Idea raises what is perhaps the most difficult problem in Deleuze's philosophy. By virtue of the laws of differentiation, the series of an Idea are always divergent. But how can divergent series communicate with each other? "It seems that a structure envelops a completely paradoxical object or element," writes Deleuze, which does not appear as such in any series, but is, as it were, the point of the convergence of the divergent series as such.¹²⁵ It is this aleatory point that forms the condition of divergence: the ceaseless displacement of this "object = x," like the dummy in bridge or the empty square in a board game, or the refrain in a song, necessary for the Idea or structure to function. In his famous article, "The Purloined Letter," Lacan described the characteristics of this object in psychic systems, which he terms the phallus or "objet a": it is a paradoxical place without an occupant (or an occupant without a place), constantly displaced in relation to itself, ceaselessly differing from itself, being found always as lost, never present but always bearing witness to its own absence.¹²⁶ But the nature of this perpetuum mobile varies depending on the Idea: in the domain of sexuality, the phallus (Lacan); in the domain of economics, it is "value in general" (Althusser); in social structures, it is the function of "mana" as a floating signifier (Lévi-Strauss); in literature, it may take the form of portmanteau words like "Snark," which ensure the ramification of series (Carroll, Joyce, Roussel), and so on. This mobile object

¹²⁵Deleuze, "A quoi reconnaît-on le structuralisme," p. 321.

¹²⁶Lacan analyzed the function of the aleatory point and the serial form in two important commentaries: on Poe, "Seminar on The Purloined Letter," trans. Jeffrey Mehlmann, Yale French Studies 48 (1972) (first series: king, queen, minister; second series: police, minister, Dupin); and on the Rat Man, "The Neurotic's Individual Myth," trans. Martha Noel Evans, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly 48 (1979), pp. 405-425 (the paternal and filial series). See Deleuze summary analysis of the aleatory point in Difference and Repetition, pp. 101-103.

= x. neither recognizable nor identifiable, is the differentiator of differences, relating divergent series to each other.

Jacques Derrida's brilliant neologism différance expresses the movement of this aleatory point that is never present as such, and that cannot be constituted apart from the series of its own differentiations (the undecidability between the active and passive voice, between temporal "deferring" and spatial "differing," between writing and speaking, etc.), and that thus subsists in a dimension "supplementary" to the series themselves.¹²⁷

Perhaps more significantly, contemporary mathematical physics has discovered "strange" or chaotic attractors that function as aleatory points in physical systems: two neighboring trajectories in a determinate system of coordinates diverge in an exponential manner before coming together through operations of stretching and folding that are repeated and intersect with chaos.¹²⁸ It is precisely because the path this point traces is invisible in itself and becomes visible only in reverse, covered over by the phenomena it induces in the system, it has no place other than that from which it is "missing," no identity other than that which it lacks. "The logical identity abstractly imputed to it by reflection, along with the physical resemblance which reflection imputes to the series which it relates, express only the statistical effect of its functioning on the system as a whole. In other words, these express only the manner in which it conceals itself under its own effects,

¹²⁷Jacques Derrida, "Différance," in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 1-27. On the notion of the "supplement," see "...That Dangerous Supplement...." in Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 144-164.

¹²⁸On strange attractors, see Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Entre le temps et l'éternité (Paris: Flammarion, 1992), chapter 4; and James Gleik, Chaos: Making a New Science (London: Sphere, 1988).

because of the way it is perpetually displaced within itself, and is perpetually disguised in the series."¹²⁹

This leads us to a third criteria: singularities which are extended into heterogeneous series form a system which is neither stable nor unstable but metastable, endowed with a potential energy in which the differences between the series are distributed. Gilbert Simondon has shown that individuation always presupposes such a prior metastable state, that is, the existence of a "disparateness" between at least two orders of magnitude or two scales of heterogeneous reality between which potentials are distributed.¹³⁰ Remarkable points or singularities (as opposed to ordinary points) are defined precisely by the existence and distribution of such potentials. The problematic field is defined by the distance between two heterogeneous orders, and the act of individuation emerges like the act of solving such a problem. This state of affairs, Deleuze suggests, receives an adequate expression in certain physical concepts: there is a coupling between heterogeneous series, from which is derived an internal resonance within the system, and from which is in turn derived a forced movement the amplitude of which exceeds that of the basic series themselves.¹³¹

¹²⁹Difference and Repetition, p. 120.

¹³⁰Gilbert Simondon, L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964). Deleuze notes, however, that Simondon maintains as a condition of this disparateness the requirement of resemblance between the series; see Difference and Repetition, p. 318. See also Steven Rose, The Conscious Brain (New York: Norton, 1976), appendix I, who discusses the role of such potentials in neurobiology.

¹³¹Difference and Repetition, p. 117.

§ 13. Conclusion: Deleuzian Ideas. This double set of components simply serve to outline the basic criteria by which Deleuze defines an Idea. Let us summarize some of the essential points. First, the components of the Idea do not form a list of categories or universals, but determine the state of a multiplicity that is in constant variation, so that in each case we must ask: What are the genetic elements of a given domain? What distribution of singularities does it imply? What are the synthetic relations established between series? What are the paths taken in the actualization of the idea? Second, whereas the possible was defined in terms of the two processes of resemblance and limitation, virtual Ideas are defined in terms of the two processes of difference and actualization, of divergence and creation. It is difference that is primary in the process of actualization: the difference between the elements of the Idea, but also the difference between the virtual from which we begin and the actual at which we arrive.¹³² Third, spatio-temporal qualities do not resemble the differential relations they incarnate, any more than the singularities resemble the organized extensity that actualizes them: there is an absolute non-resemblance between the condition and what it conditions. Fourth, an Idea is not a condition of possible experience but the genetic element of real experience, since the "conditions" it establishes are no larger than what they condition, and are perfectly filled in each instance (the conditions are determined along with what they condition). Fifth, the time of this genesis does not go from one actual term to another, but

¹³²See Bergsonism, p. 97: "The characteristic of virtuality is to exist in such a way that it is actualized by being differentiated and is forced to differentiate itself, to create its lines of actualization, in order to be actualized" (we have changed the spelling of "differentiation" to "differenciation" in order to accord with the distinction Deleuze later makes in Difference and Repetition).

from the virtual to its actualization: it is a genesis without dynamism, a static genesis. Finally, the elements, relations, and singularities of an Idea are never exhausted by their actualization, since they possess a potentiality or metastability that perpetually exceeds their effectuation in a given state of things.

For Deleuze, then, Ideas are not models one uses to distinguish between differences, as they are in Plato. Nor are they regulative notions that serve to unify and totalize the different moves undertaken by the understanding in field of knowledge, as in Kant.¹³³ They are differential and problematic multiplicities whose elements, relations, and singularities are incarnated in actual relationships and forms. They are not transcendent models one aspires to imitate, nor are they ideals one aspires to approach. They are genetic structures that engender thinking, that give rise to thought. "The Idea is not the element of knowledge, but that of an infinite 'learning'.... Representation and knowledge are modeled entirely on propositions of consciousness which designate cases of solution... [but] learning evolves entirely in the comprehension of problems as such...."¹³⁴

¹³³See The Logic of Sense, pp. 175-176: "It is true that the form of the self ordinarily guarantees the connection of a series, that the form of the world guaranteed the convergence of continuous series which can be extended; and that the form of God, as Kant had clearly seen, guarantees disjunction in its exclusive or limitative sense. But when disjunction accedes to the principle which gives to it a synthetic and affirmative value, the self, the world, and God share in a common death to the advantage of divergent series as such....The divergence of the affirmed series forms a 'chaosmos' and no longer a world; the aleatory point that traverses them forms a counter-self and no longer a self; disjunction posed as a synthesis exchanges its theological principle for a diabolic principle....The Grand Canyon of the world, the "crack" of the self, and the dismemberment of God."

¹³⁴Difference and Repetition, p. 192.

CHAPTER TWO

AESTHETICS: THE THEORY OF SENSATION

§ 1. Introduction. Aesthetics since Kant has been haunted by a seemingly irretractable dualism. On the one hand, aesthetics designates the theory of sensibility as the form of possible experience; on the other hand, it designates the theory of art as a reflection on real experience. The first is the objective element of sensation, which is conditioned by the a priori forms of space and time (the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the Critique of Pure Reason): the second is the subjective element of sensation, which is expressed in the feeling of pleasure and pain (the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" in the Critique of Judgment). Gilles Deleuze has argued that these two aspects of the theory of sensation (aesthetics) can be reunited only at the price of recasting the transcendental project as formulated by Kant, pushing it in the direction of what Deleuze calls a "transcendental empiricism." The conditions of experience in general must become conditions of real experience, in which case the work of art would truly appear as experimentation: the principles of sensation would at the same time constitute the principles of composition of the work of art; and conversely, it would be the structure of the work of art that reveals these conditions.¹

¹For Deleuze's formulations of the aesthetic problem, see Difference and Repetition, pp. 56-57, 68, and The Logic of Sense, p. 260. For his early formulations of the notion of a "transcendental empiricism," see Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 51-52, and "La conception de la différence chez Bergson," in Études bergsoniennes 4 (1956), p. 85.

This chapter examines the means by which Deleuze attempts to overcome this duality in aesthetics, following this single thread through the network of his thought, even if in tracing this line we sacrifice a certain amount of detail in favor of a certain perspicuity. In the first part, we will see how Deleuze reformulates the "Transcendental Aesthetic" by locating the principles of sensibility in an intensive conception of space and an implicative conception of time, thereby attempting, as he puts it, to give a genetic account of real, and not merely possible, experience. (Given its importance for Deleuze, we consider the theory of time separately and in more detail in the second half of the chapter.) Our primary point of reference here will be Deleuze's 1968 thesis Difference and Repetition, which presents his philosophy in its most systematic form, though we will also have recourse to some of his earlier books (particularly his study of Proust), which provide more detailed analyses of topics taken up in the later work. Using Deleuze's book Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation as a case study, the second part will then show how these same principles are manifest in Bacon's paintings, and how works of art themselves constitute a profound exploration of this transcendental domain of sensation. In this way, I hope we can begin to make sense of Deleuze's claim that only a transcendental empiricism would allow us to reunite the structures of works of art with the conditions of real experience.

I. OVERCOMING THE KANTIAN DUALITY

A. The Theory of Sensation: "The Being of the Sensible"

We begin with the theory of sensibility, and Deleuze's claim that the conditions of the sensible must be found, not in the a priori forms of space and time, but in intensive relations of force. We will retrace Deleuze's line of argument by separating out four points of comparison between Kant and Deleuze, which bear on their respective views of (1) the nature of sensation (object versus sign); (2) the "images of thought" from which they are derived; (3) the doctrine of the faculties they entail; and finally (4) the transcendental principles that condition them.

§ 2. Object versus Sign. Deleuze frequently begins his discussions of aesthetics by referring to a passage in the Republic where Plato distinguishes between two types of sensations: those that leave the mind tranquil and inactive, and those that force it to think. The first are objects of recognition ("This is a finger"), for which sensation is a more or less adequate judge. "In these cases," writes Plato, "a man is not compelled to ask of thought the question, 'What is a finger?' for the sight never intimates to the mind that a finger is other than a finger.... There is nothing here which invites or excites intelligence."² Deleuze defines recognition, in Kantian terms, as the harmonious exercise of our faculties on an object that is supposedly identical for each of these faculties: it is

²Plato, Republic, VII, 523b. Deleuze refers to this text in Difference and Repetition, pp. 138-142, 236; Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 108, 210 (note 33); Proust and Signs, pp. 96, 166.

the same object that can be seen, remembered, imagined, conceived, and so on.³ To be sure, each faculty (perception, imagination, memory, understanding) has its own particular given, and its own way of acting upon the given. We recognize an object, however, when one faculty locates its given as identical to that of another, or more precisely, when all the faculties together relate their given and relate themselves to a form of identity in the object. Recognition consequently finds its correlate in the ideal of common sense, which is defined by Kant, not as a special "sense" or a particular empirical faculty, but by the supposed identity of the subject that functions as the foundation of our faculties, as the principle that unites them in this harmonious accord. These are two primary poles of what Deleuze terms the "dogmatic" image of thought, and which constitutes one of the main objects of his critique: the subjective identity of the self and its faculties (common sense), and the objective identity of the thing to which these faculties refer (recognition). Thus in Kant, the "object in general" or "object = x" is the objective correlate of the "I think" or the unity of consciousness.⁴

But there also exists a second kind of sensation in the world, continues Plato, sensations that force us to think, that give rise to thought. These are what Deleuze terms "signs" or "signals," which are no longer objects of recognition, but objects of a fundamental encounter. More precisely, they are no longer even recognizable as objects,

³See, for example, Descartes, Meditations, II: "It is the same wax which I see, which I touch, which I picture in my imagination, in short the same wax which I thought it to be from the start...." (The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984], p. 21). Difference and Repetition, p. 133: "Such is the meaning of the cogito as beginning, it expresses the unity of all the faculties in the subject."

⁴Kant's Critical Philosophy, p. 15.

but rather refer to sensible qualities or relations that are caught up in an unlimited becoming, a perpetual movement of contraries. A finger is never anything but a finger; but a large finger can at the same time be said to be small in relation to a third; a given temperature can be considered to be both hot and cold; a given surface can simultaneously exhibit the qualities of softness and hardness, and so on.⁵ Recognition measures and limits these qualities by relating them to an object, but in themselves, these "simultaneously opposed sensations," says Plato, perplex the soul, they force it to think because they demand "further inquiry." Rather than a voluntary and harmonious accord, the faculties here enter into an involuntary discord, a discord that lies at the base of Plato's model of education: sensibility compels the intelligence to distinguish the large and the small from the sensible appearances which confuse them, which in turn compels the memory to begin to remember the intelligible Forms.

It is this second aspect of sensation, in Deleuze's view, that constitutes the basis for any possible aesthetic and forms the starting point of his own discussions.⁶ Deleuze

⁵This notion of becoming is the theme of The Logic of Sense, chapter 1. For Plato's discussions, see Republic, 524d; Philebus, 24d; Parmenides 154-155; Theaetetus, 152-155.

⁶Phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty and Henri Maldiney, for example, have shown that "sense experience" [le sentir] must be analyzed, not only insofar as it relates sensible qualities to an identifiable object (the figurative moment), but insofar as each quality or sign constitutes a field that stands on its own without ceasing to interfere with others (the "pathic" moment). See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), pp. 207-242; and Henri Maldiney, Regard Parole Space (Lausanne: Éditions l'Age d'Homme, 1973), pp. 124-208. "What phenomenology sets up as a norm," comments Deleuze, "is 'natural perception' and its conditions. These conditions are existential coordinates which define an 'anchoring' of the perceiving subject in the world, a Being-in-the World, an opening to the world which will be expressed in the famous 'all consciousness is consciousness of something...'" (The Movement-Image, p. 57). It is this aspect of sensation Kant short-circuits: Deleuze will nonetheless break with the phenomenological model: cf. Difference and Repetition, p. 179.

develops his most complete analysis of such signs, however, not in direct relation to Plato, but through a reading of Proust's great novel, In Search of Lost Time.⁷ Yet the relation between the two immediately becomes evident: Deleuze interprets Proust's novel as a vast apprenticeship to sensations of this second type, an experimentation in reminiscences and essences. Rather than working on the novel he has announced, the narrator finds himself wasting time deciphering a whole host of such provocative signs: the empty and frivolous signs of the social world, the gestures, intonations, and glances of others that demand his unceasing attention as so many signs of status; the deceptive and often painful signs of love, through which he receives signals of preference or rejection from the unknown worlds enveloped in his lovers; the sensuous signs of the material world, which in turn become signs of completely different objects, as the flavor of the madeleine evokes Combray, or the uneven cobblestones call up the memory of Venice; and most importantly, the essential signs of art, which come to transform all the others. The Search begins in a situation similar to that described by Lévi-Strauss: "the universe signified long before people began to know what it signified."⁸ In Proust, however, these signs no longer indicate merely contrary qualities, but testify to a much more complex network of various implicated orders of signs, which will in turn mobilize both memory

⁷We follow Richard Howard in rendering the title of A la Recherche du temps perdu literally as In Search of Lost Time rather than utilizing the Shakespeare-derived title of the standard English translation, Remembrance of Things Past. The latter title, while more "literary," effaces the idea of a search or apprenticeship, and implies an erroneous interpretation of Proust's project: lost time is never regained through a voluntary recall of the past.

⁸Claude Lévi-Strauss, Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss, trans. Felicity Baker (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), p. 61.

and intelligence. The narrator will slowly discover that, when he thought he was wasting his time, he was in fact already embarked on an intellectual apprenticeship to these signs, a search for their meaning, the revelation of their truth.

§ 3. The Image of Thought. This distinction between the recognized object and the encountered sign, however, corresponds in turn to a more general distinction between two different images of thought. Images of thought, says Deleuze, are presuppositions of philosophy, a pre-philosophic "system of coordinates, dynamisms, orientations: what it means to think, 'to orient oneself in thought.'"⁹ The study of images of thought (noology) is a prolegomena to philosophy, and Deleuze has pursued it throughout his works. The "dogmatic" image of thought, he suggests, is one that conceives of thinking as the voluntary and natural exercise of a faculty: that presumes in us a natural love or desire for the truth, a philia; that assumes we are diverted from the truth by forces that are foreign to it: and thus that all we need to think truthfully is a "method" that will ward off error and dispel illusion.¹⁰ Proust will set all the power of signs against this more or less Greek image of thought: thinking is never the product of a prior disposition, but rather the result of forces that act upon thought from the outside, of encounters that do violence to us, that

⁹Negotiations, p. 148.

¹⁰For elaboration of these formulas, see Nietzsche and Philosophy, "New Image of Thought," pp. 103-110; Proust and Signs, "The Image of Thought," pp. 159-167; and Difference and Repetition, chapter 4, "The Image of Thought," pp. 129-167. Deleuze pursues these "noological" themes further in The Logic of Sense, Series 18, "Of the Three Images of Philosophers," pp. 127-133 (height, depth, and surface as coordinates of thought), and in A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 3-25 (the tree and the rhizome as images of thought), pp. 374-380 (the State-form versus "nomad" thought), and 474-500 (the smooth and the striated). For a summary discussion, see Negotiations, pp. 202-205.

force us to think.¹¹ Thinking is not innate, but must be engendered, and what engenders thought is always an encounter, a confrontation with a sign. Philosophy consequently must not be content to determine the conditions of possible experience, but must penetrate to the conditions of real experience: transcendental principles that are not merely conditioning in relation to objects, but principles that are truly genetic and productive.

Deleuze emphasizes the fact that Proust counterposes the traditional Greek pairing of friendship and philosophy against more obscure pairing formed by love and art. Friends are like well disposed minds who agree on the meaning of words and things, and who communicate with each other voluntarily in conversation under the effect of a mutual good will. But Deleuze here applies Nietzsche's method of "dramatization": Who is it that in fact searches for the truth?¹² It is not the friend, exercising a natural desire for truth, but the jealous man, under the pressure of his lover's lies, and the anguish they inflict upon him: jealousy appears in Proust not as a disease of love, but as its truth, its finality, and all love is "a dispute over evidence," "a delirium of signs."¹³ We search for

¹¹If Antonin Artaud in particular, and the question of schizophrenia in general, play an important role in Deleuze's thinking, it is because Artaud's case presents, in its clearest form, the fact that what thought is forced to think is its own central breakdown, its own impotence, that it lives solely by its incapacity to take on form, developing in a pure milieu of exteriority as a function of singularities impossible to universalize, of circumstances impossible to interiorize. See Antonin Artaud, "Correspondence with Jacques Rivière," in Antonin Artaud: Selected Writings, ed. Susan Sontag (New York: Farrar Straus, Giroux, 1976), pp. 31-49, and Deleuze's commentary in Difference and Repetition, pp. 146-148, and A Thousand Plateaus, p. 328.

¹²Nietzsche's method "dramatizes" thought by replacing the Platonic form of the question "What is...?" ("What is truth?") with the question "Which one is...?" ("Who is it that asks 'What is truth'? What does the one that asks 'What is truth?' really want?"). Deleuze analyses this method in Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 75-79, 94-97.

¹³Proust and Signs, pp. 117, 122.

truth, we begin to think. only when compelled to do so, when we undergo a violence that impels us to such a search, that wrests us from our natural stupor: what calls for thought. says Heidegger, is the perpetual fact that "we are not yet thinking."¹⁴ And what compels us to think can never be known in advance, there is no "method" that can determine how one learns. Through what encounters does one decide to become a philosopher?¹⁵ "Who knows how a schoolboy suddenly becomes 'good at Latin,' which signs (if need be, those of love or even inadmissible ones) have served in his apprenticeship? We never learn from the dictionaries our teachers or our parents lend us...."¹⁶

It is precisely the fortuitousness or contingency of the encounter that guarantees the necessity of what it forces us to think. Deleuze implicitly rejects philosophies that take as their model dialogue, conversation, communication, or consensus. Conversation with a profound and intelligent friend may have immense value in itself, but we will derive little from it if we ourselves have not been able to reach truth by other paths. Proust says of intellectuals that "the mediocre woman one was amazed to find them loving, enriched their universe much more than any intelligent woman could have done."¹⁷ Beyond any apparent misogyny, Proust's point is that such a person, once they

¹⁴Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glann Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 28. Heidegger nonetheless retains the theme of a desire or philia, and substitutes metaphors of the gift for those of violence. See Deleuze's criticisms in Différence et répétition, p. 188n.

¹⁵Michèle LeDoeuff has explored the significance of the "theoretico-amorous" transference that often initiates one's entry into philosophy, in her essay "Long Hair, Short Ideas," in The Philosophical Imaginary (London: Athlone Press, 1989), esp. pp. 104-105.

¹⁶Proust and Signs, p. 22.

¹⁷Quoted in Proust and Signs, p. 21. On communication, see Deleuze's comments in What is Philosophy?, pp. 144-150.

are loved, can be richer in signs than the most profound intelligence. Even a mediocre love. Proust explains, can often be worth more than a great friendship, for although our lover may "communicate" nothing explicit to us, he or she unceasingly produces signs from the unknown world they implicate within themselves, and which must continually be deciphered and explicated by the lover. Similarly, a philosophic work, with all its method and good will, may be nothing compared with the pressures of a work of art, for what is enveloped in a sign is more profound than all explicit significations. Behind the distinction between the recognized object and the encountered sign, then, lies this more vast distinction between the dogmatic image of thought and the possibility of what Deleuze calls a thought "without image."¹⁸

§ 4. The Nature of Problems. What then is the nature of these encountered sensations or signs? In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze assigns them two primary characteristics. The first is that the sign "riots" the soul, renders it "perplexed," as if the encountered sign were the bearer of a problem.¹⁹ What does it mean to "bear" or "pose" a problem? What philosophy calls "dialectics," in general, is the art of posing problems and questions, whereas "analytics" provides a method that gives us the means to solve a problem or respond to a question. The dogmatic image of thought tends to conceive of the activity of thought as the search for solutions to problems. This prejudice has

¹⁸See Difference and Repetition, p. 167, where Deleuze summarizes the dogmatic image of thought in eight postulates.

¹⁹Difference and Repetition, pp. 139-140. On the necessity of such "intercessors" in thought, see "Mediators," in Negotiations, pp. 121-134.

pedagogical roots: it is the school teacher who poses problems, the pupil's task being to discover the correct solution. The problem is an obstacle, a subjective state, which the understanding has to overcome on its way to finding a solution: the point of departure is found in a "hypothesis" or a proposition of consciousness affected by a coefficient of uncertainty, while the point of arrival is found in apodictic principle which determines the solution to the problem and the truth of the hypothesis. What the notions of "truth" and "falsity" serve to qualify are precisely these responses or solutions. Now Deleuze argues that while this procedure in fact approximates the real movement of thought, in principle it at the same time betrays and distorts the transcendental conditions of this movement, rendering unrecognizable what it approximates.

For everyone "recognizes" that problems are more important than their solutions: that problems are not ready-made but must themselves be constituted and constructed (hence the scandal when a "false" problem is set in a scientific examination): that a solution always has the truth it merits depending on the problem to which it responds; and that a problem always finds the solution(s) it merits in proportion to its own truth or falsity, that is, according to the conditions that determine it as a problem. But while it is relatively easy to define the true and the false in relation to solutions whose problems have already stated, it is much more difficult to say what the true and the false consist of when they are applied directly to problems themselves. This is where philosophers fall into circular arguments: aware of the need to take the test of the true and the false beyond solutions into problems themselves, they are content to define the truth or falsity of a problem by the possibility or impossibility of its being solved. As a result, problems and

questions are conceived in the image of the propositions that serve (or can serve) as their solutions and responses; they are seen to be provisional and empirical conditions, subjective categories that indicate the imperfection of our method, but which disappear in the result as we acquire knowledge.

One can only talk seriously of "true and false problems," argues Deleuze, in terms of a production of the true and false by means of problems. A problem must be understood as an objective category of knowledge, having a completely determined "objectivity" of its own, out of which truth is produced or engendered.²⁰ Consider the following (somewhat artificial) example, which Deleuze mentions in passing in Difference and Repetition. There is a famous test in psychology in which a monkey is made to find his next meal among boxes of different colors, only one of which (say, the red one) contains food: under the constraint of a sensation of hunger, the monkey searches for the solution to this problem: in time, the number of "errors" committed by the monkey diminishes, until finally the happy moment is reached when the monkey-philosopher reaches the "truth," has a "knowledge" of the solution, a "method," and is able to choose the red box in each experiment.²¹ Now if we call "knowledge" the rule of solutions that the monkey calmly possesses at the end of this experiment, we must use the term "learning" to designate those acts that are operative, prior to knowledge, when the monkey is confronted with a sign, which reveals and actualizes the "objectivity" of a

²⁰The Logic of Sense, p. 54.

²¹Difference and Repetition, p. 214.

problem. The discontinuity among answers is engendered on the basis of an ideal apprenticeship to the problem; the truth and falsity of the solutions are distributed according to what one understands of the problem; and the final truth, once it is obtained, emerges as the limit of a problem that is completely determined and entirely understood.

This is why Deleuze says that the transcendental element of thought must be sought, not at the level of "truth" or "falsity," which apply to solutions, but at the level of the "problematic," out of which truth and falsity are themselves engendered. Put differently, it is the process of "learning" (apprenticeship), and not the end result of "knowledge," from which the transcendental structures of thought must be drawn.

Problems are objective transcendental structures, which means that problems exist not only in our heads, but occur here and there in the production of an actual historical world. Learning designates the subjective processes carried out when one is confronted with the objectivity of a problem (Idea), through which one enters into the elements, relations, and singularities constitutive of the problem, whereas knowledge merely designates the calm possession of a "method" enabling solutions. If problems are related to signs, it is precisely because it is the encounter with a sign that provokes the involuntary exploration of a problematic field.

§ 5. A Disjunctive Theory of the Faculties. The second characteristic of the sign is that it is something that can only be felt or sensed [ce qui ne peut être que senti]. As Francis Bacon says, it acts directly on the nervous system, rather than passing through the

detour of the brain.²² It is precisely this characteristic that opposes the encountered sign to the recognized object: the latter can not only be felt, but can also be remembered, imagined, conceived, and so on, and thus assumes the accord of the faculties that Deleuze, following Kant, calls "common sense." By taking the encountered sign as the primary element of sensation, then, Deleuze is pointing, subjectively, to a use of the faculties freed from the ideal of common sense and, objectively, to a science of the sensible freed from the model of recognition.

Now Kant himself had already hinted at the former possibility in the Critique of Judgment where, for the first and only time, he considered a faculty freed from the form of common sense, namely, the faculty of the imagination. Up to that point, Kant had been content to create as many common senses as there were natural interests of reasonable thought (knowledge, morality, reflection), common senses which differed according to the conditions of what was to be recognized (object of knowledge, moral value, aesthetic effect...),²³ In the Critique of Pure Reason, for example, the faculties are made to enter into a harmonious accord in the speculative interest, in which the understanding legislates over and determines the function of the other faculties ("logical common sense"): in the

²²Francis Bacon, The Brutality of Fact: Interviews with David Sylvester (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975), p. 18.

²³See the critique leveled against Kantianism in Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 89-90: "Kant merely pushed a very old conception of critique to the limit, a conception which saw critique as a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to knowledge and truth, but not on knowledge and truth themselves; a force which should be brought to bear on claims to morality, but not on morality itself. Thus total critique turns into a politics of compromise: even before the battle the spheres of influence have already been shared out. Three ideal are distinguished: what can I know? what should I do? what can I hope for? Limits are drawn to each one, misuses and trespasses are denounced, but the uncritical character of each ideal remains at the heart of Kantianism like the work in the fruit: true knowledge, true morality, and true religion. What Kant still calls--in his own terms--a fact: the fact of morality, the fact of knowledge."

Critique of Practical Reason, the faculties enter into a different accord under the legislation of reason in the practical interest ("moral common sense"); and even in the "Analytic of the Beautiful" of the Critique of Judgment, the reflective imagination is still said to be under the "aesthetic common sense."²⁴

But the third Critique opened up the possibility of a new domain. In the "Analytic of the Sublime," the faculty of the imagination is forced to confront its own limit, its own maximum: faced with an immense object (the desert, a mountain, a pyramid) or a powerful object (a storm at sea, an erupting volcano), the imagination strives to comprehend these sensations in their totality, but is unable to do so. It reaches the limits of its power, and finds itself reduced to impotency. This failure gives rise to a pain, a cleavage in the subject between what can be imagined and what can be thought, between the imagination and reason. But what pushes the imagination to this limit, what forces it to attempt to unite the immensity of the sensible world into a whole, is nothing other than the faculty of reason: absolute immensity or power are Ideas of reason, Ideas that can be thought but cannot be known or imagined, and which are therefore accessible only to the faculty of reason. The sublime thus presents us with a dissension, a "discordant accord," between the demands of reason and the power of the imagination. But this painful admission also gives rise to a pleasure: in confronting its own limit, the imagination at the same time goes beyond this limit, albeit in a negative way, by representing to itself the inaccessibility of this rational Idea. It presents to itself the fact that the unrepresentable

²⁴For the Kantian theory of common sense, see Critique of Judgment, §18-22, §40.

exists, and that it exists in sensible nature.²⁵ From the empirical point of view, this limit is inaccessible and unimaginable; but from the transcendental point of view, it is that which can only be imagined, that which is accessible only to the imagination in its transcendental exercise.

The lesson of the "Analytic of the Sublime," in Deleuze's reading, is that it discovers this discordant accord as the condition of possibility for the harmonious accords of the faculties that Kant evoked in the first two critiques, an accord that is not derived from preexistent external "facts" (the "fact" of knowledge, the "fact" of morality), but is engendered internally in the subject. It indicates the possibility of a disjunctive use of the faculties: rather than having all the faculties harmoniously united in an act of recognition, each faculty is made to confront its own differential limit, and is pushed to its involuntary and "transcendental" exercise, an exercise in which something is communicated violently from one faculty to another, but does not form a common sense.²⁶ Such is the image of thought hinted at by Proust and Plato, each in their own way: "a sensibility open to the violence of signs, a remembering soul which interprets them and discovers their meaning, an intelligent thought which discerns essence."²⁷

²⁵"For though the imagination, no doubt, finds nothing beyond the sensible world to which it can lay hold, still this thrusting aside of the sensible barriers gives it a feeling of being unbounded; and that removal is thus a presentation of the infinite. As such it can never be anything more than a negative presentation--but it still expands the soul." Kant, Critique of Judgment, §29, General Remark.

²⁶Difference and Repetition, p. 146.

²⁷Proust and Signs, p. 96; cf. pp. 164-165.

Deleuze's aim is not to establish a revived doctrine of the faculties, but simply to indicate the nature of its demands with regard to Kant's transcendental project. What he calls a "sign" constitutes the limit of the faculty of sensibility (and each faculty in its turn must confront its own limit). As Deleuze puts it, the sign is not a sensible being, nor even a purely qualitative being (aistheton), but the being of the sensible (aistheteon).²⁸ From the empirical point of view, the sign, in and of itself, is unsensible, not in a contingent way, as if it were too small or too distant to be grasped by our senses, but in an essential way, namely, from the point of view of recognition and common sense, in which sensibility can only grasp what can also be grasped by the other faculties. But from the transcendental point of view, the sign is what can only be felt or sensed, that which is accessible only to the faculty of sensibility in its transcendental exercise. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze will reserve the term "Idea" to designate, not pure cogitanda, but precisely the transcendental limit-objects or problematic fields of each faculty.²⁹

§ 6. The "Idea" of Sensibility. We are now in a position, finally, to examine the specifics of Deleuze's version of the "Transcendental Aesthetic." Deleuze's project is a science of the sensible freed from the model of recognition, for which the sign is the limit of sensibility, insofar as it opens up the transcendental problematic field (Idea) constitutive of sensibility. What is this problematic field? Already in 1790, Salomon

²⁸Difference and Repetition, pp. 139-140, 236-237.

²⁹Difference and Repetition, p. 190. On Deleuze's formulation of the distinction between the empirical and the transcendental, see p. 310, and Masochism, p. 112.

Maïmon, one of the first post-Kantians to return to Leibniz, had proposed an essential revision of Kant on this point.³⁰ Leibniz argued that a conscious perception must be related, not to a recognizable object situated in space and time, but to the minute and unconscious perceptions of which it is composed. I apprehend the noise of the sea or the murmur of a group of people, for instance, but not the sound of each wave or the voice of each person that compose them. These unconscious "molecular" perceptions are related to conscious "molar" perceptions, not as parts to a whole, but as what is ordinary to what is noticeable or remarkable.³¹ A conscious perception, in other words, is produced when at least two of these heterogeneous elements enter into a differential relation that determines a singularity.³² Consider, for example, the color green: yellow and blue can

³⁰Salomon Maïmon, Versuch über die transzendental philosophie (Berlin: Christian Vos, 1790). For commentary, see above all Martial Guérout, La philosophie transcendente de Salomon Maïmon (Paris: Alcan, 1929), esp. pp. 55ff. and 76ff.; and Sylvain Zac, Salomon Maïmon: Critique de Kant (Paris: Cerf, 1988), esp. chapter 6.

³¹Leibniz, New Essays, I, §18: "Anything which is noticeable must be made up of parts which are not." For Leibniz's theory of perception, see Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, §33: Consideration of the Doctrine of a Universal Mind, §14; Monadology, §20-25; Principles of Nature and Grace, §13.

³²The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, p. 88; Difference and Repetition, pp. 173-174. The nature of the differential relation can be made clear by comparing three types of relation distinguished in mathematics. A first type is established between elements that are themselves independent or autonomous, such as $3 + 2$ or $2/3$. The elements are real, and these relations themselves must be said to be real. A second type, for example $x^2 + y^2 - R^2 = 0$ (the algebraic equation for the circle), is established between terms whose value is unspecified, but which nevertheless must in each case have a determined value. Such relations can be called imaginary. But the third type of relation is established between elements that themselves have no determined value, but that nevertheless are determined reciprocally in the relation: thus $ydy + xdx = 0$ (the universal of the circumference or the corresponding function), or $dy/dx = -x/y$ (the expression of a curve and its trigonometric tangent). These are differential relations. The elements of these relations are undetermined, being neither real nor imaginary: dy is completely undetermined in relation to y , dx is completely undetermined in relation to x . Yet they are perfectly determinable in the differential relation: the terms themselves do not exist apart from the differential relation into which they enter and by which they are reciprocally determined. This differential relation, in turn, determines a singular point, and it is the set of these points that determines the topological space of a given structure (a triangle, for example, has three singular points, while curves and figures are derived from more complex distributions).

be perceived, but if their perception vanishes by becoming small, they enter into a differential relation ($db/dy = G$) that determines the color green: in turn, yellow or blue, each on its own account, may be determined by the differential relation of two colors we cannot detect ($dy/dx = Y$). Or consider the noise of the sea: at least two waves must be minutely perceived as nascent and heterogeneous in order to enter into a relation capable of determining a third, which "excels" over the others and becomes conscious. Every conscious sensation is therefore a threshold. Small perceptions constitute the obscure dust of the world, its dark background: these minute perceptions are not parts of conscious perception, but its genetic elements, or what Maimon called the "differentials of consciousness." It is the differential relations between these infinitely small perceptions which draw them into clarity, which "actualize" a clear perception (green) out of certain obscure, evanescent perceptions (yellow and blue). The differential calculus thus functions in Leibniz as the psychic mechanism of perception, an automatism that at once plunges into the obscure and determines the clear.³³

What Maimon derives from this Leibnizian argument is a transcendental method of genesis, rather than one of simple conditioning: a clear sensation (sign) emerges from obscurity by a genetic process. If Kant remained bound to the dogmatic image of thought, it is because he considered the sensible to be a quality related to an object in space and time (the unknown thing-in-itself) which sensibility intuited passively, and consequently he defined the transcendental form of space, as outer sense, by its geometric

³³For Deleuze's interpretation of Leibniz's theory of perception, see The Fold, chapter 7, "Perception in the Folds," pp. 88-99, from which the above examples are taken.

extension (pure intuition of objects or bodies). And if concepts in turn could be applied to intuitions, if a harmony was possible between the understanding and sensibility, it was only through the mysterious intermediary of the "schematism" of the imagination, which alone makes spatio-temporal relations correspond to the logical relations of the concept.³⁴

The Kantian duality between concept and intuition, in short, leaves us with a purely external relation between the determinable (space as a pure given) and the determination (the concept as thought). The fact that a harmony can be introduced into the doctrine of the faculties only through the intermediary of the schematism merely confirms the "extrinsicism" of Kant's project, and the reduction of the transcendental instance to a simple conditioning.

Beyond this external method of conditioning, Maimon proposed an internal method of genesis, in which the relation between the determinable and the determination is internalized. Far from perception presupposing an object capable of affecting us, and the conditions under which we would be affectable, it is the reciprocal determination of differentials (dx/dy) that entails both the complete determination of the object as perception, and the determinability of space-time as conditions. A triple genesis follows from this: space-time ceases to be a pure given in order to become the totality or nexus of differential relations in the subject (genesis of space and time); the object ceases to be an empirical given in order to become the product of these relations in conscious perception

³⁴Kant himself admitted that this schematizing power of the imagination was "blind." "an art concealed in the depths of the human soul," an activity "nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover" (Critique of Pure Reason, A78/B103, A141/B180-181). It is for this reason that Heidegger took the imagination as the focal point of his reading of Kant, in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962).

(genesis of the real); and sensibility ceases to be a mere receptivity of ready-made sensations in order to become the effect of passive synthesis which themselves determine the possibility of receiving sensations (genesis of the sensible).³⁵

It is precisely such a system of connections or differential relations between genetic elements that Deleuze terms a "problematic" or a dialectical Idea. In Deleuze, an Idea appears as a concrete universal that stands opposed to the Kantian concepts of the understanding. In an early article on Bergson, Deleuze gave a particularly helpful example of this distinction. In La Pensée et le Mouvant, Bergson had shown that there are two ways of determining what the spectrum of "colors" have in common.³⁶ Either one can extract from particular colors an abstract and general idea of color ("by removing from the red that which makes it red, from the blue what makes it blue, from the green what makes it green"); or one can make all these colors "pass through a convergent lens, bringing them to a single point," in which case a "pure white light" is obtained that "makes the differences between the shades stand out."³⁷ The former case defines a single generic "concept" with a plurality of objects: the relation between concept and object is one of subsumption; and the state of difference remains exterior to the thing. The second case, on the contrary, defines a differential Idea in the Deleuzian sense: the different

³⁵The Fold, p. 89; cf. p. 93 (translation modified): "Every perception is hallucinatory, because perception has no object. Conscious perception has no object, and does not even refer to a physical mechanism that might explain it from without: it refers solely to the exclusive psychical mechanism of differential relations between the small perceptions that compose it."

³⁶Deleuze, "La Conception de la différence chez Bergson," in Etudes bergsoniennes 4 (1956): 77-112.

³⁷Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind, tr. by Mabelle L. Andison (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1965), p. 225.

colors are no longer objects under a concept, but constitute an order of mixture in coexistence and succession within the Idea; the relation between the Idea and a given color is not one of subsumption, but one of actualization and differentiation: and the state of difference between the concept and the object is internalized in the Idea itself, so that the concept itself has become the object.³⁸ White light is still a universal, but a concrete universal, and not a genus or generality. The Idea of color is thus like white light, which 'perplexes'³⁹ within itself the genetic elements and relations of all the colors, but which is actualized in the diverse colors and their respective spaces. Similarly, the Idea of sound could be conceived of as a white noise,⁴⁰ just as there is also a white society or a white

³⁸The Logic of Sense, p. 136: "To have a color is not more general than to be green, because it is only this color, and this green which is this nuance, and is related to the individual subject. This rose is not red without having the redness of this rose. This red is not a color without having the redness of this rose". One might note in passing the retrieval of Goethe's theory of color (vis-à-vis Newton's) in contemporary scientific theories of color: redness is no longer perceived as a bandwidth of light but as a singularity within a chaotic universe, whose boundaries are not always easy to describe. See James Gleik, Chaos: Making a New Science (London: Sphere, 1988), pp. 164-166.

³⁹Like the word "problem," Deleuze uses the word "perplexion" to signify, not a coefficient of doubt, hesitation, or astonishment, but the multiple and virtual state of Ideas. Indeed, Deleuze adopts a number of neoplatonic notions to indicate the structure of Ideas: perplication, complication, implication, explication, and replication. "Certain neoplatonists used a profound word to designate the original state which precedes any development, any deployment, any 'explication': complication, which envelops the many in the One and affirms the unity of the multiple. Eternity did not seem to them the absence of change, nor even the extension of a limitless existence, but the complicated state of time itself (uno ictu mutationes tuas complectitur). The Word, omnia complicans, and containing all the essences, was defined as the supreme complication, the complication of contraries, the unstable opposition. From this they derived the notion of an essentially expressive universe, organized according to degrees of immanent complications and following an order of descending explications" (Proust and Signs, p. 45). Obviously Deleuze retains these terms only at the price of a reversal of the neoplatonic scheme and a rejection of the Christian simplificatio: see Difference and Repetition, pp. 280-281, and Logic of Sense, p. 345.

⁴⁰For a fuller analysis of the musical form along these lines (only hinted at by Deleuze), see Jean-François Lyotard, "Several Silences," in Driftworks, ed. by Roger McKeon (New York: Semiotext[e], 1984), pp. 99-110.

language, which contains in its virtuality all the phonemes and relations destined to be actualized in the diverse languages and in the remarkable parts of a same language.⁴¹

The Cartesian map of the clear-distinct-obscure-confused here receives a new meaning and an entirely new set of relations. The principle of common sense appeared in its highest form with Descartes' principle of the proportionality between the "clear and distinct": "an idea is all the more distinct the clearer it is, and clarity-distinctness constitutes the light which renders thought possible in the common exercise of all the faculties."⁴² Against this principle, Leibniz insisted that a clear idea is in itself confused, it is confused insofar as it is clear. The conscious perception of the noise of the sea, for example, is clear but confused (not distinct), because the small perceptions of which it is composed are not themselves clear, but confused: our perception, which comprehends the whole confusedly, only expresses clearly certain relations and certain elements as a function of our body, and the threshold of consciousness that it determines. And the small, unconscious perceptions are themselves distinct but obscure (not clear): distinct, insofar as all the drops of water remain distinct as the genetic elements of perception, with their differential relations, the variations of these relations, and the singular points that they determine: but obscure, insofar as they are not yet "distinguished" or actualized in a conscious perception, and can only be apprehended by thought, at best, in states close to those of sleep, stupor, swooning, death, amnesia, murmuring, intoxication.... The

⁴¹Difference and Repetition, pp. 203-205.

⁴²Difference and Repetition, p. 213.

principle of the clear and distinct is in this way broken into two irreducible values, which can never be reunited to constitute a natural light.⁴³ Every sensation, in short, is clear but confused, while the elements that determine them are necessarily distinct but obscure.

§ 7. The Concept of Intensity. Deleuze will complete this analysis by adding to it a notion derived from another post-Kantian, Hermann Cohen: what expresses these differential relations is necessarily an intensity, an intensive magnitude.⁴⁴ Kant himself, after having defined the form of sensibility as extended space, defined the matter of sensible intuitions as intensive magnitude: in the "Anticipations of Perception." Kant argued that although empirical sensations are given a posteriori, we can know a priori that they will have a certain magnitude or intensity, and that if they change they must do so along a continuum.⁴⁵ In Deleuze, on the contrary, what is extensive is the empirical quality of an object, but from the transcendental point of view, space as a pure intuition (spatium) is intensive quantity.

⁴³Difference and Repetition, pp. 212-214, 252-253.

⁴⁴See Hermann Cohen, Kants Theorie der Erfahrung, 2d ed (Dümmler, 1885), §428 ff., as well as Jules Vuillemin's commentary in L'héritage kantien et la révolution copernicienne (Paris: PUF, 1954), pp. 183-202.

⁴⁵See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929). "Anticipations of Perception": "Every sensation has a degree, that is, an intensive magnitude which can always be diminished [to the point where the intensity = 0]...Every color, as for instance red, has a degree which, however small it may be, is never the smallest; and so with heat, the moment of gravity, etc." (A169/B211). We can know a priori that an equal volume of extensive space can be filled with different intensive degrees of matter, and that between reality and negation (intensity = 0) there is a continuity of possible realities and of possible smaller perceptions (A174/B216).

This notion of intensity is one of the most important in Deleuze's thought, and has been subject to numerous misinterpretations. It played an important role in the physics and philosophy of the Middle Ages, though it was more or less forgotten in the privilege later given to extended qualities and the geometry of extension.⁴⁶ It was recovered in 19th-century energetics, since energy and its transformations could only be measured along a continuum, that is, in terms of its differences in intensity. But thermodynamics, as the science of the variations and conversions of energy, recovered the notion of intensity only to again place it under a certain suspicion. Difference in intensity was seen to be the sufficient reason of change only insofar as the change tended to negate the difference: intensity followed an objective direction through a series of irreversible states that passed, like an "arrow of time," from the more differentiated to the less differentiated, and finally to the undifferentiated (entropy). Thermodynamics, in short, was marked by a tendency to reduce quantitative differences, to equalize inequalities, and to uniformize the diverse.⁴⁷ This epistemological suspicion of the notion of intensity, argues Deleuze, derives from the fact that, in empirical experience, intensity (intensio) is

⁴⁶Duns Scotus, for instance, developed his theory of the modal distinction in response to the problem of intensities: Can a quality, without changing its formal reason or essence, be affected by various degrees or intensive variations? "Whiteness," he suggested, has various degrees of intensity, which are not added to whiteness as one thing to another thing (like an extrinsically added shape or figure), but are intrinsic determinations or internal differences of a whiteness that remains univocally the same under whatever modality it is considered. Cf. Étienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris: Vrin, 1929), pp. 53. In Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, Deleuze makes use of Scotus' modal distinction in his interpretation of individuation in Spinoza, which he sees as necessarily intensive.

⁴⁷See the short but important section in Nietzsche and Philosophy entitled "Nietzsche and Science," where Deleuze argues that Nietzsche's critique of science operates on three levels: "against logical identity, against mathematical equality, and against physical equilibrium. Against the three forms of the undifferentiated" (p. 45).

inseparable from a process of extension (extensio) which relates it to extended space (the extensum); under these conditions, intensity itself is subordinated to the qualities that fill extended space (primary physical qualities or qualitas, and secondary perceptible qualities or quales). We know intensities or forms of energy, in other words, only as already actualized, localized, and distributed in extended space.⁴⁸

Difference or intensity (difference of intensity) is therefore never given in itself.

"Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is given as diverse."⁴⁹

Intensity must therefore be understood, not as an empirical fact or scientific concept, but as a transcendental principle, as the being of the sensible. "What we call an empirical principle or law," writes Deleuze, "is first of all that which governs a particular domain or field: it is in this sense that we speak of an empirical principle or law....But there is another and quite distinct question, namely in virtue of what is a field governed by a principle: there must be a principle of another kind, a second-order principle, which accounts for the necessary compliance of the field with the empirical principle. It is this second-order principle that we call transcendental."⁵⁰ If the empirical law of reality is identification, the transcendental principle of all sensible phenomena is difference in intensity. Energy can therefore be defined either in terms of the extensive and qualified

⁴⁸This is why, as Deleuze shows, energetics defined a particular energy by the combination of two factors, one intensive and the other extensive: force and distance for linear energy, surface tension and surface area for surface energy, pressure and volume for volume energy, height and weight for gravitational energy, temperature and entropy for thermal energy, and so on. Deleuze develops the notion of intensity in detail in chapter four of Difference and Repetition; we here offer only a summary of Deleuze's theses, which deserve a more complete analysis.

⁴⁹Difference and Repetition, p. 222.

factors of extended space, in which case it refers to a partial system that is constant and uniform, and is reduced to the empirical identity of a constant; or it refers to energy in general or intensive quantity prior to its deployment in extensity or its development in qualities, in which case it refers to a transcendental principle of difference.⁵¹

This is why Deleuze insists that the object of aesthetics must be sought in the sign. The empirical exercise of the faculty of sensibility can grasp intensity only in the order of quality and extensity: "only transcendental inquiry can discover that intensity remains implicated in itself and continues to envelop difference at the very moment when it is reflected in the extensity and the quality that it creates."⁵² Every quality presupposes an difference in quantity (intensity), and it is only when an intensity reaches a given order or magnitude that the differential relations are organized in intuition, and sensation achieves the threshold of consciousness. But sensible intuition here constitutes a field of individuation that precedes the specification of extensive parts and qualities. Although experience always places us in the presence of intensities already developed in extension, already recovered by qualities, we must posit, precisely as the condition of sense experience, these pure intensities distributed in a spatium that preexists every quality and every extension.⁵³ In short, it is this notion of intensity that marks, for Deleuze, the limit

⁵⁰Masochism, p. 112

⁵¹Difference and Repetition, pp. 240-241

⁵²Difference and Repetition, p. 240.

⁵³Deleuze, "La méthode de dramatisation," in Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie 62 (1967), p. 93.

of the faculty of sensibility: it is difference in intensity that constitutes the sufficient reason of the sensible, the transcendental condition of all sensible phenomena.

Every sensation, in other words, is always intensive, the effect of a confrontation between two unequal forces, a quantitative difference between forces: "Everything that happens and appears is a correlate of orders of differences: difference of level, of temperature, of pressure, of tension, of potential, difference in intensity."⁵⁴ Sensation must be understood, not as the reception of the qualities of an extended object in space, but rather as the actualization of the differential relations of perception in an intensity (the sign). These intensive forces are never given in themselves, they cannot be grasped by the empirical senses, which only grasp intensity as already recovered or mediated by the quality that it creates: it can only be sensed from the point of view of the transcendent sensibility that apprehends it immediately in the encounter. Hence the formula: "intensity is both the unsensible and that which can only be sensed."⁵⁵ This then is what the project of a "transcendental empiricism" means for Deleuze with regard to aesthetics: he is an "empiricist" in that, for him, thinking is not innate but must be engendered, and it is always through a sign that a problem is actualized, and that thought is generated:⁵⁶ but he is a "transcendental empiricist" in that he carries his analysis down to the transcendental conditions of this sensation, which he locates in the intensive relations

⁵⁴Difference and Repetition, 222. Cf. Francis Bacon, p. 39: "Force has a strict relation with sensation: a force must be exerted upon a body in order for there to be a sensation."

⁵⁵Difference and Repetition, p. 230 (translation modified).

⁵⁶Difference and Repetition, p. 139: "What is primary in philosophy is effraction, violence, it is the enemy, and nothing presupposes philosophy, everything starts from a misosophy."

between forces. With the notion of intensity, he writes, "sensation ceases to be representative and becomes real."⁵⁷

Deleuze's theory of sensibility, in sum, is opposed to Kant's on these four interrelated points: (1) the element of sensation must be found in the sign, and not the qualities of a recognizable object; (2) the sign cannot be comprehended from the point of view of the two poles of the dogmatic image of thought, recognition and common sense; (3) the sign rather constitutes the limit-object of the faculty of sensibility; (4) the sign finds its transcendental principle in intensity (the quantitative and unequal difference between forces), which gives a genetic account of thought and constitutes the conditions of real, and not merely possible, experience.

B. The Theory of Art: "Pure Beings of Sensation"

§ 8. Philosophy and Art. With this rather summary sketch of Deleuze's theory of sensibility in hand, we can now attempt to determine its relation to the theory of art. If Deleuze has maintained an intense interest in art throughout his philosophical career, if indeed his many writings on art constitute an integral part of his philosophy, it is because works of art are themselves explorations of this transcendental realm of sensibility. To be sure, they are not the only point of entry: alcohol, drugs, schizophrenia, sado-masochism,

⁵⁷Francis Bacon, p. 34. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the history of the notion of intensity, Deleuze suggests that various disciplines have recently rediscovered the paradoxes of intensive quantities: embryology and molecular genetics have discovered a whole domain of "gradients" and "potentials"; mathematics has confronted non-extended spaces in Riemannian geometry and Mandelbrot's fractals (which stand in opposition to Kant's Euclidean model of geometry); etc.

hallucinations, vertigo, and other such limit-experiences appear in Deleuze's work as so many ambiguous approaches to this intensive realm.⁵⁸ But if art is a privileged point of entry, it is because the most general aim of art, according to Deleuze, is to produce a sensation, to create a "pure being of sensation," a sign.⁵⁹ The work of art is, as it were, a machine that utilizes these passive syntheses of sensation to produce effects of its own. The genetic principles of sensation are thus at the same time the principles of composition of the work of art: and conversely, it is the structure of the work of art that reveals these conditions.

Deleuze has consequently developed his "logic" of sensation through a creative interaction with the various arts. In his recent book What is Philosophy? he has specified the nature of this interaction in precise terms.⁶⁰ Deleuze defines philosophy as a practice of concepts, a discipline that consists in the formation, invention, or creation of concepts. "One can very easily think without concepts," he writes, "but as soon as there is a concept, there is truly philosophy."⁶¹ But this does not ascribe to philosophy any

⁵⁸See, for example, Difference and Repetition, p. 237 (translation modified): "To grasp intensity independently of the extension or before the quality in which it is developed--such is the object of a distortion of the senses. A pedagogy of the senses is turned toward this end, and constitutes an integral part of 'transcendentalism.' Pharmacodynamic experiences, or physical experiences like vertigo, approach it: they reveal to us this difference in itself, this depth [profondeur] in itself, this intensity in itself at the original moment where it is neither qualified nor extended. The lacerating character of intensity, no matter how small its degree, restores its true meaning: not the anticipation of perception, but the proper limit of sensibility from the point of view of its transcendental exercise."

⁵⁹What is Philosophy?, p. 167; cf. p. 176: "Art is the language of sensations, whether it passes through words, colors, sounds, or stones."

⁶⁰See What is Philosophy?, pp. 23-24.

⁶¹Negotiations, p. 123; cf. The Time-Image, p. 280.

privilege over or subordination to other practices such as science or art. Science, art, and philosophy are all equally creative enterprises of thought, and are differentiated solely by their object: "the true object of science is to create functions, the true object of art is to create sensible aggregates, and the object of philosophy is to create concepts."⁶² This is why such creations are marked by the signature of those who have created them: one speaks in philosophy of Plato's Idea or Leibniz's monad, or in science of the Pythagorean theorem or the Hamiltonian number, just as one speaks in art of Van Gogh's sunflowers or Jasper John's flags.⁶³ Great artists, in other words, are also great thinkers, but they think in terms of sensations rather than concepts, just as scientists think in terms of functions. Painters, for example, think in terms of lines and colors, musicians think in sounds, film-makers think in images, and so on.⁶⁴ To create a concept is neither more difficult nor more abstract than creating new visual or sonorous combinations, or creating scientific functions; and conversely, it is no easier to read an image than it is to comprehend a concept.

⁶²Negotiations, p. 123. Arthur Danto has noted that, just as Plato suggested in the Republic that art does poorly what philosophy does well, our own century has tended to pass a similar judgment on philosophy: it does poorly what science does well. Deleuze rejects all such disenfranchisements, which have nonetheless flourished in the history of thought. See Arthur Danto, The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 8, and passim.

⁶³What is Philosophy, pp. 23-24.

⁶⁴Compare the following comments Deleuze makes concerning his studies of the cinema: "The great directors of the cinema may be compared, in our view, not merely with painters, architects, and musicians, but also with thinkers. They think with movement-images and time-images instead of concepts" (The Movement-Image, p. xiv). "I say a very simple thing: that there is a thought in these great auteurs, and that to make a film is a matter of living, creative thought" ("Portrait du philosophe en spectateur," interview with Hervé Guibert, Le Monde, 6 October 1983, p. 17). "The essence of cinema--which is not the majority of films--has thought as its higher purpose, nothing but thought as its functioning" (The Time-Image, p. 168).

Each of these domains nonetheless interact with each other in definable ways.

"One must consider philosophy, art, and science as types of melodic lines that are foreign to each other and yet continually interfere with each other."⁶⁵ An artist, for instance, can produce sensations of a scientific function or a philosophic concept, as one sees in Paul Klee or the varieties of abstract art. Similarly, a scientist can produce functions of sensations, as in G. T. Fechner's Experimental Aesthetics or in theories of sound or color (Newton, Goethe), and even functions of concepts, as Albert Lautman has shown for mathematics insofar as it actualizes virtual concepts.⁶⁶ The philosopher, finally, can attempt to create the concept of a function (for example, a concept proper to Riemannian space, or to the irrational number...) or to create the concepts of sensible aggregates. It is in this latter category that we must place Deleuze's studies of the arts. Francis Bacon attempts to create the philosophic concepts of Bacon's sensory compositions, "a logic of sensation." These concepts are not given in painting, but are nonetheless the concepts of painting, and not theories about painting or reflections on it. Similarly, Deleuze's two-volume Cinema is "a book of logic, a logic of the cinema" that sets out "to isolate certain cinematographic concepts," concepts which are proper to the cinema, but which can only be formed philosophically.⁶⁷ The same must be said for Deleuze's essays in music.

⁶⁵Negotiations, p. 125 (translation modified). Cf. "Portrait du philosophe en spectateur," pp. 1, 17: "Philosophy is not in a state of external reflection on other domains, but in a state of active and internal alliance with them, and it is neither more abstract nor more difficult."

⁶⁶Albert Lautman, Essai sur les notions de structure et d'existence en mathématiques (Paris: Hermann, 1938).

⁶⁷Negotiations, p. 47; The Movement-Image, p. ix.

literature, and the theater. Properly speaking, then, there is no "theory of art" in Deleuze's work. Hermann Broch wrote that "the sole raison d'être of a novel is to discover what only the novel can discover," and each of the arts, and each work of art, confronts its own particular problems, with its own particular material and techniques.⁶⁸ "Art" itself is a concept, but a purely nominal one, since there necessarily exist "diverse problems whose solutions are found in heterogeneous arts."⁶⁹

§ 9. Aesthetics and Force. Modern art and modern philosophy can nonetheless be said to have converged on a similar problem: both renounced the domain of representation and instead took the conditions of representation as their object.⁷⁰ It is a truism to say that twentieth-century painting has aimed at, not the reproduction of forms, but the presentation of the forces that act behind or beneath these forms: it has attempted to extract from these intensive forces "a block of sensations," to produce a material capable of "capturing" these forces in a sensation.⁷¹ Paul Klee's famous phrase echoes through Deleuze's writings on the arts like a kind of motif of an aesthetics of force: not to

⁶⁸Quoted in Milan Kundera, The Art of the Novel, trans. Linda Asher (New York: Grove Press, 1988), pp. 5, 36.

⁶⁹A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 300-301.

⁷⁰In one passage, Deleuze appeals directly to modern art as a model for philosophy: "The theory of thought is like painting: it needs this revolution that makes it pass from representation to abstract art: such is the object of a theory of thought without image" (Difference and Repetition, p. 276).

⁷¹What is Philosophy?, p. 167; A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 342-345.

render the visible, but to render visible.⁷² Consider, as instances of this motif, the following examples Deleuze draws from the history of painting. When Jean-François Millet (1814-1875) was criticized by pious critics for painting peasants who were carrying an offertory like a sack of potatoes, Millet responded by saying that what matters in the painting is not what the peasant is carrying, whether it is a sacred object or a sack of potatoes, but the exact weight common to the two objects: his aim was to render the force of that weight visible in the painting. In the paintings of Cézanne, who gave this notion of force its first full expression, mountains are made to exist uniquely through the geological forces of folding they harness, landscapes through their thermal and magnetic forces, apples through the forces of germination: nonvisual forces that nevertheless have been rendered visible. Duchamp, in his Nude Descending a Staircase, makes the force of movement visible directly in the painting, and Van Gogh even invented unknown forces, such as the extraordinary force of a sunflower.⁷³ When Deleuze considers Francis Bacon's work, he shows that Bacon's primary subject matter is human bodies that have been deformed by the plurality of forces that are constantly exerted upon them: the violent force of a hiccup, of a scream, of the need to vomit or defecate, the force of copulation, the flattening force of sleep, the shock that deforms a head whipped by the

⁷²Quoted in Francis Bacon, p. 39; A Thousand Plateaus, p. 342, etc. See Henri Maldiney's commentary in Parole Regard Espace, pp. 143-146. Jean-François Lyotard, in his various studies of the avant-garde, has proposed a similar formula derived from the Kantian sublime: "not to represent, but to present the unrepresentable." See, for example, "What is Postmodernism?" in The Postmodern Condition, p. 81; and "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde," in The Inhuman: Reflections on Time (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 89-107.

⁷³For these examples, see A Thousand Plateaus, p. 343; Francis Bacon, p. 39. On the question of force in Bacon, see Francis Bacon, chapter 3, "Peindre les forces."

wind or distended by an aspiration. Despite those who find his paintings "horrific," Deleuze insists that Bacon's figures are not tortured bodies, but in fact ordinary bodies in ordinary situations discomfort, constrained by ordinary forces, just as a person forced to sit for hours on a stool would inevitably assume contorted postures.⁷⁴

Perhaps above all, each of the arts has striven in its own way to make the forces of time visible. In his Cinema books, Deleuze has argued that, since the Second World War, the cinema has been increasingly preoccupied with attaining a direct image of time, a tendency he finds most evident in the films of Orson Welles (starting with "Citizen Kane") and Alain Resnais ("Hiroshima mon amour").⁷⁵ In literature, Proust, once again, discovered that what the worlds of signs render visible are nothing other than the various invisible structures of time (passing time, wasted time, time regained): "Time, which usually is not visible, seeks out bodies in order to become visible, seizing bodies wherever it encounters them so as to cast its magic lantern," modifying this feature of someone we knew long ago, elongating, blurring, or crushing that one.⁷⁶ Barnett Newman wrote that in his painting, he was not concerned with a "manipulation of space

⁷⁴Francis Bacon, pp. 40-41. Cf. Gilles Deleuze, "Books" [text on Francis Bacon], in Artforum (January 1984), pp. 68-69.

⁷⁵The Time-Image, esp. Chapter 5.

⁷⁶Proust and Signs, pp. 17-18, 142; The Time-Image, p. 39. Cf. Francis Bacon, p. 43: "To render Time sensible in itself: a task shared by the painter, the musician, and sometimes the writer." Proust and Signs distinguishes between four structures of time: lost time is both "passing time" and "wasted time"; time regained is both a "time recovered" at the heart of time lost, and an "original time" that is affirmed in art (p. 17).

nor with the image, but with a sensation of time."⁷⁷ Modern music has perhaps confronted this problem most directly, trying to develop a highly complex and elaborate material capable of making the nonsonorous forces of time audible, a material that could render duration sonorous, as in the rise of timbre in Stravinsky and Boulez, Edgar Varèse's "ionization" of sound, or John Cage's experiments in noise, such as the "prepared piano."⁷⁸

We can only derive some very general conclusions from these examples. For each art has its particular material: in literature, words and syntax; in painting, lines and color, the canvas, the mixture of pigments, methods of perspective, various preparatory techniques; in music, the twelve tones of Western music, instruments, scales; and so on for architecture, sculpture, theater, and the other arts. And the intensive forces they attempt to capture can be of very diverse types: the forces of time and duration; attraction and repulsion; pressure, temperature, heat, weight; inertia or gravitation; isolation and deformation; germination--in short, all the forces of what Deleuze, following Worringer, has called the Non-organic Life.⁷⁹ To say that the aim of art is not to represent the world, but to present a sensation (which is itself a composition of forces, an intensive synthesis of differential relations), is to say that every sensation, every work of art is singular, and

⁷⁷Quoted in Jean-François Lyotard, "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde," in The Inhuman: Reflections on Time (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 89.

⁷⁸A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 95-96, 342-343; Francis Bacon, p. 76; What is Philosophy?, pp. 189-191.

⁷⁹Wilhelm Worringer, Abstraction and Empathy: A Contribution to the Psychology of Style, trans. Michael Bullock (New York: International Universities Press, 1963). For an explication of Deleuze's use of this concept, see Manuel DeLanda, "Non-Organic Life," in Zone 6 (1992), pp. 128-167.

that the conditions of sensation are at the same time the conditions for the production of the new.⁸⁰ A specific art, artist, or work can only be analyzed in its singularity. In what follows, we will therefore limit ourselves primarily to a consideration of Deleuze's analysis of the work of the Irish painter Francis Bacon, in order to see what his works reveal about the nature of sensation itself.

§ 10. The "Figure". Deleuze's aim in Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation is to create a series of concepts, each of which relates to a particular aspect of Bacon's paintings. Like its companion volume The Logic of Sense, it is organized in a quasi-musical fashion, divided into seventeen sequences or series that develop local concepts as if they were melodic lines, which in turn are made to enter into increasingly complex contrapuntal relations, and which together form a kind of conceptual composition that parallels Bacon's sensible compositions.⁸¹ We will here follow that line of concepts that relate most directly to the theme of sensation in Bacon's paintings.

One of the most important concepts in Deleuze's analysis of Bacon is that of the Figure: the "figural" in painting stands opposed to "figuration." The danger of figuration or representation in painting is that it is both illustrative and narrative: it relates the image to an object that it supposedly illustrates, thereby subordinating the eye to the model of recognition and losing the immediacy of the sensation; and it relates the image

⁸⁰What is Philosophy?, p. 182.

⁸¹Cf. Christine Buci-Glucksmann, "Le plissé baroque de la peinture," Magazine littéraire 257 (September 1988), pp. 54-56: "17 sequences, quasi-musicale."

to the other images in the painting, thereby tempting us to discover a narrative link between the two. As Bacon says, "The story that is already being told between one figure and another begins to cancel out the possibilities of what can be done with the paint on its own."⁸² Deleuze therefore criticizes figuration in painting in much the same way he criticizes recognition in philosophy. Painting has neither a story to tell nor an object to illustrate or represent: the painting itself is a sensation, an encountered sign. But this is precisely what constitutes the difficulty of the artistic task. "It is a very, very close and difficult thing," says Bacon. "to know why some paint comes across directly onto the nervous system and other paint tells you the story in a long diatribe through the brain."⁸³ We return to Deleuze's formula: the sensation produced by the painting is something that can only be felt or sensed [ce qui ne peut être que senti].

Bacon's attempt to paint the scream is an exemplary case in point. The forces that produce the scream, that convulse the body so as to create the screaming mouth, writes Deleuze, must not be confused with the visible horrors of the world before which one screams. Bacon distinguishes between two violences--the violence of the sensation and the violence of a horrible spectacle--and says that the painter must renounce the latter in order to attain the former. Either he paints the horror (the "sensational") and does not paint the scream, because he represents a horrible scene and introduces a story; or else he paints the scream directly (the "sensation") and does not paint the visible horror, because

⁸²Francis Bacon, p. 10; Francis Bacon, The Brutality of Fact, p. 23.

⁸³Francis Bacon, The Brutality of Fact, p. 18.

the scream is, as it were, the capture of an invisible force.⁸⁴ If Bacon, like Cézanne, was so severe with his own work, and either destroyed or renounced many of his paintings, including many of his screams, it was because they failed to attain the sensation, and fell back into the clichés of figuration and narration. Deleuze himself poses the problem in this way: "If force is the condition of sensation, it is nonetheless not the force which is sensed, since the sensation 'gives' something completely different from the forces that condition it." So that the essential question of the artist becomes: "How will the sensation be able to turn in upon itself, extend or contract itself sufficiently, in order to capture, in what is given to us, forces that are not given, in order to make us sense these unsensible forces. and elevate itself to its own conditions?"⁸⁵ This then is the task faced by the artist: How can the material used by the artist (paint, words, stone) attain this level of forces? How can it become capable of "bearing" the sensation?

Deleuze suggests that there are two general routes through which modern painting escaped the clichés of figuration or representation and attempted to attain the sensation directly: either by moving toward abstraction, or else by moving toward what Deleuze, following Lyotard, calls the "figural" (which is distinct from "figuration"). The first movement, toward abstraction, developed in several directions, but was perhaps marked by two extremes. At one pole, an abstract art like that of Mondrian or Kandinsky, though it rejected classical figuration, still retained an arsenal of abstract forms that tried to refine

⁸⁴Francis Bacon, p. 41.

⁸⁵Francis Bacon, p. 39 (emphasis added).

sensation, to dematerialize it, to reduce it to a purely visual or optical code. It tended toward a plane of architectonic composition in which the painting became a kind of spiritual being, a radiant material that was primarily thought rather than felt, and called the spectator to a kind of "intellectual asceticism." Bacon will make the same reproach against abstract painting as he did figurative painting: it still passes through the intermediary of the brain, rather than acting directly on the nervous system. Or rather, as Deleuze puts it, it perhaps attains a sensation, but it is "no longer a sensation of the sea or a tree, but a sensation of the concept of the sea or of the concept of the tree."⁸⁶ At the other pole, abstract expressionism, like that of Jackson Pollack, went beyond representation not by painting abstract forms, but by dissolving all forms in a fluid and chaotic texture of lines and colors.⁸⁷ It attempted to give matter its maximal extension, reversing its subordination to the eye, exhibiting forces by a purely manual line that no longer outlined or delimited anything, but was spread out over the entire surface. Here again, sensation is attained, but it now remains in "an irremediably confused state," too brutal, too violent.⁸⁸ Bacon says, "It's one of the reasons I don't really like abstract expressionism. Quite apart from its being abstract, I just don't like the sloppiness of it."⁸⁹

⁸⁶What is Philosophy?, p. 198.

⁸⁷ Abstract expressionism is frequently termed art informel in France, and Deleuze often follows this practice. Mireille Buydens (p. 122n) notes that the term art informel was introduced by M. Tapié with regard to the sketches of Camille Bryen. See the entry on "Art informel" in Encyclopedia Universalis, Vol. 9, p. 1174b.

⁸⁸Francis Bacon, p. 71.

⁸⁹Francis Bacon, The Brutality of Fact, p. 94.

Now in breaking with representation, both these poles of abstraction also broke with the ancient hylomorphic model, which conceives of the artistic task as the imposition of Form upon Matter (e.g., the mold and the clay). The abstractionists wanted to free up the form in a purely optical code, while the expressionists wanted to free up matter in a purely manual chaos. Simondon criticized the hylomorphic schema because it took form and matter as two terms that could be defined separately, and ignored the process of continuous "modulation" that is constantly at work behind them. Matter, for instance, is never a simple homogenous substance capable of receiving forms, but implies intensive and energetic traits that make that operation possible and continuously alter it: clay is more or less porous, wood is more or less elastic and resistant. Likewise, forms are never simple or fixed, but are determined by the singularities of the material that constantly impose implicit processes of deformation and transformation: iron melts at high temperatures, marble or wood split along their veins and fibers. Beyond the prepared matter lies an energetic materiality in continuous variation, just as beyond the fixed form there lies various qualitative processes of deformation or transformation in continuous development.⁹⁰ What becomes essential in modern art is no longer the matter-form relation, but the material-force relation: the artist takes a given energetic material composed of intensive traits and singularities, and synthesizes its disparate elements in such a way that it is rendered consistent, and can harness or capture what Paul Klee called the "forces of the cosmos."

⁹⁰Gilbert Simondon, L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique (Paris: PUF, 1964). Deleuze was heavily influenced by Simondon's text; see Logic of Sense, pp. 103-105; A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 405-411.

This task is not without ambiguity, technical and otherwise. The synthesis of the disparate elements of a material requires a certain degree of consistency, without which it would be impossible to distinguish the elements that constitute the sensation. Klee, for example, said that in order to produce a complex sensation, one must proceed with a sober gesture that simplifies the material, selects it, limits it. All one needs to harness the cosmos or render its forces visible, he said, is a pure and simple line, an inflexion, and he was infuriated when people complained about the "childishness" of his drawings.⁹¹ If one multiplies the lines, if one elaborates too rich and complex a material, the claim is that one is opening oneself up to all events, to all irruptions of force, but in fact one can merely wind up producing nothing but a scribble that effaces all lines, a "sloppiness" that in fact effaces the sensation.⁹²

It was in order to avoid this danger, as well as the danger of formalism, that Bacon followed a second path, which finds its precursor in Cézanne, and which Lyotard has termed the "figural." Whereas "figuration" refers to a form that is related to an object that it is supposed to represent (recognition), the Figure is the form that is connected to a sensation, and that conveys the violence of this sensation directly to the nervous system (the sign). It is the human body that plays this role of the Figure in Bacon's paintings: it functions as the material support or framework that sustains a precise sensation. Bacon

⁹¹Paul Klee, On Modern Art, trans. Paul Findlay; intro. Herbert Reed (London: Faber, 1966), p. 53: "Had I wished to present man 'as he is,' then I should have had to use such a bewildering confusion of lines that pure elementary representation would have been out of the question. The result would have been vagueness beyond recognition."

⁹²A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 343-344; cf. The Fold, pp. 14-20.

begins by isolating the human body inside a contour, by putting it inside a circle, a cube, a parallelepiped, balancing it on a rail, placing it on an armchair or bed. The isolated Figure is then subjected to a series of deformations: a cramp or spasm twists the figure from within, making the body shudder or vibrate violently. It is here that Bacon utilizes his most well-known techniques: making random marks, throwing the paint at the canvas with his hands, scrubbing or brushing the canvas. These manual techniques have a double effect: on the one hand, they undo the organic and extensive unity of the body, since they reveal the precise point of application of the intensive force contorting the body; on the other hand, they undo the optical organization of the painting, since this force is rendered in a precise sensation that does violence to the eye.

In Bacon, the Figure is the support for a precise sensation. Without this support, the sensation would remain diffuse and ephemeral, lacking clarity and duration. In many ways, Bacon's criticisms of expressionism had already been anticipated in Cézanne's criticisms of impressionism: sensation is not in the "free" or disincarnate play of light and color; it is in the body, and not in the air, whether this body is the human body (Bacon) or the body of an apple (Cézanne). "Sensation is what is being painted," writes Deleuze. "What is painted on the canvas is the body, not insofar as it is represented as an object, but insofar as it is experienced as sustaining this sensation."⁹³ This then is the *via media* followed by Bacon: without a material framework, the sensation remains chaotic, but on its own the framework remains abstract.

⁹³Francis Bacon, p. 27

§ 11. The Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible. How does the Figure attain the "sensation" in Bacon's painting? We have seen that every sensation is intensive, it implicates within itself a difference in quantity between unequal forces: it is thus necessarily synthetic, effecting a passive and asymmetrical synthesis between forces. "Every sensation is already an 'accumulated' or 'coagulated' sensation."⁹⁴ A sensation cannot capture the "forces of the cosmos," in other words, unless the artist is capable of effecting such syntheses in the material. If we left the nature of these syntheses unexplored until now, it is because it is the work of art that itself reveals these conditions of sensation. On this score, Deleuze has analyzed three fundamental types of asymmetrical syntheses of the forces that Bacon effects in his work.⁹⁵

1. The first type of synthesis is vibration, which characterizes a simple sensation. Even this simple type of sensation, however, is already composite, since it is defined by a difference in intensity that rises or falls, increases or decreases, following an invisible pulsation that is more nervous than cerebral. Like every great painter, Bacon will attain this vibratory state primarily through a complex use of color.⁹⁶ The Impressionists had already discovered the role of complementary colors in painting: if one is painting grass, there must not only be a green on the canvas, but also the complementary red, which will

⁹⁴Francis Bacon, pp. 28-29.

⁹⁵The primary texts on these sensible syntheses in art are: Francis Bacon, pp. 48-49; Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?, pp. 158-159; and Proust and Signs, pp. 131-142.

⁹⁶Deleuze also analyzes Bacon's use of lines, preparatory techniques, and the juncture of planes in a "shallow depth."

make the tone vibrate, and achieve a sunlit sensation that is produced by the "flash" between these two complementary colors. Cézanne, reproaching the Impressionists for depicting the atmosphere and submerging the object, refused to separate the tones according to the visual spectrum (the Newtonian conception of color) and instead mixed his complementary colors in critical proportions (in a manner closer to Goethe's theory of color than Newton's), thereby attempting to restore to the object a "Figure" through a progressive modulation of chromatic nuances.⁹⁷ Bacon will do much the same when he constitutes the flesh of his Figures through a flow of polychromatic colors, which are frequently dominated by blue and red, the colors of meat. "Each broken tone indicates the immediate exercise of a force upon the corresponding zone of the body or the head, it immediately renders a force visible."⁹⁸ If, in the preface to Francis Bacon, Deleuze writes that the summit of the logic of sensation lies in the "coloring sensation," it is because, for the painter, everything is "rendered" through pure relations of color, color is discovered as the differential relation upon which everything else depends. Even a simple sensation is a relation between colors, a vibration. Antonioni and Godard are among the great colorists of the cinema, and Godard's statement, "It's not blood, it's red," constitutes one of the great formulas of colorism.⁹⁹

⁹⁷In Newton, for example, the "optical" gray is obtained through a combination of black and white, whereas in Goethe it is obtained through a combination of green and red (the "haptic" form of gray). On the relation of Cézanne to the Impressionists with regard to color, see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Cézanne's Doubt," in The Essential Writings, ed. Alden L. Fischer (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969), p. 236.

⁹⁸Francis Bacon, p. 96.

⁹⁹The Movement-Image, p. 118.

2. The second type of syntheses, more complex, is that of resonance. In this case, two simple Figures or sensations, rather than simply being isolated and deformed, confront each other, like two wrestlers, in a "hand-to-hand combat," and are thereby made to resonate. Bacon, for instance, frequently puts two bodies in a single painting, bodies that are copulating or sleeping entangled, in such a way that the bodies themselves are rendered indiscernible, and are made to resonate together in a single "matter of fact," in order to make something appear that is irreducible to the two: this sensation, this Figure.¹⁰⁰ Deleuze argues that the great example of resonance in literature can be found in Proust's involuntary memory, in which two sensations (for instance, the present flavor of the madeleine and the past memory of Combray) are coupled together in order to make a pure Figure appear that internalizes the difference between the two sensations: Combray-in-itself. What is important in resonance is that (at least) two sensations are coupled together, and from them is extracted an ineffable "essence" (Proust) or "figure" (Bacon) that is irreducible to either of them: something new is produced.¹⁰¹

3. Finally, there is the most complicated of these syntheses, what Deleuze calls a forced movement. This is no longer a coupling of sensations, but on the contrary their distention or deviation. In Bacon, this appears most clearly in the triptychs, in which the Figures, rather than being isolated or coupled, are set apart from each other in separate panels. How can the separated Figures of the triptychs be said to present a single "matter

¹⁰⁰Francis Bacon, Chapter 9. "Couples and Triptychs."

¹⁰¹On the role of resonance in involuntary memory, see Proust and Signs, chapter 5. "The Secondary Role of Memory." James Joyce's "epiphanies" can be analyzed in the same manner: see pp. 187-188.

of fact"? It is because in them the separated Figures achieve such an extraordinary amplitude between them that the limits of sensation are broken: sensation is no longer dependent upon a Figure per se, but rather the intensive rhythm of force itself becomes the Figure of the triptych.¹⁰² The Figures loosen their grip on each other, and are no longer united by anything but the distance that separates them, and the light, the air, or the void which inserts itself between them like a wedge. It is because of this amplitude that Deleuze assigns a privileged place to the triptychs in Bacon's work.

Vibration, resonance, and forced movement are the concepts Deleuze creates to describe the three types of syntheses that Bacon utilizes to "paint the sensation." In general, it is they that constitute the intensive conditions of sensation, the three "varieties" of compositions of sensation, the three modalities of a "being of sensation." The reader of Deleuze's work will recognize here the three passive syntheses that he has explored throughout his works: the connective synthesis, which entails the construction of a single intensive series (vibration); the conjunctive synthesis, which implies the convergence of at least two series (resonance); and the disjunctive synthesis, which implies the affirmation of divergent series (forced movement).¹⁰³ Each of these syntheses coexist in Bacon's paintings: in the individual paintings, for example, the large fields of uniform

¹⁰²Francis Bacon, chapter 10, "What is a Triptych?"

¹⁰³The question concerning the conditions under which disjunction can be a form of synthesis (and not an analytic procedure that excludes the predicates of a thing by virtue of the identity of its concept) is one of the decisive questions posed by a philosophy of difference, though it lies beyond the scope of this paper. For Deleuze's discussions of the possibility of a disjunctive synthesis, see "La synthèse disjonctive" (with Guattari), in *L'Arc* 43 (1970), pp. 54-62; *The Logic of Sense*, pp. 172-176, 294-297; and *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 75-79.

color already effect a distancing function similar to that of the triptychs (disjunction), but are likewise themselves composed of subtle variations of intensity or saturation (connection); and vibrations in turn are already effects of resonance, since the couple together diverse levels of sensation (conjunction).¹⁰⁴ The important point is that the artist utilizes these intensive syntheses in order to produce "a pure being of sensation": the work of art is a functional "machine" that produces effects of vibration, resonance, and forced movement. The question that must therefore be posed to a work of art, argues Deleuze, is not "What does it mean?" (interpretation) but rather "How does it work?" (experimentation): "What are the connections, what are the disjunctions, the conjunctions, what use is made of the syntheses?"¹⁰⁵

The sensation itself, however, must not be confused with the material in which these syntheses are effected. Art is composition, but the technical composition of the material is not the same as the aesthetic composition of the sensation. It is true that in fact (quid facti?) the sensation lasts no longer than its support or materials (stone, canvas, chemical color, etc.). But in principle at least (quid juris?), the sensation is of a different order than the material, and exists in itself for as long as the material lasts. Oil painting, Deleuze suggests, provides a useful example of this distinction, since it can be

¹⁰⁴Cf. What is Philosophy?, p. 168, where Deleuze suggests that, of all the arts, it is perhaps sculpture that presents these three syntheses in an almost pure state: first, there are the sensations of stone, marble, or metal, which vibrate according to strong and weak beats; second, there are the protuberances and cavities in the material, which establish powerful combats that interlock and resonate with each other; and finally, there is the set-up of the sculpture, with large empty spaces between groups, or even within a single group, in which one no longer knows if it is the light or air that sculpts or is sculpted.

¹⁰⁵Anti-Oedipus, p. 109.

approached in two manners. In a first case, the sensation is realized in the material and projected onto it: an outline is sketched on a white background, and color, light and shade are added afterwards. In a second case, which modern art has increasingly tended to adopt, it is the material that passes into sensation: rather than beginning with a sketch, the painter gradually "thickens" the background, adding color alongside color, piling up or folding the material, in such a way that the architecture of the sensation emerges from the medium itself, and the material becomes indiscernible from the sensation. In either case, however, it is matter itself that becomes expressive, so that one can say of the sensation itself that is metallic, crystalline, stony, coloring, and so on. The material constitutes the de facto condition of the sensation, and insofar as this condition is satisfied, even if only for a few seconds (as in Tinguely's self-destructing creations), it gives the compound of created sensations the power to exist and to be preserved in and of itself: a "monument."¹⁰⁶

What, finally, can be said about the unity of the work of art, if the heterogeneous elements that it synthesizes have no other relation to each other than sheer difference? Art, Deleuze argues, presents us neither with logical unities nor organic totalities: the elements brought together by the work of art cannot be said to be fragments of a lost unity or shattered totality, nor can the parts be said to form or prefigure the unity of the work through the course of a logical or dialectical development or an organic evolution.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶On the relation of the sensation to the material, see What is Philosophy?, chapter 7, passim, esp. pp. 191-197.

¹⁰⁷Proust and Signs, pp. 196-197; Anti-Oedipus, pp. 42-43.

Rather than functioning as their totalizing or unifying principle, the work of art can only be understood as the effect of the multiplicity of the disconnected parts. Art establishes "transversals" that allow us to leap from one differential element to another, without reducing their difference to a form of identity, without ever reducing the many to the One, without ever gathering up the multiplicity into a totality.¹⁰⁸ If the work of art indeed produces a unity, this product is nothing more than a part that is added alongside the other parts, which it neither unifies nor totalizes, though it has an effect on these other parts because it establishes syntheses between elements that in themselves do not communicate, and that retain all their difference in their own dimensions. The work of art, as a compound of sensations, is not a unification or totalization of differences, but rather the production of a new difference, and "style" in art always begins with the synthetic relations between heterogeneous differences.

§ 12. Conclusion. Deleuze's retrieval of the critical project in Difference and Repetition rests on the discovery of this prodigious domain of the passive syntheses. Kant himself reserved the power of synthesis for the active "I think," for the activity of the understanding, and conceived of the passive ego as a simple receptivity possessing no

¹⁰⁸See Anti-Oedipus, p. 42: the work of art "is a whole of its constituent parts but does not totalize them: it is a unity of its particular parts but it does not unify them; rather, it is added to them as a new part fabricated separately." On the concept of "transversality" formulated by Guattari, see Proust and Signs, p. 201.

synthetic power.¹⁰⁹ One of Freud's great discoveries was that the passive Ego is itself constituted by unconscious syntheses that precede and condition the activity of the "I think," and it was under a similar inspiration that Deleuze returned to post-Kantians like Maimon and Cohen in his attempt to reformulate the critical project.¹¹⁰ The "logic of sensation" constitutes one aspect of this domain of the passive syntheses, and in this chapter we have attempted to show how Deleuze's philosophy of difference overcomes the duality that aesthetics has been encumbered with since Kant.

On the one hand, in breaking with the model of recognition and common sense, and the image of thought from which they are derived, Deleuze finds the element of sensation, not in a recognizable object, but in an encountered "sign," which in turn finds its transcendental limit in the differential relations between intensive forces. It is intensity, and not the a priori forms of space and time, that constitutes the condition of real, and not merely possible, experience. On the other hand, these genetic principles of sensibility are at the same time the principles of composition of the work of art. The artist uses these intensive syntheses to produce a bloc of sensations, and in turn it is the work of art itself that reveals the nature of these syntheses. In this way, Deleuze's logic of sensation reunites the two dissociated halves of aesthetics: the theory of forms of experience (as "the being of the sensible") and the work of art as experimentation (as "a pure being of

¹⁰⁹Difference and Repetition, p. 87: "The passive ego [in Kant] is defined solely by receptivity, and possesses no power of synthesis....It is through a completely difference evaluation of the passive ego that the Kantian initiative can be revived."

¹¹⁰The analysis of the nature of the unconscious syntheses of the bio-psychic life, and the denunciation of their illegitimate uses, is one of the principal, though least discussed, aims of Anti-Oedipus (see, for instance, pp. 74-75).

sensation"). "The work of art leaves the domain of representation in order to become 'experience,' transcendental empiricism or the science of the sensible."¹¹¹ If Deleuze's various writings on art are, as he says, "philosophy, nothing but philosophy," it is precisely because they constitute explorations of, and experimentations within, this transcendental domain of sensibility.

II. THE PURE AND EMPTY FORM OF TIME

"The time is out of joint."
--Shakespeare, Hamlet¹¹²

§ 13. The Form of Time in Kant. In the second half of this chapter, we propose to examine in more detail Deleuze's theory of time, since it plays an important role in almost all his works. Here again, we can begin with the Kantian formulations of the problem. Kant fractured the self by making time a fundamental component of the cogito, and in so doing provided philosophy with a fundamentally new conception of time. It is this new conception of time that constitutes, for Deleuze, one of the most important aspects of Kant's Copernican Revolution. In ancient philosophy, time was subordinated to the extensive circular movement of the cosmos, it was the measure of this movement, its interval or cardinal number. In Kant, this classical relation between time and

¹¹¹Difference and Repetition, p. 126.

¹¹²"The time is out of joint," Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act I, scene 5. Shestov often used Shakespeare's formula as the tragic device of his own thought, and Deleuze's use of the formula here is closely related to Shestov's. See Shestov, "The Ethical Problem in 'Julius Caesar,'" trans. S. Konovalov, in The New Adelphi (June 1928), p. 348, and "Celui qui édifie et détruit des mondes (Tolstoï)," trans. Sylvie Luneau, in L'Homme pris au piège (Pouchkine, Tolstoï, Tchekhov) (Paris: Union Générale d'Éditions, 1966), p. 29.

movement is reversed: time is no longer related to the movement it measures, movement is instead related to the time that conditions it. If Rimbaud's "I is another" characterizes the first Kantian reversal, it is Hamlet's complaint that characterizes this second reversal: "The time is out of joint," or as the French translation Deleuze uses reads, "Le temps est hors de ses gonds," "Time is unhinged." The hinges are the axis on which the door turns, and the theory of time remained "hinged" as long as it was subordinated to these ordinary celestial movements. Eric Alliez has shown that, in ancient thought, time had already tended to free itself when it began to measure movements that were themselves aberrant or derived--meteorological, terrestrial, and physiological movements, and even psychological movements of the soul, that were less and less reducible to the circular compositions of the cosmos.¹¹³ But this, Deleuze suggests, was merely a downward tendency that still made time dependent on the ever more complex adventures of movement.

Time becomes "out of joint"--the door is taken off its hinges--when movement is itself subordinated to time. This is what Kant accomplishes in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, where he analyses three relations that are internal to time as the form of interiority: succession, simultaneity, and permanence. In Kant, first of all, succession no longer defines time, it is time that defines parts of movement as successive insofar as they are determined in time: time no longer measures movement, but imposes the succession of its own determinations to every movement. Furthermore, if we ascribed succession to

¹¹³See Eric Alliez, Les Temps Capitaux (Paris: Cerf, 1991), with Deleuze's preface, pp. 7-9.

time itself. we would have to think yet another time in which the sequence would be possible. as so on to infinity. Thus, if things succeed each other in diverse empirical times, they must also be simultaneous in the same transcendental time. Finally, everything that moves and changes is in time, but time itself does not change, does not move, any more than it is eternal. It is the form of everything that changes and moves, but it is an immutable form that does not itself change--not an eternal form, but precisely the form of that which is not eternal, the immutable form of change and movement.¹¹⁴ In Kant, then, time can no longer be defined by succession, nor space by simultaneity or coexistence, nor permanence by eternity: succession, permanence, and simultaneity are themselves all modes or relations of time (duration, succession, coexistence). If space in turn becomes the form of exteriority, it is because movement is no longer the determination of an object but the description of a space--a space that must be turned into an abstraction in order to discover time as its condition.¹¹⁵

Here again, however, Deleuze's relationship to Kant is complex. On the one hand, he follows the Copernican reversal that makes movement subordinate to time: on the other hand, for Kant the relations internal to "the pure and empty form of time" are simply the conditions under which phenomena appear to the receptive ego, and Deleuze in turn

¹¹⁴Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A183/B226-227, p. 214: "Only through the permanent does existence in difference parts of the time-series acquire a magnitude which can be entitled duration....All existence and all change in time have thus to be viewed as simply a mode of the existence of that which remains and persists."

¹¹⁵Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A177/B219, p. 209: "The three modes of time are duration, succession, and coexistence. There will, therefore, be three rules of all relations of appearances in time...." On all these themes, see Critique et clinique, pp. 40-42, and What is Philosophy? pp. 29-32.

rejects this subordination of the formal relations of time to the exigencies of the active syntheses of the understanding (i.e., in the Analogies, to the categories of substance, causality, and community). In Deleuze, the three modalities or dimensions of time are freed from this subordination, and are made to constitute the structure of the passive ego, which determines a domain of syntheses that exist prior to the syntheses of the understanding, and freed from the constraints of the categories. Deleuze here is clearly indebted to Heidegger's Being and Time, which outlined a theory of three existential ecstases of time or fundamental temporal modes of Dasein which likewise precede the representation of time: the past as our "thrownness" in the world, the present as the "within-time-ness" of our care or concern, and the future as our "Being-towards-death."¹¹⁶ In Deleuze, however, these formal relations, though lived, are not phenomenological or existential, since the transcendental field is pre-individual and apersonal, and does not retain any characteristics of the empirical domains that it conditions.

The following three sections present an analysis of the three syntheses that constitute Deleuze's theory of time. Deleuze develops this theory in two texts. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze makes use of Hume and Bergson, among others, to analyze the three syntheses of time as articulations of difference and repetition.¹¹⁷ But it is primarily in The Time-Image, the remarkable second volume of his two-volume study

¹¹⁶Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), ¶ 65, "Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care," pp. 370-380 (H. 323-331).

¹¹⁷See Bruno Paradis, "Le Futur et l'épreuve de la pensée," in Lendemains 14:53 (1989), p. 26: "the present is defined as a difference extracted from repetition, the past as a difference included in repetition, and the future as a difference produced by repetition."

of the cinema, that Deleuze develops his theory most fully. Making use of certain theses of Bergson, Deleuze argues that the cinema underwent a similar reversal in the relation between time and movement after the Second World War, and shows that certain films (notably those of Welles and Resnais) have attempted to give a direct presentation of the pure form of time.

A. First Synthesis: The Present as the Foundation of Time (Duration and Succession)

§ 14. The Living Present of Habit (Hume). The first temporal synthesis that Deleuze examines in Difference and Repetition is one that was first formulated by Hume in his Treatise on Human Nature under the rubric of "habit." On the one hand, Hume argued that the "given" is nothing but a chaotic flux of perceptions, a collection of separate impressions and ideas. The constitutive principle of the given is not that "every idea derives from an impression," which has a merely regulative sense in Hume's philosophy, but rather, "whatever objects are separable are also distinguishable, and whatever objects are distinguishable are also different": this is Hume's principle of difference.¹¹⁸ On the other hand, experience also provides us with the observation, within this chaos, of a multiplicity of independent cases of repetition (AB, AB, AB, A...). This

¹¹⁸The regulative principle is set forth early on in the Treatise, p. 4: "All our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent" (p. 4) The constitutive principle is repeated in almost identical phrases throughout the Treatise, e.g., on pp. 18, 24, 36, 233, 254: "Every thing, which is different, is distinguishable, and every thing which is distinguishable, is separable by the imagination." See Norman Kemp Smith's commentary in The Philosophy of David Hume, pp. 276-279.

coalescence of difference and repetition takes us to the heart of a problem of temporality. The rule of discontinuity or instantaneity in repetition tells us that, within such a series, one case does not appear unless the other has disappeared. Since each repeated element is logically independent of the other, repetition has no "in-itself" and undoes itself even as it occurs. How then can we say, with regard to the different elements of the repeated series, that one is the second, the third, or even that they are the same?

Deleuze formulates Hume's thesis in the following manner: Repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but it does change something in the mind that contemplates it.¹¹⁹ Repetition changes nothing in the state of affairs AB (hence, strictly speaking, we cannot yet even speak of repetition). But something new--a difference--is produced in the mind that contemplates the repetition: when A appears, I now expect the appearance of B. What does this change consist of? Hume argues that the recognition of independent identical or similar cases is grounded in the imagination, which he defines by its synthetic power of contraction or fusion: like a sensitive plate, the imagination retains one element when another one appears. This process of contraction, though constitutive, is not a matter of active reflection, but is a purely passive synthesis: it is not carried out by the mind or through the activity of the understanding or memory, but occurs in the mind that contemplates. It is only when the imagination effects its passive syntheses that what it contracts appear as elements or cases of repetition. Deleuze in this way opposes the active syntheses of the understanding to the passive syntheses of the "contemplating"

¹¹⁹Difference and Repetition, p. 70: this is the first sentence of the chapter on "Repetition for Itself."

ego: in order for the active understanding to represent repetition, there must first be a sub-representative and passive synthesis capable of contracting the cases or elements into one another. Repetition can be represented only on the condition of a non-represented and non-representing synthesis.

This contraction of elements, Deleuze argues, is properly speaking a synthesis of time. What Hume calls habit is the principle through which the imagination establishes a temporal synthesis between repeated cases. A mere succession of independent instants does not constitute time any more than it causes it to disappear: "time is constituted by the ordinary synthesis which operates on the repetition of instants."¹²⁰ This synthesis contracts the instants into one another, thereby constituting a lived, or living, present. It is in this living present that time is deployed. It includes the two dimensions of past and future, the one as the immediate past of "retention," and the other as the immediate future of "expectation."¹²¹ In this context, the Stoics often spoke of a perpetual present that is coextensive with time in its entirety: what is past and future with regard to my relative present belongs to a more vast present with a greater extension that absorbs my past and my future, such that time itself is an encasing or coiling up of relative presents, with God as the extreme circle or external envelope whose divine present, as Boethius said, complicates or comprehends all of time in a living cosmic present (Chronos).¹²² Such a

¹²⁰Difference and Repetition, p. 70.

¹²¹This is Husserl's terminology in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964).

¹²²Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. W. V. Cooper (Chicago: Regency Gateway, 1981), § 4. See The Logic of Sense, pp. 61-62, 162.

metaphysical present, however, is physically impossible: the contraction implied in any contemplation necessarily implies a present that may be exhausted and which passes, a present of a certain duration (Bergson's durée) which varies according to the species, the individuals, the organisms, and the parts of organisms under consideration. The passive syntheses or contractions of habit are essentially asymmetrical: they go from the past to the future, thereby imparting a direction to the arrow of time. Taken together, duration and succession constitute the first modality of time: the duration of the living present, and the succession of these presents in time.

Now although this process of contraction is subjective, this subjectivity is that of the passive ego, or what Deleuze calls a "larval" subject. "There is a ego [moi] wherever a furtive contemplation has been established, whenever a contracting machine capable of drawing a difference from repetition functions somewhere."¹²³ Kant's error, according to Deleuze, was to have defined the passive self in terms of simple receptivity. He presupposed sensations that were already formed, and then simply related these sensations to space and time as the a priori forms of their representation. He thereby deprived the passive self of any power of synthesis (synthesis being reserved for activity), and arbitrarily unified the passive self by ruling out an internal and dynamic construction of space (which must necessarily precede the "representation" of the whole as a form of exteriority).¹²⁴ Already in his first book, Empiricism and Subjectivity (1953), Deleuze

¹²³Difference and Repetition, pp. 78-79.

¹²⁴See Difference and Repetition, pp. 26, 98.

had shown that if the question posed by Kant's critique is, "How can something be given to the subject?" (active syntheses), the constitutive question of Hume's critique is rather, "How is the subject constituted within the given?" (passive synthesis).¹²⁵ Hume's most general response is: habit. "We are habits, nothing but habits—the habit of saying 'I,'" writes Deleuze. "Perhaps there is no more striking answer to the problem of the Self."¹²⁶ In Hume, the given is not given to an active subject without there first of all being a passive and contemplative subject that is constituted within the given. Receptivity itself, Deleuze argues, presupposes this entire domain of passive syntheses (the formation of local egos), which alone can account for both the possibility of experiencing sensations and the power of reproducing them.

These contracted differences are complexes of space and time, what Deleuze calls "spatio-temporal dynamisms."¹²⁷ Now it is true that Kant himself had a strong presentiment of the operation of such dynamisms in thought, dynamisms that are irreducible to both the universality of the category and the particularity of the here and now. What Kant called a schema of the imagination is nothing other than a rule of

¹²⁵See Empiricism and Subjectivity, p. 87. For a discussion of Empiricism and Subjectivity and its relation to other interpretations of Hume, see Patricia De Martelaere, "Gilles Deleuze, interprete de Hume" in Revue Philosophique de Louvain 82 (May 1984), pp. 224-48. It was Hume, of course, who awakened Kant from his "dogmatic slumber": see Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), p. 8.

¹²⁶Deleuze, "Preface to the English-language Edition," in Empiricism and Subjectivity, p. x. As Bergson says in The Two Sources, habits are not themselves natural, what is natural is the habit of contracting habits. Deleuze frequently quotes this Bergsonian principle: Empiricism and Subjectivity, p. 44; Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 133; Difference and Repetition, p. 4.

¹²⁷On spatio-temporal dynamisms, and what distinguishes them from Kant's schemata, see Difference and Repetition, pp. 218, 285.

determination for time and of construction for space. Without the schemata, the gap between concept and intuition could never be bridged, for a concept alone is incapable of specifying or dividing itself. The schemata are thus agents of differentiation operating beneath or within the concept: it is only through the schema that spatio-temporal relations are brought into correspondence with the logical relations of the concept. But if Kant spoke of the schematism a deep mystery and a hidden art, it is because they were subordinated to the active syntheses of the categories, which reduced them to the status of simple mediations in the world of representation.¹²⁸ Deleuze proposes a different solution. If spatio-temporal dynamisms are agents of differentiation, it is only on the condition that they impose their own landscape, that they set up camp where they are momentarily posited by a larval subject. We will see that this implies an entirely new theory of the Idea: whereas Kantian Ideas are transcendent, unifying, and totalizing, Deleuzian Ideas are immanent, differential, virtual, and genetic. If dynamisms are external to concepts, they are internal to the differential elements and relations constitutive of Ideas, and trace out a space of actualization as much as they constitute a time of differentiation. As Deleuze puts it, dynamisms are not the active "schematizations" of an identical concept, but rather the passive "dramatizations" of a differential Idea, and thus necessarily sub-representative or pre-representative.

¹²⁸Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A141/B180-181, p. 183: The schematism "is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze." It is for this reason that Heidegger, in his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), interpreted the transcendental imagination as providing the "foundation" of Kant's metaphysics.

Deleuze's notion of the passive syntheses can perhaps be made clearer if we consider its applicability to another domain. Hume limited himself to an analysis of perceptual and sensible syntheses, but such syntheses inevitably refer us back to the organic syntheses of the body. Contraction would here refer, not to the sensory-motor syntheses that we have, but to the organic syntheses or habits that we are. An organic tissue becomes an eye when it succeeds in capturing light, and before one speaks of the "excitation" of an organ one must consider the organ itself as a "contraction" of elements. The organic body in its entirety is a contraction of nonorganic elements (water, nitrogen, carbon...), a primary vital sensibility, in which the immediate future appears as need and the retained past appears in the form of heredity: need and heredity are the organic forms of expectation and retention. Moreover, the duration of an organism's present, or its various presents, can vary greatly according to the range of its contractions, and in this sense Deleuze suggests that fatigue is an inevitable component of contemplation: "fatigue can be said to mark the point where the soul can no longer contract what it contemplates, the moment at which contemplation and contraction come apart."¹²⁹ The application of such temporal notions to the body is the organic parallel of Kant's fracturing of the cogito: whereas the Greek body was a matter informed by a beautiful form (hylomorphism), the modern body is fragile body into which time has been incorporated.

¹²⁹Difference and Repetition, p. 77.

Deleuze's work is marked throughout by an acute interest in the biological sciences (embryology, genetics, molecular biology), precisely because the organic body is an extremely rich domain in which the various passive syntheses can be analyzed on their own account. Every contraction constitutes what Deleuze calls a "sign," which always envelops heterogeneous elements (e.g. the proteins and amino acids of the genetic code, or the relations of genes in the chromosomes), which will then be taken up in other forms and at other levels of passive synthesis (e.g. the development of the intensive space of the egg), with varying combinations of these levels with one another and with the active syntheses.¹³⁰ The development of the organism is a dynamic process that entails the progressive construction of an internal space, a block of space-time composed of numerous milieus: "an exterior milieu of materials, an interior milieu of composing elements and composed substances, an intermediary milieu of membranes and limits, and an annexed milieu of energy sources and actions-perceptions."¹³¹ For our purposes, the essential point is that a living being is constituted through spatio-temporal dynamisms: it does not exist in a preexisting time or space, but rather creates a spatio-temporal milieu out of its heterogeneous elements.¹³²

¹³⁰Difference and Repetition, p. 73: "We must therefore distinguish not only the forms of repetition in relation to passive syntheses, but also the levels of passive synthesis and the combinations of these levels with one another and with active syntheses."

¹³¹Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 313: the plateau from which this quotation is taken, "1837: Of the Refrain," present a kind of "transcendental deduction" of milieus and territories from their component elements of repetition.

¹³²A Thousand Plateaus, p. 263: "Spatiotemporal relations, determinations, are not predicates of the thing but dimensions of multiplicities."

The thousands of habit of which we are composed (contemplations, contractions and fatigues, etc.), along with the variable presents in which they operate, form the basic domain of the passive syntheses. It appears under the modality of the duration of a living present, and the succession of the present which passes. Active syntheses, in turn, mark "the passage from spontaneous imagination to the active faculties of the reflective imagination, memory, and intelligence."¹³³ In Kant, re-presentation implies an active taking up of what is presented (signs), and hence an activity and a unity distinct from the passivity and diversity which characterizes sensibility as such.¹³⁴ Repetition can thus be said to have three moments: in-itself, in which elements appear and disappear without constancy, and thus remain unthinkable (the Idea); the for-itself of the passive syntheses, which are both organic and perceptual; and the for-us of the active syntheses, in which the signs of the passive syntheses are interpreted or redeployed. The active syntheses of the understanding thus find their necessary foundation in the passive syntheses of habit: "underneath the self which acts are little selves which contemplate and which render possible both the action and the active subject."¹³⁵ The passive syntheses constitute the system of the self, but the dissolved or fractured self, the lived reality of a sub-representative domain whose conditions we are attempting to determine.

¹³³Difference and Repetition, p. 77.

¹³⁴Kant's Critical Philosophy, pp. 4, 8.

¹³⁵Difference and Repetition, p. 75.

B. Second Synthesis: The Past as the Ground of Time (Coexistence and Simultaneity)

§ 15. The Pure Past of Memory (Bergson). With this second synthesis, we move into a much more complex domain of passivity. For although the first synthesis of time is originary and fundamental, it is founded on a paradox: it constitutes time as a present, but as a present that passes. Time never leaves the living present, but this present is continually changing and moving, by leaps that continually encroach on each other. There must therefore be another passive synthesis of time, argues Deleuze, capable of grounding the first synthesis: we thus move from the foundation to the ground. This ground, says Deleuze, following Bergson, is Memory.¹³⁶ The problem of memory can be stated in the following terms. From the viewpoint of the first passive synthesis, memory simply appears as a retention, as an immediate past belonging naturally to the duration of the living present. But from the viewpoint of the second synthesis, the active memory appears as the reproduction of former presents, which now become "represented" in the actual present. This past is no longer the immediate past of retention, but the reflexive past of representation. Here, the past is necessarily related to two presents, the former present which it was, and the actual present in relation to which it is now past. As a

¹³⁶Bergson has been a constant interest for Deleuze, starting with his earliest articles (1956) and his book Bergsonism (1966), and continuing in Difference and Repetition (1968) and his two-volume study of the cinema (1984-1985), which uses Bergson's theses on movement and time as its guiding thread. "Today there are people who have a good laugh in reproaching me for having even written on Bergson," writes Deleuze in Negotiations (p. 6). Gillian Rose, for instance, in her Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-structuralism and the Law (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984), chapter 6, has accused Deleuze of having inaugurated "a new Bergsonism" in France, much as his Nietzsche and Philosophy was said to have inaugurated the "new Nietzsche." For a response, see Michael Hardt's criticisms of Rose in Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 22-24.

principle of representation, the active synthesis of memory must therefore be regarded under two correlative though asymmetrical aspects: the reproduction of the former present and the reflection of the actual present.¹³⁷ The active synthesis of memory is necessarily founded on the passive synthesis of habit, which constitutes the general possibility of any present. But the two syntheses are profoundly different: whereas the passive synthesis of habit constituted time as a contraction of "instants" with respect to the present, the active synthesis of memory constitutes time as a contraction of the presents themselves. Our question now is: How can the former present act at a distance upon the actual present? What is it that grounds this asymmetrical synthesis of the former present and the actual present?¹³⁸

It is in Bergson's Matter and Memory that Deleuze finds a solution to this problem. Put simply: it is only with respect to the pure element of the past, understood as the past in general, as an a priori past, that a former present is reproducible and the actual present is able to reflect itself. Bergsonism has often been reduced to the idea that duration is subjective and constitutes our inner life (first passive synthesis). But increasingly Bergson came to say something much different: it is we who are internal to a non-chronological time that constitutes the pure past as such (second passive synthesis). This notion of the pure past, says Deleuze, is "one of the most profound, but perhaps also

¹³⁷Kant showed that it is of the essence of representation not only to represent something, but to represent its own representativity. Hence the actual present cannot form a memory of the former present without at the same time reflecting itself in the representation. See Critique et clinique, p. 44: "For Kant, the I is no longer a concept, but the representation that accompanies every concept."

¹³⁸See Difference and Repetition, p. 104.

one of the least understood aspects of Bergsonism," and much of his work has been aimed at retrieving these Bergsonian themes.¹³⁹ If we have difficulty comprehending the philosophical idea of a pure past, it is because we remain tied to the viewpoint of activity, in which the past seems to be caught between the former present it was and the actual present in relation to which it is past. "Two false beliefs are derived from this," writes Deleuze. "On the one hand, we believe that the past as such is only constituted after having been present; on the other hand, we believe that it is in some way reconstituted by the new present whose past it now is. This double illusion is at the heart of all physiological and psychological theories of memory."¹⁴⁰ Against all such theories, Bergson argues, in the third chapter of Matter and Memory, that the past can never be recomposed out of presents. Deleuze summarizes Bergson's argument by drawing out the three paradoxes that are constitutive of Bergson's conception of the pure past:¹⁴¹

a. Paradox of Contemporaneity or Simultaneity. Since we are accustomed to thinking in terms of the "present," we believe that a present is past only when it is replaced by another present. But we must reflect on this belief. How could a new present come about if the old present was not passing at the same time that it is present? If a new present were required for the past to be constituted as past, then the former present would never pass and the new one would never arrive. The past in itself cannot be constituted

¹³⁹Bergsonism, p. 55.

¹⁴⁰Bergsonism, p. 58.

¹⁴¹What follows is a summary of Deleuze's analyses in: Bergsonism, chapter 3. "Memory as Virtual Coexistence," pp. 51-72; Difference and Repetition, pp. 79-85; and The Time-Image, chapters 3-5.

either from the present it once was or from the present in relation to which it is now past. The past would never be constituted, in other words, if it had not been constituted at the same time that it had been present. This is the most fundamental paradox of memory--the contemporaneity of the past with the present that it was. It gives us a sufficient reason for the passing of the present: every present passes, giving way to a new present, because the past is contemporaneous with itself as present.

b. Paradox of Coexistence. This leads to a second paradox. If the past is contemporaneous with the present it was, then the whole of the past coexists with the present. "The past and the present do not denote two successive moments, but two elements that coexist. One is the present, which does not cease to pass, and the other is the past, which does not cease to be but through which all presents pass. It is in this sense that there is a pure past, a kind of 'past in general': the past does not follow the present, but on the contrary is presupposed by it as the pure condition without which it would not pass."¹⁴² If it is difficult to understand a survival of the past in itself, it is because of the common sense belief that the past is no longer, that it has ceased to be. But in fact, strictly speaking, it is the present which is not: the present is a pure becoming that is always outside of itself.¹⁴³ At the limit, then, our ordinary determinations must be reversed: of the present, we must say at every instant that it 'was,' and of the past, that it

¹⁴²Bergsonism, p. 59.

¹⁴³See Hegel, Philosophy of Nature, Part 2 of the Encyclopedia, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), § 258, p. 35: "The now has a tremendous right [ein ungeheures Recht]: it is nothing as the individual Now, for as I pronounce it, this proudly exclusive Now dissolves, flows away, and falls into dust."

'is.' and that it is 'for all time.'¹⁴⁴ If duration implies actual succession, it is only because, more profoundly, the pure past implies virtual coexistence. The pure past is thus the "in-itself" of time, the a priori element of all time. What Bergson makes visible is the differentiation of time into two flows: that of presents which pass, and that of pasts which are preserved.

c. Paradox of Pre-existence. The third paradox of pre-existence completes the other two. Each past is contemporaneous with the present it was; the whole past coexists with the present in relation to which it is past; but the pure element of the past in general pre-exists the passing present. There is thus a substantial temporal element (the Past which was never present) that plays the role of a ground with regard to the pure form of time. The transcendental passive synthesis of memory bears on this pure past from the triple viewpoint of contemporaneity, coexistence, and pre-existence. The active synthesis of memory, by contrast, is the representation of the present under the dual aspect of the reproduction of the former present and the reflection of the new present. But this active synthesis is necessarily grounded on the passive synthesis, which in turn is never itself represented: the pure past is not a psychological past, but denotes a non-psychological reality. The psychological is the present, but the past is pure ontology, an immemorial or ontological memory that serves as the foundation for the unfolding of time.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴Bergsonism, p. 55. Cf. Andrei Tarkovsky, "Imprinted Time," in Sculpting in Time: Reflections on the Cinema, trans. Kitty Hunter-Blair (Austin: University of Texas, 1989), p. 58: "In a certain sense, the past is far more real, or at any rate, more resilient than the present. The present slips and vanishes like sand between the fingers, acquiring material weight only in its recollection."

¹⁴⁵See Bergsonism, pp. 56, 57, 59.

Bergson's famous image of the cone represents this contemporaneous, coexistent, and pre-existent state of the pure past, in which there appear numerous levels of depth that mark all the possible intervals in this coexistence. The past AB coexists with the present S, but by including in itself all the sections A'B', A''B'', etc., which measure the degrees of a purely ideal proximity or distance in relation to the actuality of the present sensation S. Each of these sheets or layers of the past are virtual: they include the totality of the past, but at a more or less expanded or contracted level. "Contraction" here takes on an entirely new meaning: in the passive synthesis of memory, the present designates the most contracted degree of the coexistent totality of the past, and the past in general, its most "relaxed" state (fourth paradox). "Between the past as pre-existence in general and the present as infinitely contracted past," writes Deleuze, "there are all the circles of the past constituting so many stretched or shrunk regions, strata, or sheets: each region with its own characteristics, its 'tones,' its 'aspects,' its 'singularities,' its 'shining points' and its 'dominant themes.'"¹⁴⁶

This second modality of time (the virtual past) open us up to an entirely new domain of passive syntheses. The first synthesis presents time under the modality of a duration in the present and as a succession of presents that pass; the second syntheses, under its first aspect, presents time under the modality of a totality. The first is a material repetition of successive and independent elements; the second is a spiritual repetition of the whole of time on diverse coexisting levels. In the first synthesis, presents succeed

¹⁴⁶The Time-Image, p. 99.

each other along a "horizontal" line of succession, and a single life can be said to pass through different events in an empirical time in which a variety of things fill the present one after the other. But from the viewpoint of the second synthesis, it is also possible to consider a life (or an episode from a life, etc.) as a single event in which all the passing presents are simultaneous, implicated with each other "vertically." What we live empirically as a succession of different presents (active synthesis) is also the ever-increasing coexistence of levels of the pure past (passive synthesis), between which there are non-localizable and non-chronological relations that transcend spatial locations and temporal successions.¹⁴⁷ It is the nature of this new set of passive syntheses that we must now attempt to determine.

§ 16. The Active Syntheses of Memory: Recollections, Dreams, Paramnesia.

Our first task is to show how this conception of the pure or virtual past provides a sufficient reason for the active syntheses of memory. In chapter two of Matter and Memory, Bergson has his own way of describing the first synthesis of habit (duration), making it correspond to three material aspects of subjectivity: perception, action, and affection. Perception is a received movement that implies immobile receptive organs: we perceive an object, minus that which does not interest us as a function of our needs.

¹⁴⁷The philosophical concept of destiny can be interpreted from the viewpoint of the pure past: we have the impression that each of our presents stands for the totality of time, that each successive present plays out "the same life" at a different level, that the successive presents of someone's life express a destiny that always plays out the same thing, the same story, but at different levels. This is why destiny accords so badly with determinism, but so well with freedom: freedom consists in choosing the level. On this interpretation of "destiny," see Difference and Repetition, pp. 83-84.

Action in turn is an executed movement that implies liberated organs of reaction: we react to the perceived image and translate it into a sensory-motor response, again as a function of utility. This link between perception and action is guided by what Bergson calls "the sensory-motor schema": we sense those features of an object that are useful to us (the cow recognizes grass), and then extend this perception into a motor movement that passes on to another object through a chain of associations (the cow moves on to another clump of grass). Affection, finally, is what occupies the gap or interval of time that appears between a received and an executed movement without filling it up.

Affection is the manner in which the subject experiences itself "from the inside." it relates movement to a pure "quality" as a lived state that is no longer extended in a reaction. In each of these three aspects, subjectivity has a sensory-motor or material sense, even when these movements are "absorbed" by the subject in an affection.¹⁴⁸ Perception, action, and affection taken together serve to define what Bergson calls automatic or "habitual" recognition.

But there is also a second mode of recognition, which Bergson terms attentive recognition, and which sets Bergson on the track of the second synthesis. Rather than extending perception into movement, I revert to the singularity of the object, so as to pick out features of the object that were not actualized from the utilitarian viewpoint of habitual recognition. In the first case, I remain on one and same plane, moving from one

¹⁴⁸These three material aspects of subjectivity form the bases of Deleuze's analysis of the "movement-image" in cinema. For summary statements, see The Movement-Image, pp. 63-66, and Bergsonism, pp. 52-53.

object to another through a horizontal chain of associations (resemblance, analogy, contiguity, etc.). In the second case, however, the object remains the same, but is now made to pass through a number of different planes or circuits that correspond to its "virtual" layers or aspects. Bergson illustrates this in a second diagram that functions as a correlate to the figure of the cone. "It will be seen that the progress of attention results in creating anew not only the object perceived, but also the ever widening systems in which it may be bound up; so that in the measure in which the circles B, C, D represent a higher expansion of memory, their reflection attains in B', C', D' deeper strata of reality."¹⁴⁹

In attentive recognition, then, an actual image, rather than extending into movement, links up with a virtual image and forms a circuit with it. But what is capable of playing the role of a virtual image? Bergson answers: it is in memory that the virtual images exist. We no longer move from one actual to another, but from an actual image to a virtual memory that coexists with it. It is at this point that we enter into the second synthesis of memory, which entails a new dimension of the passive subjectivity we are considering. In chapter three of Matter and Memory, Bergson describes aspects of subjectivity that are no longer motor or material (perception, action, affection), but rather temporal and spiritual. The virtual image is not a psychological state or consciousness, but rather exists outside of consciousness, in time. Bergson argues that it is recollection that initially defines this new dimension of subjectivity. To be sure, recollection images already intervene in habitual recognition, albeit in a secondary and accidental manner, by

¹⁴⁹Bergson, Matter and Memory (New York: Zone Books, 1988), p. 105. For reproductions of Bergson's two figures, see The Time-Image, p. 294 (first figure) and p. 289 (second figure).

inserting themselves into a stimulus and a response and thereby contributing to the better adjustment of the motor mechanism by reinforcing it with a psychic causality. But in attentive recollection, our perceptions are no longer extended into action or absorbed in an affection, but enter into direct relation with time, into the "circuits" of time. In recollection, rather than linking up our actual image with other actual images through the mechanisms of association, we instead link up our actual image with a virtual image of the pure past that corresponds to a former present.

What happens when, in the actual present, we voluntarily seek the recollection of a former present that escapes us ("Who was that man...")? Bergson's analyses in Matter and Memory present us with the following schema. Starting from our actual present, we first place ourselves at once, in a kind of Kierkegaardian "leap," into the past in general which coexists with our present. Then, depending on the nature of the recollection we are looking for, we jump into the particular level or region of the past in which we think the virtual image might be hidden ("Was it a friend from childhood or youth, from school or the army?"). It is true that these regions--childhood, adolescence, maturity, and even death--appear to succeed each other, but they succeed each other only from the point of view of the former presents which marked the limit of each of them. They coexist, in contrast, from the point of view of the actual present which in each case represents their common limit or their most contracted state. We jump into a chosen region, even if we have to return to the present to make another jump, in a continually renewed search, if recollection is not where we sought it. But if we find it, if the pure past is actualized in a "recollection-image" ("He is someone I met last week"), it is because we have located the

"pure recollection" in the place where it was, a pure virtuality contained in the hidden zones of the past as it is in itself. "The past leaves the state of pure memory," writes Bergson, "and coincides with a certain part of my present."¹⁵⁰ We leave to the side here the complex question of how a pure virtual is actualized, which brings into play all the problems of Bergsonism.¹⁵¹ The essential point is this: recollection is what is represented in the present (in the actual present as a former present), but it is by the pure past that time is thereby deployed in representation.

This, for Deleuze, is the Bergsonian revolution, which completes that of Kant: we do not move from the present to the past, but from the past to the present. In the same way that we do not perceive things in ourselves, but at the place where they are, we only grasp the past at the place where it is in itself, and not in ourselves, in our present. "The virtual image (pure recollection) is not a psychological state or a consciousness: it exists outside consciousness, in time, and we should have no more difficulty in admitting the virtual insistence of pure recollections in time than we do for the actual existence of non-perceived objects in space....Just as we perceive things in space at the place where they are, and have to place ourselves among things to perceive them, we go to look for recollection in the place where it is, we have to place ourselves with a leap into the past in

¹⁵⁰Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 140.

¹⁵¹On the question of how a pure recollection takes on a psychological existence, which brings into play Bergson's distinction between a psychological unconscious and the ontological unconscious of the pure past, see Deleuze's analyses in Bergsonism, pp. 62-71, where he distinguishes between five aspects of actualization: translation (which ensures a point of contact between the past and the present); rotation (which ensures an expansion of the past in the present); the dynamic attitude of the body (which ensures the harmony of the first two movements); the mechanical movement of the body (the sensory-motor scheme that

general, into these purely virtual images which have been constantly preserved through time. It is in the past as it is in itself, as it is preserved in itself, that we go to look for our dreams or our recollections, and not the opposite."¹⁵² Far from being derived from a present or from a representation, then, the past is necessarily presupposed by every representation. "Memory is not in us," writes Deleuze, "it is we who move in a Being-memory."¹⁵³

Recollection, however, tells us little about the nature of the virtual past as it exists in itself. Recollection still respects the empirical progression of time and the exigencies of psychological memory: a recollection-image is not itself virtual, but rather actualizes a virtuality; it only represents the former present that the past "had been." "Representation concerns and reaches only those presents which result from active synthesis, thereby subordinating all repetition to the identity of the actual present in reflection, or to the resemblance of the former present in reproduction."¹⁵⁴ For this reason, Deleuze argues, we learn much more about the nature of the virtual past through the disturbances of memory or the failures of recollection than through their its successes. It is from this point of view that the phenomena of dreams present us with a much more complex synthetic process. In dreams, the virtual image of the past is not directly actualized in an image of the present, as in a recollection, but instead becomes actualized in a different ensures the proper utility of the whole); and finally displacement (by which the past is actualized only in terms of a present that is different from the one it had been).

¹⁵²The Time-Image, p. 80; see also Bergsonism, p. 56.

¹⁵³The Time-Image, p. 98.

¹⁵⁴The Time-Image, p. 84.

image, which itself plays the role of a virtual image being actualized in a third, and so on, in an entire series of anamorphoses (what Freud called condensation and displacement) that in principle can continue to infinity. The sensation of a green surface broken by white patches may evoke the image of a meadow dotted with flowers, but this image is only actualized by already becoming the image of a billiard table furnished with balls, and so on. It is as if time here achieves a profound freedom, an extremely "relaxed" state: images of the past in general move past us at a dizzying speed in a kind of temporal "panorama," an unstable set of scattered and floating images.¹⁵⁵ But while dream images are virtual images, they are still in the course of being actualized in a consciousness or psychological state: the dream is always that of a dreamer.

Even more revealing, to turn to a third example, is Bergson's evocation of the phenomenon of paramnesia, or the feeling of déjà-vu ("I have seen this man somewhere before"). Paramnesia is an actual image that can be linked up with neither the motor recognition of perception ("This is Peter standing before me"), nor the memory-based recognition of recollection ("I remember seeing Peter last week"), nor even an anamorphic series of dream-images. It is a virtual image that is contemporaneous with the actual image, a double or mirror image that is as closely coupled to the actual image

¹⁵⁵The Time-Image, p. 57. Deleuze here cites several famous dream sequences in cinema, such as those of Buñuel's Un chien andalou, Keaton's Sherlock Junior, René Clair's Entr'acte, and Hitchcock's Spellbound (not the Dali sequence, but the series of widely separated images spread throughout the film: the impressions of a fork on a tablecloth, which become stripes on pajamas, then striations on a white cover, then a glass of milk, and finally a field of snow marked by parallel ski lines). See Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp. 162-163 (referring to the figure of the cone): "We tend to scatter ourselves over AB in the measure that we detach ourselves from our sensory and motor state to live in the life of dreams; we tend to concentrate ourselves in S in the measure that we attach ourselves more firmly to the present reality."

as a role to an actor, but without ever being able to be actualized: the present is the actual image, and its contemporaneous past is the virtual image. What paramnesia presents us with is not an actualization of the virtual, but the coalescence of the actual and the virtual, an internal circuit between a present and its own past, between an actual image and its own virtual image. "The virtual image in the pure state," writes Deleuze, "is defined, not in accordance with a new present in relation to which it would be (relatively) past, but in accordance with the actual present of which it is the past, absolutely and simultaneously."¹⁵⁶ This is no longer a recollection-image, nor a dream-image, but what Deleuze calls a crystal-image: what we see in the crystal is the point of indiscernibility between the actual image that passes and the virtual image of the past which is preserved. "The crystal is like a ratio cognoscendi of time," writes Deleuze. "while time, conversely, is ratio essendi."¹⁵⁷

§ 17. The Event as the Genetic Element of Time (Fitzgerald, Proust). If Deleuze forges this notion of the "crystal of time" in The Time-Image, it is because it makes visible what he considers to be the most fundamental operation of time. Since the past is constituted not after the present that it was but at the same time, time has to split itself in two at each moment as present and past, which differ from each other in nature. It has to split into two heterogeneous directions, one of which is launched toward the future and

¹⁵⁶The Time-Image, p. 79. Deleuze devotes an entire chapter, entitled "The Crystals of Time" (pp. 68-97) to the analyses of various crystal-images of the cinema, notably in the films of Tarkovsky, Ophüls, Renoir, Fellini, and Visconti.

¹⁵⁷The Time-Image, p. 98.

makes the presents pass on, while the other preserves all the past. Whereas the first synthesis constituted a living and material present that absorbed both the past and the future (Chronos), the second synthesis constitutes a future and a past that divide the present at every instant and subdivide it ad infinitum into past and future, in both directions at once--a series that constitutes an empty form of time devoid of all matter (Aion).¹⁵⁸ The form of time is freed from the cycles of the actual present and stretches itself out in a straight line, limitless in either direction.¹⁵⁹ The present here becomes a pure Event without thickness or extension, a moment of abstraction whose primary role is to divide and subdivide every present in both directions at once, toward the past that is preserved and toward the future into which the present is launched. Like the Dedekind cut in mathematics, the Instant is a limit or frontier that determines noncommensurable relations between two series but belongs to neither, an irrational cut that has a disjunctive rather than a conjunctive or associative value. The course of time (chronology) is only the empirical form of time, the manner in which time is represented; but the pure form of time refers to relations of a completely different nature that are no less real and no less temporal.

¹⁵⁸On the relation between these two readings of time, Chronos and Aion, see The Logic of Sense, series 23, pp. 162-168. See also The Logic of Sense, p. 63: "What is going to happen? What has just happened? The agonizing aspect of the pure event is that it is always and at the same time something which has just happened and something about to happen: never something which is happening." Events also guarantee the reversibility between past and future, since by themselves they are atemporal matrices.

¹⁵⁹This is how Deleuze interprets Kant's fracturing of the cogito. If we are internal to time, if time is an interiority in which we move and change, if our subjectivity is always that of time, it is because time is a pure virtuality that divides itself into two as both the affector (making presents pass, replacing one by the other while going toward the future) and the affected (preserving all the past, dropping it into an obscure depth): "the affect of the self by itself" as a definition of time (The Time-Image, p. 83). See Foucault, p. 107: "Memory is the real name of the relation to oneself, or the affect of the self by itself."

This concept of the event plays an extremely important role in Deleuze's philosophy. "In all my books," he has written. "I have sought the nature of the event."¹⁶⁰ The event seems to play between two temporal modes: there is the present of its effectuation in a state of things, but also the paradoxical instant in which the event cannot be reduced to its actualization. This is what Deleuze calls a pure event, which is by nature virtual: it is always that which has just happened and that which is about to happen, but never that which is happening (it is never actual). The pure event is a paradoxically empty time in which nothing happens, but also a pure form of change. An event is always actualized in a living present, but this present is always passing, and always giving way to another present. In itself, a pure event therefore never exists in the present, but is rather what makes the future (not yet but always already) and the past (still present but already past) coincide in the passing present. This is the paradox of becoming.¹⁶¹ The present is that which passes, but it cannot give an account of its own passing apart from the interminable instantaneity of the event. This is no longer the relative speed of variable presents or milieus, but an absolute and instantaneous speed, a pure differential of space-time that no longer depends on a determinate time or an

¹⁶⁰Negotiations, p. 141.

¹⁶¹See The Logic of Sense, p. 1: "What I say, 'Alice becomes larger,' I mean that she becomes larger than she was. By the same token, however, she becomes smaller than she is now. Certainly, she is not bigger and smaller at the same time. She is larger now; she was smaller before. But it is at the same moment that one becomes larger than one was and smaller than what one is becoming. This is the simultaneity of a becoming whose characteristic is to elude the present. Insofar as it eludes the present, becoming does not tolerate the separation or the distinction of before and after, or of past and future. It pertains to the essence of becoming to move and to pull in both directions at once."

extended space.¹⁶² The event is no longer that which takes place in time (the actual), but a transcendental synthesis that gathers together and distributes the before and the after around the static caesura of the Instant (the virtual).

Deleuze has made use of this concept of the event in his numerous analyses of literary works. In several intriguing texts, for example, Deleuze has suggested that, as literary genres, the "novella" and the "tale" [conte] can be defined formally in terms of a pure event that never appears as such in the text: the novella is organized around the question, "What happened?" whereas the "tale" finds its structural principle in the question, "What is going to happen?" The novel, by contrast, integrates both the novella and the tale into the variation of its living present, in which what happened and what is going to happen designate retentions and protentions of the present itself (first synthesis). The detective novel is in this sense a hybrid genre: there is a something = x that has happened in the past, such as a murder or theft, a former present that will be discovered and retrieved in the actual present (active synthesis of memory). But in the novella and the tale, what happened and what is going to happen always take place in relation to an "event = x" that is never given in itself (passive synthesis of memory). The novella writer (Fitzgerald, Henry James, Chekhov, Carver) and the tale writer (Maupassant) each write in the present, but a present that is divided at every instant into a past perfect (what "has-been") and future perfect (what "will-have-been") by a pure event that is neither given nor

¹⁶²On the notion of the event as a differential, see François Zourabichvili, Deleuze: Une philosophie de l'événement (Paris: PUF, 1994), p. 93. Chapter four of Zourabichvili's book ("Temps et implication") contains an excellent analysis of Deleuze's theory of time.

even giveable. The novella thus has a fundamental relation to the form of secrecy, and the tale, to the form of discovery, but secrecy and discovery here are pure forms that have no determinate content. As such they put us into relation with something that remains forever imperceptible, unrememberable, unknowable: a form of the secret which remains impenetrable, and a form of discovery independent of what can be discovered. This is what F. Scott Fitzgerald presents in "The Crack-Up," which Deleuze considers to be one of the great American novellas. "Here is a man and a woman," comments Deleuze, "who have, as we say, everything it takes to be happy: looks, charm, riches, superficiality, and lots of talent. And then something happens that shatters them like an old plate or glass....What happened?" This question is not an appeal to recollection or reflection: it makes visible the exact structure of the fractured self, constituted in time by an event (the "crack") that is never present but always already-past and yet still-to-come. An indiscernible event, writes Fitzgerald, a something = x that is the source of his inspiration as well as of its drying up, the locus of his thought as well as its obstacle.¹⁶³

It is Proust, however, who figures most prominently in Deleuze's analyses of the syntheses of memory. Indeed, it was perhaps inevitable that Deleuze would write Proust and Signs after having worked on Bergson, since Proust's work in its entirety is mobilized around the elaboration of various structures of time (lost time, wasted time, time regained, original time). Proust's originality, however, lies in the fact that he posed a

¹⁶³Deleuze first makes this distinction in passing in The Logic of Sense, p. 63: "The \underline{x} , with respect to which one feels that it just happened, is the object of the 'novella'; and the \underline{x} which is always about to happen, is the object of the 'tale.' The pure event is both tale and novella, never an actuality." Chapter eight of A Thousand Plateaus (pp. 192-207) develops the idea through an analysis of novellas by Henry James, F. Scott Fitzgerald, and Pierrette Fleutiaux.

question that Bergson himself did not ask. For Bergson, even the deepest dream implies a corruption of pure memory, a descent from pure virtual memory into an actual image that necessarily corrupts it. This is the point at which Proust intervenes, taking up the arrow shot by Bergson: Is it possible to save the as it is preserved in itself, as it survives in itself, for ourselves? It is to this question that Proust's theory of involuntary memory offers its answer. Involuntary memory effects a passive synthesis that differs in kind from any active synthesis associated with voluntary memory. In a famous scene of the first book of A la recherche du temps perdu, the flavor of a madeleine involuntarily evokes the image of the town of Combray in the narrator's mind. This evocation, in Deleuze's interpretation of it, is based on three interrelated relations. First, there is a resemblance between an actual present (the madeleine) and a former present (Combray as it was lived). More profoundly, second, this resemblance refers us to a strict identity of a quality: the taste of the madeleine is common to the two sensations, or a sensation common to the two moments. But in turn, third, this sensation, the identical quality, implies a relation with something different: it envelops Combray as it is in itself, as a fragment of the pure past, the form of a past that was never present: it is a pure event that is irreducible both to the former present that it was (perception) and the actual present in which it might be reconstituted (the recollection of voluntary memory).¹⁶⁴

The Combray that appears in this episode is neither the Combray of perception, nor the Combray of recollection. Combray appears as it could never be experienced, it

¹⁶⁴On the role of memory in Proust, see Proust and Signs, Chapter 5, "The Secondary Role of Memory," pp. 51-64.

rises up in a form that is absolutely new: in a pure past, coexisting with the two presents, but out of their reach, out of reach of the present voluntary memory and of the past conscious perception. "A morsel of time in its pure state," says Proust, a singularity of the past that had never been lived as a present. This "in-itself" of the pure past is what Deleuze terms the memorandum, that is, something which is both unrememberable and immemorial from the viewpoint of the empirical exercise of the faculty of memory (recollection). Memory is essentially and necessarily linked with forgetting. But in empirical memory, what is recollected is something that must have already been seen, heard, imagined, or thought, and what is empirically forgotten is therefore something that cannot be grasped a second time by the memory that searches for it (it is too far removed, forgetting has effaced the memory or separated us from it). Transcendental memory, by contrast, and the essential forgetting that is its correlate, places us at the limit of empirical memory, and raises memory to its nth power. It does not grasp a contingent past, but the being of the past as such which makes possible the very exercise of memory.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁵Difference and Repetition, p. 140. In Proust, involuntary memory is only one stage, and an inadequate one, in a much more profound apprenticeship which is that of art. Involuntary memory is inadequate for two reasons. (1) Although it goes beyond voluntary memory (recollection) and dreams, involuntary memory only provides us with a fleeting image of the "original time" of the pure past: its revelations are extraordinarily brief, and cannot be extended without damage to us. (2) Although it reveals to us a region of the pure past, the memory is still localized at a particular place and moment (Combray, Venice, Balbec), and thus is inseparable from external and contingent determinations. According to Proust, only art is capable of giving us access to the pure past, and until we reach the final revelation of art, we will remain incapable of understanding what involuntary memory is revealing to us. "In Proust, the steeples of Martinville and Vinteuil's little phrase, which cause no memory, no resurrection of the past to intervene, will always prevail over the madeleine and the cobblestones of Venice, which depend on memory" (Proust and Signs, pp. 3-4). On all these issues, see chapter 5, "On the Secondary Role of Memory," pp. 51-64.

§ 18. The Passive Synthesis of Memory: Alogical, Non-Chronological, and Non-Localized Relations. With the notion of pure events, we reach the transcendental field as such for Deleuze. Deleuze ascribes to time a very different transcendental form than that given to it by Kant, and here his formulations are closer to Leibniz than to Bergson.¹⁶⁶ Kant error was to have determined the form of time by projecting its empirical relations into the transcendental, thereby subordinating the form of time to the active syntheses of representation. In the Second Analogy, for instance, Kant argues that the relations between events in time must necessarily take place in conformity with the physical law of cause and effect (principle of causal succession). In the Transcendental Ideal, similarly, after defining God as the sum total of all possibility, Kant argues that every "thing" is in effect a logical limitation of this totality, "inasmuch as part of it [reality] is ascribed to the thing, and the rest is excluded" (principle of logical exclusion).¹⁶⁷ But if the form of time constitutes the originary level of sensibility (passive synthesis), Deleuze argues, it cannot of itself guarantee an order of physical causality and logical compatibility that would be necessary and universal. On the contrary, time as an immutable form of change must designate a pure field of singularities with no determinate orientations, a field in which pure events enter into de-chronologized relations and alogical compatibilities.¹⁶⁸ These

¹⁶⁶See Deleuze's formulation in The Logic of Sense, pp. 102-103: "We seek to determine an impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field that does not resemble the corresponding empirical fields, what which nevertheless is not confused with an undifferentiated depth....Only when the world, teeming with anonymous and nomadic, impersonal and pre-individual singularities, opens up, to we tread at least on the field of the transcendental."

¹⁶⁷Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, "Second Analogy," A194/B239, pp. 218-233; and "The Ideal of Pure Reason," A577/B605, p. 491.

non-chronological and alogical relations imply the simultaneity and coexistence of the events that populate time, and designate what Deleuze terms the pure order of time.

What are these non-chronological and alogical relations? The description of the pure order of time necessarily implies what Deleuze calls a "falsifying" form of narrative.¹⁶⁹ In the history of thought, time has always put the notion of truth into crisis. This does not mean simply that truth varies according to the epoch; it is not the empirical form, but rather the transcendental form of time that puts truth into crisis. Since antiquity, this crisis has appeared in the form of "contingent futures": if it is true that a naval battle may take place tomorrow, how are we to avoid one of the following true consequences: either the impossible proceeds from the possible (since, if the battle takes place, it is no longer possible that it may not take place) or the past is not necessarily true (since the battle could have not taken place)?¹⁷⁰ Though it is easy to regard this paradox as a sophism, it nonetheless shows the difficulty of conceiving a direct relation between the form of time and the form of truth. In the seventeenth-century, Leibniz gave a strange and convoluted solution to this paradox. The naval battle may or may not take place, but not in the same world: it takes place in one world and does not take place in another

¹⁶⁸Jean-Clet Martin, Variations (Paris: Payot, 1993), pp. 78-79.

¹⁶⁹On this score, Deleuze's theory of time can be sharply contrasted with that provided by Paul Ricoeur in his Time and Narrative, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), for whom narrative "configures" the relations of time. Jean Greish compares the approach of both authors in his "Le Temps bifurqué," in Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 70 (1986), pp. 419-437.

¹⁷⁰P. M. Schuhl, in his Le dominateur et les possibles (Paris: PUF, 1960), discusses the role of this paradox in Greek philosophy. Jules Vuillemin discusses the question in detail in Nécessité ou contingence (Paris: Minuit, 1984). Deleuze points to its relevance in several contexts: see The Time-Image, 130-131, The Logic of Sense, p. 113-115, and The Fold, pp. 61-63, 81.

world, and although both these worlds are possible, they are not "compossible" with each other. Leibniz resolved the paradox and saved the truth by forging the concept of compossibility: it is not the impossible, but only the impossible that proceeds from the possible, and the past may be true without being necessarily true.¹⁷¹

But the crisis of truth thereby enjoyed a pause rather than a solution. For Deleuze (and for many modern philosophers), there is nothing to prevent us from affirming that impossibles belong to the same world, and that impossible worlds belong to the same universe, variants of the same story. This is the world presented by Resnais in his film Last Year in Marienbad: there is a present in which X claims that he knows A (so that A either does not remember or is lying), while A claims she has never met X (so X is either mistaken or playing a cruel joke on her)--two plausible but impossible presents that are simultaneously maintained in an "implicated" state. This is also the labyrinthine world presented by Borges in his story "The Garden of the Forking Paths": "In all fiction, when a man is faced with alternatives he chooses one at the expense of others. In the almost unfathomable Ts'ui Pên, he chooses--simultaneously--all of them. He thus creates various futures, various time which start others that will in turn branch out and bifurcate in other times....Fang, let us say, has a secret. A stranger knocks at his door. Fang makes up his mind to kill him. Naturally there are various possible outcomes. Fang can kill the intruder, the intruder can kill Fang, both can be saved, both can die, and so on. In Ts'ui Pen's work, all possible solutions occur, each one being the point of departure for other

¹⁷¹See Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil, trans. E. M. Huggard (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1985), §§ 414-416, pp. 370-373.

bifurcations."¹⁷² Contrary to what Leibniz believed, these worlds all belong to the same universe and constitute modifications of the same story: not-necessarily-true events that persist in the pure past as so many contingent futures. What the passive synthesis of memory present to us, in other words, is both the simultaneity of impossible presents and the coexistence of not-necessarily-true pasts: a direct presentation of time that breaks with the external succession of chronological time and makes visible the simultaneity and coexistence of the elements internal to time.¹⁷³

The pure form of time thus constitutes a nexus of pure events or singularities between which there are various types of non-chronological relations or syntheses: connective syntheses, which bear upon the construction of a single series: conjunctive syntheses, as a method of constructing convergent series; and disjunctive syntheses, which distributes divergent series as such. One of Deleuze's most profound and difficult theses is that, in the pure order of time, disjunction assumes an autonomous and paradoxical status. Normally disjunction is used logically in a negative or limitative manner in order to exclude predicates from a thing by virtue of the identity of its concept: either Fang kills the intruder or he does not; either X knows A or he does not, and so on. Disjunction becomes an affirmative principle, on the contrary, when both sides of the either/or are affirmed at the same time, "an inclusive disjunction that carries out the

¹⁷²Jorge Luis Borges, Ficciones, trans. Anthony Kerrigan (New York: Grove Press, 1962), p. 98.

¹⁷³Similarly, Buñuel's The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie presents different versions of the same meal that take place in irreducible worlds; and when Buñuel casts two characters, and two actresses, as one person in That Obscure Object of Desire, he does not present subjective (imaginary) points of view on one and the same world, but rather one and the same event in different objective worlds, all implicated in the event, in an inexplicable universe.

synthesis itself by drifting from one term to another and following the distance between terms."¹⁷⁴ This is not an identity of contraries, but rather the positive distance between different elements which is affirmed as such, without ever annulling or overcoming this distance. This notion of a disjunctive synthesis entails several consequences for Deleuze's conception of the subject: "Rather than signifying that a certain number of predicates are excluded from a thing by virtue of the identity of its corresponding concept, disjunction now signifies that each 'thing' is opened up to the infinity of predicates through which it passes, on the condition that it lose its identity as a concept and as a self."¹⁷⁵

Deleuze's temporal conception of the individual has its roots in Leibniz's philosophy. In Leibniz, the world is defined as a pure emission of singularities, which are prolonged along a series of ordinary points until they reach another singularity. An individual, in turn, is defined as a synthesis of a series of predicates. But for Deleuze, as for Leibniz, a predicate is never the attribute of a substantial being, but rather an event or singularity.¹⁷⁶ An individual will consequently be defined by the actualization of a certain number of convergent singularities or events. Leibniz defines Adam, for example, by the four singularities "to be the first man," "to live in the garden of Eden," to have a

¹⁷⁴ Anti-Oedipus, p. 77: "It is like the famous conclusion to Molloy: 'It is midnight. The rain is beating on the windows. It is not midnight. It was not raining.'"

¹⁷⁵ The Logic of Sense, p. 296; cf. 174.

¹⁷⁶ Within language, pure events are expressed, not as substantives ("green") but as neutral and undetermined infinitives ("to green"), from which voices, moods, tenses, and persons will be engendered when they are actualized in a real state of affairs. See The Logic of Sense, pp. 184-185, 214-215, and A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 263-265.

women created from his rib," "to sin." But now consider a fifth singularity: "to resist temptation." The problem is not simply that this singularity contradicts the fourth singularity "to sin"; it is rather that the lines of prolongation that pass through it do not converge with the others, they do not pass through common values. There is a divergence of series, a bifurcation in time: the world in which Adam resists temptation is not the same world in which Adam sins. There is therefore an infinity of possible worlds, each of which is defined by the convergence of its series or the condition of closure. In Leibniz, however, rather than making all possible worlds pass into existence at the same time, God instead chooses one of them--the Best of all possible worlds; and rather than creating an "ambiguous" Adam that would straddle several possible worlds, God creates "sub ratione possibilitatis" as many divergent Adams as there are worlds, each Adam including the entire world to which it belongs.

Freed from these theological exigencies, what one finds in Deleuze is a conception of the world as a "chaosmos": the theory of singularities submitted to the transcendental conditions of a nomadic distribution. For it is only at the level of actualization that we can speak of the inclusion of a predicate in a subject. But the virtual communication of events precedes the actual exclusion of predicates, and it is at this transcendental level that impossibility itself becomes a means of communication. Incompatibility, in other words, does not exist between two virtual events, but rather between an event and the world or individual that actualizes another event as divergent. One of Deleuze's primary arguments in his reading of Leibniz is that the logic of predication presupposes the distribution of pure singularities and the communication of

events in the transcendental field, to which Leibniz's original criteria of compossibility and impossibility must be applied.¹⁷⁷ Against Leibniz, Deleuze postulates the existence of a "vague Adam," a vagabond or nomadic Adam, an Adam = x, that straddles several possible worlds, and that is common to bifurcating series: a purely virtual individual that can never be actualized as such.

Why does Deleuze postulate such a principle of individuation? In an unstable system (such as an oversaturated solution), there are critical thresholds beyond which the variety of possible stable states introduces an element of uncertainty. At a certain distance beyond equilibrium, there is not only one possibility, but several possibilities between which the system is indecisive. What one calls a bifurcation is the critical point at which a new state becomes possible. As Prigogine and Stengers write with regard to physical systems, "the points of instability around which an infinitesimal perturbation suffices to determine the regime of macroscopic functioning of a system are points of bifurcation."¹⁷⁸ A rigorous description of a phenomenon must enumerate the bifurcations and fluctuations it traverses, which have decided the real or actual history of the phenomenon among all its virtual possibilities. In the fictional labyrinth described by Borges or Leibniz, however, it is not a matter of calculating an actual history but of describing the impossible worlds at the same time, in their coexistence and

¹⁷⁷See The Logic of Sense, p. 177, as well as Deleuze's analyses in The Fold, pp. 60-61. The principle of contradiction applies to actual predicates, but not to the virtual events from which they are derived, which are instead related to each other through Leibniz's criteria of compossibility and impossibility, that is, a calculus of infinite series which follow rules of convergence and divergence.

¹⁷⁸Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, La Nouvelle Alliance (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), p. 229.

simultaneity. What the virtual past presents us with is the Idea of an infinity of possible histories which are themselves real, even if they are not all actualized.¹⁷⁹ Freed from its subordination to the categories, the pure form of time entails a nexus of noncausal relations between events that forms a complex system of resonances and echoes spread out on a topological surface: non-chronological and alogical relations that surpass and temporal successions and logical linkages.

[We might note here that there is in turn a specific conception of non-extended space that corresponds to this non-chronological order of time. Kant, it is well known, was dependent on the Newtonian conception of physical space and the Euclidean conception of abstract space, which Deleuze redescibes in terms borrowed from modern science and mathematics. When time is subordinate to movement, space is defined as a regime of localizable relations, actual linkages, causal, and logical connections. It is concretely located in a hodological space (Kurt Lewin), which is defined by a field of forces, the oppositions and tensions between these forces, and the resolution or stabilization of these tensions according to the distribution of goals, obstacles, means, detours, and so on. Although movements may present many obvious anomalies, breaks, insertions, superimpositions and decompositions, they nonetheless obey laws which are based on the distribution of centers of forces or invariants in space (the point of gravity of the moving body, a privileged point of fixity for movement, etc.).¹⁸⁰ The corresponding

¹⁷⁹Leibniz, Theodicy, § 414, p. 371: "These worlds are all here, that is, in Ideas."

¹⁸⁰On the notion of hodological space, as well as its critique, see Gilbert Simondon, L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique (Paris: PUF, 1964), pp. 231 ff.

abstract form is Euclidean space, because it is the milieu in which tensions are resolved according to a principle of economy, according to the laws of extremum, of maximum and minimum (e.g. the shortest path, the most adequate detour, the minimum means for maximum effect, etc.). Time here remains dependent on movement and inferred from space: it still remains in principle a chronological time whose links are extended according to the laws of association, or continuity, resemblance, contrast, or opposition.¹⁸¹

But when movement becomes subordinate to time, this complementarity between a lived hodological space and a represented Euclidean space is fractured. Prior to the hodological space of action, there is a pre-hodological space which is no longer organized by sensory-motor connections. Such a space defines an energetic system that is neither stable nor unstable, but metastable, endowed with a potential energy defined by the singularities distributed within the system. There are no longer any centers or fixed points: forces lose the dynamic centers around which they organize space, just as weights lose the centers of equilibrium around which they were distributed, masses lose the centers of gravity around which they were ordered, and movements lose the centers of revolution around which they developed.¹⁸² Instead of being defined by their centers, forces are defined simply by their relations to other forces, by the membrane or

¹⁸¹The Time-Image, p. 128.

¹⁸²The Time-Image, p. 142.

topological surface that places them in contact.¹⁸³ Physically, the subject is never the expression of the final equilibrium of a system, but consists of an unlimited number of metastable states through which it passes. Time can no longer be a measure of movement, since movements and moving bodies have lost their invariants: the anomalies of movement, instead of being accidental or contingent, now become essential and primordial.

Likewise, prior to represented Euclidean space, there is a whole domain of disconnected, empty, or amorphous "spaces" whose nature can no longer be explained in a simply spatial manner. This is what Deleuze terms an "any-space-whatever" [espace quelconque], a concept he proposes to indicate the various types of spaces analyzed in modern mathematics (Riemannian, quantum, catastrophic, probabilistic, and topological spaces). Such spaces are collections of singular points or positions that coexist independently of the coordinates and orientations assigned to them in the extended space in which they are actualized: they are forms of space in which the connecting of parts is not predetermined but occurs through numerous non-localizable relations. Rather than the extended space of geometry, this is an intensive space (pur spatium), crisscrossed with axes, banded with zones, localized with milieus and fields, measured off by gradients, traversed by potentials, marked by thresholds, and so on. "What in fact manifests the

¹⁸³The Logic of Sense, p. 103. See Simondon, L'individu, 260-264: "The living lives at the limit of itself, on its limit....The characteristic polarity of life is lived at the level of the membrane: it is here that life exists in an essential manner, as an aspect of a dynamic topology which itself maintains the metastability by which it exists....The entire content of internal space is topologically in contact with the content of external space at the limits of the living; there is, in fact, no distance in topology: the entire mass of living matter contained in the internal space is actively present to the external world at the limit of the living....To belong to interiority does not mean only to 'be inside,' but to be on the 'in-side' of the limit."

instability, the heterogeneity, the absence of linkage in such a space is a richness in potentials or singularities which are, as it were, prior conditions of all actualization, all determination."¹⁸⁴ Time no longer derives from movement, movement and space are now derived from time, a non-chronological time that produces movements which are necessarily "abnormal" or "aberrant."¹⁸⁵ Michel Serres, under a similar inspiration, has recently developed a theory in which time flows neither in a linear nor circular movement, but in a turbulent and chaotic manner (time as percolation).¹⁸⁶

The non-chronological order of time, the non-localizable relations of space, and the a-logical relations between events define for Deleuze the transcendental field of the passive ego, which has a completely different structure from the transcendental field Kant derives from the active syntheses of the I think. It is the coexistence of simultaneity of these elements and relations that constitutes the pure order of time. It defines a field that is purely virtual, since its elements and relations exist only insofar as they are actualized in the empirical successions of chronological time, the localized linkages of extended space, and the logical relations of excluded predicates. Habit is nothing other than the actualization or contraction of the potentialities, singularities, and events that populate the transcendental field in the determinate milieus and territories of the living present. It is in

¹⁸⁴The Movement-Image, p. 109.

¹⁸⁵The Time-Image, p. 129.

¹⁸⁶Serres has developed this "percolative" theory of time in several recent works: see Eclaircissements: Entretiens avec Bruno Latour (Paris: Flammarion, 1992), pp. 88-95; Atlas (Paris: Julliard, 1994), pp. 87-116; and Les origines de la géométrie: Tiers livre des fondations (Paris: Flammarion, 1993), pp. 36-56.

this sense that the passive syntheses of memory constitute the ground for the passive syntheses of habit.

III. Third Synthesis: The Future as the Unconditioned Element of Time (Series and Event).

§ 19. Bare Repetition and Clothed Repetition (Freud, Hölderlin, Marx). We turn now, finally, to the third synthesis of time, which brings us into a new element: if habit constitutes the foundation of time, and memory its ground, the third synthesis approaches the unconditioned element of time. We will approach this third synthesis, drawing freely on examples from various domains (psychoanalysis, tragedy, history) by considering a distinction Deleuze makes between two forms of repetition: the "bare" repetition of the active syntheses (representation) and the "clothed" repetition of the passive syntheses.

Bare repetition is a mechanical or brute repetition of the Same. It refers to an ultimate or originary instance or first time (A), which is then repeated a second, third, fourth time, and so on (A', A'', A''', etc.). In cases of psychic repetition, this originary term is subject to various disguises and displacements, which are secondary yet necessary. In Freud, for instance, it is the "primal scene" that functions as the original term. Our different adult loves "repeat" our childhood love for the mother, but our original love is later repressed and disguised in our subsequent loves by various mechanisms of condensation (metonymy) and displacement (metaphor). I repeat because I repress (amnesia), and the task of therapy, through transference, is to recover this hidden origin in order to no longer repeat (anamnesis). In Plato, the form of time is introduced into

thought under the category of reminiscence (mnemosyne). The ultimate term or model is the Idea, but since Plato is unable to assign an empirical moment in the past when the Idea was present, he invokes an originary moment: the Idea has been seen, but in another life, in a mythical present (e.g. the circulation of souls in the Phaedrus). If "to learn is to remember," it is because the real movement of learning implies a distinction in the soul between a "before" and an "after": there is a first time, in which we forget what we knew, and a second time in which we recover what we have forgotten.¹⁸⁷ In either case, bare repetition refers back to a former present, whether empirical or mythical, which has a prior identity, and which provides the "thing" to be repeated (even if it is distorted in subsequent repetitions), the thing which conditions the whole process of repetition and in this sense remains independent of it.

But the question Deleuze poses is the following: are the disguises and variations, the masks and costumes, something added secondarily "over and above" the original term, or are they on the contrary "the internal genetic elements of repetition itself, its integral and constituent parts"?¹⁸⁸ In this case, we would no longer have a bare or mechanical repetition of the Same, but a "clothed" repetition of the Different. Here again, Deleuze turns to Proust's analyses rather than those of Freud or Plato. In A la recherche du temps perdu, for instance, Proust shows that love's repetition is a serial repetition: the hero's various loves--for Gilberte, Mme. de Guermantes, Albertine--form a series in

¹⁸⁷See Difference and Repetition, pp. 16-19 (on Freud); and pp. 87-88, 141-142 (on Plato).

¹⁸⁸Difference and Repetition, p. 17.

which each successive love adds its minor differences and contrasting relations to the preceding loves. (Indeed, each particular love itself assumes a serial form--beginning, course, termination--in which the hero first explicates the hidden world enveloped in his lover, and then retraces his steps in forgetting her.) But in Proust the series of loves does not refer back to the hero's mother: the childhood love for his mother is already a repetition of other adult loves (Proust's hero replays with his mother Swann's passion for Odette), and the mother's love in turn refers to repetitions he has not himself experienced. There is no first term in what is repeated that can be isolated from the series. My parents are not the ultimate terms of my individual subjectivity, but rather the middle terms of a much larger intersubjectivity. At the limit, the series of all our loves transcends our experience, and links up with repetitions that are not our own, thereby acceding to a transsubjective reality. The personal series of our loves thus refers both to a more vast transpersonal series and to more restricted series constituted by each love in particular.¹⁸⁹

What then is being repeated throughout these series? "What is this content which is affected or 'modified' in the third form of time?"¹⁹⁰ In clothed repetition, what is repeated is not a prior identity or originary sameness, but rather a virtual object or event

¹⁸⁹On the theme of series in Proust, see Proust and Signs, chapter 6, "Series and Group," p. 65-81. One of the essential critiques that Deleuze and Guattari level against psychoanalysis is that it reduces the unconscious to the familial coordinates of the primal scene or the Oedipal triangle ("daddy-mommy-me"); see, for instance, Anti-Oedipus pp. 97, 91: "The father, mother, and the self are directly coupled to the elements of the political and historical situation: the soldier, the cop, the occupier, the collaborator, the radical, the resister, the boss, the boss's wife....The family is by nature eccentric, decentered....There is always an uncle from America; a brother who went bad; an aunt who took off with a military man....The father and mother exist only as fragments...inductors or stimuli of varying, vague import that trigger processes of an entirely different nature."

¹⁹⁰Difference and Repetition, p. 299.

(an "object = x") which, in Lacan's terminology, is always displaced in relation to itself and has no fixed identity. The repeated object is a difference that differentiates itself in being repeated.¹⁹¹ The variations in the series do not come from without, but express the differential mechanisms which belong to the essence and origin of what is repeated. It is because this object constantly circulates, always displaced in relation to itself, that it determines the transformations of the terms and the modifications of the relations in the series. "Repetition is constituted only with and through the disguises which affect the terms and relations of the real series, but it is so because it depends upon the virtual object as an immanent instance which operated above all by displacement."¹⁹² Our loves do not refer back to the mother: rather the mother simply occupies a certain place in relation to a virtual element operating in the series which constitutes our present, a place which will necessarily be come to be filled by another character in the series. This is where the third synthesis connects with the second synthesis, and its essentially "falsifying" character. The virtual object refers neither to an empirical moment or a mythical moment, but belongs essentially to the past, and as such is unrememberable in itself: what is repeated can never be represented in the present, but it always disguised in the roles and masks it produces. More precisely, repetition does not refer to something underneath the masks, but rather is formed from one mask to the other. (Hence, in

¹⁹¹Lacan develops this theme most famously in his "Seminar on The Purloined Letter," trans. Jeffrey Mehlman, Yale French Studies 48 (1972), p. 55: "What is hidden is never but what is missing from its place, as the call slip puts it when speaking of a volume lost in the library. And even if the book be on an adjacent shelf or in the next slot, it would be hidden there, however visibly it may appear." See also Logic of Sense, pp. 40-41, which cites a parallel text of Lewis Carroll's.

¹⁹²Difference and Repetition, p. 105.

psychoanalysis. Deleuze suggests that transference can never serve to identify events or persons, but can only serve to authenticate the differential roles and to select their masks.)¹⁹³ How does a virtual event of the past serve as the unconditioned element of the future?

From the viewpoint of the third form of repetition, Deleuze suggests that it is Hölderlin, rather than Fichte or Hegel, who is the true and direct descendent of Kant. Commenting on the pure form of time, Hölderlin said that time no longer "rhymed" because it was distributed into a before and an after on the unequal sides of a "caesura," so that beginning and end no longer coincided.¹⁹⁴ It is this caesura, along with the before and after which it ordains, that constitutes the fracture of the "I think": the caesura is exactly the point at which the fracture appears. In his "Remarks on Oedipus," Hölderlin saw in the empty form of time the essence of tragedy: totality of time is ordered around an event in which the before and the after are put into series. Hölderlin characterizes this structure as follows. --The past (the before) appears in the form of an imagined but problematic act (an action = x) that is "too big for me." Oedipus has already carried out the act. Hamlet has not yet done so, but in either case the act is a virtual object that exists as such only in the pure past. The memory exists in the hero, but it is not recollected, and acts within the hero like something hidden: it is enacted, played out, repeated, without

¹⁹³See Difference and Repetition, p. 19.

¹⁹⁴Friedrich Hölderlin, "Remarks on Oedipus" and "Remarks on Antigone," in Essays and Letters on Theory, trans. and ed. by Thomas Pfau (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 101-116. See also Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe's commentary in "The Caesura of the Speculative," in Typographies, ed. Christopher Fynsk (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 208-235.

being known. Oedipus's actions do not unfold according to the logic of his representations, but according to the hidden logic of repetition: the repetition of the Sphinx's riddle. The practical problem of tragedy is that "this unknown knowledge must be represented as bathing the whole scene, impregnating all the elements of the play and comprising in itself all the powers of mind and nature, but at the same time the hero cannot represent it to himself--on the contrary, he must enact it, play it, and repeat it until the acute moment that Aristotle called 'recognition.'"¹⁹⁵ --It is at this point, in the present (the during), that repetition and representation merge without, however, being confused. The knowledge as it is represented on the stage and as repeated by the actor are recognized to be the same. This is the present of metamorphosis, in which the hero becomes equal to the act, and projects an ideal self in the image of the act. This is marked by Hamlet's sea voyage and by the outcome of Oedipus's inquiry: the hero becomes "capable" of the act. --But it is in the future (the after) that repetition is revealed to be the production of something new that surpasses both the past and the present. In the third synthesis, something new is produced that destroys both the condition (the past) and the agent (the present). "This signifies that the event and the act possess a secret coherence which excludes that of the self: that they turn back against the self which has become their equal and smash it to pieces, as though

¹⁹⁵Difference and Repetition, p. 15 and Critique et clinique, p. 41. See Hölderlin, pp. 101-102 (translation modified): "For the tragic transport is properly empty and the most unbound. Whereby, in the rhythmic succession of representations, in which the transport presents itself, what in meter is called the caesura, the pure word, the counter-rhythmic intrusion, becomes necessary in order to meet the on-rushing alternation of representations at its highest point, so that what then appears is no longer the alternation of representations but representation itself."

the bearer of the new world were carried away and dispersed by the shock of the multiplicity to which it gives birth."¹⁹⁶

In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx presents a "theatrical" theory of historical repetition that is very similar to Hölderlin's theory of tragedy. "All great events and historical personages occur, as it were, twice," wrote Marx famously, "the first time as tragedy, the second as farce."¹⁹⁷ Marx's theory, which he opposed to the abstract mediation of the Hegelians, is not simply that history "repeats" itself, but rather, more profoundly, that repetition is itself a condition of historical action. The resemblance between Luther and Paul, or between the French Revolution of 1789 and the Roman Republic, is neither a matter of analogy nor a concept produced by the reflection of historians. "Rather, it is in the first place for themselves that revolutionaries are determined to live their lives as 'resuscitated Romans' before becoming capable of the act which they have begun by repeating in the mode of a proper past, therefore under conditions in which they necessarily identify with a figure from the historical past."¹⁹⁸ If history is theatrical, it is because repetition is the condition of historical movement, by which historical "actors" or "heroes" produce something effectively new. Repetition is comic when it falls short, when instead of leading to a metamorphosis and the production

¹⁹⁶Difference and Repetition, pp. 89-90.

¹⁹⁷Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 15. Cf. Difference and Repetition, pp. 10, 91.

¹⁹⁸See Harold Rosenberg, "The Resurrected Romans," in The Tradition of the New (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 155-156: "Their action became a spontaneous repetition of an old role....It is the revolutionary crisis, the compelled striving for 'something entirely new,'" that causes history to become veiled in myth," as quoted in Difference and Repetition, p. 91; cf. p. 295.

of something new, it turns in on itself in a kind of involution, a bare or mechanical repetition that is the grotesque opposite of a true creation ("comic travesty replaces tragic metamorphosis").¹⁹⁹ The temporal order invoked by Marx, Deleuze suggests, must therefore be reversed. Comic repetition appears first by means of a defect in the mode of the past: the hero attempts to repeat an act that remains "too big" for him. Tragic repetition then appears only if there is a moment of metamorphosis, when the hero becomes "equal" to the act. These two moments, however, are not independent, and exist only for the third, beyond the comic and the tragic: a dramatic or joyful repetition that excludes both the past act and the present of the hero in the creation of something new.²⁰⁰ Here again, the third synthesis of time here constitutes a future which affirms the unconditioned character of the product in relation to the conditions of its production.²⁰¹

In each of these examples--Proust, Hölderlin, Marx--the third syntheses of time is a structure which is determines an order, a whole, and a series. Order designates the empty form of time which has abjured all content and which is distributed as the function of a caesura, a formal and static order of "before" and "after" which marks the division of the ego in time. Totality signifies the gathering together of the whole of time around a symbol, which is an image of the caesura or the action to be undertaken (the "object = x" or "action = x"), and which is adequate to time in its entirety. The temporal series

¹⁹⁹Difference and Repetition, pp. 91-92

²⁰⁰Proust and Signs, p. 72: "There is something tragic about what is repeated, but something comic in the repetition itself, and more profoundly, a joy of repetition understood, or of the comprehension of its law" (emphases added).

²⁰¹Difference and Repetition, p. 94.

designate the confrontation of the ego with the whole of time or the image of the action, which distributes time and its dimensions as a function of this singular event. each of which is characterized by a form of repetition: repetition by default (the action is too big for me), the metamorphosis of the agent (the actor becomes-equal to the act), and the repetition of the future (the emergence of something new).²⁰² In the third synthesis of time, the present and past are dimensions of the future: the past is its condition, the present its agent, but both the condition and the agent are annulled in the production of the new. Repetition is revealed to be a category of the future, and the future, the unconditioned element of repetition. The present (habit) is the foundation of time, the past (Memory) is the ground of time, but the future is an ungrounding of both the foundation and the ground in favor of a future to come.

Deleuze's analysis of the pure and empty form of time assigns a completely difference structure to the subject that does Kant's. In Kant, the subjective unity of consciousness (the "I think") finds its objective correlate in the form of the object (the "object = x"). In Deleuze, the "Ego = Ego" form of subjective unity ceases to be valid, and gives way to Rimbaud's formula, "I is another": this is what Deleuze terms the process of becoming. And the Kantian object = x, which is always related to the form of

²⁰²Difference and Repetition, pp. 89, 110-111. See The Time-Image, p. 275: "The before and after are no longer themselves a matter of external empirical succession, but of the intrinsic quality of that which becomes in time. Becoming can in fact be defined as that which transforms an empirical sequence into a series: a burst of series. A series is a sequence of images, which tend in themselves in the direction of a limit, which orients and inspires the first sequence (the before), and gives way to another sequence organized as series which tends in turn toward another limit (the after). The before and the after are then no longer successive determinations of the course of time, but the two sides of power [puissance], or the passage of power to a superior power. The direct time-image does not appear in an order of coexistences or simultaneities, but in a becoming as a potentialization, as a series of powers."

identity in the object, gives way to the virtual object = x, a differential element that always lacks its own identity.²⁰³ The crack or fracture of the self is nothing other than the effect of this static ordering of time, a self-relation whereby "I affect myself" in time. The passive ego is the phenomenon that corresponds to the pure and empty form of time without ever filling it, inseparable not only from its constitutive fracture (the caesura), but from the disguises and displacements that constitute its perpetual modification or becoming. The subject has no fixed identity, but is forever decentered, defined by the unlimited number of metastable states through which it passes without ever attaining a state of equilibrium.²⁰⁴ This is why the "I think" cannot be reduced to "I am a thinking being," as in Descartes, any more than "I travel" can be reduced to "I am a traveling being": thought is not a constant attribute of the subject, but an pure event or predicate that "passes from one thought to another."²⁰⁵ The subject is a series, a process of becoming that is inseparable from a power of perpetual metamorphosis and

²⁰³See Logic of Sense, p. 119: "Notice the distinction between the two x's: the x of the unformed paradoxical object which...lacks its own identity; and the x of the object in general which characterizes only the form of identity produced in common sense." See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 137: "The pure concept of this transcendental object, which in reality throughout all our knowledge is always one and the same, is what alone can confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, that is, objective reality." Deleuze reverses Kant by ascribing to the transcendental form of objectivity a differential structure (which is not "one and the same" throughout all our knowledge, but perpetually displaced throughout) and by freeing it from its ties to the transcendental ego (whose identity can no longer be guaranteed).

²⁰⁴Anti-Oedipus, pp. 19-20.

²⁰⁵The Fold, p. 53.

transformation, an open multiplicity that never ceases to displace its center by differing from itself.²⁰⁶

The notions of the external and the internal find new determinations in this conception of subjectivity. Time puts us into contact with an "outside" that cannot be reduced to the external world, but rather places us in contact with an object = x that can be something unsensible in sensibility (the sentiendum), something unimaginable in memory (the imaginandum), something unsummonable in memory (the memorandum), something unthinkable in thought (the cogitandum)--an unconditioned element that by nature appears under a problematic rather than a theorematic form.²⁰⁷ We will see in the

²⁰⁶ In The Time-Image (p. 134), Deleuze suggests that, in the films that approach this third synthesis of time, it is the forger [le faussaire] that becomes the character of the cinema: the forger is inseparable for a chain of forgers into which he metamorphoses (clothed repetition). There is no single forger, and if the forger reveals something, it is the existence behind him of another forger, as in Melville's The Confidence Man (the series of forgers which includes a dumb albino, a legless black man, a man in mourning, a man in grey, a man in a cap, an accountant, an herbal doctor, the great hypnotist) or Nietzsche's Zarathustra (the series of the "higher men" are all forgers). Deleuze notes that physics distinguishes between two forms of energy that correspond to the two types of repetition: "According to physicists, noble energy is the kind which is capable of transforming itself [clothed repetition], while the base kind can no longer do so [bare or mechanical repetition]....Power exists only in the form of a series of powers which are its exponents" (p. 141).

²⁰⁷ The Time-Image, p. 174. Whereas a theorem develops internal relationships from principle to consequences, a problem always introduces an event from the outside. Throughout his work, Deleuze has drawn a distinction, in principle, between the theorematic and the problematic, though in fact the two are in perpetual interaction. Mathematics has always been marked by this tension between an axiomatic approach, which is theorematic, and a "constructivist" or "intuitionist" approach, which emphasizes a calculus of problems very different from axiomatics. In mathematics, for example, setting a right angle into a semicircle is a theorem, since every angle in the semicircle is necessarily a right angle. But setting an equilateral triangle into a circle is a problem, since it can be set in many ways: cutting a straight line into two unequal parts is a problem, since it can be cut in many ways. Theorematics deduces properties from an axiomatic essence, whereas problematics involves numerous accidents that condition and resolve it the problem (deformations, transmutations, passages to the limit, and so on). The theorem belongs to the rational order, whereas the problem belongs to an affective order, and is inseparable from the metamorphoses, generations, and creations within science itself. See Georges Bouligand, Le déclin des absolus mathématico-logiques (Paris: Editions d'Enseignement Supérieur, 1949), as well as A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 361-374, where Deleuze draws a more general distinction between "minor" (problematic) and "major" (theorematic) forms of science.

next section that this entails a disjunctive theory of the faculties that stands opposed to Kant's conception of a "common sense." The internal, in turn, gives way to a new conception of interiority that is neither reflection (the cogito), nor intentionality (Husserl), but the "fold" of this absolute outside into the inside: "An Outside, more distant than any exterior, is 'twisted,' 'folded,' and 'doubled' by an Inside that is deeper than any interior, and alone creates the possibility of the derived relation between the interior and the exterior....Intentionality is still generated in a Euclidean space that prevents it from comprehending itself, and must be surpassed by another, 'topological,' space which establishes contact between the Outside and the Inside."²⁰⁸ Time as self-affection means, first, that the thinking self is ceaselessly affected by an outside as a problematic element of a pure memory, and second, that in thinking this unthought element, it constructs an inside-space that is co-extensive with this outside-space--an interior that is not a savage or raw "experience," but rather something that cannot be absorbed into experience, and brings about the perpetual metamorphoses of the subject.

§ 20. Recapitulation of the Three Syntheses: The Active and the Passive. One of our aims in this chapter has been to demonstrate the difference in nature that between the active syntheses (representation) and the passive syntheses (repetition) from the point of

²⁰⁸Foucault, p. 110. For parallel passages, see p. 86 ("an outside that is farther away than any external world and any form of exteriority"), p. 98 ("an inside which is merely the fold of the outside"), and The Time-Image, p. 208 ("an inside deeper than all the sheets of the past, an outside more distant than all the layers of external reality"). Gilbert Simondon, in L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique (Paris: PUF, 1964), pp. 260-265, has analyzed the structure of the living being in modern biology in terms of this topological relation between an absolute interior and exterior (the membrane as the absolute limit of the living).

view of the theory of time. From the viewpoint of the active syntheses of representation, repetition can only be explained by the form of identity in concepts, and is based on the model of a bare or naked repetition. "The first time being regarded as the Same, the question is asked whether the second displays sufficient resemblance with the first to be identified as the Same again: a question that can be answered only by the establishment of relations of analogy within judgment, taking into account the variations in empirical circumstances."²⁰⁹ This is why every argument grounded in the form of identity in the concept only gives us a nominal definition and negative explanation of repetition (what Deleuze calls "the antinomy of representation").²¹⁰ But when repetition is defined as a clothed repetition, as a differential element that is continually displaced and disguised, things are very different. The problem is no longer susceptible to the "analogies of reflection" on the part of a supposed observer, but must be lived as the internal conditions of a problematic temporal structure. Repetition no longer bears upon a first time that escapes it: repetition bears upon repetitions, upon various modes and types of repetition (the three syntheses)--the present is the repeater, the past is repetition itself, but the future is that which is repeated. In the third synthesis, present and past turn out to be no more than dimensions of the future: the past is its condition, the present is its agent, both of which are annulled in the future, or the production of something new.

²⁰⁹Difference and Repetition, p. 295.

²¹⁰In the first synthesis, repetition occurs because nominal concepts naturally possess a finite comprehension; in the second synthesis, repetition occurs because concepts are naturally devoid of memory; and in the third synthesis, repetition occurs because the concept remains unconscious: what is repeated does so only by dint of being uncomprehended, unremembered, and unknown.

CHAPTER THREE

ANALYTICS: THEORY OF THE CONCEPT

§ 1. Introduction. "Philosophy," write Deleuze and Guattari, "is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts."¹ Just as a musician works with sound, a painter with line and color, and sculptor with clay, stone, or metal, the philosopher is someone who works with concepts, who creates concepts that respond to true problems. One can certainly think without concepts, but as soon as there are concepts, there is philosophy. "So long as there is a time and a place for creating concepts, the operation that undertakes this will always be called philosophy, or will be indistinguishable from philosophy even if it is called something else."² But what is a concept? More precisely, what is a concept from a "differential" point of view? Deleuze did not take up this question explicitly until late in his career, in What is Philosophy? (1991), the last work he co-authored with Félix Guattari. The question, he says, "can perhaps be posed only late in life, with the arrival of old age and the time for speaking concretely...where one can finally say, 'What is it I have been doing all my life?'"³ Deleuze propose the following definition of a concept: a concept expresses a pure event. "For a long time one made use of concepts in order to determine what a thing is (essence). On the contrary, we are

¹Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 2, in which they quote Nietzsche, The Will to Power, § 409: Philosophers "must no longer accept concepts as a gift, nor merely purify and polish them, but must first make and create them, present them and make them convincing."

²What is Philosophy?, p. 9.

³What is Philosophy?, p. 1.

interested in the circumstances of the thing: in what case, where and when, how, etc.?
 For us, the concept must express the event, and no longer essence."⁴ In what follows, we will attempt to explicate this definition, first, by examining Deleuze's criticism of the theory of the concept proposed by Kant and Aristotle: second, by examining as a case study Deleuze's analyses of the concepts of "sadism" and "masochism," and the method of "symptomatology" he uses: third, by proposing three criteria which seem to summarize Deleuze's theory of the concept; and finally, by contrasting the philosophical concept as conceived of by Deleuze with the "functions" utilized in the domains of science, logic, and opinion.

I. THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT IN KANT AND ARISTOTLE

§ 2. The System of Judgment in Kant. Let us first examine the Kantian form of the Analytic. Deleuze accepts the Kantian definition of philosophy as decisive: knowledge through pure concepts. But if the critical philosophy was forced to change its bearings under the constraint of a new Dialectic and a new Aesthetic, the entire system of judgment that Kant develops in the Transcendental Analytic now finds itself profoundly modified as well. We saw in the first chapter that Deleuze, following Maimon, reproaches Kant for limiting his critique to a search for the conditions of possible experience, and for not having penetrated into the genetic principles of real experience. Deleuze applies this same critique to the Analytic of Concepts: "There is no reason to

⁴Negotiations, pp. 25-26. See also What is Philosophy? p. 21.

oppose knowledge through concepts and the construction of concepts within possible experience on the one hand and through intuition [real experience] on the other....Concepts are not waiting for us ready-made, like heavenly bodies. There is no heaven for concepts. They must be invented, fabricated, or rather created, and would be nothing without their creator's signature. Nietzsche laid down the task of philosophy when he wrote. '[Philosophers] must no longer accept concepts as a gift, nor merely purify and polish them, but first make and create them, present them and make them convincing.'...According to the Nietzschean verdict, you will know nothing through concepts unless you have first created them--that is, constructed them in an intuition specific to them: a field, a plane, and a ground that must not be confused with them but that shelters their seeds and the personae who cultivate them."⁵

This last sentence, referring to the cultivation of concepts and their seeds, echoes the passage with which Kant opens his *Analytic*, and can be compared with a parallel passage that appears in Kant's essay, "On the Different Human Races": "We shall follow up the pure concepts to the first seeds and dispositions in the human understanding, in which they lie prepared, till at last, on the occasion of experience, they are developed, and by the same understanding are exhibited in their purity, freed from the empirical conditions attaching to them" (the *Analytic*).⁶ "Man was destined to all climates and constitutions of the soil. Consequently, the varied seeds and natural dispositions of man lay prepared in such a way that, depending on circumstances, they could be developed or

⁵What is Philosophy?, pp. 7, 5.

⁶Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A66/B91, p.103, emphases added.

hindered in adapting to the place they occupied in the universe” (“On the Different Human Races”).⁷ Jean-Clet Martin has proposed a profound analysis of these parallel texts, showing that, if the Transcendental Analytic presupposes a system of empty places according to which a closed combinatory can be made to turn around itself, the double movement evoked by these two texts reveals, even if only for a brief moment, the possibility of an Analytic with an entirely different distribution. In both texts, there is a system of homogenous places (categories, races) that finalizes the development of certain “seeds” so as to impose upon them a grid of orientations and functions. Starting from this ensemble of seeds, distributed in an anarchic and undirected fashion, experience produces a distribution that is organized in conformity with the necessities of the agrarian life. As Kant argues in a later text, it is only with the appearance of agriculture that the soil renders the races irreversible and definitive. In the same way, it is on the occasion of experience that concepts find the necessary condition of their pure exposition, subtracted from the germinative anarchy that distributes them in all directions. The table of categories is to concepts (through the filter of judgment) what the soil is to races (through the filter of agriculture): a principle of sedentary distribution founded in a recognition and a finality. The four orientations of the table of judgment are nothing other than a sedentary distribution (differentiation) imposed upon a nomadic distribution of singularities (differentiation) that continues to function beneath it. Or rather, its closed

⁷Kant, “On the Different Human Races,” as quoted in Jean-Clet Martin, *Variations: La philosophie de Gilles Deleuze* (Paris: Payot, 1993), p. 106.

combinatory is an actualization of a differential field in which the virtual combinatories are maintained in a open state of a problematic Idea.⁸

What is it that being about this sedentary distribution in Kant? The Kantian notion of the concept is derived from the model of judgment. "Judgment," writes Kant, is "the faculty of subsuming under rules, that is, of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given rule."⁹ Since general logic abstracts from all content of knowledge, however, it cannot itself contain any rules for judgment. Thus, explains Kant, the sole task of the Analytic of Concepts is to give an exposition of the form of knowledge as it is expressed in concepts. From this purely formal point of view, judgment has two essential functions in relation to the manifold that it synthesizes in concepts.

On the one hand, judgment presupposes a function or faculty of identification that brings diversity in general to bear on the form of the Same. We have seen that, in Kant, this form of the Same was defined by the subjective identity of the self and its faculties (common sense), and by the objective identity of the thing to which these faculties refer (recognition). This double identity, however, remains purely static and empty, since we no more find ourselves before a universal indeterminate object than we are universal Selves. Thus, on the other hand, judgment also presupposes a dynamic

⁸Jean-Clet Martin analyzes these two texts in his Variations: La philosophie de Gilles Deleuze (Paris: Payot, 1993), pp. 106-109. On the agrarian question in Kant, see "The Conjectural Beginning of the History of Mankind," in Essays and Treatises on Moral, Political, and Various Philosophical Subjects, trans. John Richardson (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1993; reprint of 1798 edition), vol. 1, pp. 317-338: 330-334.

⁹Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A132-133/B171-172, p. 177.

instance capable of determining the indeterminate object as this or that, and of individualizing the self situated in this ensemble of object. This other instance is good sense [bon sens],¹⁰ in which judgment assumes a distributive function. The differential field constitutive of sensibility is here subordinated to a controlled movement that goes from the most differentiated to the least differentiated, from the singular to the regular, orienting the arrow of time from past to future, and ultimately equalizing and annulling difference by relating it to the form of an object or the identity of a subject. Good sense thus has two definitions, one objective and one subjective, which correspond to those of common sense: a rule of universal distribution and a rule universally distributed (Descartes: "Good sense is of all things in the world the most equally distributed").

Now these two functions of judgment, which are strictly complementary, necessarily find their expression in a distribution of concepts that is by nature fixed and sedentary, insofar as it is regulated by these exigencies of recognition, common sense, and good sense. In Kant, the Analytic of Concepts is only an analysis of the modalities and general orientations of recognition. Since recognition designates the accord of the faculties with regard to an object conceived under the form of the Same (common sense), it can serve as a guiding thread for a table of concepts in which they are oriented in a

¹⁰Deleuze frequently refers to this distinction between sens commun and bon sens, which plays on the polysemy of the French term sens. The latter term can refer to the "senses" (as in the sense of taste), to an "instinct" (a good sense of direction, or sense of rhythm), to a "meaning" (e.g., the literal or figurative sense or signification of a word), or a "direction." For Deleuze, sens commun refers to a faculty, or more precisely, to the principle that unites all our faculties; while bon sens primarily implies a directional component. Aller dans le bon/mauvais sens means "to go in the right/wrong direction"; sens unique means "one way" (i.e. a one-way street); sens interdit means "no entry." For Deleuze, bon sens implies a directional component that always goes from the most differentiated to the least differentiated. See Difference and Repetition, pp. 223-226.

direction everyone must follow, and distributed in a manner everyone must share (good sense). "A systematic 'topic.' such as that here given," writes Kant, "affords sufficient guidance as to the proper location of each concept, while at the same time indicating which divisions are empty."¹¹ This is what Kant presents in the Table of Categories: a cartography of the pure understanding in which every concept is assigned a place within a system of fixed coordinates:

¹¹Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A83/B109, p. 115.

Table 1: The Table of Judgments in Kant
(Sedentary Distribution)

Table of Judgments		Table of Categories
I <u>Quantity of Judgments</u> Universal Particular Singular	→	I <u>Categories of Quantity</u> Unity Plurality Totality
II <u>Quality of Judgments</u> Affirmative Negative Infinite	→	II <u>Categories of Quality</u> Reality Negation Limitation
III <u>Relation of Judgments</u> Categorical Hypothetical Disjunctive	→	III <u>Categories of Relation</u> Inherence and Subsistence Causality and Dependence Community
IV <u>Modality of Judgments</u> Problematic Assertoric Apodictic	→	IV <u>Categories of Modality</u> Possibility--Impossibility Existence--Non-existence Necessity--Contingency

Source: This table is a combination of those presented by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, A70/B95, p. 107 and A80/B106, p. 113.

The Analytic of Concepts proposed by Deleuze will break with this system of judgment completely. The question for Deleuze does not concern the completeness or incompleteness of Kant's table; the question concerns the nature of judgment as such, for it is of the nature of judgment to impose such a categorical or sedentary distribution of concepts. Furthermore, this complementarity of good sense and common sense will in turn enter into alliance with the Dialectical Ideas of the Self, World, and God, with God being supreme principle of identities and the instance toward which all directions converge (ideal focus). One of Deleuze's most important recent essays is entitled "To Have Done With Judgment," which shows how the problem of judgment provides the intimate link between the speculative and practical domains. "Kant does not invent a genuine critique of judgment, since this book on the contrary invents a fantastic subjective tribunal.... The judgment of knowledge implies a primary moral and theological form, according to which existence was related to the infinite following the order of time."¹² The type of distribution offered in the Table of Categories, as Kant himself says, is inseparable from the agrarian problem, insofar as it implies the establishment of enclosures, the delimitation of territories, and the assignation of "properties" and "classes." But we have seen that this sedentary distribution is itself imposed upon a prior nomadic distribution of singularities that renders it possible: beyond the categorical differentiation indicated by Kant, there is a form of differentiation that Kant does little more than indicate. It implies, as we have seen, a Dialectic in which Ideas are defined in

¹²Deleuze, "Pour en finir avec le jugement," in Critique et clinique, pp. 158-159.

purely differential, genetic, and problematic terms; as well as an Aesthetic in which space is defined intensively prior to its distribution in extensity, and time, in terms of a pure and empty form prior to its distribution into past, present, and future. But it also entails the possibility of an Analytic of Concepts that is applied directly to the virtual field, and which concerns neither the universal nor the individual, but the singular.

§ 3. The Arborescent Scheme in Aristotle. Before turning to Deleuze's characterization of this new Analytic, let us first consider a second conception of the concept from the history of philosophy. We saw in the first chapter that, according to Deleuze, it was Plato who inaugurated the reduction of difference to the principle of the Same and the condition of Similarity or imitation (theory of the Idea). But if Plato marks the moment of decision in which difference was reconciled with the concept, it is Aristotle who pushes this subordination to the point where it is caught up in an entire table of concepts that extends from the largest genus to the smallest species. Just as Deleuze sees Kantian as tied to an agrarian model of thought, he sees Aristotelianism as tied to an "arborescent" model of thought derived from the image of the tree and the root, which is neatly illustrated by Porphyry's famous diagram:

Table 2: The Taxonomic Table in Aristotle
(Arborescent Schema)

	Substance	etc.	generic difference (categories, summum genus)
Corporeal		Incorporeal	specific difference
	Body		subaltern genus
Animate		Inanimate	specific difference
	Living Thing		subaltern genus
Sensitive		Insensitive	specific difference
	Animal		subaltern genus
Rational		Nonrational	specific difference
	Human		infima species
Socrates	Plato	etc.	individual difference (individuals)

Diagram adapted from E. M. Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 29. On this theme of arborescent systems (which Deleuze and Guattari also apply to non-Aristotelian forms of thought such as Chomsky's grammatical trees), see A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 5, 16-18.

One of Deleuze's essential arguments in Difference and Repetition is that this Aristotelian taxonomy rests upon four principles that would come to assure the subordination of difference the various forms of identity. In the middle regions, the notion of "specific difference" rests upon the identity of the generic concept and the opposition of predicates in the determination of the species. At the top of the taxonomy, the highest genera (categories) are related to Being through the analogy of judgment (generic difference), while at the lower end, it is only through the perception of resemblances that the continuity of the sensible world can be gathered together in a species (individual difference). It is these four principles--identity, opposition, analogy, resemblance--that constitute the quadripartite nature of the concept in Aristotle. The most general of these principles is the subordination of difference (which must be distinguished from simple diversity or alterity) to the form of identity. Aristotle famously insists that different things differentiate themselves only through what they have in common: two terms are said to differ when they are other, not by themselves, but by belonging to some other definable thing ("the One becomes two"). Differences in species, for example, belong to their common genus ("horse" and "human" are species of the genus "animal"), differences in number belong to their common species ("Socrates" and "Plato" are numerical particularities of the species "human"), and categorical differences between the highest genera are said to belong to Being "according to analogy."¹³

¹³These and the following examples are from Porphyry, Isagoge, trans. Edward W. Warren (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1975), §§ 2-3, 9 (pp. 31-32, 43).

But what is "common" for each of these three types of difference (specific, generic, individual) is not the same: the relation of species to their common genus is not the same as the relation of individuals to their common species, or the relation of the highest genera (categories) to each other. Deleuze therefore distinguishes three strategies according to which Aristotelianism subordinates difference to a form of identity, each of which we shall consider briefly in turn.

1. Specific Difference. The first strategy concerns the role of identity and opposition in specific difference. When Aristotle writes, in the Metaphysics, that specific difference is the greatest and most perfect difference (megiste and teleios), he does so because specific difference allows the genus to remain the same in itself while becoming other in the differences that divide it. In order to maintain the identity of the generic concept in the process of specification, difference is determined as opposition, and pushed to the point of contrariety. "Rational" and "nonrational," for example, are contraries that specify the genus "animal" while preserving the identity of the latter. The process of specification, writes Deleuze, "links up difference with difference through the successive levels of the division, until the final difference, the species infima, condenses in the chosen direction the entirety of the essence and its prolonged quality, uniting this whole into an intuitive concept and grounding it in the term to be defined, which itself becomes a unique and indivisible thing (atomon, adiaphoron eidos)."¹⁴ When Linnaeus, under an Aristotelian inspiration, later dreamt of classifying the totality of living beings by enumerating a graded series of biological categories (kingdom, phylum, class, order,

¹⁴Difference and Repetition, p. 31.

family, genus, species), he posed a series of binary questions through which the "differential quality" of a thing, its sine qua non (that without which a taxon would not be itself but something other) could be determined by the progressive and orderly reduction of its characteristics to a single and decisive character.¹⁵ Specific difference thus represents the reconciliation of difference with the identity of the concept, but it thereby sacrifices a conception of difference-in-itself by determining difference as opposition or contrariety. As Deleuze puts it, Aristotle confused "the assignment of a proper concept of difference with the inscription of difference within the concept in general."¹⁶

These two criteria of identity and opposition, however, are only capable of regulating the middle regions of the taxonomy. The upper and lower extremities of the taxonomy are governed by two forms of difference that threaten to elude the identity of the concept and fall back into simple alterity. At the upper level, the "generic difference" between the ten categories is too large, since it is a difference between "uncombinables" that cannot enter into relations of contrariety; and at the lower level, "individual difference" is too small, since it is a difference between "indivisibles" that are likewise excluded from contrariety. Aristotelianism therefore developed separate strategies by which these maximum and minimum forms of difference could be "saved" by subordinating them to the "quasi-identity" of analogy or resemblance.

¹⁵On this theme, see Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Random House, 1973), chapter on "Classifying," pp. 125-165.

¹⁶Difference and Repetition, p. 32.

2. Generic Difference. Unlike specific difference, generic difference is not subject to the condition of being subordinated to an identical concept, or to a common genus such as Being. "Being is not one common genus of all things, nor are all things of the same genus because of one highest genus."¹⁷ The reason that Being itself cannot be a genus, as Aristotle himself notes, is precisely because differences exist. To predicate Being as an overarching genus would deny the being of differences; it would mean that the genus would be attributed twice, first to its species, and then to its own differentiae.¹⁸ It is this argument, borrowed from the nature of specific difference, which forces Aristotle to conclude that generic difference is of another nature than specific difference. Deleuze here identifies a "crack" [felure] that is opened in Aristotle's philosophy by the nature of difference: it is as if there were two "Logoi" in Aristotle that differ in nature but are nonetheless intermixed: on the one hand, there is the Logos of species, which rests on the condition of the identity or univocity of a concept in general, taken as a genus: but on the other hand, there is the Logos of the genera which, freed from this condition, move about within the equivocity of Being as in the diversity of the most general concepts.¹⁹

¹⁷ Porphyry, Isagoge, 6, 6-7. For the ten categories on Aristotle, see Topics, Book I, Chap. 9, 103b, 20 ("Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Position, State, Activity, Passivity").

¹⁸ Aristotle, Metaphysics, III, 3, 998b, 22-27: "It is not possible that either unity or being should be a single genus of things: for the differentiae of any genus must each of them both have being and be one, but it is not possible for the genus taken apart from its species (any more than for the species of the genus) to be predicated of its proper differentiae: so that if unity or being is a genus, no differentia will either have being or be one." Aquinas takes up the question in In VIII Metaphysic, lect. 2, n. 1697. The genus "animal," for example, would have to be predicated once to its species (the "human") and another time to its difference (the "rational"), thus constituting another species. See Aristotle, Topics, VI, 6, 144a, 35-40: "Animal is predicated of 'man' or 'ox' or other walking animals, not of the actual differentia itself which we predicate of the species. For if 'animal' is to be predicated of each of its differentiae, then 'animal' would be predicated of the species several times over."

¹⁹ Difference and Repetition, pp. 32-33.

Generic difference would therefore seem to point to a concept of difference freed from a strict subordination to identity. But Aristotle shrinks back from taking this path: he instead develops a unique conception of Being that preserves the uncombinable nature of the categories without falling into simple diversity or alterity (pure equivocity) but that also preserves their communality without asserting that Being is itself a common genus (pure univocity). To do so, he turns to the via media of analogy: what is generically common to species differs from what is analogically common to categories. When Heidegger inaugurated the modern renaissance of ontology in Being and Time, he did so by posing anew this question of ontological difference: What is the difference between Being and beings? More precisely, how is Being distributed among beings? Deleuze addresses this question in Difference and Repetition, not by confronting Heidegger directly, but by taking up the debate at the point where the issue formulated by Aristotle was posed in the most decisive terms, namely, the scholastic debate between the Thomists and the Scotists: Is being distributed among beings by analogy (Aristotle, St. Thomas) or univocally (Spinoza, Duns Scotus).²⁰

Now it is true that Aristotle himself does not speak of "analogy" in connection with the concept of being: it is only with Aquinas, or more precisely, with the theoretical

²⁰One will recall in this context that Heidegger's first text was on Duns Scotus. Deleuze's only direct discussion of Heidegger is the important footnote in Difference and Repetition, pp. 64-66, "Note on Heidegger's Philosophy of Difference." It is significant, however, that Heidegger never wrote directly on Spinoza, even though the Ethics is a book of pure ontology. From this point of view, Deleuze's Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza can be read as a direct response to the ontological question formulated by Heidegger, even though Heidegger is never mentioned in the text. In a crucial section of Difference and Repetition, Duns Scotus, Spinoza, and Nietzsche are identified as the three primary representatives of the doctrine of the univocity of Being, which Deleuze opposes to the analogical conception of Being. The footnote mentioned above discusses Heidegger's oscillation between these two options.

reformulations of Thomistic thought in Cajetan, that the Aristotelian terms came to be known, respectively, as the "analogy of proportionality" and the "analogy of proportion." and received a theological rather than ontological usage.²¹ But in both cases, these two forms of analogy were developed in order to propose a communal conception of Being--at once distributive and hierarchical--that would preserve the peculiar nature of categorical difference. On the one hand, Being forms a distributive unity (implicit and confused) and not a collective unity (explicit and distinct) such as is possessed by a genus or a category, insofar as the concept of Being has no content in itself, but only a content proportional to the formally different terms of which it is predicated.²² The "proportionality" involved here must not be understood in a strict mathematical sense ($a:b::c:d$), since the categories do not need to have an equal connection with Being; it is sufficient that the connection of each category with Being be internal to the category, since it is by its own account and by virtue of its own nature that each has unity and being. On the other hand, Being also tends to form a hierarchical series, insofar as the unique term is not only Being itself, but already the category of substance as the primary category. The scholastics will speak here of an analogy of "proportion": there is no longer a distributive concept that is related

²¹Cf. Aristotle, Categories, 1a §§ 1 and 6: "When things have only a name in common and the definition of the name which corresponds to the name is different, they are called homonymous." "When things have the name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is the same, they are called synonymous" (trans. J. C. Akrill). It was Boethius who translated aequivoce for homonymous and univoce for synonymous and set the terminology for the medieval discussions of analogy.

²²On this use of the terms "distributive" and "collective," see Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A582/B610, p. 494; and A644/B672, p. 533.

formally to different terms, but a serial concept that is related eminently to a principal term (substance), and to a lesser degree to the others.²³

Aristotle thus relates Being to the categories (generic difference) in a different manner than he relates a genus to its species, but in a way that still allows the "quasi-identity" of a concept to subsist, either under an implicit and confused form (distributive proportionality), or under a virtual form (hierarchical proportion). Here again, the sole agent capable of proportioning out Being to the terms of which it is affirmed is judgment, which specifies the concept and subsumes the particular under the general through the dual operations of common sense and good sense. "In this sense," writes Deleuze, "every philosophy of categories takes judgment as its model--as we see in the case of Kant, and still even in the case of Hegel....Analogy is itself the analogue of identity in judgment." writes Deleuze. "Analogy is the essence of judgment, but the analogy of judgment is the analogue of the identity of the concept."²⁴

3. Individual Difference. At the lower end of the table, finally, lies individual difference. Beneath the smallest species (species infima), we encounter the swarming of individuals, the boundless diversity of "logically indiscriminable particulars" that elude

²³The theological reformulations of analogy are summarized in Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.13.5: since "we cannot speak of God at all except in the language we use of creatures", knowledge of God can only be had analogously, either (1) in terms of an ordered relationship between two proportions, e.g. the divine goodness is to God as human goodness is to man (analogy of proportionality); or (2) by reference to a focal meaning or "prime analogate" such as "Goodness," which God possesses eminently and creatures only derivatively (analogy of proportion). On the relation of analogy to judgment, see Etienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot: Introduction à ses positions fondamentales (Paris, Vrin, 1952), p. 101: "The thomistic doctrine of analogy is above all a doctrine of the judgment of analogy."

²⁴Difference and Repetition, p. 33. See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 177: judgment is the faculty "of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given rule"; and Hegel, Logic, Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 230: "To judge is to specify the concept."

further specification and stand outside the concept.²⁵ Here again, Deleuze argues that it is only under certain conditions that differences are thought as individual. The problem of classification has always been that of the ordering of differences, but what the zoological and botanical classifications of the natural world themselves show is that differences are only ordered on the condition of "a direct perception of resemblances that presuppose a continuity of sensible intuition in the concrete representation."²⁶ Foucault has shown that the idea of a continuity in living beings ("there are no leaps in nature") was one of the requisites for any possible classification or natural history, for it alone could assure the immediate resemblance between beings. Out of this continuity, one then had to ask, for example, among several differences, which was the one that forms a veritable 'character,' i.e., that allows a group of beings, which resemble each other on a maximum number of points, to be grouped under a reflexive concept. For example, if one considers three plants, A, B, and C, of which A and B are ligneous, C is non-ligneous, B and C are blue, and A is red, it is 'ligneous' that forms the character, because it assures the greatest subordination of differences to the order of resemblances.²⁷ To say that A resembles B, B resembles C, etc., means that all these terms conform in varying degrees to an eminent term or quality as the principle behind the series. In short, for the concept to master

²⁵Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, II, 19, 100a. As Michel Foucault writes, "Beneath the ovine species, we are reduced to counting sheep." Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 182.

²⁶Difference and Repetition, p. 34.

²⁷Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 138-145 (on "Character"). Foucault shows that sight was given almost exclusive privilege over taste, smell, and touch in the determination of character, and even within this domain of visibility color provided little foundation for useful comparison. On these points, see Différence et répétition, p. 319.

individual difference. perception must first apprehend and continuously evaluate resemblances at the root of diversity: difference remains general, even if it refers to the individual.²⁸

In Aristotle, then, it is only in relation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined opposition, a perceived resemblance that difference can become the object of a concept: identity in the form of the undetermined concept, opposition in the relation of the determinations internal to the concept, analogy in the relation between the ultimate determinable concepts, and resemblance in the determined object of the concept itself.²⁹ Forms of difference that are not submitted to these conditions are rejected; or rather, they recover an effectively real concept only to the degree that they designate catastrophes: either ruptures in the continuity of a series of resemblances, or insurmountable faults between analogous structures. But "does not difference as catastrophe bear witness to an irreducible, rebellious depth that continues to act under the apparent equivalence of organic representation?"³⁰

The problem with the Aristotelian conception of being is that, in the middle regions of genus and species, everything passes through mediation and generality, and depends on a certain complicity between generic difference and specific differences. Consequently, Aristotelianism inevitably falls into two insurmountable difficulties at the

²⁸It is this movement from perception to conceptual representation (sensation-image-memory-experience) that is outlined by Aristotle in the well-known conclusion of the Posterior Analytics (II, 19, 100a). On the double subordination of difference to perceived resemblances and conceived identities, see Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 69.

²⁹Difference and Repetition, p. 29; cf. 34, 137.

³⁰Difference and Repetition, p. 34.

extreme limits of the taxonomic table. First, it cannot posit Being as a common genus without destroying the very reason one posits it as such, that is, the possibility of being for specific differences; it can conceive the universality of Being only as a quasi-identity (analogy). Second, it has to relate Being to particular beings, but it cannot say what constitutes their individuality: it retains in the particular only what conforms to the general (resemblance). A true universal is lacking, no less than a true singular: Being has only a distributive common sense, and the individual has no difference except a general and reflexive one. What is lacking in Aristotle is both a truly collective sense of Being (and not merely an analogical or distributive sense) and a comprehension of the play of singular differences within beings (and not merely generalities conceived within a network of resemblances).

Here again we can see that the entire taxonomic table could not operate apart from a differential field composed of singularities. This is the doctrine of the univocity of Being that Deleuze finds in a tradition stemming from Duns Scotus and Spinoza through Nietzsche: "When we say that univocal being is related immediately and essentially to individuating factors [singularities], we certainly do not mean by the latter individuals constituted in experience, but that which acts in them as a transcendental principle: as a plastic, anarchic and nomadic principle, contemporaneous with the process of individuation, no less capable of dissolving and destroying individuals than of constituting them temporally: intrinsic modalities of being, passing from one 'individual' to another, circulating and communicating under matters and forms....Univocity of being, insofar as it is immediately related to difference, demands that we show how

individuating difference precedes generic, specific, and even individual differences within Being."³¹ Aristotle's taxonomic table (arborescent scheme), no less that Kant's table of categories (sedentary distribution), exist only on the basis of an obscure substructure that entails a nomadic distribution of singularities, and a rhizomatic network of relations that are purely differential (and of which identity, opposition, analogy, and resemblance are only effects). For Deleuze, it is in this problematic, differential, and genetic domain that the philosophers install themselves when they fashion their concepts. The question now is: what is the analytic of concepts that corresponds to this ontology?

PART II: THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT IN DELEUZE

§ 4. The Critical and the Clinical: The Example of Sado-Masochism. When Deleuze and Guattari set out to define what a concept is in What is Philosophy? they use as their example the "fairly complex" example of the autrui. "Readers," they go on to advise, "may start from whatever example they like."³² We will follow that advice in what follows for two reasons. First, the definition they propose of the autrui [the other person] comes from Deleuze's own work, and apart from that context can easily be confused with concepts of the autre [the Other] that have recently been formulated, notably by Levinas. Second, a more useful and easily accessible conceptual analysis by Deleuze is in fact ready at hand, one which takes as its object two concepts that have both

³¹Difference and Repetition, p. 38.

³²What is Philosophy?, p. 19.

a popular and technical currency, and which provides a very clear example of the "differential" analytic of concepts that is at issue here. This is the analysis of the concepts of "masochism" and "sadism" that Deleuze proposed in his 1967 study Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty.

Long before the publication of the book of same title in 1991, Deleuze had often spoken of a project he called "The Critical and the Clinical." "The critical (in the literary sense) and the clinical (in the medical sense)," he wrote in Masochism, "may be destined to enter into a new relationship of mutual learning."³³ The project invites a comparison between the method of "symptomatology" in medicine and the creation of works of art or the formation of concepts in philosophy (which in turn is related to Nietzsche's notion of the philosopher as a "physician of culture").³⁴ The names of Sade and Masoch have been used in psychiatry to designate two "perversions," and as such they are examples of the clinical use to which literature may be used. The principles behind this labeling process deserves closer analysis. While some diseases are named after typical patients, such as Lou Gehrig's disease, more often they are designated by the name of the doctor who first constructed a clinical concept of the illness: Parkinson's disease, Roger's disease, Alzheimer's disease, Kreutzfeld-Jacob's disease. The doctor does not invent the disease: rather, he or she forms a clinical picture of a new disorder or illness by dissociating symptoms (singularities) that were previously grouped together and juxtaposing them

³³Masochism, p. 14. See also Negotiations, p. 142 ("I've dreamed of a set of studies under the general title, 'Critique et clinique'") and Dialogues, p. 141 ("The critical and the clinical: life and work are the same thing").

with others that were previously dissociated. The doctor, in short, constructs a concept. The components of the concept are the symptoms, the signs of the illness, and the concept becomes the name of a "syndrome," which marks the meeting-place of these symptoms.

Why are diseases named after their symptoms and not their causes? It is because, historically as well as conceptually, an accurate etiology depends first of all on rigorous symptomatology. "The symptomatological specificity is primary," writes Deleuze. "the specificity of the causal agent, always secondary and relative."³⁵ Tuberculosis was first identified by its symptomatology, though it was assigned a different causal agent by the 19th-century (defects of character) and the 20th-century (bacterial microbes).³⁶ Similarly, AIDS was identified through its symptomatology, though the relationship between its symptomatology and etiology still remains obscure.³⁷ Deleuze certainly does not deny the efficacy of the causal agent, nor the fact that identification (or presumption) of a causal agent can determine the a doctor's interpretation of a patient's symptoms. His point is that "etiology, which is the scientific or experimental side of medicine, must be subordinated to symptomatology, which is its literary, artistic aspect."³⁸ Refinements in symptomatology generally tend to lead toward greater specificity; Deleuze notes that the

³⁴Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Philosopher as Cultural Physician" (1873), in Philosophy and Truth, ed. Daniel Brezeale (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1979), pp. 67-76.

³⁵Deleuze, "De Sacher Masoch au masochisme," in Arguments, vol. 5, no. 21 (Jan-Apr 1961), pp. 40-46.

³⁶This example is Ian Hacking's in "Making Up People," in Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individual, and the Self in Western Thought, ed. Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery, with Arnold I. Davidson, Ann Swidler, and Ian Watt (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), pp. 222-236: 227.

³⁷See Deleuze's comments in Negotiations, pp. 132-133.

³⁸Masochism, p. 133.

plague and leprosy were more common in the past, for instance, not only for historical and social reasons, but because one tended to group under these concepts various types of diseases that are now classified separately. "The history of medicine," he concludes, "can therefore be regarded under at least two aspects. The first is the history of illnesses, which disappear, become less frequent, reappear or alter their form according to the state of the society and the development of therapeutic techniques. Intertwined with this is the history of symptomatology, which sometimes precedes and sometimes follows changes in therapy or in the nature of diseases: symptoms are named, renamed, and regrouped in various ways."³⁹

The theory of the proper name thus plays a crucial role in symptomatology. "When a doctor gives his name to an illness this is a major linguistic and semiological step, inasmuch as a proper name is linked to a given group of signs, that is, a proper name is made to connote signs."⁴⁰ In psychiatry, the names of Sade and Masoch were attached to two perversions by Krafft-Ebing, in his Psychopathia Sexualis, because their literary works presented a symptomatology that enabled him to discriminate between two previously indiscernible disturbances. Freud made use of Sophocles in the same way when he created the concept of the "Oedipal conflict," or of Shakespeare when he wrote of Hamlet. "From the perspective of Freud's genius," writes Deleuze, "it is not the complex which provides us with information about Oedipus and Hamlet, but rather

³⁹Masochism, p. 15, emphasis added. See also Logic of Sense, pp. 70, 237-238 (and note 2) for a general statement of the symptomatological method.

⁴⁰Masochism, p. 16.

Oedipus and Hamlet who provide us with information about the complex."⁴¹ The idea of Deleuze's "critique et clinique" project is that this symptomatological method can be extended beyond the domain of medicine. "Why is there not a 'Nietzscheism,' 'Proustism,' 'Kafkaism,' 'Spinozism' along the lines of a generalized clinic?" he asks.⁴² In physics, for example, physical "effects" are often named after the physicists who isolated or produced them: Kelvin effect, Seebeck effect, Zeeman effect.⁴³ In history, there are likewise "effects that are not a mere dependence on causes, but the occupation of a domain, and the operation of a system of signs": a Joan of Arc effect, a Heliogabalus effect.⁴⁴ In cinema, there exist cinematographic concepts that are associated with the proper names of the great auteurs (Deleuze describes his two-volume study of cinema as "a matter of classifying types of images and their corresponding signs").⁴⁵ And in philosophy itself, concepts are always created, and bear the signature of those who have created them: Aristotle's substance, Leibniz's monads, Descartes' cogito, and so on.⁴⁶

⁴¹Logic of Sense, p. 237. From this point of view, Anti-Oedipus can be read as a symptomatological analysis of the Oedipal conflict.

⁴²Dialogues, p. 120. Deleuze has written studies on all of these authors, and each of these texts, along with the essays collected in Critique et clinique, can be read as installments in the general project of "The Critical and the Clinical."

⁴³Logic of Sense, p. 70; Anti-Oedipus, p. 86. On "effects," and the creation of phenomena in physics, see Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 220-232; and "Five Parables," in Philosophy in History, ed. R. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 117-118.

⁴⁴Anti-Oedipus, p. 86.

⁴⁵Anti-Oedipus, p. 86; Dialogues, p. 120. These are only general characterizations: each domain would have to be specified in a symptomatological method.

⁴⁶What is Philosophy? p. 7.

Of all his works, Masochism is the one in which Deleuze engages most directly in this type of conceptual analysis, and it provides a useful case study of the theory of the concept provided in What is Philosophy?. Through a close reading of the literary works of Sade and Masoch, Masochism presents a differential analysis of the component elements of the concepts "sadism" and "masochism," and concludes that the oft-utilized concept of "sado-masochism" is in fact "a crude syndrome that fails to satisfy the demands of a genuine symptomatology."⁴⁷ Each of its eleven chapters examines a specific component of sado-masochistic concept, and shows that it falsely unites symptoms that are in fact specific to "sadism" and "masochism," each of which are irreducible concepts that define separate dramas that are incommensurate, specific universes between which there is no communication. The belief in a sado-masochistic entity, Deleuze argues, is grounded in pre-Freudian thinking that relied on hasty symptomatological assimilations and faulty etiological interpretations that psychoanalysis, rather than questioning, simply helped to make more convincing.⁴⁸ The most general symptom of sado-masochism, for example, is the transformative or dialectical assumption that the sadistic partner enjoys inflicting pain while the masochist enjoys suffering it (hence the popular joke in which the masochist says "Hurt me," and the sadist replies, "No"). But a differential reading shows that a genuine sadist could no

⁴⁷Masochism, p. 40.

⁴⁸Masochism, pp. 132-133: "From the point of view of etiology, sadism and masochism are each deprived of some of their components in order to ensure that the two types of perversion can transform into each other....From the symptomatological viewpoint, crude common symptoms, vaguely analogical manifestations and approximate 'coincidences' are treated as proof of the sado-masochistic entity.... Yet no doctor would treat a fever as though it were a definite symptom of a specific disease; he views it rather as an

more tolerate a masochistic victim than a masochist could tolerate a sadistic torturer: the sadistic libertine does not allow his victims to experience pleasure (the sadistic victim can never be a masochist), and the masochist requires a mistress willing to be molded and educated in accordance with his contractual project (the masochistic torturer can never be sadistic).⁴⁹

Negatively, then, Masochism, argues against a "dialectical" conception of concepts, which evokes nonspecific causes and crude coincidences between symptoms. Positively, it not only shows what a genuinely differential analysis of the concepts of sadism and masochism would be, but that it depends in the last instance on the literary techniques of the authors who gave their names to the disturbances.⁵⁰ "Because the judgment of the clinician is prejudiced, we must take an entirely different approach, the literary approach, since it is from literature that stem the original definitions of sadism and masochism....Symptomatology is always a question of art."⁵¹ Deleuze's analysis in Masochism are extraordinarily rich, but for our purposes we can draw up the following balance sheet of some of the most important differences Deleuze establishes between the concepts of sadism and masochism:

indeterminate symptom common to a number of possible diseases. The same is true of sado-masochism: it is a syndrome of perversion in general that must be broken down to make way for a differential diagnosis."

⁴⁹See Masochism, pp. 40-41.

⁵⁰See Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 157: "Opposition can be the law of relation between abstract products, but difference is the only principle of genesis or production....Dialectic thrives on oppositions because it is unaware of far more subtle differential mechanisms: topological displacements, typological displacements....Deprived of all its ambitions, opposition ceases to be formative, impelling and coordinating: it becomes a symptom, nothing but a symptom to be interpreted."

⁵¹Masochism, p. 14.

1. Nature of the Ideal. Sadism is based on pure negation as a totalizing Idea of pure reason ("primary nature"), an impersonal element or "universal crime" that is embodied in "secondary nature" through acts of personal violence. Masochism, on the contrary, operates through a suspension and disavowal of the world, in order to secure a purely ideal reality that is suspended in fantasy, and includes the suspension of sexual pleasure itself.

2. Use of Language. The language of sadism is speculative-demonstrative, since sadistic violence is related to a higher and impersonal function which can only be the object of a rationalist or deductive demonstration (the sadistic "instructor"). Masochism is dialectical-imaginative, since the masochist must persuade and convince the woman to form a contractual alliance, which requires a dialectical imagination that ascends toward a platonic or "mythical" Ideal (the masochistic "educator").

3. Role of Descriptions: "Sadism operates by means of quantitative reiteration, masochism by means of qualitative suspense." Sade multiplies the number of his victims precisely in order to condense them and subordinate them to the coldness of demonstrative reason; in Masoch, by contrast, the descriptions are not obscene because they are displaced from the object to the fetish.

4. Role of the Mother and Father. Sadism negates the mother and inflates the father, presenting an alliance between the father and daughter: the father represents nature as a primitive anarchic force beyond all laws, and since procreation competes with this primary nature, the sadistic heroine is made to enter into a sodomitic union with the father in a fundamental alliance against the mother, who becomes an outcast. Masochism disavows the mother and abolishes the father, presenting an alliance between the son and the oral mother: the functions of the father are transferred onto three mother-images, which are all concentrated in the second mother, the "oral" woman, who confronts the anonymous uterine mother and the sadistic Oedipal mother: the return of the father (the "Greek") always abolishes the masochistic situation.

5. Aestheticism and Mechanism. Masochism is aesthetic, since it is the work of art and the contract that makes possible the transition from a lower nature to the Great Nature. In Sade, the transition from secondary to primary nature implies, not a system of aesthetics, but a mechanism of perpetual motion, and with it institutions of perpetual motion that render laws unnecessary (p. 76.)

6. Relationship to the Law. "Sadism is institutional, masochism is contractual." In Masoch, the contract is a law that establishes "the ideal form of the love-relationship and its necessary precondition" (p. 75), implying the free consent of

the contracting parties, and which is valid for a limited period. Sadistic institutions determine a long-term state of affairs that is both involuntary and inalienable, and that replaces the system of rights and duties by a dynamic model of action, authority, and power that is above all laws (p. 77).

7. Apathy and Coldness. "There is the most radical difference between sadistic apathy and masochistic coldness" (p. 134). Sadistic "apathy" both toward the victims and toward the feelings of the torturer implies the absolute subordination to the pure Idea of negation (the personal desire to be cruel would thwart the "pure element of impersonal and demonstrative sensuality"). Masochistic "coldness," by contrast, is not the negation of feeling but the disavowal of sensuality in favor of a "supersensual, ice-cold sentimentality" (p. 51).

§ 5. Deleuze's Concept of the Concept. What these examples show is that a differential analytic of concepts--as opposed to a dialectical, sedentary, or arborescent analytic--defines a concept in terms of the components or singularities of which it is constituted. It establishes differential relations between these components that cannot be reduced to relations of identity, opposition, analogy, or resemblance. Deleuze defines his own concept of the "concept," as it were, in terms of three primary components:

a. First Components: Endo-consistency. No concept is ever simple: not only does it refer to other concepts, but each concept also has its own components (which in turn can themselves be considered as concepts). A concept is therefore always a

multiplicity: it is composed of a finite number of distinct, heterogeneous, and nonetheless inseparable components; it is the point of coincidence, condensation, or accumulation of these component elements (symptoms, signs), which it renders consistent in itself; and this internal consistency in turn is defined by the zones of proximity [voisinage] or indiscernability that it creates between these components. These are the three aspects that define the endo-consistency of a concept. The components of the concept, first, are neither constants nor variables, but pure "variations," they are neither general nor particular, but pure and simple "singularities." The concept is a case of solution of a problematic Idea, it takes the chaotic or nomadic virtuality of an problematic structure and renders it consistent. Concepts therefore extend to infinity and, being created, are never created from nothing. Second, the internal relations of the concept, which are established between these singularities, are neither relations of comprehension nor extension, but rather relations of "intensive ordination." "Components remain distinct, but something passes from one to the other, something that is undecidable between them. There is an area ab that belongs to both a and b, where a and b become indiscernible. These zones, thresholds, or becomings, this inseparability, define the internal consistency of the concept."⁵² Third, what the concept thereby expresses is an event, which must not be confused with the state of things in which this event may be actualized: the concept is what Deleuze calls, following Ruyer, un point en survol absolu, a point that "hovers" absolutely over the traits of which it is composed, without

⁵²What is Philosophy? p. 20.

any distance being introduced between them ("it does not have spatio-temporal coordinates, but only intensive ordinates").⁵³

b. Second Component: Exo-consistency. Every concept also refers to other concepts, they coexist with other concepts on a plane of immanence. Concepts thus have an exo-consistency both in terms of their "external" history (which changes when its components change, or the plane of immanence or problematic to which it belongs) as well as their "internal" becoming (the components of a concept can in turn be taken as concepts, to infinity). Descartes' concept of the "cogito," for instance, has three components, namely, thinking, doubting, and being: "I (who doubt) think, and therefore I am (a thinking being)." But like a hypertext, such a concept is an open-ended totality that contains the potential for "bridges" that provide links or crossroads to other concepts. For Descartes, the "idea of infinity" is the bridge leading from the concept of self to the concept of God, a new concept that has three components forming the "proofs" for the existence of God. In turn, "the third proof (ontological) assures the closure of the concept but also throws out a new bridge or branches off to a concept of the extended, insofar as it guarantees the objective truth value of our other clear and distinct ideas."⁵⁴

Concepts can become modified or recast when they are brought into relation with new concepts or a new problematic field, or when a new component is added to a

⁵³What is Philosophy? p. 21. Cf. Deleuze, "Le cerveau, c'est l'écran," in Cahiers du cinéma (March 1986), p. 28: "A classification is always a symptomatology, and what one classifies are signs, in order to extract a concept that is presented as an event, and not as an abstract essence." For the notion of survol absolu, see Raymond Ruyer, Néo-finalisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952), chapters 9-11, pp. 95-131.

⁵⁴What is Philosophy? p. 26. Paul Patton makes the comparison of Deleuzian concepts with hypertext document in his review of What is Philosophy? in the Times Literary Supplement, 23 June 1995, pp. 10-12.

concept. When Kant "criticized" Descartes, he did so in the name of a problematic field what could not be occupied or completed by the Cartesian cogito. Kant argued that if the "I think" is a determination that implies an undetermined existence ("I am"), we still do not know how this undetermined comes to be determinable and hence in what form it appears as determined. Kant in this way introduces a new component into the cogito: it is only in time that my undetermined existence is determinable. Concepts thus possess an internal history, a potential for transmutation into other concepts, which constitutes the history of philosophy. "The history of philosophy means that we evaluate not only the historical novelty of the concepts created by the philosopher, but also the power of their becoming when they pass into one another."⁵⁵

c. Third Component: Self-Referentiality. A concept does not have a reference: it is self-referential. it posits itself and posits its object at the same time that it is created. In Deleuze's terminology, a concept marks the constellation of an event that is extracted from a state of things.⁵⁶ This third component is the most difficult to comprehend, and raises a host of issues that we must now examine in some detail. For Deleuze and Guattari draw a sharp distinction between philosophical concepts and scientific and logical "functions," which are always referential. In the next section we will attempt to explicate the difference Deleuze and Guattari establish between the two in order to clarify the exact status of philosophical concepts.

⁵⁵What is Philosophy? p. 32.

⁵⁶See Deleuze, "Le cerveau, c'est l'écran," in Cahiers du cinéma (March 1986), p. 28: "A classification is always a symptomatology, and what one classifies are signs, in order to extract a concept that is presented as an event, and not as an abstract essence."

III: CONCEPT VERSUS FUNCTION: PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, LOGIC, OPINION

§ 6. Concepts Versus Functions. For Deleuze, then, a concept is defined in terms of its endo-consistency, exo-consistency, self-referentiality. With this definition of the concept in hand, Deleuze and Guattari make a distinction between "concepts" and "functions" that corresponds to the distinction between the virtual and the actual. Just as concepts are defined by the inseparability of a finite number of virtual singularities or events that it renders consistent, a function is always defined in relation to an actualized virtual. These functions are not expressed in concepts but in propositions, and such propositions are what Deleuze terms "prospects," since they always have an information value.⁵⁷ It is here that What is Philosophy? takes up a theme that Deleuze had already developed in The Logic of Sense. In the latter book, Deleuze identifies three distinct relations that have generally been recognized in a proposition: "manifestation," which relates the proposition to a subject that speaks or expresses itself; "denotation," which relates the proposition to external state of affairs as its referent; and "signification," which relates the proposition to an order of logical implication. "The one who begins to speak is the one who manifests; what one talks about is the denotatum; what one says are the significations."⁵⁸ These three domains can be said to find their principle in the Kant's

⁵⁷What is Philosophy?, p. 138.

⁵⁸The Logic of Sense, p. 181.

three transcendental Ideas: "If the Self is the principle of manifestation in relation to the proposition, the World is that of designation, and God, that of signification."⁵⁹ One of the fundamental arguments of The Logic is Sense is that the event, as a virtuality, is irreducible to any of these three actualized domains, just as sense constitutes a "fourth dimension of the proposition" (expression) that is irreducible to the relations of denotation, manifestation, or signification.

What is Philosophy? takes up these distinctions and develops them further. It identifies three discursive systems (science, logic, opinion) that find their referent in one of these three actualized domains, and therefore operate with functions or propositions rather than with concepts: science deals with states of things (designation), logic with truth conditions (signification), and opinion with lived experience (manifestation). Deleuze and Guattari insist upon the irreducibility of each of these domains; but at the same time they argue against the reduction of the concept to a function, and consequently against the reduction of philosophy to either science, logic, or opinion. The confusion of concepts with functions, Deleuze argues, has been disastrous for philosophy. This argument requires that Deleuze and Guattari provide a definition of each of these domains as they are distinguished from philosophy. What Deleuze and Guattari provide in What is Philosophy? is certainly not a "philosophy of science" or a "philosophy of logic," but merely summary indications of the types of functions operative in each of these domains.

⁵⁹The Logic of Sense, p. 176. Foucault, in his essay on Deleuze, suggests that positivism tended to confuse the event with the World as referent; phenomenology situated the event in relation to the Self as a modality of lived experience; and the philosophy of history tended so subordinate the event to the order of time.

§ 7. First Type of Function: Science (Designation). Like every domain, Deleuze defines science in terms of the Idea it confronts as its problematic field. For Deleuze, science is a discursive system that determines a state of things through a constant battle against chaos. Deleuze defines chaos, not in terms of "disorder" or the lack of determinations, but rather by the infinite speed that makes any relation between two determinations impossible; it is a disjunctive diversity in which every determination appears only to disappear immediately, without consistency or reference, without consequence.⁶⁰ Chaos remains an abstraction, a pure Idea or virtuality that never exists in itself, since it is always inseparable, as Leibniz said, from a series of "filters" or screens that makes something emerge from it.⁶¹ If the problem of philosophy is to create concepts that give a consistency proper to this virtuality, the problem of science is to create functions that give references to chaos, that are capable of actualizing the virtual in a state of things. What science calls a "state of things" is nothing other than a function, and in this sense a function is an immense "slowing-down" of the infinite speeds of chaos. "To slow down is to set a limit in chaos to which all speeds are subject, so that they form a variable determined as an abscissa, at the same time as the limit forms a universal constant that

⁶⁰Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, in Entre le temps et l'éternité (Paris: Fayard, 1988), give as an example the crystallization of a superfused liquid, a liquid at a temperature below its crystallization temperature: "In such a liquid, small germs of crystals form, but these germs appear and then dissolve without involving any consequences" (pp. 162-163).

⁶¹On the Leibnizian notion of the filter, see The Fold, pp. 76-77, and Michel Serres, Le système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1968), vol. I, pp. 107-127.

cannot be gone beyond."⁶² The two primary elements of a function are thus the limit and the variable, and it is in this sense that science invokes, for example, the speed of light (299.796 km/sec) or absolute zero (-273.15°C) as limits, each of which is designated by a number. The importance of these limits lies less in their empirical value than in the heterogeneous and irreducible systems of coordinates that they impose upon chaos and which provide it with its references. It is in relation to such references that a determination takes on the role of a variable: a particle, for instance, will have a position, an energy, a mass, and a spin value only on the condition that is actualized in trajectories that can be grasped by a system of coordinates.

Science, in short, takes up chaos into a system of coordinates, making the slowed-down variability pass through constants or limits, and thereby forming a referenced chaos that becomes Nature. These systems of coordinates, to be sure, are not homogenous, even within science. Sometimes chaos is related to centers of equilibrium, submitted to a selection that retains only a small number of independent variables in axes of coordinates, and installing relations between these variables whose future state can be determined from the present (determinist calculus). Sometimes, on the contrary, it makes so many variables intervene at the same time that the state of things is only statistical (calculus of probabilities). Sometimes, when the slowing-down takes place at the slim border that separates us from the ocean of chaos, science gets as close as it can to the nearest waves by positing relations that are conserved with the appearance and disappearance of the variables: the difference between the chaotic state is made increasingly smaller to the

⁶²What is Philosophy?, p. 118.

point where the appearance and disappearance of a variability are merged at the semi-chaotic state which presents a relation as the limit of the variables that appear and disappear (differential calculus). In this way, we can conceive, as Leibniz showed, of a series of coordinates or a space of phases as a succession of filters, in which the preceding filter will be, relatively speaking, a chaotic state, and the following filter what Deleuze calls a "chaoid" state, so that one would pass through chaotic thresholds rather than going from the elementary to the composed. Indeed, for Deleuze, one of the most important aspects of modern mathematical physics (which is awkwardly called "chaos theory") appears in the transitions toward chaos through the action of chaotic or "strange attractors": two neighboring trajectories in a determinate system of coordinates do not remain so, and diverge in an exponential manner before reapproaching each other through operations of stretching and refolding that are repeated, and recuperate chaos (non-linear dynamics). If attractors of equilibrium (fixed points, limited cycles) express the battle of science against chaos, strange attractors express well its profound attraction toward chaos, as well as the constitution of a "chaosmos" internal to modern science (all the things that were betrayed, in one way or another, in the preceding periods, notably in the fascination with turbulence).

In short, whereas philosophy condenses a set of inseparable variations in a concept, science coordinates a set of independent variables in a function. Like philosophic concepts, however, scientific functions are created and bear the signature of their creator: one speaks of the Pythagorean theorem or the Hamiltonian number in science just as one speaks of the Platonic Idea or Descartes' cogito in philosophy. And

yet the time in which scientific functions and philosophic concepts are deployed is very different. Opinion presents us with a picture of science that dreams of its own unity, and that is still seeking today to unite the four forces. But science, Deleuze argues, can never achieve a unification of the Referent, since it necessarily produces ruptures and bifurcations in the determinations that it coordinates. It is said, for instance, that the fractional number breaks with the whole number, the irrational with rational numbers, Riemannian with Euclidean geometry. Yet in the reverse direction, the whole number appears as a particular case of the fractional number, or the rational as a particular case of a "cut" in linear set of points. Science, in other words, is deployed in a peculiarly serial and ramified time in which the before always designates bifurcations and ruptures to come, and the after designates retroactive reconnections. The proper names of scientists are written in this serial time, marking points of rupture and reconnection. The plane of immanence produced by philosophy, by contrast, proceeds in a stratigraphic time of coexistence that does not exclude the before and after, but superimposes the proper names of philosophers on each other. "Of course, it is possible, and sometimes fruitful, to interpret the history of philosophy according to this scientific rhythm. But to say that Kant breaks with Descartes, and that the Cartesian cogito becomes a particular case of the Kantian cogito, is not entirely satisfying since this is, precisely, to turn philosophy into a science."⁶³ Concepts have very different relationships among themselves than functions. Since concepts do not form part of a discursive system, "there is no reason why concepts

⁶³What is Philosophy?, p. 125. On the problems raised by this conception of stratigraphic time for the history of philosophy, see chapter two, "The Plane of Immanence."

should cohere: as fragmentary totalities, concepts are not even pieces of a puzzle. for their irregular contours do not correspond to one another....⁶⁴

§ 8. Second Type of Function: Logic (Signification). If science belongs to the domain of designation, logic belongs to the domain of signification, though it does not for all that depart from the circle of reference. The dream of Frege and Russell, according to Deleuze, was precisely to reduce philosophical concepts to functions.⁶⁵ But in order to do so, functions could no longer simply be defined in terms of mathematical or scientific propositions, but had to characterize a more general order of propositions as that which is expressed by the sentences of a natural language. A new type of function therefore had to be invented, which was properly logical. Deleuze summarizes his argument against confusing philosophical concepts with logical functions in this way: "in becoming propositional, the concept loses all the characteristics it possessed as a philosophical concept." namely its endo-consistency, exo-consistency, and self-referentiality.⁶⁶

The endo-consistency of the concept is defined in terms of the inseparability of the components or variations that it renders consistent within itself. The logical function, by contrast, is a regime of independence (of variables, axioms, and undecidable propositions). In the propositional function "x is human," "x" marks the position of an

⁶⁴What is Philosophy?, p. 23.

⁶⁵See in particular Frege's articles "Function and Concept," "On Concept and Object," and "What is a Function," in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed. by Peter Geach and Max Black (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960), and Bertrand Russell, Principles of Mathematics, 2d ed. (New York: Norton, 1938), Appendix A.

⁶⁶What is Philosophy? pp. 137-138.

independent variable that does not belong to the function as such, but without which the function is incomplete: the complete function is made up of one or more "ordered pairs." What defines the logical function is the relation of dependence or correspondence, so that "being human" is not even the function, but the value of $f(a)$ for a variable x . It matters little that most propositions have several independent variables, or that the notion of the variable can be replaced by an argument. The relation to the independent variable or argument defines the reference of the proposition, or the truth value ("true" and "false") of the function for the argument: John is a man, but Bill is a cat. The set of truth-values for a function constitutes the extension of the concept: the objects of the concept occupy the place of variables or arguments of the propositional function for which the proposition is true, or its reference filled. The concept itself is in this way a function for the set of objects that constitute its extension. Every complete concept is a set, and has a determined number: the objects of the concepts are the elements of the set. This regime of independence is very different than the regime of separability in the philosophical concept.

Logic must also fix the conditions of reference, which constitutes not the concept's extension but its intension. These are logical "descriptions" or presentation, what some logicians call "possible worlds," the sub-sets of the concept. For example, a concept having a single element, the concept of Napoleon I, has as its intension "the victor at Jena," "defeated at Waterloo," and so on. There is thus no difference in nature between intension and extension: intension is the condition of reference and constitutes the endo-reference of the proposition, while extension constitutes its exo-reference. The

question lies in knowing how one arrives, through these intensional presentations, at a univocal determination of the objects or elements of the function of the point of view of exo-reference. This is the problem of the proper name in logic: a logical identification that takes us from states of things to the object, utilizing operations of quantification that allow one to assign the essential predicates of the object, which finally constitutes the comprehension of the concept: "the victor at Jena" is a description, whereas "general" is a predicate of Bonaparte. The "propositional concept" thus revolves entirely within the circle of reference, and the proper name here loses its role of rendering consistent an ensemble of singularities.

Finally, propositions have no self-reference, as the paradox "I am lying" demonstrates. Even performatives are not self-referential, since they imply both an exo-reference (the action linked to it by convention) and an endo-reference (the state of things that entitles one to formulate the proposition: for example, the intention of the concept in the proposition "I swear" may be a witness in court, a child blamed for something, a lover declaring his love, and so on). Furthermore, the self-consistency of a proposition can only reside in the formal non-contradiction of the proposition or between propositions. But these means that, materially, propositions have no endo-consistency nor exo-consistency: according to the two aspects of Gödel's theorem, the demonstration of the consistency of arithmetic cannot be represented within the system (there is no endo-consistency), and the system necessarily comes up against true theorems which are nonetheless not demonstrable, and remain undecidable (there is no exo-consistency, or the consistent system cannot be complete). The undecidable no longer marks the

inseparability of intensional components (zone of indiscernability) but on the contrary the necessity of distinguishing them according to the requirement of reference, which renders all consistency (self-consistency) "uncertain."

In all this, Deleuze argues, logic remains subordinate to the form of recognition that Deleuze identifies as one of the fundamental postulates of the dogmatic image of thought, with the negative of error as its correlate. In its desire to supplant philosophy, he suggests, logic detaches the proposition from all its psychological dimensions, but it clings all the more to "the set of postulates that limited and subjected thought to the constraints of a recognition of truth in the proposition" ("Who is the author of Waverly?").⁶⁷ The question of philosophy, by contrast, concerns the conditions of the production of the new: by separating propositions from their psychological as well as sociological adhesions, it shows how thought is capable of producing something new when it accedes to the infinite movement that frees it from truth as a supposed paradigm and reconquers an immanent power of creation. But to do so, it must penetrate into consistency, that is, into the problematic domain of the virtual, a domain that is only actualized in scientific states of affairs, and at the end of which logic sets up its camp. "But it is this sphere of the virtual," writes Deleuze, "that logic can only show, according to a famous phrase [of Wittgenstein], without ever being able to grasp it in propositions or relate it to a reference. Then logic falls silent, and it is only interesting when it is silent."⁶⁸

⁶⁷ What is Philosophy? p. 139.

⁶⁸ What is Philosophy? p. 140, emphasis added.

"By confusing concepts with functions," concludes Deleuze, "logic acts as if science were already dealing with concepts or forming concepts of the first zone. But it must double scientific concepts with logical functions, which are supposed to form a new class of purely logical, or second zone, concepts. It is a genuine hatred that animates logic in its rivalry with, or its will to supplant, philosophy. It kills the concept twice over. However, the concept is reborn because it is not scientific function and because it is not a logical proposition: it does not belong to a discursive system and does not have a reference."⁶⁹ It is precisely this confusion of the concept and the proposition that makes us believe in the existence of scientific concepts, and which considers the proposition to be an "intension" (what the proposition expresses): the philosophic concept in this way often appears as a proposition devoid of sense. This confusion reigns in logic, and explains the infantile idea it sometimes has of philosophy.

§ 9. Third Type of Function: Opinion (Manifestation). Logic itself nonetheless allows philosophic concepts to be reborn in a third form, a third zone, which escape number (science) and no longer constitute well-defined sets (logic). These are instead vague or fuzzy sets, simple aggregates of perceptions and affections, which are formed in lived experience as immanent to a subject, that "belong" to a consciousness that manifests itself. They are qualitative or intensive multiplicities, such as "red" or "bald," for which one cannot decide if certain elements belong to the set or not (at what point does a man become bald, or a color, red?). These sets of lived experience are expressed neither in

⁶⁹What is Philosophy? p. 140.

scientific enunciations nor in logical propositions, but in subjective evaluations or judgments of taste, that is, in the pure and simple opinions of a subject: "That is already red." "He is almost bald." Faced with such empirical judgments, one would still have to attempt to isolate the functions of which these fuzzy subsets or lived contents are only variables. We therefore find ourselves before the following alternative: either we try to reconstitute scientific or logical functions for these variables, which would definitively render the appeal to philosophic concepts useless; or we could invent a new type of function, a properly philosophical type of function, which would then be the ground or support of the science and logic of states of things. The philosophical concept would now be a function of "lived experience" [le vécu], but the derivation would change direction, since these functions of lived experience would now be primordial. This would be a "transcendental" or "dialectical" logic, which would be the primordial soil of both formal logic and derived regional sciences. The subject would become transcendental, capable of constituting new functions of variables or conceptual references.

Kant began to accomplish this task, by showing how philosophic concepts are necessarily related to lived experience by propositions or a priori judgments that are functions of any possible experience. But according to Deleuze, it was Husserl who took this to a limit by discovering the triple root of acts of transcendence (thought) through which the subject first constitutes a sensible world populated by intentional objects (immanent transcendence), then an intersubjective world populated by other egos (privileged transcendence), and finally a common ideal world populated by scientific,

mathematical, and logical formations (objective transcendence).⁷⁰ The numerous phenomenological concepts such as "being-in-the-world," "flesh," and "ideality," are the expression of these acts. They are at once references of the transcendental subject to lived experience; functions that find in perceptive-affective variables their respective trajectories of truth; and totalizations that exceed all power of sets. These are not merely empirical judgments or opinions, but proto-beliefs. Urdoxa, ordinary opinions as propositions.⁷¹ The situation of philosophy in North America, Deleuze suggests, has for a long time been one that maintained a precarious balance between scientifico-logical concepts and phenomenological-philosophical concepts, with a large faculty of logic and a few colleagues in phenomenology. When science abrogates the concept to itself, it allows nonscientific (phenomenological) concepts to be tolerated only in homeopathic doses--hence the strange hybrids of Fregu-Husserlianism or Wittgensteino-Heideggerianism.

Now if a philosophical concept is in this way confused with a function or proposition, it is clearly not as a scientific or even logical kind but rather, by analogy, as a function of lived experience or a proposition of opinion. Here again, Deleuze is compelled to formulate a precise concept of "opinion": opinion is a function or a proposition whose arguments are perceptions and affections. An opinion is "a certain relation between an external perception as the state of a subject [exo-reference] and an

⁷⁰What is Philosophy? p. 142

⁷¹See Husserl, Ideas, §104: "We introduce the term primary belief (Urglaube) or Protodoxa (Urdoxa) as suitably expressing the intentional back-reference of all 'modalities of belief.'"

internal affection as the passage from one state to another [endo-reference]."⁷² Consider the perceptive-affective situation Deleuze uses as an example, a piece of cheese being brought to the dinner table. A proposition of opinion would present itself under the following form: I extract a perceptual quality from the object, and at the same time, I identify myself with a generic subject who experiences the same affection (of attraction or repulsion) toward this quality. For instance, extracting the quality of a bad odor. I identify myself with those who detest cheese, and who thereby vie with those who like cheese, usually as the function of another quality. "Discussion" would then bear upon the choice of the abstract perceptive quality, and on the power [puissance] of the affected generic subject: Does detesting cheese mean that one is not a bon vivant? But is being a bon vivant a generically enviable affection? "Opinion," writes Deleuze, "is a thought that is closely molded on the form of recognition: recognition of a quality in perception (contemplation), recognition of a group in affection (reflection), recognition of a rival in the possibility of other groups and other qualities (communication)."⁷³

Deleuze provides an interesting interpretation of Greek philosophy from this point of view. The Greeks distinguished philosophy as knowledge from opinion-doxa, which they relegated to the sophists and rhetoricians. They also had a clear idea of science, which was not confused with philosophy: it was a knowledge of the cause, of the definition, and hence already a kind of function. The problem was, how can one arrive at definitions, which are the premises of scientific or logical syllogisms? Aristotle

⁷²What is Philosophy? p. 144.

⁷³What is Philosophy pp. 145-146.

responded: by means of the dialectic. Whereas analytics gives us the means to solve an already stated problem or to respond to a question, dialectics gives us the means of posing the question or formulating the problem.⁷⁴ Dialectic was therefore an investigation that aimed, on a given theme, to determine which opinions were the most plausible by reference to the perceptual quality they extracted, and which opinions were wisest by reference to the affections of the subject who advanced them. The problem with the sophists was not that they confined themselves to opinion, but that they could not attain a "true" opinion: they made a bad choice of the quality to be extracted from perceptions, and of the generic subject to be extracted from affections. Plato, as we have seen, proposed the concept of the Idea as a criterion according to which true opinions could be selected. "It was necessary to choose the quality that was like the unfolding of the Beautiful in any lived situation, and to take as generic subject the Man inspired by the Good....To reach true opinion, perception had to be taken as far as the beauty of the perceived [dokounta] and affection as far as the test of the good [dokimôs]: this will no longer be changing and arbitrary opinion but an original opinion, a proto-opinion that restores to us the forgotten homeland of the concept."⁷⁵ It is only when the sensory

⁷⁴Difference and Repetition, p. 160. See Aristotle, Topics, I, 4, 101b, 30-35 (as quoted in *ibid.*, p. 158): "The difference between a problem and a proposition is a difference in the turn of phrase. For if it be put in this way, 'Is two-footed terrestrial animal the definition of man?' or 'Is animal the genus of man?' the result is a proposition; but if thus, 'Is two-footed terrestrial animal the definition of man or not?' and 'Is animal the genus of man or not?' the result is a problem. Similarly too in other cases. Naturally, then, problems and propositions are equal in number; for out of every proposition you will make a problem if you change the turn of phrase."

⁷⁵What is Philosophy? p. 148.

appears without beauty, reduced to illusion, and the mind appears without the good, given over to simple pleasure, that opinion remains sophistical and false.

Phenomenology, in Deleuze's interpretation, took up a similar task, though it replaced the Platonic solution of a transcendent Idea with the originary opinions (Urdoxa) of a transcendental subject. The popular conception of philosophy as "conversation" or "dialogical" derives from the same impulse: rival opinions struggling over the dinner table "chez M. Rorty."⁷⁶ Deleuze rejects any conception of philosophy as a "discussion" because it remains tied to the reign of opinion (orthodoxy) and the model of recognition. As in a game show, a true opinion will be the one that coincides with the group to which one belongs: you must express your opinion, but you "win" (you have spoken the truth) if you say the same thing as the majority of those surveyed (the cliché). "Opinion in its essence is the will to majority, and already speaks in the name of the majority."⁷⁷ Worse, opinion achieves a complete triumph when the retained quality becomes the image or "mark" of a constituted group that itself determines the perceptive and affective model, the quality and affection that each person must acquire (marketing). This is precisely the danger Deleuze finds in the philosophies of communication, with their search for a universal liberal opinion as consensus.⁷⁸

⁷⁶What is Philosophy? p. 144.

⁷⁷What is Philosophy?, p. 140, emphasis added. See also Deleuze's idiosyncratic interpretation of Platonism in this light (pp. 140-141): the Sophists were reproached, not for confining themselves to opinion, but for not knowing how to choose the quality to extract from perceptions, nor the generic subject to disengage from affections: for the Platonists, it was necessary to choose the quality that was like the deployment of the beautiful in perception, and to consider as the generic subject the man inspired by the Good in affection ("the good and the beautiful are functions of which opinion is the truth value").

⁷⁸What is Philosophy? p. 146.

In each of these cases--science, logic, opinion--the confusion of concepts with functions or propositions, Deleuze argues, has been disastrous for a comprehension of the nature of philosophical concepts. It turns science into the concept par excellence, which is expressed in scientific propositions (first prospect): it replaces the philosophic concept by a logical concept, which is expressed in propositions of fact (second prospect); and it leaves to the philosophic concept a reduced or degenerate part, which takes as its own the domain of opinion (third prospect). But for Deleuze, the philosophical concept has no place in either of these three discursive systems (science, logic, opinion). The concept is no more a function of lived experience than it is a scientific or logical function. The irreducibility of concepts to functions can only be discovered if, rather than comparing them in an indeterminate manner, one compares what constitutes the reference of functions with what constitutes the consistency of concepts. States of things, objects, and lived states form the references of the function, whereas events are the consistency of the concept. It is these terms that would have to be considered from the point of view of a possible reduction:

1. Functions are functions of states of things, and constitute scientific propositions as the first type of prospects: their arguments are independent variables on which coordinations and potentializations are carried out that determine their necessary relationships.
2. Functions are functions of objects: their arguments are singular terms taken as independent logical atoms, on which are exerted descriptions (logical state of things) which determine their predicates.

3. Functions are functions of lived experience, which have as their arguments perceptions and affections (the doxa as the third type of prospect): we have opinions on every thing that we perceive or that affects us, to the point where the human sciences can be considered as a vast doxology.

Such is the path that descends from the virtual to its actualization: one does not encounter concepts on this path, but functions. Functions derive all their power from reference, whether to states of things (science), objects or other propositions (logic) or lived experience (opinion). But if, on the contrary, we go up this path, if we go from actualized states of things to the virtual, it is not the same line, because if it not the same virtuality. The virtual is no longer a chaotic virtuality that receives references through functions; it is a virtuality that is rendered consistent in itself: an entity that is formed on a plane that cuts across the chaotic virtuality and gives it consistency. This is what Deleuze calls an event.

§ 10. The Theory of the Event. We are finally in a position to examine the Deleuzian definition of a concept that we started with: a concept expresses a pure event. The event is one of the primary notions in Deleuze's corpus. "In all my books," he commented late in his career. "I have been seeking the nature of the event."⁷⁹ Two books, however, stand out in Deleuze's explication of the notion of the event. The Logic of Sense is in part a long meditation on the "minor" philosophy of the Stoics, precisely because Deleuze reads them as having brought about the first great reversal of Platonism:

⁷⁹Negotiations, p. 141.

"To reverse Platonism," he writes, "is first of all to remove essences and substitute events in their place."⁸⁰ A Thousand Plateaus, in turn, builds on these earlier analyses to isolate the linguistic and pragmatic dimensions of the event. The theory of the concept presented in What is Philosophy? builds upon the work of these earlier books, and indeed for Deleuze the theory of the concept is inseparable from the theory of the event. In this section, we will summarize the aspects of Deleuze's theory of the event that is relevant to our concerns.

In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze argues that the Stoics were the first to have traced the frontier between states of affairs and events that we have been considering. On the one hand, the Stoics, discovered the agitated world of bodies, along with their corresponding "states of affairs" (pragmata), which are determined by the blending or "mixture" (mixis or krasis) of bodies.⁸¹ They assigned a wide province to this domain of bodies ("pansomatism"): qualities, breaths and souls,⁸² impressions,⁸³ actions and passions,⁸⁴ utterances,⁸⁵ and even the virtues,⁸⁶ were all considered to be corporeal. The

⁸⁰The Logic of Sense, p. 53; cf. pp. 130, 132.

⁸¹Most of the Stoic texts quoted have been collected in A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, eds., The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. 1 (English translations) and Vol. 2 (Greek and Latin texts). In the notes that follow, the abbreviation "HP" refers to this sourcebook ("HP 48B" refers to section 48, text B).

⁸²Nemesius, De natura hominis, 81.6-10 (HP 45D): "The soul is a body."

⁸³Cf. the texts collected in HP 39A, which define impressions as "mental bodies."

⁸⁴Aristocles (Eusebius, Evangelical preparation 15.14.1 [HP 45G]): "[Zeno says] that fire has as its principles god and matter, like Plato. But Zeno says that they are both bodies, both that which acts and that which is acted upon, whereas Plato says that the first active cause is incorporeal."

⁸⁵Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the philosophers 7.55-56 (HP 33H): "According to the Stoics, utterance is a body...for everything that acts is a body; and utterance acts when it travels from those who utter it to those who hear it."

entire cosmos is a compound of bodies, which interpenetrate and force themselves on each other. To the degree that there is a unity of bodies among themselves, i.e., a unity of active principles (god [theos], reason [logos], or cause [aition]) and passive principles (matter [hyle]), a cosmic present embraces the entire universe: only bodies exist in space, and only the present exists in time.⁸⁷ In the scope of the cosmic present, the affirmation of the unity and interconnection of these causes is called destiny or fate (heimarmene or fatum).⁸⁸ and the realm of the unity of these causes is called physics (phusis).

On the other hand, there are the effects produced by the mixtures of these bodies, which are, properly speaking, not corporeal but "incorporeal" (asomata). When a scalpel cuts flesh, or when fire heats iron, the first body does not produce a physical "property" in the second, but what the Stoics called a dialectical or logical "attribute": "to cut" or "to burn." It is only through these attributes, writes Sextus Empiricus, that something can be said to "happen" to a body.⁸⁹ These logical attributes do not designate a real quality of bodies, they add nothing to the realm of Being, but are rather ways or manners of being:

⁸⁶Seneca, Letters, 117.2 (HP 60S): "What is good is a body because what is good acts, and whatever acts is a body." Cf. Bréhier, Incorporeals, p. 7.

⁸⁷Cf. Stobaeus 1.106 5-23 (HP 51B): "Only the present belongs; the future and past subsist." For this reason the Stoics say that signs are always present, that "the sign must be the present sign of a present thing." One cannot say of someone mortally wounded that he has been wounded and that he will die, but that he is having been wounded, and that he is going to die; see Sextus Empiricus, Against the professors 8.254-5 (HP 51H).

⁸⁸Cicero, On divination 1.125-6 (HP 55L): Fate is "an ordering and sequence of causes...the connection of cause to cause....[This is] not the 'fate' of superstition, but that of physics."

⁸⁹Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors 9.211 (HP 55B): "The Stoics say that every cause is a body which becomes the cause to a[nother] body of something incorporeal. For instance, the scalpel, a body, becomes the cause to the flesh, a body, of the incorporeal predicate 'being cut.' And again, the fire, a body, becomes the cause to the wood, a body, of the incorporeal predicate 'being burnt.'" S. Sambursky, in his Physics of the Stoics (New York: Macmillan, 1959), summarizes the Stoic view thus: "Instead of the

they lie at the limit of being, at its surface. They do not change the nature of bodies but are the result, the effects of their interaction. They are not physical properties, but logical attributes: they do not exist, but insist or "subsist" (huphistasthai). They are not agents or patients, but the result of actions and passions, "impassibles." In short, they are not bodies or states of things, but events (tungchanon, "that which happens"): pure, impassive, incorporeal events.⁹⁰ Whereas bodies and causes form the object of physics, these incorporeal effects constitute the subject matter of Stoic logic: what the Stoics called "dialectics" is the science of incorporeal events as they are expressed in statements or propositions (axiomata).⁹¹

Deleuze suggests that a battle can perhaps be considered as the exemplary instance of this Stoic theory of the event.⁹² A battle is a result or a product of bodies colliding, mixing, and separating: sabers cut into flesh, bodies are dismembered, blood and sweat seep into the ground. The battle-event depends upon these state of things as its cause, it is produced by bodies and is only an effect of their interaction. Yet the battle itself does not exist in any of these mixtures, it is not a property of these bodies. Like Samuel Butler's erewhon (both "now-here" and "no-where"), it is everywhere but nowhere in particular: it "surveys" [survole] the battlefield as a "logical attribute." it subsists at the surface of bodies like a fog over the prairie (or rather, even less than a fog,

vague formulation 'A is the cause of B' (in the language of today), the Stoic definition elaborates thus: 'A is the cause of the effect E being wrought on B'" (p. 53).

⁹⁰The Logic of Sense, Series 2, "Of Surface Effects," pp. 4-11.

⁹¹Cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.83: "The wise man is always a dialectician."

⁹²The Logic of Sense, p. 100.

since a fog is still a body), indifferent to these corporeal mixtures, neutral with regard to the victors and the vanquished, impassible with regard to all its temporal manifestations.⁹³ Each soldier knows and experiences the battle according to a different level of actualization--hence the now-classic comparisons of Hugo, Tolstoy, and Stendahl on viewpoint of the battle they give to their narrators (the battle as a pure event) and the one they give to their respective heroes, who only experience the event as incarnated, tragically, in their own bodies.⁹⁴

For the Stoics, every event can be said to be constituted by a double structure: first, there is the present moment of actualization, where the event is embodied in a state of affairs; and then there is the event considered in itself, free from the limitation of a state of affairs, incorporeal and impersonal, neutral, impassible, neither general nor particular. This is, as Blanchot put it, that "part of the event that its accomplishment cannot realize."⁹⁵ what one might call the eternal truth of the pure event, eventum tantum. On the one hand, there is the spatio-temporal actualization of the event in a state of affairs (the object of Stoic physics), and on the other hand, there is the event-in-itself, by nature ideal (the object of Stoic logic).⁹⁶

⁹³The Logic of Sense, pp. 100-101.

⁹⁴The Logic of Sense, pp. 122-123. For Deleuze, however, the greatest novel of the battle-event is Stephen Crane's The Red Badge of Courage, precisely because its heroes are designated anonymously in relation to the event ("the young soldier").

⁹⁵Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1982), p. 155.

⁹⁶The Logic of Sense, p. 68. It is this same conception of ideality that Derrida explored in his early writings on the "ideality of the literary object." See his comments in "The time of a thesis: punctuations," in Philosophy in France Today, ed. Alan Montefiore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 34-50, esp. pp. 36-40.

Much of Logic of Sense is taken up with an analysis of the relationship of this theory of the event to the Stoic theory of sense. More germane to our purposes, however, is a second development in the theory of the event that appears later in A Thousand Plateaus. Deleuze and Guattari note that there are several aspects of language that are particularly suited toward expressing events. We have already seen that proper names like as Masoch and Sade are not only indicators of subjects or singular terms, but can also be used to designate assemblages of singularities that are fundamentally of the order of what Deleuze calls an event.⁹⁷ Such examples could be multiplied: when battles ("Waterloo"), strategic operations ("Desert Storm"), storms ("Hurricane Bob"), corporations ("IBM"), peoples and tribes ("the Nuer"), places and moments, and so on, are designated by proper names, they express events that are irreducible to the state of affairs and bodies in which they are actualized. The second aspect is the infinitive verb, which Deleuze contrasts with the copula "is." If the inflections of a verb--its gender, number, tense, person, mood, and voice--denote the values and chronological time of an existing state of affairs (Chronos), the verb in the infinitive can be said to express the nonpulsed and nonchronological time of the pure event (Aeon). "We must conceive of an infinitive which is not yet caught up in the play of grammatical determinations," writes Deleuze, "an infinitive independent not only of all persons, but of all time, of every mood and every voice (active, passive, or reflective). This would be a neutral infinitive for the pure event....From this pure and undetermined infinitive, voices, moods, tenses and

⁹⁷Dialogues, p. 51: "The proper name does not designate a subject, but something which happens between at least two terms which are not subject, but agents, elements."

persons will be engendered."⁹⁸ Third, the indefinite article ("a") and the indefinite pronoun ("one") likewise express events that have no subject of inherence, such as "it is raining," "one dies," "it is day" (the Stoic phos esti), "someone is beating a child." Such indefinite articles or pronouns are no more indeterminate than the infinitive; they have a perfect individuality that lacks nothing, even though they express "evental" modes of individuation that are very different from those of persons, subjects, things, or substances (such as the individuation of an hour of the day, a season, a climate, a region, a life, a battle, a wound).⁹⁹ This is why Deleuze will say that proper names and indefinite articles and pronouns are not subjects of a tense but "agents of the infinitive," that is, expressions of an event.¹⁰⁰ Proper name + indefinite article + infinitive verb constitutes, for Deleuze, the basic chain through which events are expressed in language.

⁹⁸Logic of Sense, p. 215; cf. p. 184. See also Dialogues, pp. 64, 92; Negotiations, p. 34; and A Thousand Plateaus, p. 263. Émile Bréhier, in his La théorie des incorporeals dans l'ancien stoïcisme (Paris: Vrin, 1929), pp. 19-21, shows that the "logical attribute" of the Stoics is neither substantive nor adjectival (which denote states of things), but verbal: what it expresses in the proposition is neither a property nor a concept (e.g., "the tree is green") but an event ("the tree greens"). In this way the Stoics merged both the predicate and the copula into the verb, thereby solving the ancient problem of attribution by rejecting both the Platonic solution of participation (of the predicate in the subject) and the Aristotelian solution of inclusion (of species within a genus). See also Bréhier's Chrysippe et l'ancien stoïcisme, 2d ed. (Paris: P.U.F., 1951; 1st ed., 1910), p. 70: "Stoic dialectic did not decompose the verb, as Aristotle had done, into a copula and an attribute designating a general notion; they took the verb in its unity, in that it expresses an event." Deleuze comments: "'Green' designates a quality, a mixture of things, a mixture of tree and air in which chlorophyll coexists with all the parts of the leaf. 'To green' on the contrary is not a quality in the thing, but an attribute which is said of the thing" (Logic of Sense, p. 21).

⁹⁹Maurice Blanchot in particular has stressed the importance of indefinite articles ("a") and indefinite pronouns ("it," "one"), which bring about events that are incapable of being effectuated by persons ("something happens to them that they can only get a grip on again by letting go of their ability to say I"). See L'entretien infini (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), pp. 566-567; La part du feu (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), pp. 29-30; and The Space of Literature, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), pp. 90, 122, 126. Cf. A Thousand Plateaus, p. 541, n. 43.

¹⁰⁰A Thousand Plateaus, p. 264; cf. 37.

A Thousand Plateaus, however, also consider a third aspect of the event, which constitutes its pragmatic rather than linguistic dimension. The Stoics started from bodies and their states of affairs in order to isolate the domain of pure events, which are the incorporeal effects of these corporeal mixtures. But events also have a genetic capacity: the attribution of an incorporeal event to a state of affairs is capable of bringing about what Deleuze terms an incorporeal transformation of that state of affairs. J. L. Austin had already opened up a similar field of study in analytic thought with his theory of speech acts, although Deleuze gives a different scope to the notion of incorporeal transformations.¹⁰¹ In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari offer several examples of what they mean by an incorporeal transformation.¹⁰² In a juridical act of sentencing, what takes place before the sentencing (the crime) and what takes place afterward (the punishment) are actions and passions affecting bodies (the body of the property, the victim, the accused, the prison, and so on); but the transformation of the accused person into a convict is a pure instantaneous act or incorporeal attribute that is the "expressed" of the judge's sentence. War and peace could each be said to imply determinate relationships between numerous types of bodies: but a declaration of war, or an order for a general mobilization, expresses an incorporeal and instantaneous transformation of bodies. In a hijacking, the brandishing of a revolver or the execution of hostages are actions between bodies; but the transformation of passengers into hostages, and of the

¹⁰¹J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). Austin distinguishes between the performative (actions that are accomplished by saying them: I swear by saying "I swear!"), and more generally, the illocutionary (actions that are accomplished in speaking: I ask a question by saying "Is...?", I make a promise by saying "I will"; I command by using the imperative, etc.).

plane-body into a prison-body, is an incorporeal transformation (a "media event," which testifies to the very real power of journalists to "create" an event by attributing a sense to it). Eating and drinking are an intermingling of bodies, and communing with Christ might even be said to imply the intermingling of 'spiritual' bodies; but the transformation of the body of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist is a logical attribute attributed to these bodies in a liturgical statement. The rampant inflation in Germany after World War I was a crisis affecting the monetary body (and many others besides); but when, on 20 November 1923, the old reichmark was declared to be no longer money, it effected an instantaneous and incorporeal transformation of these bodies.¹⁰⁵ When the First Marxist International issued the statement "Workers of the world, unite!" it attempted to "invent" a new type of class (the proletariat) before the conditions were present for the proletariat to exist as a body: on July 4, 1917, Lenin decreed another incorporeal transformation that extracted from the proletariat a vanguard that was attributed to the "Party," even though this decree was likewise issued prior to the organization of the body to which it would be attributed, namely, the Party itself.¹⁰⁴ Such incorporeal transformations do not "refer" to bodies or states of things, nor do they "represent" them. In expressing an incorporeal event, and attributing it to bodies, one is neither representing nor referring, but "intervening" in bodies in a particular way-- whether to separate bodies or combine them, speed them up or slow them down, delimit

¹⁰²For the following examples, see A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 80-81.

¹⁰³A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 82, 86, 88, 524 n. 12. Plateau Four of A Thousand Plateaus, entitled "November 29, 1923--Postulates of Linguistics," is named after this event, and all the chapters of the book are dated so as to mark an incorporeal transformation.

them in various manners.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, incorporeal transformations are characterized by their instantaneousness, their immediacy, the simultaneity of the statement or proposition that expresses it and the effect that the transformation produces: this is why they tend to be precisely dated, sometimes to the hour, minute, and second, and take effect the moment they are dated.¹⁰⁶

This fundamental distinction between bodies (or states of affairs) and events, between corporeal modifications and incorporeal transformations, is one that will be developed throughout Deleuze's work, though in different contexts he adopts a rather varied terminology to refer to the two domains: an assemblage of bodies and an assemblage of enunciation, a form of content and a form of expression (in A Thousand Plateaus), a field of the visible and a field of the sayable, non-discursive formations and discursive systems (in Foucault).¹⁰⁷ What the previous analyses make clear is that forms of expression do not represent or describe a corresponding content, nor do states of things function as a referent for expressions. Rather, there is a continual interpenetration and passage from one to the other: expressions are inserted into contents or bodies just as

¹⁰⁴On this example, see A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 83, 88.

¹⁰⁵Cf. A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 86, 87. Ian Hacking has utilized this notion of "intervening" in a similar fashion in Representing and Intervening (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), Part B.

¹⁰⁶A Thousand Plateaus, p. 81.

¹⁰⁷See A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 43, 50, 85-91; Foucault, pp. 31, 47. The distinction between "content" and "expression" is borrowed from Louis Hjelmslev in his Prolegomena to a Theory of Language (tr. Francis J. Whitfield; Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969). Deleuze prefers Hjelmslev's formulation because it breaks with, first, the Saussurean distinction of the signifier and the signified, since it retains all the presuppositions of the signifier that are criticized by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus (cf. A Thousand Plateaus, p. 523, n. 28) as well as, second, the Marxist distinction between the infra- and super-structure, between the economic base and its ideological expression, which not only presumes a causal relation between the two but becomes enmeshed in all the difficulties of dialectics that Deleuze criticizes so heavily. For his critique of ideology, see A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 4, 68, 89-90.

much as contents are deployed in expressions. For Deleuze, the philosophic importance of Foucault's early work lies in its investigation of the relation between these two domains in specific historical formations. Deleuze published an important book on Foucault in 1986, following the latter's untimely death. In it, he shows that in Discipline and Punish, for example, the prison appears as a form of content whose substance is the bodies of the prisoners that are incarcerated there; it defines a corporeal place of visibility, a new way of seeing and displaying the bodies of criminals ("panopticism," a place where one can see everything without being seen), and which is related to other forms of content (schools, barracks, hospital, factory). But related to this there is also an incorporeal form of expression ("delinquency"), which defines a new field of sayability, "a new way of classifying, stating, translating, and even committing criminal acts" (delinquency becomes the object of the statements of penal law).¹⁰⁸ Likewise, Madness and Civilization shows how, in the "classical age," the asylum appears as a place of visibility for madness, as a new way of seeing and displaying the bodies of madmen that was very different from the Renaissance or the Middle Ages. At the same time medicine--as well as law, literature, regulatory systems, and so on--forms a new field of sayability by formulating a system of statements about the new concept of folie or madness.¹⁰⁹ Though Foucault tended to give a certain primacy to statements (particularly in The Archaeology of Knowledge), it is because bodies play the role of a passion in relation to the action of

¹⁰⁸See A Thousand Plateaus, p. 66, and Foucault, Discipline and Punish, passim.

¹⁰⁹Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization, tr. Richard Howard (New York: Random House, 1965). Deleuze develops these themes in the first chapter of Foucault, "Strata of Historical Formations: the Visible and the Articulate," pp. 47-69.

statements: in Kantian terms, one could say that bodies and states of things form a Receptivity, in relation to which statements form a Spontaneity.¹¹⁰

§ 11. Conclusion: Philosophical Concepts as Events. It is easy to see, finally, how this theory of the event is related to the theory of the concept presented in What is Philosophy?. In science, logic, and opinion, the virtual receives a referent from a function: in philosophy, the virtual is rendered consistent by a concept, which expresses an event and not a state of affairs. "The concept is an incorporeal," write Deleuze and Guattari, "even though it is incarnated or effectuated in bodies. But it must not be confused with the state of things in which it actualized. It does not have spatio-temporal coordinates, but only intensive ordinates....The concept expresses the event, not the essence or the thing."¹¹¹ Concepts therefore do not have a reference, but are self-referential and constructivist: they create the events they describe at the same time as they are created. ""The concept is obviously knowledge, but knowledge of itself, and what it knows is the pure event, which must not be confused with the state of affairs in which it is embodied."¹¹²

It is true that, once a concept is created, the event that it expresses can be actualized in states of affairs (incorporeal transformation). Several recent studies have analyzed certain concepts in the human sciences from a similar point of view: Ian

¹¹⁰Cf. Foucault, p. 60: "If there is any neo-Kantianism [in Foucault], it is because visibilities together with their conditions form a Receptivity, and statements together with their conditions form a Spontaneity."

¹¹¹What is Philosophy?, p. 21.

Hacking has shown how the creation of concepts such a "child abuse" and "split personalities" can not only be dated, but have the effect of "making up people" or creating phenomena through an act of what he calls "dynamic nominalism."¹¹³ Arnold Davidson has similarly analyzed the emergence the psychiatric concept of "sexuality" in the nineteenth century, and the related concepts of perversion (as deviant forms of "sexuality").¹¹⁴ And David Halperin has shown that the concept "homosexuality" was created in 1892 by Chaddock, and that the effect it produced in bodies was to make possible a new "mode of existence."¹¹⁵ Thus, though an event is made up of inseparable components, it is itself inseparable from the state of affairs, bodies, and lived experience in which it is actualized.

Yet the reverse it also true: a given state of affairs is no more inseparable from the event that surpasses its actualization in every respect. From everything that a subject may live, from its own body, from other bodies and objects distinct from it, and from the state of affairs or physico-mathematical field that determines them, the event releases a

¹¹²What is Philosophy?, p. 33.

¹¹³Ian Hacking, "Making Up People," in Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought, ed. Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery, with Arnold I. Davidson, Ann Swidler, And Ian Watt (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), pp. 222-236; "The Invention of Split Personalities," in Human Nature and Natural Knowledge, ed. Alan Donagan, Anthony N. Perovich, Jr., and Michael V. Wedlin (Dordrecht, 1986), pp. 63-85; "Biopower and the Avalanche of Printed Numbers," in Humanities in Society 5 (1982), pp. 279-295.

¹¹⁴Arnold I. Davidson, "Closing Up the Corpses: Diseases of Sexuality and the Emergence of the Psychiatric Style of Reasoning," in Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam, ed. George Boolos (Cambridge: CUP, 1990), pp. 295-325; "Sex and the Emergence of Sexuality," in Critical Inquiry 14, pp. 16-48; "How to Do the History of Psychoanalysis: A Reading of Freud's Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality," in The Trial(s) of Psychoanalysis, ed. Françoise Meltzer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 39-64.

¹¹⁵David M. Halperin, "One Hundred Years of Homosexuality," in One Hundred Years of Homosexuality and Other Essays on Greek Love (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 15-53.

"vapor" that does not resemble them, and that takes, for instance, the battlefield, the battle, and the wound as the components or variations of a pure event. "The event is actualized or effectuated whenever it is inserted, willy-nilly, into a state of affairs; but it is counter-actualized whenever it is abstracted from states of affairs so as to isolate its concept."¹¹⁶ One descends from virtuals to actual states of affairs, one rises from states of affairs to virtual event: these two lines are inseparable but nonetheless independent.

"One could say that science and philosophy take opposed paths, because philosophical concepts have events for consistency, whereas scientific functions have states of things or mixtures as their reference: through concepts, philosophy continually extracts a consistent event from the state of affairs--a smile without a cat, as it were--whereas science continually actualizes the event in a state of affairs."¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶What is Philosophy?, p. 159.

¹¹⁷What is Philosophy?, p. 126.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

GILLES DELEUZE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF DIFFERENCE:
TOWARD A TRANSCENDENTAL EMPIRICISM

VOLUME TWO

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CHAPTER FOUR

ETHICS: THEORY OF AFFECTIVITY

§ 1. Introduction. In several interviews given after the publication of Foucault in 1986, Deleuze offered his own version of the distinction between "ethics" and "morality," which has traditionally been drawn to distinguish modes of reflection that place greater emphasis, respectively, on the good life (such as Stoicism) or on the moral law (such as Kantianism). Deleuze uses the term "morality" to define, in very general terms, any set of "constraining" rules, such as a moral code, that consists in judging actions and intentions by relating them to transcendent or universal values ("This is Good, that is Evil"). What he calls "ethics" is, on the contrary, a set of "facilitative" [facultative] rules that evaluates what we do, say, and think according to the immanent mode of existence that it implies. One says or does this, thinks or feels that: what mode of existence does it imply? "We always have the beliefs, feelings, and thoughts we deserve," writes Deleuze, "given our way of being or our style of life."¹ This is the link that Deleuze sees between Spinoza and Nietzsche, whom he has always identified as his own philosophical precursors.² Both Spinoza and Nietzsche argued, each in his own way, that there are things one cannot do or

¹Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 1. On the distinction between ethics and morality, see Negotiations, pp. 100-101, 113-114. Règles facultatives is a term Deleuze adopts from the sociolinguist William Labov to designate "functions of internal variation and no longer constants"; see Foucault, pp. 146-147, note 18.

²Negotiations, p. 135 (translation modified): "Everything tended toward the great Spinoza-Nietzsche identity." Deleuze devoted a full-length monograph and a shorter introductory volume to both of these thinkers: Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962) and Nietzsche (1965); Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (1968) and Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (1970; revised and expanded edition, 1981).

think except on the condition of being weak, base, or enslaved, unless one harbors a vengeance or ressentiment against life (Nietzsche), unless one remains the slave of passive affections (Spinoza); and there are other things one cannot do or say except on the condition of being strong, noble, or free, unless one affirms life, unless one attains active affections.³ Deleuze calls this the method of "dramatization": actions and propositions are interpreted as so many sets of symptoms that express or "dramatize" the mode of existence of the speaker. "What is the mode of existence of the person who utters a given proposition?" asks Nietzsche. "What mode of existence is needed in order to be able to utter it."⁴ Rather than "judging" actions and thoughts by appealing to transcendent or universal values, one "evaluates" them by determining the mode of existence that serves as their principle. A pluralistic method of explanation by immanent modes of existence is in this way made to replace the recourse to transcendent values: an immanent ethical difference (noble/base), as Deleuze puts it, is substituted for the transcendent moral opposition (Good/Evil).

This immanent conception of an "ethics without morality," however, has not fared well in the history of philosophy. Few philosophers have been more maligned and ridiculed than Spinoza and Nietzsche. They were condemned, by both their contemporaries and successors, not only for being atheists, but even worse, for being "immoralists."⁵ The

³Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, pp. 22-23; and Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 269.

⁴On the notion of "dramatization," see Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 75-79.

⁵At best, the Spinozistic and Nietzschean critiques were accepted as negative moments, exemplary instances of what must be fought against and rejected in the ethico-moral domain. See, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2d ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of

potent danger that was sensed to be lurking in the Ethics and the Genealogy of Morals is clear: without transcendence, without universals, one will fall into the dark night of chaos, reduced to a pure "subjectivism" or "relativism." A philosophy of immanence, it is argued, far from resolving the question of justification, seems to shift the problem onto an unresolvable terrain. It seems unable to put forth "normative" criteria by which certain modes of existence can be judged as acceptable and others condemned as reprehensible, and winds up espousing a kind of moral nihilism in which all "differences" are affirmed in their turn. Deleuze himself, in a late essay, states the problem in this way: "What disturbed us was that in renouncing judgment we had the impression of depriving ourselves of any means assessing the differences [faire des différences] between existing beings [existants], between modes of existence, as if from now on everything were equally valid."⁶ Nietzsche, for instance, famously criticized morality for having been derived from a reactive or base mode of existence. But by what "right," according to what criteria, is a noble or active mode of existence "better" or "worth more" than a base one? Put succinctly: How can one evaluate modes of existence using criteria that are

Notre Dame Press, 1984), who, for his part, summarizes the contemporary ethical options in the chapter title: "Aristotle or Nietzsche?" ("The defensibility of the Nietzschean position turns in the end on the answer to the question: was it right in the first place to reject Aristotle? [p. 117]).

⁶Critique et clinique, p. 168. For similar critique of Foucault, see for example Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 264: "Foucault owes us a criterion of what makes one kind of danger more dangerous than another." Less sympathetic critics have caricatured the political consequences of a philosophy of difference as everything from an "infantile leftism" to "neo-conservative." On infantile leftism, see Michael Walzer, "The Politics of Michel Foucault," in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. David Couzens Hoy (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 51. On neo-conservatism, see Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988).

immanent to the mode itself without thereby abandoning any basis for comparative evaluation?

It is this problem that lies at the heart of an ethics of immanence, and Deleuze's response to it is rigorous. A mode of existence can be evaluated, apart from transcendental or universal values, by the purely immanent criteria of its power or capacity [puissance], that is, by the manner in which it actively deploys its power by going to the limit of what it can do (or on the contrary, by the manner in which it is cut off from its power to act and is reduced to impotence). Deleuze will express this in various formulas throughout his work: modes of existence are evaluated "according to their tenor in 'possibilities,' in freedom, in creativity":⁷ by "the manner in which the existing being [existant] is filled with [s'emplit de] immanence":⁸ the ethical task entails "an amplification, an intensification, an elevation of power an increase in dimensions, a gain in distinction":⁹ "there are never any criteria other than the tenor of existence, the intensification of life."¹⁰ Immanent modes of existence, in short, must be evaluated according to the purely intensive criteria of power. From afar, the meaning of this principle seems obscure, and has itself been subject to naive caricatures (for instance, that it simply valorizes "powerful" modes of existence, "superhuman" individuals who

⁷Deleuze, "What is a dispositif," in Michel Foucault: Philosophy, trans. Timothy J. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 163.

⁸Critique et clinique, p. 171.

⁹The Fold, p. 73

¹⁰What is Philosophy?, p. 74.

capriciously exert their power and will upon others). The aim of this chapter is to elucidate its content, multiplying the cautions in order to ward off misunderstandings, in order to examine the nature of the ethical task as it appears from a purely immanent point of view.

"Immanence can be said to be the burning touchstone of all philosophy," writes Deleuze, "because it takes upon itself all the dangers that philosophy must confront, all the condemnations, persecutions, and repudiations that it undergoes. This at least persuades us that the problem of immanence is not abstract or merely theoretical. At first sight, it is not easy to see why immanence is so dangerous, but it is. It swallows up sages and gods."¹¹ In the first section of the chapter, we briefly examine the various avatars of transcendence that have been posed in response to the problem of immanence. We then examine Deleuze's respective readings of Nietzsche, Spinoza, and Foucault as exemplary case studies in the philosophy of immanence. We make no attempt to analyze or assess the nature of Deleuze's readings with regard to other possible interpretations: our sole concern is to show how each of these thinkers, from Deleuze's point of view, responded to the ethical question of immanence without recourse to the transcendent or the universal.

¹¹What is Philosophy, p. 45 (translation modified).

I. AVATARS OF TRANSCENDENCE

§ 2. Three Types of Transcendence. We have seen that a philosophy of immanence takes as its minimal unity of analysis what Deleuze calls an agencement or "assemblage." An assemblage is a mixed state or differential system: a spatio-temporal multiplicity made up of heterogeneous terms linked according to variable relations; a set of singularities that actualized along complex lines of differentiation and integration; individuating intensities that augment and diminish; etc. To analyze an assemblage is to unravel the variable lines and singular processes that are produced within the multiplicity, their connections and disjunctions, their circuits and short-circuits, and above all their possible transformations. According to Deleuze, however, it is not difficult to introduce transcendence into analyses of such fields of immanence. It is enough to introduce "points" that would serve as constant coordinates for these processes, and to stop their movement.¹² Universal coordinates such as the One, the Whole, Reason, Subject, and Object, for instance, are abstractions that explain nothing; they are rather what need to be explained. What one finds in an assemblage are rather foci of unification, knots of totalization, or processes of rationalization, subjectivation, or objectivation operating within concrete multiplicities, processes that are always relative, and which need to be analyzed on their own account. One could make a list of such universalizing coordinates; in fact, the list would be infinite. In What is Philosophy?, however, Deleuze and Guattari

¹²What is Philosophy?, p. 47; Negotiations, pp. 86, 145-146.

propose a typology of three general types of transcendentals or universals that the history of philosophy has introduced into the plane of immanence.¹³

a. Contemplation. The paradigm of transcendence in philosophy can be found, of course, in Plato. Philosophy, as Vernant and Detienne have shown, found its condition of possibility in the field of immanence formed by the Greek cities which, in contrast to the mythic transcendence that still dominated the neighboring imperial empires, "laïcized" forms of thought by bringing them into the agonistic and public space of the agora.¹⁴ What Plato condemned in the Athenian democracy, however, was the fact that, within this field of immanence, anyone could now lay claim to anything, and gain the upper hand by the mere force of persuasion and rhetoric. In order to define criteria by which one could select among these rival modes of existence (Socrates versus the sophists), he erected a new type of non-mythic transcendence that would be capable of being exercised within this field of immanence (though Plato made use of myth by giving it a special function). This is the ethical significance Deleuze assigns to the theory of Ideas. Plato posits the Idea as that which possesses a quality first-hand: it allows him to determine those beings that possess the quality second-hand, third-hand, depending on the nature of their participation: the legitimate claimant is the one who possesses the quality second-hand, whose claim is validated by the Idea, with other claimants eliminated from the

¹³See What is Philosophy?, pp. 44–49: "Can the entire history of philosophy be presented from the viewpoint of the instituting of a plane of immanence?"

¹⁴See Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982) and Marcel Detienne, Les maîtres de vérité dans la grèce archaïque (Paris: Maspero, 1967), esp. ch. 5. "Le procès de laïcisation"), both of whom locate the passage from "myth" to "reason" in the structure of the Greek polis.

selection. This Platonic inspiration will continue through the Neo-platonists and Christianity: the field of immanence becomes a simple field of phenomena that now only possesses secondarily what is attributed first of all to the anterior unity of the Idea, or the "One beyond Being," or the transcendence of "God."¹⁵

b. Reflection. Modern philosophy, Deleuze suggests, will follow Plato in this regard, but by determining the transcendent instance in ways that are very different from those proposed by Plato. Beginning with Descartes, and then with Kant, the cogito made it possible to treat the plane of immanence as a field of consciousness. In Kant, this is no longer the transcendence of the Idea or the One, but the transcendence of a Subject to which the field of immanence is attributed: immanence belongs to a passive ego, which the Subject necessarily represents to itself as its own. Much of Deleuze's work can be read as a profound critique of the reflective subject, with all the implications this entails (there is no universal subject, for instance, that could function as the bearer of universal human rights).¹⁶ The ambiguity of the Kantian critique can be seen in the trajectory that

¹⁵For Deleuze's interpretation of Platonism, see in particular "Plato and the Simulacrum" in The Logic of Sense, pp. 253-266 (though the concept of the simulacrum developed there assumes less and less importance in Deleuze's work); "Platon, les Grecs" in Critique et clinique, pp. 170-171: "The poisoned gift of Platonism is to have introduced transcendence into philosophy, to have given transcendence a plausible philosophical meaning (triumph of the judgment of God)."

¹⁶Deleuze first book, Empiricism and Subjectivity (1953), already informed by a rigorously post-Kantian viewpoint, argued that the essential question of Hume's empiricism was not "How is experience given to a subject?" but rather, "How is the subject constituted within the given?" In Difference and Repetition (1968) the Humean response--that the subject (human nature) is a derivative of the principles of association--was transformed into a "transcendental empiricism": the subject is no longer a transcendental instance that actively synthesizes experience, but is constituted within a plane of immanence by syntheses that are themselves passive, that is, by processes of subjectivation. For Deleuze, human rights must therefore be understood, not as universals, but as "axioms" of the modern State; see Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), pp. 453-473. For a critique of the notion of abstract human rights, see Alain Badiou, D'un désastre obscur: Droit, Etat.

the transcendent Ideas themselves follow in his philosophy: Kant denounced the transcendent Ideas of Soul, World, and God in the first Critique, but only in order to make them the "horizon" of the field immanent to the subject, and to then resurrect them in the second Critique, as we shall see below, as the necessary "postulates" of practical reason.¹⁷

c. Communication. A third step is taken with phenomenology and its successors. When immanence becomes immanent to a transcendental subjectivity, it is from within its own field that the mark of transcendence must appear. "Husserl conceived of immanence as the flux of lived experience within subjectivity." write Deleuze and Guattari, "but since this lived experience, pure and even primordial, does not belong completely to the self that represents it to itself, it is in the regions of non-belonging that the horizon of something transcendent is reestablished."¹⁸ Levinas, for example, founds ethics on the infinite transcendence of the "Other" which challenges the status of the reflective subject and undoes the primacy of the Same.¹⁹ In a different manner, Habermas attempts to ground ethics on the privileged transcendence of an intersubjective world populated by other selves, and governed by a "communicative consensus." Whatever form it takes, in this modern moment of transcendence one no longer thinks of

Politique (Paris: Editions de l'aube, 1993), pp. 46ff; Michel Butel, in L'Autre journal 10 (March 1991), pp. 21-25; and Francis Ewald, L'Etat providence (Paris: Grasset, 1980), pp. 24-27.

¹⁷On the Idea as "horizon," see Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, "Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic." We examine Deleuze's analysis of the moral law in Kant below.

¹⁸What is Philosophy?, p. 46 (translation modified).

¹⁹Emmanuel Levinas, Totalité et infini (La Haye, 1961). Deleuze never discusses Levinas's work directly, except as an instance of Jewish philosophy (in What is Philosophy?, p. 233, note 5). See, however, Alain Badiou's critiques in L'Éthique: Essai sur la conscience du Mal (Paris: Hatier, 1993), pp. 19-28.

immanence as immanent to something (the One, the Subject), but on the contrary one seeks to rediscover a transcendence within the heart of immanence itself, as a breach or interruption of its field (e.g., as absolute alterity)

Deleuze rejects all these forms of transcendence as illusions, even if they are inevitable ones. Together they constitute what he calls the moral vision of the world, whose postulates of transcendence he ceaselessly contrasts with those of an immanent ethical vision.²⁰

The distinction between transcendence and immanence, however, is not an absolute one, for even the illusions of transcendence can serve "to recharge the plane of immanence with immanence itself."²¹ The Christian tradition, for example, contains an important line of inspiration that can be traced from Pascal to Kierkegaard. What was at stake in Pascal's celebrated wager, as Deleuze interprets it, was not the existence or non-existence of a transcendent God, but rather the immanent modes of existence of those who must choose between his existence or non-existence. A complex typology results: there are the devout, tyrannical, hypocritical perhaps, guardians of order, for whom there is no question of choosing; the skeptics, the grey men of uncertainty, who do not know how or are unable to choose; creatures of evil, who are free to choose, but whose first choice places them in a situation where they can no longer repeat their choice, like Goethe's Mephistopheles; and finally, men of belief or grace who, conscious of choice,

²⁰On the "moral vision" of the world, see Difference and Repetition, p. 127 (Plato); Expressionism in Philosophy, p. 255 (Descartes).

²¹What is Philosophy?, p. 73.

make an "authentic" choice that is capable of being repeated in a steadfast spiritual determination.²² Kierkegaard drew out the necessary consequences of this line of thinking: decision or choice covers as great an area as thought itself. It is no longer a question of the existence of a transcendent God, but of the immanent possibilities of those who "choose" to believe. Nonetheless, Pascal's "gambler" (he who throws the dice) or Kierkegaard's "knight of faith" (he who makes the leap) remain men of faith: though the existence of God is not put into play in the wager, it is the perspective presupposed by it, the standpoint according to which one wins or loses. One still seeks to encounter a transcendence within the heart of immanence. This is why Deleuze argues that the comparisons often made between Nietzsche, on the one hand, and Kierkegaard and Pascal (or Chestov and Péguy) on the other, are only valid up to a certain point. As Nietzsche himself wrote: "'Without the Christian faith,' Pascal thought, 'you, no less than nature and history, will become for yourselves un monstre et un chaos': This prophecy we have fulfilled."²³

§ 3. Kant and Immanent Critique. Deleuze's project is thus to restore to immanence its full extension and purity in the domain of ethics, with all the risks this entails. Now Deleuze presents this idea of a purely immanent conception of ethics not, as

²²Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. W. F. Trotter (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1958), §233. Deleuze analyzes this Christian tradition in his two-volume Cinema, where he draws a parallel between the philosophy of Pascal and Kierkegaard and the films of Bresson and Dreyer. See The Movement-Image, pp. 114-116, and The Time-Image, pp. 176-179.

²³Nietzsche, Will to Power, §83. For Deleuze's analyses of these two traditions, see Difference and Repetition, pp. 5-11; Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 36-38.

one might perhaps expect, as a rejection of Kantianism, but on the contrary as its fulfilment. Kant's genius, in Deleuze's interpretation, was to have conceived of a purely immanent critique of reason, a critique that did not seek, within reason, "errors" coming from an external corporeal cause, but "illusions" that inevitably arise from within reason itself. Yet already the post-Kantian philosophers, from Maïmon to Fichte, had argued that Kant himself was unable to fully realize this project of immanent critique because he lacked a method that would allow reason to be critiqued internally without giving it the task of being its own judge.²⁴ Deleuze accepts this indictment of the Kantian tribunal. "Kant merely pushed a very old conception of critique to the limit," he writes, "a conception which saw critique as a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to knowledge and truth, but not on knowledge and truth themselves; a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to morality, but not on morality itself."²⁵ Kant's project was a critique of reason by reason itself: reason is both the judge and the judged, the accuser and the accused. But because knowledge and morality were made to correspond to the "natural interests" of reason, these interests themselves were never placed in question. What Kant condemned was simply those employments (illusions) through which reason, in its natural state, confuses those interests and allows these domains to impinge on one

²⁴For the interpretation of the post-Kantian tradition, Deleuze relies primarily on Martial Gueroult, La philosophie transcendentale de Salomon Maïmon (Paris: Alcan, 1929) and L'évolution et la structure de la Doctrine de la Science chez Fichte (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1930); and Jules Vuillemin, L'héritage kantien et la révolution copernicienne (Paris: PUF, 1954). In English, see Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).

²⁵Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 89. The third chapter of this study, entitled "Critique," is largely devoted to an examination of the relations between the Kant and Nietzsche.

another. In themselves, however, these domains and interests--and reason itself--were seen to be founded on an inalienable right, a natural law to which the critique bestows its highest blessing.²⁶ "Thus total critique turns into a politics of compromise: even before the battle the spheres of influence have already been shared out. Three ideals are distinguished: What can I know? What should I do? What can I hope for? Limits are drawn to each one, misuses and trespasses are denounced, but the uncritical character of each ideal remains at the heart of Kantianism like the worm in the fruit: true knowledge, true morality....What Kant still calls--in his own terms--a fact: the fact of morality, the fact of knowledge."²⁷

If Nietzsche, as Deleuze insists, was able to fulfill the purely immanent aims of the critical project and thus belongs to the history of Kantianism, it is because he brought critique to bear on truth itself, that is, on true morality and true knowledge. "We need a critique of moral values." writes Nietzsche in On the Genealogy of Morals. "the value of these values must first be called into question." And again: "The will to truth requires a critique--let us thus define our own task--the value of truth must for once be experimentally called into question."²⁸ Nietzsche was not content to discover transcendental principles that would constitute the condition of possibility for the "facts"

²⁶"It is impossible that this highest tribunal of all the rights and claims of speculation [i.e., reason] should itself be the source of deceptions and illusions." Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A669/B697, p. 549.

²⁷Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 89-90. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), §7, pp. 31-32: the conscious of the moral law is a fact, "not an empirical fact, but the sole fact of pure reason, which by it proclaims itself as originating law."

²⁸Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Preface, §6, p. 20; Essay III, §24, p. 153.

of reason (the "fact" of knowledge, the "fact" of morality): rather he was intent on discovering immanent principles that were truly genetic and productive, that would give an account of the genesis of knowledge, morality, and reason itself. He found such a principle, at once critical and creative, in the will to power. What he called genealogy was a method that traced the ancestry of knowledge and morality back to the modes of existence that serve as their principle, each of which is the expression of a certain quality of the will to power (affirmation or negation). "Noble" and "base" are not themselves values, but rather designate the immanent types of existence from which values are derived.²⁹ The phrase "mode of existence" must therefore not be taken as a subjective category: it refers neither to individuals nor groups, but to ontological types, and to the immanent ethical difference between these types.

Deleuze thus accepts the Kantian demand for an immanent critique, just as he accepts the Platonic demand for a selective ontology. What he refuses in both cases is the attempt to ground critique and selection in the avatars of transcendence: the contemplative transcendence of the Idea, the reflective transcendence of the Subject, the infinite transcendence of the Other, the communicative transcendence of Consensus. "The question," he writes, is knowing whether such a reaction [against platonism] abandons the project of a selection among rivals or, on the contrary, if it draws up, as Spinoza and Nietzsche believed, completely different methods of selection, which are no longer directed toward claims as acts of transcendence, but toward the manner in which

²⁹Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. x-xi: on the "method of dramatization," see pp. 78-79.

the existing being is filled with [s'emplit de] immanence."³⁰ In the following three studies, we attempt to analyze these immanent methods of selection proposed by Nietzsche, Spinoza, and Foucault, as well as the critiques of transcendence and negation that form their necessary complement.

II. NIETZSCHE: BECOMING-REACTIVE

§ 4. Interpretation and Evaluation. Nietzsche, in Deleuze's reading, inaugurated a new conception of philosophy, a new image of both the thinker and of thought for the "philosophy of the future." To the ideal of knowledge and the discovery of the true, Nietzsche substituted the task of the interpretation and evaluation of multiplicities. One of Nietzsche's essential theses is that there is no phenomenon that does not have a multiple sense: a thing is sometimes this, sometimes that, sometimes something more complicated, depending on the forces that take possession of it. What Nietzsche called "interpretation" is the art of determining the sense of a phenomenon ("there are no facts, only interpretations").³¹ The "sense" of a phenomenon consists of a relation of forces, according to which certain forces act and others react in a complex and hierarchical ensemble. Any two forces, being unequal, constitute a "body" (whether chemical, biological, social, or political) as soon as they enter into relationship. Whatever the

³⁰"Platon, les Grecs," in Critique et clinique, p. 171.

³¹Nietzsche, Will to Power, §§481, 556.

complexity of a given phenomenon, a given body, we must distinguish between the primary active forces of conquest or subjugation, and these secondary reactive forces of adaptation and regulation, and the varying relations of coexistence and hierarchy that are maintained between them. This is what Deleuze calls the principle of internal difference that lies at the base of Nietzsche's method: "In the beginning, at the origin, there is the difference between active and reactive forces."³² A given phenomenon is a mere "symptom" that reflects states of forces, and the philosopher is a "symptomatologist" who interprets the sense of these symptoms by determining the forces that produced them.

What Nietzsche called "evaluation," in turn, is the art of determining the value of a phenomenon. Every relation of force implies a hierarchy, a dominant force which commands and a dominated force which obeys. This relation of force with force expresses what Nietzsche called a "will." Deleuze takes great care in warding off naive misunderstandings of the Nietzschean principle of the "will to power." This principle does not mean (at least not at first) that the will wants power or desires domination. As long as one interprets the will to power as a "desire to dominate," we necessarily make it depend on established values, which alone are capable of determining who must be "recognized" as the most powerful in this or that case. Such a conception of power, which runs from Hobbes through Hegel, misunderstands the nature of the will to power as the pluralist principle of all our evaluations, as the principle of new and unrecognized values. The will to power, says Nietzsche, does not consist in taking but in giving; it does

³²Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 55.

not consist in coveting established values but in creating new values. As Deleuze puts it, power, in the will to power, is not what the will wills, but rather that which wills in the will. It is through the will to power that an active force commands, but also through the will to power that a reactive force obeys. To the two types of qualities of forces, Deleuze argues, there corresponds two qualities of the will to power, which are more profound than those of the forces that derive from them. The will to power makes active forces affirm themselves, affirm their own difference: in them, affirmation is primary, and negation is only a consequence. The characteristic of reactive forces, on the contrary, is to first of all oppose themselves to what they are not, to limit the other force: negation is primary, it is through negation that they arrive at an appearance of affirmation. What power wills in the will to power is a particular relation of forces, and the particular quality of power that is expressed in this relation. To "evaluate" a phenomenon is thus to determine the type of will that is expressed in its relation of forces. The philosopher here becomes a "genealogist" who evaluates phenomenon by tracing their ancestry back to quality of the will to power that they express: affirmation or negation.

This image of the philosopher of the future, as interpreter and evaluator, as symptomatologist and genealogist, is for Nietzsche also the oldest image of the philosopher: the Presocratic thinker. The future philosopher will therefore be able to create only by reviving something that has essentially been forgotten or erased. This "something," according to Nietzsche, is the unity of thought and life: modes of life inspire ways of thinking, and modes of thought create ways of living. Life activates thought, and thought in turn affirms life. But we no longer have a clear idea of what this

Presocratic unity of action and affirmation means: in fact, Nietzsche suggests that it was perhaps already effaced at the origins of philosophy. For at the moment of his birth in Greece, the philosopher could only survive by disguising himself with the mask of his predecessor, the Oriental wise man, the priest: we still tend to think of the philosopher as a being of conversion and ascent, the one who leaves the cave and rises up toward a transcendent principle on high.³³ Philosophy thus developed in history only by degenerating, by turning against itself, and by letting itself take its mask as its own. Socrates was the first genius of this decadence. In place of the unity of an active life and an affirmative thought, in Socrates one sees thought taking upon itself the task of judging life, erecting higher values that are supposedly superior to life (the True, the Good, the Beautiful), in order to measure, limit, and condemn life in the name of these values. And as thought becomes negative, life becomes depreciated, it ceases to be active, and becomes measured and limited, reactive and adaptive, reduced to its weakest forms, to the sickly forms that are alone compatible with these so-called superior values.³⁴ Reaction triumphs over the active life, and negation triumphs over affirmative thought. Nietzsche calls this common victory of reactive forces and the will to deny "nihilism," or the triumph of slaves.

³³"The popular image of the philosopher with his head in the clouds depends on it, as does the scientific image according to which the philosopher's heaven is an intelligible one." The Logic of Sense, p. 127: Deleuze's analysis of the "three images of philosophers."

³⁴Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §13. This is the source of Nietzsche's critique of Darwin and Spencer, who defined life in terms of a reaction or "adaptation" to an external milieu, rather than in terms of an aggressive domination that uses the milieu to further the needs of the individual: see Genealogy of Morals, Essay 2, §12.

§ 5. Nihilism: How Reactive Forces Triumph. This mutual triumph of negation and reaction (nihilism) poses one of the essential problems for an immanent philosophy of force or will such as Nietzsche's. How could weak forces have triumphed over the strong? How could "weak" or "base" modes of existence have gained the upper hand? For the weak cannot prevail simply by banding together so as to form a force stronger than the strong: inferior forces can prevail without ceasing to be inferior in quantity and reactive in quality, without ceasing to be slaves.³⁵ Here again, Deleuze shows how it is necessary to avoid misunderstanding the terms Nietzsche uses to designate modes of existence: "strong" and "weak," "master" and "slave." The slave is not someone who finds himself dominated by a master, and deserves to be; nor are the strong those who, in a given social regime, are the most powerful. In Nietzsche, forces are not measured quantitatively, but always in terms of an immanent qualitative typology of baseness and nobility. The slave does not cease to be a slave in taking power; in gaining the upper hand, reactive forces do not cease to be reactive. It is only when nihilism triumphs that the will to power ceases to mean "create," and instead signifies "wanting power" or "desiring domination" (and thus having established values attributed to oneself, such as money, honors, power). But this conception of the will to power is precisely that of the slave, it is the way in which the impotent slave conceives of power, it is the idea he has of power, and which he applies when he triumphs. Our masters are slaves who triumph in a

³⁵See Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 58-59. "The Problem of the Measure of Forces."

universal becoming-slave, a becoming-reactive that implies "the defeat of the stronger, the more privileged, the fortunate exceptions."³⁶ For Deleuze, one of the finest remarks in the Will to Power is: "The strong always have to be defended against the weak."³⁷

In Nietzsche and Philosophy, therefore, Deleuze presents the aim of Nietzsche's philosophy as at once critical and creative: a critique of nihilism and its various forms, and the creation of an affirmative thought derived from an active mode of existence. Nietzsche's argument, according to Deleuze, is that the weak, the slaves, do not triumph by the addition of their forces, but by the subtraction or division of active force by means of a fiction: they separate the strong from what they can do. Nietzsche devoted an entire book (The Genealogy of Morals) to analysis of the stages of the triumph of nihilism, stages which also form the great discoveries of Nietzsche's psychology, and which we must now examine in turn: ressentiment, bad conscience, and the ascetic ideal.

a. Ressentiment (moment of accusation). "There is no single concept of 'good,'" writes Nietzsche.³⁸ The concept of "good" requires interpretation and evaluation, and the sense and value of the concept can only be determined by applying the method of dramatization: Who is it that says, "I am good"? What mode of existence is required to utter this proposition? From the point of view of activity, the one who says "I am good" is not someone who compares themselves with others, or judges his actions in relation to

³⁶Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1968), "Expeditions of an Untimely Man," §14, pp. 75-76.

³⁷Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 58.

³⁸Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay 1, §11.

superior and transcendent values. Good qualifies an activity, an affirmation, and a joy that is experienced immediately in its exercise. "The good' themselves, that is to say, the noble, the high-minded, who felt and established themselves and their actions as good, that is, of the first rank, in contradistinction to all the low, low-minded, common and plebeian."³⁹ I am good, therefore you are evil: such is the formula of the master. With the master, everything positive is in the premises; and the negative conclusion has importance only insofar as it augments the tenor of the action and affirmation, and intensifies the corresponding joy: the good "only looks for its antithesis in order to affirm itself with joy."⁴⁰

With the slave, this formula is reversed: You are evil, therefore I am good. The slave can only say "I am good" by reacting against the other, by first positing the other as evil. While the master begins with a concrete feeling of positive difference, the slave begins with an abstract thought of negative opposition: the master affirms his own difference, while the slave denies those who differ from him. "While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is 'outside,' what is 'different,' what is 'not itself,' and this No is its creative deed."⁴¹ Values are still being created, but these are now the values of reactive forces which express a will of negation. What was good from the active viewpoint now becomes evil from the reactive viewpoint. "This inversion of the value positing eye...is

³⁹Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay 1, §2, pp. 25-26.

⁴⁰Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay 1, §10.

⁴¹Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay 1, §10, p. 36.

the essence of ressentiment: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile world."⁴² The evil one is now he who acts; the good one is he who does not act, who holds himself back from acting, and who refers action to the point of view of a passive third party (who claims an interest in and "profits" from actions he does not perform), someone who experiences their consequences (judging their "utility" their utility or harmfulness), or better still, a divine party (who scrutinizes the "intentions" of the one who acts). "This is how good and evil are born," comments Deleuze. "ethical determination, that of good and bad, gives way to moral judgment. The good of ethics has become the Evil of morality, the bad has become the Good of morality."⁴³

Ressentiment thus operates by means of projective recrimination and accusation: "It's your fault." it's your fault if I suffer, if I am weak and unhappy, if I am misunderstood and unloved. The man of ressentiment seeks a cause for his pain by accusing everything that is active in life: the power of ressentiment is directed against others, imputing wrongs, handing out reproaches, distributing responsibilities. Deleuze summarizes slave morality in the following syllogism: "You are evil; I am the opposite of what you are: therefore I am good." The man of ressentiment needs to conceive of a non-ego, then to oppose himself to this non-ego, in order to finally posit himself as a self. One of Deleuze's most important claims in Nietzsche and Philosophy is that Nietzsche's primary

⁴²Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay 1, §10, pp. 36-37.

⁴³Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 121-122.

enemy is Hegel.⁴⁴ The syllogism of the slave begins with a negation in the premises, and produces the appearance of an affirmation only through the negation of a negation, a double negation. "We can already sense the form in which the syllogism of the slave has been so successful in philosophy: the dialectic."⁴⁵ The dialectic is the ideology of ressentiment, the way of thinking of the slave.

How does this dialectic of ressentiment arrive at its pseudo-affirmation? The syllogism can reach its conclusion only by means of a paralogism that lies hidden within it. Following Nietzsche's famous example, Deleuze formulates the syllogism of the lamb-slave as follows: "birds of prey are evil: I am the opposite of a bird of prey: therefore I am good." In the minor premise, the bird of prey is seen to be what it is: a force of action which is not separated from its effects or manifestations. In the major premise, however, the paralogism is introduced: it is assumed that the bird of prey is able to not manifest its active force, that it could hold back from its effects and separate itself from what it can do. This is what Deleuze calls the paralogism of ressentiment: the fiction of a force separated from what it can do. Deleuze analyzes the paralogism by separating it into three moments. First, force is split in two, the manifestation of force (the activity of the bird of prey) is turned into an effect, which is then referred to the force as if it were a separate cause: "the same event is posited first as cause and then a second time as its

⁴⁴Deleuze contrasts these two conceptions of the affirmation-negation conception in Difference and Repetition, pp. 53-55. For an analysis of Deleuze's early attempts to forge an anti-Hegelian philosophy, see Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990).

⁴⁵Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 121.

effect" (moment of causality). Second, this divided force is then projected onto a substrate, a neutral subject endowed with a free will who is deemed to be capable of acting or of refraining from action: Nietzsche constantly exposes the "subject" as a fiction or grammatical function, as when we say "lightning flashes" or "force moves" (moment of substance). Finally, once forces are projected onto a fictitious subject, this subject is deemed to be morally blameworthy if active force (bird of prey) performs the activity which is its own, and deserving if reactive force (lamb) does not perform the activity which it...does not have, "just as if the weakness of the weak--that is to say, their essence, their effects, their sole ineluctable, irremovable reality--were a voluntary achievement, willed, chosen, a deed, a meritorious act" (moment of reciprocal determination).⁴⁶

Ressentiment in this way effectively neutralizes active force. it makes action "ashamed" of itself. it separates action from its power of acting, it makes active forces become reactive. Even more, ressentiment, hiding its hatred under the guise of a venomous "love," is inseparable from a will to spread an infection: "I who accuse you, it is for your own good: I love you in order that you will join me, until you are joined with me, until you yourself become a painful, sick, reactive being, a good being...."⁴⁷ This is why Nietzsche argues that ressentiment requires the intervention of an artist of genius: the priest. The priest, as a type, is the one who makes himself the master of those who

⁴⁶Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay I, §13, p. 46.

⁴⁷Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 128.

suffer, and who derives his power from the ressentiment of others. He thus accompanies reactive forces, but is not strictly speaking a part of them; he is the artist who gives ressentiment its form, who ensures its triumph through the interjection of a fiction--but precisely in order to establish and maintain his own power.

b. Bad Conscience (moment of introjection). Ressentiment deprives active force of the material conditions of its operation. But although force is fictitiously separated from what it can do, something real nonetheless happens to it as a result of this fiction: it is internalized, it is turned back against itself, it produces pain. Here again, the concept of pain has different senses depending of the forces that take possession of it. From the active point of view, pain has an external meaning: that of giving pleasure to the one who inflicts or contemplates the pain (even if, as with the Greeks, it is the gods who find pleasure in human suffering). But from the reactive point of view, pain is taken over by new forces and given a new meaning, an internal meaning. Having neutralized active force, ressentiment must change direction: the reactive man can no longer locate the cause of his suffering in others, but must now find it within himself. "All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward--that is what I call the internalization of man....That is the origin of the bad conscience."⁴⁸ The reactive man must now look for the cause of his pain "in himself, in some guilt, in a piece of the past, he must understand his suffering as a punishment."⁴⁹ The term "fault" no longer refers to others ("It's your

⁴⁸Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay II, §16, pp. 84-85, as quoted in Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 128.

⁴⁹Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay III, §20, p. 140.

fault!") but to myself ("It's my fault! I'm guilty!"). It is in the bad conscience that ressentiment comes into its own and reaches the summit of its contagious power. The priest appears a second time to preside over this change of direction by inventing the notion of sin. "Quite so, my sheep! someone must be to blame for it--you alone are to blame for yourself!"⁵⁰

c. The Ascetic Ideal (moment of sublimation). The ascetic ideal marks the third moment of the reactive mode of existence, the triumph of reactive forces, the moment of sublimation. Life is "judged" by transcendent values superior to life, pious values that are opposed to life, that condemn it, that lead it to nothingness. They promise salvation only to the most reactive, the weakest and sickliest forms of life. This is the alliance between the reactive man and the nihilist God: it is the idea of God that expresses the depreciation of life, the will to nothingness. "If one shifts the center of gravity of life out of life into the 'Beyond'--into nothingness--one has deprived life as such of its center of gravity."⁵¹ Everything is here reversed: slaves are called masters, the weak are called the strong, baseness is called nobility. One says that someone is strong and noble because he "bears": he bears the weight of "superior" values, he feels responsible. Even life, above all life, seems difficult to bear. This is the first meaning of nihilism in Nietzsche, what Deleuze terms "negative nihilism." The nihil in nihilism does not mean non-being but a

⁵⁰Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay III, §15, p. 128.

⁵¹Nietzsche, Antichrist, §43, p. 155, as quoted in Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 152.

value of nil: life takes on a value of nil, it is denied, judged, and negated in the name of values superior to life.

§ 6. The Phenomenon of Culture. Ressentiment, bad conscience, and the ascetic ideal are the three psychological categories Nietzsche develops to describe the triumph of reactive forces, the reign of nihilism, the formation of morality as the judgment of life in the name of transcendent values. But on what fiction does the internalization of ressentiment rest? This problem is extremely complicated, as Deleuze shows, since it brings into play the whole phenomenon of what Nietzsche calls "culture." Culture, for Nietzsche, means training and selection. Culture is a matter of giving man habits, of making him obey laws, of training him. Just as Bergson showed that all habits are arbitrary, but that the habit of forming habits is natural, so Nietzsche argues that although every historical law is arbitrary, what is not arbitrary is the law of obeying laws. To obey a law, no matter what its content, means that a certain active force is exerted on man and given the task of training him. But what does culture train man for? Nietzsche's response is famous: it trains man to make a commitment to the future, to form the capacity to make promises, to assume the responsibility for a debt. It is in the debtor-creditor relation, writes Nietzsche, "that one person first encountered another person, that one person first measured himself against another."⁵² Promises were given, debts were

⁵²Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay II, §8, p. 70, quoted in Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 213-214.

incurred. and the justice of the laws existed in order make one responsible for one's promises and debts, "to create a memory for the future," in short. to become active.

In order to achieve this aim. culture in principle does not recoil from any sort of violence. Culture is not a great conversation, nor a system of exchange and communication. but an immense system of cruelty. "Perhaps indeed there was nothing more fearful and uncanny in the whole prehistory of man than his mnemotechnics. 'If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory'--this is the main clause of the oldest (unhappily the most enduring) psychology on earth....Man could never do without blood, torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need to create a memory for himself."⁵³ Culture. in short. made use of pain (and not money) as a medium of exchange, a currency, an equivalent: it turned pain into an exact equivalent of a forgetting, of an injury caused, a promise not kept, a debt not paid. In relation to this means, culture is called "justice," and the means itself is called "punishment." "Injury caused = pain to be suffered": this is the terrible equation of debt that determines the relationship of man to man.⁵⁴ These mnemotechnics of culture were inscribed directly onto the body: tattooing, scarifying, circumcising, mutilating, piercing, excising, incising, carving, encircling, initiating--all constituted so many techniques through which a person ceased to be a mere biological organism and entered into the selective activity of

⁵³Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay II, §3, p. 61.

⁵⁴Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 134-135; Anti-Oedipus, p. 191.

culture.⁵⁵ As Deleuze and Guattari argue in Anti-Oedipus, "society is not first of all a milieu for exchange where the essential would be to circulate or cause to circulate, but rather a socius of inscription where the essential thing is to mark and to be marked."⁵⁶

Now Nietzsche's genius was to have posed in its most rigorous form the question concerning the relation of pain with justice: How can one "pay back" with suffering? How can a criminal's pain serve as an "compensation" to the harm he has done? How can the removal of flesh compensate for the loss of money (Shakespeare's "Merchant of Venice")? The moralist response that justice derives from a deeply felt offense, a spirit of revenge, or a justiciary reaction still leaves the essential question unexplained, namely, how the pain of others could ever satisfy this thirst for revenge. Nietzsche argued that the active meaning of pain is necessarily an external meaning. The equation "injury caused = pain undergone" can only be understood if a third term is introduced, namely, the pleasure which is felt in inflicting pain or in contemplating it. This third term is what Nietzsche calls the "evaluating eye," which extracts from the pain it is contemplating, from the spectacle of the punishment, a kind of "surplus value," a surplus value that compensates for the broken alliance the criminal has wronged, for the mark that has not sufficiently penetrated his body or sufficiently etched itself upon his memory. From this active point of view, justice--that is, the entire sphere of legal obligations, with all its stupidity, pain,

⁵⁵See Pierre Clastres, "Of Torture in Primitive Societies," in Society Against the State (New York: Zone Books, 1987).

⁵⁶Anti-Oedipus, p. 142. "The mythologies sing of organs-partial objects and their relations with a full body that repels or attracts them: vaginas riveted on the woman's body, an immense penis shared by the men, an independent anus that assigns itself a body without anus."

and perversity--was an activity that sought to train man's reactive forces, to make them suitable for being acted, and to hold man responsible for this suitability itself.

Thus, among the many senses punishment can have, there is one that it does not have: it does not awaken the feeling of guilt in the culprit, it does not produce the bad conscience. "It is precisely among criminals and convicts that the sting of conscience is extremely rare: prisons and penitentiaries are not the kind of hotbed in which this species of gnawing worm is likely to flourish. Punishment makes men hard and cold: it concentrates: it sharpens the feeling of alienation: it strengthens the power of resistance....If we consider those millennia before the history of man, we may unhesitatingly assert that it was precisely through punishment that the development of the feeling of guilt was most powerfully hindered--at least upon the victims upon whom the punitive force was vented."⁵⁷ What then is the final product of culture? "If we place ourselves at the end of this tremendous process, when the tree at last brings forth fruit, where society and the morality of customs at last reveal what then have simply been the means to: then we discover that the ripest fruit is the sovereign individual, like only to himself, liberated from morality of customs, autonomous and supramoral (for 'autonomous' and 'moral' are mutually exclusive), in short, the man who has his own independent, protracted will and the right to make promises."⁵⁸ The means of culture, in other words, must not be confused with its result. Culture trains and selects by means of responsibility before the

⁵⁷Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay II, §14, pp. 81-82.

⁵⁸Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay II, §2, p. 59.

law (justice), and punishment in the settling of debts (pain). But the result of culture is not the man who obeys the law, but the sovereign and legislative individual who defines himself by a power over himself and over the law; its product is not the responsible or moral man, but the autonomous and supramoral man who acts all his reactive forces, and who "is able" to promise precisely because he is no longer responsible to any tribunal. This is why Nietzsche speaks of a self-destruction of justice: the means of culture disappear in its product.

What Nietzsche calls "history," however, is the means by which reactive forces take possession of culture and divert its course in their favor. "Instead of justice and its process of self-destruction, history presents us with societies that have no wish to perish and which cannot imagine anything superior to their own laws."⁵⁹ Instead of the active individual as the product of culture, history presents us with reactive forces who prevent this product by forming themselves into collectivities or "herds" (States, Churches, classes, peoples, races). Culture does not abandon its task of training and selection, it still wants to train man and make use of his reactive forces. But the training procedures are now used to break the strong, and to select the weak, to preserve, organize, and propagate the reactive life. The product of "universal history" is not the active man, but the domesticated man, the "sublime abortion," "the gregarious animal, docile, sickly, mediocre Being, the European today."⁶⁰ Within these herds, certain reactive forces

⁵⁹Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 138.

⁶⁰Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §62; Genealogy of Morals, Essay 1, §11, as quoted in Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 138.

appear to act (priests), others appear to serve as material (slaves); but in fact, everything now happens between reactive forces. This is where the will to power is given its reactive meaning of "wanting power" or "desiring domination," and, as has been frequently pointed out, it is easy to see where Nietzsche would have ranked the race of "masters" conceived of by the Nazis in his name.

Here again, Deleuze argues, Nietzsche shows that a fiction and a projection intervene: it is the debtor-creditor relation itself that changes nature. Firstly, debt loses the active character by virtue of which it took part in man's liberation, and now becomes a debt toward purely reactive instances ("the consciousness of having a debt toward the divinity," or toward society, the State, the Church). Secondly, as we have seen, debt loses its external meaning and becomes internalized in the form of the bad conscience: responsibility-debt becomes responsibility-guilt. Thirdly, and most importantly, in its new form, debt is no longer finite, it no longer passes between parties, provoking a change of state and creating something active in them (an affect); the debt now becomes infinite, inexhaustible, and therefore unpayable in principle. "The aim now is to preclude pessimistically, once and for all, the prospect of a final discharge: the aim now is to make the glance recoil disconsolately from an iron impossibility: the aim now is to turn back the concepts of 'guilt' and 'duty'--back against whom? There can be no doubt: against the 'debtor' first of all...finally they are turned back against the creditor too."⁶¹ In ressentiment, reactive force discharges itself against others: in bad conscience, having

⁶¹Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay II, §21, p. 92.

neutralized active force, reactive force discharges its ressentiment against itself: but with the ascetic ideal, finally, reactive force precludes any discharge whatsoever.

This is the genius of the Christian concept of "redemption." It is no longer a discharge from debt, but a deepening of debt: it is no longer an external suffering through which one pays off a debt, but an internalized suffering through which one becomes a debtor forever. Debt becomes a relation of debtor who will never finish paying off his debt to a creditor who will never finish collecting interest on the debt--to the point where the creditor himself must take on the responsibility for redeeming the debt. "God himself sacrifices himself for the guilt of mankind. God himself makes payment to himself. God as the only being who can redeem man from what has become unredeemable for man himself."⁶² Hence the idea of a Savior who is at once executioner, victim, and comforter: "the Holy Trinity, the wonderful dream of the bad conscience."⁶³ It is the priest who once again gives this guilt form, who exploits this guilt to establish his power of judgment: he organizes the herd into a collectivity (the Church), and gives it a means to endure this multiplied and internalized pain, to make it livable (confession-absolution).⁶⁴

⁶²Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay II, §21, p. 92; cf. Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 142.

⁶³Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 16.

⁶⁴In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari show that the despotic State operated according to similar means ("there is always a transcendent monotheism on the horizon of despotism"). Justice was no longer inscribed directly on the flesh, but on stones, parchments, and lists: its medium of currency was no longer pain but money. But the circulation of money not only makes one's debt, in the final analysis, an indebtedness to the State (in the form of taxes, rent, and labor), but is equally a means of rendering the debt infinite: one never has done with one's indebtedness to the State. See Anti-Oedipus, p. 197.

§ 7. Parenthesis: The Moral Law in Kant. It is worth pausing here to consider Deleuze's analysis of Kant's theory of the moral law, since in effect it submits Kantianism itself to the critical reversal set in motion by Nietzsche. Just as the Critique of Pure Reason effected a Copernican revolution by making the objects of knowledge revolve around the subject, Deleuze suggests that the Critique of Practical Reason effected an equally important revolution by making the Good revolve around the Law. He thereby inverted the relation that had prevailed since antiquity, and seemed to be in a position to reverse the ascetic ideal. But what actually happens in the second Critique? In Plato, laws are a secondary or derived power, subordinate to the Good: if humans knew the Good, and how to conform to it, they would not need laws. From the point of view of principles, then, laws are only a "second resort," an imitation of the Good given to humans when the true politics is lacking;⁶⁵ and from the point of view of consequences, the righteous person, in obeying the laws of his or her country, can nonetheless be said to be acting for the "Best," even though he or she retains the freedom to think of the Good and for the sake of the Good.⁶⁶ Kant, in Deleuze's reading, effectively reversed this classical conception of the law, as much from the point of view of the principles upon which the law rests as the consequences it entails:

1. From the point of view of principles, laws are no longer seen to find their foundation in a higher principle from which they would derive their authority. Instead,

⁶⁵Such is the tripartite figure presented by Plato in the Statesman: the Good as the father of the law, the law itself, and constitutions. Constitutions become simulacrum as soon as they violate or usurp the law, thereby cutting themselves off from the Good. See The Logic of Sense, p. 296, n. 2.

⁶⁶Masochism, p. 71.

THE Law is made into a first principle, a pure form of universality that has neither object nor content (since a content would imply a Good of which the law would be the imitation...). It does not tell us what we must do, it does not present itself as a comparative or psychological universal ("Do unto others..."). Rather, it provides a subjective rule, a logical test, that we must obey no matter what our action: every action whose maxim can be thought without contradiction as universal, and whose motive has no other object than this maxim, will be a moral action, or at least consistent with morality. Lying, for example, cannot be thought as a universal, because it at least implies people who believe the lie and who, in believing it, are not lying. In Kant, the Law becomes stripped of all content, its imperative being merely a categorical one. The Law does not tell us which object the will must pursue to be good, but simply what form it must take to be moral. "It does not tell us what we must do, it simply tells us "You must!" leaving us to deduce from it the Good, that is, the objects of this pure imperative."⁶⁷

2. From the point of view of consequences, it is no longer possible to say that the righteous man obeys the law for the sake of the Best. Since it is valid by virtue of its form alone and its content remains undetermined, the Law is not part of the domain of the understanding. The Law is not known, and can never be known, precisely because there is nothing in it to "know." We come across the Law only through its action, through a

⁶⁷For Deleuze's critique of the moral law in Kant, see "Sur quatre formules poétiques qui pourraient résumer la philosophie kantienne," in Critique et clinique, pp. 45-47; as well as the more detailed analysis in Kant's Critical Philosophy.

purely practical determination that is opposed to any speculative or theoretical proposition. The Law defines a realm of transgression where one breaks the Law without ever knowing what it is. It is this realm, Deleuze suggests, whose mechanisms were described with frightening detail by Kafka in The Trial: the Law acts and expresses itself through its sentence, and one can learn of this sentence only through its application in a punishment.⁶⁸ Consequently, the person who tries to obey the moral imperative of the law no longer becomes or even feels righteous; on the contrary, the Law makes one feel guilty, necessarily guilty, guilty in advance, and the more strict one's obedience, the greater one's guilt. Freud, in his analysis of the superego, uncovered the secret of this paradox of conscience: if duty presupposes a renunciation of our interests and desires, the moral Law will inevitably exert itself all the more strongly and rigorously the deeper our renunciation. The Law thereby makes itself all the more severe to the degree that we observe it with exactitude.⁶⁹ And even guilt and punishment will not give us a final knowledge of our faults: the Law remains in a state of indeterminacy equaled only by the extreme specificity of the punishment. It never acquits us, no more of our virtues than of our faults.⁷⁰

Deleuze, in short, defines the Kantian moral Law in terms of two paradoxical poles: formal transcendence, from the point of view of principles; and a priori guilt, from

⁶⁸Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, esp. chap. 5.

⁶⁹Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, Trans. James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1961), pp. 72-73 (S.E., XXI, 125), as quoted in Masochism, p. 72.

⁷⁰This is the theme of "Immanence and Desire," the third chapter of Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature.

the point of view of consequences. The modern critique of Kant's moral philosophy has tended to take these two poles as its point of departure. In his 1967 study of Masochism, for instance, in which this analysis of the Law first appeared, Deleuze argued that Sade and Masoch presented two "perverse" modes of existence that had as their aim the subversion of the moral Law: either by a new revolt that aims at a higher sovereign principle beyond the Law, an ironic principle that would no longer be the Good, but rather the Idea of Evil or primary nature (Sade's institutional model of anarchy): or else by a humorous submission that eludes the imperative of the Law by turning punishment into the very condition that makes the forbidden pleasure possible (Masoch's contractual model).⁷¹ Deleuze's analyses in Masochism, in turn, can be read as an atheistic version of Kierkegaard's analysis of the "suspension of the ethical," for whom the domination of the universal law did violence to the ethical singularity. In Kierkegaard, Job contests the Law ironically, dismissing the general in order to attain the most singular as a principle: whereas Abraham submits to the law in a humorous manner, "but in this submission he recovers the singularity of the only son that the Law has commanded him to sacrifice."⁷² But these critiques, important as they are, only expose the paradoxes of the Kantian law, its limits, pointing either to a "leap" beyond the law into the religious, or a "transgression" of the law through perversion.

⁷¹Masochism, chapter 7, "Humor, Irony, and the Law," pp. 81-90. "Perversion" plays an important role in Deleuze's writings as a specific type of mode of existence that retains a positivity of its own (even if it sometimes remains dependent upon the Law for its transgressions).

⁷²Difference and Repetition, p. 7.

Nietzsche's method of dramatization, on the contrary, provides an immanent critique, not of the paradoxes, but of the very principles of Law. Who is it that says, "You must!?" It is the priest, and the categorical imperative expresses the purely formal aspect of the will to judge. Who is it that is always already guilty? It is the slave, laden with a responsibility-guilt of which he can never acquit himself. The moral law, for Deleuze, is simply "the juridical form assumed by the infinite debt."⁷³ Rather than submitting this system of judgment to a true critique, Kant merely erected "a fantastic subjective tribunal" that placed both the priest and the slave within the subject: it is the same person who now becomes both priest and believer, legislator and subject, judge and judged.⁷⁴ "Kant's dream was not to abolish the distinction between two worlds (sensible and super-sensible) but to secure the unity of the personal in the two worlds."⁷⁵ In the name of practical reason, "reason" itself is made to represent our slavery and subjection as something superior that makes us reasonable beings. "The more you obey, the more you will become master, for you will only be obeying pure reason, in other words...yourself."⁷⁶

In the first Critique, Kant denounced the transcendent Ideas (Soul, World, God), relegating them to the "horizon" of the field immanent to the subject. But one by one, they are each resurrected in the second Critique and given a practical determination.

⁷³Anti-Oedipus, p. 213.

⁷⁴Critique et clinique, p. 158.

⁷⁵Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 93.

⁷⁶A Thousand Plateaus, p. 376.

"Freedom," as the "fact" of morality, implies the cosmological Idea of a supra-sensible world, independent of any sensible condition: in turn, the abyss that separates the noumenal Law and the phenomenal world requires the intermediary of an intelligible author of sensible Nature or a "moral cause of the world" (the theological Idea of a supreme being), and can only be bridged through the "postulate" of an infinite progress. Acquittal can only be hoped for, not in the here and now, but from the point of view of a progress that continues to infinity in an ever more exacting conformity to the Law. Since this path exceeds the limits of our life, it requires the psychological Idea of the immortality of the soul (the debtor must survive if the debt is to be infinite).⁷⁷ This indefinite prolongation leads less to a paradise above than a hell here below: it does not bestow immortality, but condemns us to a "slow death," leaving us no other juridical alternatives than those proposed by Kafka: either an "apparent acquittal" or an "unlimited postponement." Or rather, Deleuze argues, it is not that judgment is deferred, put off until tomorrow, repressed to infinity: on the contrary, it is this very act of deferring, of carrying things to infinity, of making the debt infinite, that renders judgment possible.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 129: "The highest good is practically possible only on the supposition of the immortality of the soul, and the latter, as inseparably bound to the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason." On all these points, see Deleuze's analysis of the second Critique in Kant's Critical Philosophy, chapter 2, pp. 28-45.

⁷⁸ Critique et clinique, p. 159: "Even a judgment of knowledge envelops an infinity of space, time, and experience which determines the existence of phenomena in space and time ("every time that..."). But the judgment of knowledge in this sense implies a moral form and a primary theology, according to which existence is related to the infinite in the order of time: the existing being as having an infinite debt toward God."

The moral law is a system of judgment that "condemns us to a servitude without end and annuls any liberatory process."⁷⁹

§ 8. The Transvaluation of Values. It is at this point that we can once again take up Nietzsche's thread. For Nietzsche, nihilism did not end with the ascetic ideal or the creation of the system of judgment. It continued to pursue a path that constitutes our own history, and leads to the problem by which Deleuze will define the ethical question: namely, the becoming-active of forces.

d. The Death of God (moment of recuperation). The death of god means: the higher values of the system of judgment are reacted against, their existence is denied, they are refused all validity. Previously nihilism signified: the negation of life in the name of higher values (negative nihilism). Now it takes on a new sense: the negation of these superior values (reactive nihilism). "The sensational news spreads: there is nothing to be seen behind the curtain, 'the characteristics which have been assigned to the "real being" of things are the characteristics of non-being, of nothingness.'"⁸⁰ The reactive man takes the very weapons of his triumph--ressentiment and the bad conscience--and turns them against God. The nihilist becomes one who denies God, the good, the true, all forms of the supersensible. Nothing is true, nothing is good, God is dead. It is important to see that this second sense of nihilism derives from and presupposes the first: in negative

⁷⁹Deleuze, "Pour en finir avec le jugement," in Critique et clinique, p. 160.

⁸⁰Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 148.

nihilism, life was depreciated in the name of higher values; in reactive nihilism, this depreciated life remains, but it now continues in a world without superior values, devoid of meaning and purpose.

Now one of Nietzsche's great thesis is that the death of God is a great and noisy event, but not a sufficient one. (Nietzsche presents at least fifteen versions of the death of God throughout his oeuvre so as to heighten its comic aspect.) Man discovers himself to be the murderer of God, but at the same time he wants to assume the logical consequence of this death: to become God himself, to replace God. Higher values are negated, but they are now replaced by human values, all-too-human values. Morality replaces religion; utility, progress, history itself replace divine values. But nothing has changed: it is the same reactive life, the same slavery, the same ressentiment and bad conscience, which once triumphed in the shadow of divine values, and which now triumphs in the name of human values. This is why Nietzsche, in Book IV of Zarathustra, traces the great misery of the "higher men," those who want to replace God and be the bearers of human values, and why he can gather together in a single polemic his critique of Christianity, humanism, socialism, nihilism, evolution, progress, theories of history and culture (à la Hegel), and the dialectic itself.

e. The Last Man (moment of the end). The death of God is thus an event, but one whose meaning and value is not immediately apparent. To the degree that the principle of evaluation does not change, that the element from which the value of values was derived has not been reversed, nothing is changed, we still remain under the reign of established values. At each step, nihilism advances further, its inanity is revealed even more clearly.

For what appears with the death of God is that the alliance between the reactive man and the nihilist God is in the process of being broken: man takes the place of God, but he falls further and further into the abyss of nothingness, in a world increasingly devoid of all values, divine or even human. At the end of the series of higher men emerges "the last man," the one who says: "Everything is vain, it is better to fade away passively! Better a nothingness of will than a will to nothingness!" There are many avatars of the nihilist theme before one reaches this point, the reactive life strives for a long time to secrete its own values. But at the end of this road lies "the great disgust": the reactive life left alone with itself, no longer even having the will to disappear, dreaming of a passive extinction. This is the interpretation Deleuze gives to Zarathustra's "Ass": he says "yes," but for him, to affirm is to bear: to bear either the burdens with which he is laden (divine values), those which he assumes himself (human values), of the weight of his tired muscles when he no longer has anything to bear (the absence of values).⁸¹ Negative nihilism is replaced by reactive nihilism, but reactive nihilism ends in passive nihilism.

f. The Man Who Wants to Perish (Midnight: the moment of transvaluation). But because of this rupture, the will to nothingness turns against reactive forces, it becomes the will to deny the reactive life itself, and inspires in man a new inclination, the desire to destroy himself actively. Beyond the last man, there is still the "man who wants to perish," who wants to be overcome. At this point nihilism is achieved (midnight), and

⁸¹Difference and Repetition, pp. 53; cf. p. 311, note 16: "Nietzsche never ceases to denounce the assimilation of 'affirm' with 'bear' (cf. Beyond Good and Evil, §213: "'Thinking' and 'taking something seriously,' taking on its weight--to them, these things go together, they have no other experience of it)."

everything is ready--ready for a transmutation. The passive extinction of the last man is the final product of becoming reactive, the final manner in which the reactive man preserves himself. But the active destruction of the man who wants to perish is the product of a selection that passes through the last man but does not stop there. This is the "decisive point" of Nietzsche's philosophy, nihilism at once completed and defeated: the point at which negation defeats itself and becomes a power of affirming, a power which announces and prepares for the "Overman." The overman refers to neither a master race nor a "superhuman" individual. If the "universal" history of man can be defined as a becoming-reactive of forces in general (nihilism), the overman is the one who overcomes man, who differs in nature from the reactive man. If "man" imprisoned and judged life in favor of higher values, the overman is what frees life within man himself, in favor of a form which is no longer man. "The most cautious people ask today: 'How may man still be preserved?' Zarathustra, however, asks as the first and sole one to do so: 'How shall man be overcome?' The overman lies close to my heart, he is my paramount and sole concern--and not man."⁸² What interests Nietzsche is not the death of God, which is already an old and tiresome story, but the death of man, that is, the way in which reactive forces can themselves become active.

The transvaluation of all values is thus defined by Deleuze as a becoming active of forces (interpretation), and the triumph of affirmation in the will to power (evaluation): the unity of an active life and an affirmative thought. Under the reign of nihilism, the

⁸²Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Book IV, "Of the Higher Man," §3, p. 297, as quoted in Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 163.

negative is the form of the will to power: affirmation is second, subordinated to negation (the dialectical syllogism of ressentiment). Now everything changes: affirmation becomes the essence or the will to power itself; the negative subsists, but as the mode of being of the one who affirms, as the aggressivity or destruction proper to affirmation--as the total critique that accompanies creation. The transmutation signifies this reversal of the roles of negation and affirmation. But this transmutation is only possible at the end of nihilism: it was necessary to pass through the last man, to reach the man who wants to perish, in order for negation to finally turn against reactive forces, to itself become an action, and to pass into the service of a superior affirmation. Hence Nietzsche's formula: nihilism is defeated, but defeated by itself.

The stages of nihilism, as analyzed by Deleuze, thus form a coherent ensemble, and can be summarized as follows:

Table 3: The Stages of Nihilism in Nietzsche
(Becoming-Reactive: The Genealogy of Morals)

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1. RESSENTIMENT: moment of accusation and recrimination. "It's your fault....";
 2. THE BAD CONSCIENCE: moment of introjection. "It's my fault...". fault is internalized, turned back against oneself, one becomes guilty;
 3. THE ASCETIC IDEAL: moment of sublimation, triumph of reactive forces and the will to nothingness. life is "judged" in the name of values superior to life (negative nihilism);
 4. THE DEATH OF GOD: moment of recuperation. superior values are reacted against, replaced by human values. the higher men (reactive nihilism);
 5. THE LAST MAN: moment of the end. denial of even human values, the will to nothingness becomes a nothingness of will (passive nihilism);
 6. THE MAN WHO WANTS TO PERISH: moment of transmutation, achievement of nihilism. movement from passive extinction to active destruction. from negation to affirmation (nihilism destroyed by itself).
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§ 9. The Eternal Return. The "transvaluation of values" thus implies, not simply a change in values, but a change in the differential element from which values themselves had hitherto been derived (affirmation rather than negation, action rather than reaction). What is the principle capable of effecting such a transmutation? Nietzsche thought he had found such a principle in the "eternal return," a purely immanent principle which Deleuze contrasts point by point with the transcendent criteria proposed by Kant and Plato. "Whatever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return." In Kant, the categorical imperative functions as a test of thought that determines what can be

repeated without contradiction under the form of the moral law. As a selective thought, the eternal return provides a practical rule for the autonomy of the will as strict as the Kantian imperative, but one that frees the will from all morality by making the repetition of affirmation its sole object: whatever you will (your gluttony, your laziness, your cowardice, your wounds, your vices as well as your virtues), you "must" will it in such a way that you also will its return. "Even a cowardice and a laziness that could will their eternal return become something other than a cowardice and a laziness: they become active and noble, powers of affirmation."⁸³ In Plato, the Idea functions as a test that selects against those modes of being that do not repeat or imitate its model. As a selective being, the eternal return provides a criteria of selection as rigorous as the Platonic one, but one that is freed from all transcendence. Reactive modes of existence that are based on a "half-willing," that will on the condition of saying "once, only once...", are in this way eliminated from the selection as base, feeble, or weak.

Here again, we must avoid simplistic misunderstandings of Nietzsche's thought. The eternal return does not imply a tedious or cyclical return of the Same. Such a thesis is the reactive interpretation of the eternal return, and reduces it to a negative hypothesis that is both banal and terrifying: banal, because it reduces the eternal return to a natural certitude, a formula already well known with the ancients; and terrifying, because, if everything returns, and returns to the Same, then the reactive man and nihilism would also return. But reactive forces cannot and do not want to will their return: theirs is a

⁸³Deleuze, Nietzsche (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965), p. 38.

will to nothingness that negates this life, with its pain and suffering ("only once"), in the hope of a better life to come. Reactive forces can only will the eternal return by changing their mode of being: in willing the eternal return, they actively destroy what is reactive in themselves, they actively negate their own will to nothingness. This is why the eternal return is not only a principle of selection among modes of existence, but also a process of transmutation. Through the eternal return, negation as a quality of the will to power is transmuted into an affirmation, and reaction is transformed into an action.⁸⁴

But what is the mode of existence heralded by the Overman? Nietzsche can only sketch in something embryonic and not yet functional, as will Foucault when he analyzes the "death of man" in The Order of Things. Nietzsche sees the transvaluation as both the retrieval of a lost and forgotten origin (the Presocratics) and the intimation of a form that is still to come (the Overman): he took little interest in what happened after Plato, maintaining that it was necessarily the continuation of a long decadence, the history of a long error. Deleuze will break with Nietzsche's historical schema: becoming-active refers neither to a future form nor an erased origin, but is a process of becoming that is continually operative, constantly being taken up and left behind.

This is why Deleuze's reading of Spinoza must be seen as a necessary complement to his reading of Nietzsche. For Deleuze, Spinoza's Ethics is perhaps the central text in the history of philosophy, "one of the greatest books in the world," and Spinoza himself.

⁸⁴The doctrine of the eternal return is notoriously one of the most difficult and obscure aspects of Nietzsche's thought, with implications that are not only ethical, but also physical and cosmological. We summarize it here only to indicate its place and role within Nietzsche's thought. For Deleuze's interpretation, see Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 42-49, 68-72, and all of chapter five: Nietzsche, pp. 17-41; and Difference and Repetition, pp. 90-91, 126-127.

"the prince of philosophers."⁸⁵ Spinoza is perhaps "the only philosopher never to have compromised with transcendence and to have hunted it down everywhere."⁸⁶ Apart from the Presocratics, Nietzsche himself recognized Spinoza as his sole precursor;⁸⁷ if Deleuze in turn reads Spinoza as a precursor to Nietzsche, it is because every writer, as Borges says, creates his own precursors.⁸⁸ For Deleuze, Spinoza meets Nietzsche on three essential points: Spinoza sought to derive his ethics from an active rather than reactive mode of existence ("joy" rather than "sadness"); he formulated a purely affirmative mode of thought that implied a radical critique of the negative; and he located the conditions of activity and affirmation in an unlimited field of pure immanence rather than having recourse to the infinite transcendence of the Law.

III. SPINOZA: BECOMING-ACTIVE

§10. The Model of the Body (Philosophy of Nature). As with Nietzsche, Spinoza's philosophy consists of an analysis of complex multiplicities. To understand the nature of these multiplicities in Spinoza, Deleuze suggests, one must take Spinoza neither at the beginning nor the end, but "in the middle" [au milieu]. Historians of philosophy

⁸⁵Critique et clinique, p. 172: What is Philosophy?, p. 48.

⁸⁶What is Philosophy?, p. 48.

⁸⁷Nietzsche, letter to Overbeck, 30 July 1881: "I am amazed, really delighted: I have a precursor, and what a precursor....I hardly knew Spinoza: what brought me to him now was the guidance of instinct."

⁸⁸Jorge Luis Borges, "Kafka and His Precursors," in Labyrinths (New York: Grove Press, 1978), p. 117.

generally begin with the first principle of a philosopher: but in fact, writes Deleuze, "the first principle is always a mask, a simple image.... Things only begin to move and become animated at the second, third, and fourth principle, and these are no longer even principles. Things only begin to live in the middle."⁸⁹ Spinoza's first principle is famous: a single substance for all the attributes. The Ethics begins with this speculative first principle, and develops all that follows from it through a long chain of definitions, axioms, postulates, propositions, demonstrations, corollaries, and scholia. But in order to understand the practical significance of Spinoza's philosophy, and the difference between an "ethics" and a "morality," one must put aside the theoretical exposition and install oneself "in the middle" of Spinoza, that is, one must begin with an analysis of the composition of finite modes.⁹⁰ From this point of view, substance is not simply a speculative principle but implies the practical construction of a geometric plane of immanence or consistency upon which these finite modes are situated and operate. Spinoza's Ethics, argues Deleuze, finds its model, neither in the mind, nor in the will, but in the body. To take Spinoza "in the middle" means that one first install oneself in the midst of this modal plane of Nature and plot out the lines, dimensions, and capacities of the bodies one finds there. "We do not know what a body can do...!"--this declaration of Spinoza's echoes like a battle cry throughout Deleuze's writings. "We speak of

⁸⁹Dialogues, pp. 54-55.

⁹⁰See Deleuze, letter to Martin Joughin, as quoted in the translator's preface, Expressionism in Philosophy, p. 11: "What interested me most in Spinoza wasn't his Substance, but the composition of finite modes. I consider this one of the most original aspects of my book. That is: the hope of making substance turn on finite modes, or at least of seeing in substance a plane of immanence in which finite modes operate, already appears in this book."

consciousness and its decrees, or the will and its effects, of the thousand ways of moving the body, or dominating the body and the passions--but we do not even know what the body can do. Lacking this knowledge, we engage in idle chatter. As Nietzsche will say, we stand amazed before consciousness, but 'the truly surprising thing is rather the body.'⁹¹ From this point of view, Spinoza presents a "cartographic" or "topological" analysis of the body which is defined by two axes, a longitude and a latitude, on the immanent plane of Nature.⁹²

One the one hand, a body is defined, extensively or kinetically, by a complex and hierarchical set of relations under which an infinite multiplicity of parts is subsumed. To take Spinoza's example, chyle and lymph are two bodies (singularities), each determined by its own relation, and which compose blood according to a third dominant relation: blood in turn is a part of a animal or human body, determined by a more composite and powerful relation.⁹³ Each individual is thus composed of individuals of an inferior order, and enters into compositions with individuals of a superior order governed by more complex relations. On this longitudinal axis, I have a knowledge of my body solely through the "affections" (affectus) that is, through the trace of the effect of other bodies on my own, which indicates the state of my body at a given moment insofar as it is

⁹¹Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 17, quoting Spinoza, Ethics, IIP2S, in The Collected Works of Spinoza, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 495. In subsequent notes, page references to the Curley edition will be preceded with a "C."

⁹²A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 256-257: "Latitude is made up of intensive parts falling under a capacity, and longitude of extensive parts falling under a relation." And p. 203: ethics "pertains only to lineaments running through groups as well as individuals."

⁹³Spinoza, Letter 32, to Oldenburg, as cited in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 32.

submitted to the action of another body. When my body is affected by another body, for example, the two relations will sometimes combine to form new composite relation (as when I ingest food); and sometimes one body will decompose the other, destroying the cohesion of one of its constituent parts (as when a poison breaks down the blood).

Spinoza thus presents the body as a geometric but fluid structure that is constantly transformed and deformed, composed and decomposed, at different speeds, according to complex laws. At the limit, there is the unique object of Nature in its entirety, which is an infinitely transformable and deformable object, a multiplicity of perfectly individuated multiplicities affecting each other to infinity (facies totius Naturae).

This longitudinal conception of the body stands opposed to a certain conception of "natural history," such as that of Cuvier, for whom the scientific definition of the body concerned the external relations between a body's organs, functions, or forms. Natural history tended to conceive of these relations in two manners: either the relations defined a series of resemblances (a resembles b, b resembles c, etc.), in which case branchings and ruptures, regressions and degradations had to be taken into account in the development of the series; or else the relations defined a structure according to an analogy of proportionality (a is to b as c is to d), in which case one had to define the variables that could be combined to form a structure, and the correlations that could be established between them (e.g., gills are to breathing under water as lungs are to breathing air). In either case, natural history presumed a transcendant plane of organization or development, one that directed the development of series by assigning to them an eminent quality or term that served as their principle, or that established the proportional relations

that served as the principle for the organization of the structure or form. Such a plane was never given in itself, but remained hidden; it could only be inferred or induced from the empirical givens of organs and forms; it always implied a dimension supplementary (n + 1) to the dimensions of the given, and as such was teleological.⁹⁴

Spinoza, on the contrary, does not define a body by the organs it possesses, the functions it fulfills, or the form it adopts. The plane of consistency of Nature is not a teleological plane of organization or development, but an immanent plane of composition and decomposition, in which the plane is given at the same time as that which it gives rise to. The process of composition must be apprehended in itself, that is, through the relations of movement and rest between the unformed elements of which it is composed, and which imply no prior form or organ; and through the affects of anonymous powers that imply no prior subject or function. In this sense, Spinoza is a forerunner of Geoffroy Saint-Hillaire who, against Cuvier, proposed a purely intrinsic viewpoint in which different animals corresponded to a structure determined by variations of relation among fixed anatomical components (primarily bones).⁹⁵ Indeed, Deleuze suggests that Spinoza anticipated the principle that would later be adopted in genetics and molecular biology: the structure (fabrica) of a living individuality must be understood, not at the perceptible

⁹⁴For Deleuze's contrast between these two conceptions of the "plane," see Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, pp. 128-129; A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 233-237, 265-272

⁹⁵Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Principes de philosophie zoologique (Paris: Pichon & Didiet, 1830), p. 70, which includes the texts of the controversy with Cuvier. Deleuze often refers to the debate between Geoffroy and Cuvier; see Difference and Repetition, pp. 184-185; Expression in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 393, note 15; A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 45-47; Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 117n. For an analysis of the principles that lay behind natural history, see Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), chapter 5, "Classer," pp. 137-176.

level of a body's organs, function, or sensible form, but in terms of intelligible relations of composition between differential elements in constant interaction.⁹⁶

On the other hand, a body is defined, intensively or dynamically, by a certain degree of power or potential, that is, by a certain capacity to be affected by other bodies. On this latitudinal axis, I have a knowledge of my body through the "affects" (affectus) of which it is capable, that is, through the manner in which my affections augment or diminish my power in time. I experience joy or pleasure when a body encounters mine and enters into composition with it, augmenting my power (food nourishes me); and sadness or pain when, on the contrary, another body threatens my own coherence and diminishes my power (poison sickens me)--or at the limit, destroys me. Joy and sadness are passages, becomings, risings and fallings of my power, which go from one state to another and are in continuous variation. Like the affections, the affects are extremely variable: an affection can increase or decrease our power at the same time, what is an increase for one part of the body can be a diminution for another part, a rise can be followed by a fall and conversely. To the relations composing and decomposing an

⁹⁶For example, in Difference and Repetition (p. 185), Deleuze shows how, in genetics, this compositional structure reappears at a different level, with a new determination of differential elements and ideal relations (genes and chromosomes). In molecular biology, in turn, the statistical organization of the body will be shown to be derived, in the genetic code, from the relations between nucleic acids and enzymatic proteins interacting in a state far from equilibrium: it is the chance interactions among these elements, as Jacques Monod argued, that extracts the living being from the inanimate necessity of nature. In Anti-Oedipus (pp. 284-291), Deleuze and Guattari argue that, at this "molecular" or "differential" level, there is no opposition between the organism conceived as a structural unity (mechanism) and as an individual and specific unity (vitalism). On all these points, see Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity, trans. Austryn Wainhouse (New York: Knopf, 1971), pp. 77-78, 90-98; and Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, La Nouvelle Alliance (Paris: Gallimard, 1979), pp. 260-265.

individual, there thus corresponds a degree of power, and a body will be defined by the affects of which it is capable within the maximal and minimal limits of its power.

This latitudinal axis also has precise implications for Spinoza's philosophy of Nature. For Spinoza, a body cannot be classified by the abstract notions of genus and species, as in Aristotelian biology, but must rather be classified by its capacity to be affected, that is, by the affections of which it is "capable." When we define a body in terms of class, species, or kind, we no longer seek to understand the relations that enter into composition. Instead, we select a certain perceptible characteristic of the body as an essential trait, disregarding others, and we distinguish objects possessing this trait from those that do not. We define man, for instance, as a "featherless biped," a "rational animal," an animal of erect stature, an animal who laughs, or who speaks, and so on. But such traits are accidental: we choose easily imagined traits, and necessarily pass over minor differences, since objects become confused once their number exceeds the capacity of our imagination. They are also extremely variable, changing not only from individual to individual, but also among the different objects that affect the same individual: certain objects are defined by their sensible form or organs, others by their use or function, their manner of being, and so on. Abstractions such as "species" or "classes" do not express the nature of things, but simply the variability of our human constitution. For the composition of relations and the internal structure of the body, we substitute a crude

attribution of external resemblances and differences, thereby establishing continuities, discontinuities, and arbitrary analogies in Nature.⁹⁷

Spinoza, on the contrary, proposes a classification of beings by their power, by their capacity to be affected, with its maximum and minimum thresholds. In this way one will see which beings agree with each other, and which do not agree. For a given being, what is it affected by in the infinite world? What leaves it unaffected? What does it "take" in its world, its territory? To what excitations does it react? What does it react to positively or negatively? What are its nutrients and poisons? How can it take other beings into its world while preserving the others relations? What affects threaten its cohesion, diminishing its power, slowing it down, reducing it to a minimum, or even destroying it? What can its body do? We know nothing about a body until we know what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with the affects of other bodies.⁹⁸ A horse, a fish, a dog, a man, or even two men compared one with the other, are distinguished by their capacity to be affected: they are not affected by the same things, or not affected by the same things in the same manner.⁹⁹ In this way, we arrive at immanent "types" of modes of existence that are more or less general, but which do not have the same criteria as the abstract ideas of species and kind. There are more differences between a race horse and a workhorse, for instance, than between a workhorse

⁹⁷For Deleuze's analysis of Spinoza's critique of the abstractions of the Aristotelian tradition, see Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 44-48; and Expressionism in Philosophy, pp. 277-278.

⁹⁸A Thousand Plateaus, p. 257.

⁹⁹Expressionism in Philosophy, p. 217.

and an ox: a workhorse does not have the same capacity to be affected as a race horse, but rather has affects in common with the ox. In Spinoza, the "ethical difference" between types of modes of existence (strong versus weak) will be derived from this method of classification.¹⁰⁰

§ 11. The Illusions of Consciousness and Values. Spinoza's topological analysis of the body corresponds to Deleuze's analysis of an open and differential multiplicity, and implies a philosophy of Nature, a naturalism. Whereas the theological doctrine of infinite debt determined the relation of the immortal soul with a system of judgments, Spinoza's ethics determines the finite relations of an existing body with the forces that affect it.¹⁰¹ But how does this naturalistic conception of the body serve as a model for ethics? Deleuze's claim seems to run up against an obvious objection: the doctrine of "parallelism," one of the most original of Spinoza's theoretical theses, only denies any real causality between the mind and the body, but also forbids any primacy of one series over

¹⁰⁰Here again, Deleuze argues that Spinoza anticipates the modern discipline of ethology, which attempts to describe animal worlds in terms of affects. Uexküll, for instance, in an example frequently cited by Deleuze, analyzes the animal world of the tick in terms of three affects: a luminous affect (attracted by light, the tick climbs up a branch); an olfactive affect (attracted by its smell, the tick falls onto a passing mammal); and a thermal affect (attracted by heat, the tick seeks an area without fur in which to burrow). Uexküll thus defines the tick as a degree of power bounded by two limits: the optimal threshold of the feast after which it dies, and the pessimal limit of the fast as it waits, an alarming void that can last for years if no mammals pass by, during which time the tick remains indifferent to all other affects of the forest. Uexküll develops a highly Spinozistic conception of Nature that is not teleological, but melodic, polyphonic, and contrapuntal: every component of Nature is a melodic line, and counterpoint arises whenever a melody arises as a motif in another melody, with Nature itself constituting an infinite symphonic plane of composition. See Jacob Johann von Uexküll, Mondes animaux and monde humain (Paris: Gonthier, 1965), pp. 137-142. For Deleuze and Guattari's use of Uexküll's philosophy of Nature, see in particular A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 313-315 (on milieus, rhythms, territories, transcodings); and What is Philosophy?, pp. 185-186.

¹⁰¹Critique et clinique, p. 161.

the other. If Spinoza denies the superiority of the mind over the body, it cannot be in order to establish the superiority of the body over the mind, which would be no more intelligible than the inverse. In fact, Deleuze argues that the thesis of parallelism entails two important practical consequences with regard to the model of the body in ethics.

The first lies in its reversal of the principle on which Morality was founded as a domination of the passions by consciousness. To say that the mind has power over the body implies that the mind, because of its eminent nature and particular finality, has superior "duties," and that the body must therefore be made to obey the mind: the body's power is in this way reduced either to a power of execution, or to a power that leads the mind astray, and makes it deviate from its duties. This is another element of what Deleuze terms the moral vision of the world, which rests on the principle that dominates most theories of the mind/body union, and which found its fullest expression in Descartes: when the mind acts, the body is acted upon; and conversely, when the body acts, the mind is acted upon.¹⁰² Spinoza's doctrine of parallelism effectively reverses this moral principle, and amounts to an ethical vision of the world: what is an action in the mind is necessarily an action in the body, and what is a passion in the body is necessarily a passion in the mind.¹⁰³

¹⁰²See, for instance, Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, I, 1 and 2, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), vol. 1, p. 328.

¹⁰³"The order of actions and passions of our Body is, by nature, at one with the order of actions and passions of the Mind." Spinoza, Ethics, IIP2S (C, 494), as quoted in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 99.

The second practical consequence of parallelism is methodological. Spinoza shows that, just as the body surpasses the knowledge we have of it, so thought itself surpasses the consciousness we have of it. There is an "automatism" of thinking that exceeds our consciousness, just as there is a "mechanism" of the body capable of astonishing us.¹⁰⁴ To arrive at an evaluation of the power of the mind, we must pass through a comparison of the powers of the body and the mind: we first seek to discover a knowledge of the powers of the body in order to then discover, in a parallel fashion, the powers of the mind that elude consciousness, and thus to compare the powers.¹⁰⁵ The model of the body, Deleuze argues, does not imply a devaluation of the mind in relation to the body, but much more importantly, a devaluation of consciousness in relation to thought: "a discovery of an unconscious of thought just as profound as the unknown of the body."¹⁰⁶ It will be by one and the same movement that we will manage, if possible, to capture the power of the body beyond the given conditions of our knowledge, and to capture the power of thought beyond the given conditions of our consciousness.

Nietzsche is again Spinozistic when he writes: "Essential: to start from the body and

¹⁰⁴Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 86: cf. Treatise on the Intellect, 85.

¹⁰⁵"To determine what is the difference between the human Mind and the others, and how it surpasses them, it is necessary for us to know the nature of its object, i.e., of the human Body....I say this in general, that in proportion as a Body is more capable than others of doing many things at once, or being acted on in many ways at once, so its Mind is more capable than other of perceiving many things at once. And in proportion as the actions of the body depend more on itself alone, and as other bodies concur with it less in acting, so its mind is more capable of understanding distinctly." Spinoza, Ethics, IIP13S (C.458).

¹⁰⁶Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 19.

employ it as a guide. It is the much richer phenomenon, which allows of clearer observation. Belief in the body is better established than belief in the spirit."¹⁰⁷

If Spinoza proposes that one begin with the body rather than the mind, it is because consciousness is by nature the locus of illusion. It merely registers the effects of compositions and decompositions, but it remains ignorant of their causes. "Our condition is such that we only take in 'what happens' to our body, 'what happens' to our mind, that is, the effect of a body on our body, the effect of an idea on our idea."¹⁰⁸ We know nothing about other bodies and minds in their respective relations, nor the rules according to which these relations compound with and decompose one another, nor even the cause of our own affections and affects. Consciousness is a purely reactive symptom of unconscious forces that escape it: this is why we do not know what a body can do, or what activity it is capable of. The conditions under which we know things and are conscious of ourselves condemn us to have only inadequate ideas, confused and mutilated, effects separated from their real causes, like conclusions separated from their premises. "This is why it is scarcely possible to think that little children are happy, or that the first man was perfect: ignorant of causes and natures, reduced to the consciousness of events, condemned to undergo effects, they are slaves of everything, anxious and unhappy in proportion to their imperfection."¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷Nietzsche, Will to Power, ¶489; cf. §532: "This entire phenomenon of the body is, from the intellectual point of view, as superior to our consciousness, to our spirit, to our conscious ways of thinking, feeling, and willing, as algebra is superior to the multiplication table."

¹⁰⁸Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 19.

¹⁰⁹Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 20.

Spinoza nonetheless assigns to consciousness a precise cause. Once a mode passes into existence, its degree of power is determined as a conatus, an effort or tendency to persevere in existence, that is, to maintain and maximize its power, preserving what is useful to it, destroying what is harmful to it. The effort of the conatus prompts us to act differently according to the affections we experience, depending on whether the body we encounter enters into relation with us (joy) or on the contrary jeopardizes our cohesion (sadness). In sadness, our power as conatus serves entirely to invest the painful trace and to repel or destroy the object which is its cause: our power is immobilized, and can no longer do anything but react. In joy, on the contrary, our power expands, compounds with the power of the other, and unites with the object which is its cause. These determinate affections of the "joy-sadness" type are the cause of consciousness: consciousness is the continual awareness of the passage from these less potent wholes to more potent ones, and vice-versa. But consciousness adds nothing to the conatus: it is a purely transitive witness of the variations and determinations of the conatus functioning in relation to other bodies or other ideas. Its value is purely informational, and what it more, the information it provides is necessarily confused and distorted.

Consciousness is also the source of the illusion of the transcendental values constitutive of Morality. For Spinoza, "good" and "bad" have a primary objective meaning, but one that is necessarily partial and relative: that which agrees with our nature is good, and that which does not agree with it is bad. The "good" is when a body directly compounds its relation with ours and, with all or part of its power, increases our

own power (food); the "bad" is when a body decomposes our body's relation, even if it still combines with our parts, but in ways that do not correspond to our essence and which reduce our power of acting (poison). Spinoza is categorical on this point: the phenomena we tend to group under the heading of Evil are all of this type: bad encounters. poisoning. intoxication. relational decomposition. In the order of Nature, relations always agree with each other, for example the agreement between a poison and the new relations into which the parts of the blood enter. But relations that agree, according to the natural order, do not necessarily coincide with the preservation of a particular relation, which may be dissolved. In this sense, there is no evil (in itself), though there is that which is bad (for me).

Transcendental notions such as Good and Evil thus arise from our ignorance of Nature. When God says to Adam in the Garden of Eden, "Thou shalt not eat of the fruit." for example, Adam understands these words as a moral prohibition. But God, says Spinoza, did not forbid Adam anything; he simply revealed to him that the fruit was capable of destroying his body and decomposing his constituent relation, "just as he reveals also to us through our natural understanding that poison is deadly to us." This is an instance of a "bad" encounter between two bodies whose characteristic relations are not compatible. But Adam, weak and ignorant, a slave to the passions, mistakes the revelation for a commandment, the effect of decomposition as a punishment, the word of God as a moral law, and God himself as a judge who enforces the law. As Deleuze

comments. "it is not sin that explains weakness, but our initial weakness that explains the myth of sin."¹¹⁰

The moral pseudo-law is simply the measure of our misunderstanding of natural laws: Adam mistook the laws of Nature as moral laws that it would be possible to violate. Spinoza shows that any law, natural or technical, inevitably appears to us in a moral form of a "You must!" insofar as we have an inadequate idea of it, as when we misinterpret the rule of three as the operation we "must" perform on three numbers in order to find a fourth. The idea of rewards and punishments similarly reflects our ignorance of the true relation between an act and its consequence. Transcendental ideas, finally, are formed when we grant a transcendent value to something that has only an immanent sense, hypostasizing it into an idea that is coextensive with being. The argument that Evil is nothing was a commonplace of 17th-century philosophy. But "rationalist moralism" denied evil in order to hypostasize the "Good" (Plato) or the "Best" (Leibniz) into a "reason" for being and acting, thereby falling into all the finalist illusions. For Spinoza, Good has no more sense than Evil: they are abstractions of good and bad, and define by an absolute opposition that which only has a relative variability.¹¹¹ There is therefore no Good or Evil in nature, but there is goodness and badness, useful and

¹¹⁰Expressionism in Philosophy, p. 263. Cf. Spinoza, Political Treatise, chapter 2, §6: "It must be admitted that it was not in the first man's power to make a right use of reason, but that, like us, he was subject to passions." And Ethics IV, 68: "If men were born free, they would form no concept of Good and Evil so long as they remained free."

¹¹¹For Spinoza's critique of Good and Evil, see Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, pp. 47, 72-73, 96-97. Deleuze provides a detailed analysis of Spinoza's theses on evil, in his article, "The Letters on Evil: Correspondence with Blyenbergh," in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, pp. 30-43, and in chapter 15 of Expressionism in Philosophy, "The Three Orders and the Problem of Evil," pp. 235-254.

harmful. for each existing mode. "Beyond Good and Evil," writes Nietzsche. "at least this does not mean: beyond good and bad."¹¹²

§ 12. The Ethical Task. What then is the "ethical task" in Spinoza? The ethical imperative for a mode of existence is, as Deleuze puts it, "to go to the limit of what it can do," that is, to come into possession of its power of being affected. But everything we have just examined seems to condemn this task to failure: we seem condemned to passive affections, inadequate ideas, sad passions. How then can we come into possession of our power? From the viewpoint of an ethology of humans, Spinoza distinguishes between two types of affections: passive affections, which originate outside the individual, and separate it from its power of acting; and active affections, which are explained by the nature of the affected individual, and allow it to come into possession of its power. To the degree that a body's power of being affected is filled by passive affections, this power itself is presented as a power of being acted upon; conversely, to the degree that a body manages to fill (at least partially) its power of being affected by active affections, this capacity will be presented as a power of acting. For an given mode, its capacity to be affected (its degree of power) remains constant and is constantly filled, under continuously variable conditions, by a series of affects and affections. But the power of acting and the power of being acted upon will vary greatly, in inverse ratio to one another. If we manage to produce active affections, our passive affections will be

¹¹²Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay I, §17.

correspondingly diminished; inversely, to the degree that we remain bound to passive affections, our power of acting will be correspondingly inhibited. For a single degree of power, the power of being acted on and the power of acting are inversely proportionate. Taken together, in their varying proportions, they constitute our capacity to be affected.

This opposition between passive and active affections, however, is purely abstract. For only the power of acting is, strictly speaking, real, positive, and affirmative: our power of being acted on is simply a limitation on our power of acting, and as such expresses nothing positive. At each moment a body has as much perfection or power of acting as it can have in terms of the affections it experiences, and our conatus is always identical with our power of acting. When our power of being affected is filled by passive affections, we are cut off from what we are capable of doing, since our power of action is reduced to attaching itself to their traces, either to preserve them if they are joyful, or to ward them off if they are sad. Our power of being acted upon only manifests our finitude or limitation: passive affections are the mark of our impotence, our bondage and servitude, that is, the lowest degree of our power of acting (hence the title of Book 4 of the Ethics, "On Human Servitude").¹¹³ But even when reduced to a minimum, the power of a body does not and cannot cease to be an affirmation: an existing mode always affirms a force of existing. Deleuze argues that Spinoza's philosophy, like Nietzsche's, implies a radical critique of the negative, exposing its status as an abstraction and a

¹¹³Cf. Spinoza, Short Treatise, II. ch. 26, 7 (C. 147), and I. ch. 2, 23 (C. 72): "For it is certain that the agent acts through what he has, and that the one who is acted on is acted on by what he does not have....Being acted on, when the agent and the one acted on are different, is a palpable imperfection." Ethics, IIP3S (C. 498): "The passions are not related to the Mind except insofar as it has something which involves a negation."

fiction. "In Hegel's reproach against Spinoza, that he ignored the negative and its power, lies the glory and innocence of Spinoza."¹¹⁴

Spinoza, like Nietzsche, rejects the moral opposition between of Good and Evil, but this does not make all things or all beings equal, on the contrary. The distinction between good and bad provides the basis for a real ethical difference which, as Deleuze ceaselessly argues, must be substituted for the false moral opposition. This is the second meaning Spinoza gives to the notions of "good" and "bad," which is a modal or typological meaning. In Spinoza, an individual will be considered to be "bad" (or servile, or weak, or foolish) who remains cut off from its power of acting, who is kept in slavery or impotence, "who is content to undergo the effects of his encounters haphazardly, but wails and accuses every time the effect undergone does not agree with him and reveals his own impotence." Conversely, a mode of existence will be called "good" (or free, or rational, or strong) that strives, insofar as it is capable, to organize its encounters, who exercises its capacity for being affected in such a way that its power of acting increases, to the point where it produces active affections and adequate ideas.¹¹⁵ Spinoza's Ethics is an ethology that evaluates "types" of beings in terms of their power: it replaces Morality, which judges modes of existence by reference to transcendent or universal values.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 13.

¹¹⁵Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 23.

¹¹⁶Cf. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 27: when Deleuze writes that "consideration of genera and species still implies a 'morality,'" he means that such abstractions necessarily imply a consideration of a teleological plane of transcendence, i.e., that seemingly theoretical questions of classification necessarily entail a "moral" image of thought that serves as their presupposition.

For Deleuze, this is the point of convergence that unites Nietzsche and Spinoza. It is never a matter of judging degrees of power quantitatively, or from an absolute viewpoint: the smallest degree of power is equivalent to the largest degree once it is not separated from what it can do. The immanent criteria by which one evaluates a mode of existence are qualitative or intensive: it is a question of knowing whether a degree of power, small or large, can deploy all its power, increasing its power of acting intensively to the point where it goes to the limit of what it "can do."¹¹⁷ There is a hierarchy in Nietzsche and Spinoza, but it is not a hierarchy that measures and judges beings in terms of their degree of proximity to or distance from an external principle (the Idea, the moral Law, communication): it is an immanent hierarchy that evaluates modes of existence in terms of manner in which they "occupy" their existence: the intensity of their power, their "tenor" of life.¹¹⁸ When Spinoza and Nietzsche critique transcendence, it is not merely out of a theoretical interest to expose its fictional or illusory status: on the contrary, their primary interest is practical and ethical. Far from being our salvation, transcendence expresses our slavery and impotence at its lowest point. For Deleuze, Spinoza and Nietzsche belong to a tradition, stemming from Epicurus and Lucretius, that sees the practical task of philosophy as the denunciation of all myths, mystifications, and "superstitions" that keep us cut off from our power of acting. Transcendence is perhaps

¹¹⁷Cf. Difference and Repetition, p. 41.

¹¹⁸What is Philosophy?, p. 74: "there are never any criteria other than the tenor of existence, the intensification of life."

the myth that comes before all others, and practical process of liberation necessarily passes through the critique of transcendence.¹¹⁹

The primary ethical question posed by Spinoza in the Ethics is therefore the following: How can we come into possession of our power of being affected? How can we come to produce active affections and adequate ideas? In short, how can we become-active? But there is also a preliminary question that arises at the level of the passions. For while it is true that the passions fill our capacity to be affected while keeping us separated from our power of acting, there is nonetheless a distinction between the sad passions, which diminish or restrain my power, and the joyful passions, which increase it. The initial ethical question is therefore: How can we produce a maximum of joyful passions? The process of becoming-active, in short, implies two stages: first, we must attempt to increase our power of action by striving to experience a maximum of joyful passive affections, by avoiding "bad" encounters that diminish our power of acting; second, we must then pass on to a final state in which our power of action has so increased that it becomes capable of producing affections that are themselves active.

§ 13. Becoming-Active. What is the liberatory process by which we become active? In Spinoza, as we have seen, the topological conception of the body has a biological significance, implying an affective conception of the embodied individual. But as a model for ethics, its primary significance is juridical: everything a body "can do"

¹¹⁹See Expressionism in Philosophy, p. 270. For Deleuze's analysis of Epicurus and Lucretius, see his article, "Lucretius and the Simulacrum," in The Logic of Sense, pp. 266-279.

constitutes its natural right. In Spinoza, right equals power. This conception of natural right, derived from Hobbes, is opposed to the classical tradition of natural law: it is independent of any order of ends, duties, or obligations, since the conatus is the primum movens, the efficient and not the final cause. "The entire Ethics presents itself as a theory of power, in opposition to morality as a theory of obligations."¹²⁰ Natural right is thus not adverse "either to strifes, hatred, anger, treachery, or, in general, anything that appetite suggests."¹²¹ At this level, there is no difference between the strong and the weak, the wise and the foolish, since the conatus is always active, and every being strives equally to extend its power and to persevere in existing.

But this is why the "state of nature," according to Spinoza, is intolerable and unlivable. I remain at the mercy of chance encounters: my capacity to be affected is exercised in such conditions that I not only experience passive affections that cut me off from my power of action, but these passions are primarily sad passions that continually reduce this power. The only way a mode can succeed in its effort to persevere is to select and organize its encounters in such a way that it maximizes its good encounters and joyful passions, and minimizes its bad encounters and the concatenation of the sad passions. This effort is that of the City, and more profoundly, that of Reason. Reason leads man to first increase his power of acting by organizing his encounters in the domain of the passions; and then to take formal possession of this power and experience the

¹²⁰Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 104.

¹²¹Spinoza, Political Treatise, chapter 2, §8; cf. Theological-Political Treatise, chapter 16; Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 102. Deleuze contrasts the natural law and natural rights tradition in Expression in Philosophy, pp. 258-260.

active joys that follow from the adequate ideas that Reason forms. The conatus as successful power, or the power of acting as possessed power, is called Virtue: Virtue in Spinoza is nothing other than power, as efficient cause, under conditions of actualization that enable it to be possessed by the one who exercises it.

a. Reason's First Aspect: Organizing One's Encounters in the Civil State. Reason would not come into its power did it not find help in another power which prepares and accompanies its development, namely, the State or the City. The City in itself is not a reasonable association, for three reasons. First, the motivating force of its formation is not an affection of reason, but anxiety or fear of the state of nature, and the hope of emerging from it. Second, the state of reason would be constituted by intrinsic relations that are directly combinable, powers and rights that are naturally additive: but in the City, men "renounce" their natural rights and form a "contract" or pact, instituting indirect conventional relations through which citizens are forced to agree and be compatible. Third, and most important, Reason is the principle of the ethical distinction between those who live under its guidance (noble, strong, powerful) and those who remain bound by the passions (slavish, weak, impotent). It is in the civil state, on the contrary, that the moral opposition finds both its principle and its domain: the City merely distinguishes between those who obey its laws and those who do not, and the notions of fault or sin, justice and injustice, reward and punishment, merit and demerit, are exclusively social categories, having to do with obedience and disobedience.

As in Nietzsche, then, the concept of "law" has different senses in Spinoza depending on the forces that take possession of it. In the state of reason, a "law" is a truth

of nature, a natural guide for the full development of the power of each individual. In the civil state, the law becomes a "moral law" that restrains and limits the individuals' power, commands and prohibits, since the power of the City as a whole surpasses that of the individual. Indeed, so compromised is the notion of law by its moral connotations that Spinoza suggests that philosophers speak of the "eternal truths" of Nature rather than the "laws" of Nature. As Nietzsche says concerning chemistry (the science of antidotes and poisons), one must be wary of the word law, which has a moral aftertaste. Moral or social laws are imperatives that have no other effect, no other finality than obedience. This obedience may be absolutely necessary, the commands of the law may be fully justified, but the law does not provide us with knowledge, it makes nothing known of the truths of Nature.

It is therefore only in the civil state that the law takes on a positive role, and this only insofar as it prepares for and develops the knowledge of Reason. In the City, the civil state and its laws does not suppress natural right. First, the City, as the whole formed by the composition of individual powers in a contract, is itself defined by its own natural right. And in renouncing his natural rights, the citizen does not renounce persevering in existing. Rather he abandons his right to personally judge what is good and bad on the basis of his personal affections, and commits himself to common collective affections, he allows himself to be determined by the common affections of hope and fear that make up the whole of the City. Second, affections of reason are not subject to the City's rule: for Spinoza the power of knowing, thinking, and expressing one's thought remains an inalienable natural right, which the City cannot suppress without

compromising itself, creating factions, instilling fear in its citizens, to the point where the City loses its power and individuals once more find themselves in the state of nature. The true City offers citizens the love of freedom instead of the hope of security or the security of possessions ("it is slaves, not free men, who are given rewards for virtue").¹²²

Spinoza thus presents a typology of social formations that parallels his typology of modes of existence. The "good" City is a democracy, insofar as it provides the best milieu for substituting the love of freedom, as an affection of reason, for the affections-passions of fear, hope, and security that motivate the City. As with individuals, however, many causes intervene to precipitate ruin or pervert the City into a "bad" City, a despotism.¹²³ Above all, one must avoid confusing the moral laws of institutions (obedience to the City) with the "eternal truths" of Nature (knowledge of Reason). At its best, the moral law prepares for this knowledge and makes it possible, prefiguring the work of Reason (democracy, the law of Abraham or Christ); at its worst, it prevents the formation of knowledge (the law of the despot); between these two extremes, it replaces Reason for those who are incapable of knowledge because of their mode of existence (the law of Moses).¹²⁴ The less we understand the laws of nature, the more we interpret them, like

¹²²Spinoza, Political Treatise, Chapter 10, §8.

¹²³Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, esp. chapter 16. The typology of social formations proposed by Deleuze and Guattari in Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Primitives, States, Nomads, Capitalism) has a similar inspiration, though its aim is to categorize, not forms of government (monarchies, aristocracies, democracies), but rather the manner in which social formations imply a certain manner of occupying space-time (smooth versus striated), a certain composition of subjectivity, certain technological and affective elements, and so on.

¹²⁴Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 24; Expressionism in Philosophy, pp. 390-391, note 29.

Adam, as orders and prohibitions, and confuse the domain of obedience with that of knowledge or Reason.

b. Reason's Second Aspect: Attaining Active Affections through Common Notions (the state of Reason). Now although the City allows us to organize our encounters so that we receive a maximum of joyful passions and increase our power, a sum of passions can never make an action. A joyful passion is still a passion, since it has an external cause: we still remain separated from our power of acting, possessing it only in a formal sense. Yet our power of action is nonetheless increased proportionally: we "approach" the point of transmutation that will establish our dominion, that will make us capable of action, or active joys. How do we come into full possession of our power, attaining active affections and adequate ideas? How do we break the concatenation of passive affections and inadequate ideas, and rise from effects to causes? Spinoza argues that we can only come into possession of our power fully through a genuine "leap," which puts us in the possession of what he calls common notions.¹²⁵

Common notions are neither abstractions (such as classes, kinds, or species) nor transcendentals (such as Good or Beauty), but conform to what Deleuze calls a "concept."¹²⁶ Common notions are so named because they represent something common to bodies, a similarity of composition: either for all bodies (extension, movement and rest), or to some bodies (at least two, mine and another). With common notion, we come

¹²⁵The idea of the common notions appear for the first time in the Ethics, and play a crucial role in Spinoza's development. See Deleuze's article, "Spinoza's Evolution: On the Non-completion of the Treatise on the Intellect," in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, pp. 110-121.

¹²⁶We analyze the nature of Deleuze's notion of the "concept" in the chapter five.

into possession of our power, and this for three reasons. First, common notions are necessarily adequate ideas, because they express a similarity of composition at the order of causes, and are formally explained by our power of thinking. Second, since we can only form adequate ideas through our power of acting, the feelings it produces are necessarily active affections of which we ourselves are the cause. Third, these active affections are necessarily joyful affections: all sadness is a diminution of our power; passive joys increase our power of action and thus agree with reason; but only joys that are active are born of reason.

But the practical question is: How do we come to form such common notions? Everything in existence seemed to condemn us to have only inadequate ideas, ideas of affections that indicate the effect of some external body upon us; as such we seemed to be condemned to remain the slave of the passions. But Spinoza argues that it is precisely through the passions that we can come into possession of our power: the joyful passions play a special role in the formation of common notions, functioning as a kind of occasional cause. When we experience a bad encounter, when a sad passive affection is produced in us by a body that disagrees with us, nothing induces us to form an idea of what is common to that body and our own. But just the opposite is the case when we experience a joyful affection: a thing being good to the extent that it agrees with our nature, the joyful affection itself induces us to form the corresponding common notion. This is why the first aspect of Reason--to select and organize our encounters such that we experience a maximum of joyful passions (feelings that agree with reason)--plays an essential role: it is only when our power has sufficiently augmented, to a point which

undoubtedly varies with each individual, that we enter into possession of this power and become capable of forming a concept, beginning with the least universal (the agreement of our body with one other), even if we then go on to attain ever larger concepts following the order of the composition of relations.

The order of the formation or genesis of common notions or concepts, as laid out by Spinoza in the beginning of Part Five of the Ethics, is as follows: 1. The first common notions we have are the least universal, that is, those that apply to our body and to one other that agrees directly with our own and affects us with passive joy. 2. From these first common notions flow affects of active joy, which at first join the passions and then take their place. 3. These initial common notions, and the active affects that flow from them, in turn give us the power to form more general common notions, expressing what there is in common even between our body and bodies that do not agree with ours, that are contrary to it and affect it with sadness. ("Sadness over some good which has perished is lessened as soon as the man who has lost it realizes that this good could not, in any way, have been kept.")¹²⁷ 4. From these new common notions, new affects of active joy follow, overtaking the sadnesses and replacing the sad passions. In this way, the progressive formation of common notions entails two series: a series of active affections through which we come into formal possession of our power, and a series of adequate ideas that allow us to comprehend the unity of composition of all of Nature, and the modes of variation within that unity.

¹²⁷Spinoza, Ethics V6s.

§ 14. The Ethical Difference. The liberatory process of "becoming-active" in Spinoza, as analyzed by Deleuze, is inseparable from a development, a formative process, an apprenticeship, a culture.¹²⁸ It implies an organization of the affects, and the formation of concepts. But Deleuze emphasizes the extremely complex relationship that Spinoza maintains between the affects and concepts. At first sight, the affects appear to occupy only a negative moment in the ethical process: they seem to intervene only to be criticized, denounced, and left behind. But in fact this is not the case. The formation of common notions is necessarily preceded by a selection of the affects, an obscure combat between joys and sadnesses that constitutes the very condition for the creation of concepts, and without which we would remain condemned to impotence and servitude. Even when we attain adequate ideas and active affections, inadequate ideas and passive affections do not disappear, nor even the inevitable sadnesses; they necessarily subsist as the double of the common notions and active affections, though they lose their exclusive and tyrannical character. "There is therefore something in signs that both prepares for and doubles the common notions," writes Deleuze, "Signs of augmentation remain passions, and the ideas they presuppose remain inadequate, but they are nonetheless the precursors of the common notions, the 'dark precursors.'" If common notions are rays of

¹²⁸Expressionism in Philosophy, pp. 262-263.

light that reveal the structure of bodies, they are nonetheless prepared for and accompanied by these obscure processes that continue to operate in the dark."¹²⁹

The following chart schematizes this process of becoming-active in Spinoza:

Table 4: The Process of "Becoming-Active" in Spinoza
(Theory of Affectivity)

Third Kind of Knowledge	Power (Power to Affect and Be Affected)		
Second Kind of Knowledge	Active Affections	Second Aspect of Reason: Attain Common Notions	
First Kind of Knowledge (the City)	Passive Affections	Joyful Passions	First Aspect of Reason: Organize One's Encounters
	Sad Passions		

This chart is adapted from Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 73, 94, 100.

¹²⁹Critique et clinique, p. 180. In French, the term sombres précurseurs ("dark precursors") refers to the meteorological phenomena that precede the onslaught of a storm, somewhat like the English phrase, "the calm before the storm."

Joys and sadnesses, however, are often ambiguous, partial, changing, and intermixed with each other. The Ethics therefore not only outlines the process of becoming-active, based on the selection of joys; it also provides a detailed account of the vector of destruction (becoming-reactive) that can traverse an individual or collectivity, based on a systematic selection of the sad passions. Spinoza traces, step by step, the dreadful concatenation of the sad passions: first, sadness itself; then hatred and aversion for the "bad" object, antipathy, mockery, indignation, anger, envy, contempt, vengeance, cruelty; and finally, shame and guilt for our own impotence, fear, despair, morsus conscientiae, pity, regret, humility, repentance, self-abasement. In Spinoza, as in Nietzsche, all the ways of humiliating and breaking life, all the forms of the negative, have two sources, one turned outward and the other inward, ressentiment and bad conscience, hatred and guilt: "The two arch enemies of the human race, Hatred and Remorse."¹³⁰ Even in hope and security, he finds that grain of sadness that makes these the feelings of slaves.¹³¹ In a parallel fashion, Spinoza likewise traces, as we have seen, the series of inadequate ideas and falsifications that correspond to these passions, again and again showing how they are linked to consciousness and its illusions.

The Ethics, like the Genealogy of Morals, draws a portrait of the resentful man, and the corresponding modes of existence that can only establish their power on sadness

¹³⁰Spinoza, Short Treatise, first dialogue; quoted in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 13.

¹³¹Spinoza, Ethics, Book 3; and IVP47S. Cf. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 26.

and affliction, on the diminution of the power of others. "Such people aim only to make others as wretched as they themselves are."¹³² Hence the infernal couple presented by Spinoza: the Despot and the Priest, terrible "judges" of life, those who have an interest in maintaining and propagating sadness, and "who know only how to break men's spirits."¹³³ It is they who establish a cult of sadness, which they present as the ideal and joy of the souls they have infected and made ill. If the slave is the man with sad passions, the despot is the one who exploits the sad passions, who needs them to establish his tyrannical power, and the priest is the one who judges and disparages life in the name of the sad passions: the moralist trinity. The sad passions provide a response to what Spinoza poses as the essential question of political philosophy: How can men fight for their slavery as if it were their freedom?¹³⁴ The despot can rule only by inspiring in men the sad passions from which he profits, just as broken spirits need a despot and a priest in order to be content and multiply.

In Spinoza, the ethical difference between the good and the bad, the noble and the base, the strong and the weak, is rooted in this inexorable affective combat between joys and sadnesses. Nobody is born active, reasonable, or free, and nobody can undergo for us the slow and difficult learning of what agrees with our nature, the slow effort of

¹³²Ethics, IVP63S.

¹³³Spinoza, Ethics IV, appendix, §13. Cf. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, pp. 25-26.

¹³⁴Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, preface (Elwes, p. 5). Deleuze and Guattari take up this question in Anti-Oedipus, p. 29: "The astonishing thing is not that some people steal or that others occasionally go out on strike, but rather that those who are starving do not steal as a regular practice, and all those who are exploited are not continually out on strike: after centuries of exploitation, why do people still

discovering and selecting our joyful passions, and of converting our affects into actions. Ethics is not grounded on universal constants or transcendent principles, but only emerges from the "groundless" difference of affective relations in continuous variation. "Of course, all life is a process of breaking down," wrote F. Scott Fitzgerald in The Crack-Up, and if Deleuze returns to this passage frequently in his works, it is because this "of course" resonates like an acknowledgment of immanence.¹³⁵ As Châtelet wrote, we are all of us born on a soil of "demolition," and we cannot know in advance how or where an individual or collectivity becomes capable of emerging from such destructions and installing in themselves a creative process of becoming active.¹³⁶ Just as thought is not the result of a prior disposition but must be engendered, so becoming-active is not the result of a good will but must be produced within the fortuitousness of encounters. For Deleuze, Spinoza's Ethics has a critical and constructive aspect: constructively, it is a purely immanent philosophy of speculative affirmation, which entails a corresponding practical ethic of joy; critically, it directs its speculative attack against the prestige of the negative and its products (transcendence), which entails a practical devaluation of the sad passions, and a denunciation of all those who depend on sadness to exercise their power.

tolerate being humiliated and enslaved, to the point where they actually want humiliation and slavery, not only for others, but for themselves?"

¹³⁵F. Scott Fitzgerald, "The Crack-Up," in The Crack-Up, ed. Edmund Wilson (New York: New Directions, 1956), p. 69. For Deleuze's discussions of this passage, see The Logic of Sense, pp. 154-161; A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 198-200, 206; and Périclès et Verdi, pp. 12-13.

¹³⁶François Châtelet, Les années de démolition (Paris: Hallier, 1975).

IV. FOUCAULT: RESISTANCE AND SUBJECTIVATION

§ 15. Dispositifs and Their Dimensions: Knowledge, Power, Subjectivation.

Michel Foucault, in his preface to the first volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia (and revealingly, with apologies to its authors), wrote that "Anti-Oedipus is a book of ethics, the first book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long time."¹³⁷ Foucault's comment was clearly meant to be provocative. It is true that France does not have a strong tradition of moral philosophy; the concerns of the discipline, to a certain extent, were largely taken up in France by the various human sciences such as psychology and sociology.¹³⁸ Even more, Anti-Oedipus was itself a work known primarily as a critique of psychoanalysis, and it bore little resemblance to what usually passes, in academic circles, for moral philosophy. For Foucault to insist that it was a book of ethics was tantamount to forcing his readers, at the very least, to regard the notion of "ethics" in a new manner. At the time Foucault wrote his preface, in 1977, he was himself, we now know, in the process of recasting the entire Histoire de la sexualité project around precisely this reformulation of "the ethical question."¹³⁹ What was the basis of this

¹³⁷Michel Foucault, "Preface" to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia I, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (New York: Viking, 1977), p. xiii.

¹³⁸On the state of moral philosophy in France today, see Monique Canto-Sperber, "Pour la philosophie morale," in Le débat 72 (Nov-Dec 1992), pp. 40-51.

¹³⁹See Foucault's introduction to The Use of Pleasure, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Random House, 1985), where he explains the reformulation of the project.

reconceptualization of ethics that Foucault recognized in Deleuze's philosophy, and which he later explored, in his own manner, in his last works?

Foucault, in Deleuze's interpretation, always took as his object of analysis concrete historical multiplicities, which he called dispositifs. During his career, which was marked by crises and breaks, Foucault successively identified three primary dimensions of a dispositif: knowledge, power, and subjectivation. Knowledge is made up of two heterogeneous lines, systems of statements and fields of visible objects, words and things, in which the former provides a determining form to the determinability of the latter (penal law is a discourse concerning "delinquency," with the prison as its place of visibility; medicine is in part a formulation of statements about "madness," with the asylum as its place of visibility, etc.). Power, in turn, entails lines of force that traverse the entire social field, moving from singularity to singularity, invisible and unenunciative, a pure power to affect that always comes from the outside, remaining unknown until it is actualized in the formed relations of Knowledge, but at the same time presenting singularities of "resistance" or lines of "fracture" that act on knowledge in such a way as to make change possible. Subjectivation, finally, is a "folding of force," a relation that force has with itself, a power to affect itself, that is, an affect of the self upon itself, a production of subjectivity that can escape Knowledges and Powers in order to give rise to new forms. Every dispositif is a multilinear ensemble composed of these various lines or vectors, immanent chains of variables which ceaselessly intersect and bifurcate: to disentangle these lines amounts to drawing a map, erecting a cartography of a given dispositif.

Foucault, like Spinoza and Nietzsche, will pose the ethical question at a purely immanent level. In a given dispositif, what are those instances that separate us from our power of acting? And what are the immanent processes that allow us to come into possession of our power, to become active? On what lines or vectors does one find liberations and servitudes? Foucault's analyses of modern forms of servitude constitute the most famous aspects of his work. In his early books on Knowledge, for instance, Foucault analyzes various discourses (medical, legal, administrative, etc.) whose result was the terrifying effect of "normalization." The works on Power analyze, on the one hand, the "anatomy-politics" of spaces of confinement based on a "Panoptic" model, whose function was to impose a particular conduct on a small multiplicity of individuals within a confined space, a function that could be applied to various ends (production, education, punishment, health care, training) and various bodies (workers, students, prisoners, the sick, soldiers); and on the other hand, the "bio-politics" of populations, whose function was that of controlling and administering the life of a large multiplicity in an open space, utilizing a statistical model of probability in which individuals are reduced to mere "dividuals," and masses become the raw data for marketing and control. In each of these cases, the subject appeared as a derived function, a "subjection" or servitude to established knowledges and powers.

At the same time, Foucault showed how each of these lines was capable of opening up new spaces of liberation. On the line of knowledge, for example, Foucault shows how mutations in 19th-century psychiatry liberated certain patients ("neurotics") from the asylum by providing the possibility of a "contractual" cure. Foucault likewise

insisted that the power to affect necessarily implied "points, knots, or foci" of resistance that acted against the closed milieus of confinement (e.g., family, school, factory, hospital, prison, barracks), and not only in forms such as strikes or sabotage. Just as the "disciplinary" societies of the 18th through 20th centuries were preceded by societies of "sovereignty" whose aims and functions were completely different (exacting tribute rather than organizing production, deciding death rather than managing life), so in a like manner, disciplinary societies themselves, following World War II, entered into relations with new forces, a mutation that put these closed milieus in crises in favor of more open spaces: the hospital gives way to sectorization, the closed form of the factory gives way to the fluidity of the enterprise, and so on. Such points of resistance presuppose a relation with the outside that constantly produces lines of "fracture" in established knowledges and powers.

§ 16. From "Resistance" to "Subjectivation." But Foucault did not remain satisfied with this notion of "points of resistance." For acts of resistance tend to become re-stratified, and to encounter or even reconstruct knots of power. Foucault himself, as Deleuze notes, was personally discouraged by the failure of the prison movement in 1971, and the fall of hopes in Iran and Poland. And already in Madness and Civilization, he had shown how, in liberating neurotics from the asylum, psychoanalysis in fact confined them within in a more insidious familial complex, which was reproduced in the doctor-patient

relationship (the transference).¹⁴⁰ Likewise, Deleuze argues that disciplinary societies are giving way to societies of control which no longer operate by enclosure but, as Paul Virilio has shown, by processes of continuous control and instantaneous communication that operate in open and smooth spaces, and whose mechanisms rival the most stringent confinements.¹⁴¹ Is there then nothing beyond power but local acts of resistance, easily recaptured by power itself? Is all that remains of liberty what Foucault called "the lives of infamous men," anonymous lives who appear only when they clash with power, argue with it, exchange "brief and strident words," and then fade back into the obscure night? He himself posed the following objection: "That's just like you, always with the same incapacity to cross the line, to pass over to the other side....It is always the same choice, for the side of power, for what power says or of what it causes to be said."¹⁴²

The problem with points of resistance is that their status, their origin, their genesis remained indeterminate apart from the question of power itself. What Foucault discovered in his last works was a new dimension of dispositifs, one of the most obscure, which he called lines of "subjectivation." Subjectivation is still a relation of force. But whereas power was a relation of force with force, subjectivation is a relation of force with itself. Force is "folded" back upon itself, and becomes the power to affect oneself, a

¹⁴⁰Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 276-278. See Deleuze and Guattari's commentary in Anti-Oedipus, pp. 92-93, 359.

¹⁴¹Deleuze, "Post-Script on Control Societies," in Negotiations, pp. 177-182. See also Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics, trans. Mark Polizzotti (New York: Semiotext(e), 1986).

relation of the self with itself. This is not a return to the subject as a person or a form of identity, but a question concerning the constitution or invention of new modes of existence. As with Nietzsche and Spinoza, modes of existence are capable of becoming-active and transforming themselves on the condition of their being capable of affecting themselves. In Foucault, the term "subjectivation" refers to a process, and the "self." to a relation (relation to oneself). Just as there is no "pure" Reason or rationality par excellence, but a plurality of heterogeneous "processes of rationalization" (of the kind analyzed by Alexandre Koyré, Gaston Bachelard, and Georges Canguilhem in the field of epistemology, Max Weber in sociology, and François Châtelet in philosophy), so there is no universal or transcendental Subject, but only variable and extraordinarily diverse "processes of subjectivation."¹⁴³

The task Foucault set for himself in the reformulated volumes of The History of Sexuality was to analyze the formations of subjectivation in the Greek, Roman, and Christian periods--modes of existence which could be summarily codified in the formulas, "Know yourself!" (Greek), "Master yourself!" (Roman), and "Deny yourself!" (Christian).¹⁴⁴ In a highly original interpretation, Foucault suggested that subjectivation

¹⁴²Foucault, "The Lives of Infamous Men." in Power, Truth, Strategy, edited by M. Morris and P. Patton (Sydney: Feral Publications, 1979), pp. 76-91. Cited by Deleuze in Foucault, p. 94 and Negotiations, pp. 109-110.

¹⁴³See Gilles Deleuze, Périclès et Verdi (Paris: Minuit, 1988), pp. 14-17; and "What is a 'dispositif'?" in Michel Foucault: Philosopher, trans. Timothy J. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 162.

¹⁴⁴Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1985); The Care of the Self, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1986). The fourth volume of the series, Les aveux de la chair (The Confessions of the Flesh), was written but never published. Foucault acknowledges his indebtedness to Pierre Hadot, who interpreted Hellenistic ethics as an askesis, an affect of the self upon itself, whose end was a self-transformation. See Pierre Hadot, Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique, 2d ed. (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1987), esp pp. 13-58.

was first "invented" by the Greeks. What the Greeks created in politics was a relation of power between free men, a rivalry in which free men commanded other free men. It was therefore not enough for force to be exercised on others, or to submit to the effect of other forces (power); it was also necessary for force to be exercised on itself, for only he who had gained a mastery of himself would be deemed capable of commanding others (subjectivation). Foucault analyzes the facilitative rules, at once ethical and aesthetic, by which a free man mastered himself in various domains: not only in sexuality, but also in the "dietetics" of alimentary pleasure, the "economics" of one's home and wife, the "erotics" of boys. The Greeks were thus the first to give the relation to oneself an independent status, functioning as "a principle of internal regulation" that doubled one's relation to others. But processes of subjectivation are extraordinarily diverse: Greek modes are different from Christian modes, which themselves took different paths in primitive Christianity, the Middle Ages, and the Reformation.

But the important point is that for Foucault subjectivation is distinguished from all morality, from every moral code: it is ethical and aesthetic, in opposition to morality, which participates in knowledge and power. To the codified rules of knowledge (relation between forms) and the constraining rules of power (relation of force to force), Foucault now added the "facilitative" rules of subjectivation (relation to self). It is a specific dimension, and one which may not exist in all dispositifs. In analyzing Greek and Christian modes of existence, Foucault shows how they frequently pass into knowledge or are compromised by power. But in themselves, they have a different nature. There is, for example, a Christian "morality" and a Christian "ethic," with numerous battles and

historical compromises between the two: the Church as a "pastoral" power ceaselessly attempted to codify Christian modes of existence, while these modes of existence continually placed the power of the Church in question through the formations of new subjectivations that were both individual (anchorites, heretics, reformers) and collective (monastic orders, communities).¹⁴⁵ For Foucault, the relation with oneself became one of the primary origins of the points of "resistance" against codes and powers. Even more, it is no longer merely a matter of resistance and struggle, for modes of existence are in perpetual communication with knowledge and power, capable of entering into composition with them and creating new forms of knowledge and inspiring new lines of power. "One wonders," writes Deleuze, "if lines of subjectivation are not at the extreme edge of a *dispositif*, if they do not outline the passage from one *dispositif* to another."¹⁴⁶ Recuperated by relations of power and relations of knowledge, the relation with oneself is continually reborn, elsewhere and otherwise.

§ 17. The Present and the Actual. Knowledge, power, or subjectivation do not set out universal conditions. If Foucault called them "historical a priori," it was because they constitute conditions that are never more general than what they condition (conditions of real and not merely possible experience). In Deleuze's language, they constitute

¹⁴⁵See Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p. 30. Concerning the origin of religious codes, for example. Nietzsche writes in The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufman and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), §353: "The distinctive invention of the founders of religions is, first: to posit a particular kind of life and everyday customs that have the effect of a disciplina voluntatis...and then: to bestow on this life style an interpretation that makes it appear to be illuminated by the highest value."

¹⁴⁶Deleuze, "Qu'est-ce qu'un *dispositif*?", p. 187.

problematic fields that vary with history, that is, they present the manner in which a problematic of knowledge, power, or subjectivation is posed in a given historical formation.¹⁴⁷ Deleuze suggests that, like Kant, Foucault's philosophy poses three essential questions: in any given formation, What can I know? What can I do? What can I be?¹⁴⁸ If Foucault insisted he be read as a philosopher and not as a historian, writes Deleuze, it is because it was precisely the variable and problematic conditions of these questions that interested him.¹⁴⁹ No solution is transportable from one era to another, though the fields can interpenetrate in such a way that the "givens" of an old problem are reactivated in another (for instance, the manner in which Greek, Roman, or Christian modes of subjectivation can be reactivated today).

In The Use of Pleasure, Foucault proposed that the problematic field of the relation with oneself (subjectivation, or "What can I be?") could be analyzed from the point of view of four aspects: 1. Ethical substance (ontology), which designates the material element of ourselves that is to be "folded," that is, which is deemed to be relevant to our ethical conduct and open to transformation: the body and its pleasures (Greeks), the flesh and its desires (Christians), feelings, intentions, passions, will, etc.; 2. Mode of subjection (deontology), which designates the rule according to which the force

¹⁴⁷Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 127: "The a priori of positivities is not only the system of a temporal dispersion; it is itself a transformable group."

¹⁴⁸Foucault, pp. 114-115.

¹⁴⁹Foucault, p. 116: Foucault "does not write a history of mentalities, but the conditions governing everything that has a mental existence....He does not write a history of institutions, but of the conditions under which they integrate differential relations between forces....He does not write a history of subject, by of processes of subjectivation" (translation modified).

is folded, that is, the means by which one is incited to recognize what one considers to be one's "ethical" obligations: for instance, in relation to a divine law, a cosmological order, a rational rule, an aesthetic form, etc.; 3. Ethical work (ascetics), which designates the "self-forming activity" that one exerts upon oneself in order to become active (self-examination, meditation, confession, exercise, diet, the following of exemplary role models, etc.); 4. Telos (teleology), which designates the goal or mode of being toward which this ethical activity of auto-affection is directed.¹⁵⁰

Processes of subjectivation, however, have no general formula. Could one not invoke dispositifs in which subjectivation does not pass through the aristocratic life or the aestheticized life of the free man, as in the Greeks, but through the marginalized existence of the "excluded"? Tokeï showed how the emancipated slave in China lost his social status, and found himself reduced to a plaintive or elegiac existence ("poor me"), but one which expressed a precise mode of subjectivation that led to new forms of knowledge and power.¹⁵¹ Those who "subjectivize" are sometimes the nobles, those who say, according to Nietzsche, "We the good...": but in other conditions they may be the excluded, the bad, the sinners, hermits, heretics, monastic communities--an entire typology of subjective formations in continuously changing dispositifs. And for Foucault as for Deleuze, the aim of such investigations is always borne upon the present: What new modes of

¹⁵⁰Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, pp. 25-30.

¹⁵¹Deleuze, Negotiations, pp. 150-151; "What is a Dispositif," p. 188; see also A Thousand Plateaus, p. 449: In the heavily overcoded Chinese State, the freed slaves are the only group to enjoy a certain amount of freedom, and sow "the first seeds of private property, develop trade, and with metallurgy invent a kind of private property in which they will be the new master."

existence or processes of subjectivation are we seeing today (which are irreducible to our moral codes)? How and in what places are they produced? One cannot know in advance, and the study of their variations is one of the fundamental tasks of an ethics of immanence.

Thus, it is never a question of a "return" in Foucault, whether to Greeks or Christians. As Deleuze puts it, Foucault's entire oeuvre implies a change in orientation away from the historical in order to apprehend the actual [actuel]. "When Foucault admires Kant for having posed the problem of philosophy, not in relation to the eternal but in relation to the Now, he means that the object of philosophy is not to contemplate the eternal, nor to reflect on history, but to diagnose our actual becomings."¹⁵² History thinks in terms of the past, present, and future: but if history in this way surrounds and delimits us, it nonetheless does not tell us who we are, but what we are in the process of differing ourselves from. When Foucault wrote on disciplinary societies, or on Greek and Christian modes of subjectivation, for instance, he did so in order to find out in what ways we are no longer disciplinary, are no longer Greeks or Christians, and are becoming other. This difference between the present and the actual, for Deleuze, is much more important than the difference between the present and the past. The present is what we are, and for that reason, what we are already ceasing to be: the actual is not what we are, but rather what we are becoming, what we are in the process of becoming.

¹⁵²What is Philosophy?, pp. 111-113.

History, in short, is what separates us from ourselves, and what we have to traverse in order to think ourselves; whereas the actual is the formation of the new, the emergence of what Foucault called our "actuality."¹⁵³ In his profound introduction to The Use of Pleasures, Foucault showed that the relation to oneself necessarily implies a problematization of the thinking subject, that is, a capacity of thought to affect itself. To think necessarily means to be lodged in the present. But what this means is that one must think the past as it is condensed in the relation to oneself (there is a Greek in me, or a Christian), in order to think against and resist the present, not in order to return to the past but "in favor, I hope, of a time to come" (Nietzsche). As Deleuze puts it, "thought thinks its own history (past), but in order to liberate itself from what it thinks (present), and to be able to 'think otherwise' (future)."¹⁵⁴ In every case, it is not a matter of a retrieval of the past, nor a contemplation of the eternal, nor a reflection on history, nor a search for universals, but a determination of the "untimely" conditions for the production of the new. To diagnose the becomings in each present is precisely the task that Nietzsche assigned to the philosopher as a physician, "the physician of civilization," or the inventor of new modes of existence.

§ 18. Conclusion. Despite the differences that separate them, Nietzsche, Spinoza, and Foucault all share an immanent conception of ethics. The primary consequence of

¹⁵³Negotiations, p. 95. Cf. Foucault, p. 115.

¹⁵⁴Foucault, p. 119 (translation modified). On this theme of "thinking otherwise," see Foucault's introduction to The Use of Pleasures, p. 9.

this ethics. Deleuze suggests, lies in its orientation away from the universal and toward the singular. One does not seek universals in order to judge, but singularities that are capable of creating or of producing the new. The critique of universals can be translated into the question, How is it possible for something new to appear in the world? Bergson and Whitehead, at the beginning of the century, made this the fundamental question of modern philosophy. Nietzsche, Spinoza, and Foucault each take as the object of their analyses complex multiplicities, which are made up of purely immanent lines and processes. Modes of existence are evaluated according to the manner in which they can deploy their power, or on the contrary are separated from their power of acting, according to these immanent movements and vectors. To invoke transcendental values for evaluating modes of existence is to seek universal coordinates within processes that are in continuous variation.¹⁵⁵ Notions such as Reason, One, Whole, Object, Subject, as we have seen, are not universals but singular processes: processes of rationalization, unification, totalization, objectivation, and subjectivation which are ceaselessly renewed, abandoned, and taken up again. There is no universal for "Reason," for instance, any more than there is a universal for a "catastrophe" in which Reason collapsed once and for all, as if Reason were a "grand narrative" that is now finished. There are as many collapses of Reason as there are constructions, depending on the processes of rationalization that are actualized in diverse places and times. Likewise, there is no universal "Subject," but only diverse processes of subjectivation. This is why an immanent ethics necessarily passes

¹⁵⁵What is Philosophy?, p. 47.

through a critique of transcendence and universals. Universals are fictions that provide pre-existent norms of judgment, but they thereby stop movement. arrest these processes, and prevent any new mode of existence from appearing. "This is perhaps the secret," concludes Deleuze. "to make something exist, and not to judge. If it is so distasteful [dégoûtant] to judge, this is not because everything is equally valid, but on the contrary because everything that is worthy can only create and distinguish itself by defying judgment."¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶Critique et Clinique, p. 169.

CHAPTER FIVE

POLITICS: SOCIAL THEORY

§ 1. Introduction. Deleuze's political philosophy is developed primarily in Capitalism and Schizophrenia, a massive two-volume work that Deleuze co-authored in the seventies with Félix Guattari, a militant anti-psychiatrist. The first volume, Anti-Oedipus (1972), was the first philosophical text written in direct response to the notorious "events" of May 1968, and its reception was immediate and immense; several journals devoted entire issues to it, and numerous interviews with Deleuze and Guattari appeared in the French press.¹ When Michel Foucault, three years later, published Discipline and Punish (1975), he freely admitted his indebtedness to Deleuze, and it is difficult today to read the political philosophy of either author without reference to the other.² Capitalism and Schizophrenia is organized around two fundamental problems. The first concerns the organization of power: How is power organized in a particular social formation, what Deleuze called an agencement ("assemblage"), and Foucault a dispositif ("apparatus")?

¹See the journals Critique 306 (November 1972), Esprit 40 (December 1972), L'Arc 49 (1972); for the American reception, see Semiotext(e) II/3 (1977) and Sub-stance 44/45. See Negotiations, p. 170: "For my part, I made a kind of move to politics with May '68, as I came into contact with precise problems, thanks to Guattari, thanks to Foucault, thanks to Elie Sambar [founding editor of the Revue des études palestiniennes]. Anti-Oedipus was in its entirety a book of political philosophy."

²See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 309: "I can give no notion by references or quotations what this book owes to Gilles Deleuze and the work he is undertaking with Félix Guattari." And "Intellectuals and Power," in Language, Counter-Memory, and Practice, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 213: "If the reading of your books (from Nietzsche to what I anticipate in Capitalism and Schizophrenia) has been essential to me, it is because they seem to go very far in exploring this problem [of power]." The intellectual relationship between Deleuze and Foucault would deserve a separate study of its own (their personal relationship has been treated by Foucault's recent biographers).

What are the elements, relations, and singularities that are actualized in a social formation so as to produce its institutions and subjects (forms of content) and its discourses and codes (forms of expression)? The second question concerns the investment of desire: How is desire invested in this social formation so as to legitimate it? Inversely and more importantly, How can the most oppressed and excluded members of a society invest with a passion a system that oppresses them?

Vincent Descombes has argued that, if May 1968 was such a galvanizing event for French intellectuals, it is because it posed these questions of desire and power in an acute form, raising concrete questions concerning the legitimation of authority (How is authority respected? When and why is it sometimes not?), the invincibility of power (Why do revolutions always end in the restoration of a new, and often more rigorous, order, as with Stalin, Mao, and post-1968 France itself?), and the apparent complicity of the oppressed with their own repression (Why do the enslaved tend to resist their own emancipation?). More importantly, it had revealed the inability of traditional Marxism to reply adequately to these questions,³ leading a number of thinkers to recognize that the "objective" doctrine of Marxism needed to be enriched by a "subjective" complement, desire needed to be injected into political theory, Marx needed to be complemented by Freud. For a Marxist, human discourses are determined by underlying relations of production, and the explicit ideology of a discourse must be made apparent by relating it

³This is why Althusser had invoked the principle of "overdetermination": see his remarks in Response à John Lewis (Paris: Maspero, 1973), pp. 9-11, as well as the elucidation of Althusser's successive political positions by Jacques Rancière in La leçon d'Althusser (Paris: Gallimard, 1974), a former disciple who later renounced Althusserianism.

to production in such a way that its "class interest" becomes discernible. For a Freudian, conscious representations are symptomatic of unconscious desires, and the task of analysis is to cure the subject by making these unconscious mechanisms apparent. In 1971, Roland Barthes had issued the following manifesto: "How can the two great epistemes of modernity, the materialist dialectic and the Freudian dialectic, be brought together so as to fuse and produce a new order of human relations? This is the problem we have posed ourselves."⁴

If Anti-Oedipus was seen to have succeeded with this "Freudo-Marxist synthesis" where others--such as Herbert Marcuse and Wilhelm Reich--had failed, it was because in the end its critical strand was neither Marxist nor Freudian, but primarily Nietzschean and Spinozistic. Indeed, the question of desire had been brought to the fore as much by the phenomenon of fascism as by the unfolding of the events of 1968. "The fundamental question of political philosophy," write Deleuze and Guattari, is one which was first posed explicitly by Spinoza: Why do humans fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation? "The astonishing thing is not that some people steal or that others occasionally go out on strike, but rather that all those who are starving do not steal as a regular practice, and all those who are exploited are not continually out on strike."⁵ Why do slaves consent to their slavery, or the exploited to their exploitation?

⁴Roland Barthes, Tel Quel 47 (Autumn 1971), p. 16, as quoted in Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 172. For Descombes assessment of May '68, which this paragraph relies on, see pp. 170-175.

⁵Anti-Oedipus, p. 29 (see also pp. 257, 356, 379, etc.), and A Thousand Plateaus, p. 215. See Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (New York: Dover Publications, 1951), p. 5: "Men may fight as bravely for slavery as for safety, and count it not shame but highest honor to risk their blood and lives for the vainglory of a tyrant."

The answer, they argued, could only be formulated in terms of the Freudian question of desire. The masses supported Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin, Mao, neither out of ignorance, nor because they were prey to an illusion, nor because they believed their interests were best defended by such dictators. "No, the masses were not innocent dupes; at a certain point, under a certain set of conditions, they wanted fascism, and it is this perversion of the desire of the masses that needs to be accounted for."⁶

The inaugural thesis of Capitalism and Schizophrenia is that the productions of desire cannot be reduced to subjective illusions or personal fantasies, but that desire invests the entire social field from the start: the social production of reality and the productions of desire are one and the same thing. Marx had written that the merit of Adam Smith and Ricardo was to have founded political economy by determining the essence of wealth no longer as an objective nature, but as an abstract subjective essence, namely, the activity of quantitative labor or production in general. Ricardo discovered in quantitative labor the principle of every representable value, a power of production that lies beyond all representations that would bind labor to objects, to aims, or even to particular sources. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the same must be said of Freud: his greatness lies in having determined the essence or nature of desire, no longer in relation to objects, aims (reproduction), or even sources, but as a subjective nature or abstract essence, namely, the activity of the libido.⁷ Freud was the first to

⁶Anti-Oedipus, p. 29.

⁷Anti-Oedipus, pp. 270, 299-300. Foucault, in The Order of Things, pp. 208-11, marks this same opposition between desire and representation, though he relates it, significantly, to the work of Sade and not Freud.

disengage desire in and of itself, just as Ricardo had disengaged labor in and of itself, two operations of decoding that opened up a sphere of production that effectively eclipsed the realm of "representation" that would still link desire and labor to persons or objects. "The discovery of an activity of production in general and without distinction, write Deleuze and Guattari, "is the identical discovery of both political economy and psychoanalysis, beyond the determinate systems of representation."⁸ If Capitalism and Schizophrenia was able to bypass the sterile parallelism in which one floundered between Freud and Marx, it was by "discovering how social production and relations of production are an institution of desire, and how affects and drives are part of the infrastructure itself." Political economy and libidinal economy, labor and libido, to borrow Bataille's phrase, constitute a single "general economy."⁹

If Deleuze and Guattari adopted neither a Freudian nor a Marxist perspective in Capitalism and Schizophrenia, it is because both Freudianism and Marxism, despite their immense efforts at decodification, at the same time launched upon a paradoxical attempt at recodification: "recodification by the State, in the case of Marxism ('You have been made ill by the State, and you will be cured by the State'--but not the same state), and recodification by the family, in the case of Freudianism ('You have been made ill by the

⁸Anti-Oedipus, p. 302. Michel Foucault, in The Order of Things (New York: Random House, 1970), had made a similar distinction between representation and the nature of labor (pp. 253-263) and desire (pp. 208-211), though he related the latter to the work of Sade rather than Freud.

⁹See in particular Georges Bataille, "Hegel, la mort et le sacrifice," in Deucalion 5 (Neuchâtel, 1955), as well as Jacques Derrida's article on Bataille, "From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism Without Reserve," in Writing and Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 251-277.

family, and you will be cured by the family'--but not the same family)."¹⁰ Marxism and Freudianism in this sense constitute the fundamental bureaucracies of our era--one public, the other private--whose aim is to recodify everything that ceaselessly becomes decodified at the horizon of our culture. Nietzsche, by contrast, rejected this effort of recodification; he attempted to decodify, not in a relative sense, by deciphering the former, present, or future codes of our culture and thought, but in an absolute sense, by attempting to express and transmit something that does not and will not allow itself to be codified, that confounds all codes, past, present, or future.

It is this "something" that Deleuze and Guattari term desire. A social formation is a field of pure immanence in which the abstract elements of desire (labor and libido) enter into differential relations, thereby forming singularities that are extended in series or flows. This topological field constitutes an Idea in the Deleuzian sense, which is neither a teleological model (which, for instance, would posit an ideal future state, e.g., proletarian) nor a regulative Idea (e.g., categorical or communicative, which would govern the establishment of a civil community in pursuit of its common good), but is rather a "problematic" structure that forces itself upon the socius as that which demands resolution. "The prime function incumbent upon the socius has always been to codify the flows of desire," and it is always relations of power that bring about this codification of desire. If labor and libido constitute the abstract elements of the social Idea, it is power that establishes the differential relation between these elements. To comprehend the

¹⁰Deleuze, "Nomad Thought," in *The New Nietzsche*, ed. David Allison (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), p. 142. See also "Deleuze et Guattari s'expliquent," interview published in *La quinzaine litteraire* (16 June 1972), p. 17: "We have no interest in returning to Freud or to Marx."

conceptual apparatus of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, then, it will be necessary to understand, each in their turn, the theoretical inversion Deleuze and Guattari effect for each of these notions, substituting a purely immanent formulation of desire and power that replaces their idealist or transcendent formulation.

I. POWER AND DESIRE

§ 2. The Theory of Desire. Deleuze and Guattari's theory of desire is explicitly opposed to idealist conceptions that define desire primarily as a lack, which always implies the introduction of a transcendent element. Such a conception of desire can be found, in variant forms, in a tradition stemming from Plato through Hegel and Freud. In Plato's Symposium, for example, Socrates ascribes a double heredity to desire or Eros, with one lineage coming from its mother Penia (dissatisfaction or need; lit. "poverty"), and the other coming from its father Poros (plenty; lit. "enterprise"). Desire thus oscillates between a negative and a positive pole, between lack and plenitude. The negative pole signifies the fundamental absence of the desired object (the Good); whereas need is a relative lack that is satisfied as soon as the object is attained, desire is an irremediable ontological lack that is unrealizable. This is the tragic vision of desire: humans are incomplete and riddled with deficiencies, and desire is the sign of this incompleteness, the mark of their misery. But there is also a positive pole to this desire. Conscious of this lack, humanity seeks to acquire its Being by making its desire coincide with the order of the Good that desire itself furthers. This is the dramatic dimension of

desire, the theme of the quest, the incessant search. Plato's initial postulate of the lack of Being is thus pregnant with a series of intermediate postulates that lead to the ultimate postulate of a recovered Being. But since desire, left to itself, cannot direct Being toward its realization, the Republic will indicate the conditions (of culture, knowledge) capable of making desire coincide with the essence it lacks.¹¹

Hegel will retain this definition of desire (Begierde) as lack in The Phenomenology of Spirit. When he states that "self-consciousness in general is Desire" (§167), he is expressing the general structure of consciousness' reflexivity. The subject's desire is to know itself, but it can know itself only by becoming other than itself, by establishing a mediated and dialectical relationship to that which is not itself, that which is different, strange, novel, awaited, absent, lost--the entire "labor of the negative" which imparts the specific sense of Hegelian tragedy.¹² The subject wants to find within the confines of itself the entirety of the external world: its desire is to discover the entire domain of alterity as a reflection of itself, but it can achieve this mediation only by traveling on a detour through the signs of the world and the temporality of history. The human subject requires obstruction, as it were, in order to gain reflection of itself in its environment, to gain recognition of itself from others. Hegel thus maintains the bivalence introduced into desire by Plato: negatively, desire is still conceived as a lack, a being-without, and positively, this lack initiates a quest, a labor that seeks to overcome

¹¹Plato, Symposium, 206a, 205e.

¹²Jean Hyppolite, "The Concept of Existence in the Hegelian Phenomenology," in Studies on Hegel and Marx, tr. John O'Neill (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 27: desire is "the power of the negative in human life."

this lack, to transform this difference into identity, to recover the strange as familiar, to retrieve that which was absent or lost.¹³

From Plato through Hegel, philosophy has consistently hearkened back to this circuit of desire, in a movement of thought defined as the contemplation of the Idea (Plato) or the reflection of the Subject (Hegel). Summarizing this idealist tradition, Clement Rosset writes: every time desire is defined by lack, "the world acquires as its double some other sort of world, in accordance with the following line of argument: there is an object that desire feels the lack of; hence the world does not contain each and every object that exists: there is at least one object missing, the one that desire feels the lack of; hence there exists some other place that contains the key to desire (missing in this world)."¹⁴

Kant, Deleuze suggests, brought about a small critical revolution by at least having placed desire, in Platonic terms, on the side of production rather than acquisition, attributing to it "the faculty of being, through its representation, the cause of the reality of the objects of those representations."¹⁵ Kant in this way insists on the intrinsic power of desire to produce its own object, and identifies a causality that stems from within desire itself. But for Kant, a "real" object can only be produced by an external causality and

¹³See Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth Century France (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 13. Fichte had already attempted a positive conception of desire by positing "yearning" (*Sehnsucht*) as the inevitable existential condition of human beings, a dialectic of perpetual striving or longing without the ontological possibility of synthesis or satisfaction.

¹⁴Clement Rosset, Logique du pire (Paris: PUF, 1970), p. 37, as quoted in Anti-Oedipus, p. 26.

¹⁵Kant, Critique of Judgment, Introduction, para. 3. Quoted in Anti-Oedipus, 25. On the Kantian notion of the pure will and its relation to desire, see the Critique of Practical Reason, Preface [7]; Theorem 2, Remark 1 [24].

external mechanisms: the reality of the object produced by desire is therefore merely a psychic reality (hallucinations, superstitions, imaginary objects, and so on). Freud would retain this scheme by providing a plausible explanation of desire as the production of fantasies: the unconscious is incapable of reproducing (or rediscovering) primary (childhood) situations where the drives could obtain complete satisfaction; failing to realize its desire (repression), the unconscious produces an imaginary object that functions as a compensatory double of reality, a mental production functioning alongside real production that "suspends" desire, thanks to the compensatory situations (sublimation) constitutive of civilization. Like Plato, Freud still finds the true cause of desire in a primal lack, and divides it into a positive pole (Eros, the desire for life and reproduction) that passes into the real, invests the social field, and supports the effects of moralization and culture; and a negative pole (Thanatos, the desire for death and destruction) that takes cover in the unconscious and undertakes the patient weaving of the fantastic signs of its gratification.¹⁶

The problem Deleuze and Guattari pose is this: once the productive capacity of desire is recognized, the question boils down to the relation between social production and the production of desire. Every previous attempt to reconcile Freud and Marx began with the assumption that there is the social production of reality on the one hand, and the productions of desire (fantasies, etc.) on the other. But when put in these terms, the only possible relation between these two forms of production would be secondary relations of

¹⁶This analysis is drawn from Dominique Grisoni, "Onomatopoeia of Desire," in Theoretical Strategies, ed. P. Botsman (Sydney: Local Consumption, 1982), pp. 169-182.

introjection and projection. "as though all social practices had their precise counterpart in introjected or internal mental practices, or as though mental practices were projected upon social systems, without either of the two sets of practices ever having any real or concrete effect upon the other."¹⁷ The theoretical move that Deleuze and Guattari make is therefore a simple one: the social production of reality and the productions of desire are one and the same thing; or more precisely, social production is merely desiring production under determinate conditions. "We maintain that the social field is immediately invested by desire, that it is the historically determined product of desire, and that the libido has no need of any mediation or sublimation, any psychic operation, any transformation, in order to invade and invest the productive forces and the relations of production."¹⁸

But once this theoretical move is made, the practical consequences of the argument become much more complex. The fundamental element of analysis becomes what Deleuze terms an agencement (assemblage), or Foucault, a dispositif (apparatus). Every concrete social formation is an assemblage of desire: desire does not exist except as assembled in determinate ways in social formations. But desire itself is the effective operator, which is merged in each case with the variables of a given assemblage. It is not lack or privation that produces desire: "one lacks only in relation to an assemblage from which one is excluded, but one desires only as a function of an assemblage in which one

¹⁷ Anti-Oedipus, p. 28.

¹⁸ Anti-Oedipus, p. 29. For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is primary, it is an active power that is not derived from a lack or nostalgia for an absent object: it is not bivalent, having a positive and negative pole.

is included....There is only desire insofar as there is a deployment of a particular field."¹⁹ If lack exists, it is created, planned, and organized in and through social production (for instance, the deliberate organizing of wants and needs in a market economy). The question, "How can desire desire its own repression?" does not therefore present any real theoretical difficulty, but many practical difficulties, depending on the case at hand. The powers that crush desire, that subject or repress it, already form a part of the assemblages of desire themselves. There is no more desire for revolution than there is desire for power, or desire to oppress or to be oppressed: rather, revolution, oppression, power, and so on are the actual component lines of a given assemblage. It is sufficient for desire to follow a given line in order to be caught, as it were, like a boat, by a certain wind.²⁰ Desire is not internal to a subject, any more than it tends toward an object: it is strictly immanent to a particular social assemblage.

There are two misunderstandings of Deleuze and Guattari's conception of desire that must be avoided from the start.²¹ First, it has been objected that in subtracting desire but is purely positive: and finally, desire is not produced (because of a lack), it is productive, the desired thing is not desired because it is absent, but on the contrary it is real because desired.

¹⁹Dialogues, pp. 103, 89.

²⁰When Deleuze and Guattari examine the phenomena of fascism, for example, they show how, before being made to resonate together in the National Socialist State, the social field was penetrated by molecular assemblages of desire ("micro-fascisms") that already penetrated every level of society, and was already shaping postures, attitudes, perceptions, expectations, and so on. Hitler took power, not by taking over the German State administration, but because he had at his disposal "microorganizations" that gave him "an unequalled, irreplaceable ability to penetrate every cell of society." The fascist State did not repress desire: it integrated microfascisms already proliferating society and made them resonate together and converge in a State apparatus. On this interpretation of fascism, see A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 214-215, 230-231, 462-463; and Anti-Oedipus, chapter 4.

²¹See Dialogues, p. 103: "The three misunderstandings of desire are relating it to: lack or law; a natural or spontaneous reality; pleasure or, above all, the festival."

from lack and the law. Deleuze and Guattari wind up invoking a state of nature, a desire that would be a natural and spontaneous reality. Judith Butler, for instance, characterizes Deleuze and Guattari's conception of desire as "an originary unrepressed libidinal diversity subject to the prohibitive laws of culture." an ahistorical or "pre-cultural ideal" à la Rousseau or Montesquieu, a "natural eros which has subsequently been denied by a restrictive culture," arguing that Deleuze and Guattari promise "a liberation of that more original, bounteous desire."²² But Deleuze and Guattari's argument is precisely the opposite: there is no desire other than assembled [agencé] desire. Desire is neither a natural or spontaneous reality, nor an undifferentiated instinctual energy, but always results from "a highly developed, engineered setup [montage] rich in interactions."²³ and can neither be grasped nor conceived apart from a determined agencement or dispositif, that is, a concrete social formation. "The rationality, the efficiency of an assemblage does not exist without the passions the assemblage brings into play, with the desires that constitute it as much as it constitutes them."²⁴

Second, in forging a philosophy of desire, Deleuze and Guattari have sometimes been accused of returning to an old cult of pleasure, to a principle of pleasure, or to a

²²Butler, Subjects of Desire, pp. 214-215, 206. Despite Deleuze and Guattari's explicit statements to the contrary, this interpretation has become a staple of numerous secondary interpretations of Anti-Oedipus. Vincent Descombes, in his Modern French Philosophy (p. 180), makes a similar error when he suggests that Deleuze and Guattari posit desire as a kind of normative ideal, which is then opposed point by point to the present. Likewise René Girard, in "Systeme du delire" (Critique 306 [November 1972]: 957-996, p. 957), who suggests that desire is undecidable: "If the true desire is unconscious, still erased under repressive codings, how do the two authors know that it exists?"

²³A Thousand Plateaus, p. 215.

²⁴A Thousand Plateaus, p. 399.

conception of the festival ("the revolution will be a party..."). But again, Deleuze and Guattari's argument is precisely the opposite: to relate desire to a Norm of pleasure is the same error as to relate desire to the Law of lack. It is true that pleasure is agreeable, and that we tend to seek it with all our strength (the pleasure principle). But when one relates desire to pleasure, to a pleasure to be obtained, it is clear at the same time that desire is essentially seen to lack something, namely, its pleasure in discharge. Pleasure is not the object of the desire, but a particular assemblage of desire. But as Deleuze likes to point out, phenomena such as "courtly love" and "masochism" are equally assemblages of desire, but which have as their aim the suspension or perpetual delay of discharge in pleasure, in order to maintain certain circuits of desire. In his writings on psychiatry, Deleuze defines "perversion," in the narrow sense, as an artificial reterritorialization of desire. But in the broadest and most general sense, every reterritorialization of desire could equally be defined as a perversion, insofar as it is the constitution of a territory of desire--not only artificial, but exotic, archaic, residual, private, genital, reproductive, even Oedipal. This is the tension Deleuze and Guattari find in Freud: he discovers desire as libido, as a desire that is productive; but he quickly re-idealizes desire by reducing it to the normative and Oedipal coordinates of the family. In and of itself, desire has no aims or ends: it is not subjective but world-historical; it is not merely familial, but penetrates every level of the socius; and every "normative" measure of desire is therefore always dependent on a given assemblage, and the variable elements and lines of which it is composed.²⁵

²⁵On the definition of "perversion," see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 35, 314-316.

§ 3. The Theory of Power. Every concrete social formation is therefore an assemblage of desire ("desire is the set of passive syntheses...that function as units of production").²⁶ But what assembles desire are relations of power.²⁷ Here again, we can best approach Deleuze's formulation of an immanent conception of power by distinguishing it from two philosophical conceptions of power that Deleuze breaks with: the idealist conception of power, extending from Hobbes through Hegel; and its so-called materialist inversion in Marx, which dominates traditional leftism. Each of these traditional theories can be summarized in three series of more or less parallel postulates:

a. The idealist tradition.²⁸ (1) The idealist tradition interprets power as an object the will wants but lacks. The "will to power" is interpreted as a will that wants or seeks power, or that desires domination (a platitude that has nothing to do with Nietzsche's thought). Power is the object of a representation or recognition: "in Hobbes, man in the state of nature wants to see his superiority represented and recognized by others; in Hegel, consciousness wants to be recognized by another and represented as self-consciousness."²⁹ Power would presuppose a comparison of consciousnesses, and

²⁶Anti-Oedipus, p. 26.

²⁷On the differences between Foucault and Deleuze, which concern the relation of desire to power, see the important footnote in A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 530-531, n. 39: "Our only points of disagreement with Foucault are the following: (1) to us the assemblages seem fundamentally to be assemblages not of power but of desire (desire is always assembled), and power seems to be a stratified dimension of the assemblage; (2) the diagram and abstract machine have lines of flight that are primary, which are not phenomena of resistance or counterattack in an assemblage, but cutting edges of creation and deterritorialization."

²⁸For Deleuze's critique of these "idealist" conceptions of the will to power, see Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 10, 79-84.

²⁹Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 80.

requires that one ascribe to the will a corresponding motive that would serve as the motor of comparison (vanity, pride, self-love, display, feeling of inferiority). (2) Second, when power is made the object of a recognition, it requires an external criteria according to which one can determine if one's power is recognized or not. The only thing that provide such a criteria are values that are already current, that is, ready-made or established values. Understood as a will to be recognized, the will to power is necessarily the will to have the values current in a given society attributed to oneself (power, money, honors, reputation, etc.). The conception of power from Hobbes to Hegel presupposes the existence of assignable values that the "will" seeks to have attributed to itself: a conformism. (3) Third, these values are attributed to the will only as the result of a combat or struggle, which determines those who will profit from these current values, who can claim them as their prize. But this situation is seen to place us in an untenable and unlivable state. For the will, as a desire to dominate, is seen to be infinite and insatiable; power, as an object of recognition, is seen to be unreal, an appearance; and combat, as a struggle for power, is seen to place contradiction and suffering within the will itself. "According to Hobbes the will to power is as if in a dream from which only the fear of death will rescue it; Hegel insists on the unreality of the situation of the master, for the master depends on the slave for recognition."³⁰ Philosophy thus posits the necessity of a limitation on the will, a rational or contractual limitation, which is the only thing that will make the will livable and resolve contradiction. The idealist conception of power, in short, interprets power as "the object of a recognition, the content of a

³⁰Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 83.

representation, the stake in a competition, and therefore makes it depend, at the end of a fight, on a simple attribution of established values."³¹

b. The Marxist tradition.³² (1) In the materialist tradition, on the contrary, power is interpreted as a material property, something that is possessed and exchanged like a commodity; it is the property of a dominant class that has conquered or appropriated it, and therefore seeks to preserve it. Put differently, power has an essence and is an attribute, which qualifies those who possess it (the dominant) by distinguishing them from those upon whom it is exercised (the dominated). (2) Second, power is localized in a State apparatus, to the point where even "private" powers form a part of this apparatus. The power of the State is expressed in the Law, which is conceived either as a state of peace imposed upon brute forces, or as the result of war or a battle (the class struggle) and won by the strongest. This theoretical privilege given to the State as an apparatus of power has, as its "revolutionary" correlate, the practice of a leading and centralizing party which eventually wins State power. (3) Third, power is essentially repressive, and as such tends to act according to two modes, either by violent force or by persuasive ideology, by police or by propaganda. "sometimes it reprimands, sometimes it deceives or persuades."

³¹Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 10.

³²For Deleuze's critique of the "leftist" conception of power, see Foucault, pp. 24-30. Foucault's own comments along these lines have been preserved in transcribed lectures, particularly "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 78-108, esp. lecture two (pp. 92-108), and "Power and Norm: Notes," in Michel Foucault: Power, Truth, Strategy, ed. Meaghan Morris and Paul Patton (Sydney: Feral Publications, 1979), pp. 59-66. These texts are briefly summarized in Discipline and Punish, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1977), pp. 26-29.

Such are, in sum, the theses that constitute the idealist and materialist conceptions of power, and the concept of power developed by Deleuze (and Foucault) can be seen to stand in opposition to each of these sets of parallel theses: (1) Power does not have an essence, but is operational; it is not the object of a representation or a recognition, but is itself productive; it is not an attribute, but a relation; it is less a property than a strategy, "it is exercised rather than possessed," and calls for a functional analysis. Like desire, power acts over the entire social field, down to its smallest elements, according to a system of differential relations, and the singular points through which it passes. Neither Deleuze nor Foucault deny class conflict, but argue that power relations pass through the dominant as well as through the dominating, since both these forces constitute singularities. The analysis of power cannot begin with established subjects and classes, but must try to discover how these subjects and classes "are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts."³³

(2) "Power is local because it is never global, but it is not local or localizable because it is diffuse."³⁴ Both Foucault and Deleuze deny that it is possible to identify a privileged place or site as the source of power (the State, established values). Power is defined by "the strict immanence of its field, without transcendent unification: the continuity of its line, without global centralization; the contiguity of its segments, without

³³Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p. 97. Cf. p. 36: analysis must be carried down to the level of "disputes with neighbors, fights between parents and children, misunderstandings between couples, excesses of wine and sex, public quarrels, and even secret passions."

³⁴Foucault, p. 26

distinct totalization: a serial space."³⁵ States and institutions function as mechanisms of capture that traverse this field and its singularities "in order to connect them, extend them, make them converge, make them be exercised in a new way."³⁶ But power itself has no center, even though one can identify diverse processes of centralization, unification, or totalization that act upon power relations. The analysis of power therefore requires a topological analysis, a "micro-analysis" of this immanent field.

(3) Power is not necessarily repressive: both ideology and violence are only "the dust thrown up by the combat" of power relations. Repression and ideology, struggle and comparison, certainly exist, but they explain nothing in themselves; they always presuppose a concrete agencement or dispositif in which they operate, and which is itself determined by relations of power. "Power 'produces the real' before repressing; and it also produces the true, before ideologizing, before abstracting or masking."³⁷ It therefore requires a strategic analysis of the processes of power (normalizing, centralizing, segmenting, converging, seriating, composing, distributing in space, ordering in time...).

Summarizing all these theses, we can say that power, for Deleuze, is a relation of forces that is spread out over the entire social field. Relations of power are the differential relations that determine singularities (affects). On the one hand, force is never singular, but always exists in relation with other forces, so that every force is already a relation, that is to say, power: on the other hand, force is never equal, since

³⁵Foucault, p. 27.

³⁶Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p. 34.

³⁷Foucault, p. 29.

every relation of force always presupposes a difference in quantity between forces. Every relation between forces is a "relation of power"; and conversely, it is power that determines the relation of force with force, and qualifies the related forces. An exercise of power appears as an affect, since force defines itself by its power to affect other forces (with which it is in relation), and to be affected by other forces. The actualization that stabilizes and stratifies these relations is an integration: an operation that consists of tracing "a general line of force," linking singularities, aligning and homogenizing them, placing them in series, making them converge. There is no global integration immediately (State, institution); there is rather a multiplicity of local, partial integrations, each having a certain affinity with certain relations, with certain singular points.

§ 4. The Concept of the "Agencement" (Assemblage). Deleuze and Guattari's theory of desire and power is both differential and immanent, rather than idealist or dialectical. Yet neither desire nor power, however, function as first principles. Deleuze frequently points out that what is important in a philosophy is not its first principles, but the third, fourth, and fifth principles, which are no longer even principles. The philosopher must place himself in the middle, and not the beginning or the end, the origin or the destination: "it is only in the middle that things begin to live."³⁸ The minimal real unity in Deleuze and Guattari's political philosophy is neither desire nor power, but what

³⁸On the concept of the middle (milieu), see Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 122.

they term an agencement ("assemblage"), and Foucault, a dispositif ("apparatus").³⁹

Desire and power, in other words, remain completely undetermined as long as they are not related to an assemblage that they presuppose. Capitalism and Schizophrenia is therefore neither a theory of desire nor a theory of power: instead it presents a typology of four "abstract machines" that provide conceptual tools for examining the manner in which concrete social formations or assemblages synthesize, integrate, and stratify desire in differing yet determinable ways.⁴⁰ Deleuze and Guattari's political philosophy is neither functionalist (society is an organic, integrated, self-regulating whole) nor "Marxist" (at least in the sense that Marxism defines society as constituted by various oppositions), but differential, immanentist, and topological.⁴¹ The four types Deleuze and Guattari analyze are as follows:

³⁹The French term agencement can be variously translated as an "ordering" (e.g. of elements), a "construction" (e.g. of a phrase or novel), an "organization" (e.g. of a collection), an "arrangement" or "layout." In the context of Deleuze's work, Brian Massumi's choice of the term "assemblage," in his fine translation of Mille Plateaux, must be regarded as the definitive English equivalent. Dispositif also admits of numerous possible translations (device, mechanism, system, plan of action, operation), of which "apparatus" must be regarded as equally definitive.

⁴⁰Describing his relation to Foucault in an interview, Deleuze explained: "We perhaps had a common conception of philosophy. We had no taste for abstractions, the One, the Whole, Reason, the Subject. We had as our task the analysis of mixed states, agencements, what Foucault called dispositifs. It was necessary, not to go back to points, but to follow and unravel lines: a cartography, which implied a micro-analysis (what Foucault called a micro-physics of power, and Guattari a micro-politics of desire). It is in agencements that one would find foci of unification, knots of totalization, processes of subjectivation, always relative, always needing to be undone in order to follow an agitated line even further. One would not seek origins, even lost or erased origins, but one would take things where they spring up, in the middle" (Negotiations, p. 119).

⁴¹On the conflict between these two currents of modern social theory, see Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, tr. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. 11-17. For Deleuze and Guattari's reflections on the political circumstances that gave rise to Anti-Oedipus, see "Deleuze et Guattari s'expliquent," in La Quinzaine littéraire (June 16-30, 1972): 15-19, p. 15.

1. Segmentary or "primitive" societies, which effect syntheses of connection in segmented codes and territories, following supple lines of filiation and alliance:
2. The State, which effects syntheses of convergence, forcing local codes to converge on and resonate in a single center of power by utilizing various mechanisms of capture or overcoding:
3. The Nomadic War Machine, which effects an arithmetic synthesis capable of occupying and distributing itself over a smooth space:
4. Capitalism, which effects a disjunctive synthesis between labor and capital, and effectively decodes the codes and overcodings of previous formations.⁴²

Capitalism and Schizophrenia is a "book of concepts," insofar as it attempts to construct concepts for each of these formations by defining their essential components: a certain manner of occupying space-time, a certain composition of desire and subjectivity, a certain organization of power, certain technological and affective elements, and so on.⁴³ As we shall see, these types are not to be understood as stages in a progressive evolution: rather, they sketch out a topological field in which each type functions as a variable of coexistence that enters into complex relations with the others.⁴⁴ Their central thesis is that, by definition, a given socius cannot tolerate states of difference or serial flows, and

⁴²Anti-Oedipus analyses "primitive" societies, the State, and capitalism (pp. 139-271); A Thousand Plateaus adds to this an analysis of the war machine (pp. 351-423), and in an essential chapter entitled "Apparatus of Capture" (pp. 424-473), it lays out in specific terms the complex relations between these various typologies.

⁴³See Negotiations, p. 30.

⁴⁴Marc Auge, The Anthropological Circle: Symbol, Function, History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) criticizes Deleuze and Guattari for being "neo-evolutionist" (pp. 15, 77, 91-92). As we shall see, if there is an evolution, it does not move in a linear fashion, from one formation to another (archaic societies, then States, then capitalism), but in a chaotic fashion, from the topological field to its various actualizations, which attain (or do not attain) a certain "threshold of consistency."

necessarily seeks at all points and at all times to master these flows, to actualize them in such a way that their divergent power is controlled or suppressed as far as possible. The central political question for Deleuze and Guattari concerns the concrete means by which the singularities and flows of the transcendental field are assembled in a given agencement.⁴⁵ In the sections that follow, we analyze each of the four typologies that Deleuze and Guattari propose.

II. TYPOLOGY OF SOCIAL FORMATIONS

A. The Primitive Territorial Machine (Segmentarity)

§ 4. Filiation and alliance: The Debtor-Creditor Relation. Much as Ferdinand Braudel looked on history as a "geohistory," Deleuze thinks of political philosophy, and philosophy in general, as a "geophilosophy."⁴⁶ Social formations or agencements are defined in terms of the relation between the earth (Terre) and a territory (territoire).⁴⁷ The "earth" is a concept that designates a plane of pure immanence, it constitutes "the surface upon which the whole process of production is inscribed, on which the forces and means of labor are recorded, and the agents and products distributed."⁴⁸ To delimit a territory, in

⁴⁵Anti-Oedipus, pp. 139, 262: "To code desire is the business of the socius....The general theory of society is a generalized theory of flows."

⁴⁶See What is Philosophy?, chapter 4, "Geophilosophy."

⁴⁷On the importance of the concept of the earth, see What is Philosophy?, p. 86, where Deleuze and Guattari contrast the earth-territory relation with that of the subject-object relation in Kant and Hegel, and the difference between Being and beings in Heidegger (and the themes of building and dwelling).

⁴⁸Anti-Oedipus, p. 141.

turn, amounts to leaving the surface of the earth in order to enter into the sphere of representation: to territorialize is to pass from an energetic, intensive order to a representational, extensive system through various processes of stratification and integration.⁴⁹ But the earth, in return, constantly beings about processes of deterritorialization that surpass any territory: it is deterritorializing and deterritorialized. Social formations therefore constantly fluctuate between these two components, earth and territory, with two zones of indiscernability: deterritorialization (from the territory to the earth) and reterritorialization (from the earth to the territory). "What must be compared in each case are the movements of deterritorialization and the processes of reterritorialization that appear in each assemblage."⁵⁰

The territorial machine is therefore the first type of social formation analyzed by Deleuze and Guattari. Like Lévi-Strauss, Deleuze and Guattari do not look upon primitive societies as a "regressive" or backwards social formation, but as a fully developed assemblage having a rationality and efficacy of its own. In Anti-Oedipus, they argue that such social systems operate, and can be analyzed, along two primary axes, filiation and alliance. On the one hand, there are the genealogical and filiative lines of lineage and kinship, with the chiefs and elders of the clan who guard the "fixed capital" of the filiative stock and arrange the marriages; on the other hand, there are the lines of

⁴⁹Cf. A Thousand Plateaus, p. 40: the earth is "permeated by unformed, unstable matters, by flows in all directions, by free intensities or nomadic singularities, by transitory particles." Processes of stratification, in turn, "consist of giving form to matters, of imprisoning intensities or locking singularities into systems of resonance and redundancy, of producing upon the body of the earth molecules large and small and organizing them into molar aggregates."

⁵⁰Dialogues, p. 134.

alliance that are established between these filiations to form the tribe, which constitutes a kind of "circulating capital" that operates through mobile blocks of debt. Filiation designates the organization of the social group into serial lines of heredity (code), and is primarily hierarchical and administrative, corresponding to a biofiliative memory; but alliance is the displacement created between these series by their differential interaction (territory), and is primarily political and economic, corresponding to a memory of words.⁵¹ Alliance designates a type of relation qualitatively different from filiation (a relation between heterogeneous terms), though these two axes are in constant interaction. A child, for instance, is identified in relation to the disjunctive filiative lines of its father or mother, but inversely, these lines of filiation themselves exist only on the basis of the connective alliance represented by the marriage of the mother and the father.⁵²

⁵¹Note on primitive myth. We should note here that the importance of myths in the analysis of primitive societies lies in the fact that it is only in myth that one can determine the intensive conditions of the system (and it is for this reason that primitive myths must be distinguished from imperial myths). Marcel Griaule, for instance, in Dieu d'eau (Paris: Fayard, 1975), shows how the myths of the Dogon describe the earth as an egg, as an intensive filiation that does not yet distinguish between persons or sexes, but comprises a single prepersonal being (the Nommo, the Twin) that traverses all the singularities and intensities of the full body of the earth (an "inclusive disjunction where everything divides, but into itself, and where the same being is everywhere, on every side, at every level, differing only in intensity"). It is only with the eighth ancestor that these disjunctions cease to be inclusive and become exclusive, "there is a dismembering of the full body, a canceling of twinning, a separation of the sexes marked by circumcision." It is here that the intensive filiative energy of the earth is organized into series of extensive lineages, and persons, sexes, and parental appellations appear in the form of the primordial ancestors. But these extended filiations appear only because there is always already an alliance at work: filiations becomes extended at the same time that lateral alliances are established. There is no primary filiation, nor is there a first generation or an initial exchange. "The system in extension is born of the intensive conditions that make it possible, but it reacts on them, cancels them, represses them, and allows them no more than a mythical expression." On these points, see Anti-Oedipus, pp. 154, 160.

⁵²Indeed, marriage itself is not an alliance between a man and a woman, but an alliance between two families, a transaction between men concerning women, so that one could argue, as does Georges Devereux, that there is essentially a homosexual motivation behind marriage--men establishing their own connections of indebtedness through women ("through the man-woman disjunction, which is always the outcome of filiation, alliance places in connection men from different filiation"). See Georges Devereux, "Considérations ethnopsychanalytiques sur la notion de parenté," L'Homme (July 1965), quoted in Anti-Oedipus, p. 165.

The analysis of so-called primitive societies has tended to emphasize their mechanisms of filiation (kinship structures), and derived alliances from filiation (e.g. as closed cycles of exchange between groups of filiation).⁵³ It is the nature of the relation between filiation and alliance that lies at the heart of the famous polemic between Edmund Leach and Claude Lévi-Strauss, and marks the ambiguity of Marcel Mauss's texts (if exchange is primary, why does it necessarily take the unequal form of gift and counter-gifts?).⁵⁴ We will not recapitulate here the ethnographic debates that Deleuze and Guattari enter into in Anti-Oedipus, but simply focus on the conclusion that Deleuze and Guattari extract from them.⁵⁵ If kinship is dominant in primitive societies, they argue, it is determined as dominant by the economic and political factors of alliance: it is alliance (social reproduction) that conditions the filiative lineages (human reproduction). Alliances weave a supple and transversal network that makes it necessary to define kinship systems as an open praxis or strategy distinct from every combinatory, forming an unstable physical system in perpetual disequilibrium rather than a closed exchange cycle.⁵⁶

It is in this context that they insist that the great text of modern ethnology is not Mauss's The Gift but Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals. Nietzsche was working with a limited amount of ethnographic material (some ancient Germanic law, the Hindu

⁵³Anti-Oedipus, pp. 146-147.

⁵⁴Jacques Derrida analyses the nature of gift-giving in Given Time I: Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kampf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

⁵⁵For these debates, see Anti-Oedipus, pp. 139-191.

⁵⁶Foucault, pp. 35-36).

law of Manu), which is why Deleuze and Guattari insist that his text can only be evaluated in the light of later anthropological works such as Mauss's and Lévi-Strauss's. Nonetheless Nietzsche did not hesitate before the essential fact, namely, that in primitive societies the unit of alliance is not exchange, but the debtor-creditor relation. It was in the debtor-creditor relationship "that one person first encountered another person, that one person first measured himself against another."⁵⁷ The Genealogy of Morals sees the archetype of social organization in credit and debt rather than exchange: promises were given, commitments made to the future, and the "justice of the laws" existed in order to make one responsible for one's debts, "to create a memory for the future." These laws did not have the immobility of a universal right, but were ceaselessly displaced between families that had to give or take back blood: blocks of debt described a direct relation or alliance between parties, something that provoked or created a change of state in each of them, that is, an affect. As Nietzsche put it, human beings are constituted biologically by an active faculty of forgetting, which filters out the mnemonic traces of the unconscious and prevents them from invading and disturbing consciousness: they must therefore create an other faculty, a faculty of memory and retention, one that is social and no longer biological, that is capable of "training" (affecting) an animal with the right to make promises, to commit to the future, to assume responsibility for a debt.⁵⁸

⁵⁷Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay II, §8, p. 70, as quoted in Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 213-214.

⁵⁸On the faculty of forgetting, see Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay II, §1: "What we experience and absorb enters our consciousness as little while we are digesting it (one might call the process "inpsychation") as does the thousandfold process involved in physical nourishment--so-called "incorporation." To close the doors and windows of consciousness for a time, to remain undisturbed by the noise and struggle of our underworld of utility organs working with and against one another...--that is the

What Nietzsche called the "morality of mores" is the activity of culture that accomplishes this training and formation. that creates this memory of the future. Nietzsche defines culture as "the labor performed by man upon himself during the greater part of the existence of the human race. his entire prehistoric labor."⁵⁹ The stupidity of laws, the pain of rituals, the perversity of education, the red-hot irons, the atrocious procedures all had this aim: to train humans, to mark them in their flesh, to render them capable of alliance and obedience, to form within them the debtor-creditor relation, to create a memory for the future. Deleuze likes to recall the Bergsonian dictum that every historical law is arbitrary and contingent, but what is not arbitrary is the law of obeying laws. This is why culture does not, in principle, recoil from any kind of violence. It is not a great conversation, nor a system of exchange and communication, but rather an immense "system of cruelty." "Perhaps indeed there was nothing more fearful and uncanny in the whole prehistory of man," writes Nietzsche, "than his mnemotechnics. 'If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory'--this is the main clause of the oldest (unhappily the most enduring) psychology on earth....Man could never do without blood, torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need to create a memory for himself: the most dreadful sacrifices and pledges (sacrifices of the first born among them), the most repulsive mutilations

purpose of active forgetfulness." Deleuze compares Nietzsche's thesis with Freud's "topical hypothesis" of the unconscious in Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 112-14.

⁵⁹Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay II, §4.

(castration, for example), the cruelest rites of all the religious cults (and all religions are at the deepest level systems of cruelties)."⁶⁰

It would be a naive caricature to reduce this activity of culture to a mere process of "socialization." One of the strengths of Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche lies in the emphasis it places on the fact that the mnemotechnics of culture are inscribed directly onto the body. It is the flesh itself that revealed what was due to and owed by each person. "Society is not first of all a milieu for exchange where the essential would be to circulate or cause to circulate, but rather a socius of inscription where the essential thing is to mark and to be marked....Cruelty is the movement of culture that is realized in bodies and inscribed on them....It makes men or their organs into the parts and wheels of the social machine."⁶¹ The techniques for marking the body--tattooing the skin, scarifying the face, circumcising the penis, mutilating a foot, piercing, excising, incising, carving, encircling, and initiating--constitute so many methods for collectively investing these organs, for tracing the codes of a society directly upon the body.⁶² Initiation societies, for example, with their cruel rites of passage, are institutions in which parts of a body (sensory organs, anatomical parts, joints) are institutionalized as partial objects and their exercise is consigned to the collectivity: prohibitions (see not, look not) apply to those who, in a given state or on a given occasion, are deprived of the right to enjoy a

⁶⁰Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay 2, §3, p. 61.

⁶¹Anti-Oedipus, p. 142. "The mythologies sing of organs-partial objects and their relations with a full body that repels or attracts them: vaginas riveted on the woman's body, an immense penis shared by the men, an independent anus that assigns itself a body without anus."

⁶²See Pierre Clastres, "Of Torture in Primitive Societies," in Society Against the State (New York: Zone Books, 1987).

collectively invested organ. (The privatization of organs only takes place in modern societies.) It is through such methods of inscription that a person ceases to be simply a biological organism and becomes attached to the requirements of the socius.

Debt, Deleuze and Guattari argue, is the direct result of this investing of organs and marking of bodies. If the relationship between humans is determined as a relation of creditor and debtor, justice is what makes one responsible for a debt. If primitive society constitutes a system of cruelty, it because it makes use of pain as the exact equivalent of a forgetting, of an injury caused, a promise not kept. In primitive societies, it is pain, and not money, that functions as a medium of debt, a currency, an equivalent. This is the terrible equation of debt that determines the relationship of man to man: "injury caused = pain to be suffered."⁶³ In relation to this medium, culture is called justice, and the medium itself is called punishment. Nietzsche's genius was to have posed in its most rigorous form the question concerning the relation of pain with justice: How can one "pay back" with suffering? How can a criminal's pain serve as an "compensation" to the harm he has done? The moralist response that justice derives from a deeply felt offense, a spirit of revenge, or a justiciary reaction still leaves unexplained how the pain of others could ever satisfy this thirst for revenge. Shakespeare's "Merchant of Venice" poses the question in an acute form: How can the removal of flesh compensate for the loss of money? The equation "injury caused = pain undergone" can only be understood if a third term is introduced, namely, the pleasure which is felt in inflicting pain or in contemplating it. This third term is what Nietzsche calls the "evaluating eye," which

⁶³Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 134-135; Anti-Oedipus, p. 191.

extracts from the pain it is contemplating, from the spectacle of the punishment, a kind of "surplus value," a surplus value that compensates for the broken alliance the criminal has wronged, and the mark that has not sufficiently penetrated his body, or sufficiently etched itself upon his memory. It is precisely the spectacle of pain and punishment that re-establishes the rupture of an alliance, the failure to repay.

The sphere of legal obligations, according to Nietzsche, has its roots in forms of violence and cruelty inflicted directly upon the body. "To inspire trust in his promise to repay, to provide a guarantee of the seriousness and sanctity of his promise, to impress repayment as a duty, an obligation upon his own conscience, the debtor made a contract with the creditor and pledged that if he should fail to repay he would substitute something else that he "possessed," something he had control over: for example, his body, his wife, his freedom, or even his life....Above all, however, the creditor could inflict every kind of indignity and torture upon the body of the debtor: for example, cut from it as much as seemed commensurate with the size of the debt--and everywhere and from early times one had exact evaluations, legal evaluations, of the individual limbs and parts of the body from this point of view, some of them going into horrible and minute detail."⁶⁴ What is primary in primitive economies is not exchange between kinship units (Mauss), but the bloody network of debt and credit in which each exchange is enmeshed, and the coding of pain and cruelty that is inscribed directly upon the body: exchange is always secondary with regard to inscription.

⁶⁴Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, II, 4 (p. 64).

§ 5. Segmentarity and Power. The relation of alliance in primitive societies is defined in terms of debt, the marking of bodies, and a justice in which pain serves as the medium. It is along this double axis of filiation (kinship) and alliance (debt) that Deleuze and Guattari analyze the organization of power in primitive societies. If primitive societies can be described as "territorial," it is not in the sense that they divide the earth into geographic units (this will only happen with the appearance of the State form), but in the sense that they subdivide people and distribute them on the indivisible and immanent unity of the earth, following this declension of alliance and filiation. Since they lack a centralized State apparatus and power is not localized in specialized political institutions, primitive societies have often been defined politically in terms of segmentarity. The double apparatus of filiative lineages and tribal alliances cuts up into segments of varying lengths: genealogical filiative units of major, minor, and minimal lineages, territorial tribal units of primary, secondary, and tertial sections. These two apparatuses constantly intersect and interpenetrate each other, so that primitive societies, and the individuals and groups that compose them, are segmented spatially, temporally, and socially in terms of various types of lines.

In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari sketch out several figures of segmentarity that are not merely applicable to primitive societies, but constitute a general typology of segmentarity equally relevant to modern societies. (1) There are lines that segment in a binary fashion, according to disjunctions based on gender (men/women), age (child/adult), race (black/ white), sector (private/public), class (dominant/dominated),

party (left/right), and so on. Such binarization inevitably produces intermediary mixes: if one is neither black nor white, one is mulatto; if one is neither man nor woman, one is transvestite; and so on. (2) There are lines that segment in a circular fashion, in ever widening spheres, following rules of convergence: myself, family, neighborhood, city, country, world, cosmos. Here again, these circular segments often cross over into one another. Jacques Lizot shows how, among the Yanomami, the communal house is organized circularly as a series of coronas in which certain activities take place (worship and ceremonies, exchange of goods, family life, then trash and excrement): but at the same time, "each of these coronas is itself transversally divided, each segment devolves upon a particular lineage and is subdivided among different kinship groups."⁶⁵ (3) Finally, there are lines that segment in a linear fashion, according to episodes and roles (and institutions), following links of connection: family, then school, then the army, then the office or factory, then retirement, and if need be, the hospital, or even the prison. And from one linear segment to another, we are told, "You're no longer a baby," or at school, "You're no longer at home," and in the army, "This is no longer like school...." All these figures of segmentation--binary, circular, and linear--are bound up with one another, crossing into each other, intersecting in various manners, changing according to the point of view. They do not have the intrinsic properties of a structure, but extrinsic and relational properties of an open system.

Now Deleuze and Guattari argue that if one examines the system of primitive segmentarity, it can be seen to operate between two extreme poles: the fusion of the tribe

⁶⁵Jacques Lizot, Le cercle des feux (Paris: Seuil, 1976), p. 118, quoted in A Thousand Plateaus, p. 209.

(and the territory it occupies) through its opposition to other groups, and its scission through the constant formation of new lineages that aspire to independence.⁶⁶

a. Mechanisms against Fusion. On the one hand, primitive societies have often be defined as societies without a State, segmentary machines in which the process of fusion never reaches the point where power becomes concentrated in a State or political institution, whose economic development or political differentiation never reach a level that would make the formation of organs of power that define the State apparatus not only possible but inevitable. The importance of the work of the ethnologist Pierre Clastres, for Deleuze and Guattari, is that he labored to reverse the negative and evolutionary implications of this presumption, asking if it is not in fact one of the concerns of primitive societies to ward off or avert the formation of a State, to make use of scission to exorcise fusion, even if the mechanisms that effect this process are not consciously understood as such.

As a first approach to the question, Deleuze sharply distinguishes the chief in primitive societies from the despotic man of power in State formations, and more generally the organization of power in group phenomena such as bands, packs, and tribes from its organization in a State apparatus. He cites a study by Jacques Meunier on the gangs of street children in Bogatá, in which the leader of the gang is prevented from acquiring power by a number of subtle mechanisms: the gang members undertake their

⁶⁶This is why Deleuze and Guattari reject the distinction between infra- and super-structure, between economics and ideology. "The whole problem," writes Jean-François Lyotard, "is that the whole is not given, that society is not a unified totality; rather it is displacements and metamorphoses of energy that never stop decomposing and recomposing sub-units and that pull these units along, now towards the organs'

theft activities in common and share their loot collectively, but they disperse afterwards, and do not remain together to eat or sleep: each member is paired off with one or more other members, so that if he has a disagreement with the leader, he will not leave alone but will take along his allies, whose combined departure will threaten the to break up the entire gang; and there is an unspoken age limit so that at age fifteen a member is required to quit the gang.⁶⁷ In these group phenomena, leadership is a complex mechanism that operates by the diffusion of prestige, rather than by reference to centers of power, such that the mechanisms that sustain leadership at the same time work to inhibit the installation of stable powers. The chief has no institutional power other than his prestige, and no other rule than his sense of the group's desires.⁶⁸ In this sense, he is more like a "star" than a man of the State: if his prestige wanes, if his means of persuasion become ineffectual, he is in danger of being disavowed by the people, his power passing on to another. Such collective mechanisms of inhibition make use of scission to impede the fusion of power by keeping the role of the chief in a relation of impotence within the group: they do not act to promote the strongest, but rather inhibit the installation of stable powers in favor of a complex web of immanent relations and affects.

perverse schizo functioning, now towards the neurotic-paranoiac functioning of the great absent signifier" ("Energumen Capitalism," pp. 18-19).

⁶⁷Jacques Meunier, Les gamins de Bogatá (Paris: Lattès, 1977). Quoted in A Thousand Plateaus, 358. "High-society life" could also be seen to operate according to this diffusion of prestige. Clastres discusses the paradoxical status of the chief in certain South American tribes (who enjoy a "power that is deprived of its own exercise") in "Exchange and Power," Society Against the State, pp. 27-47.

⁶⁸Such is the meaning of the potlatch: "The chief converts this perishable wealth into an imperishable prestige through the medium of spectacular feasting. The ultimate consumers are in this way the original producers." Edmund Leach, Rethinking Anthropology, p. 89, quoted in Anti-Oedipus, p. 150.

But more importantly, Deleuze and Guattari identify war in primitive societies as the surest mechanism directed against the formation of the State: it is war that maintains the dispersal and segmentarity of groups. "and the warrior himself is caught in a process of accumulating exploits that lead to solitude and a prestigious but powerless death."⁶⁹ "Far from deriving from exchange, even as a sanction for its failure, war is what limits exchanges, maintains them in the framework of 'alliances.'"⁷⁰ Just as Mauss demonstrated that the potlatch was a mechanism that prevented the concentration of wealth in primitive society, so Clastres attempts to demonstrate that the destiny of the warrior is to perpetuate a mechanism that will prevent the concentration of power in a single organ.⁷¹ And just as Hobbes saw clearly that the State, as a mechanism of conservation, was against war, so Clastres will argue that war is essentially against the State, and makes it impossible. War, as we shall see, is not a state of nature, but rather the mode of a social state that wards off and prevents the State. Clastres thus broke with the "evolutionist" thesis that saw segmentary societies as a rudimentary and less organized social form that gave way to the centralization of power in a State apparatus; on the contrary, such social machines imply a fully developed form that is not only irreducible to the State, but whose

⁶⁹ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 357.

⁷⁰ A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 357-358.

⁷¹ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 553, n. 12. See Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State (New York: Zone Books, 1987), and "Archéologie de la violence: la guerre dans les sociétés primitives" and "Malheur du guerrier sauvage" in Recherches d'anthropologie politique (Paris: Seuil, 1980), pp. 171-208, 209-248. Clastres also suggests that certain forms of prophetic speech, which are first directed against the chiefs, produce a new and formidable type of power directed against the concentration of power in leaders.

mechanisms effectively serve to prevent its formation. The mechanisms of leadership and war make use of scission to exorcise the fusion of power in a centralized organ.

b. Mechanisms against Scission. On the other hand, an even greater danger for primitive societies would be a scission in which all possibilities of coding could be suppressed. Such a decoding, Deleuze and Guattari argue, will in fact be effected by capitalism, which breaks the codes of primitive societies in favor of the abstract or fictional quantities of capital and labor. The primitive machine is not ignorant of the mechanisms of exchange, commerce, and industry; but it exorcises them, localizes them, cordons them off, encastes them, and maintains the roles of the merchant and the blacksmith in a subordinate position, so that exchange and production always remain subordinate to the segmentary codes. Deleuze and Guattari subscribe to the Marxist idea that all of history is susceptible of a retrospective reading in terms of capitalism ("a motley painting of everything that has ever been believed"),⁷² but on the condition that the decoding of flows effected by capitalism is seen as the negative of other social formations. Decoded flows constitute "the nightmare that the primitive social machine exorcises with all its forces, and all its segmentary articulations."⁷³ If the model of primitive society must be found in credit and debt rather than exchange, it is not because exchange is unknown in primitive societies, but just the contrary: exchange is well known, but as something that must be severely restricted, so that no corresponding value can develop as an exchange that would introduce the nightmare of a commodity

⁷² Anti-Oedipus, p. 34.

⁷³ Anti-Oedipus, p. 153.

economy. This is why the primitive market operates through bargaining rather than by fixing an equivalent, for the introduction of money would lead to a decoding of flows and a collapse of the mode of inscription in the *socius*.⁷⁴

Primitive societies, defined by segmentary forms of power, have scission and fusion as their functional limits: scission is used to ward off the centralized fusion of power (the formation of a State apparatus), while fusion is in turn used to prevent the scission of the codes into a decoded flow of exchange (the formation of capitalism). Deleuze and Guattari dismiss the idea that primitive societies have no history, that they are dominated by archetypes and their repetition--an idea, they argue, that was conceived of, not by ethnologists, but by ideologists in the service of a Judeo-Christian consciousness they wished to credit with the "invention" of history.⁷⁵ For primitive societies are neither stable, static, unanimous, nor harmonious groups, but constitute dynamic and open physical systems that lie fully within history. Primitive societies operate essentially by codes and territorialities, "a code based on lineages and their varying situations and relations, and an itinerant territoriality based on local, overlapping divisions."⁷⁶ Codes and territories form a fabric of relative supple segmentarity, and it is precisely the distinction between the clan system of lineages (filiation) and the tribal system of territories (alliance) that prevents power from resonating in a single apparatus. Between these the extremes of fusion and scission, primitive assemblages maintain

⁷⁴Anti-Oedipus, p. 186.

⁷⁵See, for instance, Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).

themselves "in a state of functional disequilibrium, or an oscillating equilibrium, unstable and always compensated, comprising not only institutionalized conflicts but conflicts that generate changes, revolts, ruptures, and scissions."⁷⁷

This notion of primitive society as a system in oscillating disequilibrium is, for Deleuze and Guattari, a postulate of any social machine (and any system in general). "It is in order to function," they write, "that a social machine must not function well....The social machine's limit is not attrition, but rather its misfirings: it can operate only by its fits and starts, by grinding and breaking down, in spasms of minor explosions. The dysfunctions are an essential element of its very ability to function....The death of a social machine has never been heralded by a disharmony or a dysfunction: on the contrary, social machines make a habit of feeding on the contradictions they give rise to, on the crises they provoke, on the anxieties they engender, and on the infernal operations they regenerate. Capitalism has learned this, and has ceased doubting itself, while even socialists have abandoned belief in the possibility of capitalism's natural death by attrition. No one has ever died from contradictions. And the more it breaks down, the more it schizophrenizes, the better it works, the American way."⁷⁸ A social system, in other words, functions only by its dysfunctions (a fear that drives its motor).⁷⁹ We will

⁷⁶A Thousand Plateaus, p. 209.

⁷⁷Anti-Oedipus, pp. 150-151.

⁷⁸Anti-Oedipus, p. 151.

⁷⁹Deleuze rejects the distinction between infra- and superstructure, between economics and ideology. There is no reason to privilege (under the name of infrastructure or economics) that which regulates the production and circulation of goods, for there is no less an economy regulating law of kinship, the concretions of roles, persons, and goods on the surface of the socius, there is no less production and exchange of labor force, images, words, knowledge and power, travel, sex. "The whole problem is that the

see how this picture of social formations as unstable physical systems holds true for every assemblage.

In sum: (1) primitive societies are defined by their operations of filiation and alliance: (2) the primitive economy (alliance) is not exchangeist but based on a debtor-creditor relationship: (3) the codes and territories that are thereby established are not based on the circulation of goods (Mauss) but on the marking of bodies (Nietzsche); (4) primitive societies must be understood not as closed structural systems but as an open-ended and dysfunctional machines, with scission and fusion as its operative limits (which at once serve to ward off the formation of a capitalist economy and centralized apparatuses of power).

B. The State Apparatus of Capture (Interiority)

§ 6. The Origins and Concept of the State. The second type of assemblage or social formation Deleuze and Guattari examine is the State. Their analysis of the State-form rests on two fundamental thesis. The first concerns the origins of the State, and on this score their conclusions are controversial. They reject evolutionary or dialectical theories that would suggest that the State was formed in progressive stages. Such scenarios have taken on various forms: economic (gatherers → hunters → animal breeders → farmers → industrialists), ethnologic (nomads → semi-nomads →

whole is not given, that society is not a unified totality; rather it is displacements and metamorphoses of energy that never stop decomposing and recomposing sub-units and that pull these units along, now towards the organs' perverse schizo functioning, now towards the neurotic-paranoiac functioning of the great absent signifier." Lyotard, "Energumen Capitalism," pp. 18-19.

sedentaries), ecological (dispersed autarky of local groups → villages and small towns → cities → States), and so on.⁸⁰ Deleuze and Guattari give numerous reasons for rejecting the evolutionist framework, all of which boil down to the following hypothesis: there have been State always and everywhere. Marx defined the State in terms of "Asiatic production," but as Deleuze and Guattari constantly emphasize, archaeology has discovered that the State dates back to the most remote ages of humanity, that it has always existed, not only in Asia, but in Africa, America, Greece, Rome. The State appears from the beginning as a fully formed social assemblage, "a master stroke executed all at once."⁸¹ This not to say that there are not different forms of the State. But as we shall see below, these forms are determined, not in terms of a progressive development, but rather by the relations of coexistence that the State maintains with other formations, such as primitive societies, nomadism, or capitalism. Primitive societies, for instance, were always in contact with imperial States (the Jews in relation to Egypt, the Greeks in relation to Mycenaea, etc.): conversely, the State has always been in contact with an outside and is inconceivable apart from that relationship. In and of itself, the State does not mark an historical break; even Marx made no place for it in his famous five stages (primitive communism, ancient city-states, feudalism, capitalism, and socialism).⁸² On the contrary, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the State is a basic social

⁸⁰ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 430; see pp. 427-437 for Deleuze and Guattari's critique of evolutionism, as well as Anti-Oedipus, 217-222.

⁸¹ Anti-Oedipus, p. 217.

⁸² Anti-Oedipus, p. 219.

formation that exists on the horizon throughout history. "Spiritual or temporal, tyrannical or democratic, capitalist or socialist, there has never been but a single State." a complete and perfect "Urstaat," "the eternal model of everything the State wants to be and desires."⁸³

The second thesis follows from the first: the State, through all its forms, remains definable by a determinate and consistent concept of its own. What is this concept? At the most general level, Deleuze and Guattari define the State as a apparatus of capture, which operates through processes of overcoding, deterritorialization, stratification, unification, totalization, and integration. We have seen that, for Deleuze and Guattari, "power" never finds its source or origin in the State; on the contrary, the State is derived from differential relations of power that operate at numerous "micro-levels" of the socius (pedagogical, juridical, economic, familial, sexual), and which the State is able to integrate by its mechanisms of capture. Foucault expressed this by saying that "government" precedes the State, defining government as the power to affect under all its aspects (the government of children, souls, the sick, a family, etc.). The most general character of an institution, State or otherwise, consists in organizing these governmental relations, which are molecular or "micro-physical" relations, around a molar agency (such as the Sovereign or the Law, with regard to the State).⁸⁴ But if the State, as an abstract assemblage, is definable conceptually by its mechanisms of capture, the nature of these

⁸³ Anti-Oedipus, pp. 192, 217. "Urstaat" is a term that Deleuze and Guattari coin playing on both the German prefix and the city of Ur as Abraham's point of departure.

mechanisms necessarily changes depending on the relations the State maintains with other assemblages, allowing Deleuze and Guattari to distinguish between several actualizations of the State-form: the great archaic, imperial, and despotic States; the modern nation-State; and a variety of intermediary forms ("evolved empires, autonomous cities, feudal systems, monarchies").⁸⁵ We will therefore consider each of these in turn.

§ 7. First Form of the State: The Imperial State. The first type of State assemblage that Deleuze and Guattari examine is what they call the "barbarian despotic machine," which comes to be imposed upon the primitive territorial machines. Following the Marxist description, the codes of the territorial regime here find themselves overcoded or captured by a transcendent unity, to which the communal villages (now merely residues of the territorial organization) now become subservient. The despotic State has sometimes been defined as an act of territoriality that fixes a center in a palace-temple, around which the earth is ordered and "cosmicized." But Deleuze and Guattari show that this "pseudo-territory" of the despotic State is in fact the result of a massive detritorialization of the territorial machines, which are now no longer related directly to the body of the earth, but rather to the body of the despot. The extended filiations of the old communities are replaced by the direct filiation of the despot with his deity (a god

⁸⁴On these themes, see Foucault, p. 76. For Foucault's theses on "governmentality," see "The Subject and Power," in H. L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 208-226, esp. pp. 221-222.

⁸⁵A Thousand Plateaus, p. 459.

superior to all others); and the lateral alliances are replaced by a new alliance of the despot with the people.

In the archaic imperial State, this deterritorialization is one of transcendence: a transcendent order is projected from above onto the field of immanence formed by the territories, a plane of organization is imposed upon it from without, from "on high," following a vertical or celestial line that converges on the body of the despot and his god. What counts in the imperial apparatus, however, is not the person of the sovereign per se, nor even his function, which is frequently limited by severe prohibitions and restrictions. What has changed is the social machine itself; we are in a new agencement. To use Lewis Mumford's phrase, the imperial State appears as a vast megamachine, a functional pyramid that has the despot at its apex as an immobile motor; a vast hierarchical network of bureaucratic functionaries as its lateral surface and its transmission gear (a dominant "caste" that does not yet manifest itself as a class, since it is merged with the State apparatus); and the remains of the territorial communities and villagers at its base, serving as the working parts.⁸⁶ This change is reflected, for example, in the function of myth. Primitive myths describe the intensive conditions of the territorial machine, and the divergence of this intensive energy into an extensive system of extended filiations and lateral alliances. Imperial myths, on the contrary, such as the Babylonian Enuma Elish, narrate a disjunction between this intensive energy (the genesis of the world) and the

⁸⁶ Anti-Oedipus, p. 194. See Lewis Mumford, "The First Megamachine," in Diogenes 55 (July-Sept 1966), p. 3: "If a machine can be defined more or less in accord with the classic definition of Reuleaux, as a combination of resistant parts, each specialized in function, operating under human control to transmit motion and perform work, then the human machine was a real machine." Cited in A Thousand Plateaus, p. 457.

establishment of order by the despot's god (the beginning of sovereign power): they trace the avatars of sovereignty back through a succession of generations to the point where a supreme being put an end to the dramatic elaboration of the intensive chaos. This is why, in the despotic system, power is elaborated through the genealogy of dynasties and imperial families, which trace the direct filiation of the despot from his god, rather than through the complex interplay of kinship relations, which determines the fluid leadership of the chief and the warrior.

§ 8. The Apparatuses of Capture. Deleuze and Guattari devote an entire chapter (or plateau) of A Thousand Plateaus to an analysis of the mechanisms of capture in the imperial State. In the imperial State, the coded flows of the primitive regime are allowed to persist in a more or less modified form, but their surplus value is appropriated and requisitioned by the superior power of the transcendent unity in the form of a stockpiled agricultural surplus, and put into the service of other ends. Deleuze and Guattari identify three primary mechanisms of capture in the imperial State:

a. Money. One of the primary mechanisms of appropriation by the State is money (the issuing of currency), which was not introduced in order to serve the needs of commerce, but rather as a mechanism through which the State was able to regulate commerce and exchange. As Edouard Will has shown, what money makes possible is a direct and abstract comparison between goods and services, which the State can then

appropriate in the form of taxation (money = goods or services).⁸⁷ In primitive economies, exchange was carried out indirectly and subjectively: the debtor-creditor relation is necessarily unequal, and exchange (gift and counter-gift) is the means by which goods are indirectly compared and equalized. But the introduction of money as an abstract equivalent is enough to destroy the very basis of the codes of exchange and the finite blocks of debt. In the State formation, exchange remains what it is in principle, that is, unequal, but money allows the State to produce an equalization that directly results from this inequality. It is the State that introduces direct comparison, objective pricing, and monetary equalization, making it possible "to begin and end with money, therefore never to end at all."⁸⁸

b. Land. In a similar way, money also makes possible a direct comparison between territories. The territorial lands are allowed to persist as semi-autonomous units of production: they continue to produce, inscribe, and consume. But they are, as it were, bricked over by the State, and made into working parts of the State machine. The land is striated and plots are distributed to landowners, bureaucratic officials or servants whose ownership of the land is entirely dependent on their position in the State apparatus. In the imperial State, however, everything is public. There is no private property, since ownership is public and communal, and the despot is the sole and transcendent public-property owner: an individual is a landowner only as a member of the community, and

⁸⁷Edouard Will, "Réflexions et hypothèses sur les origines du monnayage," in Revue numismatique 17 (1955), pp. 3-24. Michel Foucault discusses Will's theses in "La Volonté de savoir," a course given at the Collège de France in 1971. For Deleuze and Guattari's discussions, see Anti-Oedipus, p. 197, and A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 442-443.

the eminent property of the despot is in turn derived from the supposed Unity of the communities. The despot maintains control over the territories through the extraction of ground rent, which allows a quantitative comparison to be drawn between qualitatively different lands. The worst land bears no rent, but thereby constitutes the lowest element in a cardinal series that allows the other soils to produce rent in a comparative way.

"Ground rent homogenizes, equalizes different conditions of productivity by linking the excess of the highest conditions of productivity over the lowest to a landowner."⁸⁹ The land is distributed according to this common quantitative criterion (the fertility of plots of equal surface area), which alone makes the land comparable. It marks a center of convergence located outside or above the territories, and is the condition under which the subdued territories become appropriable by the State apparatus, the act of deterritorialization that turns the earth into the object of a State ownership of property. The earth is in this way made the object of the State's higher unity.

c. Labor. Third, there is an appropriation of activity in the form of surplus labor, which goes into the construction of large-scale public works projects (urban, agricultural, hydraulic works). It has often been said that people in primitive societies do not, strictly speaking, "work," even if their activities are very constrained and regulated. The man of war, in his capacity as a warrior, does not work either (the "labors" of Hercules, for example, presuppose submission to a king); it was often said of blacks in America the "they don't work, they don't know how to work," though they were forced to work more

⁸⁸ Anti-Oedipus, p. 248-249.

⁸⁹ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 441.

than anyone else, in terms of abstract quantity: "it also seems true that the Indians had no understanding of, and were unsuited for, any organization of work, even slavery: the Americans apparently imported so many blacks because they could not use the Indians, who would rather die."⁹⁰ For there to be "work," argue Deleuze and Guattari, there must be a capture of activity by the State apparatus: it is only in the State that activity comes to be compared, linked, and subordinated to a common and homogenous quantity called "labor." Primitive groups, on the contrary, were under a regime of what Martial Gu eroult terms "free action," or activity in continuous variation that excluded stockpiling, stressed mobility or freeness of movement, and was measured in terms of the "convenience of transporting the object" (and thus entailed its own rigor and cruelty: get rid of whatever cannot be transported, the aged, the children....).⁹¹

In the context of the State apparatus, "labor" is invented as a quantitative measure capable of evaluating qualitatively different activities, making them susceptible to comparison and subordination, to multiplication and division. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that this development reached its apex in the nineteenth century, when the socioeconomic concept of labor-power was linked to a physico-scientific concept of mechanical work (weight-height, force-displacement): it was a question of defining the constant mean value of a force for lift and pull exerted in the most uniform way possible by a standard-man. "Impose the Work-model upon every activity, translate every act into

⁹⁰ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 491; cf. 401.

⁹¹ See Marshall Sahlins, "La premi re soci t  d'abondance," in Les temps modernes 268 (October 1968), pp. 654-673, as quoted in A Thousand Plateaus, p. 573, note 25. For the distinction between "work" and

possible or virtual work, discipline free action or else (which amounts to the same thing) relegate it to 'leisure,' which exists only by reference to work."⁹² But already in the imperial State, labor constituted stockpiled activity. From this point of view, "labor" and "surplus labor" cannot be said to be independent, as if there were necessary labor, and beyond that surplus labor. Labor and surplus labor are strictly the same thing, and all labor implies surplus labor: the term "labor" simply applies to the quantitative comparison of activities, and "surplus labor," to the monopolistic appropriation of labor by the State.⁹³

These three mechanisms can be said to constitute a three-headed apparatus of capture in the imperial State. Deleuze and Guattari derive these formulas from Marx, though they distribute things differently.⁹⁴ Each of mechanism of capture operates according to two operations, direct comparison (in the form of abstract quantities) and monopolistic appropriation (in the form of stock): commercial goods and services are stockpiled as money, and appropriated in the form of taxes; territory is stockpiled as striated land, and appropriated as rent; and activity is stockpiled in tools and public

"free action," see Martial Gu eroult, Dynamique et m etaphysique leibniziennes (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1934), pp. 55, 119ff., 222-224.

⁹² A Thousand Plateaus, p. 490. Cf. p. 573, note 24: "For example, Navier, and engineer and professor of mathematics, wrote in 1819: "We must establish a mechanical currency by which to estimate the quantities of work used to accomplish every kind of fabrication."

⁹³ Deleuze and Guattari suggest that, in the twentieth century, the capitalist organization operates less and less according to this physico-social conception of work, insofar as one can furnish a surplus labor without doing any work (by simply watching television, consuming time, using commodities, etc.). See A Thousand Plateaus, p. 492.

⁹⁴ For Marx's analysis of the three forms of rent, see Karl Marx, Capital, trans. Ernest Untermann (New York: International Publishers, 1967), Vol. 3, part 6, chapter 47; on the "trinity formula," of capital-profit, land-ground rent, and labor-wages, see chapter 48.

projects, and is appropriated as labor. Insofar as all of these stockpiled flows converge on the person of the despot, the organization of power in the State apparatus can be said to operate by means of resonance. Primitive societies certainly have circular segments of power, but these circles are not concentric and do not have the same center: there are a multiplicity of centers (each of which, for example, can be assigned a particular totem or animal spirit) which do not converge on the same point, and imply localized foci of control (the shaman, the chief, the warrior). In the State, there are just as many centers of power, but they now act as apparatuses of resonance: the circles become concentric, and the centers all resonate in a single point of accumulation (whose center, to borrow Anselm's phrase, is everywhere but whose circumference is nowhere).⁹⁵

§ 9. The Imperial Law: Infinite Debt. These imperial mechanisms of capture, in turn, imply a system of justice very different from that of the primitive system. Justice is no longer inscribed directly on the flesh, but is written on stones, parchments, and lists: its medium of currency is no longer pain, but money. As Leroi-Gourhan showed, if primitive societies are oral, it is not because they lack a graphic system, but because the graphic system in these societies is independent of the voice, and the signs it marks on the body enjoy an autonomous status. If barbarian civilizations are written, it is not because the voice has been lost, but because the graphic system aligns itself on the voice, and is

⁹⁵ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 211.

no longer independent of it (phonetism).⁹⁶ It is the despot, or rather the imperial formation, that turns graphism into a system of writing in the proper sense of the term. "Legislation, bureaucracy, accounting, the collection of taxes, the State monopoly, imperial justice, the functionaries' activity, historiography: everything is written in the despot's procession."⁹⁷ There is thus a difference in nature between the primitive and imperial regimes of justice: as Deleuze and Guattari put it, "a system of terror has replaced the system of cruelty."⁹⁸ If the body is liberated from the markings and pain of the primitive system, it is now subsumed under the higher superimposed unity of the imperial "Law," which is at the origin of new forms of suffering on the body. Punishment is no longer a festive occasion in which the eye extracts a surplus value of pain in order to mend a broken alliance: punishment becomes the vengeance of the new alliance that has transformed the debtor-creditor relationship. The cycle of credits remains, but in a new form created by the State, the form of money. The circulation of money not only makes one's debt, in the final analysis, an indebtedness to the State (in the form of taxes, rent, and labor), but is a means of rendering the debt infinite and in principle unpayable, inexhaustible. The primitive blocks of mobile and finite debt (alliance), with their interplay of action and reaction (affect), are now subordinated to the new alliance with the despot, who hovers over each subject, demanding of each of them an infinite and interminable service to the State.

⁹⁶ André Leroi-Gourhan, Le geste et la parole, vol. 1: Technique et langage (Paris: Albin Michel, 1964), pp. 270ff., 290ff.

⁹⁷ Anti-Oedipus, p. 202.

In the despotic formation, the Law does not start out being what it will become or seek to become later: a guarantee against despotism, an immanent principle that unites parts into a whole, that makes of this whole the object of a general knowledge and will, and whose sanctions are merely derivative of a judgment and an application directed against the rebellious parts. On the contrary, the imperial barbarian Law possesses two features that are in opposition to those just mentioned. On the one hand, the Law governs nontotalizable and nontotalized parts, organizing them as bricks, partitioning them off and forbidding their communication, acting in the name of a formidable but purely empty and formal Unity, which is distributive and not collective. On the other hand, the Law constitutes a system of justice based on magico-religious speech that reveals nothing and has no knowable object. "the verdict having no existence prior to the penalty, and the statement of the law having no existence prior to the verdict."⁹⁹ The voice no longer sings, but dictates and makes decrees; graphism no longer animates bodies, but is set to writing on tablets, stones, and books; and the eye no longer extracts pleasure from pain, but sets itself to reading and interpreting. When writing is subordinated to the voice, when graphism is no longer inscribed on the body but aligned on the voice, it makes a fictitious and transcendent voice appear from on high which, inversely, no longer expresses itself except through the writing signs that it emits (revelation). It is at this

⁹⁸ Anti-Oedipus, p. 211.

⁹⁹ Anti-Oedipus, p. 212.

point that questions of exegesis and interpretation begin to prevail over use and efficacy:

"The emperor, the god--What did he mean?"¹⁰⁰

It would be possible here to trace, as Deleuze had already done in his study on Nietzsche, the evolution of this infinite debt through Catholicism, and then the Reformation. Nietzsche argued that the despotic mechanism reached its highest refinement in Christianity, when it took over the Empire ("There is always a transcendent monotheism on the horizon of despotism").¹⁰¹ The genius of Christianity was to have both spiritualized and internalized the relation of infinite debt characteristic of the State: it created a transcendent object (God) that became more and more spiritualized, for a field of forces that became ever more internalized. In Christianity, debt is no longer an economic debt, but becomes a debt of existence. "the consciousness of having a debt toward the divinity."¹⁰² As Deleuze explains, "It is no longer a matter of a discharge from debt, but of a deepening of debt; it is no longer a matter of a suffering through which a debt is paid, but of suffering through which one is shackled to it, through which one becomes a debtor forever....Debt becomes the relation of debtor who will never finish paying to a creditor who will never finish using up the interest on the debt."¹⁰³ The pain of the debtor is no longer marked directly on the body, nor inscribed on the books of the despot: it is now internalized in the depths of the soul, interiorized as a feeling of guilt (sin).

¹⁰⁰ Anti-Oedipus, p. 206.

¹⁰¹ Anti-Oedipus, p. 197.

¹⁰² Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, II: cf. Anti-Oedipus, pp. 222, 268.

¹⁰³ Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 141-142.

Responsibility-guilt is made to replace responsibility-debt. The entire Christian constellation of concepts (immortality, judgment, atonement, justification, redemption) define so many cogs in the mechanism of this spiritualized machine, no longer a system of terror, but an internalized system of judgment. What Christianity calls "redemption" is not a discharge, but a deepening of debt. Not only must the debtor survive eternally for the debt to be rendered infinite, but the responsibility for the debt is in the end taken out of the hands of the debtor and transferred to the creditor, who himself assumes the bulk of the debt. Such is the "good news" Christianity brings concerning the infinite debt: "God himself sacrifices himself for the guilt of mankind, God himself makes payment to himself, God as the only being who can redeem man from what has become unredeemable for man himself."¹⁰⁴ In this sense, the Christian institution of power constituted a continuation but also a "spiritualization" of the despotic State-machine.

§ 10. Second Form of the State: The City. Though the State was not formed by an evolution but appeared in a single stroke, Deleuze and Guattari nonetheless point to an internal mutation of the State form, a mutation that, in the end, would come to account for the wholly contingent rise of the capitalism in the West. The principle of this mutation derives from the same principle of overcoding and capture that defines the archaic State, but functions as its supplementary double. For the archaic State cannot overcode and capture without at the same time freeing up a large quantity of decoded flows that escape

¹⁰⁴Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay 2, § 21, p. 92. Deleuze develops all these themes at length in the fourth chapter of Nietzsche and Philosophy, "From Ressentiment to the Bad Conscience."

from it. Deleuze and Guattari, as we have seen, define the apparatus of capture in the imperial State in terms of the appropriation of territory (as land), the appropriation of work (in the great public-works projects), and the appropriation of exchange (in taxation and the issuing of money). But each of these appropriations in turn give rise to new flows that are themselves decoded, and which are a necessary correlate of the apparatus of capture. The State cannot create large-scale public works, for instance, without a flow of independent labor escaping from its hierarchized bureaucracy of functionaries (notably in the mines and in metallurgy). It cannot create the monetary form of the tax without flows of money escaping, and nourishing or giving birth to other powers (notably in commerce and banking). It cannot create a system of public property without a flow of private appropriation growing up beside it, and then starting to slip through its fingers.¹⁰⁵

Finally, it is with the rise of private property that classes appear, since the dominant classes are no longer merged with the State apparatus, but become distinct determinations that make use of a now transformed apparatus. The essential point is that, in one way or another, and in a multitude of forms, the apparatus of overcoding inevitably gives rise to flows that are themselves decoded--flows of money, flows of labor, flows of property,

¹⁰⁵Ferenc Tökei has posed the problem of the origin of private property in the most precise manner: How can private property arise in a social system that seems to exclude it completely? For private property cannot arise on the side of the despot; nor on the side of the peasants, whose autonomy is tied to communal possession; nor on the side of the functionaries, whose status is based on the public community; nor on the side of the slaves, who belong to the community. The question then becomes: Are there people who are constituted in the overcoding empire, but constituted as necessarily excluded and decoded, as outsiders? Tökei finds an answer in the freed slaves: it is they who have no place; but it is also they who form the seeds of private property, who develop trade, and with metallurgy invent a kind of private slavery in which they will be the new master. Ferenc Tökei, "Les conditions de la propriété foncière dans la Chine de l'époque Tcheou," *Acta Antiqua*, vol. 6 (1958), pp. 245-300; quoted in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 449.

flows of population.¹⁰⁶ If the first great movement of deterritorialization appears in the overcoding performed by the despotic State, the second movement appears in the decoding of the flows that are set in motion by the despotic State's own apparatus of overcoding.

It is precisely in relation to this new situation that the second pole of the State arises, which will take on a diverse variety of forms--"evolved empires, autonomous cities, feudal systems, monarchies"--all of which will have as their aim the recoding, by means of regular or exceptional operations, of the products of these decoded flows. According to Marx, it would be the conjunction of two of these decoded flows--abstract capital and naked labor--that would mark the birth of capitalism. Yet the mere action of decoding is not enough to constitute the appearance of the capitalist formation. If the State appears fully formed on the horizon of history, capitalism appears only after a long succession of contingent events and encounters: the time of the despotic machine is synchronic, while the time of the capitalist machine is diachronic. It is this situation that allows Deleuze and Guattari to take up a question posed by historians such as Ferdinand Braudel and Etienne Balazs: Why was capitalism born in Europe rather than, say, in 13th-century China, or in Rome, or during the Middle Ages, when all the conditions for it seemed to be present but were not effectuated?¹⁰⁷ In the evolved empire of Rome, for example, landed flows were decoded through the privatization of property, commercial

¹⁰⁶ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 449; Anti-Oedipus, p. 223.

¹⁰⁷ Ferdinand Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800, trans. Miriam Kochan (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 308; Etienne Balazs, La bureaucratie céleste (Paris: Gallimard, 1968). Cf. Anti-Oedipus, pp. 197, 224.

flows through the development of commodity production. monetary flows through the formation of fortunes, and so on. "All the preconditions are present, everything is given, without producing a capitalism properly speaking, but rather a regime based on slavery."¹⁰⁸ Or again, the example of medieval feudalism: "there again, private property, commodity production, the monetary afflux, the extension of the market, the development of towns, and the appearance of manorial ground rent in money form, or of the contractual hiring of labor, do not by any means produce a capitalist economy, but rather a reinforcing of feudal offices and relations, at times a return to more primitive stages of feudalism, and occasionally even the reestablishment of a kind of slavery."¹⁰⁹ If, as Deleuze and Guattari like to recall, the only "universal history" is the history of contingencies, what were the specific contingencies that made capitalism appear in Europe and not elsewhere?

Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the answer can be found in the confrontation between the Orient and the West. We have seen that Deleuze and Guattari, following Childe, define the content of the imperial State apparatus as a stockpiled agricultural surplus (in the form of taxes, rent, and work), which maintained a specialized body of mercantile and metallurgical artisans. But this agricultural surplus must not only be stockpiled by the State, but must also be capable of being absorbed, consumed, and realized by it: there must be an enterprise of antiproduction at the heart of the State, capable of absorbing the surplus value of the codes. In the imperial apparatus, this

¹⁰⁸ Anti-Oedipus, p. 223.

¹⁰⁹ Anti-Oedipus, p. 223.

surplus was absorbed in the vast public works projects undertaken by the bureaucratic institution, in the maintenance of the war machine as appropriated by the State in a military institution, and also by this body of nonagricultural artisans, whose labor will reinforce the sedentarization of agriculture. "It was in Afro-Asia and the Orient that all of these conditions were fulfilled and that the State apparatus was invented: in the Middle East, Egypt, and Mesopotamia, but also in the valley of the Indus (and in the Far East). That was where the agricultural stock and its bureaucratic, military, but also metallurgical and commercial concomitants came into being."¹¹⁰

Yet this imperial solution was threatened by an impasse in the Orient: the State overcoding kept the metallurgists and merchants under powerful bureaucratic control, reducing them to functionaries and preventing them from gaining an autonomy (in China, the State closed the mines as soon as the reserves were judged sufficient, preventing the formation of a surplus); it maintained a monopolistic appropriation of foreign trade in the service of the ruling class, so that the peasants themselves benefited little from State innovations, and so on. Thus if archaeology discovers the State-form everywhere on the horizon of history, it is not under the same conditions. In the West, the Aegean civilizations of the Mediterranean basin (Minos and Mycenae) were mere caricatures of an empire in comparison with those of the Orient. With regard to this confrontation between the East and the West, the Egyptian's melancholy warning to the Greeks echoes throughout history: "You Greeks will never be anything but children!" This second pole of the State thus presupposes the great empires, and cannot be understood except in terms

¹¹⁰ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 450.

of the Urstaat that serves as their horizon: it tries to reconstitute the Urstaat as far as possible by attempting to recode flows that are becoming increasingly decoded (flows of labor, money, property): "putting despotism in the service of new class relations; integrating the relations of wealth and poverty, of commodity and labor; reconciling market money and money from revenues: everywhere stamping the mark of the Urstaat on the new state of things."¹¹¹ But the imperial State has become a latent model that can no longer be equaled, even if one cannot help but imitate it. This is why Deleuze and Guattari can insist on the purity of the concept of the State, despite the multiplicity of its forms. The State as a category, they write, "appears to be set back at a remove from what it transects and from what it resects, as though it were giving evidence of another dimension, a cerebral ideality that is added to, superimposed on the material evolution of societies, a regulating idea or principle of reflection (terror) that organizes the parts and the flows into a whole."¹¹²

The Aegean States of the West thus found themselves in a unique situation. They were both too far from the archaic Oriental empires and too poor to stockpile a surplus themselves, but not far away enough or impoverished enough to ignore the markets of the Orient: they could profit from the Oriental empires without following their model. Childe's archaeological analysis has shown that nowhere in the Aegean world were there accumulations of wealth or food comparable to those of the East. The Aegean peoples found themselves in a situation in which they could take advantage of the Oriental

¹¹¹ Anti-Oedipus, p. 218.

¹¹² Anti-Oedipus, p. 219.

agricultural stock without having to constitute one themselves. They plundered it when they could; and since the Oriental empires assigned their merchants a long-distance role, the Aegeans could procure a share of the Oriental stock in exchange for raw materials (notably wood and metals, often coming from as far away as Central and Western Europe). The Aegeans, in short, bathed in a new element, a particular mode of deterritorialization that proceeds by immanence rather than transcendence. They formed a kind of "international market" on the borders of the East, which was organized around a multiplicity of independent cities, each linked to the others, in which the metallurgical artisans and commercial merchants enjoyed a mobility a freedom that the empires denied them. Their existence did not depend directly upon a surplus accumulated by a local State apparatus, and many metallurgists and merchants consequently moved from the Orient to the Aegean world, where they found a freer status, a more diversified market, more varied and more stable conditions (even if the peasant suffered an exploitation in the West as bad or worse than that of the East). In short, "the same flows that were overcoded in the Orient tended to become decoded in Europe....It is as if the same problem had received two solutions, the solution of the Orient, and then that of the West, which is grafted onto the first and brings it out of the impasse, while continuing to presuppose it."¹¹³

How is this second, Western pole of the State distinguished from the Eastern (archaic, imperial, barbarian) model? Deleuze and Guattari here make a distinction "state revolution" and the "urban revolution," between the imperial system (temple-palace) and

¹¹³ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 451.

the urban system (the City). In both cases there is a centralized power, but this power does not take on the same figure. In the first, the city is an outgrowth of the palace or temple (the capital), whereas in the second the palace is a concretization of the city (the metropolis). Egypt is an example of the imperial solution; Sumer, of the city solution. Even more so, it was the Mediterranean world--the Pelagians, Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians--that created an urban fabric distinct from the imperial States of the East. If imperial States and urban Cities are both social formations that "deterritorialize" their surrounding rural territories, they accomplish this deterritorialization in two different ways.

The City is a phenomenon of transconsistency. It brings about an immanent deterritorialization that adapts the surrounding territories to a geometrical extension in which the city itself is merely a relay-point in a vast network of commercial and maritime circuits (with the maximum deterritorialization occurring when the city is separated off from the countryside, as in Athens, and later, Carthage and Venice). The city constitutes a central power, but at the same time functions as a distinctive point through which commerce enters and exits. The power of the city does not lie above but in the middle: it exists only as a function of circulation, and is a correlate of the road. "It imposes a frequency. It effects a polarization of matter, inert, living, or human; it causes the phylum, the flow, to pass through specific places, along horizontal lines."¹¹⁴ Whatever the flow involved, it must be deterritorialized to enter the network, to submit to the

¹¹⁴ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 432.

polarization, to follow the circuit of urban and road recoding.¹¹⁵ This was reflected in the internal civic space of the city. Whereas the imperial spatium was centered vertically on the royal palace or temple, which marked the locus of the transcendent sovereignty of the despot or his god, the political extensio of the Greek city, following Cleisthenes' reform, was modeled on a new type of geometric space (isonomia) which organized the polis horizontally around an immanent, common, and public center (the agora) in relation to which all the points occupied by the "citizens" appeared equal and symmetrical.¹¹⁶ The City invented the idea of the magistrature, which is very different from the imperial State's bureaucratic civil-service sector. This is why the structure of power in the Greek City had egalitarian pretensions, regardless of the form it took (tyrannical, democratic, oligarchic, or aristocratic).

The State, by contrast, is a phenomenon of intraconsistency that "overcodes" or captures the territories by relating them to a superior arithmetic unity (the despot), by subordinating them to a transcendent or mythic order imposed upon them from above. It selects and retains only certain elements from the territories as material (geographic, ethnic, linguistic, moral, economic, technological elements), and makes this set of points resonate together. It cuts off the relation of these elements with each other, and these relations now become exterior to the State, which it attempts to inhibit and control. It

¹¹⁵François Châtelet has questioned the traditional notion of the city-state, doubting that the Athenian city can be equated with any form of the State, but is part of a network of towns that does not form a part of a mosaic of States, as it does in China and India. See A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 565-66, n. 16.

¹¹⁶On the spatial organization of the Greek polis, see Jean-Pierre Vernant, Myth and Thought among the Greeks (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), Part 3, esp. chap. 8, "Space and Political Organization in Ancient Greece," pp. 212-234. On relations of rivalry, see Vernant, "City-State Warfare," in Myth and Society in Ancient Greece (New York: Zone Books, 1990), esp. pp. 29, 41-42.

does so by means of stratification, that is, by forming a vertical set that traverses the horizontal lines in depth. The State forms a purely internal circuit that depends primarily upon resonance rather than frequency, a zone whose center is not in the middle but on top: the only way the State can combine what it isolates is through subordination. This is why the central power of the State is hierarchical, and constitutes a functionary bureaucracy rather than a magistrature.

In summary fashion, the second pole of the State can also be distinguished from the first in several domains: 1. The public sphere no longer characterizes the objective nature of property (with the despot as the sole transcendent landowner). It instead becomes the shared means for a now private appropriation of property (for instance, through the institutions of the concilium and the fiscus in the Roman Empire).¹¹⁷ 2. The bond between persons is no longer strictly communal or based on one's public function (with the despot constituting the formal unity of the communities). Instead, the bond is transformed into an interpersonal relation of dependence, both between owners (contracts) and between the owned and the owners (conventions). Likewise, slavery no longer defines the public availability of the communal worker, but private property as applied to individual workers. 3. The law no longer designates the formal unity of noncommunicating parts. Instead, it becomes a subjective, conjunctive, and "topical" law. This is because the task of the State is no longer to overcode already coded flows, but to organize conjunctions (recodings) of decoded flows as such. Paul Veyne has shown how Roman law was a "law without concepts" that proceeded by topics, and

¹¹⁷ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 451. Cf. Paul Veyne, Le pain et le cirque (Paris: Seuil, 1976).

differs from the modern "axiomatic" conception of the law (the civil code).¹¹⁸ 4. The "machinic enslavement" of the imperial State is replaced by a "social subjection." "There is enslavement when human beings themselves are constituent pieces of a machine they compose among themselves and with other things (animals, tools), under the control and direction of a higher unity. But there is subjection when the higher unity constitutes the human subject linked to a now exterior object, which can be an animal, tool, or even a machine. The human being is no longer a component of the machine but a worker, a user. He or she is subjected to the machine and no longer enslaved by the machine."¹¹⁹

C. The Nomadic War Machine (Exteriority)

§ 11. Interiority and Exteriority. The third type of social formation in Deleuze and Guattari's typology is what they call "the war machine," which is analyzed in one of the most innovative and important chapters of A Thousand Plateaus, the "Treatise on Nomadology." The thesis it proposes is radical and somewhat startling: the war machine was an invention of the nomads and constitutes a separate social formation distinct from the State, even if it has historically tended to be appropriated by the State in the form of an army or a military institution. Why the introduction of this new type of social formation, which played no role in the typology presented in Anti-Oedipus? In fact, Anti-

¹¹⁸Paul Veyne, Le pain et le cirque (Paris: Seuil, 1976), chapter 3 and 4. The axiomatic conception of the law may be summarized by the claim of civil codes to form a complete and rational system; but also by the relative independence of the propositions, which always permit further axioms to be added.

¹¹⁹A Thousand Plateaus, p. 457.

Oedipus refers to the war machine, but only in passing, and only insofar as it was already appropriated by the State apparatus. The innovation of A Thousand Plateaus is the thesis that the war machine constitutes a separate social formation that cannot be reduced either to State armies or the ritualized warfare of primitive societies.¹²⁰ Indeed the precursors to this thesis are readily apparent in Deleuze's earlier works, notably in Difference and Repetition, where Deleuze had distinguished between two types of ontological distribution, that is, the manner in which Being is distributed among beings): a sedentary distribution and a nomadic distribution.¹²¹ The first type of distribution finds its primarily social actualization in the State, with its mechanisms of overcoding, capture, integration, striation, and hierarchization. But at the same time, we saw that primitive societies had certain mechanisms that tended to ward off the formation of a State apparatus, including the mechanism of war. If Deleuze and Guattari felt to need to add the war machine to the typology of social formations developed in Anti-Oedipus, however, it was out of a recognition that war is not simply an aspect of primitive societies that tends to prevent the centralization of power in a State apparatus. The thesis of A Thousand Plateaus is much stronger: the war machine is itself a mode of a fully developed social formation that constitutes the "outside" of the State, and that finds its concrete actualization in nomadism.

¹²⁰See, for instance, the reference to the religious-military organization of Moses in Anti-Oedipus (p. 193), as an instance of a State-form, which is taken up again in A Thousand Plateaus (p. 417), under the rubric of the war machine

¹²¹See, for instance, Difference and Repetition, pp. 36-37, 309, note 6..

The war machine is exterior to the State apparatus: the "Treatise on Nomadology" takes this axiom as its starting point. If Hobbes argued that the State is inherently conservative, that it is against war, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the opposite is also true, that war is against the State. But the problem Deleuze and Guattari face lies in conceptualizing the nature of this exteriority in positive terms, in creating a concept for the war machine. We have examined their thesis that the State form has always existed and is not the result of an evolutionary formation (the Urstaat). But it is the reverse hypothesis that comes to the fore here: "the State itself has always been in a relation with an outside, and is inconceivable apart from that relationship."¹²² The State is sovereignty, but sovereignty can only reign over what is capable of internalizing, of appropriating locally, of integrating from without. Not only is there no universal State, but the outside of States cannot be reduced to "foreign policy," that is, to sets of relations among States. If it is difficult to conceptualize the war machine, as a pure form of exteriority, however, it is because philosophy has frequently taken the concept of the State as a model for thought itself. Modern German philosophy, particularly in Kant and Hegel, invented the fiction of a State that is universal in principle, in relation to which the particularity of States becomes merely an accident of fact, marking their imperfection or perversity.¹²³ This modern State is defined in principle as "the rational and reasonable organization of a

¹²²A Thousand Plateaus, p. 360.

¹²³This is particularly true of a certain Hegelianism of the right that still dominates political philosophy, and weds the destiny of thought to the State (Alexandre Kojève and Eric Weil in France; Leo Strauss, Allan Bloom, Francis Fukuyama in America). On this score, see Jacques Derrida's incisive critique of Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992), in Spectres de Marx (Paris: Galilée, 1993), chapter 2, "Conjurer--le marxisme," esp. pp. 98-100.

community," a community of free-thinking beings submitted to the universality of a principle (the Law or Communication). The State and reason were in this way made to enter into a curious exchange: realized reason was identified with the de jure State, and the State was identified as the becoming of reason. The State in this way became the sole principle separating rebel subjects (which are consigned to the irrational state of nature) from consenting subjects (who rally to the form of the State because of their own "reasonable" nature).¹²⁴ Hence the prevalence, in modern political thought, of themes like that of a republic of free spirits, the contract, the tribunal of reason, judgment, recognition, method, question and response, inquiries into the understanding, a pure "right" of thought--categories derived from the State and its legislative and juridical organization. What is crushed and denounced as a nuisance in this image of thought is everything that escapes the de jure State as a form of interiority.¹²⁵

This modern elevation of the State in philosophy finds a certain antecedent in mythology. Georges Dumézil, in his definitive works, identified three functions of power in Indo-European mythology: the king, the priest, and the warrior. Whereas the first two of these functions, the magician/king (despot) and the jurist/priest (legislator), constitute the two poles of the State, the warrior represents a function that irreducible to the State

¹²⁴See, for example, the following lines from the first preface to the Critique of Pure Reason, which marks the "geo-philosophy" of Kant's critical project (A viii-ix): "The battle-field of these endless controversies is called metaphysics....Her government, under the administration of the dogmatists, was at first despotic. But inasmuch as the legislation still bore traces of the ancient barbarism, her empire gradually through intestine wars gave way to complete anarchy, and skeptics, a species of nomads, despising all forms of settled life, broke up from time to time all civil society. Happily they were few in number, they were unable to prevent its being established ever anew, although on no uniform and consistent plan."

¹²⁵On the relation between the State and the image of thought, see A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 374-380.

apparatus. Dumézil shows that, from the standpoint of the State, the man of war almost always appears in a negative form, as eccentric, stupid, deformed, illegitimate, mad, usurping, sinful: his actions are seen to be directed against the king, against the legislator, and against the laws of war originating in the State.¹²⁶ When the State appropriates the war machine, it does so by subordinating it to one of the first two functions: but the war machine itself is irreducible to the State apparatus, it lies outside its sovereignty and is prior to its law.¹²⁷ Deleuze and Guattari suggest that modern historians, whether "bourgeois" (Grousset) or Soviet (Vladimirtsov), have tended to follow this negative tradition: men of war like Genghis Khan and Atilla, they explain, didn't "understand" the phenomenon of the city, they were unable to reconstitute a State after their conquests: the nomads were a pitiful segment of society that understood neither agriculture or technology.¹²⁸ But the problem with all such assessments, whether philosophical, mythological, or historical, is that they are made from the point of view of the State. That the war machine is exterior to the State apparatus: that the State has no war machine of its own; that it can only appropriate one in the form of a military institution (hence the distrust States have toward their military)--all this, Deleuze and

¹²⁶See Georges Dumézil, The Destiny of the Warrior, trans. Alf Hiltebeitel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

¹²⁷A Thousand Plateaus, p. 352: "Either the State has at his disposal a violence that is not channeled through war--either it uses police officers and jailers in place of warriors, has no arms and no need of them, operates by immediate, magical capture, 'seizes' and 'binds,' preventing all combat--or the state acquires an army, but in a way that presupposes a juridical organization of war, and the organization of a military function."

¹²⁸A Thousand Plateaus, p. 354; cf. 394. Boris Iakovlevich Vladimirtsov, Le régime social des Mongols, trans. Michael Carsow (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1948); René Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes, trans. Naomi Walford (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970). Deleuze and Guattari nonetheless

Guattari suggest, is everywhere apparent, but difficult to conceptualize from a point of view other than that of the State itself.

This is why they argue that it is not enough to say that war is external to the State apparatus. "It is necessary to reach the point of conceiving the war machine itself as a pure form of exteriority, whereas the State apparatus constitutes the form of interiority we habitually take as a model, or according to which we are in the habit of thinking."¹²⁹

Whenever the irruption of war power is confused with the domination of the State, the war machine can only be understood through the negative categories, since nothing is left that remains outside the State. But returned to its milieu of exteriority, the war machine is seen to be of another species, of another nature, of another origin than the State. This is why the term "war machine" proposed by Deleuze and Guattari is somewhat misleading, for the importance of the concept lies less in its relation to war than its relation to an "outside," even if war is the concrete form this social mode often takes, for reasons we shall see below. The war machine is not merely external to the State; it is the Outside of the State apparatus, a pure form of exteriority, the mode of a social state that wards off and prevents the State. If philosophy has frequently followed an image of thought based on a model of interiority (the State or Consciousness), the war machine is derived from an image (or non-image) of thought based in the exteriority of forces and their relations.

rely heavily on Grousset's work, particularly on his comparison of Tamerlane and Ghenghis Khan (A Thousand Plateaus, 563, n. 105).

¹²⁹ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 354.

§ 12. Definition of the War Machine. Given the exteriority of the war machine in relation to the State apparatus, Deleuze and Guattari posit the second of their axioms: "the war machine was the invention of the nomads."¹³⁰ This thesis is posited in the historical interest of showing that the war machine as such was invented, though again the importance of the concept, for Deleuze and Guattari, lies less in its historical dimension than in the manner in which the war machine constitutes a dimension of "becoming" in all social formations, each of which contains potential war machines that manifest themselves in various ways. The "Treatise on Nomadology" defines the concept of the war machine in terms of numerous component elements: a spatio-geographic element (smooth versus striated space), an arithmetic or algebraic element (number versus capture), an epistemological element (a hydraulic versus a hylomorphic model), a technological element (weapons versus tools), and so on. We will concentrate on the first two of these elements, since they are, for our purposes, the most important and determining aspects of the exterior nature of the war machine in relation to the State.

a. First of all, then, the war machine can be distinguished from the State-form by the manner in which it occupies space-time. One of the fundamental tasks of the State is to striate the space over which it reigns, whereas the war machine can be defined by the way in which it creates and occupies a smooth space. Deleuze and Guattari devote a separate chapter of A Thousand Plateaus, entitled "The Smooth and the Striated," to an analysis of the role these two concepts play in various modern disciplines (technology,

¹³⁰ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 380.

music, mathematics, physics, art).¹³¹ In striated or sedentary space, one closes off a surface and allocates it according to determinate intervals and assigned breaks. The striated space of the State is marked by walls, partitions, enclosures, roads between enclosures, and so forth, which constitute so many processes of capture by which the State controls numerous type of flows (populations, commodities or commerce, money or capital). Paul Virilio has argued that the primary problem of the State--for its "police"--is the management of the public ways, the control of speed, the regulation of circulation: "the gates of the city, its levies and duties, are barriers, filters against the fluidity of the masses, against the penetration of power by migratory packs," people, animals, and goods.¹³² Similarly, if Deleuze and Guattari argue that Karl Wittfogel's general thesis on the importance of large-scale waterworks for an empire remains valid, it is because the State needs to subordinate hydraulic force to conduits, pipes, embankments, which prevent turbulence, and which constrain movement to go from one point to another, subordinating the turbulence of fluids to solid grids.¹³³

In smooth space, on the contrary, one distributes oneself in an open space, according to frequencies and in the course of one's crossings. The nomad occupies a smooth space (desert, steppe, ice) in which people and animals are distributed in an open space that is indefinite and noncommunicating, as opposed to sedentary space, which

¹³¹ A Thousand Plateaus, plateau 14, "1440: The Smooth and the Striated," pp. 474-500.

¹³² Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics, trans. Mark Polizzotti (New York: Semiotext(e), 1986), pp. 12-13. Cf. A Thousand Plateaus, p. 386.

¹³³ Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1957). See A Thousand Plateaus, p. 363.

parcels out a closed space, assigning each person a share and regulating the communication between these shares. Deleuze notes that the Greek term nomos, before it came to designate the law, originally designated a mode of distribution: "Homeric society knew neither enclosures nor the propriety of pastures: it was not a matter of distributing the earth to the animals, but on the contrary of distributing the animals themselves, spreading them out here and there in an unlimited space, a forest or a side of a mountain."¹³⁴ The word nemo ("to take to pasture") referred, not to a parceling out of land, but to a scattering of animals. It was only when the agrarian question came to the foreground, in the time of Solon, that nomos came to designate the principle at the basis of the laws and rights (thesmoi and dike), and finally came to be identified with the law themselves. But prior to that, the Greeks saw an alternative between the city or polis, which was ruled by laws, and the outskirts as the place of the nomos (the backcountry, the mountainside, the vague expanse around a city).¹³⁵ To fill up a space, to distribute things in a non-delimited and unpartitioned space, is very different operation from parceling out space itself.

In striated space, lines and trajectories tend to be subordinated to points: one goes from one point to another, and the striations exist to regulate movement from point to point. In smooth space, it is just the opposite: points are subordinated to the line, to the trajectory or journey. The nomad is not ignorant of points (water points, dwelling points,

¹³⁴Difference and Repetition, p. 309, note 6.

¹³⁵Deleuze draws on Emmanuel Laroche, Histoire de la racine "nem" en grec ancien (Paris: Klincksieck, 1949). See A Thousand Plateaus, p. 557, note 51.

assembly points), but these points are subordinated to the paths they determine on this open and smooth space. The water point is reached only to be left behind: dwellings (tent, igloo, boat) are constructed in terms of the journey that is forever mobilizing them, and are tied not to a territory but to an itinerary.¹³⁶ Every point is a relay and exists only as a relay. The nomad inhabits an open space through vectors of deterritorialization: the earth ceases to be a land, and becomes simply the support for the movements of the nomads and their trajectories. These directional vectors are determined less by visual coordinates than by sonorous or tactile "traits." "There is no line separating earth and sky," write Deleuze and Guattari, describing ice and sand deserts, "there is no intermediate distance, no perspective or contour: visibility is limited; and yet there is an extraordinarily fine topology that relies not on points or objects but rather on hacceties, on sets of relations."¹³⁷ The desert not only has oases (which function as fixed points), but shifting undulations of sand or snow, winds, the song of the sand or the creaking of ice, temporary vegetation that shifts location depending on rains--local traits that determine the direction of the nomadic vectors, and alters their cartography. (In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish the nomad from the migrant, who moves principally from one point to another, even if the second point remains uncertain or not well localized.)

Consequently, the notion of the "line" itself takes on two different natures in striated and smooth space. The line in striated space is dimensional or metric, marking

¹³⁶A Thousand Plateaus, p. 557, note 49.

¹³⁷A Thousand Plateaus, p. 382.

out volumes and forms, grids and bearings. whereas the line in smooth space is purely directional, marking a pure vector that constructs space by local operations and changes in direction. Put differently, one can say that striated space is defined by movement, whereas smooth space is defined by speed. "Movement is extensive; speed is intensive. Movement designates the relative character of a body considered as 'one.' and which goes from point to point: speed, on the contrary, constitutes the absolute character of a body whose irreducible parts (atoms) occupy or fill a smooth space in the manner of a vortex, with the possibility of springing up at any point."¹³⁸ Deleuze and Guattari argue that it is therefore false to define the nomad by movement: Toynbee was correct to say that nomads are those who do not move, who cling to a smooth space upon which they remain immobile "with big strides."¹³⁹ The nomad is the deterritorialized being par excellence: whereas the migrant reterritorializes afterward (leaving behind a hostile or amorphous milieu), and the sedentary reterritorializes on something else (a property regime or State apparatus), the nomad reterritorializes on deterritorialization itself. It is the deterritorialized earth that provides the nomad with a territory, but in such a way that the earth ceases to be the earth and becomes simply the soil (sol) or support; that is, it is deterritorialized, not globally, but at specific locations, where the forest recedes, where the desert and the steppe advance. It is these spaces that the nomad inhabits and occupies

¹³⁸ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 381.

¹³⁹ A. Toynbee, A Study of History (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 132 ff. See Dialogues, pp. 37-38.

by a series of local operations of speed, whose orientation and direction vary endlessly (vectors of deterritorialization).

This distinction is particularly evident in the sea. If the sea is the smooth space par excellence, it was also the first to encounter the demands of an increasingly strict striation in response to the problem of navigation in open water. Maritime space came to be striated by a number of astronomical and geographical developments: bearings, obtained by a set of calculations based on the exact observation of the stars (the pole star) and the sun; and the map, which intertwines meridians and parallels, longitudes and latitudes, plotting regions known and unknown onto a grid (hence the importance of the invention of the compass; and the present role of satellites as artificially fixed points of reference for striating the oceans). One of the reasons for the hegemony of the West was the ability of its State apparatuses to striate the sea and annex the Atlantic, by making the sea dependent on the land, with its fixed routes and constant directions. But the sea maintains complex relations with these forces of striation. Deleuze and Guattari quote a number of studies which show that long before the determination of longitude lines, there existed a complex and empirical nomadic system of navigation based on the wind and noise, the colors and sounds of the seas, and so on.¹⁴⁰ Even more strikingly, in the aftermath of striation, the annexation of the sea by the State itself produced an unexpected result: the sea was in a sense reconstituted as a kind of smooth space, which was

¹⁴⁰A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 479, 572, notes 9 and 10. See, in particular, two articles contained in Les aspects internationaux de la découverte océanique aux XVe et XVIe siècles, ed. M. Mollat and P. Adam (Paris: SEVPEN, 1960): Paul Adam, "Navigation primitive et navigation astronomique," pp. 91-112; and Guy Beaujouan, "Science livresque et nautique au XVe siècle," pp. 61-90.

occupied first by what Virilio calls the "fleet in being," and later by the perpetual movement of the strategic submarine, whose task was to occupy an open space with a vortical movement capable of rising up at any point to strike any other point on the planet. The dimensional gridding of the sea here becomes the condition for a new type of directional vector, whose purpose is to control striated space even more completely, and which would be extended into the air (the strategic bomber) and even the stratosphere as types of smooth spaces.¹⁴¹

From the point of view of spatial categories (point, line, surface), the smooth and the striated can be distinguished in three ways: there is an inverse relation between the point and the line (in striated space, the line is always between two points, whereas in smooth space, the point is between two lines); a difference in nature of the line itself (in striated space, the line is dimensional and metric, whereas in smooth space, the line is directional and vectorial); and a different relation to the surface (in striated space, the surface is closed off and allocated, whereas in smooth space, things are distributed in an open space).

b. The second primary aspect of the war machine, after its spatio-geographic aspect, is its arithmetic status (which is in fact a correlate of the directional rather than dimensional status of its line). The idea of a numerical organization of people came from

¹⁴¹ A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 363, 386-387, 480. On the "fleet in being," see Paul Virilio, L'insecurité du territoire, chapter 1; and Speed and Politics, pp. 134-135: "If, as Lenin claimed, 'strategy means choosing which points we apply force to,' we must admit that these 'points,' today, are no longer geostrategic strongpoints, since from any given spot we can now reach any other, no matter where it might be....Geographic localization seems to have definitely lost its strategic value and, inversely, this same value is attributed to a delocalization of the vector, of a vector in permanent movement." Similarly, the tank, a "land ship," reconstituted a kind of maritime or smooth space on land, and "superimposed naval tactics of land warfare" (A Thousand Plateaus, p. 560, note 76).

the nomads. Moses, on the advice of his nomadic father-in-law, Jethro the Kenite, applied it to the Jewish people during the Exodus in order to constitute a war machine to conquer the promised land: hence the importance of the biblical Book of Numbers. When the State appropriates the war machine, it necessarily appropriates this rather peculiar principle of numerical organization, dividing its army into decimal groupings of tens, hundreds, thousands (units, companies, divisions...). The merit of Deleuze and Guattari's work is to have isolated, in a short but essential text, the nature of this numerical principle. For there is an understandable tendency to criticize numerical organization, denouncing it as a military or even concentration camp principle in which people are treated as mere "numbers." But such a critique misses the point. A numerical organization of people is not necessarily more cruel than the lineal organizations of primitive societies, or State organizations ("treating people like numbers is not necessarily worse than treating people like trees to prune or geometrical figures to shape and model").¹⁴² What is in question here is the specificity of numerical organization: Why is it connected to the nomadic mode of existence and the war machine function? And how is it distinct from both lineal codes and State overcoding?

If the specificity of numerical organization is difficult to isolate, it is because arithmetic (the number) has always played a decisive role in the State apparatus. If the State is defined by its processes of capture and overcoding, this overcoding proceeds differently in the archaic imperial State and the modern State. The archaic State follows an astronomical model, enveloping a spatium with a summit, a differentiated space with

¹⁴² A Thousand Plateaus, p. 390.

depths and levels, whereas the modern State (starting with the Greek city-state) follows a geometrical model, developing a homologous extensio with an immanent center, divisible homologous parts, and symmetrical and reversible relations. If number played an important role in imperial bureaucracies (census, taxation, election), it takes on even greater importance in the calculation techniques of modern societies, which applies the arithmetic element to primary matters (raw materials), to the secondary matter of produced commodities, and perhaps most importantly, to the ultimate matter of the human population (the social calculus at the basis of political economy, demography, and the organization of work, which are treated as statistical elements). "Thus number has always served to gain mastery over matter, to control its variations and movements, in other words, to submit them to the spatiotemporal framework of the State--whether the imperial spatium or the modern extensio."¹⁴³ Both models, in other words, imply the subordination of number to space and to metric magnitudes: number becomes a means of counting or measuring the striations of space effected by the State apparatus.

Deleuze and Guattari's thesis is that, in the nomadic system, the numerical principle takes on an autonomy that the State apparatus could only seek to control and put to its own use. The war machine does not utilize number as a means of measuring a divided up space; instead, number takes on an independence in relation to space and becomes, as it were, an autonomous subject: it is number itself that becomes the mobile occupant of a smooth space, which is occupied by the number without being counted or measured. "The more independent space is from metrics, the more independent the

¹⁴³ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 389.

number is from space."¹⁴⁴ If the war machine necessarily takes on an autonomous arithmetic organization, it is because it is no longer subordinated to the metric determinations and geometrical dimensions of situated space, but is distributed and displaced over a smooth space that it occupies without dividing. It is precisely the autonomy of this numerical principle in relation to space that gives the war machine its incredible mobility, an arithmetized social body gliding across smooth space, swooping down upon the State like a flash from without: "They come like fate, without reason, consideration, or pretext; they appear as lightning appears, too terrible, too sudden, too convincing, too 'different' even to be hated...." "In some way that is incomprehensible they have pushed right into the capital; at any rate, here they are: it seems that every morning there are more of them...."¹⁴⁵ In the war machine, number is no longer dimensional or metric, but is directional, and maintains a dynamic relationship with purely geographical directions. In Spinozistic terms, number becomes a "numbering number" rather than a "numbered number": it is no longer numbered or counted, but becomes a pure figure or digit [*chiffre*].

The formation of power in the war machine is derived from this numerical composition, and is therefore distinguishable from both the lineal aristocracies of primitive societies and the functionaries of the State. It is formed through a series of complex operations. First, the lineages, as the starting aggregates or sets, are arithmetized

¹⁴⁴ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 389.

¹⁴⁵ The first quotation is from Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Essay II, § 17, p. 86. The second is from Kafka, "An Old Manuscript," The Complete Stories, ed. N. Glazer (New York: Schocken, 1983), p. 416.

and organized numerically; "a numerical composition is superimposed upon the lineages in order to bring the new principle into predominance."¹⁴⁶ Second, once the lineages have been arithmetized, subsets of men from each lineage are extracted from the lineages in order to form a special numerical body that constitutes the war machine itself (the constitution of groups tens, hundreds, thousands). This second operation is what gives an autonomy to the number: it is not enough to organize the social body numerically; number itself must be made to form a special body that is proper to it. One can see these operations at work in Moses' composition of a desert war machine: he first takes a census of the twelve tribes and organizes them numerically; then he makes a law decreeing that the firstborn of each tribe at that time belong by right to Yahweh, who form a special body that will ultimately be charged with making war.

But there is a third operation that constitutes the originality of the war machine, which is the formation of another elite set that is internal to the numerical composition, and is instituted as the element determinant of power in the war machine. Moses, for instance, transfers the firstborn to a special tribe, the Levites, who guard the ark of the covenant, were awarded certain privileges, and whose dominance put them in constant tension with the other tribes throughout Israelite history.¹⁴⁷ In other cases (the Egyptian Mameluks, the Saxons, the Ottoman Janissaries), this elite institution was made up of, not

¹⁴⁶A Thousand Plateaus, p. 391.

¹⁴⁷The three operations are apparent in a less well known but equally relevant example, the organization of the steppe by Genghis Khan: first, he arithmetized the lineages; then, he placed the fighters of each lineage under a number and a chief ("groups of ten with decurions, groups of one hundred with centurions, groups of one thousand with chiliarchs"); finally, he extracted from each lineage a number of men who constituted his personal guard, and formed a dynamic group of staff, commissars, messengers, and diplomats ("antrusions"). On these points, see Vladimirtscov, Le régime social des Mongols.

members of a privileged internal lineage, but of external slaves, infidels, foreigners, or captives, who were forced to become "commissars," emissaries, spies, strategists, logicians, and even smiths. Special schools or institutions were created to convert these infidels into believers, or captured slaves into soldiers. Deleuze and Guattari insist on the fact that the formation of such elite bodies, with their strength of "secret solidarity" and "honor," was the creation of the war machine, and defines its concept. For when the State appropriates the war machine, it will adapt this body to its own ends, transforming it into a bureaucratic staff (the military man), a technocratic staff (the military analyst or advisor), an esprit de corps of commissioned officers, and so on. But the fact remains that such collective bodies find their distant origin in the war machine, and are fundamentally different from the hierarchical organisms of State functionaries. They can not only reconstitute equivalents in sometimes unforeseen forms (lobbies, secret societies, guilds, journeyman's associations, etc.): more importantly, they constitute a type of collective body that is irreducible to the State-form, so that, even when appropriated by the State, they remain "movable" organizations that testify to the autonomy of the numerical principle, and are equally capable of entering into other alliances and turning against the State.

§ 13. The Question of War: The War Machine and the State. These considerations bring us to the complex question of the relation between the war machine and the State apparatus, and more specifically, the relation between the war machine and war. Is war the "object" of the war machine? Deleuze and Guattari give two responses to

this question. First response: No. If the war machine is the invention of the nomad, it is because the war machine is the constitutive element of smooth space, the occupation of this space (nomadic rather than sedentary distribution), displacement within this space (directional vectors rather than a dimensional metric), and the corresponding composition of people (numerical rather than lineal or overcoded): this nomos (and not war) is the only positive object of the war machine. Its aim is to make the desert, the steppe, grow, and not to depopulate it. Second response: yes. For if war necessarily results, it is because the war machine collides with States and cities, as forces (of striation) that oppose its positive object. It is only at this point that the war machine becomes war, takes as its enemy the State and the city, and adopts as its objective their annihilation. War is therefore not the primary or positive object of the war machine, but a second-order, supplementary, synthetic, and negative objective. Or rather, the war machine is as it were the inevitable outgrowth of nomadic organization. The campaigns of Atilla, Genghis Khan, and Moses all illustrate this progressive progression from the positive object to the negative object, which is frequently grasped in a kind of progressive revelation marked by a certain fear and dread, by a hesitation that often proves fatal. Such is the adventure of the Israelite Exodus presented in the Pentateuch: the Israelites leave the Egyptian State behind and launch into the desert of Sinai, where Moses begins by forming a war machine that does not have war for its object: he then realizes, in stages, that war is the necessary supplement of that machine, because it encounters cities and States, must send ahead spies, and finally must take things to extremes (war of annihilation): Moses and the Jewish people shrink before the revelation of this supplement, fearing that they are not

strong enough; so Yahweh destroys this reticent generation (the forty years wandering), and assigns the Joshua the task of waging war.

The question of war, then, has less to do with the war machine per se than with the relations between the war machine and the State apparatus. For just as war is not the object of the war machine, neither is war the positive object of States, quite the contrary: most archaic States do not seem to have had a war machine, their domination being based on other agencies (police, prisons). It is likely that one of the reasons for their mysterious annihilation was the sudden intervention of an extrinsic war machine that counterattacked and destroyed them. What is at issue here is precisely the coexistence of these two social formations, which raises specific problems in both directions. "One of the biggest questions from the point of view of universal history is: How will the State appropriate the war machine?"¹⁴⁸ For when the State appropriates the war machine, the latter changes its nature and function: the war machine again takes war as its object, but now as its primary and "analytic" object; war then becomes subordinated to the political aims of the State, and is directed not only against other States, but back against the nomads themselves. Conversely, the nomads faced the question: What to do with the lands that have been crossed and conquered? Return them to the desert, to the steppe, to open pastureland? Or let a State apparatus survive that is capable of exploiting them directly, but at the risk of letting the war machine be appropriated by that apparatus?¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸A Thousand Plateaus, p. 418.

¹⁴⁹The adventure of Genghis Khan, for Deleuze and Guattari, illustrates each of these problems: first, there was the composition of a war machine on the steppes; second, its contact with external States (the Chinese emperor), and subsequent war; then, there came the famous Pax Mongoliana, in which Genghis

And in fact, the defeat of the nomads was complete: history is one with the triumph of State. "If there is no history from the point of view of the nomads," writes Deleuze, "to the point where they are the 'noumena' or unknowables of history, it is because they are inseparable from an enterprise of abolition that made the nomadic empires dissipate themselves, at the same time that the war machine either destroyed itself, or else passed into the service of the State."¹⁵⁰ This is why history tends to dismiss the nomads, and is written from the point of view of the State, as a succession of States. Deleuze and Guattari note that, from this point of view, attempts have been made to apply either a military category to the war machine (a "military democracy"), or a sedentary category of nomadism ("feudalism").¹⁵¹ But both these interpretations appeal to territorial principles, and the importance of Deleuze and Guattari's hypotheses, on this score, has been to insist on the autonomy and specificity of the mobile numerical principle of the nomads, even if this principle necessarily and inevitably enters into mixtures with other social formations (military democracy and feudalism point to what survives of the numeric composition in sedentary State regimes).¹⁵²

Khan and his followers were able to sustain the war machine for a long time by partially integrating themselves into the conquered empires, while at the same time maintaining a smooth space on the steppes to which the imperial centers were subordinated: finally, there came Tamerlane, who turned the war machine back against the nomads, but in doing so erected a State apparatus that was heavy and unproductive, since it existed only as the empty form of appropriation of that machine. See René Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes, pp. 417-419; and A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 418-419.

¹⁵⁰Dialogues, p. 142.

¹⁵¹Vladimirtsov develops a feudal interpretation in Le régime social des Mongols, trans. Michel Carsow (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1948); whereas Mikhail Giraznov, leans toward a military democracy, in The Ancient Civilization of Southern Siberia, trans. James Hogarth (New York: Cowles, 1969).

¹⁵²A Thousand Plateaus, p. 394.

This is why, in historical terms, it is the appropriation of the war machine by the State that comes to the fore, a process that is extremely varied, and requires that one distinguish between several sorts of problems. The first concerns the possibility of appropriation. It is because war is not the object of the war machine that the war machine experiences the hesitation that proves fatal to it, and which allows the State to lay hold of war and turn the war machine against the nomads: but States themselves have felt an equal danger and risk that the appropriation represents for them: hence the suspicion the State constantly maintains toward its military, and the possibility that the war machine may turn against the State. The second problem concerns the concrete forms the appropriation takes, which oscillates between two poles: the "encastment" of a society of warriors, and an "appropriation" proper that constitutes a military institution in accordance with the rules corresponding to civil society as a whole. But there is a constant passage and transition from one formula to another: Mercenary or territorial? Conscripted army or professional army? A special body or national recruiting? A third problem concerns the means of appropriation, which must be examined from the point of view of the fundamental aspects of the State's mechanisms of capture (territoriality, taxation, and public works). The constitution of a military institution necessarily implies a territorialization of the war machine, that is, a granting of land to the military, which can take diverse forms: it requires a civil tax upon all or part of society for the maintenance of the army; and the army must be given a determinative role in the State's

public works programs, in order to pursue its own projects (fortresses, fortified cities: strategic communication, logistical structures, industrial infrastructure, etc.).¹⁵³

What are we to make of these somewhat radical thesis? Deleuze and Guattari inevitably compare their concept of the war machine with that of Karl Clausewitz. Clausewitz's famous formula, "war is the continuation of politics by other means" is derived from a complex theoretical and practical set of ideas which are closely related to each other: (1) there is a pure concept of war as an absolute, unconditioned war (to eliminate the enemy), an Idea that is never given in experience: (2) what is given in experience are real wars submitted to State aims, which condition the realization of the pure Idea in experience, and which are better or worse "conductors" in relation to absolute war: (3) real wars therefore oscillate between two poles: the war of annihilation, which tends to approach the unconditioned concept through an ascent to extremes (escalation toward total war), and the limited war, which effects a descent toward limiting conditions (de-escalation toward mere "armed observation"). Deleuze and Guattari accept Clausewitz's distinction between absolute war as a pure Idea and real wars, but argue that it must be reformulated according to different criteria. The pure Idea, they argue, is not that of the abstract elimination of the adversary, but that of a war machine that does not have war as its object, but maintains only a supplementary or synthetic relation with war. The nomadic war machine, with its own objects, space, and composition, is the content adequate to this pure Idea. But Deleuze and Guattari add, as an immediate consequence of this, that it is therefore the nomads who remain an abstraction: "a pure nomad does not

¹⁵³On these three problems, see *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 418-419.

exist."¹⁵⁴ This is not only because elements of nomadism always enter into de facto mixes with other elements (migration, itinerancy, the State, etc.), which act back upon the war machine from the start. For even in the purity of its concept, the nomad war machine necessarily effectuates its relation with war as a supplement, which is developed in opposition to the State form: but it cannot effectuate this supplementary object without the State, in turn, finding the means appropriate to the war machine, making war its direct object, and turning it back against the nomads. Thus the integration of the nomad into the State is a vector traversing nomadism from the start, from the very first act of war against the State. We once again are brought back to the typological aspect of Deleuze and Guattari's political theory: it is a matter of creating pure concepts of types of social formations (agencements) that necessarily enter into various synthetic relations of coexistence.

We are now in a position to recognize the importance of the concept of the war machine for Deleuze and Guattari, and the reasons it takes on such a large role in the second volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia. The two axioms that guide their analysis are, first, that the war machine is exterior to the State apparatus, and second, that the war machine was an invention of the nomads, even if from the start it displayed vectors that allowed it to enter into composition with the State. But what defines the assemblage of the war machine is not the nomad but a constellation of characteristics, such as the construction and occupation of smooth space, vectorial displacement, numerical constitution, and so on. It is this constellation of traits that defines the nomad,

¹⁵⁴ Anti-Oedipus, p. 148.

who brought about their concrete actualization, and not the reverse. The nomad does not hold the secret of the war machine. We will see below that worldwide ecumenical movements, local mechanisms such as gangs and bands, minority and popular movements, and scientific and artistic movements are equally capable of actualizing a potential war machine that remains external to the State apparatus.

D. The Civilized Capitalist Machine (Axiomatics)

§ 14. The Capitalist Formation: The Conjunction of Labor and Capital. The fourth type of social formation analyzed by Deleuze and Guattari is the capitalist formation, and their analyses of capitalism remain fully Marxist. "I believe that Félix Guattari and myself have remained Marxists," wrote Deleuze in 1990. "This is because we do not believe in a political philosophy that would not be centered on the analysis of capitalism and its developments."¹⁵⁵ It is true that, as Lyotard has noted, Capitalism and Schizophrenia contains a critique of Marx that is implicit rather than explicit, since a number of classical Marxist concepts (such the super- and infra-structure, the workers' struggle, the proletariat, and work-value theory) drop out of Deleuze and Guattari's analyses completely: they are neither analyzed nor criticized, but simply ignored.¹⁵⁶ Yet

¹⁵⁵Negotiations, p. 171. Cf. Jacques Derrida, Spectres de Marx: L'État de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle Internationale (Paris: Galilée, 1993), p. 101: "Marxism remains at once indispensable and structurally insufficient but provided that one transforms and adapts it to new conditions." See also the analyses of Alain Badiou, D'un désastre obscur: Droit, État, Politique (Paris: Éditions de l'Aube, 1991); and Antonio Negri and Félix Guattari, Communists Like Us (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991).

¹⁵⁶See Jean-François Lyotard's review of Anti-Oedipus in "Energumen Capitalism," Critique 306 (Nov 1972), which analyses the relations between Capitalism and Schizophrenia and Marxism.

what Deleuze and Guattari retain of Marx's analyses is the definition of capitalism that lies at the heart of Capital, and in this sense Capitalism and Schizophrenia can be said to present a Marxist theory of capitalism that has been transformed and adapted to new conditions.

Marx's definition is organized around the encounter of two elements of abstraction: the flow of subjective labor and the flow of objective capital. We have seen that the overcoding of the State apparatus does not operate without at the same time ceaselessly engendering decoded flows that surpass and escape it on all sides. This is why there is a certain amount of ambiguity in the second pole of the State, with its various forms: they necessarily function with decoded flows, but rather than letting them run together, they perform topical conjunctions that stand as so many knots or recodings. This decoding of flows draws capitalism in negative outline. But for capitalism to be realized there must be an entire integral of decoded flows, a generalized conjunction of flows that overflows the topical conjunctions and attains a level of decoding that the State apparatuses are no longer able to contain. On the one hand, the flow of labor must no longer be determined as slavery or serfdom, but must become naked and free labor, in the form of the worker having to sell his labor capacity; and on the other hand, wealth must no longer be determined as money dealing, merchant's or landed wealth, but must become pure homogenous and independent capital, which is capable of buying this labor. Capitalism appears only when these two purely quantitative flows of unqualified wealth and unqualified labor encounter each other and conjugate, providing a "universal subject"

(abstract and subjective labor) and an "object in general" (the materialized labor of the commodity) for each other.

Capitalism, in other words, marks a new threshold of deterritorialization. It was the attainment of this threshold that the preceding conjunctions of the State, which were still topical or qualitative, had always inhibited. This is particularly evident in the status of private property: private property no longer refers to the ownership of the land or soil (or people), nor even the means of production as such, but of convertible and abstract rights. And when capital becomes an active right in this way, the law ceases to be an overcoding of customs (the imperial State), or a set of topics (evolved States), and increasingly assumes the characteristics of an axiomatic (the civil "code").¹⁵⁷ The conjunction of these two flows--flows of producers or workers (labor) and flows of money (capital)--was not historically necessary: the two flows could have continued to exist side by side "virtually" without ever encountering each other. The fact of their conjunction is a historical contingency that brings into play various processes of decoding and deterritorialization that have very different origins, and which have been analyzed in detail by Etienne Balibar in Reading Capital. On the one hand, the formation of the free and deterritorialized worker (in the form of abstract labor) depended on a transformation of the agrarian structures that constituted the old social body: a deterritorialization of the soil through privatization, a decoding the in the instruments of production through appropriation, the loss of the means of consumption through the dissolution of the family; and the decoding of the worker in favor of work itself or the machine. On the other hand,

¹⁵⁷On the evolution of the law and private property, see A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 451, 453.

the formation of decoded money (in the form of independent capital) depended on a completely different series which passes through the merchant and the usurer, who existed in the pores of the previous formations: the deterritorialization of wealth through monetary abstraction, the decoding of the flows of production through merchant capital, the decoding of States through financial capital and public debts, the decoding of the means of production through the formation of industrial capital, and so on.¹⁵⁸ Thus an entire series of contingent factors led to the conjunction of these two series in order to assemble, piece by piece, the capitalist production machine.

For Deleuze and Guattari, what defines the conditions of fact for capitalism is the specific nature of the abstraction brought about by capital. For even before the development of the capitalist system, commodities and money had already effected a decoding of flows through abstraction, but this abstraction did not take on the same form. In the primitive economy, simple exchange implied that commercial products, as qualified pieces of labor, were nonetheless made to correspond to a particular quanta of abstract labor, if only implicitly. In the State formation, with the introduction of money as a "general equivalent," one enters the reign of abstract quantitas, which can be worth all sorts of quanta. In the exchange relation, money effects what Deleuze calls a "disjunctive synthesis," formally uniting "partial objects" (goods and services) that have been produced independently of it, effecting transverse relationships with otherwise disparate products. But this abstract quantity must still have a particular value, and

¹⁵⁸See Etienne Balibar, in Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Pantheon, 1970), p. 281.

appears only as a relation of magnitude between quanta: money maintains a simple relation of alliance with a noncapitalist mode of production. In Deleuze and Guattari's terminology, the capitalist machine will appear only when capital ceases to be a money of alliance and becomes a filiative capital, that is, when money begets money, or value a surplus value. As Marx writes, "Value...suddenly presents itself as an independent substance endowed with a motion of its own, in which money and commodities are mere forms which it assumes and casts off in turn. Nay more: instead of simply representing the relations of commodities, it enters now, so to say, into relations with itself. It differentiates itself as original value from itself as surplus-value: as the father differentiates himself qua the son, yet both are one and of one age: for only by the surplus value of £10 does the £100 originally advanced become capital."¹⁵⁹ It is only under these conditions that capital itself becomes the body of the socius, replacing the earth as the body of primitive societies, the despot as the body of the imperial State, or number as the body of the nomadic war machine.

As a concept, then, Deleuze and Guattari define capitalism as the conjunction of the two abstract flows of labor and capital. Given this conjunctive relation, Deleuze and Guattari sketch out four primary components of the capitalist formation: the differential relation between these two coefficients: the absence of any external limits for this relation, which defines the immanence of the capitalist field: the "axiomatic" that operates at the heart of capitalism so as to fill its internal limits, and which finds in the modern

¹⁵⁹Karl Marx, Capital, trans. Ernest Untermann (New York: International Publishers, 1967), Vol. 1, p. 154, as quoted in Anti-Oedipus, p. 227.

nation-State its model of realization; and the persistence of a "war machine" within the capitalist formation that constantly exceeds these internal limits.

§ 15. Definition of Capitalism I: The Two Forms of Money and the Differential Relation. In the capitalist formation, the two decoded flows of labor and capital are expressed by two forms of money, namely, payment and financing. The first is the exchange-money or "income" that is inscribed on the account of the wage earner, and is used for the direct purchase of products and services; the second is the credit-money that is inscribed on the balance sheet of the firm, and is based on the circulation of drafts rather than money. It is this second form of money, Deleuze and Guattari argue, that constitutes the true "economic force" of capitalism, "the immense deterritorialized flow that constitutes the full body of capital."¹⁶⁰ The first has its roots in a simple circulation in which money is used as a means of payment, with bills of exchange falling due on a fixed date, constituting a monetary form of finite debt. Finance-money, however, constitutes what Deleuze and Guattari call the capitalist form of infinite debt, a vast "dematerialization" or "demonitarization" of money. Rather than transferring a preexisting currency as a means of payment, finance capital is a flow that the banks create ex nihilo as a debt owing to themselves: it hollows out a negative money at one extreme (as a debt entered as a liability of the banks) while projecting a positive money at the other extreme (as a credit granted to the productive economy by the banks). "Today we can depict an enormous, so-called stateless, monetary mass that circulates through foreign

¹⁶⁰ Anti-Oedipus, p. 237.

exchange and across borders, eluding control by the States, forming a multinational ecumenical organization, constituting a de facto supranational power untouched by governmental decisions."¹⁶¹

Banks participate in both these flows, situated at the pivotal point between financing and payment. They function as exchangers or oscillators that convert the flows of financing into segments of payment. "If the flow of financing money, or credit money, involves the mass of economic transactions, what banks govern is the conversion of the credit money that has been created into segmentary payment-money that is appropriated, in other words, coinage or State money for the purchase of goods that are themselves segmented (the importance of the interest rate in this respect)."¹⁶² One of the functions of the State, as a regulator, is to ensure the convertibility between these two forms of money by guaranteeing credit, a uniform interest rate, the unity of capital markets, and so forth. But it would be absurd to postulate a world supergovernment making the final decisions regarding this monetary mass, for there is no power that regulates the flow itself, and neither the banks nor the State are even capable of predicting the growth in the money supply.

The magnitude of these two orders, however, cannot be measured in terms of the same analytical unit--there is no common measure between the value of the enterprises

¹⁶¹A Thousand Plateaus, p. 453. Bernard Schmitt, in Monnaie, salaires et profits (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966), has advanced a profound modern theory of money, describing the full body of capital as "a flow possessing the power of mutation" that does not enter into income and is not assigned to purchases, a pure availability, nonpossession and nonwealth (pp. 234-236). See Anti-Oedipus, p. 237; and Negotiations, p. 152.

¹⁶²A Thousand Plateaus, p. 226.

and the labor capacity of the wage earners--and it is precisely this incommensurability that is expressed in the capitalist field of immanence. In capitalism, the abstraction introduced by money "no longer appears in the simple quantity as a variable relation between independent terms: it has taken on itself the independence, the quality of the terms, and the quantity of the relations."¹⁶³ The immanent social field particular to capitalism is defined instead by the differential relation between these two decoded flows, which bestows on their quantitative abstraction a concrete value, its "tendency" toward concretization. In the differential relation dy/dx , dy derives from labor power and constitutes the fluctuation of variable capital, and dx derives from capital itself and constitutes the fluctuation of constant capital:

$$\frac{dy = \text{Labor Power (variable capital or payment-money)}}{dx = \text{Capital (constant capital or capital-money)}}$$

The formation of surplus value, or the filiative form of capital $x + dx$, results from this fluxion of conjunction of decoded flows. It is from the point of view of this differential relation that Deleuze and Guattari reinterpret Marx's famous problem concerning the tendency to a falling rate of profit (of surplus value in relation to total capital). For if surplus value cannot be determined mathematically, as capitalist economists constantly point out, it is precisely because the falling rate of profit has no end. Like a curve without a tangent, the quotient between these differentials is incalculable: the differences never cancel each other out in the relation. The "tendency" has no exterior limit it could reach

¹⁶³ Anti-Oedipus, p. 227.

or even approximate, and consequently its only limit is an internal limit.¹⁶⁴ If capital never encounters this external limit, if indeed it has no assignable external limit, it is because it approaches this absolute limit only in order to displace it, to surpass it--and then to reconstitute and rediscover it as an internal limit, which in turn will be surpassed again by means of a displacement. It is this question of limits that brings us to the second component of the capitalist formation.

§ 16. Definition of Capitalism II: Its Relative and Absolute Limits. The question of the external limits of the capitalist formation raises a number of complex conceptual issues regarding Deleuze and Guattari's critique of evolutionary and dialectical interpretations of history. The problem concerns the nature of the topological relations of coexistence and perpetual interaction that exist between the variable social formations (primitive, imperial, urban, nomadic, capitalist), and the means by which they each cross (or fail to cross) what Deleuze and Guattari call a threshold of consistency.

Primitive societies, as we have seen, have mechanisms that ward off the formation of a central power or State, and yet to ward off is also to anticipate this something that is being repelled. Primitive societies, in other words, simultaneously have vectors moving in the direction of the State and mechanisms warding it off, which together mark a point of convergence that is repelled as quickly as it approaches. "The appearance of a central power is thus a function of a threshold or degree beyond which what is anticipated takes

¹⁶⁴Cf. Anti-Oedipus, p. 230: "A quotient of differentials is indeed calculable if it is a matter of the limit of variation of the production flows from the viewpoint of full output, but it is not calculable if it is a matter of the production flow and the labor flow on which surplus value depends."

on a consistency (or fails to), and what is warded off ceases to be so and arrives."¹⁶⁵ The State-form, in other words, was already acting internally in primitive societies as the actual limit these societies warded off, the point toward which they converged but could not reach without self-destructing--hence the functional and intrinsic instability of primitive societies. The State can therefore be said to exist in two forms: the State as it has always existed on the external horizon of primitive societies; and the State that functions internally in these societies as a "presentiment" of what does not "yet" exist (though it is precisely not a question of a diachronic development).

A similar threshold of consistency can be seen at work in the State, which simultaneously anticipated and warded off the formation of capitalism. The State is defined by its mechanisms of overcoding, capture, and appropriation; but it cannot effect a capture unless what it captures coexists with the State, whether in the form of the resistance of primitive societies, or in the escape brought about by other formations such as the war machine or the cities. The State cannot overcode without its mechanisms of overcoding at the same time giving rise to a new threshold of deterritorialization through the decoded flows (of money, labor, property, population, etc.) that escape from the State, which constitute the conditions of fact for the formation of the capitalist machine, and which in turn change the form of the State itself, which becomes an immanent model of realization rather than a transcendent mechanism of overcoding. Finally, such mechanisms of coexistent interaction are also evident in the war machine: primitive societies had mechanisms of war that prevented the formation of the State; these

¹⁶⁵A Thousand Plateaus, p. 432.

mechanisms change when they take on an autonomy in the nomadic war machine, which occupies a smooth space and whose tendency is to annihilate the State; and they change again when the State appropriates the war machine in the form of a military institution.

The thesis that lies at the base of Deleuze and Guattari's political philosophy is that the relation between these social formations cannot be reduced to a dialectical or even materialist evolution. Each type of social assemblage is defined by Deleuze and Guattari through certain machinic processes: primitive societies, by mechanisms of prevention-anticipation; State societies, by apparatuses of capture; urban societies, by instruments of polarization; nomadic societies, by war machines; and so on. These types do not constitute successive stages in an evolution; rather, they are the coexistent loci of a social topology that defines primitive societies here, States there, and elsewhere war machines. Contemporary physics and biology have developed a rich and complex notion of "reverse causalities" that are without finality but testify to the action of the future on the present, or of the present on the past: just as the notion of "neighborhood" in topology is independent of distance or contiguity, so the notion of time in dissipative systems is not linear, but folded, twisted, and "complicated."¹⁶⁶ The coexistent relations between these social formations can be said to operate by similar causal mechanisms, and similar

¹⁶⁶On the notion of reverse causality, see Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, *Entre le temps et l'éternité* (Paris: Fayard, 1988), esp. chapter 1, "Le temps en question." On the notion of complication in time, see Michel Serres, *Eclaircissements: Cinq entretiens avec Bruno Latour* (Paris: François Bourin, 1992), p. 89: "Time does not always flow according to a line, nor according to a plane [plan], but according to an extraordinarily complex variety, as if it showed stopping points, ruptures, shafts, funnels of striking acceleration, tearings, lacunae, with everything distributed in an aleatory manner....It is not very difficult, once one comprehends this, to accept that time does not always develop along a line, and that, in culture, there are things that the line makes seem very distant which are in fact close together, or on the contrary, things that seem very close which are in fact distant."

conceptions of space and time. There is not only an extrinsic coexistence, but also an intrinsic interaction, in which each process can not only subordinate other processes to its own "power," but can in turn switch over to other powers, and be taken up by a power corresponding to another process.

Deleuze and Guattari draw two conclusions from this notion of the threshold of consistency for the capitalist formation. On the one hand, they agree with Marx's claim that the capitalist social formation is the limit of all societies, and that a retrospective reading of history is possible from the point of view of capitalism. Capitalism is the limit of previous social formations because it is the only social machine constructed on the basis of decoded flows, and consequently marks a new level of deterritorialization. But this retrospection is possible because it reveals capitalism as the negative of all social formations. Capitalism has haunted all forms of society, but it haunts them as their terrifying nightmare--"it is the dread they feel of a flow that would elude their codes."¹⁶⁷ On the other hand, and more importantly, if capitalism marks the limit of previous societies, capitalism itself at the same time wards off and repels its own limits. The reason for this lies in the nature of the differential relation between the two flows of labor and capital. What Deleuze and Guattari term "schizophrenia" is precisely the absolute limit of capitalism, a limit in which would cause the decoded flows to travel in a free and unbound state on a desocialized body ("the body without organs is the deterritorialized *socius*, the wilderness where the decoded flows run free, the end of the world, the

¹⁶⁷ Anti-Oedipus, pp. 140, 153.

apocalypse").¹⁶⁸ Such a state constitutes an "Idea" in the precise sense Deleuze gives to this term in Difference and Repetition, an Idea that is neither teleological nor regulative, but differential and genetic, constituting a problematic field that finds its resolution in social assemblages as so many cases of "solution." This limit never exists in a pure state, but only as always-already resolved or actualized in a concrete assemblage or apparatus.¹⁶⁹ As an absolute limit, schizophrenia pervades the entire capitalist field from one end to the other. Thus if schizophrenia constitutes the exterior limit of capitalism or the conclusion of its deepest tendency, this limit is nonetheless never reached. Capitalism only functions on the condition that it inhibit this tendency, "that it push back or displace this limit by substituting for it its own immanent relative limits, which it continually reproduces on a wider scale."¹⁷⁰

This thesis leads Deleuze and Guattari to abandon another Marxist precept without ever criticizing it explicitly. Traditional Marxism, in the law of the counteracting tendency, taught that there was a frontier, a limit beyond which the capitalist machine would break apart, beyond which the correspondences between capital and labor, between money and commodities, would reach a state of contradiction or disequilibrium, causing the whole system to fibrillate and finally collapse. Marxist politics was built on the search for this limit, for the revolutionary "conditions" that would cause the capitalist

¹⁶⁸ Anti-Oedipus, p. 176: "Desiring-production is situated at the limits of social production: the decoded flows, at the limits of the codes and the territorialities: the body without organs, at the limits of the socius."

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Difference and Repetition, p. 186. From the point of view of the trajectory of Deleuze's own thought, the Capitalism and Schizophrenia project in its entirety can be read as a working out of the Ideas presented in this passage.

¹⁷⁰ Anti-Oedipus, p. 246.

structure to crumble, making possible the appearance of a new type of social formation-- first "crude communism" (the abolition of private property), then the positive transcendence of a "fully developed humanism."¹⁷¹ For Deleuze and Guattari, this eschatological conception of the capitalism's limit is abandoned entirely. The most profound law of capitalism, embodied in the differential relation, is that it continually pushes toward its own limit of an absolutely decoded flow, but it also continually recodes these decoded flows in an extremely rigorous axiomatic that maintains the energy of the flows in a bound state on the body of capital. This is how capitalism, for its part, manifests Deleuze and Guattari's general principle that social formations work well only on the condition that they break down: they "make a habit of feeding on the contradictions they give rise to, on the crises they provoke, on the anxieties they engender, and on the infernal operations they regenerate....The more it breaks down, the more it schizophrenizes, the better it works."¹⁷² Capitalism, in other words, will never reach a natural death by attrition or contradiction, since its perpetual crises, its crashes and booms, are nothing other than "the means immanent to the capitalist mode of production."

§ 17. Definition of Capitalism III: The Formation of an Axiomatic. The third component of capitalism, then, concerns the means by which capitalism reconstitutes its

¹⁷¹Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" (1844) in Early Writings, ed. Quintin Hoare (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), pp. 348-350. See also Jean-François Lyotard, "Energumen Capitalism" in Critique 306 (Nov 1972).

¹⁷²Anti-Oedipus, p. 151.

internal limits. One of Deleuze and Guattari most innovative theses on this score is that capitalism operates by means of an axiomatic rather than a code: capitalism axiomatizes with one hand what it decodes with another. In precapitalist societies, codes served to establish indirect relations between elements that were already qualified (such as consumer goods, prestige goods, women and children). But precisely because capitalism no longer functions on the basis of qualified flows but rather on purely abstract and quantitative elements (labor, capital) that enter into variable formal relations, these elements are subject to an axiomatic treatment rather than to a code. It is by means of an axiomatic that capitalism reestablishes its internal limits. "Our use of the word 'axiomatic' is far from a metaphor," explain Deleuze and Guattari. "we find literally the same theoretical problems that are posed by the models in an axiomatic repeated in relation to the State."¹⁷³ An axiomatic is "the disengagement of a structure that makes the variable elements to which it is applied homologous or homogenous," and as such is always an operation of recoding, a restoration of order, whether in logic, science, or politics.¹⁷⁴ Obviously the axioms of capitalism are not theoretical propositions, but rather operative statements that enter as component parts into the assemblages of production.

¹⁷³A Thousand Plateaus, p. 455, emphasis added. The theoretical problems shared by politics and axiomatics, as we shall see, are the following: the relative independence of the axioms; the question of whether the system can be fully saturated, or at least made "strongly complete"; its models of realization, which are isomorphic in relation to the system but retain a large degree of heterogeneity; the problem of undecidable propositions (contradictory statements that are equally demonstrable); and the power of nondenumerable infinite sets that exceed the axiomatic (e.g. the power of the continuum, which cannot be conceived axiomatically since every axiomatization relies on a denumerable model). See Robert Blanché, Axiomatics, trans. G. B. Keene (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); and A Thousand Plateaus, p. 570, notes 54 and 60.

¹⁷⁴Dialogues, p. 67.

circulation, and consumption. Such axioms neither derive from nor depend upon each other. A given flow (a flow of population, food, urbanity, matter-energy...) can be the object of one or several axioms: it can have no axioms of its own, its treatment being only a consequence of other axioms; or it can be left in a state of "untamed" variation in the system. But it is the set of all axioms that constitutes the conjugation of flows in the capitalist formation, and defines the consistency of the overall axiomatic.

Now as the relation of production, capital is realized and made concrete in a variety of sectors and means of production, which can be termed "models of realization." But one of the primary models of realization in the capitalist axiomatic (though not the only one) is precisely the modern nation-State, which constitutes the third form of the State in Deleuze and Guattari's typology, after the imperial State and its derivatives, such as the ancient City. States are not canceled out in capitalism, but change form and take on a new meaning: from being at first a transcendent unity that operates through overcoding (the *Urstaat*), States now become immanent to the field of social forces, and enter their service. Modern States function as models of realization through the creation of axioms. They provide an apparatus of regulation for the decoded and axiomatized flows of capitalism, combining numerous sectors depending on their resources, population, wealth, industrial capacity, and so on.¹⁷⁵ Though these models of realization can be very diverse and heterogeneous in reality--democratic, liberal, dictatorial, totalitarian, fascist, and so on--they are nonetheless isomorphic in relation to the

¹⁷⁵What is Philosophy?, pp. 106, 98: "It is as if the deterritorialization of the States would moderate that of capital, and provide the latter with compensating reterritorializations....The immense relative deterritorialization of worldwide capitalism needs to reterritorialize itself in the modern national state."

worldwide market. insofar as the latter is not only presupposed by the various States, but itself produces the determining inequalities of development between them.

Deleuze and Guattari suggest, for example, that the "social-democratic" pole of the State can be defined by its tendency toward addition, toward the invention of axioms (whereas the "totalitarian" pole was defined by its tendency toward subtraction by falling back on a small number of axioms regulating the dominant flows). One decisive factor promoting the multiplication of axioms, Deleuze and Guattari argue, was the organization of a powerful working class that required a high and stable level of employment. After World War I, the double influence of the world depression and the Russian Revolution forced capitalism to invent axioms dealing with the working class, employment, union organization, social institutions, the role of the State itself, foreign and domestic markets: Keynesian economics and the New Deal were the primary laboratories of these new axioms. After World War II, the Marshall plan became such a laboratory, inventing axioms concerning forms of assistance and lending, and transformations in the monetary system. The social-democratic State was thus induced to play an increasingly important role in the regulation of the axiomatized flows--not only with regard to production and its planning, the economy and its "monetarization," and surplus value and its absorption in "anti-production" (i.e. the organizing of wants and needs in advertising, the military-industrial complex, etc.), but for many other things besides. "things that are much smaller, tiny even, absurdly insignificant...."¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁶ Anti-Oedipus, p. 253. The "fascist" (national-socialist) pole of the state must therefore be distinguished from totalitarianism as a special case. Though it coincided with totalitarianism by reducing the number of its axioms and collapsing its domestic market, its promotion of the foreign sector took place

Of all these axioms, the one that most directly concerns philosophy is the axiom of human rights, which is sometimes said to constitute the "dignity" of the democratic State. Without denying its importance, Deleuze and Guattari nonetheless insist on its ambiguous status as an axiom within the capitalist axiomatic. Alain Badiou has recently argued that it is an error to think that axioms such as human rights concern individuals directly. The State is related only to its constituent parts, that is, to its denumerable subsets. Even when it appears to deal with an individual, it is not the concrete multiplicity of the individual mode of existence that it considers, but this multiplicity reduced to a "one" that can be counted (the subset of which this individual is the sole element, what mathematicians call a "singleton"). The individual who votes, who is imprisoned, who contributes to Social Security, and so on, is itemized by a number which is the name of this singleton, and which does not take the individual per se into account as a concrete multiplicity. States that operate on the basis of "rights" are those in which no subset of the State--the nobility, the working class, the Party--is accorded a paradigmatic or privileged status with regard to the operation by which other denumerable subsets are enumerated and treated. Such States consequently operate by a large set of rules or axioms--the rules of law--which are purely formal since, in order to

through an economy of total war--but not in the sense of a State army taking power; quite the contrary, it was a war machine that took over the State in its entirety. Whereas the totalitarian State seals off possible lines of flight, the fascist State was itself constructed on an intense line of flight that preferred to eradicate itself rather than stop the destruction: a pure, cold line of abolition, a "realized nihilism." See Paul Virilio, L'insécurité du territoire (Paris: Stock, 1975), chapter 1. Virilio writes that the final outcome of the Nazi State was the famous Telegram 71: "If the war is lost, may the nation perish. Hitler here decides to join forces with his enemies in order to complete the destruction of his own people by obliterating the last remaining resources of its life-support system, civil reserves of every kind (potable water, fuel, provisions, etc.)." Virilio concludes that the fascist State was less totalitarian than "suicidal." On this interpretation of fascism, see A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 214-215, 230-231, 462-463, 538 note 33.

maintain their legitimacy, they are declared to be valid for "everyone," that is, for all the subsets the State registers as being subsets of the situation (the priority of the right over the good).¹⁷⁷ The importance of Rawls' Theory of Justice lies in its attempt to provide, through the device of an "original position," a powerful decision theory that would govern the addition of axioms such as human rights into the capitalist field by democratic States.¹⁷⁸

But Deleuze and Guattari insist on the following point: if there is no universal democratic State, despite the foundational dream of German philosophy, it is because the only thing that is universal in capitalism is the market, within which the diverse States (democratic, dictatorial, totalitarian...) function as models of realization. But this market, far from being universalizing or homogenizing, constitutes on the contrary a fantastic distribution of riches and misery. "There is no democratic state that is not compromised to its core by this fabrication of human misery," or the dictatorial States the democratic States remain linked to and support. "Who can keep and manage misery, and the deterritorialization-reterritorialization of shantytowns, except the powerful armies and police that coexist with the democracies?"¹⁷⁹ Human rights are axioms, but they coexist on the capitalist market with other axioms--notably the axiom of the security of property--which will often simply ignore or suspend these rights rather than contradict them. Human rights therefore cannot make us bless the "joys" of the liberal capitalism in the

¹⁷⁷ Alain Badiou, D'un désastre obscur: Droit, État, Politique (Paris: Éditions de l'Aube, 1991), pp. 39-57.

¹⁷⁸ John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).

democratic States so actively participate. The democratic State can only be thought in relation to both what lies beyond it (the market, the worldwide war machine, ecumenical organizations, etc.) as well as what remains uncaptured and unaxiomatized within it (minorities, etc.), and the defense of human rights, necessary as it is, must necessarily pass through the internal critique of every democracy. "Rights do not save men or a philosophy that reterritorialize on the democratic State." writes Deleuze. "The rights of man say nothing about the immanent modes of existence of the man provided with rights."¹⁸⁰ In the modern democratic State, what counts is not only the acquired and codified rights, but everything that continually problematizes these rights, and through which what has been acquired risks being placed in question.

This amounts to saying that the social axiomatic of modern societies is caught between two poles and constant oscillates between them. Deleuze and Guattari maintain two theses with regard to the modern State that seemingly stand opposed to one another: that national State represents a genuine break with the despotic State, in terms of its immanence, its generalized decoding of flows, and its axiomatic that comes to replace the codes and overcodings; and that nonetheless there has never been but one State, the

¹⁷⁹Negotiations, p. 173.

¹⁸⁰What is Philosophy?, p. 107. In his recent work, Spectres de Marx, Derrida lists ten "scourges" [plaies] that could be brought to bear against the "new world order" and the democratic States: (1) unemployment, and the function of "social inactivity"; (2) "the massive exclusion of homeless citizens from all participation in the democratic life of the States, the expulsion or deportation of so many exiled, stateless people, and immigrants outside a so-called national territory"; (3) the merciless economic war between countries; (4) the contradictions of the concept of the liberal market; (5) "the aggravation of external debt and other related mechanisms which drive a large part of humanity to starvation or despair"; (6) "the industry and commerce of armament," which are "inscribed in the normal regulation of scientific research, the economy, and the socialisation of work in the western democracies"; (7) the extension of nuclear armaments; (8) interethnic wars, guided by "a primitive conceptual fantasm of community, of the nation-State, of sovereignty, of frontiers, of the soil, and of blood"; (9) the power of phantom States such as the Mafia and the drug consortiums; (10) the present state of international law and its institutions.

Urstaat. But what these two theses point to is the simultaneity of the two movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization characteristic of the capitalist formation. "Born of decoding and deterritorialization, on the ruins of the despotic machine, [modern] societies are caught between the Urstaat they would like to resuscitate as an overcoding and reterritorializing unity, and the unfettered flows that carry them toward an absolute threshold. They recode with all their might...while decoding--or allowing the decoding of--the fluent quantities of their capital and their populations. They are torn in two directions: archaism and futurism, neo-archaism and ex-futurism, paranoia and schizophrenia."¹⁸¹ What capitalism deterritorializes with one hand, continually surpassing its own limits, it reterritorializes with the other, reproducing these limits on an ever wider scale, with the modern State as the primary mechanism of reterritorialization.

§ 18. Definition of Capitalism IV: The War Machine. If it is the modern State that gives capitalism its primary mode of realization, what is thereby realized is an independent and world-wide axiomatic of which the States are only the working parts or "neighborhoods." The capitalist national State therefore finds itself surpassed in two directions. On the one hand, the world-wide axiomatic of the capitalist market is brought to its own expression in international, ecumenical organizations (industrial complexes, multinational corporations, religious formations such as Christianity and Islam), which are spread out over the entire ecumenon and have the capacity to move through diverse social formations simultaneously, enjoying a large degree of autonomy in relation to

¹⁸¹ Anti-Oedipus, p. 260.

States. On the other hand, and at the same time, there also exist local mechanisms or "neo-territorialities" (gangs, bands, minorities, margins, "tribalisms"), "which continue to affirm the rights of segmentary societies in opposition to the organs of State power." and tend to persist within the interiority of the State itself.¹⁸² Both of these directions imply social formations that are irreducible to that of the State, and present certain problems of their own with regard to the capitalist axiomatic. Axiomatics has historically confronted two essential problems--the powers of infinite sets, which by nature elude axiomatic treatment, and "undecidable" propositions--and Deleuze and Guattari argue that each of these problems manifest themselves in the capitalist axiomatic in variable form of a war machine.

a. The War Machine as a Continuum. The first problem concerns the power of nondenumerable infinite sets that exceed the axiomatic, for instance, the power of the continuum, which cannot be conceived axiomatically since every axiomatization relies on a denumerable model. This problem finds its expression in the capitalist axiomatic in its relation to the war machine as a power of destruction, which is incarnated in military, industrial, and financial technological complexes. We have seen that States, throughout their history, have appropriated the war machine in the form of an army or military

¹⁸² A Thousand Plateaus, p. 360. Deleuze and Guattari note that the "neo-territorialities" created by capitalism are often artificial, residual, or archaic, but they are archaisms that have a perfectly current function. "our modern way of 'imbricating,' of sectioning off, of reintroducing code fragments, resuscitating old codes, inventing pseudo codes or jargons" (Anti-Oedipus, p. 257). Some are mainly folkloric, but nonetheless represent social and potentially political forces (domino players, home brewers...); others constitute enclaves that are equally capable of nourishing a modern fascism as of freeing a revolutionary charge (ethnic minorities, the Basque problem, the Irish Catholics, the Indian reservations); others take form spontaneously, in the very current of the movement of deterritorialization (neighborhood territorialities, "gangs," McLuhan's "neo-primitivism"); still others are organized and encouraged by the State, even if they sometimes turn against the State and cause it problems (regionalisms, nationalism).

institution; and that it was only after the war machine was appropriated that war became the exclusive object of the machine, subordinated to the political aims of the State. The factors that allowed State war to become "total war," as in the case of Nazism, are closely connected to the rise of capitalism, and the investment of constant capital in equipment, industry, and a war economy. Total war is no longer a war of annihilation whose object is to eliminate the enemy army or State, but whose aim is to eliminate the entire population and its economy--even if, as with the case of the fascist State, this political aim entered into contradiction with its object, and turned against itself.

But Deleuze and Guattari argue that it was only after World War II that the automation and automatization of the war machine had its true effect. In appropriating the war machine to such a degree, States tended to unleash an immense war machine of which they are no longer anything more than opposed or opposable parts. This is what Deleuze and Guattari call the "worldwide war machine," which no longer has war as its primary object, but rather peace (deterrence). The war machine reforms a smooth space that spreads over the entire earth (sea, air, atmosphere), takes charge of the political aim of worldwide order, and itself appropriates the States as objects or means adapted to that machine. It is at this point that Clausewitz's formula becomes effectively reversed: politics can be said to be the continuation of war by other means. It was the peace of deterrence that technologically freed up the material process of total war, promoting and installing a new conception of security as a materialized war, a kind of organized insecurity or programmed catastrophe. The war machine assigned to itself a peace more terrifying than death, the peace of terror or survival, maintaining and instigating the most

terrible of local wars as a part of itself ("wars become a part of the peace"), and itself appropriating the States as its component elements. It created a new type enemy, no longer another State, but the "unspecified enemy," against which it sets into place complex counterguerilla elements.¹⁸³

In this way, the war machine, particularly during the Cold War, can be said to have reigned over the entire capitalist axiomatic like the power of the continuum that surrounded the world economy, surpassing the power of the States and the axiomatic to effectively control it. But it is important to note that, with regard to Deleuze and Guattari's typology, the various shapes that war assumes—limited war, total war, worldwide organization—do not refer to the essence of the war machine, but only the set of conditions under which States appropriate the machine, even if they project the war machine to the entirety of the planet, toward a dominant order of which they themselves constitute only operative parts. For there is a second pole of the war machine which is closer to its essence, operating with infinitely lower "quantities," which has as its primary object, not war, but the composition of smooth space and the movement of people within that space. At this other pole, the war machine indeed encounters war, but now as its supplementary or synthetic object, which is directed against the State and against the worldwide axiomatic expressed by the States.

b. Minorities as Undecidable Elements. In axiomatic terms, the second pole of the war machine is expressed in the problem of "undecidable" propositions. It is here that the topological problem of minorities comes to replace the Marxist notion of the class

¹⁸³On all these themes, see A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 420-423, 466-467.

struggle, which was still dependent on a model of opposition or contradiction. Marx derived his conception of the class struggle from his definition of capitalism in terms of the two abstract flows of labor and capital. The capitalist axiomatic does not need to mark bodies and organs in order to fashion a memory for man, as in primitive societies; nor does it need to write in books, as in the despotic formation, despite the proliferation of identity cards, files, and other means of control. In principle, what is marked in the capitalist formation are no longer persons but the abstract quantities themselves--"your capital or your labor capacity, the rest is not important."¹⁸⁴ Individual persons are first of all functions derived from the abstract quantities: the capitalist is a function derived from the flow of capital (personified capital), and the worker is a function derived from the flow of labor (personified labor).

But it is only partially true, argue Deleuze and Guattari, to say that there is a class that rules (the capitalists) and a class that is ruled (the workers), each defined by the distinction between the flows of financing and the flows of income in wages. For capitalism is defined by the conjunction of these two flows in the differential relation, and it integrates them both in the continually expanding reproduction of its limits. "That the State is entirely in the service of the so-called ruling class is an obvious practical fact, but a fact that does not reveal its theoretical foundation. The latter is simple to explain: from the viewpoint of the capitalist axiomatic, there is only one class, a class with a

¹⁸⁴ Anti-Oedipus, p. 251; cf. p. 264: Individual or private persons "are therefore images of the second order, images of images--that is, simulacra that are thus endowed with an aptitude for representing the first order images of social persons.... Private persons are an illusion, images of images or derivative of derivatives.... Father, mother, and child thus become the simulacrum of the images of capital ('Mister Capital, Madame Earth,' and their child the Worker)."

universalist vocation. the bourgeoisie."¹⁸⁵ Classes are the negative of castes and statuses, they are castes and statuses that have been decoded. It is in this sense that bourgeoisie is at once a decoding of castes and codes, and an integral element in the axiomatic of the capitalist system. On the one hand, there is a single capitalist machine defined by the conjunction of the two decoded flows; and on the other hand there is the bourgeoisie as the decoding and decoded class whose sole end is abstract wealth, who extracts from this machine a flow of income convertible into consumer goods (consumption or antiproduction). In and of itself, the bourgeoisie is sufficient to fill the entire field of capitalism. The theoretical opposition, then, "is not between two classes, for it is the very notion of class, insofar as it designates the 'negative' of codes, that implies there is only one class. The theoretical opposition lies elsewhere: it is between, on the one hand the decoded flows that enter into a class axiomatic on the full body of capital, and on the other hand, the decoded flows that free themselves from this axiomatic."¹⁸⁶ The true opposition is between THE class (bourgeoisie) and those who lay outside this class (minorities).

Now the concept of the "minor" is a complex one, having references that are musical, literary, and linguistic, as well as juridical and political. In the political context, the opposition between majority and minority is not a quantitative one. Minorities are not defined by their small numbers, but by the gap that separates them from the axiom that constitutes the majority. A majority is not defined by its large numbers, but by an ideal

¹⁸⁵ Anti-Oedipus, p. 253, emphasis added.

¹⁸⁶ Anti-Oedipus, p. 255.

constant or standard measure by which it can be evaluated (for instance, white, western, male, adult, reasonable, heterosexual, residing in cities, speaking a standard language...). Any determination that deviates from this axiomatic model, by definition and regardless of number, will be considered minoritarian. "Man" constitutes a majority, even though it may be less numerous than women or children: and minorities are frequently larger in number than the majority (hence the apocalyptic warnings that "in twenty years, whites will form only 12 percent of the world population"). What defines a minority, then, is not the number but relations internal to the number: a majority is constituted by a set that is denumerable, whereas a minority is defined as a nondenumerable set, no matter how many elements it may have. The axiomatic manipulates only denumerable sets (no matter what their number, finite or infinite), whereas minorities constitute "fuzzy," nondenumerable, and nonaxiomizable sets--in short, "masses," multiplicities of flux.¹⁸⁷ But one must add that, although there is a majoritarian "fact" (the majoritarian as a constant and homogenous system), it is the analytic fact of Nobody: everyone, under one aspect or another, is taken up in a becoming-minor of one sort or another.

One of the primary theses of A Thousand Plateaus is that modern nation-States must be defined, not in terms of their classes, but their minorities (as constitutive of a line of flight). It is precisely for this reason that modern nation-States tend to crush their minoritarian (or "nationalist") phenomena. A nation, in this sense, can be said to be constituted by a land and a people: a "natal" (or land), which is not necessarily innate.

¹⁸⁷We recover here Deleuze's distinction between two types of multiplicities: the majoritarian is a constant and homogenous system comprised of denumerable elements; the minoritarian is a subsystem, potential, creative and created, a becoming comprised of nondenumerable aggregates.

and the "popular" (or people), which is not necessarily given.¹⁸⁸ The problem is aggravated in the extreme cases of a land without a people and, even more so, a people without a land (e.g. the Palestinians, who have pushed the question of territory to its highest point).¹⁸⁹ How can a people and a land be made, in other words, a nation? The coldest and bloodiest means vie with upsurges of romanticism. We have seen that the land implies a certain deterritorialization of territories, and the people, a decoding of the population: the nation is constituted on the basis of these decoded and deterritorialized flows. If in the capitalist formation, the nation is inseparable from the State, it is because it is the State that gives consistency to the land and the people: it is the flow of labor that makes the people, just as it is the flow of capital that makes the land and its industrial base.

But the State and the nation are clearly not identical phenomena: the aim of the State is to capture and control nationalist and minoritarian phenomena, or else to repress, isolate, or, at the limit, exterminate them. Extermination rests on the mobilization of a war machine: isolation, on the organization of camps or internal peripheries. Nazism and the socialist sector distinguished themselves in these areas, and they continue to be utilized elsewhere (Cambodia, Bosnia). But more often, the mechanism of capture aims at some form of integration through the creation of axioms that accord a certain degree of autonomy to minorities, whether regional, federal, or statutory. This operation consists in translating the minorities into denumerable subsets, who can then be counted among the

¹⁸⁸ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 456.

¹⁸⁹ Negotiations, pp. 126, 153.

majority. This struggle at the level of axioms is extremely important, and applies equally to the status accorded to women, children, itinerant workers, and so forth, through the addition of axioms (e.g., women's struggle for the vote, for abortion, for jobs). When a minority creates models for itself, it is because it wants to become a majority, and undoubtedly this is inevitable for its survival or salvation (for example, to have a State, to be recognized, to impose rights).

But Deleuze and Guattari insist upon the following point: minorities, as nondenumerable sets or flows, receive no adequate expression by becoming a denumerable set, even an infinite one.¹⁹⁰ What is proper to the minority is to assert a power of a nondenumerable, and what characterizes the nondenumerable is neither the set nor its elements, but the connections that are established elements or sets, which belongs to neither, which eludes them and constitutes a "line of flight." Minorities have the potential of promoting compositions and connections that do not pass by way of the conjugations of the capitalist axiomatic or the State-form. Against the axiomatic of denumerable sets, minorities imply a calculus or conception of the problems of nondenumerable sets. If minorities do not constitute viable States (culturally, politically, economically), it is because neither the State-form nor the axiomatic of capital is appropriate to them. "When we talk about 'undecidable propositions,'" write Deleuze and Guattari, "we are referring to the coexistence and inseparability of that which the system

¹⁹⁰What is Philosophy?, p. 108: "Europeanization does not constitute a becoming but merely the history of capitalism, which prevents the becoming of subjected peoples. Art and philosophy converge at this point: the constitution of a land and a people who are missing, as the correlate of creation.... This people and this land will not be found in our democracies. Democracies are majorities, but a becoming is by nature that which is always subtracted from the majority."

conjugates, and that which never ceases to escape it, following lines of flight that are themselves connectable."¹⁹¹

The power of minorities, in short, is not measured by their capacity to enter and make themselves felt within the majority system, nor even to reverse the necessarily tautologous criterion of the majority, but to bring to bear on it the force of the nondenumerable sets. This power is derived from the very law of capitalism itself: it constantly sets and then repels its own limits, and in so doing gives rise to numerous flows in all directions that escape its axiomatic. "At the same time as capitalism is effectuated in the denumerable sets serving as its models, it necessarily constitutes nondenumerable sets that cut across and disrupt those models."¹⁹² It is in this sense that the power of minorities corresponds to the essence of the war machine, precisely because its object is not war, but the creation of a smooth space of displacement that is necessarily directed against the State and the axiomatic expressed by them. It is therefore not the nomads who hold the secret of the war machine: minority and popular movements, artistic and even scientific movements, can equally constitute a war machine, insofar as they bring connections to bear against the great conjunction of the apparatuses of capture or domination. Some of Deleuze and Guattari's most profound texts are those which explore the concept of the "minor" apart from the political realm, in the domains of art, music, literature, and science; or rather, which show the political import of minoritarian

¹⁹¹ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 473.

¹⁹² A Thousand Plateaus, p. 472.

phenomena in these domains.¹⁹³ This is the case in Deleuze and Guattari's attempt to construct a concept of what they call a "minor literature," which is not a literature written in a minor language, but rather that which a minority creates in a major language (Jewish literature in Warsaw or Prague, black literature in the United States).

§ 19. Conclusions. Primitive societies, the State, the nomadic war machine, and capitalism: these are the four types of social formations or "abstract machines" that form the core the political philosophy presented in Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Although we have voluntarily left to the side many of the details of Deleuze and Guattari extraordinarily rich analyses, we are now in a position to draw some conclusions about the status of these concepts.

It is true that a large part of Deleuze and Guattari's work in Capitalism and Schizophrenia is presented under the ambitious guise of a "universal history," taking as its points of reference the sweep of world history: the ubiquitous territorial societies, the great imperial States that overcoded them, the nomadic war machines that swooped down and destroyed these States, the appropriation of the war machine by the State, the mutation of the State form and the development of capitalism, the capitalist redeployment of the modern State and the war machine, and so forth. In this their approach differs greatly from Foucault's, whose dispositifs have very different coordinates from Deleuze

¹⁹³See A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 423, 473. For the concept of "minor" science, see pp. 361-374; for "minor" art, see pp. 492-500, and The Time-Image, pp. 215-224; for "minor" literature, pp. 100-110, and Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature, chapter 3; on the notion of "smooth space" in Boulez's music, see A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 477-478.

and Guattari's agencements. Foucault limits himself to the analysis of original historical sequences, whereas Deleuze and Guattari emphasize geographical and territorial components. "We always had a taste for a universal history," comments Deleuze, "which he detested."¹⁹⁴ But such a presentation of universal history, defined by its contingencies, discontinuities, ruptures, and thresholds of consistency, implies not only a rejection of any dialectical conception of history which would find its fulfillment in the State (democratic or proletarian) as the becoming of Reason. It also implies a reformulation of the time in which history unfolds, which does not move from one actual term to another, but rather from the components of the virtual Idea of society (absolute decoding, or schizophrenia) to its actualization in various concrete assemblages, sketching out a State here, a war machine there, and so on, with their complex interactions.

The presentation of a universal history is thus only a secondary aspect of the project. "If one follows a given line of research," writes Deleuze, "it is historical in a certain part of its course [parcours], at certain places, but it is also an-historical, trans-historical. In A Thousand Plateaus, becomings have much more importance than history."¹⁹⁵ Deleuze conceives of the task of philosophy as the creation of concepts, and as a work in political philosophy Capitalism and Schizophrenia is above all a book of concepts. But for Deleuze, concepts do not refer to states of affairs but to events, and as Charles Péguy shows in Clio, "a great work in philosophy," there are two ways to consider an event. The first consists in recording the manner in which an event is conditioned

¹⁹⁴Negotiations, p. 150 (translation modified).

¹⁹⁵Negotiations, p. 30.

by history, by examining its actualization and deterritorialization in a state of affairs; the second consists of coming back to the event in itself, and creating a concept that passes through its components or singularities.¹⁹⁶ This is a domain that is no longer historical, but neither is it eternal or universal: it is what Péguy called the Aternal [Interne], or Nietzsche, the Untimely. It is this domain, according to Deleuze, that the philosopher inhabits. "What History grasps of the event," writes Deleuze, "is its effectuation in a state of things or in lived experience, but the event in its becoming, in its own consistency, in its auto-position as a concept, escapes History."¹⁹⁷

Each of the concepts developed in Capitalism and Schizophrenia describes an event, and it is precisely the status Deleuze assigns to concepts that accounts, in part, for the power of his political philosophy. "We have had done with all globalizing concepts," he writes, concepts "only have value in their variables, and in the maximum number of variables they allow."¹⁹⁸ When Deleuze insists on the "consistency" of concepts, it is not because they gather particulars into a harmonious whole, but because concepts are always related to variables that determine its own mutations. The concept of the war machine, for example, implies a certain type of space (smooth space), an arithmetic composition of humans (numbering number), a certain process of subjectivation (nomadic), and so on. But as Deleuze explains, "such an agencement is historical only secondarily, when it

¹⁹⁶Charles Péguy, Clio (Paris: Gallimard, 1931), pp. 266-269. For Deleuze's frequent appeals to this text, see Negotiations, p. 170; Difference and Repetition, p. 189; What is Philosophy?, pp. 111-113.

¹⁹⁷What is Philosophy?, p. 110.

¹⁹⁸Dialogues, p. 144.

enters into extremely variable relations with State apparatuses."¹⁹⁹ The same holds true for the concept of the State, which implies a different type of space (striated space), a movement of deterritorialization, apparatuses of capture, and so on. Here again, the concept of the State does not deny a long historical sequence of mutation (imperial States, Cities, modern nation-States, etc.); on the contrary, it requires and implies it, without in any way compromising the consistency of the concept. In Deleuze, concepts are not related to "essences" but to "circumstances." For each concept, we must ask: in which cases? where and when? how? and so on. For instance, how and in what cases does the war machine take war as its direct object? (When State apparatuses appropriate the war machine which was initially exterior to their apparatuses...).

The minimal unit of analysis in Deleuze's political philosophy is the agencement ("assemblage"). An assemblage is always a mixed state, a multiplicity of heterogeneous elements arranged according to various lines, dimensions, and directional components, all functioning at the same time. To analyze an assemblage is to disentangle these lines and dimensions, to create a "cartography" that marks their distinctions as well as their mixtures, and assesses their dangers as well as their content of novelty and creativity. The problem with traditional Marxism is that it tends to analyze assemblages in terms of a dialectic of oppositions or contradictions (notably class contradictions); it remains "unaware of far more subtle and subterranean differential mechanisms: topological displacements, typological variations."²⁰⁰ But although Deleuze and Guattari propose a

¹⁹⁹Negotiations, p. 30.

²⁰⁰Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 157.

much more complex analysis of assemblages, their concepts in no way constitute a set of universal coordinates that are given once and for all: they have no other meaning than to make possible the estimation of a continuous variation. Primitive societies, States, war machines, and capitalism do not mark out a historical progression, but trace a topology in which each of these types exist in a perpetual field of interaction. The time of becoming is always a time of actualization on a topological field, giving rise to States in one neighborhood, a war machine in another, always interacting, with the same processes being taken up elsewhere, under new conditions, with new mixtures. "All history does it to translate a coexistence of becomings into a succession."²⁰¹

What is primary in any society, for Deleuze, are its "lines of flight," the continuous variations of abstract flows. These lines, far from being a flight outside the social, far from being utopic or even ideological, are constitutive of the social field, and constitute its plane of consistency. Every social formation codes or axiomatizes these flows in determinate ways: there are "molecular" lines that impose relatively small foci of equilibrium and stability on these lines of flight, and "molar" lines that accumulate in well defined segments (institutions, States) and constitute a plane of organization, an apparatus of power, a machine of overcoding. But a social assemblage cannot code, overcode, or axiomatize without at the same time giving rise to new flows that escape from it. This is why Deleuze and Guattari insist on the primacy of lines of flight: they can be relativized on the molecular lines, stopped and segmented on the molar lines; but

²⁰¹ A Thousand Plateaus, p. 430; on this distinction between history and becoming, see Negotiations, pp. 170-171.

they also constitute the cutting edges of creation and deterritorialization. Every agencement is defined by its content of novelty and creativity, which marks its capacity to transform itself, to confront its most solid and rigidified lines. It is precisely these lines of flight that constitute the fact and the principle of the "untimely."

What then can be said about the question of revolution, that is, about the revolutionary experience upon which modern philosophy has never ceased to reflect (the revolution in America, France, England, Russia...). Deleuze suggests that the many critiques which denounce the "horrors" of revolution are usually based on the following model: there is a globalizing State apparatus, and then there are forces of resistance against this State, which can be found either in the organization of a revolutionary vanguard Party that would be modeled on the conquest of this apparatus (which inevitably "betrays" the revolution by adopting the State-form); or else in the form of local and partial struggles, or spontaneous, utopic manifestations of a "state of nature" (which are inevitably stifled and beaten each time). Hence the so-called thinkers of the "impossible" revolution, who take so much pleasure in its impossibility. The first error of this model is to believe that there exists such a State that is totalizing, a kind of supremely evil Master. For the State is itself a milieu of experimentation, and its mechanisms of power make their experimentations along the complex lines of concrete assemblages. Even the most centralized of States is never the master of its five-year plans, and the constant errors of men of State are as important and decisive as their successful evaluations.²⁰² "The question of revolution has always been organizational, and not at all

²⁰² A Thousand Plateaus, p. 225; cf. 461.

ideological: is an organization possible that would not be modeled on the State apparatus, even to prefigure the State to come?"²⁰³ Hence the importance of the concept of the war machine, with its lines of flight: the experimentations of the State can give rise to experimentations of another sort that undermine the State and the worldwide axiomatic of capitalism. But the second error would be to overlook the dangers of the lines of flight themselves. Deleuze and Guattari provide numerous examples of this, not only in the case of the nomads themselves, whose war machines tended to dissipate themselves and disappear from history, but also in the case of Nazism, where the war machine took over the State completely, and after World War II, where a single automated war machine came to reign over the entire capitalist axiomatic.

This is why politics can never be an apodictic science, but is always an experimentation. The questions Deleuze and Guattari pose always relate to our actual situation: What are our hard segments, our machines of overcoding? What is our set of relative deterritorializations, and correlative reterritorializations? What are our lines of flight, "where flows conjugate, where thresholds attain a point of adjacency or rupture"?²⁰⁴ Each of these lines implies its own sorts of dangers, and to diagnose the "becomings" of the present is the task Nietzsche assigned to the philosopher as "the physician of civilization." The creation of concepts itself appeals to a future form, to a new earth and a new people who do not yet exist. To think the past, in order to act on the present, in favor (one hopes) of a future to come--such is the task of the philosopher.

²⁰³ Dialogues, p. 145.

²⁰⁴ See Dialogues, pp. 143-144.

"But there is no general prescription," concludes Deleuze. "Nothing can be known in advance."²⁰⁵

²⁰⁵Dialogues, p. 144; A Thousand Plateaus, p. 461.

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Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties [1963], trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), with a new preface by Deleuze.

The Logic of Sense [1969], trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale. ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

Masochism [1967], trans. Jean McNeil (New York: Zone Books, 1989).

Negotiations 1972-1990 [1990], trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

Nietzsche and Philosophy [1962], trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), with a new preface by Deleuze.

Proust and Signs [1964; rev. ed. 1970], trans. Richard Howard (New York: George Braziller, 1972).

Spinoza: Practical Philosophy [1970; rev. ed. 1981], trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights, 1988).

A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia [1980] (with Félix Guattari), trans. Brian Massumi. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).

What is Philosophy? [1991] (with Félix Guattari), trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

II. Chronological Listing of Deleuze's Publications

The following is a chronological listing of Deleuze's publications from 1945 through 1996. The bibliography is partly based on the work of Timothy S. Murphy, who has compiled the definitive bibliography of Deleuze's works, with the cooperation of Deleuze himself. A fuller version of Mr. Murphy's bibliography, including lists of video and audio recordings by Deleuze, as well as the theses he directed, can be found in The Deleuze Reader, ed. Paul Patton (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 270-300. I am grateful for his permission to reproduce items from his bibliography here.

1945

1. "Description de la femme: Pour une philosophie d'Autrui sexuée" in Poésie 45, No.28 (October-November 1945), pp. 28-39.

1946

1. "Du Christ à la bourgeoisie" in Espace (1946), pp. 93-106.
2. "Mathèse. Science et Philosophie." introduction to Jean Malfatti de Montereaggio. Études sur la Mathèse ou Anarchie et Hiérarchie de la Science (Paris: Éditions du Griffon d'Or, 1946), pp. ix-xxiv.
3. "Dires et profils" in Poésie 47, No.36 (December 1946), pp. 68-78.

1947

1. Introduction to Denis Diderot, La Religieuse (Paris: Éditions Marcel Daubin, 1947), pp. vii-xx.

1952

1. --with André Cresson: David Hume, sa vie, son oeuvre, avec un exposé de sa philosophie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952).

1953

1. "Introduction" to Gilles Deleuze, ed., Instincts et institutions (Paris: Hachette, 1953), pp. viii-xi.

2. Empirisme et subjectivité: Essai sur la Nature humaine selon Hume (Paris: Press Universitaires de France, 1953). English translation: Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature, Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

3. Book review of Régis Jolivet, Le problème de la mort chez M. Heidegger et J.-P. Sartre, in Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger CXLIII:1-3 (January-March 1953), pp. 107-108.

4. Book review of K.E. Lögstrup, Kierkegaard und Heideggers Existenzanalyse und ihr Verhältnis zur Verkündigung, in Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger CXLIII: 1-3 (January-March 1953), pp. 108-109.

5. Book review of Helmut Kuhn, Encounter with Nothingness/Begegnung mit dem Nichts, in Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger CXLIII:1-3 (January-March 1953), p. 109.

6. Book review of Bertrand Russell, Macht und Persönlichkeit, in Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger CXLIII:1-3 (January-March 1953), pp. 135-136.

7. Book review of Carl Jorgensen, « Two Commandments », in Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger CXLIII:1-3 (January-March 1953), pp. 138-139.

1954

1. Book review of Darbon, Philosophie de la volonté, in Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger CXLIV:4-6 (April-June 1954), p. 283.

2. Review of Jean Hyppolite, Logique et existence, in Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger CXLIV:7-9 (July-September 1954), pp. 457-460.

1955

1. Book review of Émile Leonard, L'Illuminisme dans un protestantisme de constitution récente (Brésil), in Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger CXLV:4-6 (April-June 1955), p. 208.

2. Book review of J.-P. Sartre, Materialismus und Revolution, in Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger CXLV:4-6 (April-June 1955), p. 237.

1956

1. "Bergson 1859-1941" in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ed., Les Philosophes célèbres (Paris: Éditions d'Art Lucien Mazenod, 1956), pp. 292-299.
2. "La conception de la différence chez Bergson" in Les Etudes Bergsoniennes IV (1956), pp. 77-112.
3. Book review of Ferdinand Alquié, Descartes, l'homme et l'oeuvre, in Cahiers du Sud XLIII:337 (October 1956), pp. 473-475.

1957

1. Henri Bergson, Memoire et vie: textes choisis, ed. Gilles Deleuze (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1957).
2. Book review of Michel Bernard, La Philosophie religieuse de Gabriel Marcel (Étude critique), in Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger CXLVII: 1-3 (January-March 1957), p. 105.

1959

1. "Sens et valeurs" (on Nietzsche) in Arguments 15 (1959), pp. 20-28. Reprinted in revised form in Nietzsche et la philosophie.

1960

1. "Cours de M. Deleuze -- Sorbonne 1959-1960: Rousseau." Lecture notes in the archives of l'École Normale Supérieure de Saint-Cloud, series CI, number 12167. 27 typescript pages.

1961

1. "De Sacher-Masoch au masochisme" in Arguments 21 (1961), pp. 40-46. Reprinted in revised form in Presentation de Sacher-Masoch.
2. "Lucrece et le naturalisme" in Études philosophiques 1961:1, pp. 19-29. Reprinted in revised form as an appendix to Logique du sens.

1962

1. Nietzsche et la philosophie (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1962). English translation: Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

2. "250^e anniversaire de la naissance de Rousseau. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, précurseur de Kafka, de Céline et de Ponge" in Arts 872 (6-12 June 1962), p. 3

1963

1. La Philosophie critique de Kant: Doctrine des facultés (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1963). English translation: Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
2. "Mystère d'Ariane" (on Nietzsche) in Bulletin de la Société française d'études nietzschéennes (March 1963), pp. 12-15. Reprinted in Philosophie 17 (Winter 1987), pp. 67-72. Reprinted in revised form in Magazine littéraire 298 (April 1992), pp. 21-24. Revised version reprinted in Critique et clinique.
3. "L'Idée de genèse dans l'esthétique de Kant" in Revue d'Esthétique 16:2 (April-June 1963), pp. 113-136.
4. "Raymond Roussel ou l'horreur du vide" (book review of Foucault's Raymond Roussel) in Arts, 23 October 1963.
5. "Unité de 'A la recherche du Temps perdu'" in Révue de Métaphysique et de Morale 4 (October-December 1963), pp. 427-442. Reprinted in revised form in Marcel Proust et les signes.

1964

1. Marcel Proust et les signes (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1964). Second edition changes title to Proust et les signes and adds long essay entitled "La Machine littéraire." Third edition adds a conclusion entitled "Présence et fonction de la folie, l'Araignée." and divides "La Machine littéraire" into separate chapters. English Translation (of 2d ed.): Proust and Signs, trans. Richard Howard (New York: George Braziller, 1972)
2. "Il a été mon maître" (on Sartre) in Arts, 28 October-3 November 1964, pp. 8-9. Reprinted in Jean-Jacques Brochier, Pour Sartre (Paris: Éditions Jean-Claude Lattès, 1995), pp. 82-88.

1965

1. Nietzsche: sa vie, son oeuvre, avec un exposé de sa philosophie (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1965).

2. "Pierre Klossowski ou les corps-langage," in Critique 214 (1965), pp. 199-219. Reprinted in revised form as an appendix to Logique du sens.

1966

1. Le Bergsonisme (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1966). English translation: Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988).
2. "Philosophie de la Série noire" (on hard-boiled detective fiction) in Arts & Loisirs 18 (26 January-1 February 1966), pp. 12-13. Reprinted in Roman 24 (September 1988), pp. 43-47.
3. Book review of Gilbert Simondon, L'Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique, in Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger CLVI:1-3 (January-March 1966), pp. 115-118.
4. "L'homme, une existence douteuse" (book review of Foucault's Les Mots et les choses) in Le Nouvel Observateur, 1 June 1966, pp.32-34.
5. "Renverser le Platonisme" in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 71:4 (October-December 1966), pp. 426-438. Reprinted in revised form as an appendix to Logique du sens.

1967

1. "Conclusions: Sur la volonté de puissance et l'éternel retour," in Cahiers de Royaumont: Philosophie #VI: Nietzsche, ed. Gilles Deleuze (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1967), pp. 275-287.
2. --and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch: Présentation de Sacher-Masoch (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1967). Contains "Le froid et le cruel" by Deleuze and "Venus à la fourrure" by Sacher-Masoch. Reprinted by 10/18 (Paris, 1974). English translation: Masochism, trans. Jean Mitchell (New York: George Braziller, 1971); Reprinted by Zone Books (New York, 1989).
3. "Une Théorie d'autrui (Autrui, Robinson et le pervers)" (on Michel Tournier's Vendredi) in Critique 241 (1967), pp. 503-525. Reprinted in revised form as an appendix to Logique du sens, and as a postface to Tournier's Vendredi ou les limbes du Pacifique (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), pp. 257-283.
4. "Introduction" to Émile Zola, La Bête humaine in Oeuvres complètes, Vol. 6 (Paris: Cercle du livre précieux, 1967), ed. Henri Mitterand, pp. 13-21. Reprinted in revised

form as an appendix to Logique du sens, and as the preface to the Gallimard edition of La Bête humaine (Paris, 1977), pp. 7-24.

5. --with Michel Foucault: "Introduction générale" to Friedrich Nietzsche, Le Gai Savoir, et fragments posthumes (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), pp. i-iv. Nietzsche texts edited by Giorgio Colli and Massimo Montinari and translated by Pierre Klossowski.

6. "L'éclat de rire de Nietzsche" (interview with Guy Dumur) in Le Nouvel Observateur, 5 April 1967, pp. 40-41.

7. "Mystique et masochisme" (interview with Madeleine Chapsal) in La Quinzaine littéraire 25 (1-15 April 1967), pp. 12-13.

8. "La Méthode de Dramatisation," in Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie 61:3 (July-September 1967), pp. 89-118. Reprinted in revised form in Différence et répétition.

1968

1. Différence et répétition (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968). English translation: Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

2. Spinoza et le problème de l'expression (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1968). English translation: Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1990).

3. "A propos de l'édition des oeuvres complètes de Nietzsche: Entretien avec Gilbert [sic] Deleuze" (interview with Jean-Noël Vuarnet) in Les Lettres françaises 1223 (28 February-5 March 1968), pp. 5, 7, 9.

4. "Le Schizophrène et le mot" (on Carroll and Artaud) in Critique 255-256 (August-September 1968), pp. 731-746. Reprinted in revised form in Logique du sens.

1969

1. Logique du sens (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1969). Reprinted by 10/18 (Paris, 1973). English translation: The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

2. "Gilles Deleuze parle de la philosophie" (interview with Jeannette Columbel) in La Quinzaine littéraire 68 (1-15 March 1969), pp. 18-19.

3. "Spinoza et la méthode générale de M. Gueroult" (book review of Martial Gueroult's Spinoza, Vol. 1) in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 74:4 (October-December 1969), pp. 426-437.

1970

1. Spinoza: textes choisis (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1970). Second edition, Spinoza: Philosophie pratique (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1981), includes three new chapters (chapters three, four, and five), and deletes the selections from Spinoza's works. English translation (of 2d ed.): Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights, 1988).
2. "Schizologie," preface to Louis Wolfson, Le Schizo et les langues (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), pp. 5-23. Reprinted in revised form in Critique et clinique.
3. "Un nouvel archiviste" (book review of Michel Foucault, L'Archaeologie du savoir) in Critique 274 (March 1970), pp. 195-209. Reprinted as a separate edition by Fata Morgana (Paris, 1972). Reprinted in revised form in Foucault. English translation: "A New Archivist," trans. Stephen Muecke, in Peter Botsman, ed., Theoretical Strategies (Sydney: Local Consumption, 1982).
4. "Faille et Feux locaux: Kostas Axelos" in Critique 26:275 (April 1970), pp. 344-351.
5. "Proust et les signes" in La Quinzaine littéraire 103 (1-15 October 1970), pp. 18-21. Extract from "La Machine littéraire," essay included in the second edition of Proust et les signes.
6. Proust et les signes (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1970). Second edition of Marcel Proust et les signes, including new essay entitled "La Machine littéraire."
7. Footnote to Michel Foucault's "Theatrum Philosophicum" in Critique 282 (Nov. 1970), p. 904. English translation: in Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 191.
8. --with Félix Guattari: "Le synthèse disjonctive" in L'Arc 43: Klossowski, pp. 54-62. Reprinted in revised form in l'Anti-Oedipe.

1971

1. --with Michel Foucault, Denis Langlois, Claude Mauriac and Denis Perrier-Daville: "Questions à Marcellin" in Le Nouvel Observateur, 5 July 1971, p. 15.

1972

1. --with Félix Guattari: L'Anti-Oedipe: Capitalisme et schizophrénie, Vol. 1 (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1972). Second edition (1973) includes the appendix. "Bilan-programme pour machines-désirantes," originally published in Minuit 2 (1973). English translation: Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane.(New York: Viking Press, 1977), with a preface by Michel Foucault.
2. "Hume." in François Châtelet, ed., Histoire de la Philosophie, Vol. 1, Les Lumières (Paris: Hachette, 1972), pp. 65-78. Reprinted in Châtelet, ed., La Philosophie, Vol. 2, De Galilée à Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Verviers, Belgium: Marabout, 1979), pp. 226-239.
3. "A quoi reconnaît-on le structuralisme?" in François Châtelet, ed., Histoire de la philosophie, Vol. 8, Le XXe siècle (Paris: Hachette, 1972), pp. 299-335. Reprinted in Châtelet, ed., La Philosophie, Vol. 4, Au XXe siècle (Verviers, Belgium: Marabout, 1979), pp. 293-329.
4. "Trois problèmes de groupe," preface to Félix Guattari, Psychanalyse et transversalité (Paris: François Maspero, 1972), pp. i-xi. Reprinted in Chimères 23 (Summer 1994), pp. 7-21, under the title "Pierre-Félix." English translation: "Three Group Problems," trans. Mark Seem, in Semiotext(e): Anti-Oedipus, Vol. 2, No.3 (1977) , pp. 99-109.
5. --with Michel Foucault: "Les Intellectuels et le pouvoir" in L'Arc 49: Deleuze (1972: 2d ed., 1980), pp. 3-10. English translation: "Intellectuals and Power," in Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 205-217. Also published in Telos 16 (Summer 1973), pp. 103-109.
6. --with Félix Guattari: "Sur Capitalisme et schizophrénie" (interview with Catherine Backès-Clément) in L'Arc 49: Deleuze (1972: 2d ed., 1980), pp. 47-55. Reprinted under the title "Entretien sur l'Anti-Oedipe" in Pourparlers 1972-1990, pp. 24-38. English translation: "Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari on Anti-Oedipus," trans. Martin Joughin, in Negotiations 1972-1990 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 13-24.
7. Extracts from unpublished courses given by Deleuze at the École Normale Supérieure (rue d'Ulm) and at the Faculté de Vincennes in 1970-1971 and from Deleuze's intervention at a Proust colloquium at the E.N.S. on Jan. 22, 1972, cited in France Berçu, "Sed perseverare diabolicum" in L'Arc 49: Deleuze (1972), pp. 23-24, 26-30.
8. "Ce que les prisonniers attendent de nous..." (on the Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons), in Le Nouvel Observateur, 31 January 1972, p. 24.

9. --with Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Claude Mauriac, Jean-Marie Domenach, Hélène Cixous, Jean-Pierre Faye, Michel Foucault and Maurice Clavel: "On en parlera demain: Les dossiers (incomplets) de l'écran." in Le Nouvel Observateur, 7 February 1972, p. 25.
10. "Appréciation" (on Jean-François Lyotard, Discours, figure), in La Quinzaine littéraire 140 (1 May 1972), p. 19.
11. --with Félix Guattari: "Deleuze et Guattari s'expliquent..." (interview with Maurice Nadeau, Raphaël Pividal, François Châtelet, Roger Dadoun, Serge Leclair, Henri Torrubia, Pierre Clastres and Pierre Rose) in La Quinzaine littéraire 143 (16-30 June 1972), pp. 15-19. English translation: "In Flux," trans. Jeanine Herman, in Félix Guattari, Chaosophy (New York: Semiotext(e), 1995), pp. 93-117.
12. "Gilles Deleuze présente Hélène Cixous ou l'écriture stroboscopique" (book review of Cixous' novel Neutre), in Le Monde, No. 8576 (11 August 1972), p. 10.
13. --with Félix Guattari: "Capitalismo e schizofrenia" (interview with Vittorio Marchetti), in Tempi Moderni 12 (1972), pp. 47-64. English translation: "Capitalism and Schizophrenia," trans. Jarred Becker, in Félix Guattari, Chaosophy (New York: Semiotext(e), 1995), pp. 75-92.
14. "'Qu'est-ce que c'est, tes "machines désirantes" a toi?," introduction to Pierre Bénichou, "Sainte Jackie, Comedienne et Bourreau." in Les Temps Modernes 316 (November 1972), pp. 854-856.
15. "Joyce indirect" in Change 11 (1972), pp. 54-59. This article is a collection, by Jean Paris, of previously published texts by Deleuze on James Joyce.

1973

1. --with Gérard Fromanger: Fromanger, le peintre et le modèle (Paris: Baudard Alvarez, 1973). Contains "Le froid et le chaud" by Deleuze and reproductions of a series of Fromanger's paintings.
2. "Pensée nomade" and ensuing discussion, as well as discussion following the presentation of Pierre Klossowski, in Nietzsche aujourd'hui?, Vol. 1, Intensités (Paris: 10/18, 1973), pp. 105-121, 159-190. English translation: "Nomad Thought" (without discussion), trans. David B. Allison, in David B. Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977), pp. 142-149. Also published in Semiotext(e) 3:1 (1978), pp. 12-20.

3. --with Félix Guattari: "Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari" (interview with M.-A. Burnier), in C'est demain la veille, ed. M.-A. Burnier (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1973), pp. 137-161. English translation: "Capitalism: A Very Special Delirium," trans. David L. Sweet, in Félix Guattari, Chaosophy (New York: Semiotext(e), 1995), pp. 53-73.
4. --with Félix Guattari: "Bilan-programme pour machines désirantes" in Minuit 2 (January 1973), pp. 1-25. Reprinted as an appendix to the second edition of L'Anti-Oedipe. English translation: "Balance Sheet-Program for Desiring-Machines," trans. Robert Hurley, in Semiotext(e): Anti-Oedipus, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1977), pp. 117-135.
5. "Sex-Pol en acte," in Recherches 12, Grande Encyclopédie des Homosexualités: Trois milliards de pervers. (March 1973), pp. 28-31. The texts in this volume were all published anonymously.
6. Responses to a questionnaire on "La belle vie des gauchistes," sent by Guy Hocquenghem and Jean-François Bizot, published in Actuel 29 (March 1973), and reprinted in Hocquenghem, L'Après-Mai des faunes (Paris: Grasset, 1974), pp. 97, 101.
7. "Lettre à Michel Cressole," in Michel Cressole, Deleuze (Paris: Éditions universitaires, 1973), pp. 107-118. Also published in La Quinzaine littéraire 161 (1 April 1973), pp. 17-19. Reprinted as "Lettre à un critique sévère" in Pourparlers 1972-1990. English translation: "I Have Nothing to Admit" (partial translation), trans. Janis Forman, in Semiotext(e): Anti-Oedipus, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1977), pp. 110-116; a complete translation, with the title "Letter to a Harsh Critic," in Negotiations 1972-1990.
8. "Présence et Fonction de la Folie dans la recherche du Temps perdu," in Saggi e Ricerche di Letteratura Francese, Vol. 12, new series (Rome: Editore, 1973), pp. 381-390. Essay added to the third edition of Proust et les signes. English translation: "The Signs of Madness: Proust," trans. Constantin V. Boundas, in Boundas, ed., The Deleuze Reader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 127-135.
9. --with Félix Guattari: "14 Mai 1914. Un seul ou plusieurs loups?" (on Freud's Wolf Man), in Minuit 5 (September 1973), pp. 2-16. Reprinted in revised form in Mille plateaux. English translation: "May 14, 1914. One or several wolves?" trans. Mark Seem, in Semiotext(e): Anti-Oedipus, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1977).
10. "Relazione di Gilles Deleuze" and ensuing discussions, in Armando Verdiglione, ed., Psicanalisi e Politica: Atti del Convegno di studi tenuto a Milano l'8-9 maggio 1973 (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1973), pp. 7-11, 17-21, 37-40, 44-45, 169-172.
11. --with Félix Guattari and Michel Foucault: "Chapitre V: Le Discours du plan" (on urban space) in François Fourquet and Lion Murard, eds., Recherches 13: Les équipements de pouvoir (December 1973), pp. 183-186. Reprinted as "Formation des

équipements collectifs," chapter 4 in Les équipements du pouvoir (Paris: 10/18, 1976), pp. 212-220.

12. --with Félix Guattari: "Le Nouvel arpenteur: Intensités et blocs d'enfance dans 'Le Château,'" in Critique 319 (December 1973), pp. 1046-1054. Reprinted in revised form in Kafka: pour une littérature mineure.

13. --with Stefan Czerkinsky: "Faces et surfaces" (discussion and six drawings by Deleuze) in Deleuze and Michel Foucault, Mélanges: pouvoir et surface (Paris: no publisher listed, 1973), pp. 1-10.

1974

1. Preface to Guy Hocquenghem, L'Après-Mai des Faunes (Paris: Grasset, 1974), pp. 7-17.

2. --with Félix Guattari: "28 novembre 1947. Comment se faire un corps sans organes?" in Minuit 10 (September 1974), pp. 56-84. Reprinted in revised form in Mille plateaux. English translation: "How to Make Yourself a Body Without Organs." trans. Suzanne Guerlac. in Semiotext(e), Vol. 4, No. 1 (1981).

3. "Un art de planteur." in Deleuze, Jean-Pierre Faye, Jacques Roubaud and Alain Touraine. Deleuze - Faye - Roubaud - Touraine parlent de "Les Autres", un film de Hugo Santiago écrit en collaboration avec Jorge Luis Borges et Adolfo Bioy Casares (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1974), unpaginated.

1975

1. "Deux régimes de fous." in Armando Verdiglione, ed., Psychanalyse et sémiotique: Actes du colloque de Milan (Paris: 10/18, 1975), pp. 165-170.

2. "Schizophrénie et positivité du désir." in Encyclopædia Universalis, Vol. 14 (Paris: Encyclopædia Universalis, 1975), pp. 733-735.

3. --with Félix Guattari: Kafka: Pour une littérature mineure (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1975). English translation: Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).

4. --with Roland Barthes and Gerard Genette: "Table ronde." in Cahiers de Marcel Proust, New Series 7 (1975), pp. 87-115.

5. --with Jean-François Lyotard: "A propos du département de psychanalyse à Vincennes." in Les Temps Modernes 342 (January 1975), pp. 862-863. English

translation: "Concerning the Vincennes Psychoanalysis Department." in Jean-François Lyotard, Political Writings, trans. Bill Readings and Kevin Paul Geiman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 68-69.

6. "Ecrivain non: un nouveau cartographe" (book review of Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir) in Critique 343 (December 1975), pp. 1207-1227. Reprinted in revised form in Foucault.

1976

1. --with Félix Guattari: Rhizome: Introduction (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1976). Reprinted in revised form in Mille plateaux. English translation: "Rhizome," trans. Paul Foss and Paul Patton, in I and C 8 (1981). Also translated by John Johnston in Deleuze and Guattari, On the Line (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983).

2. Proust et les signes (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1976). Third edition of Marcel Proust et les signes. Includes a new conclusion. "Présence et fonction de la folie, l'Araignée."

3. "Avenir de linguistique." preface to Henri Gobard, L'Aliénation linguistique (Paris: Flammarion, 1976), pp. 9-14. Reprinted as "Les langues sont des bouillies où des fonctions et des mouvements mettent un peu d'ordre polémique" in La Quinzaine littéraire, 1-15 May 1976, pp. 12-13.

4. "Trois questions sur Six fois deux" (on Godard's television films), in Cahiers du Cinéma 271 (1976), pp. 5-12. Reprinted in Pourparlers 1972-1990. English translation: "Three Questions on 'Six Fois Deux,'" trans. Diane Matias, in Afterimage 7 (Summer 1978), pp. 113-119; and "Three Questions on Six Times Two," in Negotiations 1972-1990.

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