nificance is the reader’s absorption of the meaning into his or her own existence.

FOR FURTHER STUDY

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REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY This tradition was founded in the first years of this century by a group of students of the philosopher-psychologist Theodor Lipps (1851–1914) in the University of Munich. The members of the group had been inspired to rebel against their teacher Lipps, a proponent of PSYCHOLOGISM, by a certain JOHANNES DAUBERT, a talented organizer who had read EDMUND HUSSERL’S Logische Untersuchungen (1900–1901) and had persuaded his fellow students to accept this work as their philosophical bible. The term “phenomenological movement” was in fact first used by the group around Daubert to describe its activities, and already in 1900 ALEXANDER PFÄNDER published his Phänomenologie des Wollens, a work written under Lipps’s direction that reveals many of the characteristic features of later works in realistic phenomenology.

To understand the phenomenology of the Munich school it is useful to distinguish two strands within Husserl’s own thinking. On the one hand is the strand —represented by the slogan “Back to the matters themselves!” — of “phenomenological description.” This yields an object-oriented phenomenology that holds that we are in possession of a priori (which is to say: non-inductive) knowledge relating to certain fundamental structures in a wide range of different spheres of objects (for example, colors, tones, values, shapes). On the other hand is the strand of act-oriented phenomenology presented most clearly in Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie I (1913) and drawing to some degree on German idealist sources. Both strands are already present in the Logische Untersuchungen and both draw on work in metaphysics and on the descriptive psychology of FRANZ BRENTANO and his followers.

The Munich realists, now, remained faithful to the descriptive strand of object-oriented phenomenology and they rejected what they saw as the move to “transcendental idealism” in Husserl’s later writings. They preserved an interest in the work of Brentano and his school and in wider contemporary developments in logic, linguistics, and empirical and theoretical psychology, and they also followed Brentanians such as Alexius Meinong (1853–1920) in defending a realistic theory of values and of our knowledge of values. Realistic phenomenology thus has important roots in AUSTRIA.

The historical importance of the Munich group can be seen in the fact that phenomenology became important in Göttingen only after members of the Munich group, and especially ADOLF REINACH, had moved to join Husserl there, where they served to propagate the latter’s ideas and to assist in making them accessible to new generations of students. (HERBERT SPIEGELBERG refers in this connection to the “Munich invasion of Göttingen.”) Of the five initial editors of Husserl’s Jahrbuch, four — ALEXANDER PFÄNDER, MORITZ GEIGER, MAX SCHLER, and ADOLF REINACH — derive from Mu-

lich. Of these, Pfänder (1870–1941) is most familiar as the author of a phenomenological logic and of work in descriptive psychology on willing, motivation, etc. (Herbert Spiegelberg is the most prominent among his students.) Geiger is the author of work on phenomenological aesthetics, on emotions, and on the a priori foundations of geometry as a science of essential structures of space. Scheler is the author of *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (Formalism in ethics and nonformal ethics of value, 1913/1916), a defence of value realism and a critique of Kantian “formalist” ethics that also includes a detailed treatment of the aprioristic methodology of the Munich school. Reinach was the author of a work entitled “Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechts” (The a priori foundations of civil law), a contribution to the phenomenology of law and to the ontological foundations of the social sciences that was published in the first volume of Husserl’s *Jahrbüch* in 1913. The work presents in particular a theory of promising and of related “social acts,” and offers a remarkable anticipation of the later work on speech act theory of John Austin (1911–1960) and John Searle.

Other first generation members of the Munich group were THEODOR CONRAD, AUGUST GALLINGER, and WILHELM SCHAPP. The second generation of the realist phenomenological movement included: THEODOR CELMS, HEDWIG CONRAD-MARTIUS, ERICH HEINRICH, DIETRICH VON HILDEBRAND, AUREL KOLNAI, EDITH STEIN, and KURT STAVENHAGEN, as well as the already mentioned Spiegelberg. ROMAN INGARDEN, too, was allied with the Munich realists and was responsible for some of the most important criticisms of Husserl’s turn to idealism. Common to all of these thinkers is the attempt to describe in painstaking fashion — in a way that is opposed to all reductionism — the fundamental ontological principles governing different spheres, whether in language, law, action, perception, aesthetics, value, politics, or religion. Ingarden took realist phenomenology to Poland, where it had an influence also on the philosophical thinking of the young KAROL WOJTYŁA and is exemplified in the latter’s work on Scheler.

Contemporary philosophers allied with realistic phenomenology include Roderick Chisholm, J. N. FINDLAY, WŁODZIMIERZ GALEWICZ, GUIDO KÜNG, KEVIN MULGAN, DIETER MÜNCH, ANDRZEJ POLTAWSKI, KARL SCHUMANN (the historian of the movement), PETER SIMONS, BARRY SMITH, ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI, DALLAS WILLARD, DAVID WOODRUFF SMITH, and WOJCIECH ŻELANIEC. As will be clear, realistic phenomenology is set apart from later phenomenological schools by its closeness to certain tendencies in Anglo-American ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY. This holds most conspicuously of Reinach’s work on speech act theory and on the foundations of logic. The value realism of the Munich phenomenologists recalls the ethical work of G. E. Moore (1873–1958), and their work on essences recalls more recent work in the analytic tradition on essentialism and natural kinds and on the “universals” of language and cognition.

That Daubert’s work is little known follows from the fact that his many shorthand manuscripts, which remained unpublished in his lifetime, have only recently, through a massive effort directed by Karl Schuhmann, been brought into readable form. Daubert’s critique of Husserl’s idealistic turn rests on the thesis that consciousness functions in a normal way precisely when it “hits” an object, above all in veridical perception. Consciousness is then — for Daubert as for JEAN-PAUL SARTRE — exhausted in this relation to an object. It can be substantivized as an ego only by becoming deprived of this, its original function — for example through a special “phenomenological reduction”: only when consciousness withdraws from contact with reality does it acquire a pseudo-being of its own.

This entanglement of consciousness with reality — to the detailed elucidation of which many of Daubert’s manuscripts are dedicated — makes it impossible for phenomenology to achieve any “pure” description of an “absolute” consciousness. Husserl’s (Cartesian) argument in *Ideen I* to the effect that where one thing can turn out to be a hallucination, nothing will be safe against this possibility, is countered by Daubert with the thesis — since familiar from the work of MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, Wittgenstein, and Austin — that doubt, error, and hallucination make sense only when seen against the general background of the veridical awareness of reality. A single object of consciousness might turn out not to be real, “but only with regard to the standard of reality itself.”

Further contributions to our understanding of the inextricable entanglement of consciousness and world are to be found in the work of Daubert, Reinach, Pfänder, and Ingarden on facts and states of affairs. Already Husserl had seen in the *Logische Untersuchun-
gen that genuine, veridical ("fulfilled") experience of reality is possible not only via perception but also via judgment. The world itself (the realm of the "matters themselves") is correspondingly organized not merely in terms of the objects, qualities, events, and processes that are given (for example) in perception, but also in terms of the states of affairs that make our judgments true. Pfänder distinguishes in his *Logik* (1921) two varieties of judgment-correlate: the intentional *Sachverhalt* that is "projected" in dynamic fashion and simultaneously posited as real through the act of judgment; and the "Selbstverhalten des Gegenstands" on the side of the object itself — a segment of reality that is "thrown into relief" through the given act. A judgment is true precisely when its intentional state of affairs stands in perfect coincidence with the corresponding "disposition of the things" on the side of the object. Logic, accordingly, as science of truth and falsehood, must be built on the theory of *Sachverhalte* as its basis, and a conception of the laws of logic as "nothing other than general principles expressing relations between states of affairs" was worked out in detail by Reinach in his essay "Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils" of 1911.

It was against the background of this work on logic, language, and intentional directedness that Reinach put forward in 1913 the first systematic theory of the phenomena of promising, questioning, requesting, commanding, accusing, etc., phenomena that he himself collects together under the heading "social acts." Reinach's work provides a rich taxonomy of the various different speech act varieties and of their possible modifications. It contains a detailed treatment of the quasi-legal status of speech acts and of the relations between legal and ethical obligations and also of the relations between the a priori laws governing social formations of different sorts and the enactments of lawmakers. It also contains a discussion of one feature of speech acts that seems hardly to have been dealt with in the later Anglo-American literature — that feature whereby such actions may be performed by proxy, as when an action of promising or commanding or inviting is carried out by one person in the name of another.

Husserl had distinguished in the *Logische Untersuchungen* between the "quality" and "ideal content" of an act — thus, for example, between the quality of an act of judgment and its ideal content (as a judgment to the effect that snow is white, that Fritz is saluting, etc.). Such ideal contents or "propositions" can be abstractly discriminated in contexts of quite different sorts. Thus we can judge that a given proposition is true; but we can also regret that it is true, and we can wish or doubt or hypothesize that it be true, and so on. As Pfänder pointed out in his *Logik*, there is a veritable plethora of "propositional formations" that result thereby. He mentions questions, assertions, reports, thanks, recommendations, requests, warnings, allowings, promising, inviting, summonings, incitements, prescribing, orders, decrees, prohibitions, commands, laws — all of which share with judgments the fact that their ideal contents are propositional in nature.

By developing a scientific taxonomy of such propositional formations, the Munich phenomenologists were able to develop a theory of the communicative aspects of language more sophisticated than that of Husserl, who was to some degree blind to the phenomena in question by virtue of his insistence that language and linguistic meaning is present in unmodified form even in silent speech.

Reinach's own work on speech act theory was influenced not only by the work of Husserl and his Munich colleagues, but also by his background as a student of law, which helped him to do justice to the legal and normative aspects of the phenomenon of promising, aspects that had been neglected in traditional accounts (for example, of Hume and Lipps). The latter had seen the action of promising either as the expression of an act of will or as the declaration of an intention to act in the interests of the party in whose favor this declaration is made. The most obvious inadequacy of this account is that it throws no light on the problem of how an utterance of the given sort can give rise to a mutually correlated obligation and claim on the part of promisor and promisee. The bare intention to do something has, after all, no quasi-legal consequences of this sort, and it is difficult to see why things should be different in reflection of the fact that such an intention is brought to expression in language.

Reinach's thesis, now, is that to do justice to phenomena such as claim and obligation, it is necessary to recognize that speech acts are not built up out of independently existing (mental and linguistic) parts: they are structures of a new sort, within which mental and linguistic aspects can be distinguished only abstractly (and not as separable elements). Such structures are
marked further by the fact that they demand an alien subject toward whom they are directed and by the fact that the utterance-aspect must of necessity be registered or grasped by the subject in question. A promise or a command must be received and understood by the one to whom it is addressed (something that does not apply, for example, to an act of blessing, forgiving, or cursing).

A promise, then, cannot be identical with the expression or intimation of an act of will or of an intention, because some of the acts that underlie a promise are such that they are simply not able to exist outside the compass of a whole of just this sort. And similarly there is no independent and self-contained mental experience that is somehow brought to expression in the issuing of a command. Hence, a fortiori, social acts of these kinds cannot be mere reports of such experiences.

Reinach’s treatment of speech act phenomena thus belongs neither to the province of logic or philosophy of language nor to the philosophy of law or to the theory of action. Rather, his work shows that speech acts and related phenomena are structures of a transcategorial sort, so that their proper treatment would require a theory embracing within a single frame not merely the linguistic and logical aspects, but also the psychological, legal, and action-theoretic dimensions of the phenomena in question. There is, now, a common tendency within the history of philosophy to seek to reduce transcategorial structures down to one single dimension. It can be seen at work in the “methodological solipsism” of CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY, which seeks to reduce all phenomena to the single dimension of “constituting consciousness.” But it is at work also in the tendency among analytic philosophers to conceive claims, obligations, values, etc., as mere reflections of our ways of speaking. This tendency was resisted by the Munich phenomenologists.

From the realistic perspective the world contains promissary acts, commands, claims, obligations, etc., just as it contains instances of biological and logical species such as lion and tiger or judging and inferring. As Husserl saw in the third of his Logische Untersuchungen, the species that people the world can be divided into two sorts. On the one hand are independent species whose instances require specific instantiations of no other species in order to exist. Lion might be taken as an example of an independent species in this sense. On the other hand are dependent species whose instances do not exist in and of themselves but only in association with instances of complementary species of determinate sorts. And then, as Husserl emphasized, the relations of complementation here are not arbitrary; rather, they reflect “firmly determined relations of necessity . . . which vary with the species of dependent contents and accordingly prescribe one sort of completion to one of them, another sort of completion to another.”

Judging is an example of a dependent species in Husserl’s sense: a judging exists only as the judging of some specific subject (as a smile smiles only in a human face). Promising, too, is an example of a dependent species. Here, however, we see that the dependence is multifold: a promise requires that there be also at least the species claim, obligation, utterance, and registering act, reticulated together with language-using subjects within the framework of a single whole of a quite specific transcategorial sort. Moreover, the mental acts that underlie a promise are themselves such that they are not able to exist outside the compass of such a whole. Hence we have to deal here with a relation of two-sided dependence: the promise is as a matter of necessity such that it cannot exist except in association with an intending act, but this intending act is itself of a special (promising) sort and is as a matter of necessity of such a nature that it can exist only in the framework of the given whole. It is only superficially similar to an intending act of the sort that can exist outside the framework of a promise.

Promising involves, then, a certain sort of complex structure in reality. Each such structure will consist of instances of given species reticulated together in specific ways. Such structures can be understood on two distinct levels. On the one hand they exist in re, i.e., to the extent that their constituent species are instantiated here and now in some region of empirical reality. On the other hand, however, they are from the structural point of view always structures among the corresponding species, and the latter may be realized, in principle, at any time or place. In this respect they have the character of universals, and the dependence relations that tie them together have the character not of contingent associations, but of necessary laws.

The structures in question are therefore both necessary and universal. Now as is well known, Kant had specified “necessity and strict universality” as “sure
and certain marks" of the a priori that "belong together inextricably." His remarks to this effect are of course formulated within the wider context of his own epistemological theory of the a priori. The Munich phenomenologists, however, turn the tables on Kant, exploiting the features of necessity and strict universality as the basis of an ontological theory of what they call "a priori structures" or "essential connections" (Wesenszusammenhinge or Wesensgesetze). Such structures do indeed have certain epistemological peculiarities. That a promise cannot exist except in association with a mutually correlated claim and obligation is something we know not merely through experiment and induction ("a posteriori," in the usual epistemological sense of this term), but rather because the relation in question possesses an intrinsic intelligibility of its own: it can be grasped immediately, in the way that we grasp, for example, that a triangle is not a circle, that blue is not a shape, or that nothing can be simultaneously red and green all over. This, however, is for realist phenomenologists a consequence of their necessity and universality as ontologically conceived.

At the core of realistic phenomenology, now, lies the thesis that such intelligible, universal, and necessary structures may call forth entire disciplines of an a priori sort. The family of such disciplines includes much of logic and mathematics, as well as Reimach's a priori theory of law. And it includes also what Husserl and his Munich followers called "phenomenology."

FOR FURTHER STUDY


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REASON

Reason is an issue that leads to the core of EMDUH HUSSELR'S CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY. His phenomenological analysis of reason can be found in Part IV of the Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie I (1913) and in the third of the Cartesianische Meditationen [1931]. The place of these parts in both books indicates that the phenomenology of reason is the final stage of the analysis of intentional acts and of active synthesis. In the Third Meditation Husserl in addition points out that essential parts of the phenomenology of reason had to be used naively in the considerations preparing the first exposition of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. A correct and complete understanding of the concepts used in the development of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction is possible only with the aid of the corroborated phenomenology of reason. This is not a vicious circle. It is possible to develop a phenomenology of reason in phenomenological psychology, i.e., in the natural or mundane attitude. The phenomenology of reason is also presupposed in the idea of a telos of humanity in the Die Krisis des europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (1936). A phenomenology of reason is, therefore, of central significance in phenomenology. If phenomenology is understood as the replacement of traditional first philosophy and if it is understood as transcendental phenomenology, then a phenomenology of reason is of central significance in phenomenology.

Reason is not a name for a specific faculty of the