A Phenomenological Critique of Ratcliffe’s Existential Feeling: Affect as Temporality

Abstract:

Matthew Ratcliffe’s model of existential feelings can be seen as a critical engagement with perspectives common to analytic, theory of mind and psychological orientations that view psychological functions such as cognition and affectivity within normative objective propositional frameworks. Ratcliffe takes a step back from and re-situates objective reifications within an interactive subject-object matrix inclusive of the body and the interpersonal world. In doing so, he turns a mono-normative thinking into a poly-normative one, in which determinations of meaning and significance are relative to the changing structural coherence of felt bodily and inter-socially shaped schemes of interaction. And yet, from the phenomenological vantages of Husserl, Gendlin and Heidegger, Ratcliffe’s approach retains the metaphysical presupposition of subject-object relationality as interacting inherences, with a separate causative glue necessary to provide for the means of their connection. Ratcliffe re-purposed Damasio’s concept of background feeling and dressed it up in the garb of phenomenology, but as such it remains a reciprocally causal model of psychological function.

What Heidegger’s Being-in-the-World, Merleau-Ponty’s figure-background structure of corporeal inter-subjectivity, Gendlin’s implicit intricacy and Husserl’s reduced transcendental ego have in common is a radicalized notion of temporality that overcomes the split between feeling and thinking informing Ratcliffe’s understanding of being ‘immersed in’ and connected to a world, and thus abandons the need to posit bodily feeling as a ‘glue’ organizing and maintaining the meaningful structure of consciousness of a world. Temporality, not the empirically causal body, provides the basis of affect, cognition and the organizational glue for structures of meaning.

Introduction

Matthew Ratcliffe’s model of existential feelings can be seen as a critical engagement with perspectives common to analytic, theory of mind and psychological orientations that view psychological functions such as cognition and affectivity within normative objective propositional frameworks in which affect is either peripheral to cognitive processes or only directed toward internal bodily feeling. Ratcliffe takes a step back from and re-situates objective reifications within an interactive subject-object matrix inclusive of the body and the interpersonal world. In doing so, he turns a mono-normative thinking into a poly-normative one, in which determinations of meaning and significance are oriented by the changing structural coherence of world-directed felt bodily and inter-socially shaped schemes of interaction.

The aim of this paper is to show that while Ratcliffe’s existential feeling significantly transforms Damasio’s concept of background feeling, in dressing it up in the garb of phenomenological philosophical conceptions, he neglects to follow Husserl, Gendlin and Heidegger in establishing
a radicalized concept of temporality as the ground of affectivity. Whereas the above phenomenologists fuse affect and intention within the moment of time itself as tripartite structure of temporal becoming, Ratcliffe founds affect and intention as distinguishable structural aspects of a reciprocally causal model. As a result, Ratcliffe substitutes polarizing, semi-arbitrary conditionings for a more intimate, intricate and unitary process of affective-connative meaning creation.

**Existential Feeling as Global Situatedness:**

In the early 2000's Ratcliffe introduced the outlines of what was to become his model of existential feelings, incorporating elements of Damasio’s background feeling.

> “According to Damasio, background feelings are ever-present, although ordinarily tacit. They serve to structure the everyday ways in which we encounter the world, the basic ways in which we find ourselves in the world” (Ratcliffe 2002, p.298)

Damasio wrote: “...I am postulating another variety of feeling which I suspect preceded the others in evolution. I call it background feeling because it originates in “background” body states rather than in emotional states. It is not the Verdi of grand emotion, nor the Stravinsky of intellectualized emotion but rather a minimalist in tone and beat, the feeling of life itself, the sense of being.” (1995, p. 150)

Ratcliffe (2020) fleshed out his approach with elements drawn from the phenomenologies of Merleau-Ponty, Husserl and Heidegger:

> “Both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty add that localized experiences of possibility presuppose a more-enveloping orientation, a sense of belonging to the world. When I see or think about something, when I am afraid of something, and when I am in a bad mood about a wider situation, I already find myself in the world, in a way than differs in kind from intentional experiences in one or another modality (e.g. imagining, perceiving, or remembering something). This ‘world’ is presupposed by intentional states of whatever kind with whatever content. We can think of it in terms of a possibility space, a receptivity to types of possibility.” “Things are experienced as significant to us, as mattering to us, in various different ways, something that involves a sense of the possibilities they offer.”

> “...what Heidegger in *Being and Time* calls ‘Being-in-the-world’ is exactly what we gain reflective access to by performing the phenomenological reduction...This conveys much the same broad conception of ‘world’ that we find in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty:...something that we are already practically, unreflectively immersed in when we experience something, think about it or act upon it.”

> These globally structured patterns of existential feeling amount to “‘ways of finding oneself in the world’. As such, they are what we might call ‘pre-intentional’, meaning that they determine the kinds of intentional states we are capable of adopting, amounting to a ‘shape’ that all experience takes on.” (Ratcliffe 2015)

**The Affective ‘glue’ organizing existential feeling:**

If for Ratcliffe, a global structure of feeling orients the significance for us of the objects and persons we interact with in the world, how is this structure organized and sustained? What is the
Ratcliffe’s causal reinforcement-based model of affect assigns it the role of biasing appraisal via selectively guiding attention toward a heightening or lowering of perceived significance of various world events. The role of affective attunement is to produce “changes in the types of significant possibility to which one is receptive.” (Ratcliffe 2016) “...existential feelings determine the kinds of noetic and noematic feelings that one is open to. “...the existential feeling sets the parameters for the kinds of more localized experience one is capable of having.”(2016). “Emotions “tune us to the world, making it relevant to us by opening up certain possibilities for explicit deliberation and closing off others. “(Ratcliffe 2002)

Bodily dispositions can actively direct one toward salient objects in one’s world, but are “equally implicated in feeling unable to act upon something. Passivity in the face of threat may involve inclinations to withdraw, to retreat, along with the absence of any other salient possibilities.” (Ratcliffe 2015). For instance, in depression one cannot find the motivation to act to change one’s situation (a confident ‘I can’ becomes ‘I can’t’). Solipsistic self-perpetuating narratives, reinforced and organized by feelings of avoidance and reduced salience, tell one why they shouldn’t or can’t connect with others.

“In any experience, only certain possibilities are offered up and only some of these appear especially salient. According to both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the possibilities that show up are constituted by bodily dispositions. These dispositions shape all experience and show up as potentialities that belong to objects. The different ways in which the body responds to things amount to different systems of concrete possibilities. “(Ratcliffe 2010)

In order to situate Ratcliffe’s orientation relative to the phenomenologists whose ideas he incorporates, it is helpful to see how he makes use of Damasio’s neuroscience-inspired theorizing on the relations of affect and intention.

“...emotions play a role in constraining and structuring the realm of explicit deliberation, restricting deliberation to a small number of options and structuring patterns of reasoning, so that we remain focused and relevant in our activities, able to act towards goals without becoming distracted by trivia. Thus emotions and feelings serve to constrain and focus our attention, so that we only consider from a pre-structured set of options. Damasio’s (1995, 1996) more specific hypothesis is that emotions are cognitively mediated body states. He christens this theory the “somatic marker hypothesis”. The idea is that somatic (body) signals are associated with perceptual stimuli, either as a result of innate or learned neural connections, and thus “mark” those stimuli. Different perceptions can be associated with various kinds of body states, which may serve as alarm signals or, alternatively, as enticing invitations. According to Damasio, a complex of such signals focuses and structures our cognitive interactions with the world. Once we incorporate complex learned associations between perceptions and body states, a vast web of somatic markers can develop. These signals serve to eliminate certain possibilities, which feel bad, from a choice set and focus deliberation upon other feel good signals. Thus cognition is constrained, enabled and structured by a background of emotion-perception correlations, that manifest themselves as a changing background of implicit representations of body states.”(Ratcliffe 2002)
Let me encapsulate Ratcliffe’s perspective on the role of affect in determining the ways that the world can make sense to us. Ratcliffe says emotion and embodiment are “incorporated as essential components in cognition”, but emotion and cognition are clearly not identical; “...emotions and moods are not explicitly cognitive but neither are they independent of cognition” (Ratcliffe 2002, p.299). They originate as bodily sensations structuring cognition from outside of it. Emotion and cognition can 'conflict' and emotion can “override cognitive judgement” (p.299). Ratcliffe cites Ramachandran’s clinical observations of individuals with anosognosia, who apparently distort environmental information which contradicts an internally generated narrative. Ramachandran attributes this behavior to damage to connections between emotion and cognitive centers. Ratcliffe concludes from this that, in typically functioning persons, emotion signals from the body are presumed to pack a contentful punch large enough to break through a psychological narrative's resistances where weaker percepts from the environment cannot.

It seems, then, that for Ratcliffe, intention is a capacity for manipulating objects of thought, but emotion, as conditioning valuative valence, provides the criteria for such processing. He is apparently not able to find the resources strictly within what he thinks of as intentional thought to de-center thinking processes, because he treats cognition as tending to form temporarily self-perpetuating narratives which can distort or keep out contradictory input from the world. So he relies on the body, in the form of emotion cues, to come to the rescue and bring the stalled cognitive apparatus back in touch with a dynamically changing world. The stimulus of emotion is assumed to intervene in order to infuse a stagnant narrative with a new direction and meaning.

(FOOTNOTE: For Ratcliffe emotions selectively organize cognition not just by prompting the interruption of a current narrative, but also by facilitating the assimilation of new events into an ongoing context. Ratcliffe (2002) cites Ramachandran’s account of individuals with Capgras syndrome as evidence that affect can serve to inform the cognitive system that a previously experienced object is similar or identical to a current one.)

Ratcliffe (2002) asserts: “Without emotional responses, one is not uprooted from a coherent interpretation of events...” (p.306). Although these emotion cues are claimed to be inseparably linked with conceptual processes, this linkage amounts to more of a concatenation between pre-existing states than a radical indissociability. This may be due to the belief that feeling originates developmentally within the individual independently from cognition, as action readiness circuits that, Panksepp (1998) claims, are “completely biological and affective but..., through innumerable sensory-perceptual interactions with our environments, [become] inextricably mixed with learning and world events” (p.303)

Illustrating the flipside of the same thinking, Ratcliffe (2017) delineates situations in which emotions associate themselves with intentional states in maladaptive ways.

“We might say that certain emotions are properly associated only with certain other kinds of intentional state. This could be understood in various ways: an “improper” association might be regarded as epistemically or behaviorally misleading, irrational, biologically dysfunctional, socially...
Ratcliffe relies on the adaptationist presumption that meaning is shaped in a semi-arbitrary way by inputs which come to influence it from a pre-existing outside. I don’t think Ratcliffe’s model of affectivity has abandoned the pre-suppositions animating Damasio’s (2000) claim: “...as a result of powerful learning mechanisms such as conditioning, emotions of all shades eventually help connect homeostatic regulation and survival values to numerous events and objects in our autobiographical experience” (p.54). According to this thinking, feeling processes adapt and co-ordinate with a partially independent cogitative environment, authorizing adaptationism as a causal explanation of origins.

Viewed as an adaptation, emotion is linked to a milieu outside of itself and with which the logic of the bond is indirect, partially arbitrary in the sense that it is capable of being made irrational, as is supposedly the case with nonadaptive feeling-intending associations. There is a partial independence assumed between the participant aspects of reciprocally adaptive interactions. The cobbling can be uncobbled unilaterally. Emotion can aid reason, but can also be dysfunctional.

It is important to mention that Ratcliffe’s thinking deviates from Damasio’s empirical model in a number of significant respects.

“Although I will suggest that Damasio’s conception of emotional feeling is plausible in at least some respects, I do not wish to endorse the way he uses the terms ‘emotion’ and ‘feeling’. And what I will say here does not require me to accept the empirical details of his account, such as some of the specific claims he makes about the relationship between somatic markers and decision-making, and about the roles of particular brain areas.” (Ratcliffe 2010)

More specifically, for Ratcliffe (2008) “Existential feelings are both ‘feelings of the body’ and ‘ways of finding oneself in a world’.” We don’t simply experience body states as an inward focused datum. Rather, bodily feeling is the vehicle through which we encounter the world.

Slaby provides this useful elaboration of how bodily feeling can be world-oriented:

“feeling bad emotionally (as opposed to feeling bad due to physical illness or injury) is not a disembodied, intellectual appreciation of things going badly – although it surely is some kind of appreciation of things going badly. It is also and essentially a bodily experience. If you are angry and feel offended by your colleague, you have a self-disclosing bodily feeling. It is not easy to describe it exactly, but I think you have the physical impression of being “pushed down”, of being literally “oppressed” by an external force. In this way, emotional pain is essentially bodily. Its bodily nature is not a separable “aspect” that is merely added on to an otherwise purely intellectual appreciation of what’s going on; rather, it is the very core of the painful emotional experience.” (Slaby 2008)

From the vantage of the present discussion, Ratcliffe’s most contentious claim concerning what separates his approach from empirical, neurobiological theories of affect is philosophical. Ratcliffe claims to assign primacy to phenomenological over naturalistic, scientific accounts of emotion and other psychological phenomena.
“The unquestioned givenness of the objective world that is constitutive of scientific descriptions cannot capture the way in which the given is disclosed by a meaning-giving background. Thus, if anything, it is the transcendental, meaning-giving account that has ontological priority over an objective/causal description.” (Ratcliffe 2002)

In making this assertion, Rattcliffe undoubtedly appreciates that there is no one-size-fits-all notion of the natural or the empirical. The history of science is a genealogy of changing philosophies of the empirical and the natural. What he has set his sights on is a presumption common to contemporary versions of empiricism: i.e. that there are facts of the matter that can be teased apart from the personally appearing, contextually situated ways in which matters are meaningfully relevant to us.

I believe that Ratcliffe’s approach does indeed expose the limitations of such forms of objective naturalism. But I also maintain that, rather than abandoning a causal motivational grounding entirely, Ratcliffe has instead replaced it with a more sophisticated brand of causality. There are a number of perspectives within the larger phenomenological philosophical community which are compatible with Ratcliffe’s motivational account (Stein, Scheler, Henry) but there are certain other phenomenologists from whose vantage point Ratcliffe’s thinking retains remnants of naturalist naïveté, or, as Husserl puts it, “falls a victim to the inconsistency of a transcendental philosophy that stays within the natural realm.” In particular, Husserl, Heidegger and Gendlin offer what I have referred to elsewhere as radically temporal phenomenologies which cannot be subsumed under Ratcliffe’s systematics without losing what is most essential to them. My interest in this paper is to persuade that Ratcliffe’s particular interpretation of phenomenology lacks a core concept defining the approaches of Husserl, Gendlin and Heidegger, the fusion of affectivity, intention and temporality.

**Husserl’s Transcendental Affect**

Ratcliffe insists that affectivity and intentionality are inseparable, And yet, it is significant that he still finds it coherent to imagine what a situation might be like in which affect was absent from our experience of the world.

“...affect binds us to things, making them relevant and ‘lighting up’ aspects of the world in such a way as to call forth actions and thoughts. Without the world-structuring orientation that they provide, we are disoriented, cut off from the world, which no longer solicits thoughts and actions and is consequently devoid of value. In effect, [William] James is saying that our very sense of reality is constituted by world-orienting feelings that bind us to things.” (Ratcliffe 2005)

“...The absence of emotion comprises a state of cognitive and behavioural paralysis rather than fully functional cognition, stripped of ‘mere’ affect. A phenomenology without affect is a phenomenology that guts the world of all its significance. The experienced world is ordinarily enriched by the feelings that we sew into it, that imbue it with value and light it up as an arena of cognitive and behavioural possibilities. So cognition without affect is not, according to James, in any sense complete. It is an extreme phenomenological privation that strips the world of all
meaning, a state of depression or ‘melancholia’. In such a state, James describes how ‘the world now looks remote, strange, sinister, uncanny. Its color is gone, its breath is cold, there is no speculation in the eyes it glares with’” (James 1902: p. 151), (Ratcliffe 2005).

Slaby concurs: “Nothing but “neutral states of intellectual perception” would remain, as William James famously put it, when we “try to abstract from consciousness [of an emotion] all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms” (James 1884, 193).” “Not all human experience is clearly marked as hedonic, and so not all human experience is affective. “(Slaby 2008)

In sum, the experienced world without affect is an ‘extreme privation’, a world of paralysis, meaninglessness, disorientation. Even if Ratcliffe conjures the idea of affectless cognition only as a purely hypothetical thought experiment or limit case, the fact that he can associate any qualities at all with such a world indicates that he is operating from a concept of affect that does not treat it as a philosophical a priori. But what would such a philosophically grounding approach to affect look like? Imagine that instead of hypothesizing awareness without affect, we were to place time out of bounds. It is immediately clear that any attempt to describe the qualitative features of one’s experience of such a world (meaningless, paralyzed, disoriented, etc) would be pointless, since without time there could be no awareness and no world. If we were to re-construe affect in such a way that it became as irreducible to experience as time, then it would no longer be a matter of deriving feeling, mood, emotion and other forms of affectivity from adaptive patterns of contingent interactive bodily and interpersonal schemes, but of locating their origin in the basis of being itself. This is what Husserl attempted with his model of temporal constitution.

Husserl’s grounding of affectivity in inner time consciousness is a transcendental grounding, not a naturalistic one. Underlying and founding all strata of bodily and interpersonal dynamics is the assimilative basis of temporal constitution as retention, primal impression and protention. This is Husserl’s primordial pre-condition for any world, any being.

The subjective and objective sides of the structure of temporal synthesis are not separate entities but only poles of a single act of intentional sense. In this synthesis, both the subject and the object pole contribute their own quality of feeling to what ‘an object is for the subject’ in its valutative, affective sense. The energetic dynamism of feeling isn’t something added to a content of perception from outside of it, in causal relation with it as agent of conditioning. Meaning content implies its own affective force, the affective signature is intrinsic to the subjective and objective sides. This is what constitutes the ‘life’ in what Husserl calls the living present. The aesthetic qualities contributed by the objective pole (noema) are its vivacity. Husserl describes the aesthetic allure contributed by the objective pole as “that varying vivacity of a lived experience, of a datum of consciousness.” (Passive and Active Synthesis, p.214)

And an affective signature is intrinsic to the subject, in the form of desires, tendencies, strivings, anticipations, aimed at the objective pole. As Husserl says, there are rays emanating from subjective side to the objective side and vice-versa. Both affects originating on the subjective
side and those originating on the objective side are implied in all intentional meaning. The always present affective qualities of the object (beautiful, pleasurable, unpleasant) are not made thematic in objectivating acts (perceiving a spatial object), but they are in valuative acts. And one’s affective, hedonic attitude toward the object of an intention (disappointed, depressed, elated, bored, frightened) may not be thematized in theoretical interest, but will appear in our practical attitude toward the world.

Natural bodily structures are not the basis of affect for Husserl. If one wants to still talk about a body, what remains of the body for Husserl once one has dug beneath all the sedimented layers of constituted meaning, would be the ‘body’ of the retention-impression-protention triad of time consciousness. Husserl’s starting point in time consciousness is already an exposure to the foreign from within the resources of subjectivity, prior to any configurational-corporeal constitution, prior to any empirically defined physiological or psychological structures, prior to human beings, but presupposed by them. Affect is not an evolutionary device, it is synonymous with entity, being, existence, object, subject. Being as the moment of experience is simultaneously the feeling of being affected and the feeling of anticipatory striving. These precede the notion of a body as biological organism, and instead is a pre-condition for being of any sort. Feeling, understood most primordially, is simply movement (not in empirical but subjective space), transition, becoming, time.

Footnote: Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s (2011) grounding of affectivity in activity recalls Husserl, but her rendering of it in terms of spatio-temporal movement and kinesthesia remains at the level of empirical space and time and fails to ground feeling relative to more primordial notions of internal temporality and spatiality common to Husserl, Gendlin, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger.

Husserl’s model of inner time consciousness generates a primordial motivational principle in the guise of associative synthesis. Unlike naturalist causal forms of association, in which the bond between elements is externally conditioned, in Husserl’s motivational model noetic anticipatory assimilation dominates the foreignness of the noematic object pole. That is to say, associative synthesis achieves a belongingness between the constituting and constituted poles as a unity of identification, homogeneity, similarity, likeness.

“Thus each everyday experience involves an analogizing transfer of an originally instituted objective sense to a new case, with its anticipative apprehension of the object as having a similar sense. To the extent that there is givenness beforehand, there is such a transfer. “(Cartesian Meditations, p.111)

“all immediate association is an association in accordance with similarity. Such association is essentially possible only by virtue of similarities, differing in degree in each case, up to the limit of complete likeness. Thus all original contrast also rests on association: the unlike comes to prominence on the basis of the common. Homogeneity and heterogeneity, therefore, are the result of two different and fundamental modes of associative unification.”(Experience and Judgement)

“...consciousness is connected in the most general way to another consciousness by a commonality that is correlatively noetic and noematic; and all connection is connection through "commonality." through uniformity and similarity.”(Passive and Active Synth, p.485)

This means that the capacity of experiences to delight or disturb us, particularly when it comes to profoundly self-affecting valuative concerns, is much more a function of the relation of the
event to our strivings and anticipations than it is to whatever qualitites of feeling (enticement, allure, vivacity) are contributed by the object pole in itself.

If we were simply to conclude that an anticipatory tendency, a general striving toward ‘possibilities’ of fulfillment, characterizes at all levels Husserl’s project, then we could justifiably claim that he has this in common with Ratcliffe, whose approach also is oriented around anticipatory temporality and possibilities. But it is not simply that Husserl claims protention as a general going beyond itself of one’s experience of an object, rather that this going beyond itself has the character of a peculiar implicative consistency.

We strive to assimilate experiences. We see the centrality of similarity manifest itself at all levels of constitution, in the subjective achievement of synthetic unities, analogical apperceptive pairing, associative relationality, correlations, harmonious fulfillments, subjective ‘mineness’, variations, flowing multiplicities, congruities, nexuses, coherences, etc. Even in unfulfillment, negation, senselessness, irrationality, alienation there is no experience in consciousness that is not in an overarching way a variation on a thematics for Husserl, a similarity-within-difference.

Protention and retention are included in what Husserl calls a “universal drive intentionality (Treibintentionalität).” Experience is being affected and changed by what one anticipatorily aims at through striving. As Bernet says “this originary process, as a life-process, is not simply an automatic process; it has a goal and the tendency to draw near to this goal.” (Bernet 2010, p.16).

The radical belonging between self and world that associative synthesis instantiates renders all experience as intrinsically relevant and significant based on some basis of commonality between my past and what presents itself to me. By contrast, in causal models, personal experience accommodates, adapts and shapes itself in accordance with bodily and interpersonal inputs that impinge on it in semi-arbitrary ways. This makes such models incapable of manifesting relevance and salience in Husserl’s radical sense. Not only is relevance not a given, but when it is achieved, it amounts to an externally imposed association between elements of bodily feeling and thought.

We can see this difference in a comparison between Husserl’s motivational grounding of intentional experience in associative synthesis and Ratcliffe’s claim that bodily felt dispositions constrain and orient our receptivity to the world.

Ratcliffe explains:

“The extent to which a possibility is enticing is a matter of bodily feeling; it is through the feeling body that things show up as salient.” (Ratcliffe 2008) “I have argued – drawing on the work of Husserl (1989), amongst others – that experience of worldly possibilities is inextricable from a sense of bodily dispositions... loss of enticing possibilities from the world is bound up with a lethargic body that is not stirred into action by its surroundings. Again and again, first-person reports by psychiatric patients convey pervasive experiential changes, where an alteration in how the body feels is at the same time a shift in how the world appears and in how one relates to it.” (Ratcliffe 2016)
Footnote: Fuchs(2013) further elaborates the idea of emotional feeling as causal associations between perceptions and body states:

“In short, the depressive state may be characterized by a general constriction or ‘congealment’ of the lived body, leading to a numbing of emotional resonance and loss of attunement. This alters the patient’s existential feelings of being-with, resulting in a general sense of detachment, segregation, or even expulsion. In severe depression, the lived body loses the lightness, fluidity, and mobility of a medium and turns into a heavy, solid body which puts up resistance to all intentions and impulses directed towards the world.”

Ratcliffe(2012a) treats Husserl’s notion of associative synthesis as subordinate causal associations nested within, and conditioned by, the larger dispositional space of global bodily feeling.

“Husserl would have regarded loss of conation as something that affects passive synthesis: a kind of possibility that we ordinarily take for granted is gone from the world.” “In so far as this sense of reality is an achievement of passive synthesis, a loss of conation affects passive synthesis. Although objects are recognized as “what they are,” something is missing from them, some quality.”

The dependence of our perceptions on bodily dispositions that Ratcliffe credits Husserl for revealing to us is a correlation that appears when we are approaching the world within the natural attitude. It represents that stratum of constitution within which the world opens up for us in terms of physical objects, subjective sensations, and causal relations between the psychical and the physical. Included within this naturalistic stratum of thinking are psychophysical relations intertwining my feeling sensate body with my felt physical body. Ratcliffe’s account of bodily felt dispositions as a complex of learned associations between perceptions and body states belongs to this natural causal stratum. However, Husserl asserts that making sense of intersubjective experiences such as affect, feeling, valuation, emotion and mood requires a shift from the natural attitude to what he calls the personal or spiritual attitude. Within this higher stratum, natural causation is replaced by intentional motivation.

“...when we speak of the spiritual or personal Ego, that is to be understood as the subject of intentionality, and we see that motivation is the lawfulness of the life of the spirit.” “The "because-so" of motivation has a totally different sense than causality in the sense of nature.”(Ideas II, p. 231)

My bodily felt dispositions lose their character as causal conditionings when I relate to the world as a valuing, intending social participant, and instead are fused with and subordinated to the motivated valuative intentionalities driven by the dynamics of my social interactions. Only when I shift back to the natural attitude do mood dispositions appear for me again in terms of causal bodily feelings and sensations (lethargic, constricted, closed off, energized, aroused, etc). But noticing ‘how my body feels’ only contributes to the elucidation of intentional moods when transferred from the naturalistic to the personalistic sphere as a metaphor. For example, my personalistic sense of my depression infuses and animates my feeling of bodily lethargy with the corresponding affective intentional meaning of feeling ‘down in the dumps’. Without this interpretive animation coming from the higher intentional stratum, fusing with and lending metaphorical significance to the bodily data, my corporeal sensations of lethargy would bear no
direct relevance to my being in the world as depressed. No pattern of organization of causally intertwined perception and corporeal feeling would ever be able to turn bodily sensations like generic lethargy into intentionally significant moods, values or emotions.

“To be sure, I find the stratum of sensation to be localized in the Body, including therefore physical pleasure and physical pain; but that only shows that this stratum does not belong to the realm of what properly pertains to the Ego.” (Husserl, Ideas II p.223)

“...in my theoretical, emotional, and practical behavior-in my theoretical experience and thinking, in my position-taking as to pleasure, enjoyment, hoping, wishing, desiring, wanting-I feel myself conditioned by the matter in question, though this obviously does not mean psychophysically conditioned... For this realizing apprehension, the psychophysical relations do not play, obviously, any actual essential role. I apprehend myself as dependent in my behavior, in my acts, on the things themselves, on their beautiful color, on their special form, on their pleasant or dangerous properties. I do not therein apprehend myself as dependent on my Body or on my history.” (Ideas II p.148)

Ratcliffe might interpret Husserl’s comments as illustrating how globally attuned existential feeling operates behind the scenes, implicitly delimiting possibilities of affective salience in social situations via the intricate intertwining of bodily feedback with perception, without the role of the body as vehicle of feeling becoming thematic. But Husserl’s point is that, while social emotions are the result of a constituting genesis, they are not the product of a reciprocally causal concatenation process acting as tacit background for their emergence. It is only by abstracting away from a more primary intentional motivational attitude (grounded in associative synthesis) that emotional salience and enticement come to be seen as shaped by bodily feeling. In sum, it is not the intertwining of bodily reinforcements with perceptual and intentional states that determine what I care about and how I care about it, how salient, enticing or relevant my social world appears to me. The senses of meaning that emerge from my interpersonal engagements do not pass through an intermediary mesh of bodily potentiators and constraints; such causal conditioning structures are already subsumed within, and transcended by, my immediate way of being in the world with others as intentional agent. I feel my world directly. Feeling simply IS intentional sense, because intentional sense is always self-affecting change of sense. Drawing on, but subtly or not so subtly re-situating a habitual history of valutative position-takings, feeling, mood and emotion express the relative anticipatory integrity of my motivated position takings, how I construe fresh interpersonal situations along dimensions of difference and similarity, concordance and incompatibility with respect to past situations, via active associative syntheses.

Husserl’s primary motivational principle of associative synthesis, via its higher constitutive manifestation as active intentional motivation, offers a model of recursivity uniting self-referential continuity and absolute alterity, the subjective and the objective, the affective and the intentional, in the same moment. Husserl’s general notion of affect, applying to such terms as emotion, feeling and desire as well, determines that every experienced event of any kind (bodily-sensory, perceptual, conceptual, practical-valuative) is an affect, and every affect is a change in affect. If every event of meaning is an advent of qualitative novelty, then cognition is affective not simply in the sense that a background affective tonality, mood or attunement frames
the activity as a whole, as “a kind of cradle within which cognition rests” (Ratcliffe, 2002, p. 296), but in that each moment of engagement is an inseparable inter-bleeding between a prior context of attunement or thematics, and a change in that attunement.

**Heidegger on Feeling, Intentionality and Time:**

In Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit, which has been variously and imperfectly translated as attunement, mood, self-finding and state of mind, we find the most thoroughgoing phenomenological articulation of the inseparable relation of affect, intention and temporality. Temporality is the well-spring out of which Dasein as Being in the world emerges. Temporality, the way the world discloses itself to Dasein, is structured as the equi-primordial gestures of care, understanding, attunement and discourse. Since his earliest writings on background dispositions of feeling, Ratcliffe has used Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit as a source of inspiration. In Ratcliffe’s model, cognition and intentional states function in the manner of moves within a more or less fixed frame. Ratcliffe (2012) writes;

“...a mood is not an intentional state but a condition of possibility for intentionality.”
“According to Heidegger, moods are not intentional states that encompass a wide range of objects. Rather, they are modes of Befindlichkeit, ways of finding oneself in the world. This, he says, is presupposed by the intelligibility of intentionally directed experiences, thoughts and activities: “ A central characteristic of Befindlichkeit, in its various modes, is that it determines the ways in which things can matter to us and, therefore, the kinds of intentional state we can adopt.”

“However broadly directed an emotion might be, it still presupposes a sense of being there, of the possibilities that must already be in place for an object-directed emotion or more broadly directed mood to be possible. This is something that Heidegger succeeds in conveying. World-constituting moods are neither specifically focused emotions nor broadly focused emotions. Rather, they comprise a space of experiential possibilities that these and all other intentional states take for granted, the meaningfulness of life.” (Ratcliffe 2010) “Without specific emotional interruptions, there is nothing to break down coherence, nothing to disturb an ongoing interpretation of events.” (Ratcliffe 2002)

While I agree that attunements are world-constituting frames, I think there are significant differences in Ratcliffe’s and Heidegger’s representations of the way that meaning emerges out of the relation between attuning frames and the concrete experiences they make possible. Heidegger follows Husserl in grounding the orienting capacity of affective attunement in a radical notion of temporality rather than in a schematic causal interaction between body states and meaning intentions. Heidegger’s grounding of attunement in temporality means that the developing unfolding of a mood is not a matter of subordinate changes within an unchanging superordinate structure. Even as moods maintain an ongoing thematic consistency over time, nevertheless each interpretive moment of attuned understanding subtly modifies the frame by developing its possibilities. Each presenting experience, each ‘NOW’, is a shift of existential feeling, a punctuation in relation to the previous moment of time. Thus, if changes in attunement can be said to punctuate a stable thematic of feeling, this interruption is only a more extreme variant of the always already in process self-displacement that defines the temporal
unfolding of a stable mood. The relative consistency over time of a stable background presupposes moment to moment punctuations. It is built from these displacements, which allow it to remain the same slightly differently. This instability at the heart of an attunement would seem to run counter not only to Ratcliffe’s normative conception of existential feeling as global attunement, but to Heidegger’s own articulation of attunements as persisting moods projecting stable interpretative frameworks.

“...in interpretatively addressing something as something, one addresses the thing encountered against the background of a more or less explicit acquaintance with it: as a tool as suitable for this or that, etc. These 'as what', in light of which one interprets the surrounding world as well as the concern that is immersed in it, are not usually newly discovered by Dasein. As being-together-with-others, Dasein grows up in and into this fixed interpretedness. The interpretative undertaking has a firm fore-conception. At the same time, it fixes the point of view from which those things that fall within the fore-conception are, as it were, targeted. The possible lines of 'sight' remain within circumscribed limits. Interpretation has its fore-sight. The world with which we are concerned and being-in itself are both interpreted within the parameters of a particular framework of intelligibility.”

(Heidegger 2011b)

How can a mood subsist as both a stable pre-condition for meaningful experience, projecting a ‘fixed interpretiveness’, and yet represent a ground that changes its sense moment to moment? Heidegger’s analysis of the derivation of propositional logic from a pragmatic ‘as’ structure illustrates the immediately transformative nature of intentional aboutness. Heidegger explains that in taking something to be the case in a propositional judgement (for instance, S is P), we are taking something as something within a wider context of pragmatic relevance. (The ‘as’ structure designates the peculiar ‘between-ness’ of Dasein that Heidegger also describes as the ontological difference between Being and beings). Making sense of something is an act that always has the ‘as’ structure, as Heidegger tells us, but this structure of relevantating is covered over and flattened down in causal models.

“The most immediate state of affairs is, in fact, that we simply see and take things as they are: board, bench, house, policeman. Yes, of course. However, this taking is always a taking within the context of dealing-with something, and therefore is always a taking-as, but in such a way that the as-character does not become explicit in the act.” (Heidegger 2010b)

One might be tempted to read Heidegger’s hermeneutic ‘as’ structure as compatible with the role the wider possibility space plays for Ratcliffe in orienting cognition. However, in taking something AS something, we are not simply associating two externally related entities in relation to each other and with reference to a more encompassing causal framework. If a cognition or intention is merely about something, then it functions as external binding, coordinating and relating between two objectively present participants.

Heidegger(2010b) says:

“If the phenomenon of the "as" is covered over and above all veiled in its existential origin from the
hermeneutical "as," Aristotle's phenomenological point of departure disintegrates to the analysis of logos in an external "theory of judgment," according to which judgment is a binding or separating of representations and concepts. Thus binding and separating can be further formalized to mean a "relating." Logistically, the judgment is dissolved into a system of "coordinations," it becomes the object of "calculation," but not a theme of ontological interpretation. "If the kind of being of the terms of the relation is understood without differentiation as merely objectively present things, then the relation shows itself as the objectively present conformity of two objectively present things."

Despite Ratcliffe’s assertion that “it is the transcendental, meaning-giving account that has ontological priority over an objective/causal description”, his account of the personalistic flattens the ‘as’ structure into a system of reciprocal coordinations among objectively present entities, states and dispositions. But the ‘is’ connecting S with P is not a causal copula, it is a transformative relevanting altering in one gesture both the S and the P. The ‘as’ enacts a crossing of past and present such that both are already affected and changed by the other in this context of dealing with something. When we take something as something, we have already projected out from a totality of relevance such as to render what is presenting itself to us as familiar and recognizable in some fashion. But in this act of disclosure, we only have this totality of relevance by modifying it. This is why Heidegger says that in the process of interpreting what is projectively familiar to us, the ‘as’ structure takes apart what it puts together.

Heidegger (2010) offers:

“What is to be got at phenomenally with the formal structures of "binding" and "separating," more precisely, with the unity of the two, is the phenomenon of "something as something...In accordance with this structure, something is understood with regard to something else, it is taken together with it, so that this confrontation that understands, interprets, and articulates, at the same time takes apart what has been put together.”

“...projection is an occurrence which, as raising us away and casting us ahead, takes apart as it were;-in that apartness of a raising away, yet as we saw, precisely in such a way that in this process there occurs an intrinsic turning toward on the part of whatever has been projected, such that that which has been projected is that which binds and binds together.”(Heidegger 1995)

In experiencing something as something, Dasein comes back to its having been from its future, which is to say, it interprets a global context of relevance via the ‘as’ structure. In so doing, it “takes apart” the relation between what it encounters and a previous instance of it by coming back to it from a fresh context of relevance. Seeing something as something makes sense of what is encountered in a new way, on the basis of a freshly modified totality of relevance. It is produced rather than discovered.

"The essence of something is not at all to be discovered simply like a fact; on the contrary, it must be brought forth. To bring forth is a kind of making, and so there resides in all grasping and positing of the essence something creative.... To bring forth means to bring out into the light, to bring something in sight which was up to then not seen at all, and specifically such that the seeing of it is not simply a gaping at something already lying there but a seeing which, in seeing, first brings forth what is to be seen, i.e., a productive seeing."(Heidegger 1994)

That beings (essences) are produced by Dasein in the act of taking something as something is not to be understood as intentional activity that ‘takes for granted’, as Ratcliffe claims, a world
constituting space of experiential possibilities that is not itself changed in the act of intending objects. For Ratcliffe, Befindlichkeit is the condition of possibility of being in an intentional state, but for Heidegger the condition of possibility for Befindlichkeit, for a world constituting space of possibilities, is that this totality of relevance be modified anew each moment in an act of bringing forth. The totality of one’s past pragmatic-valuative-affective comportment toward the world functions and changes as a single unit, with all of its ‘parts’ always implying each other. Being-affected always addresses and modifies all of ones prior experience as a whole. Beings can only be produced because the foundation of their being is created anew as a ‘ground-laying’ every time we see something as something. The creative re-making of the ground, which Heidegger says is the essence of feeling, is at the same time the productive seeing of an intentional object.

“Every “foundation” in the sense we discussed comes too late with regard to the positing of the essence, because the productive seeing of the essence is itself a productive seeing of that in which the essence has its ground—a productive seeing of what its ground is. Knowledge of the essence is in itself a ground-laying. It is the positing of what lies under as ground.” (Heidegger 1994)

Heidegger(1994) refers to this ground-laying as displacement, because the act of laying a ground is the displacing of a previous ground. This self-transcending movement is the basis of all attunement.

“What we are now calling displacement is the essential character of what we know under the name of disposition or feeling. A deep-rooted and very old habit of experience and speech stipulates that we interpret feelings and dispositions—as well as willing and thinking—in a psychological-anthropological sense as occurrences and processes within an organism, as psychic lived experiences, ones we either have or do not have. This also means that we are “subjects,” present at hand, who are displaced into these or those dispositions by “getting” them. In truth, however, it is the disposition that displaces us, displaces us into such and such a relation to the world, into this or that understanding or disclosure of the world, into such and such a resolve or occlusion of one’s self, a self which is essentially a being-in-the-world.”

Feeling as the displacing, disposing ground-laying of beings returns to itself from out ahead of itself. This dynamic can already be found within the structure of seeing something as something.

“Because my being is such that I am out ahead of myself, I must, in order to understand something I encounter, come back from this being-out-ahead to the thing I encounter. Here we can already see an immanent structure of direct understanding qua as-structured comportment, and on closer analysis it turns out to be time. And this being-ahead-of-myself as a returning is a peculiar kind of movement that time itself constantly makes, if I may put it this way.” (Heidegger 2010b)

The returning from a totality of relevance in the act of understanding something constitutes temporality not as a present object happening IN time but as temporalization. The past, present and future don’t operate for Heidegger as sequential modes which mark distinct states of objects. They interpenetrate each other so completely that they together form a single unitary event of occurrence.
“Temporalizing does not mean a "succession" of the ecstasies. The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present. “Dasein "occurs out of its future"."Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general." Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future that has-been (or better, is in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself. We call the unified phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having-been temporality.”(Heidegger 2010)

The structure of temporality provides the key to the unification of what has commonly gone under the names of affectivity, feeling, mood and emotion on the one hand, and understanding, cognition and intentionality on the other. When Heidegger says that, in attunement, Dasein “is disclosed to itself before all cognition and willing and beyond their scope of disclosure” this is not a validation of Ratcliffe’s claim that propositional intentionality is an activity oriented within and framed by mood. The distinction Ratcliffe makes between existential-affective and intentional-cognitive structures of experience does not exist for Heidegger(1985).

“It could be shown from the phenomenon of care as the basic structure of Dasein that what phenomenology took to be intentionality and how it took it is fragmentary, a phenomenon regarded merely from the outside. But what is meant by intentionality-the bare and isolated directing-itself-towards-must still be set back into the unified basic structure of being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-involved-in. This alone is the authentic phenomenon which corresponds to what inauthentically and only in an isolated direction is meant by intentionality.”

While attunement, as an ontological concept, is a more primordial notion than will or cognition, it is not as if the latter simply act as variable moves strictly WITHIN a more or less stable orienting background situatedness. On the contrary, such ontic concepts as cognition, willing and intending are inauthentic modes of ‘letting things be encountered’ and ‘letting beings be relevant’. Letting things be encountered as relevant IS being affected or moved by them freshly moment to moment. In other words, each intention as it appears subtly reinvents the attunement that it occurs into, articulates, develops and discloses. We continue to be sad, joyful or angry differently moment to moment and day to day.

Against Heidegger’s explicit determination of attunement as equi-primordial with discourse and understanding, which implies that none of these modes has priority over the others in a valuative, genetic or ontological sense, Ratcliffe wants to prioritize attunement.

“...it is mood that has primacy over understanding, as mood is responsible for determining the kinds of possibility that are presupposed by understanding. What Heidegger calls “discourse ” (Rede ) similarly depends upon mood .” (Ratcliffe 2012)

We can see why it may be important for Ratcliffe to give mood a formative role that is not accorded to understanding or discourse, based on what has been presented so far concerning his distinction between existential feeling and intentionality. Briefly stated, Ratcliffe reads Heidegger’s account of attunement as akin to the role of existential feeling, a, global interactive scheme composed of reciprocally causal innate and learned associations between perceptions and body states. Understanding, as propositional intentionality, is a particular relational structure within that orienting disposition. “...cognition is constrained, enabled and structured by a
background of emotion-perception correlations, that manifest themselves as a changing background of implicit representations of body states.”(Ratcliffe 2002). Heidegger, in contrast, explicitly warns against interpreting Understanding as the thematic propositional grasping of intentional meaning, insisting that such a misreading “degrades it to the level of a given, intended content.”(Being and Time, p.145)

Intentionally directed experiences don’t simply occur within the larger framework of a specific attunement. As factual experiences of interpretation, they are themselves developments of mood. That is to say, they develop the theme of an attuned understanding by subtly redefining it. The mode of interpretation, which is where one can locate activities of perception, intention and interpersonal interaction in general, is not a modality simply conforming to a specific theme of significance of a prior attunement. As a development of understanding, it is a particular way of subtly modifying ones attunement as a whole. Thus, if attuned understanding determines the kinds of intentional meanings we are capable of adopting, then intentional meanings as they arise in circumspective relevance out of previous ones subtly reshape the kinds of attuned understanding we are capable of having.

On the one hand, variation in attunement and its equi-primordial mode of Understanding is as continuous as time itself. On the other hand, a thematic continuity holds for Dasein throughout its moment to moment global shifts in sense and feeling such that relatively stable ongoing modes of feeling comportment toward the world are discernable. This relative thematic stability is what allows us to talk about a mood of sadness or anger lasting days or weeks, but it is also what requires us to recognize that the feeling of situatedness and relevance does not become diminished when we transition from one relatively stable mood to another.

Ratcliffe believes he can prioritize attunement over understanding because, as we have seen, his schematic feeling model begins from a split between the subjective (body feeling state) and objective (perceptual and propositional intentional meaning) poles of experience. As a result of this split, the affective and perceptual-conative components are treated as if they are separate aspects in states of variable relationality. When bodily feeling states function to enhance our engagement with the world, according to Ratcliffe, we experience ourselves more intimately situated in the world. On the other hand, affective relevance (“the sense of being situated in a world” (Ratcliffe 2017) can be profoundly diminished, leaving propositional intentionality intact but devoid of adaptive orientation. One is still aware of a world moment to moment, one still has perceptions and memories, and yet this world is denuded of felt relevance and we are inclined to avoid social interaction. For instance, Ratcliffe claims that anxiety is intrinsically ‘alienating’ or ‘externalising’. It can alienate us from its objects (Ratcliffe and Wilkinson 2016). Ratcliffe considers the most extreme cases of erosion of situatedness, of the ability and capacity to experience types of possibility and to contemplate certain relevant options, to be a form of decision-making impairment and incompetence (Ratcliffe, forthcoming).

Fernandenz, along with Ratcliffe, believes that psycho-pathologies like depression involve “a general degradation in our ability to be affectively situated in and attuned to our world” and perhaps even the complete loss of affective situatedness.
“... the degree to which one is attuned to and situated in a world through moods can itself undergo change. ... Some cases of people diagnosed with depression are best understood not as an erosion of a particular mood, or as the emergence of a new mood, but instead as an erosion of the category of moods as a whole; that is to say, as an erosion of the structure of situatedness.”

“Alfred Kraus also characterizes melancholic depression as a loss of moods and feelings: "At its core, the melancholic mood alteration is paradoxically formulated—rather a lack of mood" (Kraus 2003, 208, Fernandez 2014).”

Footnote: Fuchs(2013) follows Ratcliffe and Fernandez in considering depression as a loss of affective attunement (situatedness and relevance).

“The loss of bodily resonance or affectability concerns, more generally, the experience of affective valences and atmospheres. The deeper the depression, the more the attractive qualities of the environment faint. The patients are no longer capable of being moved and affected by things, situations, or other persons. This leads to an inability to feel emotions or atmospheres at all, which is all the more painful as it is not caused by mere apathy or indifference (as for example in frontal brain injury) but by the tormenting bodily constriction and rigidity”.

Ratcliffe’s understanding of situatedness differs from Heidegger’s in a number of crucial ways. First, unlike Heidegger’s account, Ratcliffe’s Befindlichkeit is not an irreducible apriori of affective experience, but instead is the contingent product of a complex configuration of bodily and perceptual elements. Affective attunement for him is the achievement of a concatenating process. When we delve beneath Ratcliffe’s global schemes to locate the invariant and essential condition of possibility of his feeling-perceptual concatenations, we arrive at a reciprocally causal model of co-determinative interactive bits. But having arrived at this ‘apriori’, we are not yet in the vicinity of Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit. Befindlichkeit is not the product of an orienting device, adaptation or conditioning scheme, and not the ground of any reciprocally causal schematic structure, except as that structure be understood as a derived abstraction concealing its own basis in temporality.

In order to understand primordial situatedness, we have to bracket Ratcliffe’s causal model in its entirety, and think prior to the split between feeling and thinking that it presupposes. What is essential and invariant in the Heideggerian structure of situatedness as temporality is that each moment is the disclosure of the now as affectingly foreign-familiar. For Heidegger not only is there no self and no world prior to relationship, but the self is nothing BUT this between. Being situated in a world is not a contingent accomplishment of a scheme of reinforcements, but a presupposition of temporality.

Dasein is always fundamentally affectively situated in that it is thrown into its NOW as surprised familiarity. This means that attunement is not a relationship between self and world that can be broken or diminished, as Ratcliffe asserts, regardless of what mood one is in. The most intractably severe depression is still, moment to moment, an awareness of being thrown into continual affective transformation and transition, as long as it is an awareness of anything at all.
And as self-transforming, the affective basis of ongoing experience is always at the same time a projecting fore-having that anticipates into what surprises or disappoints or depresses it. The world of the depressive that appears unreal, insignificant, irrelevant, un-engaging, is meaningful precisely in its unreality and deficiency as disorienting, confusing, strange, uncanny, un-engageable, numbing. Experience of ongoing deprivation, lack and loss is not the degeneration of the structure of situatedness as projective-thrownness, but situatedness as always a new but at the same time anticipated sense of loss and absence.

Heidegger tells us:

“Dasein in itself is essentially Being-with” “Being-with existentially determines Da-sein even when an other is not factically present and perceived. The being-alone of Da-sein, too, is being-with in the world. The other can be lacking only in and for a being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of being-with, its possibility is a proof for the latter.” When one feels alone in a crowd, “Their Mitda-sein is encountered in the mode of indifference and being alien. Lacking and "being away" are modes of Mitda-sein...[Being-with-others]”. (Being and Time, p.113)

I want to make clear that the essential issue between Heidegger and Ratcliffe I am attempting to articulate does not rest on whether we deem the nightmarish existential experience of severe depression, as well as other alterations of affective significance, in qualitative vs quantitative terms. After all, Heidegger uses a variety of adjectives (distorted, flattened, blind to itself, led astray, confused, closed off, obscuring, forgetful, deficient) to describe inauthentic modes of Dasein, and their associated moods, which can just as well be interpreted in terms of a lessening of the fluidity of existential movement as they can via a positive qualitative shift in modality of comportment. For instance, Heidegger’s distinction between fundamental anxiety and inauthentic moods can be understood in terms of the degree of openness to self-transforming movement.

The key point here is that however we prefer to characterize the organizational characteristics of mood marking the devastation of depression and other pathologies of world significance, we must understand such variation as taking place within the structure of a primordial situatedness whose essential features are invariant throughout such vicissitudes of mood. Specifically, what remains essential regardless of the severity of states of trauma, melancholia or depersonalization, is the underlying temporal-affective-intentional ‘glue’ of Befindlichkeit. To be radically, irreducibly, primordially situated in a world is to be guaranteed, at every moment, a world that feelingly, creatively impinges on me anew as futural. And it is simultaneously, to feel a belonging (familiarity) to what impinges on me due to the anticipative, projective aspect of temporality. In this way, affectivity as temporality constitutes the essence of the fundamental, irreducibly situated felt significance a world always already has for me, a meaningfulness within whose bounds pathological conditions such as depression appear as modifications, but whose basis they can never undermine.(Heidegger would say that their possibility as deficiencies or privations is proof for the essentiality of Befindlichkeit.).

Such experiences are predicaments within affective situatedness rather than crises of situatedness. The supposed crisis of situatedness which leads to what Ratcliffe calls an impairment and even incompetence in capacity to experience significant meaningfulness (Ratcliffe, forthcoming) only appears as a possibility when one begins from a split between
affect and intention. When one instead begins from the self-world hinge that radical temporality instantiates, there can be only existential predicaments, not disorders of situatedness. Since I am always already relevantly involved in a world via thrownness, depression has to do with the kind of relevance I experience, not my capacity or competence to experience it. “Hopelessness, for example, does not tear Da-sein away from its possibilities, but is only an independent mode of being toward these possibilities.”(Heidegger 2010)

Because emotions, moods and feelings are not causal entities, they can be neither adaptive nor maladaptive, neither facilitate salience nor degrade it. Affect doesn’t cause, it temporalizes. This is why, contra Ratcliffe, anxiety doesn’t ‘cause’ alienation. It is instead the attempt to mitigate the loss of coherence that alienating, threatening events portend. Heidegger says inauthentic anxiety is a form of fear, and “fear is a fear of something threatening-of something that is detrimental to the factual potentiality-of-being of Da-sein” “What is encountered has the relevant nature of harmfulness.” (Being and Time p.313). Thus it is the situation, not the emotion, that is alienating, and anxious attunement is the anticipation of, and incipient comportment away from, an impending event that holds within itself the specter of the alien, the unassimilable and thus the unanticipatable.

For Heidegger the rug cannot be pulled out from under our situated comportment toward the world. That is, there can be no overall loss, erosion or diminishment of mattering and significance, only shifts in where significance finds itself. However, in everyday contexts of interpreting the world in which we are immersed, the horizon of intelligibility by reference to which things are understood as being what and how they are, and through which Dasein’s affective attunement is disclosed to itself, is only minimally modified by what that horizon frames. This leads to a flattening, distorting and concealing of Dasein’s disclosure of possibilities. Throughout his work, Heidegger associates flattened, closed-off, forgetful, alienated, distorted and confused thinking with modes of interpretation and attunement which see the world in terms of co-ordinations among present at hand subjects and objects. Even as one’s world can be made to appear familiar and predictable through such attunements, its very familiarity rests on a sort of self-alienation. As such a model, Ratcliffe’s entire range of descriptions of a self’s sense of belonging to a world, from ensconced familiarity to extreme estrangement, amounts to a self-alienating concealing of the intimate relation between self and world fundamental to Dasein’s authentic attuned self-understanding.

For Heidegger, the sort of concernful mattering that being confidently situated within such a pre-given space of possibilities represents is far from an optimal engagement with experience. Its inadequacies and limitations are precisely due to the fact that the potentialities of change in one’s being in the world are restricted to variations on already given themes. This falling prey to pre-given horizons of intelligibility within the world is what Heidegger calls inauthentic Dasein. He contrasts this mode of existing with authentic being, wherein Dasein turns away from beings in the world, and their already projected horizons of possibility, in order to anticipate new possibilities, “to let the possibility of an authentic potentiality-of-being shine forth.”

Heidegger associates what he calls the mood of primordial or authentic anxiety with this mode of experiencing which has cast off the chains of presuppositions that encumbers and closes off
everyday forms of encountering the world. Anxiety reveals Dasein at its creative, world-forming best. Primordial anxiety exposes Dasein to itself in the mode of its greatest possibilities of significance and mattering by perching itself at the very edge of the new, embracing the future in its authentic immediacy. What we learn from the structure of primordial anxiety and the nothing is that the more thoroughgoing and continuous Dasein’s self-transcendence, the richer its experience of meaningfulness and significance. Inauthentic moods like fear and depression hold Dasein back from discovering its very own potentialities of being.

The essence of freedom, which surpasses every particular factic and factual being, its surpassive character, can be seen particularly in despair, where one's own lack of freedom engulfs a Dasein absorbed in itself. This completely factical lack of freedom is itself an elemental testimony to transcendence, for despair lies in the despairing person's vision of the impossibility of something possible. Such a person still witnesses to the possible, inasmuch as he despairs of it.”(Heidegger, 1984)

“Depression forces Da-sein back to its thrownness, but in such a way that its thrownness is precisely closed off.” (Heidegger 2010)

Authentic anxiety opens up possibilities that fear and depression conceal.

“He who is resolute knows no fear, but understands the possibility of Angst as the mood that does not hinder and confuse him. Angst frees him from "null" possibilities and lets him become free for authentic ones.” (Being and Time)

Why is it that Dasein’s transcendent peering out beyond beings as a whole toward the edge of the new does not constitute an arbitrary, alienating and even despairing gesture? This is because Dasein’s pragmatic ‘for the sake of which’ provides a continuity of situatedness throughout transformation. Dasein continues to recognize itself throughout its displacing disclosure of new possible ways for it to be. This lends to authentic anxiety, and to temporality itself, its peculiarly amalgamated quality of familiarity and foreignness, nihilation and discovery, which Heidegger captures with terms like strangeness, mystery, uncanniness, wonder, astonishment, bliss, joy, entrancement, melancholy and rapture.

“Discoverture’s authentic way of being is uncanniness, while the most common everyday mode of discovert is concealment.”(Heidegger 2011b)

"Uncanniness is the fundamental kind of being-in-the-world, although it is covered over in everydayness. Tranquillized, familiar being-in-the-world is a mode of the uncanniness of Dasein, not the other way around. Not-being-at-home must be conceived existentially and ontologically as the more primordial phenomenon." "The publicness of the they suppresses everything unfamiliar.” (Heidegger 2010)

“Thus thrown in this throw, man is a transition, transition as the fundamental essence of occurrence...Man is enraptured in this transition and therefore essentially 'absent'. Absent in a fundamental sense-never simply at hand, but absent in his essence, in his essentially being away, removed into essential having been and future-essentially absencing and never at hand, yet existent in his essential absence. Transposed into the possible, he must constantly be mistaken concerning
what is actual. And only because he is thus mistaken and transposed can he become seized by terror. And only where there is the perilousness of being seized by terror do we find the bliss of astonishment -being torn away in that wakeful manner that is the breath of all philosophizing.” (Heidegger 1995)

Believing that significance and salience are functions of reinforcing present-at-hand bodily states, Ratcliffe (2012b) misreads primordial anxiety’s deconstruction of objectively present states as a crisis of relevance.

“…in anxiety, all practical significance falls away and what we previously took for granted becomes salient in its absence….and thus amenable to phenomenological reflection when it is lost or distorted.”. Ratcliffe (2012b) concludes that the structure of Heidegger’s primordial anxiety “is very similar to that of depression” (p.172), which he characterizes in terms of a degradation of the salience and meaningfulness of objects and subjects in the world.

For Heidegger, however, authentic anxiety is anything but a despairing degradation of meaningfulness. On the contrary, Heidegger (1995) explains that in authentic anxiety “there is not even anything enticing about beings any more” because, in a moment of vision, Dasein has become entranced by the authentically perceived temporal horizon.

“Dasein as such can no longer go along with them [beings] only if it is entranced as Da-sein, and indeed as a whole. What entrances is nothing other than the temporal horizon…The moment of vision which properly makes Dasein possible is simultaneously announced in this telling refusal of beings as a whole.”

The paradox of Heidegger’s radically temporal thinking is that it enacts a carrying-forward which re-invents its direction, sense and past every moment, beyond conscious control, without rending the intimate fabric of its anticipative continuity. Heideggerian attunement exposes a relentless global self and world-transformational mobility within every moment of, but invisible to, Ratcliffe’s supposed schematic existential states, and at the same time imparts to our ongoing world situatedness an irreducible integrity, intimacy and relevance which no pathology can undermine.

**Gendlin’s Model of Temporality: Occurring Into Implying**

My attempt at a direct comparison between Ratcliffe’s embodied approach and Heidegger’s ontological project has been somewhat hampered by the fact that Heidegger made little reference in his work to the status and role of the body in relation to situatedness and affectivity. It may be helpful, then, to turn to Eugene Gendlin’s process model. Like Ratcliffe’s existential feeling, Gendlin’s approach offers an account of embodied affect that engages with empirical descriptions. But Gendlin rejects Ratcliffe’s reciprocally causal conditioning model of the body, and its reliance on conventional notions of time, in favor of a reading of Heideggerian temporality consonant with the one I have been advancing in this paper. In various writings, he distinguishes his Heideggerian account of affective situatedness from phenomenologically-influenced causal interactionist readings such as those of Gallagher, Varela, Fuchs and Sheets-Johnstone (See Gendlin 2008, 2012). Gendlin’s notion of felt sensing articulates bodily feeling,
and embodied meaning, as an organized totality whose motivational principle is not that of an interactional causality between feeling and knowing states, but a crossing of past and present reminiscent of Heideggerian temporality.

As Gendlin (1997b) argues,

‘The continuity of time cannot first be made by things next to each other, because such a continuity is passive; each bit IS alone, and must depend on some other continuity to relate it to what is next to it...’(p.71). For instance, fresh intentional experience does not simply sit alongside a prior context; it explicates the immediate past [Gendlin characterizes this past as an implicatory whole].

In Ratcliffe’s model, interaction spreads in a reciprocally causal fashion from point to point, whereas for Gendlin, each point somehow implies each other point; each part of a meaning organization somehow “knows about”, belongs to and depends intrinsically on each other part. And this happens before a part can simply be said to exist in itself (even if just for an instant). What kind of odd understanding concerning the interface between identity and relation could justify Gendlin's insistence that the inter-affection between parts of a psychological organization precedes the existence of individual entities?

Gendlin (1997b) explains:

In the old model one assumes that there must first be "it" as one unit, separate from how its effects in turn affect it.. In the process we are looking at there is no separate "it," no linear cause-effect sequence with "it" coming before its effects determine what happens. So there is something odd here, about the time sequence. How can "it" be already affected by affecting something, If it did not do the affecting before it is in turn affected?...With the old assumption of fixed units that retain their identity, one assumes a division between it, and its effects on others. (This "it" might be a part, a process, or a difference made.) In the old model it is only later, that the difference made to other units can in turn affect "it." (p.40)

Addressing causally interaffecting organizational models like Ratcliffe’s, Gendlin explains:

If one assumes separate events, processes, or systems, one must then add their co-ordinations as one finds them, as if unexpectedly...“Inter-affecting" and "coordination" are words that bring the old assumption of a simple multiplicity, things that exist as themselves and are only then also related. So we need a phrase that does not make sense in that old way. Let us call the pattern we have been formulating "original inter-affecting". This makes sense only if one grasps that "they" inter-affect each other before they are a they (p.22).

The integral nature of inter-affecting is such that even the most subordinate event within an overarching framework of intelligibility and attunement alters at once, and in a functionally unified manner, the framework as a whole. This bodily totality, which Gendlin calls the implicit understanding, can by certain means be experienced as a directly sensed feeling. In the act of having a felt sense of one’s implicit understanding as a whole, one productively shifts the meaning of this integrated frame, thereby opening up new creative possibilities for interpreting one’s world. By contrast, in everyday circumstances one does not typically access the implicit
understanding as a whole, but rather attends to only a subordinate aspect of one’s experiencing.

Let me call attention to the similarities between these two forms of attention and Heidegger’s distinction between authentic and inauthentic modes of experience. In particular, I want to emphasize the importance of the fact that for both Gendlin and Heidegger, whether the nature of one’s engagement with the world involves an authentic, wholistic transformation of one’s global disposition or is restricted to a disclosure of entities within the ‘pre-existing’ frame, in both cases the entire frame has already been interaffected and thus renewed (in the second case it remains the same differently) alongside the subordinate events it makes possible.

“What happens remakes "all" parts and differences.”“The single occurring includes all the differences, and the differences made to each other by these differences, and again by the differences they make. Occurring is an interaffecting of everything by everything.”(Gendlin 1997b)

Gendlin founds his concept of feeling in a novel model of body-environment interaction grounded in this radical inter-affecting. He asks

“How does the organism ‘select and interpret’ what is relevant to it? Selection and interpretation would not be necessary if by ‘environment’ we meant the organism’s own which it actively participates in generating. Recently some authors speak of organism and environment as mutually causing each other” (Gallagher, 2007)

Gendlin digs beneath such causative approaches to locate a more fundamental notion of interaction. “This ‘interaction’ is prior to two separate things that would first meet in order to interact. I call it ‘interaction first’.” ‘Interaction first’ functions as what Gendlin(2008) calls implying into occurring, and in this way carrying forward a previous change.

“Implying is not an occurring that will happen. It is not an occurring-not-yet. It does not occupy a different time-position than the occurring. Rather, one implying encompasses all three linear time positions, and does not occupy an additional linear time position of its own. (See A Process Model, IVB. This is a more intricate model of time. It includes a kind of “future” and a kind of “past” that are not linear positions. This time model can be reduced back to the liner model by considering just occurring-occurring-occurring as if it were cut off from implying.”

“We feel the change made by the actual environment occurring into the body's implied behavior context. The feedback occurs into the implying which carries the sequence forward into further implying and occurring, as our little model says. Behavior forms only as perceptions and feelings of this kind.”

Feeling is a change made in an implicit mesh of intercorrelated understandings.

“A bodily felt sense is a crossing of the relevant facets” of a situation, a change made that carries forward...In the bodily implying all perceptions and cognitions may function implicitly.”

Concepts like ‘interaction first’, 'already interaffected', and occurring into implying share features with Husserl’s associative synthesis, in particular the belonging of new sense to what it occurs into via dimensions of commonality and likeness. It also shares features with
Heidegger’s concernful dealing with entities oriented in relation to a pragmatic totality of relevance. Relevance is not imposed on an experience from the outside via a bodily feeling state, but is presupposed by the always already self-differentiating movement of experience.

“A process is a relevanting. This verb says both that a process occurs relevantly, and that the relevance is made by the process. What occurs makes itself relevant. So we cannot use relevance as if it were on another level from which one can pre-determine what will occur.” Gendlin’s occurring into implying process, like Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit, guarantees that the relevance, significance, mattering, salience of experience is never in question, even in the midst of the most severe depression. “Irrelevant events are not produced by the body” (Gendlin 1997b)

Since relevance is already presupposed by the structure of implying-occurring fundamental to all living processes, and this in turn is grounded in the structure of temporality, Gendlin does not need to draw upon affect as a motivational conditioning agent supplying events with, or depriving them of, salience, enticement and allure. Gendlin’s organizational principle of radical interaffecting, made possible by his Heideggerian approach to temporality, exposes the concept of states, dispositions, and causal interactions between felt and intentional factors founding Ratcliffe’s model as an abstraction derived from a more primary, intricate and intimate process in which feelings and intentions, like Heidegger’s attunement and understanding, are equi-primordial rather than one being causally oriented by the other. According to Ratcliffe, intentional states (propositional beliefs, cognitive schemata) are framed and given their significance by a global possibility space, but function within their own bounds via the logic of causal association. For Gendlin, by contrast, cognition and propositional belief are not simply a ‘being about something’, directedness toward or an aiming at an object, but transform and enrich what they ‘represent’, creatively altering their sense.

“Supposedly cognizing the “external” things does not change them. Cognizing is only about them. This “only about” assumes that our cognition does not change the behavior context, the situation including what our scientific work is about. But I will argue that it does change the behavior space...It has not been clear how cognition is a bodily process. “Only about” has meant that cognition happens in representations.”

“Words go beyond their regular meaning. Regularly they appear to carry forward only their own standard discursive context. But they are and do more than that. They come as a body process in its detour as behavior context, now further detoured as “only about.” (Gendlin 2008)

The bodily process that effectuates change in behavior space possibilities, as we have seen, is not a causally conditioning schematics, but the occurring into implying of language and thought into an already inter-affected mesh of implicit understandings which is modified further by what occurs into it. “To feel something as an inner object is a change..., not just a representation; feeling something makes a change in it.” (Gendlin 1991)

Gendlin’s (1997b) occurring into implying echoes Heidegger’s unification of the components of time.

“The future that is present now is not a time-position, not what will be past later. The future that is here now is the implying that is here now. The past is not an earlier position but the now implicitly
functioning past.”“......the past functions to “interpret” the present,...the past is changed by so functioning. This needs to be put even more strongly: The past functions not as itself, but as already changed by what it functions in”(p.37)

In comparing Gendlin’s and Heidegger’s models of time with Ratcliffe’s, we see that Ratcliffe splits temporality into three separated time positions. Heideggerian Care is ”the way that we are anchored in the past (facticity), situated in the present (fallenness) and forever looking to the future (projection)” (Ratcliffe (2002)

In this way of thinking, an object of experience is a temporary presence that occupies a time position. As objective presence, it persists, or endures, as itself. The sophisticated brand of reciprocal causality that I have attributed to Ratcliffe turns on this formulation of time as the modal changes of a self-present object.

Footnote: Slaby refers to his model of affect as ‘radical situatedness’ and yet shares Ratcliffe’s traditional, inauthentic understanding of affective temporality as causal dispositional state taking place in time, which is to say that, contrary to Heideggerian temporality, for Slaby time is divided into separate phases: the present as what is happening now, the future as what is not yet now, and the past as what is no longer now.

Slaby(2017) says factual situatedness

“is situatedness in a place and a time, synchronic and diachronic”, “Affectivity ultimately is time, namely the factual past in the form of sedimented remainders that infuse, burden, and potentially suffocate ongoing comportment.” “The existential task of affective disclosure is circumscribed by this essential tension: A tension between what is already apprehended, articulated, and made sense of, and what is furthermore “out there,” beyond us, yet weighing on us and determining our situation in unforeseeable ways.”

For Gendlin and Heidegger, affectivity is neither a separate past that burdens the present nor a generator of future possibilities as a hypothetical present that has not happened yet. Instead, it encompasses all three temporal ecstasies as the way in which I find myself changed.

“The being-possible, which Da-sein always is existentially, is ... distinguished from empty, logical possibility and from the contingency of something objectively present, where this or that can "happen" to it. As a modal category of objective presence, possibility means what is not yet real and not always necessary. It characterizes what is only possible. Ontologically, it is less than reality and necessity. “(Being and Time p.135)

Conclusion:

I have argued in this paper that affective and intentional situatedness, understood by Ratcliffe as
globally patterned inter-causal states (existential feeling), functions as a structure of entrenchment and self-conservation, inhering in itself and resisting its own transformation. A global change in bodily feeling is thus required to infuse supposedly stagnant affective-intentional narratives with a new direction and meaning, disrupt entrenched patterns, dissolve the conditioning glue holding them together, reveal their contingency and open up new possibilities. Ratcliffe sees the role of Husserl’s transcendental reduction and Heidegger’s primordial anxiety as such disrupters. I have claimed, instead, that rather than a contingent island of static structure in a sea of indeterminacy, an affective-intentional attunement is the essence of temporal becoming as self-transformative dynamic, hiding within the supposedly static moment of Ratcliffe’s existential feeling state. The role of Husserl’s epoche and Heidegger’s authentic anxiety is to reveal this intimate, intricate foreign-familiar binary of movement concealed within naive naturalized models of psychological functioning. If the purpose of the epoche and primordial anxiety is, as Ratcliffe says, to bring us face to face with indeterminacy, then it is not an indeterminacy outside of, before, after, or surrounding stable structures of situatedness, but rather an indeterminacy at the core of those structures themselves. But Befindlichkeit at the same time evinces a radical self-belonging and irreducible world-connectedness obscured by and undiscoverable when thought in terms of Ratcliffe’s schematism.

In failing to ground affective experience in radical temporality, Ratcliffe’s conception of mood as causally configured state renders his approach an outsider’s view. By the time Ratcliffe has noticed what he calls a shift in mood, an intricate process of change of felt meaning has already taken place, both within thematically harmonious and confused temporally unfolding episodes of affective experience. Not recognizing this fundamental co-dependence between transitivity and identity leads to reification of each pole of experience. If dispositions to act and acts themselves, being and becoming, feeling and intention, state and transition can be treated as separate moments, then their relations are rendered secondary and arbitrary, requiring causations and glues to piece them together.

Ratcliffe writes: “This default ‘style’ (minimal self) of anticipation is not specific to any particular life-structure, any particular configuration of cares, concerns, commitments, projects, and pastimes. It is, if you like, the glue needed to hold any such structure together, any kind of world.”(Trauma, Language and Trust, forthcoming)

The glue that holds together Ratcliffe’s minimal self, interaffecting causation, is a secondary concept of organization, a naturalized abstraction derived from the primary temporal structuration of affectivity-connation.

What DeJaegher, critiquing Gallagher’s primary intersubjectivity account, writes in that narrower context, could apply to Ratcliffe’s general orientation; “first we carve nature up at artificial joints – we split mind and body apart – and then we need to fasten the two together again, a task for which the notion of embodiment is, according to Sheets-Johnstone’s assessment, used as a kind of glue. But gluing the two back together does not bring back the original ‘integrity and nature of the whole” (De Jaegher 2009, Sheets-Johnstone, in press). Unlike first generation cognitivims, Ratcliffe begins from interaction, but an interaction that is grounded in separated moments of subject and object, feeling and intention, being and becoming, time and stasis.
The radically temporal account of affect introduced by Husserl and transformed in different ways by Merleau-Ponty, Gendlin and Heidegger, implies a rejection of two long-standing assumptions supporting the depiction of affect and cognition as distinct states. Contrary to these assumptions:

1) Intentional experience does not need to be pushed or pulled into action, or change of direction, by extrinsic reinforcement contingencies. Every moment of experience is already intrinsically affective (qualitatively self-displacing), assuring that even the most apparently non-emotive, ‘rational’, reflective type of awareness, such as supposedly characterizes affectively neutral empirical accounts, qualitatively, intuitively, hedonically transforms the meaning of what it references. Feelings belong to, operate within, carry forward, and transform what are called conceptual meanings. This qualitatively transformative effect in moment to moment experience is often subtle enough to go unnoticed, explaining the apparent analytical stability and inter-subjective objectivity attributed to empirical phenomena, the allegedly self-perpetuating coherence of linguistic narratives, and even the illusion of a stable ongoing pre-reflective self-awareness, minimal self or reflexive ‘feeling of being’.

2) ‘Raw’ affect is intrinsically intentional. So-called bodily sensations of feeling not only manifest the characteristics of metaphoricity and narrative consistency traditionally associated with conceptual thought, but in fact are not categorically distinguishable from what has been called conceptual meaning in any stable way.

Prior to any notion of cognition and affect as distinguishable constructs, within and beyond such terms as cognitive states and bodily affective signs, lies a universe of self-exceeding senses, modulations, aspects, variations, ways of working. Not variations or modulations of STATES but modulations of modulations.

If feeling, understood this new way, IS the very core of so-called conceptual and perceptual thought, merging narrative-thematic consistency and global self-transformation, the subjective and the objective, the felt and the understood, in the same gesture, then the presumed partial independence of rationality and affect vanishes, and the distinction re-emerges as aspects inherent in each event. The inter-affecting of context and novelty which defines an event simultaneously produces a fresh, particular modulation of change (empirical aspect) and a unique momentum (hedonic component) of self-transformation. From this vantage, the valutative, hedonic (the perceived goodness or badness of things), aesthetic aspect of experience, underlying ‘non-emotional’ appraisals as well as our sadnesses, fears and joys, simply IS our vicissitudes of momentum of sense-making through situations, rather than arising from causal feedback loops. Affective valences are contractions and expansions, coherences and incoherences, accelerations and regressions, consonances and dissonances, expressing how intimately and harmoniously we are able to anticipate and relate to, and thus how densely, richly, intensely we are able to move through, new experience. If we can believe that a unique qualitative moment of momentum, ranging from the confused paralysis of unintelligibility to the exhilaration of dense transformative movement, is intrinsic to ALL events, then perhaps there is no need to attribute the origin of aesthetic pleasures and pains to the functioning of a limited class of entities like bodily affects, even if it is understandable why this kind of assumption has survived for so long in psychology.
From the standpoint of verbal expressivity, what has traditionally been called emotion often appears to be a minimalist art, because it is the situational momentum of experiencing slowing or accelerating so rapidly that feelings seem to distill meaning down to a bare inarticulate essence. When the momentum of our reflective thought shifts in such dramatic ways (acceleratively enriched in joyful comprehension, impoverished in grief, ambivalent in fear, alternately disappointed and confident in anger), such so-called emotional events may appear to be a species apart from conceptual reason, a blind intuitive force (surge, glow, twinge, sensation, arousal, energy) invading, conditioning and orienting perceptual and conceptual thought from without as a background field. It is said that such ‘raw’ or primitive feeling is bodily-physiological, pre-reflective and non-conceptual, contentless hedonic valuation, innate, passive, something we are overcome by. At other times, situational change may be intermediate, just modulated and gradual enough that content seems to perpetuate itself in self-cohering narratives. Such situations have been called rational, voluntary, factual, reflective, stable, conceptual, propositional, rational, logical, theoretical, non-aesthetic. However, as I have said, these dichotomies: hedonic versus reflective, voluntary versus involuntary, conceptual versus pre-reflective bodily-affective, are not effectively understood as reciprocally causal innate or learned associations between perceptions and body states; they are relative variations in the momentum of a contextually unfolding process which is always, at the same time, within the same event, intentional and affective.

Am I suggesting that emotion be thought as a ‘cognitive’ appraisal, cut off from bodily sensation, movement and expression? On the contrary, it is precisely the treatment of cognition, bodily sensation and expression as separately pre-existing processes (even when treated as mutually structuring each other via ‘intentional-affective’ syntheses) which I am questioning. The point isn’t that bodily responses to experience via such avenues as the endocrine, autonomic nervous system and the motor pathways are irrelevant or peripheral to the intentional experience of emotion, feeling and mood, but that, whether we talking about the experience of so-called conceptual appraisal or bodily sensation, the phenomenological scene of affect (or any other aspect of bio-psycho-social functioning) does not depend on an arbitrary concatenation or mutual conditioning between discrete components. Prinz(2004), Colombetti and Thompson(2006), Damasio(1999) and others deny such a thing as a totally disembodied emotion, arguing that the feeling of emotion is affected in degrees concordantly with the severity of damage to avenues of connection with the body. I support their larger claim that experiential processes, including what are called cognitive and affective, function as radically, contextually inter-relational. However, I want to turn their views around a bit. Feeling does not depend on the fact that the brain, as a spatial locale and repository of temporary states of content, always has some access to the body, as a separate locale with semi-independent contents.

I have said that feeling functions from within so-called reflective thought, and that bodily affect is intentional. But if both the former and latter are true, it is not because body sensation structures cognition(or vice-versa). Rather, it is because these stratifying abstractions are but inadequately formulated moments of a process of sense-making uniting the hedonic and the intentional prior to any distinction between, or intertwining of, mind and body. Before I could speak of the occurrence of emotion as mental appraisals structured and conditioned by a background field of physiological energetics and behavioral expressions, I would have to re-figure all of these modes, what would be referred to as the “motoric”, the “sensate”, the “cognitive”, as unstable
metaphorical figures emerging contextually out of each other over the course of an indissociably
tentive-affective global movement of experience which would imply the unraveling of the basis
of categorical distinctions currently orienting the understanding of these terms.

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