Investigations in Radical Temporality

My central research focus over the past 30 years has been the articulation of what I call a radically temporal approach to philosophy. In the papers below, written between 2001 and 2022, I treat the varying ways in which radically temporal thinking manifests itself in the phenomenological perspectives of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Eugene Gendlin. I also discuss Jacques Derrida's deconstructive project and George Kelly's personal construct theory as examples of radically temporal thinking. With the aim of clarifying and further defining the nature of this family of orientations, I have delineated the important ways in which it differs from a range of interlinked approaches in philosophy and psychology that includes hermeneutic and radical constructivisms, social constructionism, 4EA (Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, Extended, and Affective) cognition, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of corporeal intersubjectivity, autopoietic self-organizing systems theory and American pragmatism. Among the authors whose work I have submitted to critique from the radically temporal perspective are: Francisco Varela (autopoietic self-organizing systems), Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson, Matthew Ratcliffe, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Dan Zahavi, Hanne De Jaegher, Michel Bitbol, Thomas Fuchs (enactive, embodied ('4EA') cognition), Gilles Deleuze (Deleuzian biopolitics), Ken Gergen and John Shotter (social constructionism), Kym Maclaren (critical phenomenology) and Jan Slaby (critical neuroscience). I argue that these authors' accounts of the relation between affect, motivation and intention, attention, reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness, the basis of mathematical naturalism and sensori-motor models of behavior, and the relation between the body, language and culture remain burdened by traditional presuppositions that the radically temporal philosophies of Heidegger et al put into question.
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Where is the Social? (2001)

Abstract:

Common to different versions of social constructionism is the definition of discourse as taking place between persons. Experiences which take place in the absence of immediate others, such as thinking to oneself or reading a text, are treated as secondary phenomena, as introjected versions of social utterance-gestures. This article asserts that representative constructionist articulations of between-person relationality rest on abstractions masking a more primary locus of sociality. I offer an alternative formulation of the social as the embodiment of sensate experience, borrowing from Merleau-Ponty's and Gendlin's accounts. Sensate experience is already radically relational before and beyond any notion of sociality as between-person voices-gestures, generating more intimate and mobile possibilities of interpersonal understanding than is offered via discursive readings of terms like social, language and embodiment. Note; Although this paper pertains to social constructionist positions, my central criticism of these approaches applies as well to Deleuze's bio-political notion of sociality. While constructionists restrict their focus to inter-personal communication, Deleuze broadens the notion of language to include the living and material world, which includes the body. This places the site of otherness and sociality within intentionality itself via its entanglement with affect. Nevertheless, Deleuze's treatment of affective-intentional dynamics, rather than dismantling social constructionism's between-person abstractions, manages to import them into bodily process.

INTRODUCTION:

Those familiar with recent debates within philosophy and the biological and social sciences know that much discussion centers on how to best move beyond the "God's eye view", the idea that an external world of objects exists independently of the subject experiencing it, which can be represented by a thinking subject via formal symbols(brain in a vat). One of the most notorious and controversial challenges to the God's eye, or objectivist, view is the linguistically-centered 'radical relativism' associated with Richard Rorty's pragmatism, French poststructuralist philosophies(Foucault) and social constructionist psychologies(Gergen), which claims that it is nonsensical to assert such things as internal components of the mind or external features of the world existing independently from the processes of cultural interaction through which we construct these artifacts. Linguistic relativisms are not without their weaknesses, however. (Rorty is one of a number of writers who rejects the relativism label others have pinned on him. He argues that "relativism, just as much as realism, assumes that one can stand within one's language and outside it at the same time." Derrida also refuses the label, associating it with vagueness and indeterminacy, while Gendlin, ironically, equates relativism with cultural determinacy).
If meanings, both personal and scientific, are generated and only have real existence through and within the languages and gestures we use to relate to and transform each other's worlds, if science is nothing but a social construction, where does the social begin? With humans and their languages? But then does this mean that the cultural ontologically precedes the biological and the physical? Is the only alternative the belief that human social interaction and meaning-making are the product of 'objective' cause-effect brain mechanisms impervious to cultural changes? We have already discussed a third avenue of approach besides objectivism and linguistic relativism: empirical psychologies(dynamical systems, second-generation cognitivism) influenced by or sharing features with phenomenological philosophies(Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger) systematically investigate the 'embodied' nature of the social, which has been generally overlooked by social constructionists in their one-sided focus on cultural practices. If the world of human culture cannot be understood to precede the pre or non-human, then neither can we go back to the belief that there is a pre-existing reality sitting outside of our constructions of it. This paper critiques social constructionism's explanation of the basis of the social and of language, not by championing embodied cognitive psychology, but by offering a way of thinking which I believe transcends the limitations of both social constructionism and embodied cognitivism.

Social Constructionism's Claims:

Writers affiliated with the growing social constructionist movement in psychology have made powerful claims concerning its efficacy in the understanding of persons (Kenneth Gergen(1985), Harre(1986), Shotter(1993)(click here for large collection of Shotter's writings), Potter(1987)). It's purported advantages over other psychological traditions depend on its radical treatment of the nature of the relationship between self and world. Gergen(1985) posits two poles around which much psychological theory in the 20th century has revolved: the autonomous subject or self, an originating psychological agent possessing context-resistant inner structures, and that of environmentalism, positing stimuli as univocal sources of conditioning. Both alternatives tend to reify that which they posit as the source of meaning organization. The question, then, is how we can be in touch with the world without resorting to doctrines of internal Givens (rationalism, conceptual schemes, transcendental subjects) or external Givens (empirical content, objectivity, nature, materialism) and their relations. Social constructionism offers a way out of this dilemma, not by situating itself somewhere between these poles, but rather by reconfiguring the axes 'subject-world' themselves. As Gergen explains, "Although the roots of constructionist thought may be traced to long-standing debates between empiricist and rationalist schools of thought, constructionism attempts to move beyond the dualism to which both of these traditions are committed and to place knowledge within the process of social interchange(p.266)."

Shotter(1993) reiterates,

"Common to all versions of social constructionism is the central assumption that-instead of the inner dynamics of the individual psyche (romanticism and subjectivism), or the already determined characteristics of the external world (modernism and objectivism)-it is the
contingent, really vague (that is, lacking any completely determinate character) flow of continuous communicative activity between human beings that we must study (p.179)."

The poles of this responsive conversation are no longer objective entities encapsulated in terms like drive and stimulus, or schema and input, but in a communally enacted play between conformity and resistance, ideology and emancipation. The site of meaning is a relational horizon of collective processes, interdependencies, discursive practices and conventions, a joint-negotiation of reality. What is the ethical-political achievement of what has been referred to as the `discursive revolution' (Potter, 1987)? A constructionist rethinking of the subject-object relation generates two crucial, and paradoxical, ethical implications. On the one hand, it transforms meaning from a positive in-itself into an indeterminate border. But at the same time that it destabilizes signification, it locates larger patterns of stability in cultural practices. In sum, even as it eschews artificial orders based on mental or society mechanisms, it understands in all engagements a certain minimal relational coherence missing from more traditional psychologies. Constructionism liberates persons from the tyranny of reified schemes, but protects them from the arbitrariness of the punctual self. Gergen (1994) explains, "If one believes that the central unit of society is the individual self, then relationships are by definition artificial contrivances, unnatural and alien. For the individualist, people are bounded entities leading separate lives on independent trajectories: we can never be certain that anyone else understands us, and thus, that they can care deeply about us. By the same token, the self-contained individual can never be certain that he or she understands the mind (thoughts, needs, feelings) of others, and is thereby restrained from investing too heavily in their lives." (p.213). For example, first generation (Chomsky, Fodor) cognitive information processing accounts are still wedded to some degree to a belief in context-independent entities or processes.

Where is the Other?

The discursive turn is indeed revolutionary for having liberated thinking from these structuralist limitations. By reifying human experience into mechanisms partially independent of ongoing culture, modernist perspectives make the world at the same moment too static and too arbitrary. By contrast, the movement in discursive interrelationality is emancipatory to the extent that it sees in human relationship a certain ongoing, fully contextual relational order missing from objectivizing psychologies. But even if one believes that the central unit of society is the social nexus of relation, the coherence and continuity that one is allowed to perceive in day to day experience may be limited fundamentally by the way one characterizes the nature of the `social'. While Gergen's intent here is to point to the 'pathology' inherent in reifying content of experience, one can just as well apply these comments to the way that many variants of social constructionism reify and polarize the PROCESS of experience. The flavor of alienness, separateness, interpersonal polarization Gergen mentions as the legacy of intellectual Romanticism still asserts itself in a muted way in their thinking. I intend to show how, from a certain vantage, rhetorical-social constructionisms can be seen to suffer from an anthropomorphizing of the notion of the social. How so?
In the above accounts, as well as in the work of authors such as Shotter, Potter(1987) and Harre(1986), we find the essence of human meaning as emerging from a lattice defined by a circle of related terms: language, rhetoric, sociality, embodiment. We need to examine how these terms work to structure the world for these writers in order to reveal what more primary process of meaning may lie hidden within the confines of their notions of language as social embodiment. If language, as ‘forms of life’, is at the root of discourse, what is the fundamental requirement for language? There would seem to be agreement among a number of versions of constructionism that dialogically-structured activity requires the participation of more than one person. This would seem to be the minimal requirement of any notion of sociality. But then how do we account for communication with oneself, or with a written text?

Wittgenstein(1953) asks, 'Can one think without speaking? Can one say things only to oneself?' His answer, echoed by various social constructionists: A thought is not something present somewhere in one's mind, like a picture, to be observed, translated, described or expressed without that observation changing the very nature of what it is we had 'in mind'. Therefore, the idea of a thought divorced from expression, usage, application, is meaningless. Speech, for Wittgenstein, only has meaning in relation to its ongoing usage within a community of speakers. Beliefs and desires are not unobservables but are always shown by our acting. Thought In-vention only can be understood as joint activity constrained and fed by Con-vention. This does not mean that the other who says to me, 'Yes, I understand what you are thinking' is sharing a supposed identical insight with me. How would either of us know on what basis our thinking is identical, without further explication? And the very necessity of responsively elaborating the supposed initial meaning of my thinking continues to change it's role in our interchange. So, as it turns out, my attempt to represent my 'private' understanding identically to another reveals the concept of identity to be a fiction, or more specifically, to be a transient non-recuperable moment in the process of discursive activity. Gergen(1985), like Wittgenstein, denies linguistic, and thus meaningful, significance to the idea of conversation-with-self independent of my rhetorical interactions with other people. He says "Languages are essentially shared activities. Indeed, until the sounds or markings come to be shared within a community, it is inappropriate to speak of language at all. In effect, we may cease inquiry into the psychological basis of language (which account would inevitable form but a subtext or miniature language) and focus on the performative use of language in human affairs(p.270)."

If the self thinking to itself only has meaning as a derived form of social speech, then the same must go for the understanding of a written text. As Shotter(1993) argues, "the essence of textual communication is its so-called intertextuality: the fact that it draws upon people's knowledge of a certain body of already formulated meanings in the making of its meanings-this is why texts can be understood without contexts, that is, independently of immediate and local contexts(p.26)." In treating the interaction with a written work as, in some cases, resistant to the immediacy of context, Shotter upholds a distinction between speech and writing that Derrida has spent a career deconstructing. Derrida uses the terms 'text' and 'writing' to refer to all modes of understanding, inscribed, spoken, gestured or otherwise, precisely in order to demonstrate the radically contextual process underlying all forms of communication. While it is not our intent here to show
how Derrida's (1976) grammatological project destabilizes distinctions between writing and speech, we want to question why a written text should be seen, even if in only rare circumstances, as in any fundamental way less of a fully local, contextualized conversation than any face-to-face encounter. I suggest that the dialogue between oneself as artist and one's created work, whatever the medium of expression, is a fully contextual sociality not because such experiences show themselves in my actions with other people, affirming my relation to public cultural practices, but because my conversation with myself is already fully public prior to any notion of interchange with 'other human beings'. Even my repetitive reading of the 'same' sentences over and over is a fully contextualized and social process. In what sense can we claim that such situations are 'public', and how can repetition of the same text expose us to otherness, if it excludes other voices from our definition of the social?

Who we perceive ourselves to be is indeed formed and reformed through our encounters with an other, but the question I want to raise is, does this shaping depend on the fact that the othernesses which impinge upon us are formulated as other voices, other persons? What does 'person' or 'other' mean? If language, as 'forms of life', is at the root of discourse, what is the fundamental requirement for language? Is thinking to oneself not to be understood as a fully linguistic activity? Is solitary experience an activity which simply recycle meanings co-created in interaction with other members of a symbolizing community, or does private thought re-invent language? It seems that a social constructionism which bases its notion of the 'socius' on a too-authoritative notion of speech needs to begin from the question which sparked Heidegger's project. Before we ask, what is a person, we must ask 'what is a thing'.

There is a way of understanding communication, even such experiences as solitary reflection, the reading of a book, or the encounter with a work of art, as fully social and discursive events, without relying on the more obviously formulated notion of actual other speakers being present to us or even introjected by us as internalized voices. Representative constructionist articulations of between-person relatiolarity rest on abstractions masking a more primary locus of sociality. Sensate experience is already radically relational before and beyond any notion of sociality as between-person voices-gestures, generating more intimate and mobile possibilities of interpersonal understanding than is offered via discursive readings of terms like sociality, language and embodiment. Sociality can be understood as originating at a more concrete, intricate site than that of languaged or gestured utterance, allowing each participant in conversation to maintain an ongoing thread of non-agential, anticipative consistency and immediacy missing from constructionist accounts. Derrida has analyzed this under the rubric of 'iterability', and Gendlin (1991),(1992) has articulated it as 'experiential intricacy'. Let us first examine the general architecture of this dynamic. We will then discuss its implications for the understanding of persons-in-culture.

The Body of Perception as Discourse:

I offer an account of the origin of language and the social which unravels speech in order to reveal working within the apparent dynamics of joint activity a less 'conceptual' dynamic,
consisting in an intricate process of sensate interaction. It is not as if the body has not already been a focus of discussion recently within the constructionist community (See Stam(1998)) However, I introduce a notion of embodiment which differs from the way in which the body is treated in constructionist accounts (Sampson(1996), Shotter(1993)).

The sensate body is a metaphorical boundary, an intricate site of discursive responsivity of which actual experiencing represents but the moments of its play. The body does not exist first and then interact with an outside. It is nothing but this relational fold. Language IS sensate, already to be found in the `raw' experience of what we hear and see. This is an important point, because it determines the very core of sensate experience to be double, split within itself before it ever has a chance to exist as singular moments. An element of experience is already divided within itself, not only before it enters into relation with other people, but before it is simply `itself' as singular meaning.

Derrida has said:

"The iterability of an element divides its own identity a priori, even without taking into account that this identity can only determine or delimit itself through differential relations to other elements and hence that it bears the mark of this difference. It is because this iterability is differential, within each individual "element" as well as between "elements", because it splits each element while constituting it, because it marks it with an articulatory break, that the remainder, although indispensable, is never that of a full or fulfilling presence; it is a differential structure escaping the logic of presence..(LI53)."

What Derrida is saying here is that no meaning returns to itself identically, even for an instant. One cannot repeat, copy or reproduce a particular meaning or context, even by the simple act or recollection from memory or from some other form of recorded archive, without changing the sense of that context. To attempt to do so is to retrieve this `same' meaning slightly differently, to `split' it, to alter it, to re-invent it. The process of experiencing as radically interactive captures a more subtle sort of modulation, a finer silt of the world, than that represented by the way in which sense is supposedly created in responsive dialogue. Whereas rhetoric begins in reaction, the sensate fold is a modulation which already takes place before we react to what we experience in behavioral-bodily or verbal conversation with others, or in silent reactivity. As we said earlier, interactivity is not only prior to the perception of objects by a subject, it is prior to any notion of a pre-existingly-patterned object-in-itself, whether on the scale of the physical, neural, psychological or cultural.

There is no pure, monological tone, sense, feel, form, entity. We could not even say that sense is unformed, incomplete, or vague before its participation in discourse. There simply is no such thing as a meaning, sense, tone, which is not already mobile, ahead of itself, simultaneously a relation of similarity to my previous experience and an absolute departure from my history. Each moment is both an imminence and a transcendence, a reference to something familiar and previous, and the admittance of an exceeding. As such it is double, a split unity. I can only speak
of such a thing as another person because my world is already ordered as a referential transit, but now `person' loses its prior meaning as monovocal participant.

Responsivity seen in this way need not rely on the more obviously formulated notion of actual other speakers being present to us or even imagined by us, because the social world has already begun in the instant that I experience myself. One might argue that one has introjected the multiple voices of the social realm even in seeming solitary reflection, but this misses the crucial point that if we want to conceive of `solitary' experience as a social, responsive, discursive dynamic, then we need not determine it thus by reference to the artificial level of introjected formed utterances, voices, gestures of others. Instead, sociality can be understood at the more concrete, intricate site of individual intention. This is a more fundamental level than that of language utterance, not because it resists the otherness of community, but because it is already structured as such, but in a way which requires a more immediate, intimate and integral conceptualization of the social.

This more immediate origin of meaning is not an already constituted self, but something prior, of which the self is merely one of its effects. The irreducible basis of meaning is what Derrida calls a mere mark or trace, not yet an `I' or an `Other', but the basis of both. The mark implies both subject and object because, as Derrida's analyses show, for a mark to be a mark it must be repeatable, and the very repetition of a mark of meaning, an intention, a `meaning to say', transforms it. Repetition is altering, and this is what Derrida calls `iterability':

"Through the possibility of repeating every mark as the same, [iterability] makes way for an idealization that seems to deliver the full presence of ideal objects... but this repeatability itself ensures that the full presence of a singularity thus repeated comports in itself the reference to something else, thus rending the full presence that it nevertheless announces"(LI29).

...the possibility of its being repeated another time-breaches, divides, expropriates the "ideal" plenitude or self-presence of intention,...of all adequation between meaning and saying. Iterability alters...leaves us no room but to mean (to say) something that is (already, always, also) other than what we mean (to say) (Limited, Inc.p.61)." "The break intervenes from the moment that there is a mark, at once. It is iterability itself, ..passing between the re- of the repeated and the re- of the repeating, traversing and transforming repetition(p.53)."

This situation is valid not only for linguistic signs, but, Derrida says, for all of what philosophy calls experience, "even the experience of being"(Limited,Inc.,p.9). Derrida is telling us that nothing can be thought before or outside of transformation, not even movement itself taken as its own theme. No concept is ever actually stored, archived, dormant, old, existing independently of the 'NOW' which marks both our recognition and our modification of its meaning for us. It is not Derrida's point to say that in the ongoing flow of experience and language, the past instants of this endless chain of changing senses of meaning are presumed to still exist somewhere, untouched by what follows them in time. For Derrida this past FOLLOWS the future which is framed by it. That is to say, there is never a question of returning to recover a `what was' untouched by what follows it temporally.
Gendlin(1997) affirms that the self-transcendence of the sensate body is already operative before and after interaction with other 'persons':

"Individuals are inherently social, but that doesn't mean everything must come from society, and be imposed on us. Rather, it means that what is individual is also social. In living, our bodies generate, imply, and enact language and culture; but with and after those, our bodies imply (project, experience, sense, practice, demand...) more. What they imply is inherently interactional and social, but it is more precise and implies what has never as yet formed and happened.(p.393)"

Meaning as Beyond Itself:

In distinguishing the relationality of meaning as social constructionisms consider it from our perspective, I do not mean to suggest that a rhetorical social constructionism treats language as anything as reified as formal symbol system. Constructionists agree that language is not a closed system of signs; it is to be understood as a tool, not as a finished form. What I bring to a conversation with each word, gesture or bodily action is not a symbol whose referent is available as context-independent meaning, but is instead radically indeterminate. But notice that the utterance-gesture, even as unfinished tool in a responsive play, is still seen as an 'it', a form, a unitary element in joint activity. Its definition may always be in question, but its status as singularity, however indeterminate its referent, apparently is not. Let's take Shotter's position, for instance. On the one hand, Shotter(1999) affirms that experience is a temporally unfolding, implicate order, a relationality not simply of interpersonal dialogues but of perceptual othernesses in which the event of meaning is a part of "the indivisible wholeness of the ceaseless flow of activity within which we-along with the others around us-are embedded"(p.6). In many respects this emphasis on responsivity as expectant, anticipative, implicative, captures the general flavor of my argument. I agree with Shotter's observation that we need not conceive of experience as being 'shot out of a pistol at us'. But when he refers to dialogic entities as "incomplete, ongoing, on the way to being other than at the moment they already are"(1993,p.94), he makes a conversational entity, even as a moment in a responsive order, seem to exist first as itself ('what it already is', even if just for a moment) before it becomes its other through the dialectic of joint activity. Thus, responsivity is treated as an implicate order based on a meeting between utterances-gestures.

While I applaud Shotter's rhetorical-responsive version of social constructionism for stretching its reach to the limits of a thinking of culture as joint activity, I want to take a step beyond the notion of discourse as a meeting or joining of othernesses. I argue instead that an utterance is already a meeting with itself. Events don't speak with their surroundings; they ARE their surroundings. As Gendlin(1992) says,"In sensing itself the body functions as our sense of each situation(p.345). It is not a perceived object before you or even behind you. The body-sense IS the situation, inherently an interaction, not a mix of two things (p.347)." An element or 'form' of language, as embodied perception, is already split in two as a sensing and being-sensed, a touching and being touched, not only before it enters into relation with other people, but before it is simply 'itself'. A moment of experience is not only not monological, but it is equivocal. This
internal dichotomization, this infinitesimal way in which a new experience shows itself for me, or more accurately shows myself to me, in terms both of ownness and moreness, transforms a language of rhetorical negotiation into a more sublime dance which sees the latter's forms as overstuffed. That which we 'are' at any moment does not need to wait for a response (felt, gestured, spoken) from an other in order to be contested, an entity of meaning is already its own response, its own co-ordination. In this double awareness I leave myself and return to myself, I join the novel and the familiar. More accurately, the familiar and novel are joined as the permeable boundary called 'I', always leaving and returning to itself differently in each moment of its instantiation, thus always meaning more than it meant. To sense, to be, is to already be beyond, more than, that which we identify with as the object of our attention.

If to be is in a single instant to be 'more than', if to intend is to intend beyond what one intends, then the flow of experience is best thought of as a repetition of this movement-event, rather than as an encounter. Such an experiencing has the quality of perspectival variation, as when we see an object as modulations, fluctuations, each variation existing as a pointing to the next. Gendlin(1997) offers, "Intricacy is very orderly in response to formulations, but it IS neither this nor that formulation. It does not have a static "IS". Rather, it 'is-for-carrying-forward'. Although not as yet formed, it always very demandingly and precisely IMPLIES a next step (p.385)."

The process of perception as flesh captures a more subtle sort of modulation, a finer silt of the world, than that represented by the way in which sense is created in responsive dialogue. Whereas rhetoric begins in reaction, the sensate fold is a modulation which already takes place before we react to what we experience in behavioral-bodily or verbal conversation with others, or in silent reactivity. There is no pure, monological tone, sense, feel, form, entity. We could not even say that sense is unformed, incomplete, or vague before its participation in discourse. There simply is no such thing as a meaning, sense, tone, which is not already mobile, ahead of itself, simultaneously a relation of similarity to my previous experience and an absolute departure from my history. Each moment is both an imminence and a transcendence, a reference to something familiar and previous, and the admittance of an exceeding. As such it is double, a split unity. I can only speak of such a thing as another person because my world is already ordered as an embodied dialectic, but now 'person' loses its prior meaning as monovocal participant.

Culture and Perceptual Embodiment:

I mentioned that notions of embodiment have been offered from various constructionist perspectives. Language as discursive relation can be said to be embodied to the limited extent that it is contaminated by an outside, an other, formed and reformed in every repetition of its joint use. Yet, as monovocal tool, it wields too arbitrary and disruptive a power. For a constructionism of joint utterance, embodiment refers to the body politic, the between-person community. For instance, Sampson's(1998) characterization of the role of the body is that of reflecting and generating a person's position in a social field. He writes, "Not only have we been socialized to use particular words but also to employ our bodies in particular ways. Even the most mundane of our actions, including how our mouths, lips, lungs, vocal cords, and breath
patterns are all socialized to form the words we speak, tell us clearly of the embodiment of discourse. (p.25).

Similarly, Shotter (1993) speaks of ideas originating in `sensuous bodily activities' (p.30). But he seems to assign internal thinking the role of liaison, helping to shape one's behavior in conformity with the supposed constraints of cultural mores and practices. He says, "...one's task in developing into a morally autonomous adult in one's own society is not just that of learning to direct one's own mental processes with the aid of words and signs, but of doing so in a way that makes sense and is considered legitimate by others... Thus our mental life is never wholly our own. We live in a way which is both responsive, and in response to, what is both `within us' in some way, but which is also `other than' ourselves" (p.45). If Shotter's view of inner speech is in fact close to our own perspective, which it may be, then `sensuous bodily activities' need not be characterized as shaping themselves to an outer realm of social convention when that `outer' realm is already included in (but deconstructed by) an ontologically prior perceptually embodied self-world horizon. I agree that we do not direct our own mental processes. But what is `within us' is `other than ourselves' not because it is exposed to other people's responses, but simply because it is exposed to itself. As I have said, each awareness of meaning is a double movement, in which what I `am' returns to question me from beyond my own resources. The incessant way in which our self-sameness is put into question via the otherness of perceptual sociality puts us always just beyond culture defined as `between person' conventions. As Gendlin puts it (1997), "Culture elaborates and acts in something [experiential intricacy] that is much more than culture (p.391)." To say that my local coordinations of meaning are embedded within broader social processes, or `permitted forms of talk' (Shotter, 1993), is putting the cart before the horse. When these broader social processes are understood via the vantage of embodied perception, they lose their legitimacy. Via thinking from the intricate process which is the only site where culture has any real existence, monovocal abstractions like genre, convention, practice make way for a changed landscape of the social, a subtler vocabulary of ongoing styles of implicit experiencing.

What use to us, then, is the idea of a cultural world? What is left of the significance of shared experience and conventions, of genres and communities, if these terms derive from a dialogic thinking that I claim is mired in overly conceptual simplifications masking a more fundamental relational process? I do not at all reject the crucial constructionist insight that human understanding is best understood as relationality fashioned and re-fashioned (and only really existing) within immediate local contexts. But I have asserted that the moment to moment history of my Being-in-relation is of an order which hides within the level of responsive between-person dialogue. This means that those larger patterns of human belonging abstracted from local joint activity, which constructionists discern in terms of cultural language games and practices, also hide within themselves a more primary patterning.

While I affirm that our experience as individuals is characterized by stable relations of relative belonging or alienation with respect to other individuals and groups, the site of this interactivity, whether we find ourselves in greater or lesser agreement with a world within which we are enmeshed, has a character of peculiar continuity of the order of an implying ahead of itself. It
also has a character of relentless creative activity that undermines and overflows attempts to understand human action based on between-person determinisms. We may identity to a greater or lesser extent with various larger paradigmatic communities, delicately united by intertwining values. But the contribution of each member of a community to the whole would not originate at the level of spoken or bodily language interchange among voices; such constructs repress as much as they reveal. Even in a community of five individuals in a room, I, as participant, can perceive a locus of integrity undergirding the participation of each of the others to the responsive conversation. In my dealings with other persons, I would be able to discern a thread of continuity organizing their participation in dialogue with me, dictating the manner and extent to which I can be said to influence their thinking and they mine. My thinking can not properly be seen as 'determined' by his response, and his ideas are not simply 'shaped' by my contribution to our correspondence.

The extent to which I could be said to be embedded within a particular set of cultural practices would be a function of how closely other persons I encounter resonate with my own ongoing experiential process. I can only shape my action to fit socially legitimate goals or permitted institutionalized grammatical forms to the extent that those goals or forms are already implicated in my ongoing experiential movement. Even then, what is implicated for me is not 'the' social forms, but aspects hidden within these so-called forms which are unique to my perceptually embodied construing; what I perceive as socially 'permitted' rhetorical argumentation is already stylistically distinctive in relation to what other participants perceive as permitted. Each individual who feels belonging to an extent in a larger ethico-political collectivity perceives that collectivity's functions in a unique, but peculiarly coherent way relative to their own history, even when they believe that in moving forward in life their strategic language moves are guided by the constraints imposed by essentially the 'same' discursive conventions as the others in their speech community. All that exists for me in an interchange is that which carries forward the implicate order of my embodied perceptual experiencing.

Perception as Non-Agential Relationality:

'Carries forward the implicate order of my embodied perceptual experiencing'? Isn't this just code for 'interprets reality via internal representations'? Aren't we resurrecting the specter of a power-centered agent choosing her world? My perspective is no more to be thought of in essentialist terms than is the constructionist claim that our actions are guided and constrained by larger patterns of communal intelligibility. In both cases, the patterning which constrains our meaning-making is not the order of a context-independent agency, but a relational process which only really exists within the contingency of local interchange. Constructionist orders like genres, practices, conventions are not static but dynamically stable coherences, re-enforced and re-fashioned in each local social encounter. This is precisely how we need to think of the implicate order of perception, the key difference being that, instead of the dialogic space consisting of a responsive conversation between monovocal participants, it exists first and foremost as a conversation between a meaning, sense, utterance, gesture and itself. This strange idea of the instant of awareness, perception, meaning as simultaneously both itself and beyond
itself turns a single moment of verbal exchange between two people into a plurality of conversations. In the instant a constructionist account would locate a single interchange of responsive language forms, I would trace a multiplicity of intertwined aspectival variations continually altering my sense of the situation, of myself and the other person. By the time a series of discursive interactions had taken place, allowing the constructionist to place them as tactics or performances within a cultural genre, that `genre' supposedly constraining the interchange would have already been subtly made and remade a number of times over in different ways for each participant.

It is an easy mistake to read perceptual intricacy via constructionist definitions of interpersonal engagement. This results in the appearance that I am claiming to be able to take away from an interpersonal encounter only those aspects that I preemptively announce as `resonant with our own implicative order', thus retreating from the full contingency of responsive being into a kind of teleological self-actualizing process. It is crucial that this implicate order not be confused with a schematic or narrative agency. I agree with Gergen(1994) when he says people "do not consult an internal script, cognitive structure, or apperceptive mass for information or guidance; they do not interpret or "read the world" through narrative lenses; they do not author their own lives. He rightly points out that such a system can never get beyond its own biases in order to truly be affected by a world outside of its own schemes. Each moment of my ongoing participation in a world, as a play of memory and otherness, destroys the unity which a monological narrative, schematic or apperceptive entity would claim to impose on my understanding. The peculiar ongoing continuity generated by sensate intricacy is not the result of the total or partial preservation of an `internal' meaning, protected from contestation. I am remade differently, but integrally, in every instant.

I am not claiming that we respond to mentally prefigured aspects of another's voice, gesture, feeling; I don't begin from constructionist premises concerning what or who it is that we respond to in interpersonal contact. It is just as much a misnomer to refer to what I do, as embodied being, as choosing or selecting from a world as it is for the constructionist to speak in these terms. It is not that our perspectival understanding is resistant to the influence of discursive communication, but that the way in which we are influenced by a world takes the peculiar form of an anticipative repetition, rather than a contamination. Experience for me is not agential, not a question of autonomous choice, assimilation or self-actualization, but of a fully contextual responsivity which happens to unfold as resonant, perspectival, anticipative, implicative because that is all there is in the fabric of a world as sensate relationality. The discursive other who surprises me as a polarization, intervention, destabilization of my history is presumed to come at me from a substantial distance. But the sensate other who intervenes in my solipsism doesn't come AT me, doesn't interrogate me. The other as variation, implication, anticipated elaboration is impossibly close to me. Far from choosing a reified notion of the individual over more relational thinking, my account of meaning as embodied perception is more radically open to history and culture. Culture is already to be found, shaped and reshaped, in each moment of this transformative process, allowing relationality and culture to intervene more aggressively, more immediately, more intimately in my ongoing history of experience than is seen in monovocal
constructionist accounts.

Idealism and Coherence:

Where does the coherence of embodied perception derive from? Mustn't its philosophical justification rest on an idealism of sorts? I might note that the same accusation has been leveled against a between-person constructionism. What, after all, is to guarantee that the interactive nature of human relations expresses itself in terms of larger patterns that allow us to speak of shared genres and practices, rather than a scene of arbitrary, nihilistic freedom (as constructionism's realist detractors (Richardson(1999)) view it)? I think Gergen (1994) is on the way to an answer when he points out the inseparable roles that both novelty and memory play in the act of understanding. He says we are always confronted with novelty.

"Yet our actions in each passing moment will necessarily represent some simulacrum of the past; we borrow, reformulate, and patch together various pieces of preceding relationships in order to achieve local coordination of the moment. Meaning at the moment is always a rough reconstruction of the past, a ripping of words from familiar contexts and their precarious insertion into the emerging realization of the present (p.270)."

If it is the complex interweaving of memory and novelty that allows the social world to unfold for constructionists in terms of larger patterns and stabilities, then the articulation of a more immediate and intricately woven process, wherein the future engages the past not as a ripping of words but a transformative carrying forward, can reveal at the same time a more integral and a more dynamic social order.

Reconciling the Other-in-Me and the They:

An even more central question from a constructionist point of view might be how our claim that an ongoing thread of continuity underlies my participation in interpersonal relations could possibly allow a more penetrating understanding of the Other, than a discursive account which makes no such claim. Haven't I made people into 'bounded entities, leading separate lives on independent trajectories'? On the contrary, even as I discover that I am not simply my interactions with other people in the abstract and polarized way that they are represented in discursive accounts, I am able to insert myself into the process of another's thinking more effectively. Being able to relate to others via dimensions of commonality is indeed crucial to going on with life rather than being lost in a fog of chaos and confusion; as such my recognition of the other's integrity of perceptual process is not a barrier to intercourse with them, but an invitation to proceed further than the level of analysis which locates our conversation within shared rhetorical genres. This further engagement is not a retreat from the depth of social connectivity that is achieved via discursive methodology, but the move to a more thoroughgoing sociality. The fine silt of varying perspectives which is the implicative order of experience does not separate me from other persons in any fundamentally different manner than that by which one moment of my experience is 'separated' from the next (that is, from itself). Whether my ongoing situational
conversation intertwines me within the otherness of an 'inanimate' object or a living soul, the process is the same.

Let's take a closer look at the underlying process uniting these conversational modalities, beginning with the kind of experience which finds me alone with my thoughts and my 'inanimate' surroundings as I attempt to write a paper. As I write these words, it is a given that my activity arises out of a background of assumptions, concerning my competency, relation to an audience, etc. Through my acquaintance with their own writing, I enter into a conversation with a particular community, and it is important to me that, at least for the purposes of this article, what I have to say is intelligible to that group. On the other hand, I could decide to write for 'myself', using a vocabulary which I fully expect will be only marginally coherent to other readers. The point is that, whether I write with an audience or 'myself' in mind, the process of generating ideas for the work is not simply the elaboration of an already formed role that I am socialized to perform as discursive partner in a society, involving repositioning myself within the constraints of grammatical forms. The process of writing is itself an ongoing conversation moving subtly BEYOND the reach of those cultural constraints, during which both my view of my own position as well the arguments of my imagined audience is subject to potentially significant change. The role that I perceive to take on in relation to my imagined audience shifts as I reconstrue my own position incrementally in every word that I write, every thought, image, feeling, recollection. I begin with a sketchy idea of what I want to say. As I jot this down, I search for the proper words to convey what it is I think I already know. The sense of a thought that I intend, even before committing it to writing, speaks back to me and surprises me. As I attempt to solidify this new sense of the word by giving it a name, it engages me now as just a bit inadequate, in need of supplement. Not just my writing, but my thinking, perceiving, has this spiral quality wherein I reach for an idea just beyond my grasp; then grasping it, find it instantly inadequate in the moment of it's capture. Even as inadequate, what I nail down as 'this sense' of a thought has the feel of at the same time a completion and a qualitative alteration not just of what immediately preceded it, but of my entire history.

The dialogue between myself as artist and my created work, whatever the medium of expression, is a fully contextual sociality not because such experiences show themselves in my actions with other people, affirming my relation to public cultural practices, but because my conversation with myself is already fully public prior to any notion of interchange with 'other human beings'. Even my repetitive reading of the 'same' sentences over and over is a fully contextualized and social process (As Derrida's 'iterability' trope remind us, to repeat a 'meaning to say' is to transform it). The peculiar dual quality of completion and instant obsolescence that attaches itself to each moment of my thinking, wiping out and remaking my past, applies to an infinity of other modes of awareness that intervene when I seemingly lose my train of thought and, succumbing to creative fatigue, find myself observing visual textures of my surroundings, listening distractedly to ambient sounds, noting the touch of warm air blowing on my skin from the heating vent. In my immersion in these objects of attention, I am confronted with othernesses as fully interrogational as any 'voice'.

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They are in the most immediate sense my culture, background others which ground my situational comportment as well as subverting the self-sameness of my identity. Each of these perceptual encounters are not simply my assimilation of `objects' of perception, as if in encountering my familiar surroundings I revisit what was in some way already there. Neither are they othernesses in the sense of events which engage me (joint-action) from a distance. They don't come at me, they tumble out of me, as a redefinition of me. They (and myself) only exist in the instant of my contact with them as a touching-being touched, feeling-felt. I become myself anew in them, through them, and they are born anew as responses, interlocutors, to their own inquiry. In the same way as in interpersonal conversation, each of my utterances is contextualized as response to a question. My encounter with sensate objects represents further embodied conversations which depend on, and carry forward, the background thematics of my writing-connected thinking and vice-versa.

When I find myself returning to my writerly `train of thought' and discover that an impasse has been removed, it must be recognized that the `distracted' modes of experience I was tempted to conceive as a hiatus were a continuation of the writing of the work, even in their apparent departure from it. Lets say I now meet with a friend to discuss what I've written. The conversation will have all of the features which typified my solitary writing. Like my writerly and sensate conversations, interchange with my friend will involve measures of anticipation and surprise. But my contact with another person is not a dialogic ping pong game. As words, gestures, expressions are lobbed back and forth, my identity, as Gergen(1994) supposes, originates in my coming to perform a role, defined by and dependent on the validation of others with whom I enact that role. But my role is not fundamentally in relation to another person or persons, but in relation to the otherness of sensate experience underlying both my self-conversation and my interchange with another person. Perceptual embodiment is not a grammatical order so much as a grammatological order, as in Derrida's notion of gramme as a split singularity. Rather than being constrained by between-person social role, as implicatory being always intending-beyond-itself I stand partially ahead of the culture it presumably represents. My social role is not simply pushed and pulled via the validation of others; if I determine that my conversational partner reinterprets my argument via a predicable, too-narrow perspective, I not only will not be little affected by their critique, but in anticipating such a response will consider it an affirmation of sorts. On the other hand, my `solitary' self-conversation can lead to devastating invalidation and reformulation of my identity.

Rather than a single game, interpersonal relationality is at least two intertwining games, or, more precisely, texts, from my vantage; it is both my integrally varying senses of the other's interpretation of our encounter, and my awareness of the dynamic stability of the difference between his and my outlook. (In fact, as we have seen, it is a multiplicity of modes. For in the situation, both our perspectives will wander into many subregions and modalities, just as when I am alone.) While I am with my friend, I can move back and forth between styles of my self-conversation and the interpersonal interchange, noting an ongoing difference in the relative thematic coherence of these two threads. In attempting to share my ideas with them, I can be aware of the overlap in our understanding at the same time that I recognize incommensurabilities
between our perspectives.

But my perspective and that of another are not to be understood as independent, private regions. The interpersonal relation directly remakes my sense of what my `own' perspective is, as well as what I assume to be the other's integral position. It is always a new sense of `me' and `other' that emerge in conversation, but as an intertwining iterative movement among threads of implication. When I get inside the other's head, it is simultaneously they getting inside my head, even if that other is a text I am reading or a painting I gaze at. But again, this process is no different in kind than that of `solitary' perceptive experience, in which my various activities lead me into distinct zones or situations characterized by a certain aesthetic integrity of unfolding perspectival variations. Listening to music, enjoying lunch, following my own train of thought, or conversing with others, are all modalities of experiencing having their own distinct, temporary integrities even as they blend into and carry forward previous modes. My sense of my own identity is relentlessly, but subtly, formed and reformed in moving through and between myriad modalities of experience, including my moments of self-conversation, my immersion in subjects-objects of touch, sight, as well as within interpersonal interchange.

Conclusion:

As ethical-therapeutic instruments, both between-person constructionisms and my embodied approach emphasize movement and the ceaseless questioning of ideologies. Both constitute thoroughgoing ethical relativisms. Their differences center on the kind of intimacy and intensity of movement we allow ourselves to recognize in the incessant finding and losing of ourselves in the world as simultaneously historically grounded and emancipatory actors (See Gendlin(1981) for a well-developed therapeutic approach based on sensate embodiment.) I have faulted discursive accounts for failing to see the changing contexts of a person's thinking within a more fundamental perspective of embodied-sensate intricacy. I have argued that a process of embodied perception underlies our encounters in different contexts and gives them a peculiar sort of coherence or implicate self-consistency hidden from a variety of constructionist versions. Inevitably, my argument will be read by some as the advocacy of an idealism, a structuralism, the old wine of individualism in new clothes. Let me make this much clear. There is no vantage point I am allowing, from which anyone might point to the process which I have described on these pages and totalize it, in even a momentary fashion. As I have said, myself, culture and convention are entirely reborn each moment of my sensate experience, which includes everything I might claim to know about myself or another, any particular privileged source of knowledge, theoretical or practical. Each new word I write down on these pages and which you read right now EX-ists as both continuation of contextual history, different for you as reader than for me as writer, and the introduction of a new world. It is both these things at the same time. Each new word is, as perspectival variation, a new sense of the word and thus a new philosophy of the world, in some small way. This is true even in rereading the same word over and over. The otherness of history, culture, intervenes in each supposed repetition of the 'same' word, and this comes from within a thing's own resources as simultaneously object and subject, not from the response of a `rhetorical' outside.
There is no vantage point from which I, as theorist, can escape this transformative process such as to pre-emptively determine a particular narrative foundation for experience. If I want to assert that what I've just claimed concerning the origin of discourse as embodied intricacy remains ethically, aesthetically, scientifically true now, I have to allow my terms to be self-reflexive, so that the truth of what I write is continually being rewritten in each new mark on the page, as a new philosophy of truth, embodiment, intricacy, writing, as well as a new philosophy of me. My writing does not renew itself because it introjects or coordinates with a culture beyond it, but because it already is culture, as always a (subtly) new conventionality in every moment of its instantiation, interwoven with what preceded it in an intimate order, intending beyond what it intends. Truth, then, is this horizon which in the same instant loses and comes back to me, as 'me', always a new instantiation of subject-object. Is what I offer, then, a modernism, a structuralism, a self-actualization? Such entities claim to step outside of the bounds of the repetition of difference which remakes the whole world, including my `self', anew in every awareness. This is far from what I have in mind. All that I advocate here, is that discursive thinking allow itself more aggressive and thoroughgoing exposure to the `enchanted', or the transformative, impetus renewing experience in innumerable rich and precise ways, but packed so tightly and invisibly within the abstraction that is the rhetorical social relation that what is left to be seen is a dialogic space both too plodding and too constraining.

(Joshua Soffer,2001)

References:


A Phenomenological Critique of Mindfulness (2019)

Abstract:

How do such normative affectivities as 'unconditionally intrinsic goodness', 'spontaneous compassion', 'luminosity', 'blissfulness', 'a calm and peaceful life guided by the fundamental value of nonviolence' emerge as ultimate outcomes of a philosophy of groundlessness? Aren't they motivated by a sort of 'will to goodness', a preferencing of one affective dimension over others? It would seem that groundlessness for Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson doesn't apply to the thinking of affect and desire. Despite their claim that nihilism cannot be overcome by assimilating groundlessness to a notion of the will, they appear not to recognize that the positive affectivities they associate with meditative practice are, as dispositions of feeling opposed to other dispositions, themselves forms of willing.

In The Embodied Mind, Varela and Thompson assert that Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger’s phenomenologies produce ‘after the fact’ theoretical reflections that miss the richness of immediate concrete pre-reflective experience as present in the here-and-now. But Varela and Thompson’s separating of being and becoming in their empirical approach leads them to misread these phenomenologists, and as a result to mistakenly give preference to mindfulness approaches which fall short of the radicality of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Varela and Thompson follow Husserl’s method of reduction up to a point, stripping away acquired concepts associated with a naive belief in the independence of subject and object. They don’t complete the reduction though, allowing subject and object to occupy separate moments. Varela and Thompson succeed in reducing materialist physicalism to fundamental co-dependency, but still find it necessary to ground intentional processes in a foundation of temporary self-inhering objectivities (the “arising and subsiding, emergence and decay” of transitional forms which inhere in themselves for a moment before relating to an outside).

Varela and Thompson found the affectively, valuatively felt contingency of particular acts of other-relatedness in what they presume to be a primordial neutral point of pre-reflective conscious auto-affective awareness. But the phenomenologists show that attention, as a species of intention, is sense-making, which means it is sense-changing. Attention is affectively, valuatively and meaningfully implicated in what it attends to as co-participant in the synthesis, creation, constitution of objects of regard. As auto-affection turns reflexively back toward itself, what it finds is not the normative sameness and constancy of a neutral positivity (blissful, self-less compassion and benevolence toward all phenomena) but a newly sensing being. Mindful self-reflexivity, expecting to find only what it put there, instead is confronted with the self-displacement of its being exposed to and affected by an other. The basis of our awareness of a world isn’t simply compassionate, empathic relational co-determinacy, but the motivated experience of disturbing CHANGE in relational co-determinacy.
Introduction:

Enactivism, the Subject and the Object:

The innovative nature of the psychological concepts introduced within The Embodied Mind impelled Thompson and Varela to seek out a richer conceptual language than that available within cognitive science prior to the embodied turn. While the dualistic thinking of such figures as Descartes, Locke, Hume, Leibnitz and Kant formed the philosophical basis of first generation cognitivism, Varela and Thompson’s rejection of the Cartesian separation of subject and object in favor of codeterminacy, embodiment and self-organization determined both the subjective and the objective aspects of the world to be groundless in themselves, that is, only meaningful in their dynamic interplay. The new reality for science of the loss of the Cartesian subject coupled with the fact of a radically interconnected world led them to incorporate ideas from two disparate traditions of thought. Pragmatist and phenomenological philosophy, in particular the work of Merleau-Ponty and Husserl, make subject-object interdependency fundamental to experience. And the middle way of nahayana Buddhism shows a path toward consciousness of universal empathic connection in a groundless world.

But while the enactive, embodied thinking of Varela, Thompson, and Rosch(1991)) made significant advances over the more traditional perspectives in psychology which they targeted (1st generation cognitivism, symbolic computationalism), a number of writers have argued that, despite their claims to have assimilated, and even exceeded the reaches of phenomenological insight, in relation to the work of Merleau-Ponty, Husserl and Heidegger, enactivism fails to depart from traditional philosophical assumptions in a number of respects. Their critiques focus on the claim that Varela and Thompson’s approach to empirical methodology and corresponding mathematical idealizations remains within the naive attitude rather than being consonant with a transcendentally reduced phenomenological access to the world according to Merleau-Ponty and Husserl.

For instance, Christopher Pollard argues that Varela and Thompson succumb to Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the Gestaltists and Gelb-Goldstein, by founding relational interdependency in a form of objectivist naturalism.

“Gelb and Goldstein … have never named this third term between the psychic and the physiological, between the ‘for itself’ and the ‘in itself’ to which their analyses always led them and which we call existence. Hence their earliest works often fall back on the traditional dichotomy of body and consciousness (p.140n)” (Merleau-Ponty and Embodied cognitive science, Christopher Pollard).

Furthermore, Varela’s attempt to translate Husserl’s notions of internal and absolute time into the
naturalized language of complex non-linear dynamical systems doesn't succeed in thinking beyond third person clock time and formal geometrical notions of space. (Francisco Varela’s neurophenomenology of time: temporality of consciousness explained? Esteban Vargas, Andrés Canales-Johnson, Claudio Fuentes)

In my own work(See The Meaning of Feeling(2011),http://www.janushead.org/12-1/soffer.pdf), I have argued that, in comparison with certain phenomenological approaches, the capacity of enactivism to depict a meaning-making organization generating thoroughgoing affectation, interaction and novelty may be hampered by the reliance on a notion of psycho-biological and interpersonal entities as discrete states. Residing within each of the myriad temporary subagents and bits comprising a psychological system is a supposed literal, albeit near-meaningless, identity. While the role of identity in enctivism is less prominent than in classical cognitivist frameworks (it replaces the idea of a centralized, self-present identity with that of a reciprocal system of contextually changing states distributed ecologically as psychologically embodied and socially embedded), I have alleged that their failure to banish the lingering notion of a literal, if fleeting, status residing within the parts of a psycho-bio-social organization may be responsible for the covering over of a rich, profoundly intricate process of change within the assumed frozen space of each part.

What could be the basis of my claim that Varela and Thompson treat the parts of a psychological organization as ossified centers resistant to novelty, considering that the dynamical properties of enactive embodied systems specifically determine psychological processes as non-representational and non-decoupleable variables changing continuously, concurrently and interdependently over time?

The issue here centers on the understanding of the phenomenological experience of time, the philosophical discussion of which has been ongoing since Aristotle. Varela(1999b)) recognizes that the present is not properly understood as an isolated ‘now’ point; it involves not just the current event but also the prior context framing the new entity. We don’t hear sequences of notes in a piece of music as isolated tones but recognize them as elements of an unfolding context. As William James wrote:”...earlier and later are present to each other in an experience that feels either only on condition of feeling both together” (Essays In Philosophy(1978) p.77).

The key question is how this ‘both together’ is to be construed. Is the basis of change within a bodily organization, interpersonal interaction, and even the phenomenal experience of time itself, the function of a collision between a separately constituted subjective context and present objects, or is it instead an interweaving of a subject and object already changed by each other, radically interbled or interaffected? I contend that for Varela and Thompson it is the former, that they conceive the ‘both-together’ of the pairing of subject and object as a conjunction of separate, adjacent moments. I am not suggesting that these phases are considered as unrelated, only that they each are presumed to carve out their own temporary identities.

This thematic appears within Varela and Thompson’s psychological approach as a linkage of
self-affection to an embodied neural organization of reciprocally causal relations among non-decoupleable parts or subprocesses. While these components interact constantly (Varela(1996b) says “...in brain and behavior there is never a stopping or dwelling cognitive state, but only permanent change punctuated by transient [stabilities] underlying a momentary act”(p.291) , it doesn’t seem as if one could go so far as to claim that the very SENSE of each participant in a neural organization is intrinsically and immediately dependent on the meanings of the others. I suggest it would be more accurate to claim that each affects and is affected by the others as a collision of temporary bodies. Varela(1999a) offers "...lots of simple agents having simple properties may be brought together, even in a haphazard way, to give rise to what appears to an observer as a purposeful and integrated whole"(p.52 ). The bare existence of each of these agents may be said to PRECEDE its interaction with other agents, in that each agent occupies and inheres in its own state, presenting its own instantaneous properties for a moment, apart from, even as it is considered conjoined to, the context which conditions it and the future which is conditioned by it.

Mindfulness and the Living Present:

My aim in this paper is to show how Varela and Thompson’s separating of being and becoming into discrete moments in their empirical approach leads them to misread Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological models, and as a result to mistakenly give preference to mindfulness approaches which, while in many respects consonant with the pragmatism of Dewey, James and Putnam, fall short of the radicality of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.

What do Varela and Thompson think mindfulness approaches have to offer that the phenomenological thinking of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger cannot provide? They assert that Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger’s accounts produce ‘after the fact’ theoretical reflections that miss the richness of immediate concrete pre-reflective experience as present in the here-and-now.

“Husserl's turn toward experience and "the things themselves" was entirely theoretical, or, to make the point the other way around, it completely lacked any pragmatic dimension.” “Indeed, this criticism would hold even for Heidegger's existential phenomenology, as well as for Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of lived experience. Both stressed the pragmatic, embodied context of human experience, but in a purely theoretical way.” (Embodied Mind)

Footnote: In Mind in Life, Thompson(2007) backed away from his earlier critique of Husserlian phenomenology. His reassessment of Husserl does not, however, close the gaps separating his and Varela’s approaches from Husserl’s that I address in this paper.

“Our earlier interpretation of Husserl was mistaken. Husserlian phenomenology has far more resources than we realized for productive cross-fertilization with both the sciences of mind (Petitot et al. 1999; Varela 1996) and Buddhist thought (Thompson 2005; Varela 2000b; Varela and Depraz
2003). In particular, I now believe (i) that Husserl was not a methodological solipsist; (ii) that he was greatly concerned with the intersubjective and embodied aspects of experience; (iii) that his theory of intentionality was not a representational theory; and (iv) that his theory of the life-world was not reductionistic and representationalist. Furthermore, although I think phenomenology has tended to overemphasize theoretical discussion in the form of textual interpretation (to the neglect of phenomenological pragmatics as well as original phenomenological analyses and philosophical argumentation), I think it is too facile to say simply that phenomenology is a purely abstract, theoretical project lacking a pragmatic dimension. It follows that I would now not characterize Husserlian phenomenology as a "failure."

Varela and Thompson’s claim that Buddhist-originating practices of mindful awareness reorientate experiencing from a phenomenological ‘after the fact’ theoretical stance to the immediate here and now centers on its techniques of attentive meditation.

Let’s take a look at the structural features and affective implications of Varela and Thompson’s interpretation of mindful attention in relation to Merleau-Ponty, Husserl and Heidegger’s accounts of primordial consciousness.

Varela and Thompson distinguish two stages of meditation:

Mindful meditation selectively directs attention to either the focused observing of particular objects (concentrating the mind) or to a non-object centered panoramic perspective, a reflexive turning toward the “very nature of consciousness”.

Traditionally, texts talk about two stages of practice: calming or taming the mind (Sanskrit: *shamatha*) and the development of insight (Sanskrit: *vipashyana*). Shamatha, when used as a separate practice, is in fact a concentration technique for learning to hold ("tether" is the traditional term) the mind to a single object. The purpose of calming the mind in Buddhism is not to become absorbed but to render the mind able to be present with itself long enough to gain insight into its own nature and functioning.” (Embodied Mind)

It is the insight stage that forms the core of Varela and Thompson’s claims for the ethical force of mindfulness. The following are some of the structural-formal features of this stage of supreme contemplative consciousness that Varela and Thompson mention:

- infinite, eternal, non-conceptual, internal, sheer awareness, no sensory objects, sustained attention to the here and now, mindful awareness as panoramic perspective, essential nature, transcending existence and non-existence, free of conceptual mediation, non-intentional (non-object-directedness), self-reflexive, self-luminous, undifferentiated awareness, no sense of distinct subject aware of a distinct object, non-reflective and open awareness, free of thoughts and images, intense mindfulness of what arises from moment to moment in the mind to undo conditioned habits.

Implicit in Varela and Thompson’s mindfulness account is a theory of attention. Contemplative attending is a neutral observational gaze occurring prior to and separate from intendings of
specific objects, but which provides the primordial condition of possibility for all intentional acts, habits, objectivities.

“...meditation is thought to support a “bare attention”, or “passive observational stance”, unobtrusive enough to avoid disturbing target experiences or coloring their description with theoretical preconceptions” (Thompson, Lutz and Cosmelli, 2005, pp. 69-75).

Mindful meditations is “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn 1994, p. 4).

“Mindfulness registers experiences, but it does not compare them. It does not label them or categorize them. It just observes everything as if it was occurring for the first time. It is not analysis which is based on reflection and memory. It is, rather, the direct and immediate experiencing of whatever is happening, without the medium of thought. It comes before thought in the perceptual process (Gunaratana, 2002, p. 168). (Davis and Thompson)

“...with the full achievement of Samatha, one disengages the attention from the previous meditative object, and the entire continuum of one’s attention is focused single-pointedly, non-conceptually, and internally in the very nature of consciousness.... Only the aspects of sheer awareness, clarity, and joy of the mind appear, without the intrusion of any sensory objects (Wallace, 1999, p. 182). (Thompson, Empathy and Consciousness, 2001)

Varela and Thompson’s dissatisfaction with the phenomenologies of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger stems from their belief that phenomenology begins from intentional and reflective acts as derived and secondary constructions built on top of the immediate neutral pre-objectifying awareness performed by the act of mindful attention. Phenomenological approaches can only indirectly point to this immediacy ‘from the outside’ via theoretical reflective and intuitive modes. Intentionality is the formation of conditioned habit, and attention is the mind’s immediate access to the field of experience prior to the construction of causal relations. Varela and Thompson’s belief that the neutral observational awareness of groundlessness afforded by mindfulness techniques gives immediate access to the here and now makes mindfulness an observation rather than a creation mechanism. That is to say, meditative attention gives neutral access to the immediate richness of changeable experience without itself comprising a constitutive, sense-making activity. It is instead a sense-observing process.

Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on Attention:

Contrary to Varela and Thomson’s assertions concerning the primacy of neutral attention, Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of the philosophical history of the concept of attention would appear to place Varela and Thompson’s theory of attention within the context of empiricist and idealist orientations put into question by phenomenology.

In their depiction of an independence between the objects of awareness and the mind’s attending to it via a neutral re-objectifying observational stance, Varela and Thompson share features with empiricist(sensualist) and idealist(intellectualist) philosophical approaches to the concept of
attention.

Merleau-Ponty states:

“We must now show that its intellectualist [idealist] antithesis is on the same level as empiricism itself. Both take the objective world as the object of their analysis, when this comes first neither in time nor in virtue of its meaning; and both are incapable of expressing the peculiar way in which perceptual consciousness constitutes its object. Both keep their distance in relation to perception, instead of sticking closely to it. This may be shown by studying the history of the concept of attention.”

“...in a consciousness which constitutes everything, or rather which eternally possesses the intelligible structure of all its objects, just as in empiricist consciousness which constitutes nothing at all, attention remains an abstract and ineffective power, because it has no work to perform. Consciousness is no less intimately linked with objects of which it is unheeding than with those which interest it, and the additional clearness brought by the act of attention does not herald any new relationship. It therefore becomes once more a light which does not change its character with the various objects which it shines upon, and once more empty acts of attention are brought in, in place of ‘the modes and specific directions of intention’. (Cassirer)

Merleau-Ponty explains that to attend to any experience is not merely to shine a neutral light on it, but to articulate a new sense, the ‘active constitution of a new object’. It is to identify a new figure and in doing so, to transform the sense of the previous figure along with its background.

“Attention, therefore, as a general and formal activity, does not exist.” Rather than there being a general capacity for neutral observation, a universal kind of attention necessary for any moment of consciousness, “it is literally a question of creation. “Attention is “a change of the structure of consciousness, the establishment of a new dimension of experience, the setting forth of an a priori... To pay attention is not merely further to elucidate pre-existing data, it is to bring about a new articulation of them by taking them as figures. “

“The miracle of consciousness consists in its bringing to light, through attention, phenomena which re-establish the unity of the object in a new dimension at the very moment when they destroy it. Thus attention is neither an association of images, nor the return to itself of thought already in control of its objects, but the active constitution of a new object which makes explicit and articulate what was until then presented as no more than an indeterminate horizon.”

Husserl, like Merleau-Ponty, sees attention as an intentive act of creation rather than “a light which does not change its character with the various objects which it shines upon.”

“Attention is one of the chief themes of modern psychology. Nowhere does the predominantly sensualistic [empiricist] character of modern psychology show itself more strikingly than in the treatment of this theme, for not even the essential connection between attention and intentionality-- this fundamental fact: that attention of every sort is nothing else than a fundamental species of intentive modifications-- has ever, to my knowledge, been emphasized before.”(Ideas I)
“Dazed by the confusion between object and mental content, one forgets that the objects of which we are ‘conscious’, are not simply in consciousness as in a box, so that they can merely be found in it and snatched at in it; but that they are first constituted as being what they are for us, and as what they count as for us, in varying forms of objective intention...One forgets that... an intending, or reference is present, that aims at an object, a consciousness is present that is the consciousness of this object. The mere existence of a content in the psychic interplay is, however, not at all this being-meant or being-referred-to. This first arises when this content is ‘noticed’, such notice being a look directed towards it, a presentation of it. To define the presentation of a content as the mere fact of its being experienced, and in consequence to give the name ‘presentations’ to all experienced contents, is one of the worst conceptual distortions known to philosophy.”(Logical Investigations).

The co-dependent, embodied nature of the enactive mind would seem to insulate mindful attention from Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s critiques of sensualist and idealist approaches to attention. Varela and Thompson have insisted that the meditative mind that is attending to the rising and passing away of temporary forms is not a box in the sense of a Cartesian theater in which contents display themselves before a passive onlooker. On the contrary, with regard to concentrated attention, they have pointed to the conditioning effect of selective attention on objective appearance. For instance, concentrated attention on the thought of an object can have an anticipatory effect, ‘priming’ the perceived object for more rapid identification, while focused attention can determine which of two competing images will be seen, and for how long, in binocular rivalry studies (From the Five Aggregates to Phenomenal Consciousness. Towards a Cross-Cultural Cognitive Science. Jake H. Davis and Evan Thompson).

But these examples concern the use of attention to alter the circumstances of the appearance of content whose constitution cannot be said to be inseparable from the act of attention itself. Specifically in the case of non-object directed attention, according to Varela and Thompson intentional acts are not involved, there is no ‘aiming at’ objects. The mind’s attention to the FACT of irreducible inter-determinacy (pre-reflective reflexive auto-affection) and change in the SENSE of embodiment over time (through reflective and intentional acts of selective attention) are treated as distinct and separable moments, with the latter being constituted out of the former in a second step of aiming at objects. To the extent that non-intending, non-object-oriented primordial awareness is not implicated in, that is, does not participate directly in the moment constituting and re constituting of the sense of what arises and passes away, and instead maintains itself as a distanced neutrality, it encapsulates and totalizes this experience of arising and passing away in an idealism.

For Husserl, concentrated attention does not simply prime, select, reinforce or condition the appearance of objects. Rather, the focused attention on an object is a synthesis of creative acts which first constitute and then continue to alter the nature of the object that is being ‘noticed’. The object in itself is transcendent, never seen as an actual whole, but rather from moment to moment as a changing concatenation of retentional memory, protentional anticipation and impressions of immediate sense. Turning toward and heeding an object implies a belief in its
continuity, a continuity which is nothing other than this constantly changing flow of sensations synthetically held together as unitary via memory and anticipation. Thus, the initial ‘turning toward’ an object is already a synthetic act of constitution. Attention, as a species of intention, is sense-making, which means it is sense-changing. Attention is affectively, valuatively and meaningfully implicated in what it attends to as co-participant in the synthesis, creation, constitution of objects of regard.

“We are continuously directed toward the object itself; we execute the uninterrupted consciousness of experiencing it. The consciousness of its existence is here a belief in act; by virtue of the accord in which the perceptive appearances flow off in original presentation, retention, and protention, an accord of continuous self-affirmation, belief is continuous certainty of belief, which has its certainty in this originality of the object in its living being-present.”(Experience and Judgement)

Attention involves itself in the co-creation of sense as a striving, an intending beyond itself.

“In general, attention is a tending of the ego toward an intentional object, toward a unity which “appears” continually in the change of the modes of its givenness and which belongs to the essential structure of a specific act of the ego (an ego-act in the pregnant sense of the word); it is a tending-toward in realization.

“...in the continuity of the experience of the object, there is an intention which goes beyond the given and its momentary mode of givenness and tends toward a progressive plus ultra. It is not only a progressive having-consciousness-of but a striving toward a new consciousness in the form of an interest in the enrichment of the “self” of the object which is forthcoming eo ipso with the prolongation of the apprehension. Thus the tendency of the turning-toward continues as a tendency toward complete fulfillment.” “the inception of an act of turning-toward, of paying attention to what exists, puts into play an activity with a tendency, a striving. It is a striving toward realization, a doing which includes different forms of discontinuance and completion.”(Experience and Judgement)

Derrida captures the primordial nature of awareness as sense’s intending ahead of itself in the following passages: “The coincidence between the constituting and the constituted moments is “the absolute unity of sense’s movement, i.e., the unity of the noncoincidence and of the indefinite co implication of the constituted and constituting moments in the absolute identity of a Living Present that dialectically projects and maintains itself.”

The living present as the absolute of intentionality “is passage, wherein every adventure is a change of direction [conversion] and every return to the origin an audacious move toward the horizon.” “Being “is a "sense," a teleological ought-to-be which constitutes being as movement”(Introduction to Husserl’s Origin of Geometry)

Heidegger also speaks of the intentional structure of motivated attending to as a letting oneself be affected, being-ahead-of-oneself (the moment of awareness as foreign and familiar at the same time). “One cannot construct being-in-the-world from willing, wishing, urge, and propensity as psychical acts.”(Zollikon). The desire for this conversation is determined by the task I have before me. This is the motive, the "for the sake of which" [Weswegen]. The determining factor is not an
urge or a drive, driving and urging me from behind, but something standing before me, a task I am involved in, something I am charged with. This, in turn—this relation to something I am charged with—is possible only if I am "ahead" [vorweg] of myself.” (Zollikon). This relation with something standing before me isn’t my passive observing of an object passing through my field of awareness, but a meeting between what confronts me and what I project ahead of me from my having been. My intending isn’t a theoretical but a temporal process underlying the neutrality of passive attention, and revealing the latter as a naive (inauthentic) mode of awareness.

How would Husserl reinterpret the notion of mindful attention as “the acknowledgment and acceptance as it is of each thought, feeling, or sensation that arises in the attentional field”? (Bishop, Lau et al. 2004, p. 232).

As a phenomenological process, the achievement of such a condition of mind involves acts of reflection and abstractive intention constituting a relational totality out of separately experienced parts, events, objects. The acknowledging and accepting of each particular takes place as a series of constitutive steps, beginning with a change of interest away from the grasping of each particular, toward an abstracting away of everything meaningful about the parts except their belonging to a relational whole. The achievement of this whole requires a reflective, retentive-protentive holding together of past parts simultaneously with newly appearing ones. Whereas for Varela and Thompson, this panoramic awareness of co-determinacy is the primordial basis of consciousness in general (“the very nature of consciousness”), for Husserl arriving at the consciousness of groundlessness only achieves a partial reduction of naturalism. Varela and Thompson follow Husserl’s method of reduction up to a point, stripping away acquired concepts associated with a naive belief in the independence of subject and object from each other. They don’t complete the reduction though, allowing subject and object to occupy separate moments.

As a result, the achieving of Varela and Thompson’s optimal state of ‘sheer’ groundless awareness is the attainment of an intentionally based empiricism. That is to say, Varela and Thompson have succeeded in reducing materialist physicalism to fundamental co-dependency, but still find it necessary to root intentional processes in a foundation of temporary self-inhering objectivities (the “arising and subsiding, emergence and decay” of transitional forms which inhere in themselves for a moment before relating to an outside). “in the logic of Darwin's account of evolution and the Buddhist analysis of experience into co-dependent arising, we are concerned with the processual transformation of the past into the future through the intermediary of transitional forms that in themselves have no permanent substance.” (Embodied Mind). Husserl’s admonition to Franz Brentano may be apropos here:

“Anyone who misconstrues the sense and performance of transcendental phenomenological reduction is still entangled in psychologism; he confounds intentional psychology and transcendental phenomenology.. he falls a victim to the inconsistency of a transcendental philosophy that stays within the natural realm.” (Cartesian Meditations, p.86).

A thoroughgoing phenomenological reduction would reveal the ‘sheer awareness’ of the ‘very
nature of consciousness’ as the object of an intentional noesis that, in this act of sense, is at the same time striving, intending beyond itself toward a more unitary fulfillment. No reduction is complete without including this anticipative self-exceeding within any act of awareness. Furthermore, as an intention, the sense act which makes appear the relational whole is temporal, meaning that from one moment to the next new sense acts supercede it. Thus, each moment each new act of ‘sheer awareness’ has its retentive and reflective background in the form of immediately previous, but not identical, acts of sheer awareness. There is no immediate panoramic experience of the groundless whole that maintains itself over time without resting on a changing reflective referential basis. In short, the experience of ‘neutral’ attention unfolds as intentional activity whose objective sense of ‘neutrality’, ‘accepting’ and ‘acknowledging’ will subtly, or not so subtly (depending on circumstances), shift meaningfully, valuably and affectively from moment to moment in the ongoing flow of temporally constitutive intentional synthesis. Any vantage claiming to be both an immediate pre-reflective experiencing of the ever changing ‘now’ and neutrally observational exposes itself as naive.

What Varela and Thompson recognize about the shortcomings of the Cartesian self can be turned back against their depiction of immediacy of awareness as reflexive and inhering in itself as auto-affection.

“If there were a solid, really existing self hidden in or behind the aggregates, its unchangeableness would prevent any experience from occurring; its static nature would make the constant arising and subsiding of experience come to a screeching halt.” (Embodied Mind)

Just as there is no solid self, there is no neutral, panoramic vantage from which we can totalize the changeableness (constant arising and subsiding) of experience. The contemplative experiencing of co-dependent relating is, from moment to moment, itself a unitary meaning or sense (with concrete, affective and valuative dimensions), as THIS panoramic sense of relational co-determinacy. It is an intentional act, and therefore intends beyond itself into new sense in every moment of its instantiation. If this were not the case, if the transformative impetus of the ‘intending beyond itself’ were not allowed to insert itself in the very heart of contemplative neutrality, self-reflexivity and internality, then the contemplative insight of endless relational changeability would reduce to pure identity. Varela and Thompson say mindfulness is about opening oneself to practical immediate embodied activity and change, but they found actual activity on a totalizing ideal of activity based on the idealized ‘nows’ of neutral clock time.

What Merleau-Ponty says about the ‘in-itself’ empirical object may apply equally to Varela and Thompson’s ‘for-itself’ mindful subjectivity as sheer self-reflexivity self-luminousity, and peaceful rest in itself.

Thompson writes “for the Advaitins, cognition consists in a reflexive awareness of its own occurrence as an independent prerequisite for the cognition of objects (Ram-Prasad 2007). In other words, the defining feature of cognition is reflexivity or self-luminosity, not intentionality (object-directedness), which is adventitious.”(Dreamless Sleep, the Embodied Mind, and
Consciousness, 2015) 

In contrast to these sentiments, Merleau-Ponty argues:

“...the identity of the thing with itself, that sort of established position of its own, of rest in itself, that plenitude and that positivity that we have recognized in it already exceed the experience, are already a second interpretation of the experience...we arrive at the thing-object, at the In Itself, at the thing identical with itself, only by imposing upon experience an abstract dilemma which experience ignores” (p. 162) “The relation between what I see and I who see is not one of immediate or frontal contradiction; the things attract my look, my gaze caresses the things, it espouses their contours and their reliefs, between it and them we catch sight of a complicity” (The Visible and the Invisible, p. 76)

Mindful Attention and Primordial Value Feeling:

Having delineated the differences between mindfulness thinking on attention and that of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, we are now in a position to understand the basis of the affective, valuative and ethical claims that Varela and Thompson make concerning the outcome of proper immersion in mindfulness. They provocatively assert that a thoroughgoing understanding of the decenteredness of personhood, and of reality as a whole, can lead, through the use of contemplative practice of mindfulness, to the awareness of universal empathy, compassion and benevolence.

“In Buddhism, we have a case study showing that when groundlessness is embraced and followed through to its ultimate conclusions, the outcome is an unconditional sense of intrinsic goodness that manifests itself in the world as spontaneous compassion.” (Thompson, Neurophenomenology and Contemplative Experience) “Our natural impulse is one of compassion, but it has been obscured by habits of ego-clinging like the sun obscured by a passing cloud.” (Embodied Mind)

Sebastjian Voros articulates this in the following way:

“Someone who has realized the emptiness of things (sunyata), i.e. who has directly experienced that things have no independent existence, but emerge in mutual co-determination, will be permeated with boundless compassion (karuna); and someone who has realized boundless compassion (karuna) towards all sentient beings, will grasp the emptiness of all things (sunyata).” (Voros 2014)

“The chasm of the groundless ground – of the dialectical betwixt – that opens up in such practices can be terrifying at first, but is ultimately comprehended as the existential wellspring of boundless compassion and limitless peace. When there are no more boundaries between myself and the other – when I am the other and the other is me – there can be no animosity, hatred, or anxiety between us. This is the crux of St. Augustine’s famous saying: Ama, et fac quod vis (Love, and do what you will). Love – understood in terms of the Christian selfless love (agape), analogous to Buddhist compassion (karuna) – is the cohesive force of interbeing, the (groundless) ground of genuine peace and co-existence.” (Voros 2014)
The optimal state of mindful awareness manifests and expresses itself by a chain of valuative-affective-ethical sentiments that include:

unconditional, intrinsic, spontaneous compassion and benevolence, fundamental warmth toward the phenomenal world, concern for the welfare of others beyond mere naive compassion, joy and of the mind, quiescent, blissful, peaceful and tranquil sentience, guided by the fundamental value of nonviolence.

How do Varela and Thompson get from groundlessness of self to such positive valuations as selfless compassion? We can derive these affective and valuative modes of sensing directly from the supposed neutrality of the mindfully attentive gaze (“the acknowledgement and acceptance of each thought and feeling that arises within the attentional field”) (Bishop, Lau et al. 2004, p. 232).

The first observation we can make is that, while on the one hand attention is affectively and valuatively neutral and, on the other hand benevolent compassion is affectively positive, the positive values achieved through mindful awareness share with attention a constancy of valuative tone. Attentional neutrality is not the absence of affective sense but a particular mode of valuative sensing that is presumed to perpetuate itself. What gives mindful awareness the temporal constancy of its valuative positivity is the same feature that allows for the supposed ongoing neutrality of the attentive gaze. As we have seen, Varela and Thompson split off the attentive regard from the objects of its regard, according subjective attention and objective appearing their own moment of neutral self-inherence as for-itself and in-itself. For Varela and Thompson the mind’s attention to the FACT of irreducible inter-determinacy (pre-reflective reflexive auto-affection) and change in the SENSE of embodiment over time (through reflective and intentional acts) are treated as distinct and separable moments.

We can connect Thompson’s depiction of the meditating mind reposing, “awake and alert, in the sheer ‘luminosity’ of consciousness (its quality of non-reflective and open awareness), without attending exclusively to any particular object or content” with his empirical description of pre-reflective consciousness:

“The fact that there is felt experience—the fact that there is something it is like for the subject—depends on the basic alerting function [distinct from the higher-level mechanisms of selective attention that come into play in determining what one is conscious of]. In contrast, the particular contents of consciousness—what it is like for the subject—depends also on how this consciousness is directed to particular objects and properties through selective attention. Put another way, the particular contents of phenomenal state consciousness can be seen as modifications or modulations of a basal level of creature consciousness dependent on the alerting function (see also Searle, 2000)).”(Davis and Thompson 2015)

Arriving at mindfulness from everyday modes of awareness is an achievement and the result of a training process, but once this mode of consciousness has been attained, the ongoing flow of compassionate, non-objectifying awareness is not considered as being in itself the continued
goal-directedness of an intentional achievement. In other words, one must work toward the goal of getting back to the natural state of being that one has drifted away from through ego-clinging habits. Because the boundless empathy of integrative ideality is presupposed as preceding and underpinning the possibility of all intentional acts, residing in this manner of originary awareness is not a dwelling within intentionality and achievement-orientation, but an empty, goal-less self-reflexive movement of thought (non-intentional and non object-directed), a constant background thematic and valuative-affective tone which does not change its positive sense (empathetic and peaceful) over time, just as attention does not lose its distanced neutrality over time as it observes the constantly changing particularities that flow into and out of the now of awareness.

If we subject Varela and Thompson’s dualism of ‘fact of consciousness’ and ‘intentional sense’ of awareness to a Husserlian reduction, we get the following:

It is one thing to say along with Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Husserl, that co-determinacy is primordially built into the structure of awareness. It’s another thing to claim that a particular valuative tone (the neutrality of the sheer fact of what it is like, or the self-reflexive positivity of compassion) is essentially, normatively associated with this primordial structure of awareness. Where Varela and Thompson find only the FACT of irreducible inter-determinacy at the core of primordial awareness, Husserl reduces this supposed constant ongoing essence to the temporality of a momentary intentional act determined via a unique object and manner of givenness.

“In the essence of the mental process itself lies not only that it is consciousness but also whereof it is consciousness, and in which determinate or indeterminate sense it is that. (Ideas I)”

For Husserl, a specific shift in interest is involved in generating the positive valuative regard of selfless compassionate, benevolent, joyful feelings toward others. This shift in sense involves a specific achievement, a move from a lesser sense of relational intimacy to that of greater relational interdependency. Affectivities such as 'unconditionally intrinsic goodness', 'spontaneous compassion', 'luminosity', 'blissfulness', 'a calm and peaceful life guided by the fundamental value of nonviolence' are normative valuations motivated by a sort of 'will to goodness'(the goodness of interdependence), a preferencing of one affective experience (totalizing integrative unity) over others (disconnection and isolation). In order for an awareness of co-determinacy to maintain itself as positive affectivity, it must think itself as more, and other than, the self-reflexive repetition of the initial achievement of this state of being. It must continue to strive, aim to achieve, intend beyond itself. As I argued previously with regard to attention, the experience of co-determinacy unfolds as intentional activity whose objective sense of ‘peaceful benevolence’ and empathy will subtly, or not so subtly (depending on circumstances), shift meaningfully, valuatively, affectively from moment to moment in the ongoing flow of temporally constitutive intentional synthesis.

If for Varela and Thompson there is no subject object independence, for phenomenology there is no co-dependent unity without vector of elsewhere defining the unity as a unity beyond itself. Varela and Thompson’s positive valuative-affective-ethical terms recognize and celebrate only
relation, integrity, reciprocity, interdependence, belonging. Phenomenology recognizes the fact that groundless interdependence and relationality are only possible as a disturbing renewal. Meaning, as existing, is an exiting from itself. As Merleau-Ponty says:

“In all uses of the word sens, we find the same fundamental notion of a being orientated or polarized in the direction of what he is not, and thus we are always brought back to a conception of the subject as ek-stase, and to a relationship of active transcendence between the subject and the world.” (Phenomenology of Perception, p.499).

“Action is, by definition, the violent transition from what I have to what I aim to have, from what I am to what I intend to be.”, “When I say that I know and like someone, I aim, beyond his qualities, at an inexhaustible ground which may one day shatter the image that I have formed of him. This is the price for there being things and ‘other people’ for us, not as the result of some illusion, but as the result of a violent act which is perception itself.” (Phenomenology of Perception, p.444). “

Would Merleau-Ponty want us to believe there is an awareness (the mere fact of what it is like) expressed as peaceful, blissful compassion (sheer luminosity, non-attentive to particular objects) that founds the violence of perception? On the contrary, I think Merleau-Ponty would insist that his gestalt-based, ‘same world for everyone’ can be seen as only manifesting itself in primordial awareness as a pre-reflective feeling of being alive if we understand that feeling of the living present as a departure as well as an arrival, as an exposure and a violation, as a being-connected-with compassionately that disturbs a prior order of intimacy and connection. In other words, not a subjective moment of connection subtending difference but a simultaneously subjective and objective difference-in-connection, which is another word for striving, motive, affectivity, passage, transit, signification, temporality, history.

From this vantage the ‘middle way’ is less an overcoming of dualism than a re-situating of it as a subjective totalization of dialectical relationality.

It is instructive to compare the mindful ethic of ‘concern for the welfare of others beyond merely naive compassion’ with Heidegger’s concept of primordial care. Heideggerian Care is not warmth, nor is it positive concern, compassion or benevolence. Care is ‘taking care of’, being in relevant relationality with something or someone, and presupposes and implies all variants of mood and affective comportment. Heideggerian care, as desire for the other, is a relation to the other composed of anticipation and loss, connection and disconnection, disclosure and concealment. Heidegger describes the care structure as something being understood with regard to something else. This relation is a "confrontation that understands, interprets, and articulates, [and] at the same time takes apart what has been put together"(Being and Time). If we apply this thinking to Varela and Thompson’s mindfully aware unity of differences, we see that they recognize the putting-together (as Voros 2014 put it, “When there are no more boundaries between myself and the other – when I am the other and the other is me – there can be no animosity, hatred, or anxiety between us”), but ignore the taking-apart, the dislocation with respect to the previous moment’s awareness of relationality. From this vantage, it would appear that Varela and Thompson’s notion of compassionate concern as positive sentiment is what
Heidegger’s care is meant to unravel and complicate.

In their complicity with the supposed self-constancy of neutral non-preferential, non-intentional attentional awareness, (satiṣṭāḥāna functions to decrease affective biases of attention and memory towards pleasant as well as unpleasant stimuli,(Davis and Thompson 2015)), mindful compassion, benevolence and generosity essentialize and privilege one pole (the ‘goodness’ and ‘bliss’ of unity) of the primordially relational basis of experience over the objective pole of foreignness and dislocation. Varela and Thompson ground the affectively, valuatively felt contingency of particular acts of other-relatedness in what they presume to be a primordial neutral point of pre-reflective conscious auto-affective awareness. But the phenomenologists show that as auto-affection turns reflexively back toward itself, what it finds is not the normative sameness and constancy of a neutrality or positivity, but the surprise of a newly sensing being. Put differently, self-reflexivity, expecting to find only what it put there, instead is confronted with the self-displacement of its being exposed to and affected by an other.

What mindfulness ignores in empathy is that primordial phenomenological relationality is split within itself as a becoming beyond itself. For Husserl, this split takes the form of the foreignness to self of what affects the ego as object. For Merleau-Ponty it is the violence of perceptual ek-stase, while Heidegger conceives it as the anxious uncanniness of destabilizing Being-with-others. For all three writers the particularization of self-other relationality as always a new relation renders compassion as at the same time a form of alienation.

Thompson’s depiction of the mind reposing, “awake and alert, in the sheer ‘luminosity’ of consciousness (its quality of non-reflective and open awareness), without attending exclusively to any particular object or content”, is a form of desire and intentionality in that in simple self-reflexive awareness, it is at every moment relating to a new object (its own changing sense of non-objectifying awareness of the arising and passing away of temporary forms), and being affected, disturbed, by it. Disturbance, desire and dislocating becoming is prior to, that is, implicit but not noticed in ‘neutral’ compassionate awareness.

Compassion is at the same time the violation of a previous relation. Sense is always determined by the particularity of the phenomenon itself (the thing itself). The basis of our awareness of a world isn’t simply relational co-determinacy, but the experience of motivated, desiring CHANGE in relational co-determinacy. For Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, every moment of return to the thinking of totality conjures a different affect and a slightly different motivated meaning of the whole. Feelings of compassion and benevolence belong to an infinite spectrum of always changing affectivities of positive and negative valence. Phenomenal awareness as transition from one kind of relational unity to another can just as well be malevolent as benevolent. Within the range of kinds of relationality, a particular phenomenal awareness may be a lessening of compassion or a strengthening of it. We can not say it is always benevolent, only that it is always a new sense of the correlational, that it is never without co-determinacy. Becoming is the restless anxiety of desire, striving, motivation, and the ground of all affect and valuation. Primordial awareness is from moment to moment a new way of being-affected-by the world, and thus,
what ever else it is affectively in its particular and contingent exxperience of ‘now’, a kind of astonished terror.

I’ll conclude with these thoughts from Heidegger concerning the complex affective basis of fundamental awareness as thrownness and transit:

“Thus thrown in this throw, man is a transition, transition as the fundamental essence of occurrence. Man is history, or better, history is man. Man is enraptured in this transition and therefore essentially 'absent'. Absent in a fundamental sense-never simply at hand, but absent in his essence, in his essentially being away, removed into essential having been and future-essentially absencing and never at hand, yet existent in his essential absence. Transposed into the possible, he must constantly be mistaken concerning what is actual. And only because he is thus mistaken and transposed can he become seized by terror. And only where there is the perilousness of being seized by terror do we find the bliss of astonishment-being torn away in that wakeful manner that is the breath of all philosophizing.”

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July 2013 Actas espanolas de psiquiatria 41(4):253-262
Zahavi, Husserl and Heidegger on I, You and We; For-Meness or Ownness?(2021)

Abstract:

Zahavi offers a model of ‘I’, You and We consciousness that is grounded in the transcendentalism of a minimal pre-reflective self-awareness, which he calls ‘for-meness’. Zahavi’s formulation of transcendental self-belonging as ‘for me-ness’ relies on the notion of a felt non-changing self-identity accompanying all intentional experiences. Zahavi’s treatment of the subject and object poles of experience as, respectively, self-inhering internality and externality, makes of self-awareness an alienating opposition between a purely self-identical felt for-meness and an external object, a fracture between self-identity and otherness. I argue that for Husserl the pure ego’s unchanging in-itself identity over time is merely an anonymous zero point of activity and is not felt or sensed, and thus there is no experienced for-meness to self-awareness. There is instead a relation of ownness between the ego and the object pole, consisting of a constant, that is, essential, underlying structural feature of the ego’s changing relation to objects of intentional acts. I believe that this essential structural intimacy of associative relationship between the noetic and noematic poles of intentional constitution is what Husserl is attempting to capture when he characterizes the constitution of the subject's stream of lived-experience in terms of ‘my ownness’. Zahavi thinks that what gives an intended object its ‘mineness’ is the fact that as foreign to me, it is intended by a ‘me’ that is familiar with itself. But this self-familiarity speaks only of my proximity to myself as pure self-identity, not of my proximity to my world. Husserl’s notion of ‘ownness’ understands the subject-object relation not as fracture between self-identity and otherness (“a ruptured structure which is completely foreign to its nature”) but as an intimate synthetic unification and belonging. Heidegger makes an even more radical break with Cartesianism by replacing the subject-object structure of intentionality with the self-world temporal structure of Dasein. In different ways, Husserl’s concept of ‘ownness’ and Heidegger’s notion of ‘ownmost’ capture the profound intimacy of relation between self and world that reveals itself after Zahavi’s idealized internal-external binary has been deconstructed.

Introduction

Zahavi offers a model of ‘I’, You and We consciousness that is grounded in the transcendentalism of a minimal pre-reflective self-awareness. Referencing Nagel’s argument that there is something it is like to be a conscious entity, Zahavi insists that consciousness of anything always includes a dimension of ‘for-meness’. In attempting to account for the subjective dimension of awareness, Zahavi argues that the for-meness of consciousness in its most
primordial form manifests as a self-affecting pre-reflective minimal self-awareness. He contrasts this subjective self-experience with the apprehension of objects. In the latter act, I attend to, intend, reflect or introspect on an entity. In doing so, the world that I experience appears to me over a divide, is indirect, mediated, alienated.

Zahavi(2005) says he is among those phenomenologists who “deny that the type of self-consciousness entailed by phenomenal consciousness is intentionally structured, that is, a question of a subject–object relation”. “Any convincing theory of consciousness has to respect the difference between our consciousness of an object, and our consciousness of our own subjectivity, and must be able to explain the distinction between intentionality, which is characterized by a difference between the subject and the object of experience, and self-awareness, which implies some form of identity.” (Zahavi 2004)

Zahavi(2005) argues that treating self-awareness as its own intentional object amounts to reflecting back on it. As reflection, object consciousness is characterized “by an internal division, difference, and alterity”. In reflection “the I qua first-person singular effectuates and suffers a kind of inner pluralization, a dividing self-alienation, in which it distances itself from itself. (Asemissen 1958–59, 262).

Zahavi(2014) says “the experiential self should be identified with the ubiquitous dimension of first-personal character. Although it is not a separately existing entity, it is not reducible to any specific experience, but can be shared by a multitude of changing experiences (p.72-77).”

“Normally, the “what it is like” aspect is taken to designate experiential properties. If, however, our experiences are to have qualities of their own, they must be qualities over and above whatever qualities the intentional object has. It is exactly the silk that is red, and not my perception of it. Likewise, it is the lemon that is bitter, and not my experience of it.” (Zahavi 2005)

While Zahavi finds inconsistent support in Husserl’s work for his model of minimal ‘for-meness’, Zahavi appreciates phenomenologist Michel Henry’s unwavering insistence that pre-reflective self-awareness is a non-ecstatic and radical other to object consciousness.

Zahavi (1999) approvingly paraphrases Henry:

“Unless phenomenology were able to show that there is in fact a decisive and radical difference between the phenomenality of constituted objects and the phenomenality of constituting subjectivity, i.e., a radical difference between object-manifestation and self-manifestation, its entire project would be threatened.”

“Henry conceives of this self-affection as a purely interior and self-sufficient occurrence involving no difference, distance or mediation between that which affects and that which is
affected. It is immediate, both in the sense that the self-affection takes place without being mediated by the world, but also in the sense that it is neither temporally delayed nor retentionally mediated. It is in short an event which is strictly non-horizontal and non-ecstatic.”

“Henry does acknowledge that an analysis of subjectivity confronts us with an ontological dualism: in every experience something is given to absolute subjectivity which is different from subjectivity itself.” “To speak of an ontological dualism, to distinguish a pure interiority and a pure exteriority, is by no means to accept a classical Cartesian dualism. It is merely to insist upon the existence of an absolute dimension of subjective self-manifestation, without which no hetero-manifestation would be possible.”

On the other hand, Zahavi(2005) (See also Gallagher and Zahavi 2014) departs from the staunchly irrelational character of Henry’s account of time consciousness in recognizing that there is a co-determinative relation between subject and object poles of intentionality. Self-affection is permeated by hetero-affection.

“Although these two sides can be distinguished conceptually, they cannot be separated. It is not as if the two sides or aspects of phenomenal experience can be detached and encountered in isolation from one other. When I touch the cold surface of a refrigerator, is the sensation of coldness that I then feel a property of the experienced object or a property of the experience of the object? The correct answer is that the sensory experience contains two dimensions, namely one of the sensing and one of the sensed, and that we can focus on either.”

In addition to Henry’s work, Zahavi finds further support of his model of minimal self-consciousness in Husserl’s Ideas II, among other writings, where the pure ego is depicted as unchanging and immutable.

Husserl says:

“We can discern with evidence the sense in which the pure Ego changes in the changing of its acts. It is changeable in its practices, in its activities and passivities, in its being attracted and being repulsed, etc. But these changes do not change it itself. On the contrary, in itself the pure Ego is immutable.”

“...the pure Ego is given in absolute selfhood and in a unity which does not present itself by way of adumbrations; it can be grasped adequately in the reflexive shift of focus that goes back to it as a center of functioning. (“Ideas II)

“...the primal "I,"the ego of my epoche, ...can never lose its uniqueness and personal indeclinability.”(Crisis)

But one must ask at this point, does this immutable, indeclinable pure ego contribute its own affective content to experience, a feeling of familiarity or meness, as Zahavi claims? After all, Husserl argues that “As pure Ego it does not harbor any hidden inner richness; it is absolutely simple and it lies there absolutely clear. All richness lies in the cogito and in the mode of the
function which can be adequately grasped therein.” (Ideas II). Husserl describes this pure ego pole as non-perceivable, non-graspable and anonymous. “...the ego which is the counterpart (gegenüber) to everything is anonymous. “This suggests that for Husserl, the pure ego may function as nothing but an empty zero point or center of activity rather than a consciously sensed feeling of any kind.

“...it is the center whence all conscious life emits rays and receives them; it is the center of all affects and actions, of all attention, grasping, relating, and connecting, of all theoretical, valuing, and practical position-taking, of all enjoyment and distress, of all hope and fear, of all doing and suffering, etc. In other words, all the multi-formed particularities of intentional relatedness to Objects, which here are called acts, have their necessary terminus a quo, the Ego-point, from which they irradiate.” (Ideas II)

My claim in this paper is that for Husserl the pure ego’s unchanging in-itself identity as inner time consciousness is not felt or sensed, either explicitly or implicitly, and thus minimal pre-reflective self-awareness generates no for-meness in the way that Zahavi conceives it. There is instead a relation of ownness between the ego and the object pole, consisting of a constant, that is, essential, underlying structural feature of the ego’s changing relation to objects of intentional acts.

The Bernau Manuscripts and Self-Awareness:

I think Husserl’s modification of his previous account of time consciousness in the Bernau manuscripts is relevant in this regard. It not only challenges Zahavi’s understanding of pre-reflective self-awareness as a non-mediated self-identity, but I believe it accurately captures the direction of thinking Husserl was to maintain the rest of his career. More importantly, it clarifies and advances a thinking that was his from the start, a thinking that doesn’t simply make a ‘category error’ as Zahavi claims. By treating primary self-awareness as object consciousness, but departs from Zahavi’s understanding of both the noetic and noematic aspects of consciousness.

By 1917 Husserl’s writing on time consciousness began to treat primal impression as inseparable from the retentional-protentional flow of time constitution rather than as occupying its own present moment of meaning within the temporal stream. Passive anticipatory fulfillment from the subjective, egoic side co-motivates alongside the affective pull of the objective, primal hyletic side of every concrete experience.

Gallagher(2017)writes “primal impression, rather than being portrayed as an experiential origin, “the primal source of all further consciousness and being” (Husserl 1966a: 67), is considered the result of an interplay between retention and protention. Thus, in the Bernau Manuscripts, Husserl defines primal impression as “the boundary between [...] the retentions and protentions” (Husserl 2001).
Husserl seems to suggest that the complicated interlacing of retentions and protentions is constitutive of primal impression. Not only is primal impression not self-sufficient, it is a constituted product rather than something that makes a constitutive contribution of its own. This more radical claim is expressed in Husserl’s idea that the initial event of experience is the empty anticipation.”

“First there is an empty expectation, and then there is the point of the primary perception, itself an intentional experience. But the primary presentation [or impression] comes to be in the flow only by occurring as the fulfillment of contents relative to the preceding empty intentions, thereby changing itself into primal presenting perception.” (Husserl 2001; translated in Gallagher & Zahavi 2014)

The primal impression comes on the scene as the fulfilment of an empty protention; the now, as the present phase of consciousness, is constituted by way of a protentional fulfillment (Husserl 2001).

Zahavi wants to equate temporalization with self-awareness but not in the way that Husserl in the Bernau manuscripts does. He wants it to be a pure self-affection above and beyond its intentional relation to an object, whereas in the Bernau manuscripts Husserl argues that self-awareness is always already a self-othering. Therefore, Zahavi(2004) didn’t hold back in his disagreement with Husserl over the Bernau Time Consciousness manuscript:

“...I do not think the internal object interpretation offers us a satisfactory account of either time-constitution nor of self-awareness. To be even more condemning: I think that the position that is developed in text nr. and elsewhere demonstrates an astonishing confusion, an inability to properly distinguish quite different constitutive contexts.”

“When self-affection is conceived as an ecstatic and self-transcending process it is furnished with a ruptured structure which is completely foreign to its nature.”

“...prior to reflection there is no awareness of internal objects and there is no distinction between the lived self-manifestation of the experiences and the flow of inner time-consciousness. Inner time-consciousness simply is the name of the pre-reflective self-awareness of our experiences.”

**For-Meness and Ownness:**

In the Bernau manuscripts, Husserl grounds the affectively sensed ego in the object intentionality of time consciousness. While Zahavi believes that there are many points in Husserl’s writing career where he expounds an account of pre-reflective self-consciousness compatible with Zahavi’s, in the Bernau manuscript he feels Husserl strays into an internal object morass. Zahavi believes that this formulation substitutes an alienating, mediated object intentionality of a retention-presentation-protentional streaming for the direct immediate awareness of self. But I would like to offer an alternative reading of the triadic structure of time consciousness that departs from Zahavi’s depiction of it as an alienating internal fracture between subject and object
Zahavi supports the idea of the nowness of the present as differentiated within itself. He recognizes that the present is not properly understood as an isolated ‘now’ point; it involves not just the current event but also the prior context framing the new entity. We don't hear sequences of notes in a piece of music as isolated tones but recognize them as elements of an unfolding context. As James (1978) wrote: "...earlier and later are present to each other in an experience that feels either only on condition of feeling both together" (p.77).

The key question is how this ‘both together’ is to be construed. Is the basis of change within a bodily organization, interpersonal interaction, and even the phenomenal experience of time itself, the function of an opposition between an intrinsic subjectivity and extrinsic objects? Or does my dynamic ‘now’ consist of a very different form of intentionality, a strange intersecting of a projecting subject and presenting object already changed by each other, radically interbled or inter-affected such that it can no longer be said that they have any separable aspects at all? I contend that Zahavi conceives the ‘both-together’ of the pairing of subject and object poles as a conjunction of distinct self-inherences. I am not suggesting that these poles are considered as unrelated, only that they each are presumed to carve out their own identities. At the most primordial level of constitution, the self pole maintains itself as an affective, or felt, pure self-identity which does not change with changing intentional experiences. The object pole, by contrast, subsists as a rigid identity.

“Self-affection understood as the process of affecting and being affected is not the rigid self-identity of an object, but a subjective movement. A movement which Henry has even described as the self-temporalisation of subjectivity. But as he then adds, we are dealing with a quite unique form of temporalisation, which is absolute immanent, non-horizontal and non-ecstatic. We are dealing with an affective temporality, and even though it seems to involve a perpetual movement and change, nothing is changed. In fact, it would be wrong to characterize absolute subjectivity as a stream of consciousness. There is no streaming and no change, but always one and the same Living Present without distance or difference. It is always the same self affecting itself.”

At higher levels of constitution, the ego pole’s identity changes contingently along with changing experience. At all levels, however, Zahavi (1999) treats both the subjective and the objective sides of intentionality as identities before they are poles of a relation. I have argued that Zahavi’s formulation of transcendental self-belonging as ‘for me-ness’ relies on the notion of a non-changing self-identity alienated from the intentional objects it is paired with. I believe he would do better to treat Husserl’s notion of ‘my ownness’ not as a fracture between self-identity and otherness (“a ruptured structure which is completely foreign to its nature”) but as an essential structure of intimate synthetic unification and belonging.

Central to Zahavi’s notion of the object is the belief that, at levels of constitution beyond the pure self identity of minimal self-awareness, subjective context and objective sense reciprocally determine each other as an oppositional relation or communication between contingent self-inhering contents. By contrast, I am arguing that for Husserl the ‘now’ structure of a
construed event is not an intertwining relation between self-inhering interiority and exteriority, but a radical differential intersection implicating a different understanding of psychological movement; intentional object and background context are not adjacent regions (a within and a without) in space or time; they have already been contaminated by each other such that they are inseparably co-implied as a single edge or point of intersection. The current context of an event is not a system of relations between a for-itself internality and an in-itself externality, but an indivisible gesture of passage, a referential differential axis.

Zahavi has succeeded in reducing materialist physicalism to fundamental co-dependency, but still finds it necessary to root intentional processes in a foundation of temporary self-inhering essences. Because he treats this relation between the sensing and the sensed as a pairing of only partially reduced identities, he renders the intentional act as alienating and mediate in comparison with the supposed immediacy of self-affection.

Husserl offers a foreignness to self that manifests itself as a thematic belonging to self whose self-similarity presupposes and is built from this irreducible foreignness. He introduces a primordial motivational principle in which noetic anticipatory assimilation dominates the foreignness of the noematic object pole. This peculiarly intimate ‘foreignness’ must be understood in different terms than that of the alienating fracture of objective exteriority. It is not a privileging of the same over the different, but rather a situating of the binary ‘same-different’ in a more insubstantial and therefore more intimate space of relationship than that of the alienating relation between an intrinsic subjectivity and an extrinsic object.

Husserl says actual being is constituted originally by harmoniousness of experience as a synthetic unity inseparable from my life and its potentialities. Each intentional sense is “a point of intersection belonging to my constitutive synthesis” (CM). Furthermore, this constitutive synthesis achieves its harmoniousness on the basis of the associative belongingness between the constituting and constituted poles, as a unity of identification, homogeneity, similarity, likeness. It “points back to such experiences of the same intended object or a similar one.” In this fashion the ego constitutes progressively higher levels of ownness from primordial constitutive ownness.

I believe that this essential structural intimacy of associative relationship between the noetic and noematic poles of intentional constitution is what Husserl is attempting to capture when he characterizes the constitution of the subject's stream of lived-experience in terms of ‘my ownness’. I don’t think that Husserl would have chosen to describe intentional objects in general as being constituted ‘within’, ‘inside’, as ‘a part of’, ‘internal to’ my ego, as ‘its very own’ if he meant for the ego pole to function as merely a ‘harbor’ for alienated othernesses as Zahavi claims.

We see the centrality of similarity manifest itself at all levels of constitution, in the subjective achievement of synthetic unities, analogical apperceptive pairing, associative relationality, correlations, harmonious fulfillments, subjective ‘mineness’, variations, flowing multiplicities, congruities, nexuses, coherences, etc. At the the highest constituted level of intersubjective
experience, each subjectivity interacts with other subjectivities via their own integral thread of continuous unified experience. Consistent with his subjectivity-based sociality, Husserl’s later writings on ethics is personalistic, striving toward an optimal self-consistency of all subjective values at the highest level. The intersubjective sphere is founded on my aperceptive constitution in empathy of the alter ego. In this aperceptive pairing, my self perception and my apperception of an alter ego “found phenomenologically a unity of similarity” (Cartesian Meditations, p.112).

At the level of the constitution of objects within my own sphere of ownness, where the adumbrating intentionality proceeds in an objectifying instinct, this striving is founded in an interest in the enrichment of the self [of the object], as a unified nexus of appresentations.

“Every apperception in which we apprehend at a glance, and noticingly grasp, objects given beforehand— for example, the already-given everyday world— every apperception in which we understand their sense and its horizons forthwith, points back to a "primal instituting", in which an object with a similar sense became constituted for the first time. Even the physical things of this world that are unknown to us are, to speak generally, known in respect of their type. We have already seen like things before, though not precisely this thing here. Thus each everyday experience involves an analogizing transfer of an originally instituted objective sense to a new case, with its anticipative apprehension of the object as having a similar sense. To the extent that there is givenness beforehand, there is such a transfer." (Cartesian Meditations, p.111)

Grounding these higher constituting achievements is the central role of similarity at the lowest stratum of passive pre-rational primal association. “Once a connection is formed in a stream of consciousness, there then exists in this stream the tendency for a newly emerging connection, similar to a portion of the earlier one, to continue in the direction of the similarity and to strive to complete itself in a total nexus similar to the previous total nexus.”(Ideas II, p.234).

“...consciousness is connected in the most general way to another consciousness by a commonality that is correlative noetic and noematic; and all connection is connection through "commonality." through uniformity and similarity.”(Passive and Active Synth, p.485)

Underlying and founding all these strata is the assimilative basis of temporal constitution. Protention and retention are included in what Husserl calls a “universal drive intentionality (Treibintentionalität).” As Bernet(2010) says “this originary process, as a life-process, is not simply an automatic process; it has a goal and the tendency to draw near to this goal.”

It is not simply that Husserl claims protension as a general going beyond itself of one’s experience of an object, rather that this going beyond itself has the character of a peculiar implicative consistency. Even in difference, negation, senselessness, irrationality, alterity, there is no experience in consciousness that is not in an overarching way variation on a thematics for Husserl, a similarity-in-difference.

The radical intimacy referentially, linking one moment of experience to the next, is driven not by
the positivity of an idealist subjectivity, but, on the contrary, by the insubstantiality of both the presencing and absencing poles of each absolutely new element of experience. The always novel altering repetition of experience has not the power to disturb to the same extent as it lacks, each time, the centering thickness of interiorized content. The formidability of ideal self-identity is necessary to impose the arbitrariness of polarizing conditioning on the movement of experiential process. When the irreducible origin of meaning is thought in terms of the meeting of “an ontological dualism, to distinguish a pure interiority and a pure exteriority”, fracture and alienation are irreducible in its temporalization.

Zahavi(2015) thinks that what gives an intended object its ‘mineness’ is the fact that as foreign to me, it is intended by a ‘me’ that is familiar with itself. He offers “…the best explanation of the sense of familiarity with, and lack of surprise regarding, my concurrent experience is that I was aware of it all along, in that it is built into the very phenomenal character of the experience that it is like something for me.” But this self-familiarity’ speaks only of my proximity to myself, not of my proximity to my world. Zahavi(2009) says “… the experiences I am living through are given differently (but not necessarily better) to me than to anybody else.” In other words, my experiences are given differently to me because my self-identical minimal self-awareness is marked with my signature. But without an underlying thematic, associative consistency in the temporal flow of my experiences, they cannot be said to be given ‘better’ to me than to others. My ego having been transcendentally branded as ‘unique to me’ but lacking associative intimacy with, and thus having no unique ownership over, intentional objects, Zahavi argues that “I can come to have the same kind of experiences, thoughts, beliefs and preferences as somebody else without becoming the other, just as somebody else can come to have the same type of experiences and beliefs as I have without thereby becoming me.”

In contrast to this thinking, Husserl sees the ‘mineness’ of intended objects as a result of a proximity between object and subject. That is, intended objects, as constituted senses, maintain a relation of similarity to the intending ego. They are mine because of the way they are constituted as modifications, variations, assimilations to the theme that is the temporal flow of experience. Husserl notes that “one aspect of the ego's marvellous being-for-himself” is its “reflexive intentional relatedness to itself” (Cartesian Meditations).

There is a way in which new experience is like previous experience and is familiar and recognizable to me, and belongs to me inasmuch as it elaborates my own thematics. This belonging of all my experience to my own ongoing thematics is what brands all my experience as unique to me, or as Husserl says, belonging to my ownness. Husserl(2001) says “… the style, so to speak, of "what is to come" is prefigured through what has just past”. Since what belongs to my ownness thematically, stylistically brands all my experiences as mine and distinguishes them from other transcendental egos, pace Zahavi, I do not simply ‘come to have the same kind of experiences, thoughts, beliefs and preferences as somebody else’. They are, instead, always given better, that is to say, more intimately to me than another’s experience is given to me.

Zahavi and Husserl on the Constitution of Intersubjectivity:
Because Zahavi equates for-meness with ideal self-familiarity, and otherness with the exteriorities to which that immanent interiority is opposed in an intentional act, my sphere of ownness is a mere ‘harbor’ for othernesses which have their home at the heart of, but only alongside my unique subjectivity. Therefore, the transcendence of my self-relation that alter egos represent, and the social world of second and third personal relations which this transcendence makes possible, is already anticipated by the self-alienating character of object intentionality at the most reductive level.

Thus, Zahavi (1996) claims that for Husserl “a radical implementation of the transcendental reduction leads with necessity to a disclosure of transcendental intersubjectivity”. Husserl insists, however, that a radical reduction reveals the philosophical solitude of the absolute ego, which is prior to the constitutive accomplishment of transcendental intersubjectivity.

Since all objects of my intentional acts, including my experience of my body and other selves, belong to me through primary or secondary apperceptive performances via dimensions of similarity and likeness, this unique ongoing integrity of my subjective flow of experiencing makes it impossible for me to ever have direct access to other selves, or my own body, as alien. Thus, contrary to Zahavi’s (2002) assertion that “...in my corporeal existence I am intersubjective and social from the start”, for Husserl I am never social in Zahavi’s sense of being in direct contact with alienness. This ‘world for us’, from one to the other to the other, is constituted within MY (the primal me) subjective process as MY privileged apperception of ‘from one to the other to the other’.

“...one of the main tasks of pure intentional psychology is to make understandable, by way of the progressive reduction of world-validity, the subjective and pure function through which the world as the "world for us all" is a world for all from my—the ego’s—vantage point, with whatever particular content it may have. ...” (Crisis, p.256)

Primordially, the autonomy of being given to others is not directly accessible to me (me as apodictic rather than natural empirical ego). Rather than making the absolute difference between self and Other disappear, intersubjective apperception exposes this unbridgeable gap by allowing only an interpretive mediate access to the alien, from within the singular ‘I’.

“The epoche creates a unique sort of philosophical solitude which is the fundamental methodical requirement for a truly radical philosophy. In this solitude I am not a single individual who has somehow willfully cut himself off from the society of mankind, perhaps even for theoretical reasons, or who is cut off by accident, as in a shipwreck, but who nevertheless knows that he still belongs to that society. I am not an ego, who still has his you, his we, his total community of co-subjects in natural validity. All of mankind, and the whole distinction and ordering of the personal pronouns, has become a phenomenon within my epoche; and so has the privilege of I-the-man among other men.” (Crisis, p.184)

“...it was wrong, methodically, to jump immediately into transcendental inter-subjectivity and to leap over the primal "I,"the ego of my epoche, which can never lose its uniqueness and personal indeclinability. It is only an apparent contradiction to this that the ego—through a
particular constitutive accomplishment of its own—makes itself declinable, for itself, transcendentally; that, starting from itself and in itself, it constitutes transcendental intersubjectivity, to which it then adds itself as a merely privileged member, namely, as "I" among the transcendental others. This is what philosophical self-exposition in the epoche actually teaches us. It can show how the always singular I, in the original constituting life proceeding within it, constitutes a first sphere of objects, the "primordial" sphere; how it then, starting from this, in a motivated fashion, performs a constitutive accomplishment through which an intentional modification of itself and its primordiality achieves ontic validity under the title of "alien-perception," perception of others, of another "I" who is for himself an I as I am. "(Crisis, p.185)

Zahavi argues that Husserl’s notion of the singular ‘I’ refers to the formal structure of pre-reflective self-awareness, its absolute self-identity. But this determination of ownness addresses only the ego pole, treating its relation to intentional objects as alienating. For Husserl, however, my ownness is not the formal essence of a self-identical ego, but the function of constitutive synthesis. Thus, not only my constituting ego belongs to me, but the constituted psychophysical world of direct sensation and apperceived objects, as well as my apperception of other egos.

Within this general belonging of all experience to my egoic processes, Husserl distinguishes between what is peculiar to me and what is other, that is, between primary and secondary spheres of ownness. What is peculiarly my own belongs to me as a synthetic unity inseparable from the life of my ego and its potentialities.

“Where, and so far as, the constituted unity is inseparable from the original constitution itself, with the inseparableness that characterizes an immediate concrete oneness, not only the constitutive perceiving but also the perceived existent belongs to my concrete very-ownness ”(Cartesian Meditations)

What makes the appresentation of objects an immediate concrete oneness is the possibility of verification by a corresponding fulfilling presentation. By contrast, the empathized alter ego can never be directly verified through a fulfilling presentation. This indirectness of verification makes my empathetic apperception of another ego a secondary transcendence with respect to concrete experiences belonging to my peculiar ownness. Nevertheless, my experience of others still belongs to me intimately on the basis of a harmonious unity of similarity and likeness that the apperceptive pairing achieves.

Because the constitution of egoic otherness is a secondary, higher order differentiation within my own egoic processes, bracketing off the intersubjectively constituted objective world does not deprive my egoic processes of any of their essential features. The coherent founding stratum of what is included in my ownness includes what is other for me. “...every consciousness of what is other, every mode of appearance of it, belongs in the former sphere”[ of what is included in my ownness]. (Cartesian Meditations, p.100)

“But here something remarkable strikes us: a sequence of evidences that yet, in their sequence, seem paradoxical. The psychic life of my Ego (this "psychophysical" Ego), including my whole
world-experiencing life and therefore including my actual and possible experience of what is other, is wholly unaffected by screening off what is other. Consequently there belongs within my psychic being the whole constitution of the world existing for me and, in further consequence, the differentiation of that constitution into the systems that constitute what is included in my peculiar ownness and the systems that constitute what is other.” (Cartesian Meditations, p.98)

The distinction between what belongs to my peculiar ownness, such as my reduced perception of objects and my own body, and what is other to me is a difference within an overarching belonging to self, via dimensions of likeness, of all experience. In this connection, I think it is significant that Husserl analogizes my apperception of an alter ego to the act of recollection, which belongs to my peculiar ownness.

In recollection,

“... the immediate "I" performs an accomplishment through which it constitutes a variational mode of itself as existing (in the mode of having passed). Starting from this we can trace how the immediate "I," flowingly-statically present, constitutes itself in self-temporalization as enduring through “Its” pasts. In the same way, the immediate "I," already enduring in the enduring primordial sphere, constitutes in itself another as other...Thus, in me, "another I" achieves ontic validity as co-present [kompräsent] with his own ways of being self-evidently verified, which are obviously quite different from those of a "sense" perception.” (Crisis, p.185)

From Husserl’s perspective, just as each element in a perceptual system gives birth, via associative synthesis, to the rest of the system as a synthetic unfolding, as participant in an intersubjective community each of my motivated acts gives birth to, that is, frames and orients, my reciprocal interactions with others in my community. This temporal ‘birthing’ constitutes intersubjectivity in such a way that my own subjective thread of continuity runs through and organizes it. That is to say, hidden within the naive exteriority of my social encounters is a peculiar sort of coherence or implicate self-consistency. However alien to me is a world of fellow egos, each with their own subjective process, all I can ever apperceive of that otherness is what I mediatively, non-inferentially ‘pick out’ in analogical similarity with my own process.

A thread of unified internal integrity runs through my apprehension of an intersubjectively interaffecting world of others. Other egos, reducible to transcendental subjects, are not just figments of my own constitutive process, but exist alongside my own in a system of intentional interpretation. However, an ongoing thread of subjective continuity underlies my (and every other ego’s) participation in interpersonal relations. My contact with another person is not a dialogic ping pong game. Rather than a single game, interpersonal relationality is at least two intertwining games, from my vantage; it is both my integrally varying senses of the other’s interpretation of our encounter, and my awareness of the dynamic stability of the difference between his and my outlook (our individual habitual histories of motivated position-taking).

But my perspective and that of another are not to be understood as solipsistically private regions.
The interpersonal relation directly remakes my sense of what my `own' perspective is, as well as what I assume to be the other's integral position. When I apperceptively ‘get inside the other's head’, it is simultaneously they getting inside my head. It is always a new sense of `me' and `other' that emerge in conversation, but as an intertwining correlative movement among internally unitary threads of implication.

My sense of my own identity is relentlessly, but subtly, formed and reformed through direct and indirect social engagement, but in a manner which presupposes and is made possible by the unified synthetic continuity of my motivated history of position-taking. I can passively allow myself to be influenced by others, but this is a superficial, `merely external’ type of affecting which does not steer my core motivational processes.

“What comes from others and is "taken over" by me, and is more external or less so, can be characterized as issuing from the other subject, first of all as a tendency proceeding from him and addressed to me, as a demand, to which I perhaps yield passively, perhaps reluctantly, but by which I am still overpowered. Alternatively, I might annex it on my own accord, and then it becomes part of me. In that case it no longer has the character of a mere demand to which I yield and which determines me from the outside; it has become a position-taking that issues from my own Ego and is not merely a stimulus coming from the outside and retaining the character of a borrowing of something that came forth from another Ego, of something that has its primal instauration in him.”(Ideas II, p.281))

Footnote: A number of writers have taken issue with Zahavi’s model of for-men-ness as pre-social minimal self-identity. Their arguments range from the claim that the primordial sense of self is mediated by interpersonal influences (Ratcliffe 2017) to the more radical view that the self is entirely constructed by interpersonal dynamics (Maclaren 2008, (McGann, and De Jaegher 2009). However, such positions invariably maintain Zahavi’s idealized formulation of object intentionality as a polarizing opposition between temporarily self-inhering contents (see Soffer 2011).

Heidegger on Dasein and Befindlichkeit:

Earlier in this paper I distinguished Husserl’s notion of ‘my ownness’ from Zahavi’s concept of ‘for-men-ness’. The former, I argued, characterized the primordial ego’s radical solitude as a function of an essential structural unity inhering in all its acts, harmonizing the moments of the temporal flow via likeness and similarity. This essential relational intimacy between subject and object poles only reveals itself when these poles are divested of the intrinsic interior (for-men-ness) and exterior(alien object) content that Zahavi attributes to them.

If Husserl demonstrated the radical interdependency of subject and object, Heidegger’s questioning of the being of beings sought to locate a more primordial and integral ground than that of subject-object relationality. To show how far Heidegger’s conception of the self strays from Zahavi’s account of subjectivity, I want to compare Zahavi’s reading of Heidegger with my own.

Zahavi(2005) says:
“...it seems reasonable to conclude that Heidegger did, in fact, operate with a form of self-acquaintance that precedes reflection. When understanding his claim that no self-acquaintance can occur independently of, or prior to, our world-disclosure, it is crucial to remember that this world-disclosure contains a dimension of self from the very start and, as well, that it cannot occur independently of or prior to a disclosure of self.”

“...on Heidegger's account every experience involves a primitive sense of self; every experience is characterized by the fact that “I am always somehow acquainted with myself” (Zahavi 2009)

Zahavi isn’t suggesting that Heidegger’s ‘primitive sense of self’ is a non-ecstatic and self-identical self-awareness, only that a self-aware subject pole ( albeit not pure and detached) belongs to every intentional experience.

Heidegger(1982) would seem to concur with Zahavi:

“To intentionality belongs, not only a self-directing-toward and not only an understanding of the being of the being toward which it is directed, but also the associated unveiling of the self which is comporting itself here. Formally, it is unassailable to speak of the ego as consciousness of something that is at the same time conscious of itself.”

But he then adds the following warning:

... . But these formal determinations, which provide the framework for idealism’s dialectic of consciousness, are nevertheless very far from an interpretation of the phenomenal circumstances of the Dasein, from how this being shows itself to itself in its factual existence, if violence is not practiced on the Dasein by preconceived notions of ego and subject drawn from the theory of knowledge.”

How, then does the being of Dasein show itself in its factual existence? I think it is a misunderstanding to equate Dasein with the subject pole of a subject-object structure. In the first place, Heidegger does not view Dasein from the vantage of a subject-object binary. If one instead speaks of self and world, then Dasein belongs to both poles. Specifically, the self is a constantly changing creation. It exists in unveiling itself by projecting itself on a possibility. What it projects itself on is its world. So the self is its world as the possibility that it projects itself into. Put differently, the self is the tripartite structure of temporality as the past anticipating itself into the future.

For Heidegger(1982), temporality as pure self-affection is not the essence of subjectivity but the essence of Dasein, which is not a subjectivity but what lies in between the subjective and the objective.

“The Dasein does not need a special kind of observation, nor does it need to conduct a sort of espionage on the ego in order to have the self; rather, as the Dasein gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world itself, its own self is reflected to it from things. This is not mysticism
and does not presuppose the assigning of souls to things. It is only a reference to an elementary phenomenological fact of existence, which must be seen prior to all talk, no matter how acute, about the subject-object relation.”

“To say that the world is subjective is to say that it belongs to the Dasein so far as this being is in the mode of being-in-the-world. The world is something which the “subject” “projects outward,” as it were, from within itself. But are we permitted to speak here of an inner and an outer? What can this projection mean? Obviously not that the world is a piece of myself in the sense of some other thing present in me as in a thing and that I throw the world out of this subject thing in order to catch hold of the other things with it. Instead, the Dasein itself is as such already projected. So far as the Dasein exists a world is cast-forth with the Dasein’s being. To exist means, among other things, to cast-forth a world, and in fact in such a way that with the thrownness of this projection, with the factual existence of a Dasein, extant entities are always already uncovered.”

“To understand means, more precisely, to project oneself upon a possibility, in this projection to keep oneself at all times in a possibility. A can-be, a possibility as possibility, is there only in projection, in projecting oneself upon that can-be.

… If the Dasein projects itself upon a possibility, it is projecting itself in the sense that it is unveiling itself as this can-be, in this specific being. If the Dasein projects itself upon a possibility and understands itself in that possibility, this understanding, this becoming manifest of the self, is not a self-contemplation in the sense that the ego would become the object of some cognition or other; rather, the projection is the way in which I am the possibility.”

What makes this creative act of ‘absencing’ a self, an ‘ownness’, is the intimacy and continuity of the self moment to moment as existing as a change over its past. Heidegger understands that to be radically, irreducibly, primordially situated in a world is to be guaranteed, at every moment, a world that feelingly creatively impinges on me anew as foreign in some aspect. And it is simultaneously, to feel a belonging familiarity) to what impinges on me in its foreignness due to the anticipative, projective futural aspect of temporality. Heidegger’s being-in -the-world is always characterized by a pragmatic self-belongingness that he articulates as a heedful circumspective relevance that events always have for Dasein in its world. For Heidegger, self is Dasein, Dasein is attuned understanding, attuned understanding is projection, projection is a happening, an action, historicality, temporality, the over and beyond, self as transcendence, the unveiling of a specific possibility.

A key feature of Heidegger’s philosophy is his placement of affect, in the guise of befindlichkeit, alongside understanding as the essence of dasein. Befindlichkeit reveals the ‘how’ of Dasein’s relation to itself as the understanding unveiling of possibilities, the way in which Dasein is affected by what it projects itself into. Heidegger(1982) says

“all understanding is essentially related to an affective self-finding which belongs to understanding itself. To be affectively self-finding is the formal structure of what we call mood, passion, affect, and the like, which are constitutive for all comportment toward beings, although they do not by themselves alone make such comportment possible but always only in one with understanding, which gives its light to each mood, each passion, each affect.”“... this 'one is in such and such a way' is
not-is never-simply a consequence or side-effect of our thinking, doing, and acting. It is-to put it crudely-the presupposition for such things, the 'medium' within which they first happen. “

Understanding how Heidegger accomplishes this integration of intentionality, affect and will is essential for grasping the radically temporal basis of Being in the world. More importantly, it allows us to see how Zahavi’s idealizing model of subject-object relationality not only alienates the subjective from the objective pole but splits apart the affective and intentional aspects of experience. It is not as if Zahavi follows first generation cognitivism in repeating ‘Descartes’ error’, to borrow Damasio’s phrase, by considering thought and feeling to be functionally independent. On the contrary, he takes pains to present emotion and thought as an indissociable interaction. Cognitive and affective processes are closely interdependent, with affect, emotion and sensation functioning in multiple ways and at multiple levels to situate or attune the context of our conceptual dealings with the world, and affective tonality is never absent from cognition. As Ratcliffe(2002) puts it, “moods are no longer a subjective window-dressing on privileged theoretical perspectives but a background that constitutes the sense of all intentionalities, whether theoretical or practical”(p.290).

A comparison with Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit, however, reveals that Zahavi can hardly be said to have dispensed with the divide between thought and feeling. Zahavi explains that the pre-reflective self-awareness that opposes, but is at the same time inseparably connected with intended objects, is something of the order of a feeling rather than an intentional object. How does Zahavi distinguish between feeling and mood on the one hand, and intentional object on the other?

Zahavi(1999) approvingly cites Michel Henry’s view:

“Henry calls attention to the way in which we are aware of our feelings and moods. When we are in pain, anxious, embarrassed, stubborn or happy, we do not feel it through the intervention of a (inner) sense organ or an intentional act, but are immediately aware of it. There is no distance or separation between the feeling of pain or happiness and our awareness of it, since it is given in and through itself. According to Henry, something similar holds for all of our conscious experiences. To make use of a terminology taken from analytical philosophy of mind, Henry would claim that all conscious experiences are essentially characterized by having a subjective ‘feel’ to them, that is, a certain quality of ‘what it is like’”.

In settling on feeling as a special sort of entity that does the work of establishing immediate self-awareness, Zahavi is harking back to a long-standing Western tradition whereby affective feeling is supposedly instantaneous, non-mediated experience. It has been said that ‘raw’ or primitive feeling is bodily-physiological, pre-reflective and non-conceptual, contentless hedonic valuation, innate, qualitative, passive, a surge, glow, twinge, energy, spark, something we are overcome by. Opposed to such ‘bodily’, dynamical events are seemingly flat, static entities referred to by such terms as mentation, rationality, theorization, propositionality, objectivity, calculation, cognition, conceptualization and perception. “ Because Zahavi makes self-inhering states do most of the work of establishing the awareness
of the affectively felt and objectively perceived sides of the bond between the subject and the world, the relation between subject and object becomes a mostly empty middle term, a neutral copula added onto the two opposing sides of the binary. This reification of subject, object and relation as distinct entities or states unto themselves is exemplified in Zahavi’s distinction between for-meness, meness and mineness as the difference between an awareness of an experience, an awareness of an experiencer, and an awareness of the experience as owned by the experiencer. Only the first is supposedly primary and immediate, whereas the other two are derived from the first in secondary and tertiary acts of reflection.

Footnote: Zahavi 2019 explains that for me-ness is pre-reflective self-awareness, in all experience. By contrast, “Me-ness, in short, is when the subject figures in experience as “an object of phenomenal awareness” (Guillot 2017: 35), or as Farrell and McClelland rephrase it in their summary of Guillot’s view, as “a thing-that-appears” (2017: 3). Mineness, finally, is when the experience is phenomenally given as mine. On this reading, mineness is the more complex notion, since it not only requires that the subject is aware of her experience, and aware of herself, but also aware of the possessive relation between herself and the experience, i.e., aware that she is owning the experience (Guillot 2017: 31, 43). As Guillot then points out, there is prima facie a fairly clear distinction to be drawn between an awareness of an experience, an awareness of an experiencer, and an awareness of the experience as owned by the experiencer.”

From Heidegger’s perspective, Zahavi’s need to identify and insulate a pure immediacy from the alienating effect of object intentionality is a byproduct of the idealizing way he formulates the issue of subjectivity, and Zahavi’s solution only reaffirms the problem, which is that movement and transformation are treated as secondary to self-inherence, so that the affective and cognate aspects of events are artificially split into separated entities and then have to be pieced together again in an interaction. To ground experience in radical temporality is to abandon the concept of subject and world in states of interaction, in favor of a self-world referential-differential in continuous self-transforming movement. The relation, the in-between is the irreducible basis of Dasein.

For Heidegger, the subjective and the objective, are not primordially understood as belonging to an interaction between immediately felt and mediatively given states of being; they are instead the inseparable features of a unitary differential structure of transition, otherwise known as Dasein’s equi-primordial temporality, attunement and understanding. There are no self-inhering entities, either in the guise of affects or intended objects. The awareness of the relation between self and world is not a secondary or tertiary derivation from a primordial awareness of distinct subjective and objective manifestations. On the contrary, both feeling and intentional meaning are produced only in and through Dasein’s projective self-world relation. From this perspective it is Zahavi’s notions of subject and object which are derivative and secondary. In the place of Zahavi’s three-part structure of subjective feeling, relational bond and intentional object, Heidegger proposes a unified totality. No relational connector is needed to tie subject and object together when subject and object are no longer assumed as inherences.

**Dasein, Das Man and Intersubjectivity:**
If Dasein’s being-in-the-world is always structured as an intimate, pragmatic self-belongingness, how does Heidegger explain the basis of apparently normatively driven intersubjective ‘we’ contexts? Heidegger’s most systematic treatment of Dasein’s role in a linguistic community appears in his discussion of average everydayness and das man in Being and Time.

Zahavi is among those thinkers who interpret Heidegger’s ‘we-self’ of every day das man as taking precedence over his authentic self of ‘ownmost’ possibilities. As das man, Zahavi claims “group belongingness, rather than being founded upon an other-experience, preceded any such experience.”

“...an everyday being-with-one-another characterized by anonymity and substitutability, where others are those from whom “one mostly does not distinguish oneself” (Heidegger 1996: 11)

He surmises that Heidegger would approve of Schmid’s(2005) assertion that “...the we, the “sense of us” or “plural self-awareness,” precedes the distinction between yours and mine, is prior to any form of intersubjectivity or mutual recognition, and is itself the irreducible basis for joint action and communication.”

Zahavi is far from alone in interpreting Heidegger’s discussions of the discursive practices of Das man as assuming an introjection of norms by a socially created self or a socially conditioned self-affecting subjectivity. Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s model of empathy was taken by many interpreters as evidence that the primacy of being-with for Dasein functions as the conditioning of a self by an outside.

For instance, Rousse(2014) says

“...the particular way I ‘carry out’ my being and relate to myself is unavoidably susceptible to the pressures of the others’ normative expectations,”... inauthenticity is a matter of a person having his practical orientation dominated by ‘outside forces’,...the tacitly operative normative expectations about how one ought properly and normally to behave.” “Dasein, as essentially ‘being-with’, initially ‘gets’ its existential answerability by being socialized into the shared behavioral norms of the One. In turn, this enables, even encourages, Dasein to act in accordance with them and to avoid taking its own (‘existentiell’) answerability for how it comports and understands itself. To be responsible, then, is to be the kind of agent who has the possibility to take responsibility for the socially normative determinants of identity.”

By taking for granted the notion of normativity as a shared understanding, Rousse exemplifies the kind of thinking that Heidegger says disguises, covers over, conceals and obscures a genuine understanding. Das man isn’t a matter of simply acting in accordance with norms that are communally understood but a way of thinking that pre-supposes and takes for granted that the self can internalize and introject meanings from others. Public interpretedness is not about behaving in accordance with culturally assimilated norms but believing that norms exist as the sharing of
unambiguously intelligible meanings in the first place.

Rousse misreads authenticity as a self-reflexive self’s becoming aware of what it has introjected, ‘taken in’ from culture and its attempt to take responsibility for, or embrace its own alternative to, those norms. But for Heidegger what the self discloses to itself in average everydayness is not introjected meanings from a community. The self never simply introjects from an outside to an inside. The radically temporal structuration of Dasein makes such introjection impossible.

Heidegger’s (2010) task is to explain how a Dasein which always understands others in relation to its very own pragmatic totality of relevance ends up believing in a cultural world of linguistic practices that appear to be the same for all. “…what purports to be an opening up of the world is in fact its concealment: by appealing to public opinion and tradition, idle talk creates in Dasein the belief that it possesses universally acknowledged and thus genuine truths.”

Heidegger chooses words like average, vague, flattened, confused, uprooted state of suspension, and ambiguous to describe Dasein’s being as Das Man, to indicate that the heedfulness of Care is still primordially and implicitly operative even when it is explicitly concealed and suppressed. Average everyday discourse has to be vague, approximate, superficial and ambiguous enough to conceal, disguise, cover over, miss, obscure, suppress the fact that the meaning of what is shared is never interpreted identically for each Dasein.

“What is talked about is understood only approximately and superficially. One means the same thing because it is in the same averageness that we have a common understanding of what is said.” “Publicness” does not get to “the heart of the matter,” because it is insensitive to every difference of level and genuineness.”

“Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without any previous appropriation of the matter. Idle talk, which everyone can snatch up, not only divests us of the task of genuine understanding, but develops an indifferent intelligibility for which nothing is closed off any longer. Discourse, which belongs to the essential constitution of being of Dasein, and also constitutes its disclosedness, has the possibility of becoming idle talk, and as such of not really keeping being-in-the-world open in an articulated understanding, but of closing it off and covering over inner worldly beings. “ Ontologically, this means that when Da-sein maintains itself in idle talk, it is-as being-in-the-world-cut off from the primary and primordially genuine relations of being toward the world, toward Mitda-sein, toward being-in itself.”

“Idle talk conceals simply because of its characteristic failure to address things in an originary way [ursprünglichen Ansprechens]. It obscures the true appearance of the world and the events in it by instituting a dominant view [herrschende Ansicht].”“Usually and for the most part the ontic mode of being-in (discoverture) is concealment [Verdeckung]. Interpretedness, which is speech encrusted by idle talk, draws any given Dasein into ‘one’s’ way of being. But existence in the ‘one’ now entails the concealment and marginalization of the genuine self [eigentlichen Selbst]. Not only has each particular given itself over to ‘one’, ‘one’ blocks Dasein’s access to the state it finds itself in [Befindlichkeit].” (Heidegger 2011)
What is this genuine self, this genuine understanding, this originary and primordial way of appropriating the matter, this “getting to the heart of the matter”, these primordially genuine relations of being toward the world, toward Mit-da-sein, toward being-in itself, that idle talk conceals?

To say that in the mode of average everydayness Dasein disguises, covers over, conceals, obscures its genuine self, a genuine understanding, an originary and primordial way of appropriating the matter, “getting to the heart of the matter,” primordially genuine relations of being toward the world, toward Mit-dasein, toward being-in itself, is to say that Dasein explicitly experiences itself as a constituted self, introjecting norms from other selves, but this awareness pre-supposes and is grounded in an implicit mineness.

Average everydayness of Das man and idle talk shares with what Heidegger calls the ‘present to hand’ the features of being derivative modes of the ‘as’ structure of heedful circumspective significance, functioning as a contextually rich totality of relevance. They also share the feature of being a ‘dwindling down’ of that wider experience.

Even as Zahavi mistakenly critiques Heidegger for giving precedence to “plural self-awareness,” over the distinction between yours and mine, Zahavi’s I-Thou model of sociality falls under the scope of Heidegger’s formulation of Das Man.

Zahavi(2012) says “The I and the you are prior to the we”. The I-you relation “is a reciprocal exchange of address and response that affects and transforms the self experience of the participating individuals... we take over from others (and make our own) a language, roles, attitudes and norms”.

This makes individual behavior in social situations the product of narrative norms, reciprocities, shared practices and social constraints. The presupposition here is that my own subjectivity always functions as a harbor in the reception of social signs. Intersubjectivity is characterized by a reciprocal cobbling and co-ordination between personal history and cultural signs in which the ‘joints’ of such interactive bodily-mental and social practices are simultaneously within my own subjectivity and common to other participants in my community. Zahavi assumes these culturally normed practices that we internalize represent forms of meaning no less robust in significance and relevance to our lives than those which we generate.

In contrast, for Heidegger the social norms and practices that Dasein takes in are specific modifications of meaning on the order of a diminution of significance. The publicness of Das Man and the present to handness of things are modes of Dasein representing a deprivation and trivialization of intelligibility, significance and relevance, and thus a reduction of meaningfulness. Dasein becomes alienated from itself not by being taken over by, introjecting and internalizing an outside but by encountering itself (its ownmost world of possibilities) as almost devoid of sense. This is self-alienation as senselessness rather than internalization of an other.
“However, alienation cannot mean that Da-sein is factically torn away from itself....this alienation, which closes off to Da-sein its authenticity and possibility, even if only that of genuinely getting stranded, still does not surrender it to beings which it itself is not, but forces it into its inauthenticity, into a possible kind of being of itself.”(Heidegger 2010)

Zahavi’s belief that socialization is a direct introjection and internalization from an outside marks it from Heidegger’s vantage as an inauthentic and confused self-understanding, even if we assume with Zahavi that the subject is an active participant in what it takes in from others( I-Thou).

World-understanding as Dasein-understanding is self-understanding. Self and world belong together in the single entity, the Dasein. Self and world are not two beings, like subject and object, or like I and thou, but self and world are the basic determination of the Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-world. (Heidegger 1982)

We saw earlier how for Husserl the alterity and foreignness of other egos is constituted as a variation of my own thematics, via aperceptive transfer. Heidegger understands thematic mineness through the Care structure. Heidegger says average everydayness alienates Dasein from itself, but without Dasein’s therefore being merely conditioned by others.

My being-with-others originates primordially as ‘my ownmost’ being-with, relative to my significant aims and goals, to what matters to me. As the inauthentic mode of average everydayness communication become flattened, leveled down into the vagueness of a ‘we’ understanding, but this average everydayness does not eliminate but only covers over the originary ‘mineness’ of the Care structure of primordial temporality.

The ‘solitude’ of the mineness of the self of Dasein is disclosed most fundamentally for Heidegger in the authentic mood of angst. Angst individualizes and thus discloses Da-sein as "solus ipse." This existential "solipsism," however, is so far from transposing an isolated subject-thing into the harmless vacuum of a worldless occurrence that it brings Da-sein in an extreme sense precisely before its world as world, and thus itself before itself as being-in-the-world." "Together with the sober Angst that brings us before our individualized potentiality-of-being, goes the unshakable joy in this possibility.”

As much as it is the case that Heidegger’s being-with-others is not the precedence of anonymous plural self-awareness over Dasein’s ownness, it is equally true that Dasein’s self-belonging is not a retreat from the immediate contingency of world-exposure, not the choosing of an idealist self-actualization at the expense of robust being with others. Gallagher and Gadamer’s readings of Heidegger appear to fall prey to such a solipsist interpretation.

Gallagher(2010) says: “In Heidegger, and in thinkers who follow his line of thought, we find the idea that a relatively complete account of our embodied, expert, enactive, pragmatic engagements with the world can be given prior to or without reference to intersubjectivity.”

Gadamer(2006) writes:
"Mit-sein, for Heidegger, was a concession that he had to make, but one that he never really got behind. Indeed, even as he was developing the idea, he wasn't really talking about the other at all. Mit-sein is, as it were, an assertion about Dasein, which must naturally take Mit-sein for granted...

"Care" [die Sorge] is always a concernfulness [ein Besorgtsein] about one's own being, and Mit-sein is, in truth, a very weak idea of the other, more a "letting the other be" than an authentic "being-interested-in-him."

Zahavi, Gallagher and Gadamer are right and wrong in their readings of Heidegger. Gallagher and Gadamer are right that Heidegger makes their notion of primary intersubjectivity a derivative modification of the primary self-understanding of Dasein. But they are wrong to interpret Dasein’s self-understanding as prior to sociality. Being-with is instead the very site of sociality as a referential differential inside-outside. Zahavi is right that Heidegger places being-with as prior to Zahavi’s model of pre-reflective self-awareness, but Zahavi is wrong in treating Das Man as an anonymous plural self. As a referential differential it is a more intimate notion of self-relation than Zahavi’s present-to-hand oppositional subject-object structure.

Heidegger’s ‘ownmost’ shows that a profound irreducible intimacy of relation between self and world reveals itself once idealized binaries like inside-outside, internal-external, the meeting of an in-itself and a for-itself have been deconstructed. A central implication of this thinking for the understanding of intersubjectivity is that while our experience as individuals is characterized by stable relations of relative belonging or alienation with respect to other individuals and groups, the site of this interactivity, whether we find ourselves in greater or lesser agreement with a world within which we are enmeshed, has a character of peculiar self-belonging and ownership. It also has a character of relentless creative activity that undermines and overflows attempts to understand human action based on between-person reciprocities. We may identify to a greater or lesser extent with various larger paradigmatic communities, delicately united by intertwining values. But the contribution of each member of a community to the whole would not originate at the level of spoken or bodily language interchange among voices; such constructs repress as much as they reveal. Even in a community of five individuals in a room, I, as participant, can perceive a locus of integrity undergirding the participation of each of the others to the responsive conversation. In my dealings with other persons, I would be able to discern a thread of continuity organizing their participation in dialogue with me, dictating the manner and extent to which I can be said to influence their thinking and they mine. My thinking can not properly be seen as ‘determined’ by his response, and his ideas are not simply ‘shaped’ by my contribution to our correspondence.

I can only shape my actions to fit socially legitimate goals or permitted institutionalized grammatical forms to the extent that those goals or forms can be understood by me as relevant to my ongoing experience. Even then, what is understood by me is not ‘the’ social forms, but aspects hidden within these so-called forms which are unique to the totality of relevance of my perspective; what I perceive as socially ‘permitted’ rhetorical argumentation is already stylistically distinctive in relation to what other participants perceive as permitted. Each individual who feels belonging to an extent in a larger ethico-political collectivity perceives that collectivity’s functions in a unique, but peculiarly coherent way relative to their own history, even when they
believe that in moving forward in life their strategic language moves are guided by the constraints imposed by essentially the 'same' discursive conventions as the others in their speech community.

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A Phenomenological Critique of Ratcliffe’s Existential Feeling: Affect as Temporality (2020)

Abstract:

Matthew Ratcliffe’s model of existential feelings can be seen as a critical engagement with perspectives common to analytic, theory of mind and psychological orientations that view psychological functions such as cognition and affectivity within normative objective propositional frameworks. Ratcliffe takes a step back from and re-situates objective reifications within an interactive subject-object matrix inclusive of the body and the interpersonal world. In doing so, he turns a mono-normative thinking into a poly-normative one, in which determinations of meaning and significance are relative to the changing structural coherence of felt bodily and inter-socially shaped schemes of interaction. And yet, from the phenomenological vantages of Husserl, Gendlin and Heidegger, Ratcliffe’s approach retains the metaphysical presupposition of subject-object relationality as interacting inherences, with a separate causative glue necessary to provide for the means of their connection. Ratcliffe re-purposed Damasio’s concept of background feeling and dressed it up in the garb of phenomenology, but as such it remains a reciprocally causal model of psychological function. What Heidegger’s Being-in-the-World, Merleau-Ponty’s figure-background structure of corporeal inter-subjectivity, Gendlin’s implicit intricacy and Husserl’s reduced transcendental ego have in common is a radicalized notion of temporality that overcomes the split between feeling and thinking informing Ratcliffe’s understanding of being ‘immersed in’ and connected to a world, and thus abandons the need to posit bodily feeling as a ‘glue’ organizing and maintaining the meaningful structure of consciousness of a world. Temporality, not the empirically causal body, provides the basis of affect, cognition and the organizational glue for structures of meaning.

Introduction

Matthew Ratcliffe’s model of existential feelings can be seen as a critical engagement with perspectives common to analytic, theory of mind and psychological orientations that view psychological functions such as cognition and affectivity within normative objective propositional frameworks in which affect is either peripheral to cognitive processes or only directed toward internal bodily feeling. Ratcliffe takes a step back from and re-situates objective reifications within an interactive subject-object matrix inclusive of the body and the interpersonal world. In doing so, he turns a mono-normative thinking into a poly-normative one, in which determinations of meaning and significance are oriented by the changing structural coherence of world-directed felt bodily and inter-socially shaped schemes of interaction.
The aim of this paper is to show that while Ratcliffe’s existential feeling significantly transforms Damasio’s concept of background feeling, in dressing it up in the garb of phenomenological philosophical conceptions, he neglects to follow Husserl, Gendlin and Heidegger in establishing a radicalized concept of temporality as the ground of affectivity. Whereas the above phenomenologists fuse affect and intention within the moment of time itself as tripartite structure of temporal becoming, Ratcliffe founds affect and intention as distinguishable structural aspects of a reciprocally causal model. As a result, Ratcliffe substitutes polarizing, semi-arbitrary conditionings for a more intimate, intricate and unitary process of affective-connative meaning creation.

Existential Feeling as Global Situatedness:

In the early 2000's Ratcliffe introduced the outlines of what was to become his model of existential feelings, incorporating elements of Damasio’s background feeling.

“According to Damasio, background feelings are ever-present, although ordinarily tacit. They serve to structure the everyday ways in which we encounter the world, the basic ways in which we find ourselves in the world “ (Ratcliffe 2002, p.298)

Damasio wrote:”... I am postulating another variety of feeling which I suspect preceded the others in evolution. I call it background feeling because it originates in “background” body states rather than in emotional states. It is not the Verdi of grand emotion, nor the Stravinsky of intellectualized emotion but rather a minimalist in tone and beat, the feeling of life itself, the sense of being.” (1995, p. 150)

Ratcliffe (2020) fleshed out his approach with elements drawn from the phenomenologies of Merleau-Ponty, Husserl and Heidegger:

“Both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty add that localized experiences of possibility presuppose a more-enveloping orientation, a sense of belonging to the world. When I see or think about something, when I am afraid of something, and when I am in a bad mood about a wider situation, I already find myself in the world, in a way than differs in kind from intentional experiences in one or another modality (e.g. imagining, perceiving, or remembering something). This ‘world’ is presupposed by intentional states of whatever kind with whatever content. We can think of it in terms of a possibility space, a receptivity to types of possibility.”“Things are experienced as significant to us, as mattering to us, in various different ways, something that involves a sense of the possibilities they offer.”

“...what Heidegger in Being and Time calls ‘Being-in-the-world’ is exactly what we gain reflective access to by performing the phenomenological reduction...This conveys much the same broad conception of ‘world’ that we find in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty:...something that we are already practically, unreflectively immersed in when we experience something, think about it or act upon it.”

These globally structured patterns of existential feeling amount to “‘ways of finding oneself in the world’. As such, they are what we might call ‘pre-intentional’, meaning that they determine the kinds of intentional states we are capable of adopting, amounting to a ‘shape’ that all experience takes on.” (Ratcliffe 2015)
The Affective ‘glue’ organizing existential feeling:

If for Ratcliffe, a global structure of feeling orients the significance for us of the objects and persons we interact with in the world, how is this structure organized and sustained? What is the ‘glue’ that holds it together?

Ratcliffe’s causal reinforcement-based model of affect assigns it the role of biasing appraisal via selectively guiding attention toward a heightening or lowering of perceived significance of various world events. The role of affective attunement is to produce “changes in the types of significant possibility to which one is receptive”. (Ratcliffe 2016) “...existential feelings determine the kinds of noetic and noematic feelings that one is open to. “...the existential feeling sets the parameters for the kinds of more localized experience one is capable of having.”(2016). “Emotions “tune us to the world, making it relevant to us by opening up certain possibilities for explicit deliberation and closing off others. “(Ratcliffe 2002)

Bodily dispositions can actively direct one toward salient objects in one’s world, but are “equally implicated in feeling unable to act upon something. Passivity in the face of threat may involve inclinations to withdraw, to retreat, along with the absence of any other salient possibilities.” (Ratcliffe 2015). For instance, in depression one cannot find the motivation to act to change one’s situation ( a confident ‘I can’ becomes ‘I can’t’). Solipsistic self-perpetuating narratives, reinforced and organized by feelings of avoidance and reduced salience, tell one why they shouldn’t or can’t connect with others.

“In any experience, only certain possibilities are offered up and only some of these appear especially salient. According to both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the possibilities that show up are constituted by bodily dispositions. These dispositions shape all experience and show up as potentialities that belong to objects. The different ways in which the body responds to things amount to different systems of concrete possibilities. “(Ratcliffe 2010)

In order to situate Ratcliffe’s orientation relative to the phenomenologists whose ideas he incorporates, it is helpful to see how he makes use of Damasio’s neuroscience-inspired theorizing on the relations of affect and intention.

“...emotions play a role in constraining and structuring the realm of explicit deliberation, restricting deliberation to a small number of options and structuring patterns of reasoning, so that we remain focused and relevant in our activities, able to act towards goals without becoming distracted by trivia. Thus emotions and feelings serve to constrain and focus our attention, so that we only consider from a pre-structured set of options. Damasio’s (1995, 1996) more specific hypothesis is that emotions are cognitively mediated body states. He christens this theory the “somatic marker hypothesis”. The idea is that somatic (body) signals are associated with perceptual stimuli, either as a result of innate or learned neural connections, and thus “mark” those stimuli. Different perceptions can be associated with various kinds of body states, which may serve as alarm signals or, alternatively, as enticing invitations. According to Damasio, a
complex of such signals focuses and structures our cognitive interactions with the world. Once we incorporate complex learned associations between perceptions and body states, a vast web of somatic markers can develop. These signals serve to eliminate certain possibilities, which feel bad, from a choice set and focus deliberation upon other feel good signals. Thus cognition is constrained, enabled and structured by a background of emotion-perception correlations, that manifest themselves as a changing background of implicit representations of body states.” (Ratcliffe 2002)

Let me encapsulate Ratcliffe’s perspective on the role of affect in determining the ways that the world can make sense to us. Ratcliffe says emotion and embodiment are “incorporated as essential components in cognition”, but emotion and cognition are clearly not identical; “...emotions and moods are not explicitly cognitive but neither are they independent of cognition” (Ratcliffe 2002, p.299). They originate as bodily sensations structuring cognition from outside of it. Emotion and cognition can 'conflict' and emotion can “override cognitive judgement” (p.299). Ratcliffe cites Ramachandran’s clinical observations of individuals with anosognosia, who apparently distort environmental information which contradicts an internally generated narrative. Ramachandran attributes this behavior to damage to connections between emotion and cognitive centers. Ratcliffe concludes from this that, in typically functioning persons, emotion signals from the body are presumed to pack a contentful punch large enough to break through a psychological narrative's resistances where weaker percepts from the environment cannot.

It seems, then, that for Ratcliffe, intention is a capacity for manipulating objects of thought, but emotion, as conditioning valuative valence, provides the criteria for such processing. He is apparently not able to find the resources strictly within what he thinks of as intentional thought to de-center thinking processes, because he treats cognition as tending to form temporarily self-perpetuating narratives which can distort or keep out contradictory input from the world. So he relies on the body, in the form of emotion cues, to come to the rescue and bring the stalled cognitive apparatus back in touch with a dynamically changing world. The stimulus of emotion is assumed to intervene in order to infuse a stagnant narrative with a new direction and meaning.

(FOOTNOTE: For Ratcliffe emotions selectively organize cognition not just by prompting the interruption of a current narrative, but also by facilitating the assimilation of new events into an ongoing context. Ratcliffe(2002) cites Ramachandran’s account of individuals with Capgras syndrome as evidence that affect can serve to inform the cognitive system that a previously experienced object is similar or identical to a current one.)

Ratcliffe(2002) asserts: “Without emotional responses, one is not uprooted from a coherent interpretation of events...” (p.306). Although these emotion cues are claimed to be inseparably linked with conceptual processes, this linkage amounts to more of a concatenation between pre-existing states than a radical indissociability. This may be due to the belief that feeling originates developmentally within the individual independently from cognition, as action readiness circuits that, Panksepp(1998) claims, are “completely biological and affective but..., through innumerable sensory-perceptual interactions with our environments, [become]
inextricably mixed with learning and world events”(p.303)

Illustrating the flipside of the same thinking, Ratcliffe(2017) delineates situations in which emotions associate themselves with intentional states in maladaptive ways.

“We might say that certain emotions are properly associated only with certain other kinds of intentional state. This could be understood in various ways: an “improper” association might be regarded as epistemically or behaviorally misleading, irrational, biologically dysfunctional, socially inappropriate, or inappropriate in some other respect…”

Ratcliffe relies on the adaptationist presumption that meaning is shaped in a semi-arbitrary way by inputs which come to influence it from a pre-existing outside. I don’t think Ratcliffe’s model of affectivity has abandoned the pre-suppositions animating Damasio’s (2000) claim: “…as a result of powerful learning mechanisms such as conditioning, emotions of all shades eventually help connect homeostatic regulation and survival values to numerous events and objects in our autobiographical experience”(p.54). According to this thinking, feeling processes adapt and co-ordinate with a partially independent cogitative environment, authorizing adaptationism as a causal explanation of origins.

Viewed as an adaptation, emotion is linked to a milieu outside of itself and with which the logic of the bond is indirect, partially arbitrary in the sense that it is capable of being made irrational, as is supposedly the case with nonadaptive feeling-intending associations. There is a partial independence assumed between the participant aspects of reciprocally adaptive interactions. The cobbled can be uncobbled unilaterally. Emotion can aid reason, but can also be dysfunctional.

It is important to mention that Ratcliffe’s thinking deviates from Damasio’s empirical model in a number of significant respects.

“Although I will suggest that Damasio’s conception of emotional feeling is plausible in at least some respects, I do not wish to endorse the way he uses the terms ‘emotion’ and ‘feeling’. And what I will say here does not require me to accept the empirical details of his account, such as some of the specific claims he makes about the relationship between somatic markers and decision-making, and about the roles of particular brain areas.”(Ratcliffe 2010)

More specifically, for Ratcliffe(2008) “Existential feelings are both ‘feelings of the body’ and ‘ways of finding oneself in a world’.” We don’t simply experience body states as an inward focused datum. Rather, bodily feeling is the vehicle through which we encounter the world.

Slaby provides this useful elaboration of how bodily feeling can be world-oriented:

” feeling bad emotionally (as opposed to feeling bad due to physical illness or injury) is not a disembodied, intellectual appreciation of things going badly – although it surely is some kind of appreciation of things going badly. It is also and essentially a bodily experience. If you are angry and feel offended by your colleague, you have a self-disclosing bodily feeling. It is not easy to
describe it exactly, but I think you have the physical impression of being “pushed down”, of being literally “oppressed” by an external force. In this way, emotional pain is essentially bodily. Its bodily nature is not a separable “aspect” that is merely added on to an otherwise purely intellectual appreciation of what’s going on; rather, it is the very core of the painful emotional experience. “(Slaby 2008)

From the vantage of the present discussion, Ratcliffe’s most contentious claim concerning what separates his approach from empirical, neurobiological theories of affect is philosophical. Ratcliffe claims to assign primacy to phenomenological over naturalistic, scientific accounts of emotion and other psychological phenomena.

“The unquestioned givenness of the objective world that is constitutive of scientific descriptions cannot capture the way in which the given is disclosed by a meaning-giving background. Thus, if anything, it is the transcendental, meaning-giving account that has ontological priority over an objective/causal description.” (Ratcliffe 2002)

In making this assertion, Ratcliffe undoubtedly appreciates that there is no one-size-fits-all notion of the natural or the empirical. The history of science is a genealogy of changing philosophies of the empirical and the natural. What he has set his sights on is a presumption common to contemporary versions of empiricism: i.e. that there are facts of the matter that can be teased apart from the personally appearing, contextually situated ways in which matters are meaningfully relevant to us.

I believe that Ratcliffe’s approach does indeed expose the limitations of such forms of objective naturalism. But I also maintain that, rather than abandoning a causal motivational grounding entirely, Ratcliffe has instead replaced it with a more sophisticated brand of causality. There are a number of perspectives within the larger phenomenological philosophical community which are compatible with Ratcliffe’s motivational account (Stein, Scheler, Henry) but there are certain other phenomenologists from whose vantage his thinking retains remnants of naturalist naïveté, or, as Husserl puts it, “falls a victim to the inconsistency of a transcendental philosophy that stays within the natural realm.” In particular, Husserl, Heidegger and Gendlin offer what I have referred to elsewhere as radically temporal phenomenologies which cannot be subsumed under Ratcliffe’s systematics without losing what is most essential to them. My interest in this paper is to persuade that Ratcliffe’s particular interpretation of phenomenology lacks a core concept defining the approaches of Husserl, Gendlin and Heidegger, the fusion of affectivity, intention and temporality.

**Husserl’s Transcendental Affect**

Ratcliffe insists that affectivity and intentionality are inseparable, And yet, it is significant that he still finds it coherent to imagine what a situation might be like in which affect was absent from our experience of the world.
“...affect binds us to things, making them relevant and ‘lighting up’ aspects of the world in such a way as to call forth actions and thoughts. Without the world-structuring orientation that they provide, we are disoriented, cut off from the world, which no longer solicits thoughts and actions and is consequently devoid of value. In effect, [William] James is saying that our very sense of reality is constituted by world-orienting feelings that bind us to things .” (Ratcliffe 2005)

“The absence of emotion comprises a state of cognitive and behavioural paralysis rather than fully functional cognition, stripped of ‘mere’ affect. A phenomenology without affect is a phenomenology that guts the world of all its significance. The experienced world is ordinarily enriched by the feelings that we sew into it, that imbue it with value and light it up as an arena of cognitive and behavioural possibilities. So cognition without affect is not, according to James, in any sense complete. It is an extreme phenomenological privation that strips the world of all meaning, a state of depression or ‘melancholia’. In such a state, James describes how ‘the world now looks remote, strange, sinister, uncanny. Its color is gone, its breath is cold, there is no speculation in the eyes it glares with’” (James 1902: p. 151), (Ratcliffe 2005).

Slaby concurs: “Nothing but “neutral states of intellectual perception” would remain, as William James famously put it, when we “try to abstract from consciousness [of an emotion] all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms” (James 1884, 193).” “Not all human experience is clearly marked as hedonic, and so not all human experience is affective. “(Slaby 2008)

In sum, the experienced world without affect is an ‘extreme privation’, a world of paralysis, meaninglessness, disorientation. Even if Ratcliffe conjures the idea of affectless cognition only as a purely hypothetical thought experiment or limit case, the fact that he can associate any qualities at all with such a world indicates that he is operating from a concept of affect that does not treat it as a philosophical a priori. But what would such a philosophically grounding approach to affect look like? Imagine that instead of hypothesizing awareness without affect, we were to place time out of bounds. It is immediately clear that any attempt to describe the qualitative features of one’s experience of such a world (meaningless, paralyzed, disoriented, etc) would be pointless, since without time there could be no awareness and no world. If we were to re-construe affect in such a way that it became as irreducible to experience as time, then it would no longer be a matter of deriving feeling, mood, emotion and other forms of affectivity from adaptive patterns of contingent interactive bodily and interpersonal schemes, but of locating their origin in the basis of being itself. This is what Husserl attempted with his model of temporal constitution.

Husserl’s grounding of affectivity in inner time consciousness is a transcendental grounding, not a naturalistic one. Underlying and founding all strata of bodily and interpersonal dynamics is the assimilative basis of temporal constitution as retention, primal impression and protention. This is Husserl’s primordial pre-condition for any world, any being.
The subjective and objective sides of the structure of temporal synthesis are not separate entities but only poles of a single act of intentional sense. In this synthesis, both the subject and the object pole contribute their own quality of feeling to what ‘an object is for the subject’ in its valuative, affective sense. The energetic dynamism of feeling isn’t something added to a content of perception from outside of it, in causal relation with it as agent of conditioning. Meaning content implies its own affective force, the affective signature is intrinsic to the objective and subjective sides. This is what constitutes the ‘life’ in what Husserl calls the living present. The affective qualities contributed by the objective pole (noema) are its vivacity. Husserl describes the affective allure contributed by the objective pole as “that varying vivacity of a lived experience, of a datum of consciousness.” (Passive and Active Synthesis, p.214)

And an affective signature is intrinsic to the subject, in the form of desires, tendencies, strivings, anticipations, aimed at the objective pole. As Husserl says, there are rays emanating from subjective side to the objective side and vice-versa. Both affects originating on the subjective side and those originating on the objective side are implied in all intentional meaning. The always present affective qualities of the object (beautiful, pleasurable, unpleasant) are not made thematic in objectivating acts (perceiving a spatial object), but they are in valuative acts. And one’s affective, hedonic attitude toward the object of an intention (disappointed, depressed, elated, bored, frightened) may not be thematized in theoretical interest, but will appear in our practical attitude toward the world.

Natural bodily structures are not the basis of affect for Husserl. If one wants to still talk about a body, what remains of the body for Husserl once one has dug beneath all the sedimented layers of constituted meaning, would be the ‘body’ of the retention-impression-protention triad of time consciousness. Husserl’s starting point in time consciousness is already a self-othering, thus an exposure to the foreign from within the resources of subjectivity, prior to any configurational-corporeal constitution, prior to any empirically defined physiological or psychological structures, prior to human beings, but presupposed by them. Affect is not an evolutionary device, it is synonymous with entity, being, existence, object, subject. Being as the moment of experience is simultaneously the feeling of being affected and the feeling of anticipatory striving. These precede the notion of a body as biological organism, and instead is a pre-condition for being of any sort. Feeling, understood most primordially, is simply movement (not in empirical but subjective space), transition, becoming, time.

Footnote: Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s (2011) grounding of affectivity in activity recalls Husserl, but her rendering of it in terms of spatio-temporal movement and kinesthesia remains at the level of empirical space and time and fails to ground feeling relative to more primordial notions of internal temporality and spatiality common to Husserl, Gendlin, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger.

Husserl’s model of inner time consciousness generates a primordial motivational principle in the guise of associative synthesis. Unlike naturalist causal forms of association, in which the bond between elements is externally conditioned, in Husserl’s motivational model noetic anticipatory assimilation dominates the foreignness of the noematic object pole. That is to say, associative
synthesis achieves a belongingness between the constituting and constituted poles as a unity of identification, homogeneity, similarity, likeness.

“Thus each everyday experience involves an analogizing transfer of an originally instituted objective sense to a new case, with its anticipative apprehension of the object as having a similar sense. To the extent that there is givenness beforehand, there is such a transfer.” (Cartesian Meditations, p.111)

“all immediate association is an association in accordance with similarity. Such association is essentially possible only by virtue of similarities, differing in degree in each case, up to the limit of complete likeness. Thus all original contrast also rests on association: the unlike comes to prominence on the basis of the common. Homogeneity and heterogeneity, therefore, are the result of two different and fundamental modes of associative unification.” (Experience and Judgement)

“...consciousness is connected in the most general way to another consciousness by a commonality that is correlatively noetic and noematic; and all connection is connection through "commonality," through uniformity and similarity.” (Passive and Active Synth, p.485)

This means that the capacity of experiences to delight or disturb us, particularly when it comes to profoundly self-affecting valuative concerns, is much more a function of the relation of the event to our strivings and anticipations than it is to whatever qualities of feeling (enticement, allure, vivacity) are contributed by the object pole in itself.

If we were simply to conclude that an anticipatory tendency, a general striving toward ‘possibilities’ of fulfillment, characterizes at all levels Husserl’s project, then we could justifiably claim that he has this in common with Ratcliffe, whose approach also is oriented around anticipatory temporality and possibilities. But it is not simply that Husserl claims protention as a general going beyond itself of one’s experience of an object, rather that this going beyond itself has the character of a peculiar implicative consistency.

We strive to assimilate experiences. We see the centrality of similarity manifest itself at all levels of constitution, in the subjective achievement of synthetic unities, analogical apperceptive pairing, associative relatioanalitiy, correlations, harmonious fulfillments, subjective ‘mineness’, variations, flowing multiplicities, congruitities, nexuses, coherences, etc. Even in unfulfillment, negation, senselessness, irrationality, alienation there is no experience in consciousness that is not in an overarching way a variation on a thematics for Husserl, a similarity-within-difference.

Protention and retention are included in what Husserl calls a “universal drive intentionality (Treibintentionalität).” Experience is being affected and changed by what one anticipatorily aims at through striving. As Bernet says “this originary process, as a life-process, is not simply an automatic process; it has a goal and the tendency to draw near to this goal.”( Bernet 2010, p.16).

The radical belonging between self and world that associative synthesis instantiates renders all experience as intrinsically relevant and significant based on some basis of commonality between my past and what presents itself to me. By contrast, in causal models, personal experience accommodates, adapts and shapes itself in accordance with bodily and interpersonal inputs that impinge on it in semi-arbitrary ways. This makes such models incapable of manifesting relevance
and salience in Husserl’s radical sense. Not only is relevance not a given, but when it is achieved, it amounts to an externally imposed association between elements of bodily feeling and thought.

We can see this difference in a comparison between Husserl’s motivational grounding of intentional experience in associative synthesis and Ratcliffe’s claim that bodily felt dispositions constrain and orient our receptivity to the world.

Ratcliffe explains:

“The extent to which a possibility is enticing is a matter of bodily feeling; it is through the feeling body that things show up as salient.”(Ratcliffe 2008) “I have argued – drawing on the work of Husserl (1989), amongst others – that experience of worldly possibilities is inextricable from a sense of bodily dispositions... loss of enticing possibilities from the world is bound up with a lethargic body that is not stirred into action by its surroundings. Again and again, first-person reports by psychiatric patients convey pervasive experiential changes, where an alteration in how the body feels is at the same time a shift in how the world appears and in how one relates to it. “(Ratcliffe 2016)

Footnote: Fuchs(2013) further elaborates the idea of emotional feeling as causal associations between perceptions and body states:

“In short, the depressive state may be characterized by a general constriction or ‘congealment’ of the lived body, leading to a numbing of emotional resonance and loss of attunement. This alters the patient’s existential feelings of being-with, resulting in a general sense of detachment, segregation, or even expulsion....In severe depression, the lived body loses the lightness, fluidity, and mobility of a medium and turns into a heavy, solid body which puts up resistance to all intentions and impulses directed towards the world.”

Ratcliffe(2012a) treats Husserl’s notion of associative synthesis as subordinate causal associations nested within, and conditioned by, the larger dispositional space of global bodily feeling.

“Husserl would have regarded loss of conation as something that affects passive synthesis: a kind of possibility that we ordinarily take for granted is gone from the world.” “In so far as this sense of reality is an achievement of passive synthesis, a loss of conation affects passive synthesis. Although objects are recognized as “what they are,” something is missing from them, some quality.”

The dependence of our perceptions on bodily dispositions that Ratcliffe credits Husserl for revealing to us is a correlation that appears when we are approaching the world within the natural attitude. It represents that stratum of constitution within which the world opens up for us in terms of physical objects, subjective sensations, and causal relations between the psychical and the physical. Included within this naturalistic stratum of thinking are psychophysical relations intertwining my feeling sensate body with my felt physical body. Ratcliffe’s account of bodily felt dispositions as a complex of learned associations between perceptions and body states belongs to this natural causal stratum. However, Husserl asserts that making sense of intersubjective
experiences such as affect, feeling, valuation, emotion and mood requires a shift from the natural attitude to what he calls the personal or spiritual attitude. Within this higher stratum, natural causation is replaced by intentional motivation.

“...when we speak of the spiritual or personal Ego, that is to be understood as the subject of intentionality, and we see that motivation is the lawfulness of the life of the spirit.” “The "because-so" of motivation has a totally different sense than causality in the sense of nature.” (Ideas II, p. 231)

My bodily felt dispositions lose their character as causal conditionings when I relate to the world as a valuing, intending social participant, and instead are fused with and subordinated to the motivated valuative intentionalities driven by the dynamics of my social interactions. Only when I shift back to the natural attitude do mood dispositions appear for me again in terms of causal bodily feelings and sensations (lethargic, constricted, closed off, energized, aroused, etc). But noticing ‘how my body feels’ only contributes to the elucidation of intentional moods when transferred from the naturalistic to the personalistic sphere as a metaphor. For example, my personalistic sense of my depression infuses and animates my feeling of bodily lethargy with the corresponding affective intentional meaning of feeling ‘down in the dumps’. Without this interpretive animation coming from the higher intentional stratum, fusing with and lending metaphorical significance to the bodily data, my corporeal sensations of lethargy would bear no direct relevance to my being in the world as depressed. No pattern of organization of causally intertwined perception and corporeal feeling would ever be able turn bodily sensations like generic lethargy into intentionally significant moods, values or emotions.

“To be sure, I find the stratum of sensation to be localized in the Body, including therefore physical pleasure and physical pain; but that only shows that this stratum does not belong to the realm of what properly pertains to the Ego.” (Husserl, Ideas II p.223)

“...in my theoretical, emotional, and practical behavior-in my theoretical experience and thinking, in my position-taking as to pleasure, enjoyment, hoping, wishing, desiring, wanting-I feel myself conditioned by the matter in question, though this obviously does not mean psychophysically conditioned... For this realizing apprehension, the psychophysical relations do not play, obviously, any actual essential role. I apprehend myself as dependent in my behavior, in my acts, on the things themselves, on their beautiful color, on their special form, on their pleasant or dangerous properties. I do not therein apprehend myself as dependent on my Body or on my history.” (Ideas II p.148)

Ratcliffe might interpret Husserl’s comments as illustrating how globally attuned existential feeling operates behind the scenes, implicitly delimiting possibilities of affective salience in social situations via the intricate intertwining of bodily feedback with perception, without the role of the body as vehicle of feeling becoming thematic. But Husserl’s point is that, while social emotions are the result of a constituting genesis, they are not the product of a reciprocally causal concatenation process acting as tacit background for their emergence. It is only by abstracting away from a more primary intentional motivational attitude (grounded in associative synthesis) that emotional salience and enticement come to be seen as shaped by bodily feeling. In sum, it is not the intertwining of bodily reinforcements with perceptual and intentional states that determine
what I care about and how I care about it, how salient, enticing or relevant my social world appears to me. The senses of meaning that emerge from my interpersonal engagements do not pass through an intermediary mesh of bodily potentiators and constraints; such causal conditioning structures are already subsumed within, and transcended by, my immediate way of being in the world with others as intentional agent. I feel my world directly. Feeling simply IS intentional sense, because intentional sense is always self-affecting change of sense. Drawing on, but subtly or not so subtly re-situating a habitual history of valuative position-takings, feeling, mood and emotion express the relative anticipatory integrity of my motivated position takings, how I construe fresh interpersonal situations along dimensions of difference and similarity, concordance and incompatibility with respect to past situations, via active associative syntheses.

Husserl’s primary motivational principle of associative synthesis, via its higher constitutive manifestation as active intentional motivation, offers a model of recursivity uniting self-referential continuity and absolute alterity, the subjective and the objective, the affective and the intentional, in the same moment. Husserl’s general notion of affect, applying to such terms as emotion, feeling and desire as well, determines that every experienced event of any kind (bodily-sensory, perceptual, conceptual, practical-valuative) is an affect, and every affect is a change in affect. If every event of meaning is an advent of qualitative novelty, then cognition is affective not simply in the sense that a background affective tonality, mood or attunement frames the activity as a whole, as “a kind of cradle within which cognition rests” (Ratcliffe, 2002, p. 296), but in that each moment of engagement is an inseparable inter-bleeding between a prior context of attunement or thematics, and a change in that attunement.

Heidegger on Feeling, Intentionality and Time:

In Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit, which has been variously and imperfectly translated as attunement, mood, self-finding and state of mind, we find the most thoroughgoing phenomenological articulation of the inseparable relation of affect, intention and temporality. Temporality is the well-spring out of which Dasein as Being in the world emerges. Temporality, the way the world discloses itself to Dasein, is structured as the equi-primordial gestures of care, understanding, attunement and discourse. Since his earliest writings on background dispositions of feeling, Ratcliffe has used Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit as a source of inspiration. In Ratcliffe’s model, cognition and intentional states function in the manner of moves within a more or less fixed frame. Ratcliffe (2012) writes;

“...a mood is not an intentional state but a condition of possibility for intentionality.”

“According to Heidegger, moods are not intentional states that encompass a wide range of objects. Rather, they are modes of Befindlichkeit, ways of finding oneself in the world. This, he says, is presupposed by the intelligibility of intentionally directed experiences, thoughts and activities: “A central characteristic of Befindlichkeit, in its various modes, is that it determines the ways in which things can matter to us and, therefore, the kinds of intentional state we can adopt.”

“However broadly directed an emotion might be, it still presupposes a sense of being there, of the
possibilities that must already be in place for an object-directed emotion or more broadly directed mood to be possible. This is something that Heidegger succeeds in conveying. World-constituting moods are neither specifically focused emotions nor broadly focused emotions. Rather, they comprise a space of experiential possibilities that these and all other intentional states take for granted, the meaningfulness of life.” (Ratcliffe 2010) “Without specific emotional interruptions, there is nothing to break down coherence, nothing to disturb an ongoing interpretation of events.” (Ratcliffe 2002)

While I agree that attunements are world-constituting frames, I think there are significant differences in Ratcliffe’s and Heidegger’s representations of the way that meaning emerges out of the relation between attuning frames and the concrete experiences they make possible. Heidegger follows Husserl in grounding the orienting capacity of affective attunement in a radical notion of temporality rather than in a schematic causal interaction between body states and meaning intentions. Heidegger’s grounding of attunement in temporality means that the developing unfolding of a mood is not a matter of subordinate changes within an unchanging superordinate structure. Even as moods maintain an ongoing thematic consistency over time, nevertheless each interpretive moment of attuned understanding subtly modifies the frame by developing its possibilities. Each presenting experience, each ‘NOW’, is a shift of existential feeling, a punctuation in relation to the previous moment of time. Thus, if changes in attunement can be said to punctuate a stable thematic of feeling, this interruption is only a more extreme variant of the always already in process self-displacement that defines the temporal unfolding of a stable mood. The relative consistency over time of a stable background presupposes moment to moment punctuations. It is built from these displacements, which allow it to remain the same slightly differently. This instability at the heart of an attunement would seem to run counter not only to Ratcliffe’s normative conception of existential feeling as global attunement, but to Heidegger’s own articulation of attunements as persisting moods projecting stable interpretative frameworks.

“...in interpretatively addressing something as something, one addresses the thing encountered against the background of a more or less explicit acquaintance with it: as a tool as suitable for this or that, etc. These ‘as what’, in light of which one interprets the surrounding world as well as the concern that is immersed in it, are not usually newly discovered by Dasein. As being-together-with-others, Dasein grows up in and into this fixed interpretedness. The interpretative undertaking has a firm fore-conception. At the same time, it fixes the point of view from which those things that fall within the fore-conception are, as it were, targeted. The possible lines of ‘sight’ remain within circumscribed limits. Interpretation has its fore-sight. The world with which we are concerned and being-in itself are both interpreted within the parameters of a particular framework of intelligibility.” “...the ‘fore’ character in the structure of interpretedness shows us that it is none other than what has already been that jumps ahead as it were, of a present time pervaded by interpretedness.” (Heidegger 2011b)

How can a mood subsist as both a stable pre-condition for meaningful experience, projecting a ‘fixed interpretiveness’, and yet represent a ground that changes its sense moment to moment? Heidegger’s analysis of the derivation of propositional logic from a pragmatic ‘as’ structure
illustrates the immediately transformative nature of intentional aboutness. Heidegger explains that in taking something to be the case in a propositional judgement (for instance, S is P), we are taking something as something within a wider context of pragmatic relevance. (The ‘as’ structure designates the peculiar ‘between-ness’ of Dasein that Heidegger also describes as the ontological difference between Being and beings). Making sense of something is an act that always has the ‘as’ structure, as Heidegger tells us, but this structure of relevanting is covered over and flattened down in causal models.

“The most immediate state of affairs is, in fact, that we simply see and take things as they are: board, bench, house, policeman. Yes, of course. However, this taking is always a taking within the context of dealing-with something, and therefore is always a taking-as, but in such a way that the as-character does not become explicit in the act.” (Heidegger 2010b)

One might be tempted to read Heidegger’s hermeneutic ‘as’ structure as compatible with the role the wider possibility space plays for Ratcliffe in orienting cognition. However, in taking something AS something, we are not simply associating two externally related entities in relation to each other and with reference to a more encompassing causal framework. If a cognition or intention is merely about something, then it functions as external binding, coordinating and relating between two objectively present participants.

Heidegger (2010b) says:

“If the phenomenon of the "as" is covered over and above all veiled in its existential origin from the hermeneutical "as," Aristotle's phenomenological point of departure disintegrates to the analysis of logos in an external "theory of judgment," according to which judgment is a binding or separating of representations and concepts. Thus binding and separating can be further formalized to mean a "relating." Logistically, the judgment is dissolved into a system of "coordinations," it becomes the object of "calculation," but not a theme of ontological interpretation. "If the kind of being of the terms of the relation is understood without differentiation as merely objectively present things, then the relation shows itself as the objectively present conformity of two objectively present things.”

Despite Ratcliffe’s assertion that “it is the transcendental, meaning-giving account that has ontological priority over an objective/causal description”, his account of the personalistic flattens the ‘as’ structure into a system of reciprocal coordinations among objectively present entities, states and dispositions. But the ‘is’ connecting S with P is not a causal copula, it is a transformative relevanting altering in one gesture both the S and the P. The ‘as’ enacts a crossing of past and present such that both are already affected and changed by the other in this context of dealing with something. When we take something as something, we have already projected out from a totality of relevance such as to render what is presenting itself to us as familiar and recognizable in some fashion. But in this act of disclosure, we only have this totality of relevance by modifying it. This is why Heidegger says that in the process of interpreting what is projectively familiar to us, the ‘as’ structure takes apart what it puts together.

Heidegger (2010) offers:
“What is to be got at phenomenally with the formal structures of "binding" and "separating," more precisely, with the unity of the two, is the phenomenon of "something as something...In accordance with this structure, something is understood with regard to something else, it is taken together with it, so that this confrontation that understands, interprets, and articulates, at the same time takes apart what has been put together.”

“...projection is an occurrence which, as raising us away and casting us ahead, takes apart as it were;-in that apartness of a raising away, yet as we saw, precisely in such a way that in this process there occurs an intrinsic turning toward on the part of whatever has been projected, such that that which has been projected is that which binds and binds together.”(Heidegger 1995)

In experiencing something as something, Dasein comes back to its having been from its future, which is to say, it interprets a global context of relevance via the ‘as’ structure. In so doing, it “takes apart’ the relation between what it encounters and a previous instance of it by coming back to it from a fresh context of relevance. Seeing something as something makes sense of what is encountered in a new way, on the basis of a freshly modified totality of relevance. It is produced rather than discovered.

"The essence of something is not at all to be discovered simply like a fact; on the contrary, it must be brought forth. To bring forth is a kind of making, and so there resides in all grasping and positing of the essence something creative…. To bring forth means to bring out into the light, to bring something in sight which was up to then not seen at all, and specifically such that the seeing of it is not simply a gaping at something already lying there but a seeing which, in seeing, first brings forth what is to be seen, i.e., a productive seeing. "(Heidegger 1994)

That beings (essences) are produced by Dasein in the act of taking something as something is not to be understood as intentional activity that ‘takes for granted’, as Ratcliffe claims, a world constituting space of experiential possibilities that is not itself changed in the act of intending objects. For Ratcliffe, Befindlichkeit is the condition of possibility of being in an intentional state, but for Heidegger the condition of possibility for Befindlichkeit, for a world constituting space of possibilities, is that this totality of relevance be modified anew each moment in an act of bringing forth. The totality of one’s past pragmatic-valuative-affective comportment toward the world functions and changes as a single unit, with all of its ‘parts’ always implying each other. Being-affected always addresses and modifies all of one’s prior experience as a whole. Beings can only be produced because the foundation of their being is created anew as a ‘ground-laying’ every time we see something as something. The creative re-making of the ground, which Heidegger says is the essence of feeling, is at the same time the productive seeing of an intentional object.

“Every “foundation” in the sense we discussed comes too late with regard to the positing of the essence, because the productive seeing of the essence is itself a productive seeing of that in which the essence has its ground—a productive seeing of what its ground is. Knowledge of the essence is in itself a ground-laying. It is the positing of what lies under as ground“(Heidegger 1994)

Heidegger(1994) refers to this ground-laying as displacement, because the act of laying a ground is the displacing of a previous ground. This self-transcendending movement is the basis of all attunement.
“What we are now calling displacement is the essential character of what we know under the name of disposition or feeling. A deep-rooted and very old habit of experience and speech stipulates that we interpret feelings and dispositions—as well as willing and thinking—in a psychological-anthropological sense as occurrences and processes within an organism, as psychic lived experiences, ones we either have or do not have. This also means that we are “subjects,” present at hand, who are displaced into these or those dispositions by “getting” them. In truth, however, it is the disposition that displaces us, displaces us into such and such a relation to the world, into this or that understanding or disclosure of the world, into such and such a resolve or occlusion of one’s self, a self which is essentially a being-in-the-world.”

Feeling as the displacing, disposing ground-laying of beings returns to itself from out ahead of itself. This dynamic can already be found within the structure of seeing something as something.

“Because my being is such that I am out ahead of myself, I must, in order to understand something I encounter, come back from this being-out-ahead to the thing I encounter. Here we can already see an immanent structure of direct understanding qua as-structured comportment, and on closer analysis it turns out to be time. And this being-ahead-of-myself as a returning is a peculiar kind of movement that time itself constantly makes, if I may put it this way.”(Heidegger 2010b)

The returning from a totality of relevance in the act of understanding something constitutes temporality not as a present object happening IN time but as temporalization. The past, present and future don’t operate for Heidegger as sequential modes which mark distinct states of objects. They interpenetrate each other so completely that they together form a single unitary event of occurrence.

“Temporalizing does not mean a "succession" of the ecstasies. The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present. “Dasein "occurs out of its future". "Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general." Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future that has-been (or better, is in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself. We call the unified phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having—been temporality.”(Heidegger 2010)

The structure of temporality provides the key to the unification of what has commonly gone under the names of affectivity, feeling, mood and emotion on the one hand, and understanding, cognition and intentionality on the other. When Heidegger says that, in attunement, Dasein “is disclosed to itself before all cognition and willing and beyond their scope of disclosure” this is not a validation of Ratcliffe’s claim that propositional intentionality is an activity oriented within and framed by mood. The distinction Ratcliffe makes between existential-affective and intentional-cognitive structures of experience does not exist for Heidegger(1985).

“It could be shown from the phenomenon of care as the basic structure of Dasein that what phenomenology took to be intentionality and how it took it is fragmentary, a phenomenon
regarded merely from the outside. But what is meant by intentionality—the bare and isolated directing-itself-towards-must still be set back into the unified basic structure of being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-involved-in. This alone is the authentic phenomenon which corresponds to what inauthentically and only in an isolated direction is meant by intentionality.”

While attunement, as an ontological concept, is a more primordial notion than will or cognition, it is not as if the latter simply act as variable moves strictly WITHIN a more or less stable orienting background situatedness. On the contrary, such ontic concepts as cognition, willing and intending are inauthentic modes of ‘letting things be encountered’ and ‘letting beings be relevant’. Letting things be encountered as relevant IS being affected or moved by them freshly moment to moment. In other words, each intention as it appears subtly reinvents the attunement that it occurs into, articulates, develops and discloses. We continue to be sad, joyful or angry differently moment to moment and day to day.

Against Heidegger’s explicit determination of attunement as equi-primordial with discourse and understanding, which implies that none of these modes has priority over the others in a valuative, genetic or ontological sense, Ratcliffe wants to prioritize attunement.

“...it is mood that has primacy over understanding, as mood is responsible for determining the kinds of possibility that are presupposed by understanding. What Heidegger calls “discourse” (Rede) similarly depends upon mood.” (Ratcliffe 2012)

We can see why it may be important for Ratcliffe to give mood a formative role that is not accorded to understanding or discourse, based on what has been presented so far concerning his distinction between existential feeling and intentionality. Briefly stated, Ratcliffe reads Heidegger’s account of attunement as akin to the role of existential feeling, a global interactive scheme composed of reciprocally causal innate and learned associations between perceptions and body states. Understanding, as propositional intentionality, is a particular relational structure within that orienting disposition. “...cognition is constrained, enabled and structured by a background of emotion-perception correlations, that manifest themselves as a changing background of implicit representations of body states.”(Ratcliffe 2002). Heidegger, in contrast, explicitly warns against interpreting Understanding as the thematic propositional grasping of intentional meaning, insisting that such a misreading “degrades it to the level of a given, intended content.”(Being and Time, p.145)

Intentionally directed experiences don’t simply occur within the larger framework of a specific attunement. As factical experiences of interpretation, they are themselves developments of mood. That is to say, they develop the theme of an attuned understanding by subtly redefining it. The mode of interpretation, which is where one can locate activities of perception, intention and interpersonal interaction in general, is not a modality simply conforming to a specific theme of significance of a prior attunement. As a development of understanding, it is a particular way of subtly modifying ones attunement as a whole. Thus, if attuned understanding determines the kinds of intentional meanings we are capable of adopting, then intentional meanings as they arise in circumspective relevance out of previous ones subtly reshape the kinds of attuned
understanding we are capable of having.

On the one hand, variation in attunement and its equi-primordial mode of Understanding is as continuous as time itself. On the other hand, a thematic continuity holds for Dasein throughout its moment to moment global shifts in sense and feeling such that relatively stable ongoing modes of feeling comportment toward the world are discernable. This relative thematic stability is what allows us to talk about a mood of sadness or anger lasting days or weeks, but it is also what requires us to recognize that the feeling of situatedness and relevance does not become diminished when we transition from one relatively stable mood to another.

Ratcliffe believes he can prioritize attunement over understanding because, as we have seen, his schematic feeling model begins from a split between the subjective (body feeling state) and objective (perceptual and propositional intentional meaning) poles of experience. As a result of this split, the affective and perceptual-conative components are treated as if they are separate aspects in states of variable relationality. When bodily feeling states function to enhance our engagement with the world, according to Ratcliffe, we experience ourselves more intimately situated in the world. On the other hand, affective relevance (“the sense of being situated in a world” (Ratcliffe 2017) can be profoundly diminished, leaving propositional intentionality intact but devoid of adaptive orientation. One is still aware of a world moment to moment, one still has perceptions and memories, and yet this world is denuded of felt relevance and we are inclined to avoid social interaction. For instance, Ratcliffe claims that anxiety is intrinsically ‘alienating’ or ‘externalising’. It can alienate us from its objects (Ratcliffe and Wilkinson 2016). Ratcliffe considers the most extreme cases of erosion of situatedness, of the ability and capacity to experience types of possibility and to contemplate certain relevant options, to be a form of decision-making impairment and incompetence (Ratcliffe, forthcoming).

Fernandenz, along with Ratcliffe, believes that psycho-pathologies like depression involve “a general degradation in our ability to be affectively situated in and attuned to our world” and perhaps even the complete loss of affective situatedness.

“... the degree to which one is attuned to and situated in a world through moods can itself undergo change. .. Some cases of people diagnosed with depression are best understood not as an erosion of a particular mood, or as the emergence of a new mood, but instead as an erosion of the category of moods as a whole; that is to say, as an erosion of the structure of situatedness.”

“Alfred Kraus also characterizes melancholic depression as a loss of moods and feelings: "At its core, the melancholic mood alteration is-paradoxically formulated-rather a lack of mood" (Kraus 2003, 208, Fernandez 2014).”

Footnote: Fuchs(2013) follows Ratcliffe and Fernandez in considering depression as a loss of affective attunement (situatedness and relevance).

“The loss of bodily resonance or affectability concerns, more generally, the experience of affective valences and atmospheres. The deeper the depression, the more the attractive qualities
of the environment faint. The patients are no longer capable of being moved and affected by things, situations, or other persons. This leads to an inability to feel emotions or atmospheres at all, which is all the more painful as it is not caused by mere apathy or indifference (as for example in frontal brain injury) but by the tormenting bodily constriction and rigidity”.

Ratcliffe’s understanding of situatedness differs from Heidegger’s in a number of crucial ways. First, unlike Heidegger’s account, Ratcliffe’s Befindlichkeit is not an irreducible apriori of affective experience, but instead is the contingent product of a complex configuration of bodily and perceptual elements. Affective attunement for him is the achievement of a concatenating process. When we delve beneath Ratcliffe’s global schemes to locate the invariant and essential condition of possibility of his feeling-perceptual concatenations, we arrive at a reciprocally causal model of co-determinative interactive bits. But having arrived at this ‘apriori’, we are not yet in the vicinity of Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit. Befindlichkeit is not the product of an orienting device, adaptation or conditioning scheme, and not the ground of any reciprocally causal schematic structure, except as that structure be understood as a derived abstraction concealing its own basis in temporality.

In order to understand primordial situatedness, we have to bracket Ratcliffe’s causal model in its entirety, and think prior to the split between feeling and thinking that it presupposes. What is essential and invariant in the Heideggerian structure of situatedness as temporality is that each moment is the disclosure of the now as affectingly foreign-familiar. For Heidegger not only is there no self and no world prior to relationship, but the self is nothing BUT this between. Being situated in a world is not a contingent accomplishment of a scheme of reinforcements, but a presupposition of temporality.

Dasein is always fundamentally affectively situated in that it is thrown into its NOW as surprised familiarity. This means that attunement is not a relationship between self and world that can be broken or diminished, as Ratcliffe asserts, regardless of what mood one is in. The most intractably severe depression is still, moment to moment, an awareness of being thrown into continual affective transformation and transition, as long as it is an awareness of anything at all. And as self-transforming, the affective basis of ongoing experience is always at the same time a projecting fore-having that anticipates into what surprises or disappoints or depresses it. The world of the depressive that appears unreal, insignificant, irrelevant, un-engaging, is meaningful precisely in its unreality and deficiency as disorienting, confusing, strange, uncanny, un-engageable, numbing. Experience of ongoing deprivation, lack and loss is not the degeneration of the structure of situatedness as projective-thrownness, but situatedness as always a new but at the same time anticipated sense of loss and absence.

Heidegger tells us:

“Dasein in itself is essentially Being-with” “Being-with existentially determines Da-sein even when an other is not factically present and perceived. The being-alone of Da-sein, too, is being-with in the world. The other can be lacking only in and for a being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of being-with, its possibility is a proof for the latter.” When one feels alone in a
crowd, “Their Mitda-sein is encountered in the mode of indifference and being alien. Lacking and "being away" are modes of Mitda-sein...[Being-with-others]”. (Being and Time, p.113)

I want to make clear that the essential issue between Heidegger and Ratcliffe I am attempting to articulate does not rest on whether we deem the nightmarish existential experience of severe depression, as well as other alterations of affective significance, in qualitative vs quantitative terms. After all, Heidegger uses a variety of adjectives (distorted, flattened, blind to itself, led astray, confused, closed off, obscuring, forgetful, deficient) to describe inauthentic modes of Dasein, and their associated moods, which can just as well be interpreted in terms of a lessening of the fluidity of existential movement as they can via a positive qualitative shift in modality of comportment. For instance, Heidegger’s distinction between fundamental anxiety and inauthentic moods can be understood in terms of the degree of openness to self-transforming movement.

The key point here is that however we prefer to characterize the organizational characteristics of mood marking the devastation of depression and other pathologies of world significance, we must understand such variation as taking place within the structure of a primordial situatedness whose essential features are invariant throughout such vicissitudes of mood. Specifically, what remains essential regardless of the severity of states of trauma. melancholia or depersonalization, is the underlying temporal-affective-intentional ‘glue’ of Befindlichkeit. To be radically, irreducibly, primordially situated in a world is to be guaranteed, at every moment, a world that feelingly, creatively impinges on me anew as futural. And it is simultaneously, to feel a belonging (familiarity) to what impinges on me due to the anticipative, projective aspect of temporality. In this way, affectivity as temporality constitutes the essence of the fundamental, irreducibly situated felt significance a world always already has for me, a meaningfulness within whose bounds pathological conditions such as depression appear as modifications, but whose basis they can never undermine.(Heidegger would say that their possibility as deficiencies or privations is proof for the essentiality of Befindlichkeit.).

Such experiences are predicaments within affective situatedness rather than crises of situatedness. The supposed crisis of situatedness which leads to what Ratcliffe calls an impairment and even incompetence in capacity to experience significant meaningfulness (Ratcliffe, forthcoming) only appears as a possibility when one begins from a split between affect and intention. When one instead begins from the self-world hinge that radical temporality instantiates, there can be only existential predicaments, not disorders of situatedness. Since I am always already relevantly involved in a world via thrownness, depression has to do with the kind of relevance I experience, not my capacity or competence to experience it. “Hopelessness, for example, does not tear Da-sein away from its possibilities, but is only an independent mode of being toward these possibilities.”(Heidegger 2010)

Because emotions, moods and feelings are not causal entities, they can be neither adaptive nor maladaptive, neither facilitate salience nor degrade it. Affect doesn’t cause, it temporalizes. This is why, contra Ratcliffe, anxiety doesn’t ‘cause’ alienation. It is instead the attempt to mitigate the loss of coherence that alienating, threatening events portend. Heidegger says inauthentic anxiety is a form of fear, and “fear is a fear of something threatening-of something
that is detrimental to the factual potentiality-of-being of Da-sein” “What is encountered has the relevant nature of harmfullness.” (Being and Time p.313). Thus it is the situation, not the emotion, that is alienating, and anxious attunement is the anticipation of, and incipient comportment away from, an impending event that holds within itself the specter of the alien, the unassimilable and thus the unanticipatable.

For Heidegger the rug cannot be pulled out from under our situated comportment toward the world. That is, there can be no overall loss, erosion or diminishment of mattering and significance, only shifts in where significance finds itself. However, in everyday contexts of interpreting the world in which we are immersed, the horizon of intelligibility by reference to which things are understood as being what and how they are, and through which Dasein’s affective attunement is disclosed to itself, is only minimally modified by what that horizon frames. This leads to a flattening, distorting and concealing of Dasein’s disclosure of possibilities. Throughout his work, Heidegger associates flattened, closed-off, forgetful, alienated, distorted and confused thinking with modes of interpretation and attunement which see the world in terms of co-ordinations among present at hand subjects and objects. Even as one’s world can be made to appear familiar and predictable though such attunements, its very familiarity rests on a sort of self-alienation. As such a model, Ratcliffe’s entire range of descriptions of a self’s sense of belonging to a world, from ensconced familiarity to extreme estrangement, amounts to a self-alienating concealing of the intimate relation between self and world fundamental to Dasein’s authentic attuned self-understanding.

For Heidegger, the sort of concernful mattering that being confidently situated within such a pre-given space of possibilities represents is far from an optimal engagement with experience. Its inadequacies and limitations are precisely due to the fact that the potentialities of change in one’s being in the world are restricted to variations on already given themes. This falling prey to pre-given horizons of intelligibility within the world is what Heidegger calls inauthentic Dasein. He contrasts this mode of existing with authentic being, wherein Dasein turns away from beings in the world, and their already projected horizons of possibility, in order to anticipate new possibilities, “to let the possibility of an authentic potentiality-of-being shine forth.”

Heidegger associates what he calls the mood of primordial or authentic anxiety with this mode of experiencing which has cast off the chains of presuppositions that encumbers and closes off everyday forms of encountering the world. Anxiety reveals Dasein at its creative, world-forming best. Primordial anxiety exposes Dasein to itself in the mode of its greatest possibilities of significance and mattering by perching itself at the very edge of the new, embracing the future in its authentic immediacy. What we learn from the structure of primordial anxiety and the nothing is that the more thoroughgoing and continuous Dasein’s self-transcendence, the richer its experience of meaningfulness and significance. Inauthentic moods like fear and depression hold Dasein back from discovering its very own potentialities of being.

The essence of freedom, which surpasses every particular factic and factual being, its surpassive character, can be seen particularly in despair, where one's own lack of freedom engulfs a Dasein absorbed in itself. This completely factual lack of freedom is itself an elemental testimony to
transcendence, for despair lies in the despairing person's vision of the impossibility of something possible. Such a person still witnesses to the possible, inasmuch as he despairs of it.”(Heidegger, 1984)

“Depression forces Da-sein back to its thrownness, but in such a way that its thrownness is precisely closed off.” (Heidegger 2010)

Authentic anxiety opens up possibilities that fear and depression conceal.

“He who is resolute knows no fear, but understands the possibility of Angst as the mood that does not hinder and confuse him. Angst frees him from "null" possibilities and lets him become free for authentic ones.” (Being and Time)

Why is it that Dasein’s transcendent peering out beyond beings as a whole toward the edge of the new does not constitute an arbitrary, alienating and even despairing gesture? This is because Dasein’s pragmatic ‘for the sake of which’ provides a continuity of situatedness throughout transformation. Dasein continues to recognize itself throughout its displacing disclosure of new possible ways for it to be. This lends to authentic anxiety, and to temporality itself, its peculiarly amalgamated quality of familiarity and foreignness, nihilation and discovery, which Heidegger captures with terms like strangeness, mystery, uncanniness, wonder, astonishment, bliss, joy, entrancement, melancholy and rapture.

“Discoverture’s authentic way of being is uncanniness, while the most common everyday mode of discoverture is concealment.” (Heidegger 2011b)

"Uncanniness is the fundamental kind of being-in-the-world, although it is covered over in everydayness. Tranquillized, familiar being-in-the-world is a mode of the uncanniness of Dasein, not the other way around. Not-being-at-home must be conceived existentially and ontologically as the more primordial phenomenon." "The publicness of the they suppresses everything unfamiliar.” (Heidegger 2010)

“Thus thrown in this throw, man is a transition, transition as the fundamental essence of occurrence...Man is enraptured in this transition and therefore essentially 'absent'. Absent in a fundamental sense-never simply at hand, but absent in his essence, in his essentially being away, removed into essential having been and future-essentially absencing and never at hand, yet existent in his essential absence. Transposed into the possible, he must constantly be mistaken concerning what is actual. And only because he is thus mistaken and transposed can he become seized by terror. And only where there is the perilousness of being seized by terror do we find the bliss of astonishment -being torn away in that wakeful manner that is the breath of all philosophizing.” (Heidegger 1995)

Believing that significance and salience are functions of reinforcing present-at-hand bodily states, Ratcliffe(2012b) misreads primordial anxiety’s deconstruction of objectively present states as a crisis of relevance.
“...in anxiety, all practical significance falls away and what we previously took for granted becomes salient in its absence....and thus amenable to phenomenological reflection when it is lost or distorted.” Ratcliffe(2012b) concludes that the structure of Heidegger’s primordial anxiety “is very similar to that of depression”(p.172), which he characterizes in terms of a degradation of the salience and meaningfulness of objects and subjects in the world.

For Heidegger, however, authentic anxiety is anything but a despairing degradation of meaningfulness. On the contrary, Heidegger(1995) explains that in authentic anxiety “there is not even anything enticing about beings any more” because, in a moment of vision, Dasein has become entranced by the authentically perceived temporal horizon.

“Dasein as such can no longer go along with them [beings] only if it is entranced as Da-sein, and indeed as a whole. What entrances is nothing other than the temporal horizon....The moment of vision which properly makes Dasein possible is simultaneously announced in this telling refusal of beings as a whole.”

The paradox of Heidegger’s radically temporal thinking is that it enacts a carrying-forward which re-invents its direction, sense and past every moment, beyond conscious control, without rending the intimate fabric of its anticipative continuity. Heideggerian attunement exposes a relentless global self and world-transformational mobility within every moment of, but invisible to, Ratcliffe’s supposed schematic existential states, and at the same time imparts to our ongoing world situatedness an irreducible integrity, intimacy and relevance which no pathology can undermine.

Gendlin’s Model of Temporality: Occurring Into Implying

My attempt at a direct comparison between Ratcliffe’s embodied approach and Heidegger’s ontological project has been somewhat hampered by the fact that Heidegger made little reference in his work to the status and role of the body in relation to situatedness and affectivity. It may be helpful, then, to turn to Eugene Gendlin’s process model. Like Ratcliffe’s existential feeling, Gendlin’s approach offers an account of embodied affect that engages with empirical descriptions. But Gendlin rejects Ratcliffe’s reciprocally causal conditioning model of the body, and its reliance on conventional notions of time, in favor of a reading of Heideggerian temporality consonant with the one I have been advancing in this paper. In various writings, he distinguishes his Heideggerian account of affective situatedness from phenomenologically-influenced causal interactionist readings such as those of Gallagher, Varela, Fuchs and Sheets-Johnstone (See Gendlin 2008, 2012). Gendlin’s notion of felt sensing articulates bodily feeling, and embodied meaning, as an organized totality whose motivational principle is not that of an interactional causality between feeling and knowing states, but a crossing of past and present reminiscent of Heideggerian temporality.

As Gendlin(1997b) argues,

“...The continuity of time cannot first be made by things next to each other, because such a
continuity is passive; each bit is alone, and must depend on some other continuity to relate it to what is next to it..."(p.71). For instance, fresh intentional experience does not simply sit alongside a prior context; it explicates the immediate past [Gendlin characterizes this past as an implicatory whole].

In Ratcliffe’s model, interaction spreads in a reciprocally causal fashion from point to point, whereas for Gendlin, each point somehow implies each other point; each part of a meaning organization somehow “knows about”, belongs to and depends intrinsically on each other part. And this happens before a part can simply be said to exist in itself (even if just for an instant). What kind of odd understanding concerning the interface between identity and relation could justify Gendlin's insistence that the inter-affection between parts of a psychological organization precedes the existence of individual entities?

Gendlin(1997b) explains:

In the old model one assumes that there must first be "it" as one unit, separate from how its effects in turn affect it... In the process we are looking at there is no separate "it," no linear cause-effect sequence with "it" coming before its effects determine what happens. So there is something odd here, about the time sequence. How can "it" be already affected by affecting something, If it did not do the affecting before it is in turn affected?... With the old assumption of fixed units that retain their identity, one assumes a division between it, and its effects on others. (This "it" might be a part, a process, or a difference made.) In the old model it is only later, that the difference made to other units can in turn affect "it." (p.40)

Addressing causally interaffecting organizational models like Ratcliffe’s, Gendlin explains:

If one assumes separate events, processes, or systems, one must then add their co-ordinations as one finds them, as if unexpectedly... “Inter-affecting” and ”coordination” are words that bring the old assumption of a simple multiplicity, things that exist as themselves and are only then also related. So we need a phrase that does not make sense in that old way. Let us call the pattern we have been formulating "original inter-affecting". This makes sense only if one grasps that "they" inter-affect each other before they are a they(p.22).

The integral nature of inter-affecting is such that even the most subordinate event within an overarching framework of intelligibility and attunement alters at once, and in a functionally unified manner, the framework as a whole. This bodily totality, which Gendlin calls the implicit understanding, can by certain means be experienced as a directly sensed feeling. In the act of having a felt sense of one’s implicit understanding as a whole, one productively shifts the meaning of this integrated frame, thereby opening up new creative possibilities for interpreting one’s world. By contrast, in everyday circumstances one does not typically access the implicit understanding as a whole, but rather attends to only a subordinate aspect of one’s experiencing.

Let me call attention to the similarities between these two forms of attention and Heidegger’s distinction between authentic and inauthentic modes of experience. In particular, I want to emphasize the importance of the fact that for both Gendlin and Heidegger, whether the nature
of one’s engagement with the world involves an authentic, wholistic transformation of one’s
global disposition or is restricted to a disclosure of entities within the ‘pre-existing’ frame, in
both cases the entire frame has already been interaffected and thus renewed (in the second case
it remains the same differently) alongside the subordinate events it makes possible.

“What happens remakes "all" parts and differences.” “The single occurring includes all the
differences, and the differences made to each other by these differences, and again by the
differences they make. Occurring is an interaffecting of everything by everything.”(Gendlin 1997b)

Gendlin founds his concept of feeling in a novel model of body-environment interaction
grounded in this radical inter-affecting. He asks

“How does the organism ‘select and interpret’ what is relevant to it? Selection and interpretation
would not be necessary if by ‘environment’ we meant the organism’s own which it actively
participates in generating. Recently some authors speak of organism and environment as mutually
causing each other” (Gallagher, 2007)

Gendlin digs beneath such causative approaches to locate a more fundamental notion of
interaction. “This ‘interaction’ is prior to two separate things that would first meet in order to
implying into occurring, and in this way carrying forward a previous change.

“Implying is not an occurring that will happen. It is not an occurring-not-yet. It does not occupy a
different time-position than the occurring. Rather, one implying encompasses all three linear time
positions, and does not occupy an additional linear time position of its own. (See A Process
Model, IVB. This is a more intricate model of time. It includes a kind of “future” and a kind of
“past” that are not linear positions. This time model can be reduced back to the liner model by
considering just occurring-occurring-occurring as if it were cut off from implying.”

“We feel the change made by the actual environment occurring into the body's implied behavior
context. The feedback occurs into the implying which carries the sequence forward into further
implying and occurring, as our little model says. Behavior forms only as perceptions and feelings
of this kind.”

Feeling is a change made in an implicit mesh of intercorrelated understandings.

“A bodily felt sense is a crossing of the relevant facets” of a situation, a change made that carries
forward...in the bodily implying all perceptions and cognitions may function implicitly.”

Concepts like ‘interaction first’, ‘already interaffected’, and occurring into implying share
features with Husserl’s associative synthesis, in particular the belonging of new sense to what it
occurs into via dimensions of commonality and likeness. It also shares features with
Heidegger’s concernful dealing with entities oriented in relation to a pragmatic totality of
relevance. Relevance is not imposed on an experience from the outside via a bodily feeling
state, but is presupposed by the always already self-differentiating movement of experience.
A process is a relevanting. This verb says both that a process occurs relevantly, and that the relevance is made by the process. What occurs makes itself relevant. So we cannot use relevance as if it were on another level from which one can pre-determine what will occur.” Gendlin’s occurring into implying process, like Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit, guarantees that the relevance, significance, mattering, salience of experience is never in question, even in the midst of the most severe depression. “Irrelevant events are not produced by the body” (Gendlin 1997b)

Since relevance is already presupposed by the structure of implying-occurring fundamental to all living processes, and this in turn is grounded in the structure of temporality, Gendlin does not need to draw upon affect as a motivational conditioning agent supplying events with, or depriving them of, salience, enticement and allure. Gendlin’s organizational principle of radical interaffecting, made possible by his Heideggerian approach to temporality, exposes the concept of states, dispositions, and causal interactions between felt and intentional factors founding Ratcliffe’s model as an abstraction derived from a more primary, intricate and intimate process in which feelings and intentions, like Heidegger’s attunement and understanding, are equi-primordial rather than one being causally oriented by the other. According to Ratcliffe, intentional states (propositional beliefs, cognitive schemata) are framed and given their significance by a global possibility space, but function within their own bounds via the logic of causal association. For Gendlin, by contrast, cognition and propositional belief are not simply a ‘being about something’, directedness toward or an aiming at an object, but transform and enrich what they ‘represent’, creatively altering their sense.

“Supposedly cognizing the “external” things does not change them. Cognizing is only about them. This “only about” assumes that our cognition does not change the behavior context, the situation including what our scientific work is about. But I will argue that it does change the behavior space...It has not been clear how cognition is a bodily process. “Only about” has meant that cognition happens in representations.”

“Words go beyond their regular meaning. Regularly they appear to carry forward only their own standard discursive context. But they are and do more than that. They come as a body process in its detour as behavior context, now further detoured as “only about.” (Gendlin 2008)

The bodily process that effectuates change in behavior space possibilities, as we have seen, is not a causally conditioning schematics, but the occurring into implying of language and thought into an already inter-affected mesh of implicit understandings which is modified further by what occurs into it. “To feel something as an inner object is a change...not just a representation; feeling something makes a change in it.” (Gendlin 1991)

Gendlin’s (1997b) occurring into implying echoes Heidegger’s unification of the components of time.

“The future that is present now is not a time-position, not what will be past later. The future that is here now is the implying that is here now. The past is not an earlier position but the now implicitly functioning past.”.....the past functions to “interpret” the present,...the past is changed by so functioning. This needs to be put even more strongly: The past functions not as itself, but as already
In comparing Gendlin’s and Heidegger’s models of time with Ratcliffe’s, we see that Ratcliffe splits temporality into three separated time positions. Heideggerian Care is “the way that we are anchored in the past (facticity), situated in the present (fallenness) and forever looking to the future (projection)” (Ratcliffe (2002)

In this way of thinking, an object of experience is a temporary presence that occupies a time position. As objective presence, it persists, or endures, as itself. The sophisticated brand of reciprocal causality that I have attributed to Ratcliffe turns on this formulation of time as the modal changes of a self-present object.

Footnote: Slaby refers to his model of affect as ‘radical situatedness’ and yet shares Ratcliffe’s traditional, inauthentic understanding of affective temporality as causal dispositional state taking place in time, which is to say that, contrary to Heideggerian temporality, for Slaby time is divided into separate phases: the present as what is happening now, the future as what is not yet now, and the past as what is no longer now.

Slaby(2017) says factual situatedness

“is situatedness in a place and a time, synchronic and diachronic”. “Affectivity ultimately is time, namely the factual past in the form of sedimented remainders that infuse, burden, and potentially suffocate ongoing comportment.” “The existential task of affective disclosure is circumscribed by this essential tension: A tension between what is already apprehended, articulated, and made sense of, and what is furthermore “out there,” beyond us, yet weighing on us and determining our situation in unforeseeable ways.”

For Gendlin and Heidegger, affectivity is neither a separate past that burdens the present nor a generator of future possibilities as a hypothetical present that has not happened yet. Instead, it encompasses all three temporal ecstasies as the way in which I find myself changed.

“The being-possible, which Da-sein always is existentially, is ... distinguished from empty, logical possibility and from the contingency of something objectively present, where this or that can "happen" to it. As a modal category of objective presence, possibility means what is not yet real and not always necessary. It characterizes what is only possible. Ontologically, it is less than reality and necessity. “(Being and Time p.135)

**Conclusion:**
I have argued in this paper that affective and intentional situatedness, understood by Ratcliffe as globally patterned inter-causal states (existential feeling), functions as a structure of entrenchment and self-conservation, inhering in itself and resisting its own transformation. A global change in bodily feeling is thus required to infuse supposedly stagnant affective-intentional narratives with a new direction and meaning, disrupt entrenched patterns, dissolve the conditioning glue holding them together, reveal their contingency and open up new possibilities. Ratcliffe sees the role of Husserl’s transcendental reduction and Heidegger’s primordial anxiety as such disrupters. I have claimed, instead, that rather than a contingent island of static structure in a sea of indeterminacy, an affective - intentional attunement is the essence of temporal becoming as self-transformative dynamic, hiding within the supposedly static moment of Ratcliffe’s existential feeling state. The role of Husserl’s epoche and Heidegger’s authentic anxiety is to reveal this intimate, intricate foreign-familiar binary of movement concealed within naive naturalized models of psychological functioning. If the purpose of the epoche and primordial anxiety is, as Ratcliffe says, to bring us face to face with indeterminacy, then it is not an indeterminacy outside of, before, after, or surrounding stable structures of situatedness, but rather an indeterminacy at the core of those structures themselves. But Befindlichkeit at the same time evinces a radical self-belonging and irreducible world-connectedness obscured by and undiscoverable when thought in terms of Ratcliffe’s schematisms.

In failing to ground affective experience in radical temporality, Ratcliffe’s conception of mood as causally configured state renders his approach an outsider’s view. By the time Ratcliffe has noticed what he calls a shift in mood, an intricate process of change of felt meaning has already taken place, both within thematically harmonious and confused temporally unfolding episodes of affective experience. Not recognizing this fundamental co-dependence between transitivity and identity leads to reification of each pole of experience. If dispositions to act and acts themselves, being and becoming, feeling and intention, state and transition can be treated as separate moments, then their relations are rendered secondary and arbitrary, requiring causations and glues to piece them together.

Ratcliffe writes: “This default ‘style’ (minimal self) of anticipation is not specific to any particular life-structure, any particular configuration of cares, concerns, commitments, projects, and pastimes. It is, if you like, the glue needed to hold any such structure together, any kind of world.”(Trauma, Language and Trust, forthcoming)

The glue that holds together Ratcliffe’s minimal self, interaffecting causation, is a secondary concept of organization, a naturalized abstraction derived from the primary temporal structuration of affectivity-connexion.

What DeJaegher, critiquing Gallagher’s primary intersubjectivity account, writes in that narrower context, could apply to Ratcliffe’s general orientation; “first we carve nature up at artificial joints – we split mind and body apart – and then we need to fasten the two together again, a task for which the notion of embodiment is, according to Sheets-Johnstone’s assessment, used as a kind of glue. But glueing the two back together does not bring back the original ‘integrity and
nature of the whole” (De Jaegher 2009, Sheets-Johnstone, in press). Unlike first generation cognitivisms, Ratcliffe begins from interaction, but an interaction that is grounded in separated moments of subject and object, feeling and intention, being and becoming, time and stasis.

The radically temporal account of affect introduced by Husserl and transformed in different ways by Merleau-Ponty, Gendlin and Heidegger, implies a rejection of two long-standing assumptions supporting the depiction of affect and cognition as distinct states. Contrary to these assumptions:

1) Intentional experience does not need to be pushed or pulled into action, or change of direction, by extrinsic reinforcement contingencies. Every moment of experience is already intrinsically affective (qualitatively self-displacing), assuring that even the most apparently non-emotive, ‘rational’, reflective type of awareness, such as supposedly characterizes affectively neutral empirical accounts, qualitatively, intuitively, hedonically transforms the meaning of what it references. Feelings belong to, operate within, carry forward, and transform what are called conceptual meanings. This qualitatively transformative effect in moment to moment experience is often subtle enough to go unnoticed, explaining the apparent analytical stability and inter-subjective objectivity attributed to empirical phenomena, the allegedly self-perpetuating coherence of linguistic narratives, and even the illusion of a stable ongoing pre-reflective self-awareness, minimal self or reflexive ‘feeling of being’.

2) ‘Raw’ affect is intrinsically intentional. So-called bodily sensations of feeling not only manifest the characteristics of metaphoricity and narrative consistency traditionally associated with conceptual thought, but in fact are not categorically distinguishable from what has been called conceptual meaning in any stable way.

Prior to any notion of cognition and affect as distinguishable constructs, within and beyond such terms as cognitive states and bodily affective signs, lies a universe of self-exceeding senses, modulations, aspects, variations, ways of working. Not variations or modulations of STATES but modulations of modulations.

If feeling, understood this new way, IS the very core of so-called conceptual and perceptual thought, merging narrative-thematic consistency and global self-transformation, the subjective and the objective, the felt and the understood, in the same gesture, then the presumed partial independence of rationality and affect vanishes, and the distinction re-emerges as aspects inherent in each event. The inter-affecting of context and novelty which defines an event simultaneously produces a fresh, particular modulation of change (empirical aspect) and a unique momentum (hedonic component) of self-transformation. From this vantage, the valuative, hedonic (the perceived goodness or badness of things), aesthetic aspect of experience, underlying ‘non-emotional’ appraisals as well as our sadnesses, fears and joys, simply IS our vicissitudes of momentum of sense-making through situations, rather than arising from causal feedback loops. Affective valences are contractions and expansions, coherences and incoherences, accelerations and regressions, consonances and dissonances, expressing how intimately and harmoniously we
are able to anticipate and relate to, and thus how densely, richly, intensely we are able to move through, new experience. If we can believe that a unique qualitative moment of momentum, ranging from the confused paralysis of unintelligibility to the exhilaration of dense transformative movement, is intrinsic to ALL events, then perhaps there is no need to attribute the origin of aesthetic pleasures and pains to the functioning of a limited class of entities like bodily affects, even if it is understandable why this kind of assumption has survived for so long in psychology.

From the standpoint of verbal expressivity, what has traditionally been called emotion often appears to be a minimalist art, because it is the situational momentum of experiencing slowing or accelerating so rapidly that feelings seem to distill meaning down to a bare inarticulate essence. When the momentum of our reflective thought shifts in such dramatic ways (acceleratively enriched in joyful comprehension, impoverished in grief, ambivalent in fear, alternately disappointed and confident in anger), such so-called emotional events may appear to be a species apart from conceptual reason, a blind intuitive force (surge, glow, twinge, sensation, arousal, energy) invading, conditioning and orienting perceptual and conceptual thought from without as a background field. It is said that such ‘raw’ or primitive feeling is bodily-physiological, pre-reflective and non-conceptual, contentless hedonic valuation, innate, passive, something we are overcome by. At other times, situational change may be intermediate, just modulated and gradual enough that content seems to perpetuate itself in self-cohering narratives. Such situations have been called rational, voluntary, factual, reflective, stable, conceptual, propositional, rational, logical, theoretical, non-aesthetic. However, as I have said, these dichotomies: hedonic versus reflective, voluntary versus involuntary, conceptual versus pre-reflective bodily-affective, are not effectively understood as reciprocally causal innate or learned associations between perceptions and body states; they are relative variations in the momentum of a contextually unfolding process which is always, at the same time, intentional and affective.

Am I suggesting that emotion be thought as a ‘cognitive’ appraisal, cut off from bodily sensation, movement and expression? On the contrary, it is precisely the treatment of cognition, bodily sensation and expression as separately pre-existing processes (even when treated as mutually structuring each other via ‘intentional-affective’ syntheses) which I am questioning. The point isn’t that bodily responses to experience via such avenues as the endocrine, autonomic nervous system and the motor pathways are irrelevant or peripheral to the intentional experience of emotion, feeling and mood, but that, whether we talking about the experience of so-called conceptual appraisal or bodily sensation, the phenomenological scene of affect (or any other aspect of bio-psycho-social functioning) does not depend on an arbitrary concatenation or mutual conditioning between discrete components. Prinz (2004), Colombetti and Thompson (2006), Damasio (1999) and others deny such a thing as a totally disembodied emotion, arguing that the feeling of emotion is affected in degrees concordantly with the severity of damage to avenues of connection with the body. I support their larger claim that experiential processes, including what are called cognitive and affective, function as radically, contextually inter-relational. However, I want to turn their views around a bit. Feeling does not depend on the fact that the brain, as a spatial locale and repository of temporary states of content, always has some access to the body, as a separate locale with semi-independent contents.
I have said that feeling functions from within so-called reflective thought, and that bodily affect is intentional. But if both the former and latter are true, it is not because body sensation structures cognition (or vice-versa). Rather, it is because these stratifying abstractions are but inadequately formulated moments of a process of sense-making uniting the hedonic and the intentional prior to any distinction between, or intertwining of, mind and body. Before I could speak of the occurrence of emotion as mental appraisals structured and conditioned by a background field of physiological energetics and behavioral expressions, I would have to re-figure all of these modes, what would be referred to as the “motoric”, the “sensate”, the “cognitive”, as unstable metaphorical figures emerging contextually out of each other over the course of an indissociably intentive-affective global movement of experience which would imply the unraveling of the basis of categorical distinctions currently orienting the understanding of these terms.

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Time as Relevance: Gendlin’s Phenomenology of Radical Temporality

Abstract:

In this paper, I discuss Eugene Gendlin’s contribution to radically temporal discourse, situating it in relation to Husserl and Heidegger’s analyses of time, and contrasting it with a range of interlinked approaches in philosophy and psychology that draw inspiration from, but fall short in their interpretation of the phenomenological work of Husserl and Heidegger. Gendlin reveals the shortcomings of these approaches with regard to the understanding of the relation between affect, motivation and intention, attention, reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness, the basis of mathematical naturalism and sensori-motor models of behavior, and the relation between the body, language and culture. Gendlin traces the weaknesses of these approaches in the above areas to the way these perspectives construe time.

Introduction:

As a philosopher and practicing psychotherapist, Eugene Gendlin made significant contributions to scholarship in both disciplines over the course of six decades. However, due to the success of such works as ‘Focusing’ and ‘How to Interpret Your Dreams’, he may be more widely known today for his innovative psychotherapeutic techniques than for his philosophical ideas. In fact, the association of Gendlin’s name with the practice of tuning into bodily felt meaning may have overshadowed his work in philosophy to such an extent that in the eyes of many academics Gendlin’s entire project might amount to little more than an idiosyncratic variation within the larger field of phenomenologically informed embodied cognition.

In this paper, I gather together evidence from the breadth of Gendlin’s philosophical writings disputing such a conventional reading of his work. I argue instead that his thinking calls into question fundamental assumptions grounding many of the current approaches in embodied cognitive psychology as well as phenomenology. In previous writings I have elucidated what I call the radically temporal approach to philosophy. I have articulated the varying ways that radical temporality manifests itself in the phenomenological perspectives of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger and in Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive project.

In what follows, I discuss Eugene Gendlin’s contribution to radically temporal discourse, situating it in relation to Husserl and Heidegger’s analyses of time, and contrasting it with a range of interlinked approaches in philosophy and psychology that draw inspiration from, but fall short in their interpretation of the phenomenological work of Husserl and Heidegger.
Incorporating Gendlin’s own critiques of their work, I will show that these authors’ accounts of attention and behavior, and their integration of affect and intentionality remain burdened by traditional presuppositions of time, objectivity and causality that radical temporality puts into question. I will begin with a discussion of interpretations of Husserlian time by representatives of current approaches. I will then contrast these approaches with Gendlin’s model of time, fleshing out the argument with a discussion of the parallels between his thinking on time and Husserl and Heidegger. Finally, I will unfold the implications of Gendlin’s radical temporality for the understanding of mathematical objectivity, attention, reflection, affectivity and intersubjectivity.

(Footnote: Among the authors whose work Gendlin has submitted to critique from the radically temporal perspective are: Francisco Varela, Shaun Gallagher, Alva Noe, Damasio, Dan Zahavi and Thomas Fuchs.)

**Clock Time and Dynamically Reciprocal Time:**

Modern phenomenology got its start with Husserl’s assertion that stripping away the layers of historically acquired philosophical and scientific dogma via the reduction, in order to get to ‘the things themselves’, reveals to us an irreducible primitive of immediate present experience. But rather than this primitive subsisting in an objectively present ‘now’ point appearing once before being replaced by another in an infinite series of past and future punctual ‘nows’, Husserl proposed the ‘now’ as a tripartite structure composed of a retentional, primal impression and protentional phase. In doing so, he replaced a temporality justifying objective causation with the temporality of the intentional act. Events don’t appear anonymously as what they are in themselves, they appear to someone, are about something, and reach out (protend) beyond their immediate sense.

For Husserl, the way that we experience a present event is always a complex relating process weaving together past, present and future in an indissociable unity. Influenced by Husserl’s analysis of time, a number of current authors give priority to a personalistic over a naturalistic thinking, incorporating aspects of Husserl’s time consciousness in their readings of phenomenology. Varela and Thompson reject the claim that scientific objectivity presupposes a belief in an observer independent reality. Evan Thompson (2001) writes:

“Another way to make this point, one which is phenomenological, but also resonates with William James’ thought (see Taylor, 1996), is to assert the primacy of the personalistic perspective over the naturalistic perspective. By this I mean that our relating to the world, including when we do science, always takes place within a matrix whose fundamental structure is I-You-It (this is reflected in linguistic communication: I am speaking to You about It) (Patocka, 1998, pp. 9–10).”

Ratcliffe (2002) says:
“The unquestioned givenness of the objective world that is constitutive of scientific descriptions cannot capture the way in which the given is disclosed by a meaning-giving background. Thus, if anything, it is the transcendental, meaning-giving account that has ontological priority over an objective/causal description.”

Zahavi (2008) concurs with Thompson, Varela and Ratcliffe:

“Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned.”

All these writers support a mutual enlightenment between phenomenology and scientific naturalism, but there is disagreement over what this entails; whether, for example, the phenomenological should be given priority over the natural. Varela, Thompson, Depraz, Gallagher and Fuchs all believe that phenomenology can be naturalized in the direction of a mathematization of Husserl’s account of time consciousness.

Varela writes:

“It is our general contention indeed... that phenomenological descriptions of any kind can only be naturalized, in the sense of being integrated into the general framework of natural sciences, if they can be mathematized.” (Zahavi 2004b)

Gallagher (2011) elaborates:

“A number of theorists have proposed to capture the subpersonal processes that would instantiate this Husserlian model [of time] by using a dynamical systems approach (Thompson 2007; van Gelder 1996; Varela 1999). On this view, action and our consciousness of action arise through the concurrent participation of distributed regions of the brain and their sensorimotor embodiment (Varela et al. 2001).”

Thompson (2007) says:

“The present moment manifests as a zone or span of actuality, instead of as an instantaneous flash, thanks to the way our consciousness is structured. As we will see later, the present moment also manifests this way because of the nonlinear dynamics of brain activity. Weaving together these two types of analysis, the phenomenological and neuro biological, in order to bridge the gap between subjective experience and biology, defines the aim of neuro-phenomenology (Varela 1996), an offshoot of the enactive approach.

Varela’s attempt to ‘phenomenologize’ empirical accounts of time consciousness involves rejecting time as a fixed linear sequence of nows (what Husserl calls clock time):
“In fact, we have inherited from classical physics a notion of time as an arrow of infinitesimal moments, which flows in a constant stream. It is based on sequences of finite or infinitesimal elements, which are even reversible for a large part of physics. This view of time is entirely homologous to that developed by the modern theory of computation. […] This strict adherence to a computational scheme will be, in fact, one of the research frameworks that needs to be abandoned as a result of the neuro-phenomenological examination proposed here.”

“The traditional sequentialistic idea is anchored in a framework in which the computer metaphor is central, with its associated idea that information flows up-stream. Here, in contrast, I emphasize a strong dominance of dynamical network properties where sequentiality is replaced by reciprocal determination and relaxation time.” (Varela 1997)

Varela(1997) offers a concept of duration that is independent of linear time:

“…time in experience is quite a different story from a clock in linear time. Thus, we have neuronal-level constitutive events that have a duration on the 1/10-scale, forming aggregates that manifest as incompressible but complete cognitive acts on the 1-scale. This completion time is dynamically dependent on a number of dispersed assemblies and not a fixed integration period, in other words it is the basis of the origin of duration without an external or internally ticking clock.”

“the fact that an assembly of coupled oscillators attains a transient synchrony and that it takes a certain time for doing so is the explicit correlate of the origin of nowness.”

Ratcliffe(2013) disagrees with Varela’a project of mathematicizing phenomenology.

“…Roy, Petitot, Pachoud and Varela insist that fruitful interaction between phenomenology and science ultimately requires naturalisation of the former, ‘even though Husserl himself strongly opposed naturalism’, where naturalisation is understood as integration ‘into an explanatory framework where every acceptable property is made continuous with the properties admitted by the natural sciences.”

Ratcliffe believes something is missing from empirical naturalism and that something is the personalistically situated grounding of empirical data. There may be legitimate differences between Ratcliffe and Varela on the relation between naturalism and phenomenology, and I do believe Ratcliffe’s approach exposes the limitations of various forms of objective naturalism. But I also maintain that, rather than abandoning a causal motivational grounding entirely, Ratcliffe has instead replaced it with a more sophisticated brand of causality. There are a number of perspectives within the larger phenomenological philosophical community which are compatible with current embodied motivational accounts (Stein, Scheler, Henry) but my position is that for Gendlin, Husserl and Heidegger, such thinking retains remnants of naturalist naïveté, or, as Husserl puts it, “falls a victim to the inconsistency of a transcendental philosophy that stays within the natural realm.”

Common to the approaches I am critiquing is an interactive concatenating schematics consisting of reciprocally causal innate and learned associations between perceptions and body states. Unlike more traditional empirical approaches, such reciprocal models do not ground causation in a
universal lawfulness, but instead determine the nature of causation in relation to the contextual functioning of local systems. At the same time, they inherit from the tradition a temporal thinking according to which an object of experience inheres as a temporary presence that occupies a time position. As objective presence, it persists, or endures, as itself (even if only extremely briefly or even instantaneously). The sophisticated brand of reciprocal causality that I have attributed to Ratcliffe et al turns on this formulation of time as the modal changes of a temporarily self-present object. The analyses of Husserl, Heidegger and Gendlin uncover an indissociable link between the extended, enduring object which natural causality presumes, and the mathematical. From this vantage, even those approaches, such as Ratcliffe’s, that reject attempts to mathematicize phenomenological insights begin from the same idealization of time that makes mathematical naturalism possible.

Gendlin’s Model of Time: Occurring into Implying

In various writings, Gendlin distinguishes his Heideggerian account of time from phenomenologically-influenced causal interactionist readings such as those of Gallagher, Varela, Fuchs and Sheets-Johnstone (See Gendlin 2008, 2012).

“I propose an expanded model of time. Time does not consist only of nows.” Linear time consists merely of positions on an observer's time line. The positions are supposed to be external and independent of what happens. Linear time is an empty frame.” “The linear unit model of successive self-identical times is generated from the more intricate model of time.” (Gendlin 2012)

As Gendlin (1997b) argues,

‘The continuity of time cannot first be made by things next to each other, because such a continuity is passive; each bit IS alone, and must depend on some other continuity to relate it to what is next to it...” (p.71).

Based on their efforts to integrate Husserlian time consciousness with neurological models, the researchers I discussed above may believe that in replacing a sequentially linear time with a reciprocally causal dynamical time, they have arrived at the sort of intricate, personalistic time that Gendlin is advocating for. However, there remain important differences. In embodied cognitive models, interaction spreads in a reciprocally causal fashion from point to point, whereas for Gendlin, each point somehow implies each other point; each part of a meaning organization somehow “knows about”, belongs to and depends intrinsically on each other part. And this happens before a part can simply be said to exist in itself (even if just for an instant). What kind of odd understanding concerning the interface between identity and relation could justify Gendlin's insistence that the inter-affection between parts of a psychological organization precedes the existence of individual entities?

Gendlin (1997b) explains:

In the old model one assumes that there must first be "it" as one unit, separate from how its effects in
turn affect it. In the process we are looking at there is no separate "it," no linear cause-effect sequence with "it" coming before its effects determine what happens. So there is something odd here, about the time sequence. How can "it" be already affected by affecting something, if it did not do the affecting before it is in turn affected?...With the old assumption of fixed units that retain their identity, one assumes a division between it, and its effects on others. (This "it" might be a part, a process, or a difference made.) In the old model it is only later, that the difference made to other units can in turn affect "it." (p.40)

Addressing causally interaffecting organizational models, Gendlin says:

If one assumes separate events, processes, or systems, one must then add their co-ordinations as one finds them, as if unexpectedly...“Inter-affecting" and "coordination" are words that bring the old assumption of a simple multiplicity, things that exist as themselves and are only then also related. So we need a phrase that does not make sense in that old way. Let us call the pattern we have been formulating "original inter-affecting". This makes sense only if one grasps that "they" inter-affect each other before they are a they(p.22).

Gendlin digs beneath such causative approaches to locate a more fundamental notion of interaction. “This ‘interaction’ is prior to two separate things that would first meet in order to interact. I call it ‘interaction first’.” ‘Interaction first’ functions as what Gendlin(2008) calls implying into occurring, and in this way carrying forward a previous change.

“Here we chose to put occurring and implying first in our model, and we will derive perception and objects from these. We put occurring into implying (carrying forward) at the start, and these will inhere in all the other terms. Space, time, and perception are derivative from them. The body and its environment as one interaction is prior in our model. From this we can derive separate individual things and units.”

“Implying has (makes, brings, is ..... ) time, but not only the linear merely positional time. Though far from clear (we are only beginning), we want the sequence to define time for us. We did not begin with a clear notion of time. Let us say that the relation between occurring and implying generates time, rather than saying that life processes go on in time. (The latter statement would involve an already assumed time.)”

“Implying is not an occurring that will happen. It is not an occurring-not-yet. It does not occupy a different time-position than the occurring. Rather, one implying encompasses all three linear time positions, and does not occupy an additional linear time position of its own. (See A Process Model, IVB. This is a more intricate model of time. It includes a kind of “future” and a kind of “past” that are not linear positions. This time model can be reduced back to the linear model by considering just occurring-occurring-occurring as if it were cut off from implying.”

Comparing Gendlin’s model of temporality with Heidegger’s, we see that for Heidegger also, the past, present and future don’t operate as sequential modes which mark distinct states of objects. They interpenetrate each other so completely that they together form a single unitary event of occurrence.

“Because my being is such that I am out ahead of myself, I must, in order to understand something I
encounter, come back from this being-out-ahead to the thing I encounter. Here we can already see an immanent structure of direct understanding qua as-structured comportment [my experience of something ‘as’ something], and on closer analysis it turns out to be time. And this being-ahead-of-myself as a returning is a peculiar kind of movement that time itself constantly makes, if I may put it this way.”(Heidegger 2010b)

The returning from a totality of relevance in the act of understanding something constitutes temporality not as a present object happening IN time but as temporalization.

“Temporalizing does not mean a "succession" of the ecstasies. The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present. “Dasein "occurs out of its future"."Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general." Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future that has-been (or better, is in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself. We call the unified phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having-been temporality.”(Heidegger 2010)

Gendlin(1997b) echoes Heidegger’s unification of the components of time.

“The future that is present now is not a time-position, not what will be past later. The future that is here now is the implying that is here now. The past is not an earlier position but the now implicitly functioning past.”“......the past functions to "interpret" the present,...the past is changed by so functioning. This needs to be put even more strongly: The past functions not as itself, but as already changed by what it functions in”(p.37)

Original inter-affecting differs from reciprocal causation in virtue of the fact that a prior element is already changed (affected) by what it interacts with before it can simply inhere in itself as cause. Whereas “in the old model it is only later, that the difference made to other units can in turn affect “it””, the fact of its being already affected in serving as the past of that present element with which it interacts deprives both past and present poles of the interaction a separate identity. Rather than there being first one element followed by its effect on a second element (‘caused’ by the first), there is only a single event of crossing simultaneously determining past and present in their interaction. Past and present “function as already cross-affected by the other. Each is determined by, and also determines the other.”(Gendlin 1995)

In comparing Gendlin’s and Heidegger’s models of time with the embodied versions of it discussed earlier in this paper, we see that others split temporality into three separated time positions. For instance, Ratcliffe says Heideggerian Care is “the way that we are anchored in the past (facticity), situated in the present (fallenness) and forever looking to the future (projection)” (Ratcliffe (2002). Ratcliffe says “The experience of significant possibilities being actualized... characterizes the transition from future to present to past...”

For Gendlin and Heidegger, the actualization of significance doesn’t take place and time as the transition from one discrete time position to the next (future to present to past), it temporalizes as a single unified event of occurring. Slaby refers to his model of affect as ‘radical situatedness’ and yet shares Ratcliffe’s traditional, inauthentic understanding of affective temporality as causal
dispositional state taking place in time, which is to say that, contrary to Heideggerian temporality, for Slaby time is divided into separate phases: the present as what is happening now, the future as what is not yet now, and the past as what is no longer now.

Slaby(2017) says factual situatedness

“is situatedness in a place and a time, synchronic and diachronic”. “Affectivity ultimately is time, namely the factual past in the form of sedimented remainders that infuse, burden, and potentially suffocate ongoing comportment.” “The existential task of affective disclosure is circumscribed by this essential tension: A tension between what is already apprehended, articulated, and made sense of, and what is furthermore “out there,” beyond us, yet weighing on us and determining our situation in unforeseeable ways.”

For Heidegger, affectivity is neither a separate past that burdens the present nor a generator of future possibilities as a hypothetical present that has not happened yet. Instead, it encompasses all three temporal ecstasies as the way in which I find myself changed.

“The being-possible, which Da-sein always is existentially, is ... distinguished from empty, logical possibility and from the contingency of something objectively present, where this or that can "happen" to it. As a modal category of objective presence, possibility means what is not yet real and not always necessary. It characterizes what is only possible. Ontologically, it is less than reality and necessity. “(Being and Time p.135)

The above writers follow Husserl's method of reduction up to a point, stripping away acquired concepts associated with a naive belief in the independence of subject and object from each other. They don't complete the reduction though, allowing subject and object to occupy separate moments. They have succeeded in reducing materialist physicalism to fundamental co-dependency, but still find it necessary to root intentional processes in a foundation of temporary self-inhering objectivities (the “arising and subsiding, emergence and decay” of transitional forms which inhere in themselves for a moment, occupying a unit of time before relating to an outside). “...we are concerned with the processual transformation of the past into the future through the intermediary of transitional forms that in themselves have no permanent substance.” (Varela, F., Thompson, E. and Rosch,E.(1991)). In these interpretations of time, change is the movement between events, that is, between temporarily inhering, subsisting entities or self-presences.

Footnote: Zahavi’s articulation of presence as inherence deserves particular note for its proximity to Kantian subjectivity. He claims the subjective dimension of the subject-object interaction is not contingently but transcendentally self-identical, non-horizontal and non-ecdastic.

“To speak of an ontological dualism, to distinguish a pure interiority and a pure exteriority, is by no means to accept a classical Cartesian dualism. It is merely to insist upon the existence of an absolute dimension of subjective self-manifestation, without which no hetero-manifestation would be possible””(Zahavi 2004)
Husserl on the Origin of the Mathematical as Self-Identical Object

The failure of causal models to think time primordially leads to numerous consequences. One that has been explored by Husserl, Heidegger and Gendlin concerns the inability of such approaches to locate the origin of the mathematical in a more fundamental generating process. Husserl, Heidegger and Gendlin have shown in different ways that a quantifiable, mathematizable nature presupposes the kind of time which consists of self-presences transitioning from future to present to past in sequential movement (existing ‘in’ time).

What does it imply to make a time measurement, to state that it takes certain amount of time for some process to unfold? Recall, for instance, Valela’s discovery of “neuronal-level constitutive events that have a duration on the 1/10-scale” “...an assembly of coupled oscillators attains a transient synchrony and...it takes a certain time for doing so...”

A time calculation counts identical instances of a meaning whose sense is kept fixed during the counting. To count is to count continuously changing instances of something that holds itself as self-identical through a duration or extension.

“The consideration of the conditions in principle of the possibility of something identical that gives itself (harmoniously) in flowing and subjectively changing manners of appearance leads to the mathematization of the appearances as a necessity which is immanent in them.

A true object in the sense of logic is an object which is absolutely identical "with itself," that is, which is, absolutely identically, what it is; or, to express it in another way: an object is through its determinations, its quiddities [Weisheiten], its predicates, and it is identical if these quiddities are identical as belonging to it or when their belonging absolutely excludes their not belonging. Purely mathematical thinking is related to possible objects which are thought determinately through ideal-"exact" mathematical (limit-) concepts, e.g., spatial shapes of natural objects which, as experienced, stand in a vague way under shape-concepts and [thus] have their shape-determinations; but it is of the nature of these experiential data that one can and by rights must posit, beneath the identical object which exhibits itself in harmonious experience as existing, an ideally identical object which is ideal in all its determinations; all [its] determinations are exact —that is, whatever [instances] fall under their generality are equal—and this equality excludes inequality; or, what is the same thing, an exact determination, in belonging to an object, excludes the possibility that this determination not belong to the same object.” (Husserl 1970)

“Every thingly being is temporally extended; it has its duration, and with its duration it is fit within Objective time in a strict manner. Thus with its duration it has a fixed place in the one world-time, which is a universal form of existence for all thinghood. Everything else that a thing' is," according to every other essential determination which belongs to it, it is that in its duration, with the more precise determination of its "when."” (Husserl 1989)

Husserl argues that the self-identical object on which duration and mathematical quantification is based is transcendent to what is actually experienced; it is an idealization, a synthesis pieced together from moments of experience that never reproduce their sense identically. Actual experience does not subsist, inhere or endure, and this does not produce countable instances.
In the following passages, Husserl makes a distinction between the time of constituting subjectivity and the time of constituted objects. He maintains that both kinds of temporality are perceived simultaneously in ongoing experience in what he refers to as a double intentionality. The time of constituted objects corresponds to the way that current embodied theorists treat temporality, as objects that come into presence and endure for whatever length of time before disappearing. Over the course of their duration, they can change in some subordinate respect (spatial displacement as continuous succession) that can be measured as taking a certain amount of time.

The time of constituting subjectivity corresponds to a more primordial time that consists not of self-identical objects which endure for a ‘period of time’ but a flow of qualitative change that forms no process of continuous succession. Without the concept of continuous succession to ground them, notions like ‘faster’ and ‘slower’ lose their sense. This is the time of Gendlin’s occurring into implying. It is never precisely the same noematic object that is filling out the temporal duration from moment to moment. The meant sense is that of an enduringly identical tone because of the noetic idealizing unification of the varying sensations that it encompasses. For Husserl, primary sense data represents a more fundamental form of temporality than adumbrated ‘real’ spatial objects. Notions of nowness as a countable duration occurring in time, occupying a moment of time, correspond to Husserl’s apperceived time of real spatial objects, but underlying this level of constitution is a more primordial temporality, corresponding to the time of Gendlin’s occurring into implying.

“Each individual object (each unity, whether immanent or transcendent, constituted in the stream) endures, and necessarily endures -that is, it continuously exists in time and is something identical in this continuous existence, which at the same time can be regarded as a process. Conversely: what exists in time continuously exists in time and is the unity belonging to the process that carries with it inseparably the unity of what endures in the process as it unfolds. The unity of the tone that endures throughout the process lies in the tonal process; and conversely, the unity of the tone is unity in the filled duration, that is, in the process. Therefore, if anything at all is defined as existing in a time-point, it is conceivable only as the phase of a process, a phase in which the duration of an individual being also has its point. Individual or concrete being is necessarily changing or unchanging; the process is a process of change or of rest, the enduring object itself a changing object or one at rest. Moreover, every change has its rate or acceleration of change (to use an image) with respect to the same duration. As a matter of principle, any phase of a change can be expanded into a rest, and any phase of a rest can be carried over into change.

Now if we consider the constituting phenomena in comparison with the phenomena just discussed, we find a flow, and each phase of this flow is a continuity of adumbrations. But as a matter of principle, no phase of this flow can be expanded into a continuous succession, and therefore the flow cannot be conceived as so transformed that this phase would be extended in identity with itself. Quite to the contrary, we necessarily find a flow of continuous "change", and this change has the absurd character that it flows precisely as it flows and can flow neither "faster" nor "slower." If that is the case, then any object that changes is missing here; and since "something" runs its course in every process, no process is in question. There is nothing here that changes, and for that reason it also makes no sense to speak of something that endures. It is nonsensical to want to find something
here that remains unchanged for even an instant during the course of its duration.” (Husserl 1964).

The constituted time forms itself as a kind of faith or belief in persistent self-identity that accompanies the moments of the primordial flow from the intending subjective side of the subject-object synthesis.

“The consciousness of its [the object’s] existence is here a belief in act; by virtue of the accord in which the perceptive appearances flow off in original presentation, retention, and protention, an accord of continuous self-affirmation, belief is continuous certainty of belief, which has its certainty in this originality of the object in its living being-present.”

The object is “a unity which “appears” continually in the change of the modes of its givenness and which belongs to the essential structure of a specific act of the ego.” “The "object" of consciousness, the object as having identity "with itself" during the flowing subjective process, does not come into the process from outside; on the contrary, it is included as a sense in the subjective process itself and thus as an "intentional effect" produced by the synthesis of consciousness.” (Husserl 1973)

“ Every temporal being "appears" in one or another continually changing mode of running-off, and the "Object in the mode of running-off" is in this change always something other, even though we still say that the Object and every point of its time and this time itself are one and the same.” (Husserl 1964)

In describing an unchanging enduring tone, for instance, Husserl emphasizes “…the incessantly changing mode of givenness of this duration.” “However, …through a continual coinciding of sense a unity of the objective sense can be formed and be maintained through the alteration of lived experiences.”

It would be a mistake to think the temporality of sense data lacks duration because it is instantaneous, momentary or extremely brief. Instantaneity presupposes objective time. Rather, the primordial now returns to itself moment to moment as qualitatively altered. Husserl asserts that the intentional ‘belief’ in self-identicality constitutes an empirical object out of what are in fact changing senses. Husserl’s point isn’t simply that there are no straight lines or perfect circles in nature. Rather, it is that scientific as well as ordinary conceptions of time and space assume that geometric ideality grounds the imperfect shapes of nature. Natural shapes are considered imperfect relative to a presupposed normative framework that defines objectivity in terms of an ideal geometry of extended space and enduring time. Extension and duration are products of the idealizing synthesis which constitutes self-identical objects. These in turn make possible mathematical quantification and various components of enumeration such as magnitude and the historical genesis of ideal geometric shapes, which includes geometric space-time. The ideal figure of pure line, for instance, makes possible various characteristics of number.

Heidegger on Objective Presence, Motion and Time:

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Heidegger (1987), in a move similar to Husserl, traces the origin of the mathematical and of empirical science to the concept of enduring objective presence undergirding constituted time (what Heidegger calls the vulgar concept of time).

"What does it mean to be "in time"? This "being-in-time" is very familiar to us from the way it is represented in natural science. In natural science all processes of nature are calculated as processes which happen "in time." Everyday common sense also finds processes and things enduring "in time," persisting and disappearing "in time." When we talk about "being-in-time," everything depends on the interpretation of this "in." In order to see this more clearly, we ask simply if the glass on the table in front of me is in time or not. In any case, the glass is already present-at-hand and remains there even when I do not look at it. How long it has been there and how long it will remain are of no importance. If it is already present-at-hand and remains so in the future, then that means that it continues through a certain time and thus is "in" it."

"Thus what can be shown to have the character of constantly remaining, as remanens capax mutationem, constitutes the true being of beings which can be experienced in the world. What enduringly remains truly is. This is the sort of thing that mathematics knows. What mathematics makes accessible in beings constitutes their being." (Heidegger 2010)

Heidegger explains that the fundamentally undiscussed ontological foundations of empirical science since Descartes are based on his formulation of objective presence.

"Thus the being of the "world" is, so to speak, dictated to it in terms of a definite idea of being which is embedded in the concept of substantiality and in terms of an idea of knowledge which cognizes beings in this way. Descartes does not allow the kind of being of innerworldly beings to present itself, but rather prescribes to the world, so to speak, its "true" being on the basis of an idea of being (being = constant objective presence) the source of which has not been revealed and the justification of which has not been demonstrated.

Thus it is not primarily his dependence upon a science, mathematics, which just happens to be especially esteemed, that determines his ontology of the world, rather his ontology is determined by a basic ontological orientation toward being as constant objective presence, which mathematical knowledge is exceptionally well suited to grasp." (Heidegger 2010)

Heidegger (1982) shows how the common notion of time dates back to Aristotle’s derivation of time from motion.

"The thoughts of motion, continuity, extension—and in the case of change of place, place—are interwoven with the experience of time." (basic problems of phenomenology) "So far as time is kineseos ti, something connected with motion, this means that in thinking time, motion or rest is always thought along with it. In Aristotelian language, time follows, is in succession to, motion."

"Because the now is transition it always measures a from-to, it measures a how-long, a duration."

Time is making present according to Aristotle, (the present at hand) and in so doing is a counting of time as now, now, now.
“And thus time shows itself for the vulgar understanding as a succession of constantly "objectively present" nows that pass away and arrive at the same time. Time is understood as a sequence, as the "flux" of nows, as the "course of time."

“The succession of nows is interpreted as something somehow objectively present; for it itself moves "in time." We say that in every now it is now, in every now it already disappears. The now is now in every now, thus constantly present as the same, even if in every now another may be disappearing as it arrives. Yet it does show at the same time the constant presence of itself as this changing thing.” (Heidegger 2010)

In this connection, I mentioned earlier that the sophisticated reciprocal dynamics of embodied approaches to temporality are in a position to question the model of time as a linear sequential continuity. But does this mean that they reject Descartes view of objective being as constant objective presence, and Aristotle’s model of time as motion? Heidegger says vulgar time is “the constant presence of itself as this changing thing.” By this he means that of which changing instances are instances is objective time. When naturalized phenomenological approaches such as Varela’s measure a temporal duration, time plays the role of constant objective presence, remaining self-identical throughout the measurement of a changing thing. Non-linear dynamical systems descriptions remain within Heideggerian vulgar time (and Husserlian constituted time) due to the fact that a causal metaphysics still underpins this thinking. Reciprocally determinative processes occur WITHIN in time, they take up and endure through a span of time. That they have duration makes them quantifiable. The ‘now’ takes a certain number of milliseconds.

In discussing Husserl’s distinction between constituting and constituted time, and Heidegger’s contrast between vulgar and authentic temporality, I aimed to show how attempts to naturalize phenomenology by recourse to mathematical description reify objects into abstract units. Whatever is quantifiable is a countable change in degree belonging to a series whose qualitative identity encompasses the series as a whole. As in the case of continuous motion, the series is treated as an object whose qualitative meaning endures self-identically over the temporal increments of the measurement of its numeric units. It would seem, then, that to be a participant element in a reciprocally causal dynamical process is to harbor, prior to and outside of exposure to qualitative transformation of meaning, temporarily persisting self-identity. Going on the assumption this is a fair characterization of mathematically naturalized embodied models like Varela’s, we might then wonder if collapsing the distinction between change of degree and change in kind embraced by both empirical and mathematical discourses would be enough to bring these approaches into alignment with the pre-mathematical temporality of Gendlin, Husserl and Heidegger.

It may be useful to consider Deleuze’s work on time and quantification in this connection. I mention Deleuze because he provides a reciprocally causal account that has many features in common with those of the embodied community. More significantly, within his formal account any difference of degree, any quantitative repetition, any numeration qualitatively changes the sense of what counts at every quantitative repetition.
Deleuze’s (1994) concept of intensive magnitude succeeds in deconstructing the quantity-quality binary by establishing a ‘ground’ (as metamorphosis) in difference that is neither qualitative nor quantitative, and thus a basis of number that does not measure.

“Let us take seriously the famous question: is there a difference in kind, or of degree, between differences of degree and differences in kind? Neither.” “In its own nature, difference is no more qualitative than extensive”

“The number is no longer a universal concept measuring elements according to their emplacement in a given dimension, but has itself become a multiplicity that varies according to the dimensions considered (the primacy of the domain over a complex of numbers attached to that domain). We do not have units (unites) of measure, only multiplicities or varieties of measurement.” (Deleuze 1987, p.8)

“If there exists a primitive "geometry" (a proto-geometry), it is an operative geometry in which figures are never separable from the affectations befalling them, the lines of their becoming, the segments of their segmentation: there is "roundness," but no circle, "alignments," but no straight line, etc.” (ibid, p.212)

“A multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature (the laws of combination therefore increase in number as the multiplicity grows). ... An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections.” (Ibid, p.8)

Deleuze fashioned his model with the aim of moving away from what he considered to be a subjectivist emphasis on the part of phenomenology. In this effort he was aided by Bergson, Nietzsche and Simondon. Nevertheless, writers such as Protevi (2006) and Rosenberg (1996) claim significant affinities between the organizational dynamics of Deleuze’s model and the autopoietic enactivism of Varela, Thompson, Slaby and others who incorporate phenomenological elements in their work. Their shared emphasis on the determination of singularities as nodes within a reciprocally causal multiplicity, and the incessantly mobile and transformative character of these multiplicities, allows one to imagine that enactivists like Thompson might be receptive to the idea that the mathematization of nature via quantitative measurement is a useful idealization rather than an irreducible ground. More specifically, number may be treated as pure difference of degree for the sake of convenience without denying that difference in kind is co-implied by every difference in degree.

Footnote: This hope may be optimistic. For instance, Jack Reynolds (2008,2010), an advocate of naturalized phenomenological approaches like Thompson’s, embraces a liberal form of naturalism (John McDowell and Hilary Putnam are among early formulators of this perspective) he opposes to what he considers the idealism of Deleuzian temporality.

Does Deleuze’s deconstruction of the quantity-quality, degree-kind binary offer a path toward a
reconciliation between phenomenology and embodied causal accounts? I don’t think it does. While there is not space here to present a detailed argument, Deleuze’s approach falls short in many of the ways that, as I claim in this paper, embodied accounts do (particularly with regard to the treatment of affect and intersubjectivity) owing to a common weakness in the understanding of temporality.

We saw that in Gendlin’s notion of "original inter-affecting", elements inter-affect each other before they are a they.” This ‘interaction’ is prior to two separate things that would first meet in order to interact.” A difference is “a crossing of past and present such that both are already affected and changed by the other in this ‘occurring into implying’.”

In Deleuze’s model, a singular difference is not already changed by what it interacts with, but exists first instantaneously as an intrinsic content before it is then changed by what it interacts with. This is the distinction between reciprocal inter-causation and original inter-affecting.

While Deleuzian difference closes off the possibility of countable duration and extension, it retains the idea of instantaneous intrinsic presence. Deleuze denudes everything from traditional notions of presence and cause in an entity except instantaneous identity. Deleuze’s notion of intrinsicality as a differential “produced in a time smaller than the minimum continuous time thinkable.” remains a notion of temporality as ‘in-timeness’, as the occupying of a moment of time by a content. Only an element which takes a moment of time to inhere as what it is can interact in a causal way within an assembly of differential relations.

Gendlin’s Deconstruction of Motion and Mathematical Time-Space:

In an analysis complementing those of Husserl and Heidegger, Gendlin(2009b) traces the origin of the concept of motion to the presumption of time as a sequence of self-identical units.

“What has identity is ‘self-identical’ Once we separate something out, it has its own identity. It becomes self-identical. It is a unit. I say it functions ‘as itself’. But it was not like that before being separated out. When the many are only implicit, they are not units located each in its own position in time. The contrast is sharp: Something self-identical has identity conditions and occurs in its own time location. It is a unit. But before we separate some of them out, they don't exist separately.”

"Existence includes not just single events and self-identical units, but also what functions implicitly. It was long held that what exists must be self-identical. Since self-identically have space and time locations, it was assumed that only what fills space and time can exist.”

“If only what appears exists, then what exists is “external,” in front of us, other than us, as if alone from us, over-there from here. To “exist” came to mean to appear to us. The very word for things became (and still is) “phenomena.” This is the old subject-object puzzle: what exists can only be a known-by. The metaphysical puzzle comes here only if we first assume that what exists must have a self identical shape in space and time. Then there seems to be nothing but formed forms imposed on — nothing”
For Gendlin, calculative repetition and the concepts of duration and magnitude that they rest on lose their justification. Units are no longer units if they cannot be said to belong to the same process. Sameness and identical repetition become limiting cases of transformative change.

“We predict that physics must eventually give up pointwise localization in space and time and single, non-interacting particle states. There will always be two or more particles, and their definitions, as well as those of places and times, will be definable only backwards, from interaction...For us the same units do not need to last through a change. If they do, it is a narrower special case. A particle alone is "this one," "the same one" that was earlier there and is now here...In the new model the occurrence forms its own new multiplicity. If a space time-particle grid is desired, it is determined from the occurrence. Nothing in the new model forces us to lose anything from the old, if we want it. But with the new model we do reject the assumption that occurring must be determined and necessitated by the units of previous occurrence.” (Gendlin 1983)

“Although the spectator thinks of most sequences as repetitious, I have argued that repetition depends on someone comparing the sequence to a previous one. Internally the process occurs freshly. Occurring into implying is a change. From the change process we can derive sameness and repetition as a special kind of change.” (Gendlin 1997)

Drawing on his derivation of objective space-time from the radical temporality of occurring into implying, Gendlin critiques the current emphasis on sensorimotor coupling in embodied models. Gendlin explains that descriptions of animal behavior in terms of sensorimotor interactions rely on objective space-time, and as a result they replace an intricate sense making process with a reductive causality.

“There are current proposals for a ‘sensorimotor coupling’. Current researchers are looking for a tie between perception and motion, not between perception and behavior. But living things never just change location; there is always more involved and perceived in behavior (O'Regan & Noë, 2001) (Gendlin 2009b)

“Noë, O'Regan, Gallagher and others miss the space of behavior possibilities because they think of behavior as motion. But motion is what the "external" logical grid splits off. Motion is a sophisticated product which requires an observer to define this here and that there. It involves paths of changes in mere location. Behavior does not consist of motions and cannot be reduced to motion. Noë says, for example, quite rightly that seeing an apple includes seeing the ways we could move with and around it. But motion is a separated abstract product of cognition. Behavior does not consist of this much later product. We might walk around the apple, or eat it, or save it for someone and tell them about it.”(Gendlin 2009c)

Note the similarities among Gendlin’s depiction of motion as change within a mathematical space-time grid, Husserl’s analysis of constituted time as self-identically enduring objects in continuous succession of change or rest, and Heidegger’s account of vulgar time as motion (“So far as time is kineseos ti, something connected with motion, this means that in thinking time, motion or rest is always thought along with it.”).
Attention and Reflection:

A consequence of generating the movement of time from a causative cobbling together of static presences is that it separates into opposed and alienated states dispositions to act and acts themselves, being and becoming, alterity and identity, feeling and intention, state and transition. Nowhere is this tendency more evident than in current conceptualizations of attentional processes. Phenomenological informed empirical accounts describe attention as a multi-phasic activity involving a shifting of focus bringing objects from the margins to the center of awareness. As well as its function as magnification of objects, it is studied as vigilance, orientation, selection, filtering and priming. Embodied writers typically employ the metaphor of a spotlight highlighting pre-existing contents to describe attentive grasping. For instance, Zahavi (2005) depicts Husserl’s approach to attention in the following way:

"...the concepts of attention and attentional modification are taken from the domain of object consciousness and are related to the distinction between thematic and marginal objects. The attentional modification is what is at stake when we shift our focus between different objects, bringing those at the margin into the center of attention."

"To perceive an object is always to perceive an object situated in a perceptual field; whenever we pay attention to something, we single it out from its surroundings. Thus, one might describe the appearance of a thematic object as an appearance out of a field or background."

A look at certain of Husserl’s writings might give the impression he too considered the metaphor of a highlighting or singling out of existing objects from a field to be an acceptable characterization of attention.

“Attention is usually compared to a spotlight. The object of attention, in the specific sense, lies in the cone of more or less bright light; but it can also move into the penumbra and into the completely dark region. Though the metaphor is far from adequate to differentiate all the modes which can be fixed phenomenologically, it is still designative in so far as it indicates alterations in what appears, as what appears. These changes in its illumination do not alter what appears with respect to its own sense-composition; but brightness and obscurity modify its mode of appearance: they are to be found and described when we direct out regard to the noematic Object. “...we say that the alteration consists merely of the fact that, in one of the compared cases, one moment of the object is “favored” and, in another case, another; or of the fact that one and the same moment is “paid attention to primarily” at one time and only secondarily at another time, or “just barely noticed still,” if not indeed “completely unnoticed” though still appearing.” (Husserl 1982)

Husserl’s description of attention as a form of highlighting appears consistent with that of Zahavi and other writers as long as one remains focused on the object’s noematic sense. But what appears as a minor, peripheral alteration relative to an unchanging objective core in the natural attitude reveals a continual and thoroughgoing modification when we shift our focus from the noematic to the noetic side of attention. What makes possible the appearance of a self-identical object being noticed in one mode of prominence or another relative to a field is a continuously varying
creative synthesis.

“Every apprehending turning-toward which arrests what is given in the flux of sensuous experience, i.e., turns toward it attentively and by way of contemplation searches into its properties, is already an achievement”(Husserl1973).

“Each attention-series is, as a series, something like a ray, and in each series "the same thing" is intentionally grasped. It is a series grasping one and the same thing ever more richly and more perfectly, analogously to the way in which I, by coming closer to an Object, hence in the corresponding series of orientations, gain an ever more rich knowledge of the Object and grasp it always better and more fully.”(Husserl 1989)

Rather than the noticed object pre-existing the attending grasp, the attentional ray noetically creates and then enriches the sense of an ongoingly identical object phase by phase.

“The original tendency of the process, along with what has accrued to it from what has been realized hitherto, is fulfilled phase by phase, and it is at the same time extended as a tendency and exhibits new stages of fulfillment.”(Husserl 1973)

In sum, for Husserl attention does not merely single out or prime the appearance of objects. Rather, the focused attention on an object is a synthesis of creative acts which first constitute and then continue to fulfill the ‘self’ of the object that is being ‘noticed'. The object in itself is transcendent, never seen as an actual whole, but rather from moment to moment as a changing concatenation of retentional memory, protentional anticipation and impressions of immediate sense. Turning toward and heeding an object implies a belief in its continuity, a continuity which is nothing other than this constantly changing flow of sensations synthetically held together as a unitary object via memory and anticipation. Thus, the initial ‘turning toward’ an object is already a synthetic act of constitution. Attention, as a species of intention, is sense-making, which means it is sense-changing. Attention is affectively, valuatively and meaningfully implicated in what it attends to as co-participant in the synthesis, creation, constitution of objects of regard.

In utilizing the spotlight metaphor of attention, Zahavi, Depraz and others remain within the natural attitude to the extent that they treat the constituted products of intentional syntheses (temporarily self-identical objects) as fundamental and in the process fail to reduce these noematic appearances to the constituting intentional acts of which they are idealizations. In splitting off the appearing object from the constituting subjective process, they reify not only the objective but the subjective pole of the self-world relation. Writers such as Bitbol(2009), Varela(1991) and Thompson(2001) assert a bare, raw, pre-reflective, non-objectifying, pre-intentional form of attentive self-awareness, while Zahavi(2004) speaks of an absolute dimension of subjective self-manifestation that subsists in itself as a pure interiority.

Husserl’s (1982) critique of empirical psychological approaches for construing attention as a mere singling out of a pre-existing object would seem to apply to embodied theorists as well.
“Attention is one of the chief themes of modern psychology. Nowhere does the predominantly sensualistic [empiricist] character of modern psychology show itself more strikingly than in the treatment of this theme, for not even the essential connection between attention and intentionality--this fundamental fact: that attention of every sort is nothing else than a fundamental species of intentive modifications--has ever, to my knowledge, been emphasized before.” “Dazed by the confusion between object and mental content, one forgets that the objects of which we are 'conscious', are not simply in consciousness as in a box, so that they can merely be found in it and snatched at in it; but that they are first constituted as being what they are for us, and as what they count as for us, in varying forms of objective intention...One forgets that... an intending, or reference is present, that aims at an object, a consciousness is present that is the consciousness of this object. The mere existence of a content in the psychic interplay is, however, not at all this being-meant or being-referred-to. This first arises when this content is ‘noticed', such notice being a look directed towards it, a presentation of it. To define the presentation of a content as the mere fact of its being experienced, and in consequence to give the name 'presentations' to all experienced contents, is one of the worst conceptual distortions known to philosophy.”

Like Husserl, Heidegger(1994) considers the encounter with objects in the world in an act of attention to be a creative process altering self and world in the same gesture.

"The essence of something is not at all to be discovered simply like a fact; on the contrary, it must be brought forth. To bring forth is a kind of making, and so there resides in all grasping and positing of the essence something creative…. To bring forth means to bring out into the light, to bring something in sight which was up to then not seen at all, and specifically such that the seeing of it is not simply a gaping at something already lying there but a seeing which, in seeing, first brings forth what is to be seen, i.e., a productive seeing."

Beings (essences) are produced by Dasein in the act of taking something as something because the ground (the totality of relevance) of their being is created anew in our encounter with them.

“Every “foundation” in the sense we discussed comes too late with regard to the positing of the essence, because the productive seeing of the essence is itself a productive seeing of that in which the essence has its ground—a productive seeing of what its ground is. Knowledge of the essence is in itself a ground-laying. It is the positing of what lies under as ground... It is not the subsequent adding of a ground for something already represented.”(Heidegger 1994)

Consistent with this thinking, for Gendlin cognition and propositional belief are not simply a ‘being about something’, directedness toward or an aiming at an object, but transform and enrich what they ‘represent’, creatively altering their sense. In Gendlin’s approach, experiencing is always a crossing between the past and what is being encountered in an act of sense making such that each is interbled with the other, so that no outside can be differentiated from an inside. The crossing is not an alienated opposition between subjective and objective sides of the encounter but an intimate unity of implication. Gendlin reveals the oppositional character of current accounts of subject-object interaction in his critique of their treatment of attention, intention and reflection as features of a ‘being about something’. In taking something AS something, we are
not simply associating two externally related entities in relation to each other and with reference to a more encompassing causal framework. If a cognition or intention is merely about something, then it functions as external binding, coordinating and relating between two objectively present participants.

The subject-object nexus is not a system of reciprocal coordinations among objectively present entities, states and dispositions. The ‘is’ connecting S with P is not a causal copula, but a transformative relevantating altering in one gesture both the S and the P. In Gendlin’s terms, the ‘as’ enacts a crossing of past and present such that both are already affected and changed by the other in this ‘occurring into implying’ (context of dealing with something). When we take something as something, we have already projected out from a totality of relevance such as to render what is presenting itself to us as familiar and recognizable in some fashion. But in this act of disclosure, we only have this totality of relevance by changing it.

“Supposedly cognizing the “external” things does not change them. Cognizing is only about them. This “only about” assumes that our cognition does not change the behavior context, the situation including what our scientific work is about. But I will argue that it does change the behavior space...It has not been clear how cognition is a bodily process. “Only about” has meant that cognition happens in representations.”

The bodily process that effectuates change in behavior space possibilities, as we have seen, is not a causally conditioning schematics, but the occurring into implying of language and thought into an already inter-affected mesh of implicit understandings which is modified further by what occurs into it. Gendlin says that the attending to an object of cognition is a creative act rather than an encounter between already self-inhering subject and object. Since no self-inhering subjective or objective pole precedes the crossing that occurring into implying effectuates, it makes no sense to speak of a pre-reflective immediate affective self-awareness and a gap between this felt sense and an intended object. Any awareness that takes place is awareness of a change. This change precedes the causal opposition between immediate affective self-consciousness and mediate object. The affectively subjective and the intentionally objective are unified features of the crossing.

“There are not two consciousnesses, the implicit one and attention. Rather, attention is the one occurring which results from the crossed multiplicity of implying. Any single thing of which we are explicitly aware is an occurring produced by an implicitly functioning process. The implicit cannot be called “pre-reflective” or “pre-verbal” since it includes what previously came with attention, perception, cognition, and words. Implicit functioning is not pre-reflective or pre-verbal. It is pre-verbal only in regard to the next set of words, and pre-reflective only in regard to the next act of reflection.” (Gendlin 2008)

For embodied theorists, both acts of intention and of reflection depend on the notion of time as a collision between a separately constituted context and present entities. The ‘being-about-something’ instantiated by the pairing of past and present is a conjunction of separate, adjacent phases or aspects: the past which conditions the present entity or event, and the
present object which supplements that past. This makes attention a hinge between relata, a propositional copula grounded in an objective time whose passage is marked by an attending to the appearance and disappearance of the succession of nows.

For Gendlin, the dynamic ‘now’ consists of a coupling of a past and present already changed by each other, radically interbled or interaffected such that it can no longer be said that they have any separable aspects at all. As a consequence, an attentional copula is conspicuously absent, along with the relata that it would bind and separate. In its place is an implying into occurring crossing. From this vantage, for writers like Zahavi reflection is an opposition or alienation within the self not simply because in reflecting the present self is compared with a past version, but because their way of conceiving the relation between past and present artificially splits them apart.

“...reflection and explication are often considered as if they were a mere looking back, as if the past remained there to be looked back to... It sounds all right if we say that the present goes on "in the context of" the past, but we have to mean the context it regenerates. The process goes on -- not in the context that was (and isn't here to be gone on in), but -- in the context that is changed by the it."(Gendlin 1997))

“…the reaching behind itself in going forward constitutes a re-reception, a reception of the fact of reception, which is also the further implying that brings the further occurring.”
“I must point out the sharp difference between this reflexive re-reception internal to experiencing, on the one hand, and what we call "reflection" on the other hand. The reflexive re-reception generates the process. It generates each next bit of process. A first-person process happens through this reflexive re-reception. On the other hand, when we reflect, we take a separate stand in relation to the past. The reflexivity of carrying forward is not the past, not reflection. It is the self-generating of the present. "Reflexivity" is a more complex concept of the present.”

Heidegger(1982) makes a similar point concerning the distinction between the concept of reflection as an objectively present subject staring at its past self, and self-disclosure as a self coming back to itself from its future, in the same instant defining and transforming itself:

“ Reflection, in the sense of a turning back, is only a mode of self-apprehension, but not the mode of primary self-disclosure. The way in which the self is unveiled to itself in the factical Dasein can nevertheless be fittingly called reflection, except that we must not take this expression to mean what is commonly meant by it—the ego bent around backward and staring at itself—but an interconnection such as is manifested in the optical meaning of the term “reflection”. “To reflect means, in the optical context, to break at something, to radiate back from there, to show itself in a reflection from something.”

In a 2003 paper, How to Investigate Subjectivity, Zahavi suggested that Heidegger’s depiction of the self’s reflecting itself back to itself from the world may point to a non-objectifying form of reflection “that is nothing but a higher form of wakefulness,… a more articulate and intense form of self-awareness… a special form of attention…”

Two years later, Zahavi(2005) appeared to change his mind, claiming that, rather than being an
attentive modification of awareness, Heideggerian self-disclosure should be understood as an objectifying reflection, “a type of self-fragmentation that we do not encounter on the level of pre-reflective self-awareness.”

Indeed, when Gendlin tells us that the concept of self-reflection as it is employed by contemporary embodied accounts amounts to taking a separate stand in relation to the past, and when Heidegger characterizes reflection as “the ego bent around backward and staring at itself” one might be tempted to interpret them as agreeing with Zahavi’s contention concerning the difference between self and hetero-affection. That is to say, it could seem as though they are acknowledging that when the self takes itself as an object it becomes alienated and split off from itself.

But what must be understood is that Heidegger’s primary self-disclosure, like Gendlin’s reflexive re-reception, represents neither the pure inwardness of pre-reflective attentive awareness nor the alienation of a reflective stance that turns back toward what was originally purely apprehended. The primordial structure of self-awareness functions prior to Zahavi’s splitting of experience into an opposition between self-presenting subject and appearing object, and is more originary than supposedly immediate, pre-intentional attentive self-awareness.

As a consequence, for Gendlin and Heidegger, even the most ‘alienating’ forms of reflection cannot rend the implicatory unity and continuity of the self-world hinge. Rather, they are deficient or inauthentic modes of this irreducible self-belonging.

As Heidegger(2010) explains:

“However, alienation cannot mean that Da-sein is factically torn away from itself....this alienation, which closes off to Da-sein its authenticity and possibility, even if only that of genuinely getting stranded, still does not surrender it to beings which it itself is not, but forces it into its inauthenticity, into a possible kind of being of itself.”

Gendlin reveals how reflexive re-reception functions within both so-called pre-reflective attention and reflection as the temporality of occurring into implying.

“mere attention” is not mere. What attending lifts out is a product. Attention has the same power to lift something out, as any distinction in a phenomenological treatise does. Attention is an active symbolizing, but never arbitrary. The response to it can surprise us and force us to change our categories. Attention, (consciousness, awareness, presence-to, . . .) is no merely neutral beam of light, although in some respects this can be said of it. It is always also a special kind of further symbolizing and entitizing.

No attention operates alone. It always comes from and with a mesh of physically sensed relevance just as any other kind of symbolizing does, and it is therefore questionable, relative, and various, and yet also always in a precise and demanding relation to the implicit intricacy which motivates it. The attentional "beam" emerges from an intricate mesh of knowing, bodily feeling, and doing which are not separate departments. When this mesh changes, what attention can possibly bring, changes as well. We can enter this mesh at any time and carry forward some of what “was” functioning in it.
The fact that so much – and especially we ourselves – are implicitly involved in the humble "beam" of attention can now come together with what I have said about experiencing as a "carrying forward" process, and about internal time. We might miss the inherent togetherness of self-consciousness and the internal time of carrying forward, because we are so accustomed to read the model of perception into everything, as if our consciousness were only a perceiver, added on to percepts. But here we have been pursuing a philosophical lead, the sense that self-consciousness is structurally inherent in the very making of experiencing, not just the perceiver of it. Rather than a merely added light, consciousness is the self-generating of experiencing. (Gendlin 2004)

It is not a matter of becoming aware of something that doesn't change as a result. "Coming aware" must not be thought about with the flashlight model. To "be aware" is a sequence. To be aware without changing something away is to "pause" it, to have a string of versions of that "same" thing, rather than carrying forward it away. Thereby whatever it is acquires a new nature which is then after all its own, rendered in the new medium. (“Gendlin 1997b)

Gendlin on Feelings:

It is not possible to adequately grasp the transformative nature of attention without appreciating the central role that affectivity plays in structuring temporality. Gendlin’s term "original inter-affecting" captures the idea that, rather than existing as themselves first before being related, the poles of the subject-object relation “inter-affect each other before they are a they”.

Once we recognize that attention is not a neutral beam illuminating appearances, but instead a change in what appears, we have the basis for a proper understanding of affectivity. Gendlin(1997) explains:

“But notice, this is not the concept of "consciousness" in the Western tradition, something like a mere light shining on something given there in advance. With our new concept "feeling" is the behavior; it is the series of bodily impacts of the body's own doing in the environment.”

Gendlin’s notion of feeling emerges from the ‘self-generating of experience, via the structure of occurring into implying, and is closely intertwined with the concept of ‘relevanting’ that the temporal structure of implying-occurring generates. Gendlin founds his concept of feeling in a novel model of body-environment interaction grounded in this radical inter-affecting. He asks:

“How does the organism ‘select and interpret’ what is relevant to it? Selection and interpretation would not be necessary if by ‘environment’ we meant the organism’s own which it actively participates in generating. Recently some authors speak of organism and environment as mutually causing each other (Gallagher, 2007)”(Gendlin 2009)

Gendlin digs beneath such causative approaches to locate a more fundamental notion of interaction, grounded in radical temporality. “This ‘interaction’ is prior to two separate things that would first meet in order to interact. I call it ‘interaction first’.” ‘Interaction first’ functions as what Gendlin(2008) calls implying into occurring, and in this way carrying forward a previous
“We feel the change made by the actual environment occurring into the body's implied behavior context. The feedback occurs into the implying which carries the sequence forward into further implying and occurring, as our little model says. Behavior forms only as perceptions and feelings of this kind.” Feeling is a change made in an implicit mesh of intercorrelated understandings. “A bodily felt sense is a crossing of the relevant facets" of a situation, a change made that carries forward...In the bodily implying all perceptions and cognitions may function implicitly.”(Gendlin 2008)

“The body moves further as the effect of the registry of how it just moved. It moved and is then affected by re-recognizing what it just did. Each bit of the sequence includes (is made by) the bodily impact (the registry) of how it just was. We could say that the body feels its own doing! Let us try to call this "feeling”. “Feeling is the series of changes made by the impacts of the renditions of how the body was.” “What I call "re-recognition" enables us to understand how feeling locates into itself. In feeling the body "feels itself" but not as if it were an object along with other objects. Rather, the body feels its environment by re-recognizing what it just did. Feeling is the series of impacts of what the body just did. With feeling the body not only is, but feels the impact of what it "was." This is sentience. We have derived consciousness!”(Gendlin 1997)

Concepts like ‘interaction first’, ’original interaffecting’, and occurring into implying share features with Husserl’s associative synthesis, in particular the belonging of new sense to what it occurs into via dimensions of commonality and likeness. It also shares features with Heidegger’s concernful dealing with entities oriented in relation to a pragmatic totality of relevance. Relevance is not imposed on an experience from the outside via a bodily feeling state, but is presupposed by the always already self-differentiating movement of experience.

“A process is a relevanting. This verb says both that a process occurs relevantly, and that the relevance is made by the process. What occurs makes itself relevant. So we cannot use relevance as if it were on another level from which one can pre-determine what will occur.” (Gendlin 1997)

Because most current approaches make self-inhering states do most of the work of establishing the awareness of the affectively felt and objectively perceived sides of the bond between the subject and the world, the relation between subject and object becomes a mostly empty middle term, a neutral copula added onto the two opposing sides of the binary. In these accounts, movement and transformation are treated as secondary to self-inherence, so that the affective and cognate aspects of events are artificially split into separated entities and then have to be pieced together again in an interaction. To ground experience in radical temporality is to abandon the concept of subject and world in states of interaction, in favor of a self-world referential-differential in continuous self-transforming movement.

In embodied cognitive models, feeling processes adapt and co-ordinate with a partially independent cogitative environment. Affect is linked to a milieu outside of itself and with which
the logic of the bond is indirect, partially arbitrary in the sense that it is capable of being made irrational, as is supposedly the case with nonadaptive feeling-intending associations. There is a partial independence assumed between the participant aspects of reciprocally adaptive interactions. The cobbling can be uncobbled unilaterally. Emotion can aid reason, but can also be dysfunctional. In Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit, which has been variously and imperfectly translated as attunement, mood, self-finding and state of mind, we find a phenomenological articulation of the inseparable relation of affect, intention and temporality. Gendlin recognizes a strong affinity between Heidegger’s concept of Befindlichkeit and his philosophy of the implicit. In his essay, “Befindlichkeit: Heidegger and the Philosophy of Psychology,” Gendlin observes that:

‘Heidegger’s concept denotes how we sense ourselves in situations. Whereas feeling is usually thought of as something inward, Heidegger’s concept refers to something both inward and outward, but before a split between inside and outside has been made.’ (Gendlin 1978/79).

The relation, the in-between is the irreducible basis of Dasein. For Heidegger, the subjective and the objective, are not primordially understood as belonging to an interaction between immediately felt and mediatively given states of being; they are instead the inseparable features of a unitary differential structure of transition, otherwise known as Dasein’s equi-primordial temporality, attunement and understanding. There are no self-inhering entities, either in the guise of affects or intended objects. In the place of a three-part structure of subjective feeling, relational bond and intentional object, Heidegger proposes a unified totality. No relational connector is needed to tie subject and object together when subject and object are no longer assumed as inherences. The awareness of the relation between self and world is not a secondary or tertiary derivation from a primordial awareness of distinct subjective and objective manifestations. On the contrary, both feeling and intentional meaning are produced only in and through Dasein’s projective self-world relation.

Gendlin’s occurring into implying process, like Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit, guarantees that the relevance, significance, mattering, salience of experience is never in question, even in the midst of the most severe depression. “Irrelevant events are not produced by the body”(Gendlin 1997b). Since relevance is already presupposed by the structure of implying-occuring fundamental to all living processes, and this in turn is grounded in structure of temporality, Gendlin does not need to draw upon affect as a motivational conditioning agent supplying events with, or depriving them of, salience, enticement and allure. Gendlin’s organizational principle of radical interaffecting, made possible by his Heideggerian approach to temporality, exposes the concept of states, dispositions, and causal interactions between felt and intentional factors founding embodied models as an abstraction derived from a more primary, intricate and intimate process in which feelings and intentions, like Heidegger’s attunement and understanding, are equi-primordial rather than one being causally oriented by the other. According to Ratcliffe, intentional states (propositional beliefs, cognitive schemata) are framed and given their significance by a global possibility space, but function within their own bounds via the logic of causal association. For Gendlin, by contrast, cognition and propositional belief are not simply a ‘being about something’, directedness toward or an aiming at an object, but transform and enrich what they ‘represent’, creatively altering their sense.
The bodily process that effectuates change in behavior space possibilities, as we have seen, is not a causally conditioning schematics, but the occurring into implying of language and thought into an already inter-affected mesh of implicit understandings which is modified further by what occurs into it. “To feel something as an inner object is a change.., not just a representation; feeling something makes a change in it.”(Gendlin 1991)

The current understanding of situatedness differs from Heidegger’s and Gendlin’s in a number of crucial ways. First, unlike the latter, situatedness and relevance is not an irreducible apriori of temporality, but instead is the contingent product of a complex configuration of bodily and perceptual elements. Affective attunement for them is the achievement of a concatenating process. When we delve beneath these global schemes to locate the invariant and essential condition of possibility of feeling-perceptual concatenations, we arrive at a reciprocally causal model of co-determinative interactive bits. But having arrived at this ‘apriori’, we are not yet in the vicinity of Befindlichkeit. Befindlichkeit is not the product of an orienting device, adaptation or conditioning scheme, and not the ground of any reciprocally causal schematic structure, except as that structure be understood as a derived abstraction concealing its own basis in temporality.

Gendlin doesn’t need to employ a notion of feeling as selective hedonic reinforcement of intentional organization, since it is temporality that organizes implicit bodily meaning. Feeling, as meaningful “sensed complexity”, “implicit understanding sensed in living”, makes reference to implicit bodily organizational process and by doing so contributes to the process as a further change within it. For Gendlin as for Heidegger, feeling is a function of intricate change.

“The scheme I have developed renders psychological events such that only change is felt. Rather than viewing feelings as static entities, the opposite conclusion results: if something were unchanged, it would not be felt. Feeling, or sentience, is the change made in the body, i.e., in the implying.”(Gendlin 1973)

**The Body, Language and Culture:**

In conclusion, I would like to briefly address the implications of Gendlin’s temporal model for the understanding of the body’s relation to language and culture. Current embodied and phenomenological interpretations consider the embeddedness of the embodied subject in a world of linguistic cultural practices to be of fundamental importance to the understanding of behavior.

“…intersubjective (social and cultural) factors already have an effect on our perception and understanding of the world, even in the immediacy of our embodied and instrumental copings with the environment.”(Gallagher 2012b)

While Gendlin agrees with Gallagher and others that the experiencing body is inherently an environmental, and thus social interaction, he construes the nature of this intersubjectivity
differently. The reciprocally causal temporality underpinning the embodied approaches mentioned in this paper leads necessarily to the idea of intersubjectivity as an interdependent cobbling and co-ordination between personal history and cultural signs in which the ‘joints' of such interactive bodily and social practices are simultaneously within my own subjectivity and common to other participants in my community. Socialization is seen as a direct introjection or conditioning from the cultural environment, leaving personal experience with only a weak pragmatic self-consistency.

This is what Gallagher calls primary intersubjectivity, after Merleau-Ponty’s notion of intercorporeality.

By contrast, Gendlin’s occurring into implying grounding of temporality produces an implicatory rather than a reciprocally causal account of relation between body and world. This imbues bodily sense making with a pragmatic integrity, intricacy and self-intimacy missing from other accounts of intersubjectivity.

“There is a big difference between my view and that of the current philosophers. They say that the body as sensed from inside is meaningful and interactional only through language (which includes concepts, culture, and history). If we find a bodily sense meaningful, they think this can only be what language and culture have trained into our bodies.” (Gendlin 2009c)

Gendlin’s re-envisioning of the body as radical interaffecting, like Heidegger’s Being-with, locates the genesis of meaning-making in a more fundamental process than that of socially distributed joint activity.

“Our bodily sense of situations is a concretely sensed interaction process that always exceeds culture, history, and language.” “It is not the body of perception that is structured by language. Nor is the body's interaction structured by culture and language alone. Rather, it is the body of interactional living in its environment. The body's interaction is always more intricate than language. It is after and with language, always again freshly ongoing and constellating this situation in the present.”

“To think that we are the creation of culture is not a view one can maintain if one senses ongoing bodily experiencing directly. The intricacy you are now living vastly exceeds what cultural forms have contributed to you. With focusing we discover that we are much more organized from the inside out.”

“In living, our bodies generate, imply, and enact language and culture; but with and after those, our bodies imply (project, experience, sense, practice, demand . . . ) more. What they imply is inherently interactional and social, but it is more precise and implies what has never as yet formed and happened.” (Gendlin 1994)
Failing to reduce the causal temporality of presencing objects to the more primordial time of implicatory intricacy, current models are forced to treat that any account which claims to give priority to intimate pragmatic self-belonging over socially induced self-alteration as representing a retreat from a model of full social embeddedness into a person-centered solipsistic essentialism. Gallagher’s critique of Heidegger’s account of the social exemplifies this blindness to what Gendlin calls the experiential intricacy. According to Gallagher, Dasein's being-with-others is what he dubs a form of philosophical autism, a retreat from the immediate contingency of world-exposure, (primary intersubjectivity), the choosing of solipsist instrumentalities at the expense of robust and primordial being with others.

Gallagher(2010) says:

“In Heidegger, and in thinkers who follow his line of thought, we find the idea that a relatively complete account of our embodied, expert, enactive, pragmatic engagements with the world can be given prior to or without reference to intersubjectivity.”

Rather than a retreat from a thoroughgoing notion of sociality, the radically temporal relevanting Gendlin’s model shares with Heidegger is a re-situating of the site of the social as a more originary and primordial grounding than that of the over-determined abstractions represented by discursive intersubjectivities. Those larger patterns of human belonging which intercorporeal approaches discern in terms of joint activities and cultural language practices hide within themselves a more primary patterning. While our experience as individuals is characterized by stable relations of relative belonging or alienation with respect to other individuals and groups, the site of this interactivity, whether we find ourselves in greater or lesser agreement with a world within which we are enmeshed, has a character of peculiar within-person continuity. It also has a character of relentless creative activity that undermines and overflows attempts to understand human action based on reciprocally casual between-person configurations.

For Heidegger and Gendlin, the within-person dynamic is already a between-person in that it is a thoroughgoing exposure to, and continuous self-transformation via, an outside, an alterity, an otherness. The radically inseparable interaffecting between my history and new experience exposes me to the world, and modifies who I am, in an immediate, constant and thoroughgoing manner, producing every moment a global reshaping of my sense of myself and others outpacing the transformative impetus realized via Gallagher’s inter-causal notion of primary intersubjectivity. My sense of my own identity is relentlessly, but subtly, formed and reformed through direct and indirect social engagement, but in a manner which presupposes and is made possible by the unified synthetic continuity of my implicit understanding of the world.

Before there is a pre-reflective personal ‘I’ or interpersonal ‘we’, there is already within what would be considered THE person a fully social site of simultaneously subjective-objective process overtaking attempts to understand human action based on either within-person constancies or between-person conditionings. Gendlin and Heidegger maintain that what is implicated for me in
an interpersonal social situation is not 'the' social forms as shared homunculi, based on what Gallagher calls a 'common body intentionality' between perceived and perceiver, but aspects hidden within these so-called forms which one could say are unique to the implicative thrust of my own construing, belonging to me in a fashion that exceeds my own calculative grasp even as it transcends strictly shared social normativity.

As participant in an intersubjective community my implicative experiencing shapes and orients my reciprocal interactions with others in such a way that my own subjective thread of continuity runs through it. That is to say, hidden within the naive exteriority of my social encounters is a peculiar sort of coherence or implicate self-consistency. For even the most apparently trivial cultural routine (getting on a plane, ordering in a restaurant), what I perceive as socially 'permitted', 'constrained', 'regulated' or 'normed' behavior and understanding of signs is already qualitatively distinctive in relation to what other participants recognize. Each individual who feels belonging to an extent in a larger ethico-political collectivity perceives that collectivity's functions in a unique, but peculiarly coherent way relative to their own history (which is itself reshaped by its participation in these situations), even when they believe that their interpersonal interactions are guided by the constraints imposed by essentially the 'same' discursive conventions as the others in their language community.

**Conclusion:**

In this paper, I have tried to demonstrate that Gendlin’s psychotherapeutic work identifying, articulating and creatively integrating bodily feeling with respect to objective and interpersonal relationships is an outgrowth of an ambitious philosophical effort to critique and rethink assumptions held by a range of writers in embodied cognitive psychology and phenomenology. Among the assumptions Gendlin questions are current views on relevance and affective motivation, attention, reflection, the genesis of mathematical naturalism and sensori-motor models of behavior, and the relation between the body, language and culture. Gendlin shows that within current embodied accounts each of these aspects of human functioning gets its sense and is necessarily interlinked with all the others on the basis of an overarching model of temporality that splits up the flow of time into separated units of presence. Gendlin rejects this causal model of time in favor of a radically internal time that shares a number of features in common with the temporal models of Husserl and Heidegger.

In sum, the consequences of Gendlin’s radically temporal approach are as follows:

1) Mathematical Naturalism:

In opposition to current attempts to produce a mathematical naturalization of Husserlian time consciousness, Gendlin argues that change of degree (quantitative) is always at the same time change in kind (qualitative). As a result, the world does not appear primordially as countable
units, and events do not possess mathematically calculable spatial extension or temporal
endurance.

2) Attention and Reflection:

There is no pre-reflective awareness, but this must be understood to mean that the primordial
structure of self-awareness functions prior to a splitting of experience into an opposition between
self-presenting subject and appearing object. This ‘reflexive’ reflectivity is more fundamental
than supposedly immediate, pre-intentional attentive self-awareness. All attention is inherently
intentional and self-transforming.

3) Feeling:

In current accounts, affect is the contingent product of a complex reciprocally causal interaction
among bodily, perceptual and social elements. In Gendlin's radically temporal account affective
relevance is not imposed on an experience from the outside via bodily and socially introjected
causes, but is presupposed by the always already self-differentiating movement of experience. A
prior element is already affected by what it interacts with before it can simply inhere in itself as
cause. Past and present function as already cross-affected by the other.

4) Intersubjectivity:

Gendlin’s occurring into implying grounding of temporality produces an implicatory rather than a
reciprocally causal account of intersubjectivity, locating the genesis of meaning-making in a more
fundamental process than that of socially distributed joint activity. This imbues bodily sense
making with a pragmatic integrity, intricacy and self-intimacy missing from other accounts of
intersubjectivity.

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Abstract:

In this paper, I show how Husserl, via the method of the epoche, dissolves Merleau-Ponty’s starting point in the gestalt structuralism of primary corporeal intersubjectivity, revealing a more radically temporal foundation that has nothing of gestalt form in it. Whereas for Merleau-Ponty, the dependency of the parts belonging to a whole is a presupposed unity, for Husserl, a whole instantiates a temporal story unfolding each of its parts out of the others associatively-synthetically as the furthering of a continuous progression or enrichment of sense. As a consequence of the deconstruction of the gestalt, Husserl’s notion of the foreign must be understood in different terms than that of corporeal otherness. He offers an otherness to self that manifests itself as a thematic belonging to self whose self-similarity presupposes and is built from this irreducible foreignness. This is not a privileging of the same over the different, but rather a situating of the binary in a more insubstantial and therefore more intimate space of relationship than that of corporeal embodiment.

In recent years, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty have become valuable sources of inspiration for philosophers and psychologists embracing embodied approaches to consciousness. A common tendency within this scholarly community is to judge the success of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology by how closely it aligns with Merleau-Ponty’s project. Some believe that Merleau-Ponty nudged phenomenology further along in the direction that Husserl was aiming toward in his later years, the implication being that Merleau-Ponty’s project is a more radical one than Husserl’s and that Husserl was not able to overcome a tendency to fall back into transcendental solipsism, subjectivism, Kantian idealism. Others claim that a reading of the entire Husserlian ouvre including unpublished manuscripts reveals Husserl to have escaped these charges of Cartesianism. In either case it is Merleau-Ponty’s embodied phenomenology that is often used as the yardstick by which to measure Husserl’s account.

The thesis I will argue here is that a crucial dimension of Husserl’s philosophy is being missed when we read Husserl using Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception as a normative frame of reference. Instead, I offer a reading of Husserl that shows him to have undertaken a deconstruction of Merleau-Ponty’s starting point in the structuralism of gestalt corporeality. Following from this, Husserl’s approach offers a decisive alternative to Merleau-Ponty’s explanation of the role of alterity in one’s relationship to one’s body as well as intersubjective engagements.

Let me begin with a brief outline of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of corporeal structure. For Merleau-Ponty, the body of perception is the underpinning of being in the world, and the primordial basis
of perception is the gestalt structure.

“Each point in its turn can be perceived only as a figure on a background. When Gestalt theory informs us that a figure on a background is the simplest sense-given available to us, we reply that this is not a contingent characteristic of factual perception, which leaves us free, in an ideal analysis, to bring in the notion of impressions. It is the very definition of the phenomenon of perception, that without which a phenomenon cannot be said to be perception at all. The perceptual ‘something’ is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a ‘field’.” (Phenomenology of Perception, p.4)

When Merleau-Ponty says a figure appears against a background, we can understand this to mean that the background is the system (ensemble, constellation, environment, setting, scene) that the figure belongs to. Figure-ground together form a ‘spontaneous arrangement of parts’ in which, ‘its parts together make up a whole to which each is related without leaving its place’ (Phenomenology of Perception, p.16). The figure cannot be understood outside of its role in this systematic totality. The ensemble has properties which are irreducible to those of the assembled elements. Merleau-Ponty makes internally centered structure irreducible. Gestalt is a founding configuration.

“The ‘real’ is that environment in which each moment is not only inseparable from the rest, but in some way synonymous with them, in which the ‘aspects’ are mutually significatory and absolutely equivalent... The thing is that manner of being for which the complete definition of one of its attributes demands that of the subject in its entirety; an entity, consequently, the significance of which is indistinguishable from its total appearance.”(P of Perception, p.376)

“ It is as much of my essence to have a body as it is the future’s to be the future of a certain present. So that neither scientific thematization nor objective thought can discover a single bodily function strictly independent of existential structures, or conversely a single ‘spiritual’ act which does not rest on a bodily infrastructure. ”(P. of Perception, p.501)

Merleau-Ponty sees intersubjectivity as a simultaneous configuration of parts just as he does perception of objects. Sense always co-implies body, and subjectivity belongs to intersubjectivity. Being in the world for Merleau-Ponty is occupying a position within a shared gestalt (the same world for everyone). I am primordially situated in an intersubjective world.

How does Husserl’s treatment of the concept of the whole-part relationship compare with Merleau-Ponty’s? Scattered throughout Husserl’s writings are descriptions of many different kinds of whole-part relations within both lower passive and higher active egoic constitutive strata. There are whole-part structures constituted as associative fusion, explication, objectification, relational plurality, and apperceptive intersubjective pairing, to name a few. Husserl defines a whole in the broadest sense in the following way: “by whole is understood every unitary object which admits of partial apprehensions, that is, a penetrative, explicative contemplation, and by”part” every explicate that results therefrom. “(Ex and Judgement, p.141).
Conspicuously missing from this definition is that feature of a totality which qualifies it as a
gestalt, the dependence of the meaning of the parts on the whole. If we attempt to find in
Husserl’s work a narrower delineation of whole-part structuration which captures the essence of
the gestalt field, we might at first believe we have found it in his analyses of the apprehension of a
spatial object.

When one apprehends a spatial object in terms of a quality or property that one notices in it at any
particular moment (its color, shape, size) both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty speak of such
explications as dependent moments of the object, that is, as determinations of a ‘part’ whose
meaning is dependent on the whole. Husserl writes:
“To pin down the concept of non-independence, it is enough to say that a non-independent object
can only be what it is (i.e. what it is in virtue of its essential properties) in a more comprehensive
whole.” (logical investigations, p.169). Before we assume that Husserl and Merleau-Ponty have in
mind the same concept of dependency with regard to the determinations of the moments of a
spatial object, we need to take seriously Merleau-Ponty’s own critique of the Husserlian model of
the constitution of the object.

Husserl’s reduction of the simultaneous Gestalt perception to a temporal structuration:

Merleau-Ponty sees acts of synthesis and constitution, what he calls signification, as derivative
and secondary in relation to structure (gestalt), which defines the world and is therefore the
condition of possibility of synthetic, constitutive acts. From this vantage, it appears to Merleau-
Ponty that Husserl treats the elements of a flowing multiplicity of hyletic data as positive
essences, as objects separable from what conditions them via subjective history. Instead, he
argues, “There is no hylé, no sensation which is not in communication with other sensations or
the sensations of other people.” (P. Of Perception, p.471). Perceptual essence

“is not a positive element, not a quiddity; it is rather a divergence within the corporeal field of things.
The unity of the thing is of a piece with the unity of the entire field; and this field is grasped not as a
unity of parts but as a living ensemble. The living ensemble cannot be recomposed of essences in the
sense of eide, since these are positives – significatory atoms or constants. Hence, the eidetic method is
in reality an idealistic variant of the constancy hypothesis [a point-by-point correspondence between a
stimulus and the perception of it].” (Phenomenological Method in Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of
Gurwitsch, Ted Toadvine, p.200).

**Multiplicity as Collective Combination:**

Merleau-Ponty is correct that for Husserl a totality is grasped ‘as a unity of parts’, but I believe
Merleau-Ponty misunderstands how singular elements of meaning (primal impressions) function
for Husserl in relation to totalities. (I will discuss later the relationship between hyletic data and
the body in Husserl’s account.) The central issue between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty concerns
the following: Is there a way to view Husserl’s alternative to Merleau-Ponty’s gestalt corporeality
not as a problematic treatment of originary otherness, but as putting into question the
philosophical justification (whether as phenomenology or ontology) of Merleau-Ponty’s configurational grounding of experience as centered totality?

In Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891), well before his first forays into transcendental subjectivity, Husserl described a method for understanding the constitution of a multiplicity or plurality composed of independent parts, which he dubbed ‘collective combination’. It may seem odd to introduce an analysis of whole-part relation that begins from independent parts rather than the dependent moments of a whole that gestalt structure presumes to comprise. However, as will be made evident shortly, I aim to demonstrate that the so-called dependent elements of a gestalt do not in fact meet Husserl’s criterion of radical dependence.

According to Husserl, the basis of any sort of whole of independently apprehended parts (a whole in the pregnant sense) is the collective combination, which is an abstracting act of consciousness uniting parts.

“Collective combination plays a highly significant role in our mental life as a whole. Every complex phenomenon which presupposes parts that are separately and specifically noticed, every higher mental and emotional activity, requires, in order to be able to arise at all, collective combinations of partial phenomena. There could never even be a representation of one of the more simple relations (e.g., identity, similarity, etc.) if a unitary interest and, simultaneously with it, an act of noticing did not pick out the terms of the relation and hold them together as unified. This ‘psychical’ relation is, thus, an indispensable psychological precondition of every relation and combination whatsoever.” (p.78)

He conducted these researches under a psychological rubric, leading to accusations of psychologism from Frege and others. Ten years later he understood his method to be phenomenological, correcting the impressions of psychologism without affecting the substance of his description of the constitution of totality. In Experience and Judgement, he conducts a similar investigation under the heading of apprehension of plurality.

In any such whole the parts are united in a specific manner. Fundamental to the genesis of almost all totalities is that its parts initially appear as a temporal succession.

“Succession in time constitutes an insuppressible psychological precondition for the formation of by far the most number concepts and concrete multiplicities - and practically all of the more complicated concepts in general.”(Phil of Arithmetic, p.29) “Almost all representations of multiplicities - and, in any case, all representations of numbers - are results of processes, are wholes originated gradually out of their elements. Insofar as this is so, each element bears in itself a different temporal determination.”(p.33) “Temporal succession forms the only common element in all cases of multiplicity, which therefore must constitute the foundation for the abstraction of that concept.”(p.30)

While the first step of constitution of a multiplicity is the awareness of the temporal succession of parts, each of which we are made aware of as elements “separately and specifically noticed”, the collective combination itself only emerges from a secondary act of consciousness. This higher order
constituting sense changes what was originally a temporal succession into a simultaneity by ‘bringing’ back the previous parts via reflecting on them in memory. Husserl says that a combination of objects is similar to the continuity of a tone. In both cases, a temporal succession is perceived through reflection as a simultaneity.

“For the apprehension of each one of the colligated contents there is required a distinct psychical act. Grasping them together then requires a new act, which obviously includes those distinct acts, and thus forms a psychical act of second order.” (p.77) “It is essential that the partial representations united in the representation of the multiplicity or number be present in our consciousness simultaneously [in an act of reflection].” (p.33)

The constitution of an abstract multiplicity is analogous to the creation of any whole, even though the former involves a peculiarly external form of unification in comparison to combinations unified by similarity or continuity.

A key feature of the fact that a totality is a product of a temporally unfolding series of sense acts is that prior elements of the originally apprehended series have already changed by the time we move on to the succeeding elements of that series. “In forming the representation of the totality we do not attend to the fact that changes in the contents occur as the colligation progresses.” (p.32)

The secondary sense-forming act of the uniting of the pasts into the whole is not, then, ‘faithful’ to the original meaning of the parts it colligates, in that they have already changed their original sense via the passage of time at the point where we perform the uniting act of multiplicity. Rather than a being faithful, the sense of the unification act may better be described as a moving beyond the original sense-constituting acts forming the apprehension of the parts.

In forming a new dimension of sense from retentional and protentional consciousness, the unifying act of totalization idealizes the parts that it unifies. In addition to the abstractive concept of groupness (collective combination), many kinds of more intimate idealizations are constituted as wholes out of original temporal successions. We can see this clearly in the case of the real object, an ideal totality formed out of a continuous synthetic flow of adumbrations in which what is actually experienced in the present is not the ‘faithful’, that is, actual presencing of temporally simultaneous elements but a simultaneity of retentional series, present sense and protentional anticipations.

Let me conclude this discussion by emphasizing three fundamental features brought out by the analysis of the collective combination:

1) The would-be simultaneity of ‘all these right here right now’ must be experienced originally as a series of temporal creations birthing, via association, my apprehension of each part from my apprehension of a previous.
2) In an act subsequent to the sequential apprehension of parts, when the ensemble does appear as a simultaneity, it is not as a presence of multiple parts, but as a synthesis of recollection, presencing and protention. Co-existence is never the appearance ‘at the same time, in the same space’ of multiple presencing, but a synthesis of memory, the now, and expectation. It is “the coexistence of retentions with the sensible point as momentary primordial coexistence” (Active and
3) The unity connecting all of them together in the ‘same’ instant requires a secondary act, a new temporal creation, a new ‘object’ of sense beyond the succession of original apprehensions of the individual parts. The whole, forming the full latent meaning of each part as all belonging equally to the same multiplicity, is the result of a secondary creative act motivated by the experiencing of the original parts, but constituting a new sense going beyond the parts, enriching their meaning rather than capturing it. Association connects separated consciousnesses to a consciousness of a higher order. "Unity, ipseity, is given to consciousness through a higher consciousness founded in multiple consciousnesses, precisely in "synthetic" unitary consciousness."(Passive and Active Synthesis, p.487).

Thus, for Husserl an entire ongoing history underlies an ‘all of these all at once unified in this way’.

Although the collective combination is a peculiarly abstractive and externalistic form of whole-part relation, these three features necessarily inhere in all types of wholes. To understand this more clearly, let’s look at an example where the ‘parts’ of a whole make up dependent moments of the object rather than being independent of each other. The explication of the moments of a spatial object in terms of individual determinations of its qualities and properties provides us with such an example. For Husserl the object as I experience it this moment in any of its aspects is the full, synthetically unified concatenation of contents from memory, anticipation and presence. Whereas in the case of the collective combination, each part bears no relation to the others, in the constitution of the spatial object via adumbrated synthesis, each step coincides, interpenetrates and overlaps the previous on the basis of associative similarity. Each moment enriches by being born from the totality as a new sense within the object’s(substrate) total unity or synthesis of coincidence and correlation. Each moment is a partial apprehension within what is present to consciousness as a whole. This notion of whole isn’t a sum of parts, but a creative becoming and fulfillment in which each ‘part’, each moment of adumbrated sense gives birth, via associative similarity, to a new sense of the whole.

“Of essential necessity there belongs to any “all-sided” continuously, unitarily, and self-confirming experimental consciousness of the same physical thing a multifarious system of continuous multiplicities of appearances and adumbrations in which all objective moments falling within perception with the characteristic of being themselves given “in person” are adumbrated by determined continuities. Each determination has its system of adumbrations; and each of them, like the physical thing as a whole, is there as the Same for the seizing-upon consciousness which synthetically unites memory and new perception as the Same, despite any interruption of the continuous course of actional perception.”(Ideas I, p.87)

Dependent parts of whole substrates modify and enrich the prior whole. The temporal constitution of an object is a “progressive creation of sense”.

“...the having-in-grasp of the object being explicated is not a having-in-grasp which is unchanged with regard to content, i.e., a still-having-in-grasp of the same, “such as” it was for consciousness before this stage; on the contrary, thanks to constantly new partial coincidences, it is an always different having-in-grasp. In every step, what is gotten hold of as singular is incorporated by the coincidence into the sense content of the substrate. The individual graspings are transformed, not into merely
retentive individual graspings such as occur when something is still retained in simple contemplation or when one passes on to a new object, but into modifications of a total grasp, in other words, into enrichments of its content”. (Ex and Judging, p.118)

When Husserl speaks of the co-existence of correlated features of an object, this must be understood as a reciprocal activity of constitution in which each adumbration has its own sense as a temporal moment within the fused whole. (“With every current Now, we have an "ensemble" of retentions in their succession (in "coexistence"), and this entire sequence is in "coinciding"” (Passive and Active Synthesis, p.429)). The constitution of corporeality unfolds temporally as a system of regulating changes in multiple senses (kinesthetic, optical, tactile) in the apprehension of a unified physical object. Rather than a co-presencing of parts in the same NOW, systems of corporeal relations organize themselves in consciousness temporally as what Husserl variously calls a retentionally-protentionally unfolding flow, stream, flux, synthesis, series, interplay, concordantly and synthetically progressing perception, continuous-unitary manifold.

Here we see the same features that pertained to the collective combination of independent parts. 1) the original temporal constitution of the object from singular adumbrated sense parts 2) the ‘simultaneous’ appearance of the parts, not as co-presencing within the same space of now of multiple elements, but a synthesis of retentions, presencing and protentions 3) the experiencing of the adumbrations via the aspect of ‘same’ object as a secondary act, a new ‘object’ of sense beyond the collecting together of the original apprehensions of the individual parts, enriching their meaning rather than capturing it..”Unity, ipseity, is given to consciousness through a higher consciousness founded in multiple consciousnesses, precisely in "synthetic" unitary consciousness.” (Passive and Active Synthesis, p.487)

Note that while the elements that form the collective combination are not associated with each other via similarity as are the adumbrated moments of a spatial object, they are not devoid of all connection. Their mutual relationship as members of a plurality, while abstractive, nonetheless manifests a historical dependence. That is, each particular ‘gives birth to’ the following in a temporal succession. Their mutual dependance is assured by the synthetic flow of time consciousness. The way that I am motivated to notice now one, now another element, and then to recollectively hold them together as a plurality in order to constitute a new object of sense from them what unifies them as a whole, manifests a radical dependancy of sense on previous sense, even in the case of the colligation of separate objects.

Let me now try to make clear why I chose to begin my discussion of Husserl’s account of whole-part relations with an example of colligation of independent parts. If for Husserl, even independent parts are related via original temporal dependency, is this true for Merleau-Ponty with regard to the elements that belong to gestalt configurations? It is certainly the case that the very essence of the meaning of parts of a gestalt lies in their utter dependence on the whole. But this is not the same sort of dependence as that represented by temporal genesis. Lets see why this is.

For Merleau-Ponty, there is, outside of memory and anticipation, a concatenation of parts
appearing in consciousness in the present moment all at once as ‘this object’. Intrinsic to this ‘all at once’ ensemble, giving it its unity as gestalt, is a dimension common to each part but not reducible to it, a centering identity of the whole configuration both belonging to each part but beyond each particular: A gestalt system is “a signification common to an ensemble of molecular facts, which is expressed by all the facts and which is not contained completely in any one of them.”(Structure of Behavior, p.143). The features that for Husserl are essential for dependent moments, as well as independent elements, of a whole object, are absent from Merleau-Ponty’s gestalts. Within the confines of their configurational structure, ensembles are absent history, temporality and progression. Relative to one another, the elements defined by the field evince a dependence of arbitrary connection, not a dependence of genesis.

Merleau-Ponty’s ‘spontaneous arrangement of parts’ in which, ‘its parts together make up a whole to which each is related without leaving its place’ is a collection of independent objects when seen from within the freeze-frame moment. How so? Only when we shift from one moment to the next can we discover that the meaning of all of the parts that form the whole shift as a unity, in that all of the pieces are transformed -dissolved-reconfigured equally relative to their prior role in the ensemble. But within the instantaneous frame, each element has no genetic connection with other elements. Unlike for Husserl, each part has not been ‘born’ from other elements within the ensemble. The sense of each is presupposed by itself rather than created temporally from the others, and one then presumes to understand the meaning of each independent element by its arbitrary relation with all the others within the total configuration. The nature of the dependence of each part on the others in the moment must then be considered an external relation between independent objects in comparison to the Husserlian synthesis of adumbrated parts. In the freeze frame moment, our consciousness of the ensemble is as a collective combination or relational plurality of independently constituted objects, an ‘all of these right here right now’ in such and such a pattern of relations.

This may seem to run directly counter to Merleau-Ponty’s insistence that elements of a gestalt are anything but external to each other ‘...without any perception of the whole we would not think of noticing the resemblance or the contiguity of its elements, but literally that they would not be part of the same world and would not exist at all.”(PP,p.19) Could one not say here that the whole gives birth to each of the parts? Yes, but it does so, not as unique associative syntheses between individual parts, but equally to all. Each part is dependent on the SAME genesis, and because each part is at the same time different from each other, this comes down to saying that these senses are independent of each other even as they are united by the whole. In other words, Merleau-Ponty’s dependent pieces of a whole function as a plurality of related independent parts. The whole relating each part dependently with the others does not reveal to us a temporal story unfolding each element out of the others associatively-synthetically as the furthering of a continuous progression or enrichment of sense, only a pre-supposed pattern.

The thinking of plural structure as a simultaneous spatial unity implies a multiplicity of parts or senses (even if completely dependent on the whole), captured in that present instant of the now
that is sandwiched between retention and protention. But the assumption that we can imagine this parallel existence of differences at the ‘same time’, as the ‘same space’ (subjective, not geometric space), organized and centered as a ‘THIS’ (this configuration), must unravel with the knowledge that each differential singular is born of and belongs irreducibly to, even as it is a transformation of, a prior sense. Two different elements (and they must differ if they are to belong to a configuration) cannot be presumed to exist as actually present at the same time as dependent aspects of a totality because each single sense is its own time. The assumption of a spatial frame depends on the ability to return to a previous element without the contaminating effect of time. How can we know that elements of meaning are of the same spatial frame unless each is assumed to refer back to the same ‘pre-existing’ structure?

If the notion of a gestalt, after reduction to the stratum of primordial constitution, is deprived of its claim to make the otherness of an outside configurational ground intrinsic to the meaning of an element of sense, how does otherness make its way into the heart of the primal impression? Perhaps the better question here is why Merleau-Ponty finds it necessary to begin from configurational structure in order to assure that an element of meaning is carved out of otherness rather than solipsist positivity. I think the answer from Husserl’s point of view is that Merleau-Ponty never took notice of the peculiarly insubstantial subjective-objective becoming that makes Husserl’s starting point in the retention-impression-protention triad of time consciousness already a self-othering, thus an exposure to the foreign from within the resources of subjectivity, prior to any configurational-corporeal constitution. But do not retention, primal impression and protention themselves form a totality? They do not in the sense of a colligation of separated contents. Instead, they form the structure of a SINGLE element. One could say that a singular moment of sense for Husserl is its own gestalt in that its tripartite structure (past-present-future) is a unification of three aspects.

“...one’s own presence, one’s own past are in themselves non-independent; only the entire unity of my life given in originary experience, to which belong my entire past and the anticipated future, is a full concretum.” (First Philosophy, p.376)

It would have to be made clear, though, that such a totality constitutes the structure of temporality itself. By contrast, corporeal configuration is a second order act of abstraction on a succession of elements IN time, that is, each with its own temporal marker. As such, corporeal gestalt has no claim to irreducibility and essentiality. Merleau-Ponty has inadvertently totalized a history.

The Epoche and The World For All of Us:

When a gestalt configuration changes, even though it is true that all the elements comprising that configuration are altered, there is really only one change, that of the field as an irreducible totality. If the elements of that field are persons, then in intersubjective communication each participant’s alteration is an aspect of the total change in the social
configuration. There is one change, that of the totality, and each person is only an element of that change. As Merleau-Ponty says: “as the parts of my body together comprise a system, so my body and the other’s are one whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon, and the anonymous existence of which my body is the ever-renewed trace henceforth inhabits both bodies simultaneously.” (P. Of Perception, p.412)

From Husserl’s perspective, just as each element in a perceptual system gives birth, via associative synthesis, to the rest of the system as a synthetic unfolding, as participant in an intersubjective community each of my motivated acts gives birth to, that is, frames and orients, my reciprocal interactions with others in my community. This temporal ‘birthing’ constitutes intersubjectivity in such a way that my own subjective thread of continuity runs through and organizes it. That is to say, hidden within the naive exteriority of my social encounters is a peculiar sort of coherence or implicate self-consistency. However alien to me is a world of fellow egos, each with their own subjective process, all I can ever apperceive of that otherness is what I mediatively, non-inferentially ‘pick out’ in analogical similarity with my own process.

This resistance of each subjectivity to the normativity of the intersubjective ensemble is untenable from the vantage of Merleau-Ponty’s gestalt approach. Merleau-Ponty writes, in opposition to Husserl’s apperceptive access to the Other,

” My friend Paul and I point out to each other certain details of the landscape; and Paul’s finger, which is pointing out the church tower, is not a finger-for-me that I think of as orientated towards a church-tower-for-me, it is Paul’s finger which itself shows me the tower that Paul sees, just as, conversely, when I make a movement towards some point in the landscape that I can see, I do not imagine that I am producing in Paul, in virtue of some pre-established harmony, inner visions merely analogous to mine: I believe, on the contrary, that my gestures invade Paul’s world and guide his gaze. When I think of Paul, I do not think of a flow of private sensations indirectly related to mine through the medium of interposed signs, but of someone who has a living experience of the same world as mine, as well as the same history, and with whom I am in communication through that world and that history.” (Phenomenology of Perception, p.471)

“ In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and myself a common ground; my thought and his are inter-woven into a single fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of the discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator. We have here a dual being, where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of behavior in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist through a common world. In the present dialogue, I am freed from myself, for the other person’s thoughts are certainly his; they are not of my making, though I do grasp them the moment they come into being, or even anticipate them. And indeed, the objection which my interlocutor raises to what I say draws from me thoughts which I had no idea I possessed, so that at the same time that I lend him thoughts, he reciprocates by making me think too. It is only retrospectively, when I have withdrawn from the dialogue and am recalling it that I am able to reintegrate it into my life.
and make of it an episode in my private history”. (Phenomenology of Perception, p.413))

Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of the social space as centered configuration makes individual behavior in social situations the product of narrative norms, reciprocities, shared practices and social constraints. The presupposition here is the belief that essentially the same social signs are available to all who interrelate within a particular community, that there are such things as non-person-specific meanings, originating in an impersonal expressive agency. This is not to say that his account denies any role to individual psychological history in the reception of social signs, only that intersubjectivity is characterized by a reciprocal cobbling and co-ordination between personal history and cultural signs in which the ‘joints’ of such interactive bodily-mental and social practices are simultaneously within my own subjectivity and common to other participants in my community.

Let’s take a look at how Husserl employs the phenomenological reduction to penetrate beneath the naivete of Merleau-Ponty’s ‘same’ intersubjective world in order to arrive at the world from my vantage. In this passage from the Crisis, one of his last published writings, Husserl uses the universal epoche to strip away all that is merely relative and contingent in experience, in order to lay bare the irreducible architectonics of subjectivity. Such relativities include myself as a natural ego embedded within a reciprocal intersubjective world of monadic others. What then remains as founding these secondary transcendencies is the apodictic structuration of consciousness as an essential unified mineness.

“I have others through the experiential mode of empathy as existing actualities with whom I know myself to be merely in community. But when I practice the reducing epoche on myself and my world-consciousness, the other human beings, like the world itself, fall before the epoche; that is, they are merely intentional phenomena for me. Thus the radical and perfect reduction leads to the absolutely single ego of the pure psychologist, who thus at first absolutely isolates himself and as such no longer has validity for himself as a human being or as really existing in the world but is instead the pure subject of his intentionality, which through the radical reduction is universal and pure, with all its intentional implications. This is the apodictic ego, existing apodictically in its intentionalities, which are apodictically contained within itself and can be opened up. And if the coexistence of other subjects, but as implied other egos, and thus the primal division between ‘I’ and "other," can be established [as being] in these intentionalities—and essentially so—then one of the main tasks of pure intentional psychology is to make understandable, by way of the progressive reduction of world-validity, the subjective and pure function through which the world as the "world for us all" is a world for all from my—the ego's—vantage point, with whatever particular content it may have. ..."(Crisis, p.256)

Among the things we learn from this method is that a thread of unified internal integrity runs through my apprehension of an intersubjectively interaffecting world of others. Other egos, reducible to transcendental subjects, are not just figments of my own constitutive process, but exist alongside my own in a system of intentional interpretation. However, an ongoing thread of subjective continuity underlies my (and every other ego’s) participation in interpersonal relations.
My contact with another person is not a dialogic ping pong game. Rather than a single game, interpersonal relationality is at least two intertwining games, from my vantage; it is both my integrally variating senses of the other's interpretation of our encounter, and my awareness of the dynamic stability of the difference between his and my outlook (our individual habitual histories of motivated position-taking). While I am with my friend, I can move back and forth between styles of my self-conversation and the interpersonal interchange, noting an ongoing difference in the relative thematic coherence of these two threads. In attempting to share my ideas with them, I can be aware of the overlap in our understanding at the same time that I recognize incommensurabilities between our perspectives.

But my perspective and that of another are not to be understood as solipsistically private regions. The interpersonal relation directly remakes my sense of what my 'own' perspective is, as well as what I assume to be the other's integral position. When I apperceptively ‘get inside the other's head’, it is simultaneously they getting inside my head. It is always a new sense of `me' and `other' that emerge in conversation, but as an intertwining correlative movement among internally unitary threads of implication.

Just as an object constituted from my own recollections and anticipations is only the ‘same’ over time as a unity of concordant nexus of changing modes, my sense of the identical object for all of us in empathetic community is a naive experiencing of what is only similar among all of us, a between-person similarity limited by an unbridgeable gap between our own subjective synthetic processes.

“Just as I, in the realm of my life, bring a perception of an object that I now carry out to a synthetic unity with another perception reproduced in recollection—in the consciousness of the same thing which exists presently and which also existed in the past—I can likewise, through empathy into the other, bring a perception empathized by him and carried out by him to a synthetic unity with my own perception, knowing it is the same object perceived by both of us. And likewise vice versa.” (First Philosophy, p.389)

My sense of my own identity is relentlessly, but subtly, formed and reformed through direct and indirect social engagement, but in a manner which presupposes and is made possible by the unified synthetic continuity of my motivated history of position-taking. I can passively allow myself to be influenced by others, but this is a superficial, ‘merely external’ type of affecting which does not steer my core motivational processes.

“What comes from others and is "taken over" by me, and is more external or less so, can be characterized as issuing from the other subject, first of all as a tendency proceeding from him and addressed to me, as a demand, to which I perhaps yield passively, perhaps reluctantly, but by which I am still overpowered. Alternatively, I might annex it on my own accord, and then it becomes part of me. In that case it no longer has the character of a mere demand to which I yield and which determines me from the outside; it has become a position-taking that issues from my own Ego and is not merely a stimulus coming from the outside and retaining the character of a borrowing of something that came forth from another Ego, of something that has its primal instauration in him.” (Ideas II, p.281)
Coming back now to inter-corporeal interpretations of Husserl, from the vantage of a thinking of irreducible intersubjectivity, it is troublesome that Husserl so consistently characterized the noetic-noematic subject-object relation in terms of unitary synthetic ‘mineness’. In order to make sense of this puzzling terminology in such a way as to rescue it from the charge of solipsism, it became necessary to interpret Husserl as meaning that the otherness of the world and history ‘passes through’ egoic subjectivity. For writers such as Merleau-Ponty and Zahavi, my sphere of ownness is a harbor for othernesses which have their home at the very heart of my subjectivity.

Zahavi writes:

“When I realize that I can be an alter ego for the Other just as he can be it for me, a marked change in my own constitutive significance takes place. The absolute difference between self and Other disappears. The Other conceives of me as an Other, just as I conceive of him as a self. I realize, that I am only one among many, that my perspective on the world is only one among several, wherefore my privileged status in relation to the objects of experience is suspended to a certain degree.” “No longer do I experience [my object of experience] as being dependent upon me and my factual existence. Quite to the contrary, as an intersubjective object it is endowed with an autonomy of being that transcends my finite existence.”(Zahavi, Husserl’s Intersubjective Transformation of Subjectivity, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 27/7, 1996, p.3)

Drawing from what the epoche reveals concerning the status and constitutive origin of intersubjectivity, it is possible to situate Zahavi’s comments on the social other in terms of its stratum of constitution. When Zahavi speaks of ‘my objects of experience’, he is referencing the naive view from the vantage of the natural ego. As a higher level of constitution than that of the primal ego, I apprehend myself as this natural ego in the moment that, through empathy, I apperceive an alter ego. That is the point where, the alter ego having been constituted through an apperceptive pairing, I then understand myself as one ego among others within an intersubjective community and empirically objective world. This enables the features that Zahavi describes to appear to me as constituting my world. This includes my awareness that ‘I’ (as natural ego) am only one among many, that my objectively constituted perspective on the world is only one among many perspectives, that the world is endowed with an autonomy of being that transcends my (the natural me) finite existence. But because the nature of this stratum of my experiencing is that of a secondary transcendency, this ‘world for all of us’ is only a relative, contingent constitution rather than the supposedly irreducible one Zahavi makes it out to be. Whereas Zahavi(1996) claims that “a radical implementation of the transcendental reduction leads with necessity to a disclosure of transcendental intersubjectivity”, Husserl insists that a radical reduction reveals the philosophical solitude of the absolute ego, which is prior to the constitutive accomplishment of transcendental intersubjectivity.

This ‘world for us’, from one to the other to the other, is constituted within MY (the primal me) subjective process as MY privileged apperception of ‘from one to the other to the other’. Primordially, the autonomy of being given to others is not directly accessible to me (me as apodictic rather than natural empirical ego). Rather than making the absolute difference between self and Other disappear, intersubjective apperception exposes this unbridgeable gap by allowing
only an interpretive mediate access to the alien, from within the singular ‘I’.

“The epoche creates a unique sort of philosophical solitude which is the fundamental methodical requirement for a truly radical philosophy. In this solitude I am not a single individual who has somehow willfully cut himself off from the society of mankind, perhaps even for theoretical reasons, or who is cut off by accident, as in a shipwreck, but who nevertheless knows that he still belongs to that society. I am not an ego, who still has his you, his we, his total community of co-subjects in natural validity. All of mankind, and the whole distinction and ordering of the personal pronouns, has become a phenomenon within my epoche; and so has the privilege of I-the-man among other men.” (Crisis, p.184)

“...it was wrong, methodically, to jump immediately into transcendental inter-subjectivity and to leap over the primal "I," the ego of my epoche, which can never lose its uniqueness and personal indeclinability. It is only an apparent contradiction to this that the ego—through a particular constitutive accomplishment of its own—makes itself declinable, for itself, transcendentally; that, starting from itself and in itself, it constitutes transcendental intersubjectivity, to which it then adds itself as a merely privileged member, namely, as "I" among the transcendental others. This is what philosophical self-exposition in the epoche actually teaches us. It can show how the always singular I, in the original constituting life proceeding within it, constitutes a first sphere of objects, the "primordial" sphere; how it then, starting from this, in a motivated fashion, performs a constitutive accomplishment through which an intentional modification of itself and its primordiality achieves ontic validity under the title of "alien-perception," perception of others, of another "I" who is for himself an I as I am. ”(Crisis, p.185)

Because the constitution of egoic otherness is a secondary, higher order differentiation within my own egoic processes, bracketing off the intersubjectively constituted objective world does not deprive my egoic processes of any of their essential features. The coherent founding stratum of what is included in my ownness includes what is other for me. “...every consciousness of what is other, every mode of appearance of it, belongs in the former sphere”,[ of what is included in my peculiar ownness]. (Cartesian Meditations, p.100)

“But here something remarkable strikes us : a sequence of evidences that yet, in their sequence, seem paradoxical. The psychic life of my Ego (this "psychophysical" Ego), including my whole world-experiencing life and therefore including my actual and possible experience of what is other, is wholly unaffected by screening off what is other. Consequently there belongs within my psychic being the whole constitution of the world existing for me and, in further consequence, the differentiation of that constitution into the systems that constitute what is included in my peculiar ownness and the systems that constitute what is other.”(Cartesian Meditations, p.98)

Footnote: The natural empirical ego that experiences a world as alien to me is founded on the ‘my ownness’ of the personal, psychophysical ego as a differentiation within it (exteriority constituted within interiority). But note here that the personal ego is itself an idealism in that, rather than leading us back to the apodictic self-othering, subjective-objective becoming of temporal constitution, the psycho-physical ego is itself a product of constitution, via self-apperception. When we complete the epoche by abstracting away this self-apperception, we arrive at the primordial stratum where there is as yet no ego,
but there remains the unitary flow of subjective temporal processes. “At the beginning of its development, the subject is not an Object for itself and does not have the apperceptive unity, "Ego."",(Ideas II, p.361)

If the unique ongoing integrity of my subjective flow of experiencing makes it impossible for me to ever have direct access to others, except as a naive presumption, via what Merleau-Ponty refers to as a ‘dual being’, ‘shared operation’, or ‘single fabric’, and what Zahavi calls a disappearance of the absolute difference between self and Other, then I cannot treat any notion of the intersubjective defined in this way as a philosophical a priori of experience.

As I discover that I am not simply my interactions with other people in the naive way that they are represented in corporeal intersubjective accounts, I am able to insert myself into the process of another's thinking more effectively. My recognition of the other's integrity of perceptual process is not a barrier to interaction with them, but an invitation to proceed further than the level of analysis which locates our conversation within shared rhetorical genres. This further engagement is not a retreat from the depth of social connectivity that is achieved via discursive methodology, but the move to a more thoroughgoing sociality, a sociality that recognizes the ongoing integrity of each person’s motivated position-taking.

Those larger patterns of human belonging abstracted from local joint activity, which Merleau-Ponty’s intercorporeal approach discerns in terms of cultural language practices, also hide within themselves a more primary patterning. While our experience as individuals is characterized by stable relations of relative belonging or alienation with respect to other individuals and groups, the site of this interactivity, whether we find ourselves in greater or lesser agreement with a world within which we are enmeshed, has a character of peculiar within-person continuity. It also has a character of relentless creative activity that undermines and overflows attempts to understand human action based on between-person configurations or fields. We may identify to a greater or lesser extent with various larger paradigmatic communities, delicately united by intertwining values. But the contribution of each member of a community to the whole would not originate at the level of spoken or bodily language interchange among voices; such constructs repress as much as they reveal. Even in a community of five individuals in a room, I, as participant, can perceive a locus of integrity undergirding the participation of each of the others to the responsive conversation. In my dealings with other persons, I would be able to discern a thread of continuity organizing their participation in dialogue with me, dictating the manner and extent to which I can be said to influence their thinking and they mine. My thinking can not properly be seen as 'determined' by his response, and his ideas are not simply 'shaped' by my contribution to our correspondence.

“Besides the tendencies which proceed from other individual persons, there are demands which arise in the intentional form of indeterminate generality, the demands of morality, of custom, of tradition, of the spiritual milieu: "one" judges in this way, "one " has to hold his fork like this, and so on—i.e., demands of the social group, of the class, etc. They can be followed quite passively, or one can also actively take a position with regard to them and make a free decision in favor of them. Therefore the autonomy of reason, the "freedom" of the personal subject, consists in the fact that I do not yield
passively to the influence of others but instead decide for myself. “(Ideas II, p.281)

The extent to which I could be said to be embedded within a particular set of cultural practices would be a function of how closely other persons I encounter resonate with my own ongoing experiential process. I can only shape my action to fit socially legitimate goals or permitted institutionalized grammatical forms to the extent that those goals or forms are already implicated in my ongoing experiential movement. Even then, what is implicated for me is not ‘the’ social forms, but aspects hidden within these so-called forms which are unique to my habitually stabilized motivated position-taking; what I perceive as socially ‘permitted’ rhetorical argumentation is already stylistically distinctive in relation to what other participants perceive as permitted. Each individual who feels belonging to an extent in a larger ethico-political collectivity perceives that collectivity's functions in a unique, but peculiarly coherent way relative to their own history, even when they believe that in moving forward in life their strategic language moves are guided by the constraints imposed by essentially the 'same' discursive conventions as the others in their speech community.

The Hyle and The Body:

Husserl’s exercise in abstractive reduction seems to point to a contradiction. On the one hand, I can imagine myself experiencing a modified world in which all otherness has been abstracted away, leaving only synthetic acts belonging to my peculiar ownness. And yet, such a reduced consciousness is still a consciousness of something. That is to say, it pre-supposes primal impressions and therefore hyletic data. Does hyletic data not imply sensation and therefore a constituted body? If so, am I not confronted with otherness in encountering my own corporeality, within my own ‘peculiar mineness’? Even if we could imagine a reduced world without other souls, am I not already introduced to the alien through my encounter with my corporeal body? What is at stake here is my claim that through the epoche, the unmediated otherness represented by Merleau-Ponty’s gestalt corporeality is dissolved into a radically integral absolute temporal flow.

Zahavi writes

“If there can be no primal impression without a hyletic content, and no hyletic content without a lived body (according to Husserl, the hyletic data are only given in correlation to kinaesthetic experiences), it must be concluded that the nature of temporality and embodiment cannot be exhaustively comprehended independently of each other. We are ultimately dealing with an incarnated temporality.” (Merleau-Ponty on Husserl: A Reappraisal, p.7)

"It is only possible to understand the experience of the Other—of the one who is foreign to me—when it is understood that I am foreign to myself. Hence my encounter with the Other is predelineated in my encounter with myself as an object, for then I am already an Other to myself. If I perceive a part of my own body in an objectifying way, then I am perceiving myself in my being-for-others—and it is within the horizon of this experience that the Other appears to me as well. To put it another way, in my corporeal existence I am intersubjective and social from the start” (Intersubjectivity in Sartre's Being and Nothingness, p.10).
Following this reasoning, we would need to understand the analogical, associative pairing making other egos accessible to me through apperception as the likeness I disclose between my self-alienating subjective-objective corporeality and that of others. Could it be that Zahavi and Thompson have found a way to reconcile Husserl’s apperception of the Other and Merleau-Ponty’s ‘world for all of us’ by locating the absolute origin of intersubjective otherness in my reversible relationship to my body as now subjective and now objective (as for instance when my one hand touches the other)?

Thompson and Zahavi claim that my bodily self-exploration permits me to confront my own exteriority, but this raises a number of questions. First, if Husserl considered my bodily self-exploration as a direct encounter with my own exteriority, and as preparation for my access to alien others, then why does he, in Cartesian Meditations (p.97), use the example of my one hand touching the other as demonstration of the sphere of the psychophysical ego’s ‘peculiar ownness’, and ‘marvellous being-for-himself’ as ‘reflexive intentional relatedness to itself’, contrasting this with the alienness of the transcendental other? Is not Husserl’s aim here to illustrate that I can never directly confront my own exteriority, whether within my own corporeality or through my apperception of an alter ego?

Second, even as my self-constitution as psychophysical being is a pre-condition for empathy, does my bodily self-exploration represent an ORIGINAL stratum of constitution? I agree with Merleau-Ponty, Zahavi and Thompson that my encounter with the Other is predelineated in my encounter with myself, but I believe the epoche requires me to bracket my corporeal being (my touching and touched hands), revealing the foundation of my experience of alterity not in my corporeality but within the pre-bodily stratum of original temporal constitution.

It is my contention that I originally confront my own ‘outside’ within the primordially reduced level of temporal constitution of the non-independent triadic concretum of past, present, and anticipatory future, and furthermore, this peculiarly intimate ‘foreignness’ must be understood in different terms than that of an objective exteriority. In this connection, I think it is significant that Husserl analogizes my apperception of an alter ego not to my relation to my body, but to the act of recollection.

In recollection, “... the immediate "I" performs an accomplishment through which it constitutes a variational mode of itself as existing (in the mode of having passed). Starting from this we can trace how the immediate "I," flowingly-statically present, constitutes itself in self-temporalization as enduring through “Its" pasts. In the same way, the immediate "I," already enduring in the enduring primordial sphere, constitutes in itself another as other...Thus, in me, "another I" achieves ontic validity as co-present [kompräsent] with his own ways of being self-evidently verified, which are obviously quite different from those of a "sense" perception.”(Crisis, p.185)

But if it is the case that there is a more reduced stratum than that of corporeality, within which it is
dissolved, we need to reconcile this with examples where Husserl appears to situate hyletic data as irreducibly corporeal. Take, for instance, the following passages:

“Sense data can present themselves only if there exist "in Objective actuality" sense organs, nervous systems, etc. To these correspond possible apprehensions of sensuous data and concomitant intersubjective regulations.”(Ideas II, p.303) “Surely the higher consciousness, the properly noetic, becomes co-dependent on the Body, to the extent that it is founded in the hyletic. Surely not only are the sensuous sensations in the stricter sense determined by the Body, but so are the sensuous feelings as well, and the lived experiences of instincts.”(Ideas II, p.308)

“Can it now make sense to assume that even the possibility of any apprehension whatever and of all consciousness in general is dependent on the Body and its Bodily-Objective events, or that apperceptions, position-takings of belief, of will, etc. are dependent on the Body in the same sense as the data of sensation are?”(Ideas II, p.303)

Can we conclude from this that hyletic data require a body, that corporeality is fundamental to transcendental subjectivity? What then do we make of Husserl’s analyses of the primordial stratum of constitution in which no body has yet been constituted?

In Ideas II, Husserl points to a pre-bodily stratum in which consciousness is possible without a body: He identifies a lowest level stratum of constitution of the sensuous thing, wherein sense perceptions exist prior to the construction of a corporeal Body (“no dependence on the Body has yet been taken into account”)(Ideas II, p.319).

“If we think of monadic subjects and their streams of consciousness or, rather, if we think the thinkable minimum of self-consciousness, then a monadic consciousness, one that would have no "world" at all given to it, could indeed be thought - thus a monadic consciousness without regularities in the course of sensations, without motivated possibilities in the apprehension of things. In that case, what is necessary for the emergence of an Ego-consciousness in the ordinary sense? Obviously, human consciousness requires an appearing Body and an intersubjective Body - an intersubjective understanding.”(Ideas II, p.303)

Again, in a note, Husserl speculates

“It is thinkable that there would be no Bodies at all and no dependence of consciousness on material events in constituted nature, thus no empirical souls, whereas absolute consciousness would remain over as something that cannot simply be cancelled out. Absolute consciousness would thus have in itself, in that case, a principle of factual unity, its own rule, according to which it would unfold with its own content, all the while there being indeed no Body. If we join it to a Body, then perhaps it becomes dependent, though in the first place it still retains its principle of unity and does so not just through apriori laws of consciousness in general.” (Ideas II, p.308)

“If now, as belonging to the apriori essence of consciousness, there exist certain necessities in the course of its succession- the way, e.g., the modes of retention within the constitution of time are linked (apriori), as succeeding one another necessarily, to various impressions-then these nexuses of
the sequence could not be conditioned by the Body and by the sequence of its Objective states. Only that which the essential nexuses leave open can be empirically conditioned. For instance, only the sensation could be conditioned, but not what is necessarily linked to it in terms of the retentions. Or perhaps, more precisely, what is conditioned would only be the content of the sensation and likewise, within the predelineated form of the retentional sequence, a content left open by it, that is, differences in clarity and distinctness, etc.; in which respect it is problematic, and to be determined in experience, to what extent the content is conditioned psychophysically.” (Ideas II, p.307)

Husserl appears to be saying here that because a pre-bodily stratum underlies corporeality, the structures of this pre-bodily stratum cannot be dependent on such higher levels of constitution. Thus the sensory content of hyletic data, to the extent that it is dependent on a constituted Body, is relative, empirically conditioned and embodied. However, via the epoche, the a priori essence of consciousness, and along with it an apparently pre-bodily stratum of sensuous hyle, survives the bracketing of the corporeal body.

One can perform a radical reduction such that there is as yet no notion of either my animate body and associated sensations, nor that of material objects. In reducing the psychophysical body to this absolutely primordial stratum, Husserl reveals Merleau-Ponty’s notion of gestalt to be constituted from a more primordial genesis that has nothing of gestalt form in it. And yet my subjectivity does not succumb to a solipsistic egology because what remains is a multiple structure of foreignness within temporal constitution itself.

There is the noema’s alienness with respect to the pure ego, its ability to affect the transcendental ego as a transcendence within immanence. There is also what Husserl points out as the intentional mediacy of recollection and expectation with respect to the immediate NOW (First Philosophy, p.376). Given Husserl’s characterization of my apperception of the alien Ego as a secondary mediacy, it can be argued that what makes this secondary presentation possible is the primary depresentational mediacy of memory-anticipation (a kind of double foreignness, past and future being ‘alien’, that is, mediate, to the already alien presentational NOW).

“Just as I, in my transcendental subjectivity, do not only have justified experience of what I directly perceive, but also have justified recollection, justified expectation, associative anticipation, presentification, in the same manner [I have] a presentification, based on the same justification, of transcendental consciousness—as empathy. “(First Phil., p.621)

Whichever dimension of primal time constitution we tie the foreign to, this much can be concluded. It is at the most primordially reduced level of transcendental subjectivity that I confront my own ‘exteriority’, but this peculiar sort of exteriority, otherness, foreignness at the root of Husserl’s phenomenological project is of a more intimate and insubstantial nature than what Merleau-Ponty, Zahavi and Thompson have in mind when they attempt to begin from the body as irreducible gestalt.
Footnote:

Derrida’s deconstruction of Husserl’s project is well-known, but I believe that Derrida’s critical response to Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Husserl on apperception shows that he recognized in Husserl an incipient deconstructive move in regard to the notion of corporeal-intersubjective otherness Merleau-Ponty espoused.

“I can never have access to the body (Leib) of the other except in an indirect fashion, through appresentation, comparison, analogy, projection, and introjection. That is a motif to which Husserl remains particularly and fiercely faithful. And when he says "without introjection," indeed, this is not to qualify our access to the other's living body, but the access that others have-that they have, just as I have to their own proper bodies ("without introjection") . But this access that others have without introjection to their bodies, I can have-to their own proper bodies-only by introjection or appresentation. Husserl would never have subscribed to this "It is in no different fashion . . . [ce n'est pas autrement . . . ] " ("It is in no different fashion that the other's body becomes animate before me when I shake another man's hand or just look at him" [Signs, p. 168] ) , which assimilates the touching-the-touching [le touchant toucher] of my own proper body or my two hands with the contact of the other's hand."(On Touching - Jean-Luc Nancy, p.190)

Husserl writes: "Since here this manifold expression apprants psychic existence in [carnal] Corporeality, thus there is constituted with all that an objectivity which is precisely double and unitary: the man-without ‘introjection’" (Husserl, Ideas II, p. 175) .

"Without introjection": these words do not describe my relation to the other's carnal "corporeality" (Leiblichkeit) , which, as Husserl always says unambiguously, is present for me only indirectly and by way of analogical "introjection," which is to say appresented, as this passage clearly puts it. However, what this appresentation delivers to me is another man, and what for him is inscribed-in his phenomenon, which he has, for his part, and which will never be mine-is an originary relation, "without introjection," to his own proper body, which is the relation I have with my body but will never have with his. There we can find the appresentative analogy between two heres. Husserl had continually insisted-be it only in the two preceding pages-on indirect appresentation and even on the fact that the other's hand, such as I see it while it is touching, "appresents to me his solipsistic view of this hand. " (Let us be quite clear that without this unbridgeable abyss, there would be no handshake, nor blow or caress, nor, in general, any experience of the other's body as such.)

"... at the moment when it is a matter of orienting Husserl and making him take the other into account in a more audacious way (the other who isoriginarily in me, or for me, and so forth)-at the expense of a Husserl who is more classical, more ego-centered, and so forth-there is a risk of the exact opposite resulting. One runs the risk of reconstituting an intuitionism of immediate access to the other, as originary as my access to my own most properly proper-and in one blow, doing without appresentation, indirectness, Einfühlung, one also runs the risk of reapropriating the alterity of the other more surely, more blindly, or even more violently than ever. In this respect Husserl's cautious approach will always remain before us as a model of vigilance. (P.191)

Even between me and me, if I may put it this way, between my body and my body, there is no such "original" contemporaneity, this "confusion" between the other's body and mine, that Merleau-Ponty believes he can recognize there, while pretending he is following Husserl-for example, when he follows the thread of the same analysis and writes: "The constitution of others does not come after that of the body [with which Husserl could agree, but without inferring what follows.-J. D.] ; others and my body are
born together from the original ecstasy. The corporeality to which the primordial thing belongs is more
corporeality in general; as the child's egocentricity, the 'solipsist layer' is both transitivity and confusion of
self and other" (Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 174; my emphasis-J. D.). This "confusion" would be as
originary as the "primordial thing" and
would make possible the substitutions (that we have noted are impossible) between the other and me,
between our two bodies, in what Merleau-Ponty unhesitatingly terms "the absolute presence of origins."
In another example, he writes:

"The reason why I am able to understand the other person's body and existence "beginning with" the body
proper, the reason why the co-presence of my "consciousness" and my "body" is prolonged into the
compresence of my self and the other person, is that the "I am able to" and the "the other person exists"
belong here and now to the same world, that the body proper is a premonition of the other person, the
Einfühlung an echo of my incarnation, and that a flash of meaning makes them substitutable in the
absolute presence of origins." (Merleau-Ponry, Signs, p. 175)

And so, must we not think, and think otherwise (without objecting to it frontally and integrally), that the
said "same world" (if there is some such world, and if it is indeed necessary to account for it, and account
for its "effect," as "sense of the world") is not and will never be the "same
world"? (On Touching - Jean-Luc Nancy, p.193).

The insubstantial Intimacy of Motivation:

I have been arguing that Husserl’s starting point in the retention-impression-protention triad of
time consciousness exposes me to the foreign from within the resources of my own subjectivity,
prior to any corporeal constitution. Furthermore, the radically temporal nature of absolute
consciousness dictates that when such higher strata as the subjective and empirical Body do make
their appearance within consciousness, they do so as ‘co-existences’ of retentional-protentional
syntheses, rather than as configurational wholes whose parts all belong to the same presentational
‘now’.

As a consequence of the deconstruction of the gestalt, Husserl’s notion of the foreign must be
understood in different terms than that of corporeal otherness. We have seen this difference
manifested in the way that for Husserl I maintain an ongoing thread of subjective continuity
within my participation in an intersubjective world. I want now to further explore the nature and
philosophical justification for the internal integrity of the temporal stream of consciousness. My claim is that Husserl’s articulation of the transcendentally reduced sphere of consciousness in
terms (mineness, unitary, synthetic, continuous) that risk implying a solipsism closed off to the
otherness of the world and history wasn’t simply an unfortunate choice of terminology.

Rather, Husserl’s proto-deconstruction of the gestalt demanded a primordial motivational
principle in which noetic anticipatory assimilation dominates the foreignness of the noematic
object pole. We see the centrality of similarity manifest itself at all levels of constitution, in the
subjective achievement of synthetic unities, analogical apperceptive pairing, associative
relationality, correlations, harmonious fulfillments, subjective ‘mineness’, variations, flowing
multiplicities, congruities, nexuses, coherences, etc. Even in difference, negation, senselessness,
irrationality, alienation there is no experience in consciousness that is not in an overarching way
variation on a thematics (which are already associative syntheses of variations on variations) for

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Husserl, a similarity-in-difference.

At the highest level of intersubjective experience, each subjectivity interacts with other subjectivities via their own integral thread of continuous unified experience (in an apperceptive pairing, my self perception and my apperception of an alter ego “found phenomenologically a unity of similarity” (Cartesian Meditations, p.112)). Consistent with his subjectivity-based sociality, Husserl’s later writings on ethics is personalistic, striving toward an optimal self-consistency of all subjective values at the highest level.

At the level of the constitution of objects within my own sphere of ownness, where the adumbrating intentionality proceeds in an objectifying instinct, this striving is founded in an interest in the enrichment of the self [of the object], as a unified nexus of appresentations.

“Every apperception in which we apprehend at a glance, and noticingly grasp, objects given beforehand- for example, the already-given everyday world- every apperception in which we understand their sense and its horizons forthwith, points back to a "primal instituting", in which an object with a similar sense became constituted for the first time. Even the physical things of this world that are unknown to us are, to speak generally, known in respect of their type. We have already seen like things before, though not precisely this thing here. Thus each everyday experience involves an analogizing transfer of an originally instituted objective sense to a new case, with its anticipative apprehension of the object as having a similar sense. To the extent that there is givenness beforehand, there is such a transfer.” (Cartesian Meditations, p.111)

Grounding these higher constituting achievements is the central role of similarity at the lowest stratum of passive pre-rational primal association. “Once a connection is formed in a stream of consciousness, there then exists in this stream the tendency for a newly emerging connection, similar to a portion of the earlier one, to continue in the direction of the similarity and to strive to complete itself in a total nexus similar to the previous total nexus.” (Ideas II, p.234).

“...consciousness is connected in the most general way to another consciousness by a commonality that is correlatively noetic and noematic; and all connection is connection through "commonality." through uniformity and similarity.”(Passive and Active Synth, p.485)

Underlying and founding all these strata is the assimilative basis of temporal constitution. Protention and retention are included in what Husserl calls a “universal drive intentionality (Treibintentionalität).” As Bernet says “this originary process, as a life-process, is not simply an automatic process; it has a goal and the tendency to draw near to this goal.” (Husserl’s New Phenomenology of Time Consciousness in the Bernau Manuscripts, Rudolph Bernet, p.16)

If we were simply to conclude that an anticipatory tendency characterizes at all levels Husserl’s project, then we could justifiably claim that he has this in common with Merleau-Ponty, whose approach also is oriented around anticipatory temporality. But it is not simply that Husserl claims protension as a general going beyond itself of one’s experience of an object, rather that this going
beyond itself has the character of a peculiar implicative consistency. Even in difference, negation, senselessness, irrationality, alterity, there is no experience in consciousness that is not in an overarching way variation on a thematics for Husserl, a similarity-in-difference.

Husserl offers a foreignness to self that manifests itself as a thematic belonging to self whose self-similarity presupposes and is built from this irreducible foreignness. This is not a privileging the same over the different, but rather a situating of the binary in a more insubstantial and therefore more intimate space of relationship than that of gestalt structuralist embodiment discourses.

The radical intimacy referentially linking one moment of experience to the next, is driven not by the positivity of an idealist subjectivity, but, on the contrary, by the insubstantiality of both the presencing and absencing poles of each absolutely new element of experience. The always novel altering repetition of experience has not the power to disturb to the same extent as it lacks, each time, the centering thickness of configurational ideality.

Events understood as temporally synthesized acts, working within and beyond relations among presumed simultaneous structural configurations (bodily and interpersonal), do not achieve their integrative continuity through any positive internal power. On the contrary, they simply lack the formidability of static identity necessary to impose the arbitrariness of polarizing conditioning, mirroring and cobbling, on the movement of experiential process. When the irreducible origin of meaning is thought as gestalt, violence is also irreducible in the modification of gestalts through temporalization. A gestalt is an environment, a configuration, a locality, and so by necessity temporalizes itself as dislocating gestalt shift.

The thickness of the corporeal imparts to transit an irreducible polarization. Its play of stases conceals the vicissitudes of an intimate experiential movement, so that it always comes too late, noticing and endorsing a wrenching extrication that it reifies as ecstasis the foreignness of my body to itself and of the alter ego to my ego. The dynamic of sense, pushed to its more radical implications, can teach us to be suspicious of any account of meaning which finds it necessary to claim temporal transformation as a traumatic wandering.

“In all uses of the word sens, we find the same fundamental notion of a being orientated or polarized in the direction of what he is not, and thus we are always brought back to a conception of the subject as ek-stase, and to a relationship of active transcendence between the subject and the world.” (Phenomenology of Perception, p.499).

“Action is, by definition, the violent transition from what I have to what I aim to have, from what I am to what I intend to be.”, “When I say that I know and like someone, I aim, beyond his qualities, at an inexhaustible ground which may one day shatter the image that I have formed of him. This is the price for there being things and ‘other people’ for us, not as the result of some illusion, but as the result of a violent act which is perception itself. “ (Phenomenology of Perception, p.444).
Conclusion:

In this paper I aimed to show that via the epoche, Husserl dissolved Merleau-Ponty’s primary corporeal intersubjective grounding of phenomenology into a more radically temporal foundation. I realize that a thorough search of Husserl’s published and unpublished manuscripts will not settle the issue of whether Husserl in his later years embraced a thoroughgoing corporeal intersubjectivity of the sort that Merleau-Ponty advocated. It is possible that Husserl did indeed embrace such a position and that I am misinterpreting him here. More important to me than locking down the “correct” Husserlian understanding of intersubjectivity is demonstrating why a treatment of intersubjectivity as a relative, higher order constitutive product of primordial process that is not in itself intersubjective need not be understood as a regression into Cartesianism and solipsism. I believe that the thesis I outline in this article performs a necessary deconstruction of corporeal intersubjectivity, and in so doing constitutes a bridge between Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger (who radicalized Husserl’s deconstruction of the gestalt), and beyond Heidegger, to Derrida.

Given my focus in this paper was on the implications of a ‘post-Gestalt’ reading of Husserl for the understanding of intersubjective relationships, I did not mention the possible differences between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty concerning the nature of the unconscious. I would like to make a brief comment on this issue. Husserl makes very little mention of Freud or psychoanalysis in his work, but he acknowledges that the concept of the unconscious and of latency to consciousness is implicated in the horizontal structure of retentional consciousness, as well in the relation between passive, instinctual and drive processes on the one hand, and active egoic intentionality on the other. Consistent with my argument that associative similarity, consistency and synthetic unity is central to the flow of consciousness at all levels of constitution, my inclination is to view the Husserlian unconscious as that which is not absent from, or in conflict with awareness, but implicit to it. Post-Freudian psychodynamics, to the extent that such approaches rely on gestalt-like psychic structures, fall short of this approach. Husserl explains that unconscious motives are not a matter of a split within the psyche, but rather: “A thought "reminds" me of other thoughts and calls back into memory a past lived experience, etc. In some cases it can be perceived. In most cases, however, the motivation is indeed actually present in consciousness, but it does not stand out; it is unnoticed or noticeable ("unconscious")” (Ideas II, p.234).

As I have argued, Merleau-Ponty’s gestalt corporeal model lacks Husserl’s internal assimilative integrity, invoking polarization and irreducible violence where Husserl sees variational consistency. The features within his corporeal thinking that leads him to see an intersubjective world of necessary polarization implies an intrapsychic landscape that is polarized within itself. It is not surprising, then, that Merleau-Ponty, in “The Child’s Relation With Others” (Primacy of Perception), Merleau-Ponty, drawing from Melanie Klein, entertains a neo-Freudian analysis of social behavior.

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INTRODUCTION:

Psychological theorizing today, in dialogue with the results of researches in phenomenological and pragmatist philosophy and anthropology, points to an important re-envisioning of the role of concepts such as inter-subjectivity, metaphor, the unconscious and emotion in the functioning of a psychological organization. While today’s diverse embodied approaches (Clark (1997), Damasio (2000), Gallagher (2005), Lakoff & Johnson (1999), Ratcliffe (2007), Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991)) have made significant advances over the more traditional perspectives in psychology which they target (1st generation cognitivism, symbolic computationalism), I suggest that these newer perspectives have failed to depart sufficiently from older approaches in one important respect.

Specifically, I will argue in this paper that the capacity of contemporary psychologies to depict a meaning-making organization generating thoroughgoing affectation, interaction and novelty may be hampered by their reliance on a notion of psycho-biological and interpersonal entities as discrete states. Residing within each of the myriad temporary subagents and bits comprising a psychological system is a supposed literal, albeit near-meaningless, identity. While the role of identity in embodied approaches is less prominent than in classical cognitivist frameworks (newer approaches replace the idea of a centralized, self-present identity with that of a reciprocal system of contextually changing states distributed ecologically as psychologically embodied and socially embedded), I allege that a failure of current approaches to banish the lingering notion of a literal, if fleeting, status residing within the parts of a psycho-bio-social organization may be responsible for the covering over of a rich, profoundly intricate process of change within the assumed frozen space of each part.

What could be the basis of my claim that the diverse assortment of embodied models offered by researchers like Gallagher, Varela, Clark, Damasio and Johnson have in common the treatment of the parts of a psychological organization as ossified centers resistant to novelty, considering that the dynamical properties in many of these approaches specifically determine psychological processes as non-representational and non-decoupleable “...variables changing continuously, concurrently and interdependently over quantitative time...” (Van Gelder, 1999, p.244)? And what is a ‘part’ anyway?

Interaction Before Identity:

Let me begin by suggesting the following thought experiment: What if, rather than an element of meaning (perceptual, conceptual, physiological) being juxtaposed or coinciding with what preceded and conditioned it in the manner of contact between two distinct entities, we were to imagine that the context of a prior event and the presencing of a new event indissociably belonged to the same event? I do not have in mind a simple compacting together of past and
present as distinct and separable things, but a way of looking at the relation between a meaning and its background which sees not just the interaction BETWEEN things but the things, entities, parts, bodies THEMSELVES as already kinds of qualitative change, not states but passages, a non-contradictory way of intending beyond what is intended. I want you to entertain the notion that the primordial ‘unit’ of experience is not a form that is transformed by contact with another entity, not a presence that is changed by a separate encounter with another presence, but an experience already other, more than itself in the very moment of being itself, not a form, presence or shining OCCUPYING space but already a self-exceeding, a transit, a being-otherwise. What I am suggesting is that there are no such things as discrete entities.

The irreducible basis of experience is the EVENT (many events can unfold within the supposed space of a single so-called entity). Events do not follow one another in time (or in parallel) as hermetically sealed links of a chain. Each event does not only bear the mark of influence of previous events, but carries them within it even as it transforms them. An event is a synthetic unity, a dynamic structure devoid of simply identity.

Writers endorsing a general account of meaning as non-recuperable or non-coincidental from one instantiation to the next may nonetheless treat the heterogeneous contacts between instants of experience as transformations of fleeting forms, states, logics, structures, outlines, surfaces, presences, organizations, patterns, procedures, frames, standpoints. When thought as pattern, the structural-transcendental moment of eventness upholds a certain logic of internal relation; the elements of the configuration mutually signify each other and the structure presents itself as a fleeting identity, a gathered field. The particularity of eventness is not allowed to split the presumed (temporary) identity of the internal configuration that defines the structure as structure. History would be the endless reframing of a frame, the infinite shifting from paradigm to paradigm.

It is this presumed schematic internality of eventness, the power of abstractive multiplicity given to the sign, which causes experience to be treated as resistant to its dislocation, as a lingering or resistant form, pattern, configuration, infrastructure. Of the numerous philosophers since Hegel who have attempted to rescue the subject-object scheme-content relation from metaphysical domination (Kierkegaard, Gadamer, Levinas, Nietzsche), Heidegger and Derrida are among the first to question and dismantle the very possibility of structure-pattern-scheme as subject or object. How so?

Let us examine the phenomenon of structure more closely. How is structure composed? What is the structurality of structure? Contemporary philosophical thinking outside of Heidegger and Derrida tends to think the spatial frame of structure as enclosure of co-present elements. It is an internality, full presence, a resting in itself and an auto-affection. Structure would be a pattern framing a finite array of elements. It would be a system of classification, a vector or center of organization. We can think pattern in abstract (the structure of democracy) or concrete terms (the structure of a house). A structure has properties in the minimal sense that it is defined by its center, that which organizes and, determines it thematically as that which is the bearer of its
attributes, that according to which its elements are aligned. Structure is plurality of the identical. If a structure is an organization of elements, those elements themselves are structures. The object is structure in that it is self-presence, its turning back to itself in order to be itself as presence, subsistence, auto-affection, the ‘this as itself’. Therefore structure would be irreducible. It would be the primordial basis of beings as objects (point of presence, fixed origin) as internality, space as frame, subsistence, pure auto-affection, representation, category, law, self-presence itself. Also value, will, norm. So much rides on where we begin from in thinking about beginnings.

In various writings Derrida deconstructs the notion of structure. He argues that structure implies center, and at the center, transformation of elements is forbidden. But he says in fact there is no center, just the desire for center. If there is no center, there is no such singular thing as structure, only the decentering thinking of the structurality of structure.

“Henceforth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no center, that the center could not be thought in the form of a present-being, that the center had no natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of non-locus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play. This was the moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse-provided we can agree on this word—that is to say, a system in which the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences.” (Sign, Structure and Play, Writing and Difference p352)

“The iterability of an element divides its own identity a priori, even without taking into account that this identity can only determine or delimit itself through differential relations to other elements and hence that it bears the mark of this difference. It is because this iterability is differential, within each individual "element" as well as between "elements", because it splits each element while constituting it, because it marks it with an articulatory break, that the remainder, although indispensable, is never that of a full or fulfilling presence; it is a differential structure escaping the logic of presence. (Limited Inc p53)."

In their essence, Beings don’t HAVE structure or constitution. There is no such THING as a form, a structure, a state. There is no trans-formation but rather a trans-differentiation, (transformation without form, articulation as dislocation) What is being transcended is not form but difference. Each of the elements in the array that define a structure are differences. They do not belong to a structure. They are their own differentiation. There is no gathering, cobbling, synthesis, relating together, only a repetition of differentiation such that what would have been called a form or structure is a being the same differently from one to the next. Not a simultaneity but a sequence. So one could not say that form of nature is the way in which nature transitions through and places itself into the forms and states that, from a schematic perspective, constitute the path of its movement, and nature turns into natural things, and vice versa. Nature would not transition through forms and states, Nature, as difference itself, transitions though differential transitions. Differences are not forms. Forms are enclosures of elements organized according to a rule. Forms give direction. Difference does not give direction, it only changes direction. What are commonly called forms are a temporally unfolding system of differences with no organizing
rule, no temporary ‘it’. The transformation is from one differential to the next before one ever gets to a form.

Schemes, conceptual, forms, intentions, willings have no actual status other than as empty abstractions invoked by individuals who nevertheless, in their actual use of these terms, immediately and unknowingly transform the senses operating within (and defining) such abstractions in subtle but global ways concealed by but overrunning what symbols, bits, assemblies, bodies, frames and other states are supposed to be. The briefest identification of a so-called state is an unknowing experiencing of temporally unfolding multiplicity of differences. In Being and Time, ‘What is a Thing’ and other writings, Heidegger describes a structure-thing as the bearer of properties and underlies qualities. A thing is a nucleus around which many changing qualities are grouped, or a bearer upon which the qualities rest, something that possesses something in itself. It has an internal organization.

But Heidegger doesn’t settle for this present to hand account. In a gesture allied with Derrida, he thinks the structurality of structure as the Being of beings. But he doesn’t do this by conceiving Being via the transitioning through and placing itself into, the turning toward and away from, structures, forms, schemes. This would be to pre-suppose the metaphysical concept of structure as present to hand state, and thus leave it unquestioned. Heidegger locates transformation within structure, as Derrida does in his own way. Heidegger’s discussion of propositional statements in BT sec 33 is key here. In this section he derives the apohaphic ‘as’ structure of propositional logic from the hermeneutical ‘as’.

As an "ontologically insufficient interpretation of the logos", what the mode of interpretation of propositional statement doesn't understand about itself is that thinking of itself as external 'relating' makes the propositional 'is' an inert synthesis, and conceals its ontological basis as attuned, relevant taking of 'something AS something'. In accordance with this affected-affecting care structure, something is understood WITH REGARD TO something else. This means that it is taken together with it, but not in the manner of a synthesizing relating. Heidegger instead describes the 'as' as a "confrontation that understands, interprets, and articulates, [and] at the same time takes apart what has been put together." Transcendence locates itself in this way within the very heart of the theoretical concept. Simply determining something AS something is a transforming-performing. It "understands, interprets, and articulates", and thereby "takes apart" and changes what it affirms by merely pointing at it, by merely having it happen to 'BE' itself. Heidegger’s hermeneutical ‘as’ functions as Derrida’s differential system of signs. Something is something only as differential . Articulation of the ‘is’ transforms in order to articulate. That is, articulation, hinge, IS the ‘in order to’. Thus, the problem of the primordial grounding of the 'is', and the analysis of the logos are the same problem.

Heidegger writes:

"The "is" here speaks transitively, in transition. Being here becomes present in the manner of a transition to beings. But Being does not leave its own place and go over to beings, as though beings were first without Being and could be approached by Being subsequently. Being transits
(that), comes unconcealingly over (that) which arrives as something of itself unconcealed only by that coming-over.” “That differentiation alone grants and holds apart the "between," in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward one another, are borne away from and toward each other.”(Identity and Difference.p.64)

This is the method of Heidegger’s decentering thinking of the structurality of structure. The thinking of structure as a singularity implies a multiplicity of supposed ‘parts’ captured in an instant of time. But the assumption that we think this parallel existence of differences at the ‘same time’, as the ‘same space’, organized and centered as a ‘THIS’, must unravel with the knowledge that each differential singular is born of and belongs irreducibly to, even as it is a transformation of, an immediately prior element. Two different elements cannot be presumed to exist at the same time because each single element is its own time (the hinged time of the pairing of a passed event with the presencing of a new event) as a change of place. Thus, whenever we think that we are theorizing two events at the same time, we are unknowingly engaging in a process of temporal enchainment and spatial re-contextualization. The assumption of a spatial frame depends on the ability to return to a previous element without the contaminating effect of time. How can we know that elements of meaning are of the same spatial frame unless each is assumed to refer back to the same ‘pre-existing’ structure?

The same goes for the fixing of a point of presence as a singular object. This pointing to, and fixing of, an itself as itself is a thematic centering that brings with it all the metaphysical implications of the thinking of a structural center. Heidegger’s ‘as’ (which is not a structure in itself but a differential) explains, derives and deconstructs form, structure, thing before it can ever establish itself as a ‘this’.

The issue here centers on the understanding of the phenomenological experience of time, the philosophical discussion of which has been ongoing since Aristotle. This conversation has recently been joined by a number of psychologists (See Gallagher(1998), Van Gelder(1996) and Varela(1999b)), who support the idea of the nowness of the present as differentiated within itself. They recognize that the present is not properly understood as an isolated ‘now’ point; it involves not just the current event but also the prior context framing the new entity. We don’t hear sequences of notes in a piece of music as isolated tones but recognize them as elements of an unfolding context. As James(1978) wrote: “...earlier and later are present to each other in an experience that feels either only on condition of feeling both together” ( p.77).

The key question is how this ‘both together’ is to be construed. Is the basis of change within a bodily organization, interpersonal interaction, and even the phenomenal experience of time itself, the function of a collision between a separately constituted context and present entities? Or does my dynamic ‘now’ consist of a very different form of intentionality, a strange coupling of a past and present already changed by each other, radically interbled or interaffected such that it can no longer be said that they have any separable aspects at all? In other words, is there a notion of transformation, transcendence, differentiation, event, performance that doesn't 'take time' but also avoids being a state, concept, intention, presence, structure? Is it possible to think of such a notion without inadvertently lapsing into metaphysical totalization? I contend that, even taking into account a significant diversity of views within the contemporary scene concerning the nature
of time-consciousness, current psychologies conceive the ‘both-together’ of the pairing of past and present as a conjunction of separate, adjacent phases or aspects: the past which conditions the present entity or event, and the present object which supplements that past. I am not suggesting that these phases are considered as unrelated, only that they each are presumed to carve out their own temporary identities.

For instance, Zahavi(1999), following Husserl, views the internally differentiated structure of ‘now’ awareness as consisting of a retentional, primal impressional, and protentional phase. However, in a departure from Husserl, while he denies that these phases are “different and separate elements”(p.90), claiming them instead as an immediately given, ecstatic unity, their status as opposing identities is suggested by his depiction of the association between past and present as a fracturing, “... namely, the fracture between Self and Other, between immanence and transcendence”(p.134).

This thematic, rendering past and present as an indissociable-but-fractured interaction between subject and object, inside and outside, reappears within a varied host of naturalized psychological approaches that link self-affection to an embodied neural organization of reciprocally causal relations among non-decoupleable parts or subprocesses. While these components interact constantly (Varela(1996b) says “...in brain and behavior there is never a stopping or dwelling cognitive state, but only permanent change punctuated by transient [stabilities] underlying a momentary act”(p.291) , it doesn’t seem as if one could go so far as to claim that the very SENSE of each participant in a neural organization is intrinsically and immediately dependent on the meanings of the others. I suggest it would be more accurate to claim that each affects and is affected by the others as a temporary homunculus (little man) or self perceives an object. Varela(1999a) offers "...lots of simple agents having simple properties may be brought together, even in a haphazard way, to give rise to what appears to an observer as a purposeful and integrated whole"(p.52 ). The bare existence of each of these agents may be said to PRECEDE its interaction with other agents, in that each agent occupies and inheres in its own state, presenting its own instantaneous properties for a moment, apart from, even as it is considered conjoined to, the context which conditions it and the future which is conditioned by it.

Perhaps I am misreading Varela and other enactivist proponents . Am I saying that these contemporary accounts support the idea of the object-in-itself as independent of the subject? On the contrary, it seems to me that they share a rejection of the idea of a constituted subjectivity encountering and representing an independent in-itself. Mark C. Taylor(2001) characterizes the enactivist ethos thusly; “Contrary to popular opinion and many philosophical epistemologies, knowledge does not involve the union or synthesis of an already existing subject and an independent object”( p.208). My point is that what is articulated by Varela, Gallagher and others as the reciprocal, nondecoupleable interconnections within a dynamical system functions My point is that current accounts may also involve the belief that subjective context and objective sense reciprocally determine each other as an oppositional relation or communication between
By contrast, I assert that the ‘now’ structure of an event is not an intertwining relation between contingent, non-decoupleable identities, states, phases, but an odd kind of intersecting implicating perhaps a new understanding of intentionality; intentional object and background context are not adjacent regions(a within and a without) in space or time; they have already been contaminated by each other such that they are inseparably co-implied as a single edge (Try to imagine separating the ‘parts’ of an edge. Attempting to do so only conjures a new edge). Time itself must be seen in this way as immediately both real and ideal. Events don’t speak with their surrounds. They ARE their surrounds; the current context of an event is not a system of relations but an indivisible gesture of passage.

Heidegger captures the internally articulated nature of the ‘now’ through the concept of temporality as a unity of three ecstasies: the past as 'having been', the coming into presencing, and future. Dasein "occurs out of its future"."Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general." "Only because Da-sein in general IS as I AM having-been, can it come futurally toward itself in such a way that it comes-back." Thus, "Having been arises from the future"(BT p326).

(FOOTNOTE: This gesture cannot be reduced to either a subjective mechanism of consciousness or to objective relations between particles. Like the idea of the inter-penetration of fact and value informing phenomenological philosophical perspectives, this is a quasi-transcendental (simultaneously subjective and empirical) claim concerning the irreducible nature of reality and time itself, and operates both as a pre-condition and a re-envisioning of subjective consciousness and empirical bodies.)

Gendlin(1997b), in his groundbreaking book 'A Process Model', offers an account of the nature of psychological organization which I consider in many respects closely compatible with my own as well as that of Heidegger. He explains:

In the old model something (say a particle or a body) exists, defined as filling space and time. Then it also goes through some process. Or it does not. It is defined as "it" regardless of the process "it" goes through. "It" is separate from a system of changes and relationships that are "possible" for "it."(p.50)...In the old model one assumes that there must first be "it" as one unit, separate from how its effects in turn affect it...In the process we are looking at there is no separate "it," no linear cause-effect sequence with "it" coming before its effects determine what happens. So there is something odd here, about the time sequence. How can "it" be already affected by affecting something, if it did not do the affecting before it is in turn affected?...With the old assumption of fixed units that retain their identity, one assumes a division between it, and its effects on others. (This "it" might be a part, a process, or a difference made.) In the old model it is only later, that the difference made to other units can in turn affect "it."(p.40)

If one assumes separate events, processes, or systems, one must then add their co-ordinations as one finds them, as if unexpectedly..."Inter-affecting" and "coordination" are words that bring the old assumption of a simple multiplicity, things that exist as themselves and are only then also related. So we need a phrase that does not make sense in that old way. Let us call the pattern we
have been formulating "original inter-affecting". This makes sense only if one grasps that "they" inter-affect each other before they are a they (p.22).

Gendlin’s account somewhat resembles embodied cognitive and dynamical systems approaches in its rejection of symbolic representationalism and decoupleability, but I believe there are crucial differences. For instance, in current models, interaction spreads in a reciprocally causal fashion from point to point, whereas for Gendlin, each point somehow implies each other point; each part of a meaning organization somehow “knows about”, belongs to and depends intrinsically on each other part. And this happens before a part can simply be said to exist in itself (even if just for an instant). What kind of odd understanding concerning the interface between identity and relation could justify Gendlin's insistence that the inter-affection between parts of a psychological organization precedes the existence of individual entities? Allow me to creatively interweave Gendlin’s text with my own, and suggest that an ‘entity’ can never be understood as OCCUPYING a present state, even for a moment. Its very identity is differential not simply because its relevance is defined by its relation to its context (embodied cognitive notions of the subject-object relation), but because the essence of the event IS this intersection. What is other than, more than an event (its just-past) is built into its own center in such a way that the relation between events is never an arbitrary conditioning the way it seems to be allowed to be in current accounts (as I will discuss in more detail later). That is why an event is better conceived as a transit than a state.

The most important implication of this way of thinking about the organization of meaning and intention is that the interaction between events can be seen as maintaining a radical continuity and mutual dependency of implication. To say that an event exceeds itself, in the same moment and the same space, as both past and present, is not simply to think the now as immediately a differential between the new and a prior context. It is to envision a new event and the context out of which it arises as BELONGING to, PART OF each other’s senses in a radical way, rather than just as externally cobbled together spatially or temporally as a mutual grafting, mapping, mirroring, conditioning between little bodies. This duality within the event is not to be understood as a fracture, opposition or chiasm between an already composed past carried over from previous experience, and an arbitrary element of novelty related to this past across a divide of thickness.

As Gendlin (1997b) argues,

‘The continuity of time cannot first be made by things next to each other, because such a continuity is passive; each bit IS alone, and must depend on some other continuity to relate it to what is next to it..." (p.71). For instance, fresh intentional experience does not simply sit alongside a prior context; it explicates the immediate past (Gendlin characterizes this past as an an implicatory whole):

...explication is not a representation of what “was” implicit; rather explication carries the implying with it and carries it forward. An explication does not replace what it explicates. If one divided them, one could try to divide between what is new and what is from before. Then one
part of the explication would be representational, and the other part would be arbitrary. An occurring that carries forward is an explicating. It is neither the same nor just different. What is the same cannot be divided from what is different (p.71).

What does it mean to say that what is the same can’t be divided from what is different? I would like to suggest that the very being of an event of meaning already is composed partly of that which it is not, that which it is no longer. The role which this 'no-longer' plays isn’t just as a duplication of ‘what it was’. It is a fresh, never before experienced version of my past which forms part of the essence of a new event for me. What do I mean by this? Not only does a fresh event belong to, carry forward, imply the immediate context which it transforms, but this inter-contamination between past and present operates at the same time in the opposite direction. The carried-forward past which, as I have said, inseparably belongs to a new event, is already affected by this fresh present. What does this imply? Gendlin(1997b) explains, “When the past functions to "interpret" the present, the past is changed by so functioning. This needs to be put even more strongly: The past functions not as itself, but as already changed by what it functions in” (p.37).

It is not as if other accounts do not recognize the transformative character of recollection. It would be pointed out by any psychologist who had digested Merleau-Ponty's lessons concerning reflection that the attempt to return repeatedly to an object of attention in order to preserve its identity hopelessly contaminates the purity of that identity with the sediments of new context.

(FOOTNOTE:Mark C. Taylor writes:”Neither complete nor finished, the past is repeatedly recast by a future that can never be anticipated in a present that cannot be fixed. Anticipation re-figures recollection as much as recollection shapes expectation.”(The Moment of Complexity,2001,p.198)).

My claim is not, however, that the past is partially or eventually affected by the present, but that its modification is globally and immediately implied by present experience. The past is inseparable from the future which is framed by it. Because all meanings are referential, they don't appear out of thin air but from a prior context. On the other hand, the past in its entirety is at the same time implied and transformed in present context. There is no past available to us to retrieve as an archive of presumably temporarily or partially preserved events of meaning. As we will see, this view may run counter to current approaches according to which habitual pre-noetic bodily, linguistic and cultural schemas are presumed to shape experiential processes(”...the body in its habitual schemas retains a [pre-noetic] past....that helps to define the present”(Gallagher,1997,p.144)), and thus to constrain and structure the experience of novelty, without themselves being immediately and globally refashioned in accord with the self-changing direction of intentional movement.

The Literal is Metaphoric:

To this point it may strike readers that the argument being made amounts to a quibble. Even if it were to be accepted as correct, what of theoretical and practical advantage is gained over
dynamical, embodied approaches by reworking the relationship between an element and its context in the way I am suggesting? How does this amount to more than a shuffling around of dimensional concepts? It is important to understand that it is not just dimensional slots that are being questioned here but the central characteristics of what are considered entities (conceptual, bodily, interpersonal), their alleged power to arbitrarily and polarizingly condition each other as well as, paradoxically, to resist the advent of novelty. To criticize a system in continuous inter-relational motion for resisting novelty, merely because it is depicted as interactions among innumerable, dumb bits which may only exist for an instant of time, may seem to be a spurious accusation to make. But as I hope to show, this seemingly insignificant property of stasis built into these dumb bits of a dynamical, embodied and embedded ecological system expresses itself at a macro level as homunculi-like schemes, assemblies and narratives (sensory-motor, emotive, perceptual, conceptual and interpersonal) whose creative interplay and thematic consistency may be restricted by the presumption of a distinction between their existence and interaction. (Varela (1991) describes these bits as “...a whole army of neurallike, simple, unintelligent components, which, when appropriately connected, have interesting global properties. These global properties embody and express the cognitive capacities being sought” (p. 87).

A prime example of what I mean when I allege that a separation between the existence and interaction of components of such systems polarizes their functioning can be found in the way that current embodied approaches attempt to explain the mechanism of conceptual metaphor. For instance, Lakoff and Johnson (1999), in their effort to overturn the older view of metaphor as a secondary and inferior linguistic form in comparison with literal meaning, depict metaphor as a rich and indispensable component of abstract conceptualization.

FOOTNOTE: For related models, see Glucksberg and Keysar’s (1990) attributive categorization approach, Gentner’s (Gentner, D., Bowdle, B., Wolff, P., & Boronat, C. (2001)) structure mapping model, and Lakoff” and Johnson’s (1980) conceptual metaphor theory.

Briefly, a metaphor is a correlation between conceptual domains, projecting patterns from the source domain onto the target domain. Neurologically, metaphor originates in a conflation between domains, a simultaneous activation of neural schemes in both the source and target. Johnson insists that metaphors are not formal structures, but embodied and situational. The cognitive domains, or “frames,” out of which metaphors are formed “are not fixed structures or images, but rather dynamic patterns of our interactions within various evolving environments” (Johnson, 1997, p. 156). Even if frames are not permanently fixed schemes, they do have the ability to conserve their structure over time. It is this conservative power that allows frames to define, contain, mirror, map onto, apply to and correlate with particular new experiences. “Conceptual metaphorical mappings appear to preserve image-schematic structure, and, in so doing, they map spatial inference patterns onto abstract inference patterns” (p. 156). Lakoff and Johnson (1999) explain:

Abstract concepts have two parts: 1) an inherent, literal, non-metaphorical skeleton, which is simply not rich enough to serve as a full-fledged concept; and 2) a collection of stable,
conventional metaphorical extensions that flesh out the conceptual skeleton in a variety of ways (often inconsistently with one another)(p.128). In general, central senses of words are arbitrary; non-central senses are motivated but rarely predictable. Since there are many more non-central senses than central senses of words, there is more motivation in a language than arbitrariness(p.465).

While Lakoff-Johnson believe everyday thought is largely metaphorical, they don’t accept that all meanings are metaphorical (“...all basic sensorimotor concepts are literal”(p.58)). We can extract the following points from Lakoff-Johnson’s model:

1) Metaphors are not discrete concepts themselves but correlations between two pre-existing conceptual domains.

2) Metaphors preserve the structure of the source domains that they borrow from.

3) Metaphors enrich a concept’s non-central senses with motivated meaning, but a concept’s central senses are arbitrary.

4) Not all concepts are metaphorical.

We can trace the logic of these points back to the belief, maintained in different ways across a diversity of psychological perspectives, that a concept has an ‘inherent, literal, non-metaphorical skeleton’. As Lakoff and Johnson affirm, an entity which inheres as its own state is arbitrary at its core, and can relate to another meaning only in a separate move. Metaphor considered in this way is not an intrinsic property of concepts, but a secondary function that may or may not apply to a particular concept. And when it does apply, metaphor doesn’t so much transcend the semantic gap between concepts as co-opt it by grafting meaning comparisons and mirrorings onto originally arbitrary, pre-existing conceptual cores.

To re-think the notion of an intrinsic conceptual state as the differential structure of transit I have delineated in this paper is to change and enlarge the role of metaphor(and to re-define intentionality) in important ways. I have argued that an event(whether conceived as conceptual or bodily-physiological) is itself, at one time and in one gesture, the interbleeding between a prior context(source) and novel content(target). Gendlin(1995) says, in such a crossing of source and target, “each functions as already cross-affected by the other. Each is determined by, and also determines the other(p.555)”. Thus, the weak and ambivalent integrative function accomplished by Lakoff and Johnson’s model of metaphor as a correlation between conceptual domains may conceal a more fundamental integration working WITHIN and BEYOND so-called concepts. By this reckoning, all events are metaphorical in themselves, as a mutual inter-affecting of source and target escaping the binary of representation and arbitrariness.

Gendlin(1997a) explains,

Contrary to a long history, I have argued that a metaphor does not consist of two situations, a "source domain" and a "target domain". There is only one situation, the one in which the word is
now used. What the word brings from elsewhere is not a situation; rather it brings a use-family, a great many situations. To understand an ordinary word, its use-family must cross with the present situation. This crossing has been noticed only in odd uses which are called "metaphors"...all word-use requires this metaphorical crossing(p.169).

Let’s spell out the larger implications of this argument. All events of intentional meaning in-themselves accomplish the powerful integrative function that has traditionally been attributed to metaphoric relations between concepts, not by grafting or mapping one pre-existing state onto another but by bringing the outside inside as the intimate self-transfiguration that is an event’s gesture(Jacques Derrida refers to this radical internal differentiation within the event as the metaphoricity of metaphor). By contrast, current embodied psychologies appear to maintain an opposition between inside and outside, subject and object, context and novelty, which not even the operation of metaphor (or other narrative structures) can overcome. The integrative potential of conceptual-linguistic consciousness is limited from the outset by the presumption of an irreducibly arbitrary, literal core within entities. Of course, one could argue that, whether or not Lakoff-Johnson’s model explicitly indicates it, dynamical embodiment approaches imply that there could be never such a thing as a ‘strictly’ literal meaning, since a conceptual element only conveys meaning though non-decoupleable, differential relations with other elements in a process with no permanent or transcendent center of origin. As Mark Taylor(2001) explains

“Each symbol within these networks is a node in a web of relations. Indeed, a symbol is nothing other than the intersection of relations knotted in nodes”(p.211). In this sense a kind of quasi-metaphoricity already obtains for so-called literal concepts. However, I have hypothesized that for current approaches this relation between a concept and its wider context is conceived as a conjoining of discrete contents, thereby preserving the primacy of a literal core at the heart of this quasi-metaphorical intersecting.

Consciousness As Its Own Exceeding:

How might my claim concerning the intrinsic metaphoricity of intentional consciousness help to shed new light on the wider realms of interactions within which intentionality is embedded, encompassing such processes as the unconscious, bodily affectivities, and interpersonal interactions? Not surprisingly, contemporary approaches seem to view these wider interactive functions shaping intentionality in the same disjunctive terms that they apply to linguistic processes. Gallagher(1998) writes:’There are many pre-noetic [outside of awareness] limitations on intentionality: the effects of the unconscious, embodiment, language, historical traditions, political and social structures, and so on”(p.160). He refers to these as “...happenings that go beyond intentional experience and yet condition that very experience”(p.160). Descriptions from blindsight(See footnote on blindsight), split-brain, perceptual priming, hypnosis and other dissociative studies have been employed to lend support to this idea of a partial independence among processes which are otherwise claimed to be thoroughly interactive.

As was the case with metaphor, what is at stake in all these examples is the question of whether what is presumed to come at intentionality from an ‘outside’ in the form of semi-arbitrary
conditionings, (whether that outside is located as the quasi-metaphoric graftings between conceptual states, the unconscious, the body, or the interpersonal world) is not better understood as arising out of hitherto undiscovered resources concealed within so-called intention itself. Rather than originating in an invasive, displacing outside, I suggest that psychological processes seemingly unavailable to explicit consciousness are nevertheless implied by and belong to it (and vice-versa), not in the sense of a content that arbitrarily contributes to awareness in the manner of interactions between partially independent regions, but as an integral bodily background intrinsic to, but not directly articulated in, each moment of awareness.

In this view, the ‘hidden hand’ of the unconscious, the body and culture conditions awareness not as a separate outside, but rather exceeds conscious control from within each experienced event, as the hidden hand of integral background context (intra-noetic rather than pre-noetic) See footnote on driving a car.

.Gendlin(2000) puts it this way;

“The puzzle about the body knowing our decisions before we consciously know them might make us miss the fact that there is an inwardly experienced body, and that the reflective and bodily-sentient person is much wider than conscious control”(p.110).

While it is easy to identify a present experience in terms of what appears fresh and unique about it, to superficially disassociate its function and sense from a concurrent environment of activity, it is much more difficult to detect the often exceedingly subtle way in which what appears as a break from its context is always partly composed of a modified version of that outside and carries that defining coloration and thematics within itself via its metaphoric structure. This is why "...there can be no division between awareness and events that could supposedly happen without it"(Gendlin,2004,p.146).(Contrast this view with Neisser's(2006) model of unconscious subjectivity). The influence of language, culture, memory and biological inheritance don’t operate behind the back of consciousness but are carried forward with it as an intricate implicatory whole; in each moment this inheritance insinuates itself into but (this is very important) is simultaneously and indissociably re-contextualized by its participation within and as the present event (thus it is always a new variation of this inheritance which participates in the event).

An experienced event carries forward, knows and modifies one's entire history, leaving nothing of the original behind. The way that each aspect of psychological functioning (including what would be called intentional, bodily-sensate and intersubjective processes) implicates and belongs inextricably to each other part, generates a dynamic network of intersections of intersections, metaphors of metaphors, guaranteeing that the person as a whole always functions as an implicatory unity at the very edge of experience. Consciousness, body and world intersect in this single gesture, co-implicating continuity and qualitative transformation in such a way that intentional experience maintains a unity which recognizes itself, at every moment, the ‘same differently’. Simply in struggling to write a single line of text on a page, such as what I’ve written here, I find myself experiencing in oh so subtle a fashion a whole universe of moods, thoughts,
sensations, distractions that intervene to interrupt the supposed thematic continuity of the writing. This I do in a shifting of attention in myriad ways from what is on a page to what is not and everything in between; in a transit from awareness of conceptualization to sensation to recollection to emotion to action to dreaming, when I seemingly lose my train of thought and, succumbing to creative fatigue, find myself observing visual textures of my surroundings, listening distractedly to ambient sounds, noting the touch of cool air blowing on my skin from a fan.

But how is this bouncing from mode to mode of awareness to be understood? Gallagher (1998), echoing sentiments of other enactive cognitive researchers, understands linguistic consciousness to be organized into separated fragments of schematized linear narratives which jostle, interrupt and transform each other via parallel interactions. He says that rather than simply being an "orderly successive flow" under conscious control, consciousness is a "hodgepodge of multiple serialities that often disrupt one another" (p. 194). I suggest it is not quite either of the two. The apparent interruptedness and randomness of the multitude of apprehensions intervening in the attempt to read the words you see on this page is not the haphazard competing, clashing or inter-conditioning among schematically organized narrative meanings. It is rather an integral temporal continuation of the already self-transforming thread which constitutes the wandering thematics of my thesis. To be distracted from the narrative text at hand is not to break with the peculiarly integral nature of moment to moment experience, whose continuity is not that of an 'orderly successive flow' if such an order is understood as logical derivations of an already composed scheme. It is instead a carrying-forward which re-invents its direction, sense and past every moment, beyond conscious control, without rending the intimate fabric of its anticipative continuity.

Thought has the feel of at the same time a completion and a thorough qualitative alteration not just of what immediately preceded it, but of my entire history. My most precious and defining superordinate concerns, including my core sense of myself in relation to my past and to others, my ethical and spiritual beliefs, are implied, carried into and through (as always an absolutely new version of them!) all situations and activities, an ongoing silent background which participates implicitly in (and is simultaneously completely, if subtly, reinvented by) the meaning of even my most trivial experiences. Simply to repeat a word, mark, gesture, object of sense ‘identically’ is to generate both a new sense of itself and a new philosophy of the world, of myself, in some way (installing non-propositional reflectivity and interpretation at the very heart of so-called pre-reflective self and inter-self-awareness).

(FOOTNOTE: See Gallagher (2005) Phenomenological Approaches to Self-consciousness, for a sympathetic review of the concept of pre-reflective self-awareness in psychology and philosophy.)

The otherness of culture intervenes in each supposed repetition of the 'same' word, and this comes from within that event’s own resources as simultaneously empirical (introducing novelty) and subjective (carrying forward my history), embodied and embedded before any conditioning by a ‘separate’ outside, whether that outside be formulated as mind, body or world. No activity,
no matter how apparently trivial, redundant or solipsistic, fails to redefine in some small but complete way my most global perspective of myself, leaving nothing left over of a would-be original pre-noetic past to schematically control the present from behind and outside of it.

FOOTNOTE ON BLINDSIGHT:

Laura Chivers writes 'Blindsight is seen clinically as a contrast between a lack of declarative knowledge about a stimulus and a high rate of correct answers to questions about the stimulus. People suffering from blindsight claim to see nothing, and are therefore unable to reach spontaneously for stimuli, cannot decide whether or not stimuli are present, and do not know what objects look like. In this sense, they are blind. However, they are able to give correct answers when asked to decide between given alternatives. Studies done with subjects who exhibit blindsight have shown that they are able to guess reliably only about certain features of stimuli having to do with motion, location and direction of stimuli. They are also able to discriminate simple forms, and can shape their hands in a way appropriate to grasping the object when asked to try. Some may show color discrimination as well. Subjects also show visual capacities, including reflexes (e.g. the pupil reacts to changes in light), implicit reactions and voluntary responses.

People suffering from blindsight are not "blind" because their eyes do not function. Rather they suffer from cortical blindness. People suffering from cortical blindness receive sensory information but do not process it correctly, usually due to damage in some part of the brain. The damage in blindsight patients has been shown to be in the striate cortex, which is part of the visual cortex. The striate cortex is often called the primary visual cortex, and is thought to be the primary locus of visual processing. Destruction or disconnection of the striate cortex produces a scotoma, or a region of blindness, in the part of the visual field that maps to the damaged area of the cortex. Depending on the extent of the lesion, vision can be absent in anywhere between a very small section of stimulus field and the entire field. The person is unable to process the sensory input to the striate cortex, and does not recognize having seen the object.'

Cognitive theorists conclude from clinical examples of blindsight that consciousness is only a part of what goes on in the brain, and that consciousness is not needed for behavior. To argue that blindsightedness is not an example of unconscious processing (experience occurring in parallel with, but independent of conscious awareness) requires a new and different sensitivity to content of experience, and to the understanding of awareness. If there is no 'feeling of seeing' in blindsightedness, as is claimed, then there is feeling of a different sort, a quality of meaning that is overlooked by contemporary approaches to cognition and affect because of its subtlety. Familiarization with Gendlin's focusing techniques is one way to develop sensitivity to what for most is a world they have never articulated. This is the important point; phenomena such as blindsightedness evince not unconscious but inarticulate experience. One would need, of course, to analyze the aspects of the experience in blindsightedness. One has before one a task involving an intention to see, which implies the involvement of a certain concept of vision that the perceiver expects to encounter.

If the claim for blindsightedness were simply that this experience involves a different aspect of what is involved in seeing than one normally expects of a visual situation, (for instance, if one expects contrast, color, perspective, one gets instead a vague or incipient meaning that is not
recognizable as seeing even though it in fact is normally part of all visual experiences), then I would be in agreement. If, however, the claim is that whatever meaning or information is prompting the blindsighted behavior is independent of the conscious experience (conscious and unconscious events as independent, parallel meanings), then I disagree. My claim is that the experience mistakenly called blindsight is an incipient or intuitive feel that is consciously, intentionally-metaphorically continuous with the ongoing flow of awareness. Blindsight is not an illustration of the partial independence of psychological subsystems, but of the fact that the most primordial 'unit' of awareness is something other than, and more subtle, than either contentful cognitive or empty affective identities. Just because something is not articulated does not mean that it is not fully experienced.

The nature of the experience in blindsightedness would not be unlike the way that the 'same' object that one observes over the course of a few seconds or minutes continues to be the 'same' differently even though it is typically reported to be self-identical over that interval. A changing sense of a thing is not noticed until it becomes an intense affect, and then it is ossified as an abstract 'state'. From the perspective of awareness, cognitivism seems to order experiences hierarchically, privileging what is considered conceptual content over affectivity by virtue of its supposed repeatability, and valuing both of these over other events that are labeled unconscious because they are assumed to be devoid of any conscious content. Blindsight involves a barely discernable shift of sense in an ongoing experience of regularity. There would be not only blindsight, but deaf-hearing, numb-tactility and non-conceptual conceptuality. The test of consciousness of a thing: 'Can one see that thing emerging from a field of perceived sameness?' is wrongheaded because it doesn't recognize that the field of supposed sameness is already a movement of changing meanings. The conscious-unconscious binary should be re-configured as a spectrum of meaningfulness.

My Norms Are Not Your Norms:

Once the radically self-transformational, already fully 'social' character of so-called solitary self-reflection is recognized, it becomes clear that my experiences of direct interaction with other persons are but (categorically indistinct) extensions of this primary intersubjectivity. Thus, just as in my private experience, in interacting with others in the world I do not rely on detached internal schemes, in the form of a canned 'folk psychology' (Dennett) or theory of mind (Baron-Cohen), in order to make the actions of others intelligible to me. Instead, interpersonal understanding, like solitary reflection, is an on-the-fly, non-autonomous, contextually created process. A number of cognitive researchers (Bruner, Gallagher, Ratcliffe, etc) may claim that their own critiques of folk psychology and theory of mind approaches, guided by their advocacy of socially embedded models of psychological processes, demonstrate their having moved beyond the essentialistic tendencies I have cited in this paper.

Gallagher writes:

"a set of cultural norms is learned through practice such that these become second nature. By this means common expectations that are meant to apply to all, equally, are established. By learning how I ought to behave in such and such a circumstance, I learn how you ought to behave as well. And this supplies a ready guide to your behavior in so far as you do not
behave abnormally. Such learning does not take the form of internalizing explicit rules (at least not as a set of theoretical propositions), nor does it depend on applying ones that are somehow built-in sub-personally. It involves becoming accustomed to local norms, coming to embody them, as it were, through habit and practice.

Ratcliffe(2007) suggests that “many thoughts, interpretations and viewpoints ...belong to nobody in particular and are shared products of interaction”(Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation, Palgrave Macmillan, p..175).

In furtherance of this thinking of shared products of interaction, Gallagher embraces a notion of socially distributed cognition.

“ What my initial individual intention might have been can change through this communicative process into an intention that is not reducible to just my or your individual intention. There’s no problem here of speaking about a collectively formed intention. But we can ask, “where” does a collectively formed intention reside? In our individual minds? Or in what can be called a socially extended mind, or institution (Gallagher 2013), or what Alessandro Duranti (2015) calls a socially distributed cognition (Duranti 2015: 219). Such institutions go beyond individual cognitive processes or habits: they include communicative practices, and more established institutions include rituals and traditions that generate actions, preserve memories, solve problems. These are distributed processes supported by artifacts, tools, technologies, environments, institutional structures, etc.”(The Narrative Sense of Others 2017 p467-473).

Notice that the claim by Gallagher and others that individual behavior in social situations is guided by narrative norms, reciprocities, shared practices and social constraints implies the belief that essentially the same social signs are available to all who interrelate within a particular community, that there are such things as non-person-specific meanings, originating in an impersonal expressive agency. This is not to say that these accounts deny any role to individual psychological history in the reception of social signs, only that such accounts allow for a sort of cobbiling, mapping, mirroring or co-ordination between personal history and cultural signs in which the ‘joints’ of such interactive bodily-mental and social practices are treated as pre-metaphorical objects-in-themselves. That social interaction for these writers depends on a grafting of one content onto another is suggested by the argument(Gallagher and Hutto(in press), Ratcliffle(2007), Gopnick and Metzoff(1997)) that linguistic-cultural intersubjectivity is derived from a more primary intersubjectivity, an innately structured ‘intermodal tie’ between one’s proprioceptive bodily feedback and one’s perception of another that is supposedly direct and unmediated. Gallagher cites mirror neuron studies in support of the view that “we innately map the visually perceived motions of others onto our own kinesthetic sensations”(Gopnick and Metzoff ,1997,p.129).

I maintain that what is implicated for me in an interpersonal social situation is not ‘the' social forms as shared homunculi, based on what Gallagher calls a ‘common body intentionality’ between perceived and perceiver, but aspects hidden within these so-called forms which one could say are unique to the implicative thrust of my own construing, belonging to me in a fashion
that exceeds my own calculative grasp even as it transcends strictly shared social normativity. For even the most apparently trivial cultural routine (getting on a plane, ordering in a restaurant), what I perceive as socially ‘permitted’, ‘constrained’, ‘regulated’ or ‘normed’ behavior and understanding of signs is already qualitatively distinctive in relation to what other participants recognize. Each individual who feels belonging to an extent in a larger ethico-political collectivity perceives that collectivity’s functions in a unique, but peculiarly coherent way relative to their own history (which is itself reshaped by its participation in these situations), even when they believe that their interpersonal interactions are guided by the constraints imposed by essentially the ‘same’ discursive conventions as the others in their language community. I’m aware that this resistance of my thinking to would-be interpersonal norms risks being misread as a retreat from a model of full social embeddedness into a person-centered solipsistic essentialism of rule-based mental modules.

In fact, Gallagher misconstrues Heidegger’s Being-in-the-world, which I embrace as an ally in the deconstruction of embodied intersubjectivity, as a deficient pragmatic formalization depriving one of a direct exposure to the world. Gallagher argues that the perception-based relationships of primary intersubjectivity are more direct than the ‘pragmatic contexts’ of what he understands as ‘secondary intersubjectivity’ that determine meaning for Heidegger.

“Trevarthan’s developmental concept of secondary intersubjectivity was already foreshadowed by the phenomenological analyses of Heidegger (1968) and Gurwitsch (1931), and these are analyses that have also been taken up by Dreyfus. Understanding the meaning of something is dependent on pragmatic contexts. Aron Gurwitsch, following Heidegger’s analysis of equipment and circumspective engagement with the surrounding environment, and the larger action contexts of human existence, indicates that our understanding of the other’s expressive movements depends on meaningful instrumental/pragmatic contexts. Things and situations provide scaffolds for understanding the actions of others — and in those pragmatic contexts we see and come to learn and imitate what they do. For both Heidegger and Gurwitsch, our encounters with others are primarily through these pragmatic contexts. In effect, they overlook the effects of primary intersubjectivity which give us a more direct, perception-based relationship with others. Accordingly, they give priority to the pragmatic as a basis for the social — other people appear with meaning only on the basis of pragmatic contexts. As Gurwitsch puts it, ‘we continuously encounter fellow human beings in a determined horizon. …’ (1931, p. 36).

‘In these horizonal situations the “co-included” others appear. That they come to light in this situation, and are not “near by” or “merely beside” it, signifies that they appear as belonging to the situation in their specific roles and functions’ (p. 97). Here Gurwitsch suggests that our understanding of others is from the beginning framed in terms of the roles that they play in relation to our projects. ‘But it is always a matter of a person in his role. Understanding is yielded here by virtue of the situation and is, therefore, limited to what is inherent in it’ (p. 114). For Trevarthan, and for several phenomenologists (other than Heidegger and Gurwitsch), however, secondary intersubjectivity is dependent upon the development of primary intersubjectivity. Primary intersubjectivity characterizes infancy but continues to be primary in terms of how we interact with others. We perceive the intentions of others — their meaning — in the embodied expression of movements, gestures, facial expression, and so forth.
These primary intersubjective processes are based on what Merleau-Ponty (1962) calls intercorporeality — a natural interaction of bodies that generates meaning in so far as we see the intentions of others in their expressive movements. I live in the facial expressions of the other, as I feel him living in mine … (Merleau-Ponty, 2003, p. 218). The very first of all cultural objects, and the one by which all the rest exist, is the body of the other person as the vehicle of a form of behavior (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 348). Primary and secondary intersubjectivities together give us access to a shared world, and allow us to enter into its meaning in a pragmatic way. Insofar as I have sensory functions … I am already in communication with others …. No sooner has my gaze fallen upon a living body in the process of acting than the objects surrounding it immediately take on a fresh layer of significance (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 353).” (Gallagher: Moral Agency, Self-Consciousness, and Practical Wisdom).

When Gallagher reads Heidegger saying that Dasein is Being-with even if there are no others in the world, he sees this as a solipsism, because Gallagher's intersubjective model is a relating of bodies, understood as auto-affecting self-presences. Heidegger and Derrida locate a dehiscence within auto-affection, dividing the concept of body before it can simply be itself as identity. An identity is already a 'difference from itself', Being as Being-with, and so is the origin of the social, before other bodies. At the same time this self-dehiscence is a 'belongingness to what it differs from'. What Gallagher sees as direct personal contact in the form of primary intersubjectivity is, on a certain reading of Heidegger, the product of a derived abstraction subsisting in the cobbling of identities.

Eugene Gendlin’s re-envisioning of the body as radical interaffecting, thinking along with Heidegger’s Being-with, locates the genesis of meaning-making as always beyond the reach of normative socially distributed narrative processes.

“We can speak freshly because our bodily situation is always different and much more intricate than the cultural generalities. A situation is a bodily happening, not just generalities. Language doesn't consist just of standard sayings. Language is part of the human body's implying of behaviour possibilities. Our own situation always consists of more intricate implyings. Our situation implies much more than the cultural kinds. The usual view is mistaken, that the individual can do no more than choose among the cultural scenarios, or add mere nuances. The ‘nuances’ are not mere details. Since what is culturally appropriate has only a general meaning, it is the so-called ‘nuances’ that tell us what we really want to know. They indicate what the standard saying really means here, this time, from this person. Speech coming directly from implicit understanding is trans-cultural. Every individual incorporates but far transcends culture, as becomes evident from direct reference. Thinking is both individual and social. The current theory of a one-way determination by society is too simple. The relation is much more complex. Individuals do require channels of information, public discourses, instruments and machines, economic support, and associations for action. The individual must also find ways to relate to the public attitudes so as to be neither captured nor isolated. In all these ways the individual is highly controlled. Nevertheless, individual thinking constantly exceeds society.”

For Heidegger, Derrida, Gendlin and myself, the radically inseparable interaffecting between my history and new experience exposes me to the world in an immediate, constant and
thoroughgoing manner, producing every moment a global reshaping of my sense of myself and others outpacing the transformative impetus realized via a narrative conception of socialization. I am not arguing that the meaning of social cues is simply person-specific rather than located intersubjectively as an impersonal expressive agency. Before there is a pre-reflective personal ‘I’ or interpersonal ‘we’, there is already within what would be considered THE person a fully social site of simultaneously subjective-objective process overtaking attempts to understand human action based on either within-person constancies or between-person conditionings.

The Meaning of Feeling:

How can I more precisely convey the nature of this process, this world of integrally and holistically interaffecting texturizations which I say operates from within and exceeds what have been assumed as the irreducible units of bio-psycho-social meanings? I believe it is not possible to adequately grasp its dynamics without coming to terms with its central character as ‘felt’ or affective. What do I mean here by feeling? The notion I have in mind involves bringing together in a new way traditional understandings of thought and affect. I am certainly not alone in advocating a view of affect and cognition as inseparable processes. While more traditional approaches in philosophy and psychology treated affective phenomena as at best peripheral to, and typically disruptive of, rational processes, embodied cognitive theories such as those of Panksepp(1998), Damasio(2000), Varela(1999b), Johnson(1993), Ratcliffe(2002), Colombetti and Thompson(2006) and Ellis(1995), take pains to present emotion and thought as an indissociable interaction. According to current accounts, cognitive and affective processes are closely interdependent, with affect, emotion and sensation functioning in multiple ways and at multiple levels to situate or attune the context of our conceptual dealings with the world. According to the newer thinking, affective tonality is never absent from cognition. As Ratcliffe(2002) puts it, “moods are no longer a subjective window-dressing on privileged theoretical perspectives but a background that constitutes the sense of all intentionalities, whether theoretical or practical”(p.290). In affecting reason, feeling affects itself.

I am in agreement with these sentiments, as far as they go. However, I am prevented from enlisting the aid of these ideas in support of my own position by my suspicion that the supposed inseparable relation between reason and affect functions for these writers as a polarity between cognitive states and affective activations, analogously to the treatment of the operations of metaphor I discussed earlier in this paper. In other words, I am fearful that their conceptualization of the role of affect may uphold the very idea of homuncular identity that my notion of feeling is meant to undermine, thereby acting as a monumental obstacle to grasping a more radical account of affectivity. In any case, the weight of entrenched suppositions burdening the topic of feeling must be lifted in order to illuminate the delicate terrain I am aiming at. It is therefore crucial that I address commonalities among these accounts before I can mark out a route from their thinking to mine. Let me begin with Francisco Varela’s characterization of affect.

Varela(1999b) suggests that affective dynamics initiate gestalt shifts in thought and action. Unlike older views, for Varela intentionality is not assumed to rely on an outside mechanism in
order to stir itself into motion. Nevertheless, cognition still relies on such intervention in order to significantly change its direction of movement. The general understanding Varela indicates of the relation between affective movement and the thinking which it affects seems to depend on the idea of emotion as the change of a temporarily persisting stance (scheme, state, dispositional attitude). Conceptual narratives are assumed to have a self-perpetuating schematic tendency about them, requiring outside intervention from time to time to produce qualitative change. The processes within a living system, including psychological functions, cannot be counted on to be intrinsically transformational in a way that is optimally adaptive, but must be channelized into changes in direction of action and conceptualization by extrinsic motivating sources.

We find a similar account of the role of emotion in Ratcliffe’s (2002) synthesis of Heidegger and neurophysiology. Ratcliffe says emotion and embodiment are “incorporated as essential components in cognition”, but emotion and cognition are clearly not identical; “...emotions and moods are not explicitly cognitive but neither are they independent of cognition” (p.299). They originate as bodily sensations structuring cognition from outside of it. Emotion and cognition can ‘conflict’ and emotion can “override cognitive judgement” (p.299). Ratcliffe cites Ramachandran’s clinical observations of individuals with anosognosia, who apparently distort environmental information which contradicts an internally generated narrative. Ramachandran and Ratcliffe attribute this behavior to damage to connections between emotion and cognitive centers. Ratcliffe concludes from this that, in typically functioning persons, emotion signals from the body are presumed to pack a contentful punch large enough to break through a psychological narrative’s resistances where weaker percepts from the environment cannot.

It seems, then, that for Ratcliffe and Varela, intention is a capacity for manipulating objects of thought, but emotion, as valuative valence, provides the criteria for such processing. They are apparently not able to find the resources strictly within what they think of as intentional thought to de-center thinking processes, because they treat cognition as tending to form temporarily self-perpetuating narratives which can distort or keep out contradictory input from the world. So they rely on the body, in the form of emotion cues, to come to the rescue and bring the stalled cognitive apparatus back in touch with a dynamically changing world. The mechanism of emotion is assumed to intervene in order to infuse a stagnant narrative with a new direction and meaning.

(FOOTNOTE: For Ratcliffe emotions selectively organize cognition not just by prompting the interruption of a current narrative, but also by facilitating the assimilation of new events into an ongoing context. Ratcliffe (2002) cites Ramachandran’s account of individuals with Capgras syndrome as evidence that affect can serve to inform the cognitive system that a previously experienced object is similar or identical to a current one.)

Ratcliffe (2002) asserts:

“Without emotional responses, one is not uprooted from a coherent interpretations of events...” (p.306). Although these emotion cues are claimed to be inseparably linked with conceptual processes, this linkage amounts to more of a concatenation between pre-existing states than a more
radical indissociability. This may be due to the belief that feeling originates developmentally within the individual independently from cognition, as action readiness circuits that, Panksepp (1998) claims, are “completely biological and affective but,..., through innumerable sensory-perceptual interactions with our environments, [become] inextricably mixed with learning and world events” (p.303).

For all their differences, I claim that Ratcliffe and Varela share with other contemporary accounts of affect and emotion what I call the ‘adaptationist’ presumption that meaning is shaped in a semi-arbitrary way by inputs which come to influence it from a pre-existing outside. The same assumption determining the structuration of metaphoric intentionality, the relation between consciousness and the unconscious, and even narrative intersubjectivity as arbitrary mapping, mirroring or conditioning functions between literal, schematic states, guides the relation between affect and perception-conception. Damasio (2000) puts it this way: “...as a result of powerful learning mechanisms such as conditioning, emotions of all shades eventually help connect homeostatic regulation and survival values to numerous events and objects in our autobiographical experience” (p.54). According to this thinking, physiological processes of feeling adapt and co-ordinate with a partially independent cogitative environment, authorizing adaptationism as a causal explanation of origins.

Viewed as an adaptation, emotion is linked to a milieu outside of itself (cognition) and with which the logic of the bond is indirect, partially arbitrary in the sense that it is capable of being made irrational, as is supposedly the case with nonadaptive mutations. There is a partial independence assumed between the participant aspects of reciprocally adaptive interactions. The cobbling can be uncobbled unilaterally. Emotion can aid reason, but can also be dysfunctional.

Damasio (2000) summarizes:

Emotions are curious adaptations that are part and parcel of the machinery with which organisms regulate survival. In short, for certain classes of clearly dangerous or clearly valuable stimuli in the internal or external environment, evolution has assembled a matching answer in the form of emotion” (p.54).

In sum, with regard to affectivity, Ratcliffe, Varela, Panksepp and Damasio appear to treat as reified content what could be better understood as transformative process. Hypostasizing and abstracting the intricate movement of experiencing into emotion ‘signals’ and self-perpetuating narratives, relating to each other in quasi-arbitrary brain-body interactions, misses the internal integrity of meaning processes. An emotion viewed as a schematic signal or cue originating outside of cognition can only be presumed to significantly modify and structure cognitive meaning if one profoundly under-appreciates a more primary mobility structuring (and exceeding) so-called cognitive control from within itself. Specifically, what confirms and reinforces a thinking also always alters the direction and sense of that thinking in a subtle but global way. So-called symbolic processes find their meaning reshaped well before any exposure to a separate bodily, conceptual or interpersonal outside. By the same token, what would be considered transformational or disturbing to a particular way of thinking could only have sense
relative to the orientation of that thinking itself; any modifications of thinking would have to emerge out of the resources of that thinking in a way that preserved an always ongoing integrity and implicatory self-consistency in the movement of experience.

What disturbs a perspective belongs to it; the disturbance is born intimately from it. In intending, I am not simply being directed toward ‘objects’, in the sense of revisiting something that was already there. Experiences don't come at me, they unfold from me and into each other as both a carrying forward of an intentional thematic and a subtle, but global, re-defining of me(and them). I believe what is needed is a model of recursivity uniting self-referential continuity and absolute alterity, the so-called pre-reflective and the reflective, in the same structure, the same moment. Not a model which looks for the impetus for subversive novelty in supposed effects which are grafted onto and condition states of meaning from outside of them, but as the very core of an event.

Note: Martin Heidegger pioneered a way of thinking consonant with the approach to affectivity I introduce here, via his Care and Attunement structures, extensively elaborated in Being and Time.

Let us, then, venture the following definition of affect, applying to such terms as emotion, feeling and desire as well: Every experienced event of any kind (perceptual, conceptual, bodily-sensory) is an affect, and every affect is a change in affect. If every event of meaning is an advent of qualitative novelty, then cognition is affective not simply in the sense that a background affective tonality, mood or attunement frames the activity as a whole, as “a kind of cradle within which cognition rests”(Ratcliffe,2002,p.296), but in that each moment of engagement is an inseparable interbleeding between the continuation (not as a duplicative representation but as an already modified version) of a prior context of attunement or thematics, and a change in that atunement. This implies a rejection of two long-standing assumptions supporting the depiction of affect and cognition as distinct states. Contrary to these assumptions:

1) Intentional experience does not need to be pushed or pulled into action, or change of direction, by extrinsic (pre-noetic) forces. Every moment of experience is already intrinsically affective (self-displacing), assuring that even the most apparently non-emotive, ‘rational’, reflective type of awareness, such as supposedly characterizes affectively neutral empirical accounts, qualitatively, intuitively, hedonically transforms the meaning of what it references. Feelings belong to, operate within, carry forward, and transform what are called conceptual meanings even before any specific experience of bodily activitation. This qualitatively transformative effect in moment to moment experience is often subtle enough to go unnoticed, explaining the apparent analytical stability and inter-subjective objectivity attributed to empirical phenomena, the allegedly self-perpetuating coherence of linguistic narratives, and even the illusion of a stable ongoing pre-reflective self-awareness.

2) ‘Raw’ affect is an intrinsically (non-representational, non-propositional) reflective intentionality. So-called bodily sensations of feeling not only manifest the characteristics of
metaphoricity and narrative consistency traditionally associated with conceptual thought, but in fact are not categorically distinguishable from what has been called conceptual meaning in any stable way.

Let me elaborate on my first assertion. What do I mean by my claim that what has been called symbolic, rational thought is inherently qualitatively transformational? What finer, more mobile process may be obscured by current notions of linguistic reasoning? Penetrating the veil of the homuncular permeating our language of the things within us and around us is not a matter of discovering smaller, faster, dumber, more interactive ‘bits’ within the units of current approaches, for that would simply displace the issues we’ve discussed onto a miniaturized scale. It is a matter of revealing perhaps an entirely different notion of the basis of entities than that of the freeze-frame state. This is where a finely-tuned detection of feeling-in-thought becomes crucial. Many researchers may agree that, even apart from the specific contribution of the body as they understand it, intentional entities have a qualitative ‘feel’ in the sense of representing a meaning which is in some measure unique to the individual (‘the feeling of what it is like’). It is widely understood today (see Putnam(1990)) that objective fact and subjective valuation are inseparably intertwined such that an inter-subjective, third person science can never entirely eliminate interpretive gaps in communication. I am trying to convey a different way of understanding the ‘feel’ of things than this idea of a supposedly ‘pre-reflective’ self-awareness of qualitative meaning. What I have in mind is a notion of feeling which combines and redetermines current understandings of thought, affect and expression.

Prior to any notion of cognition and affect as distinguishable constructs, this idea of feeling as event has its entire effect exhausted in its being just barely more than itself, as just the most insignificant and gentle whiff, feel, tinge of novelty. Within and beyond such terms as cognitive states and bodily affective signs, lies a universe of barely self-exceeding accents, modulations, aspects, variations, ways of working. Not variations or modulations of STATES but modulations of modulations.

The subpersonal, personal and interpersonal worlds generated from (but never overtaking) this intricate process may be clumsily described via the ‘homuncular’ terminology of patterned interactions between discrete parts, but at the cost of missing the profound ongoing internal relatedness and immediacy of this underlying, overflowing movement. Count from one to ten and discover how the intent and meaning of this supposed repetition of identical increments shifts in very subtle ways as soon as you begin. Look at the period at the end of this sentence. Notice how the feel, the sense of it (and you) changes immediately and constantly as you continue to gaze as it for a few moments. Can you sense-feel this ‘it’ undergoing change not as a series of different freeze frame states (‘what it is’) but as self-exceedings of self-exceedings (‘how it changes’), trans-formations without form? Even the most momentary identification of a so-called state conceals a whole journey of feeling transformations, colorations, hedonic tonalities, remaking each moment my entire past (bodily, linguistic, cultural) along with my whole sense of myself. Yet we name this auto-multiplication ‘a’ sign.
In doing so are we painting a whole vicinity of varying affective textures with one brush? No, the brush itself is experienced implicitly as this multiplicity even when we are not explicitly aware that we are accessing more than a uniform state. It is precisely the way that a name, a sign continues to be the same differently (meaning that what it is, and who we are, is utterly and completely transformed, but in the most exquisitely subtle way, moment to moment, and within a single instantaneous moment) in our experience of it that allows us to see a name, sign, concept, percept as an apparent unity across these changes, and to communicate it to someone else the same differently as further developments of it, and they to receive the information from us the same differently as even further self-variations, and share it interpersonally, empirically, ‘objectively’, the same differently (I suggest that the precision of science, as well as the illusion of a constant, pre-reflective self-awareness, rests on this mobile continuity within, between and beyond so-called signs). To overtly recognize what had traditionally been assumed as a unity as this ever-developing multiplicity is not to go from stasis to motion but to further enrich an already ongoing process.

Now my second point may become clearer. I asserted that affect is an intrinsically (non-propositional) reflective, quasi-thematically unfolding intentionality. My depiction of the little ‘I’ implied by a concept as an illusionary effect of an intricate texturizing sequence of affective variations of variations, metaphors of metaphors, gently reinventing itself and me (and undermining, from within itself, the alleged constancy of ‘pre-reflective’ self-awareness) moment to moment the same differently, establishes a gentle tapestry of feeling transformations as the hidden basis of what have been called concepts, before the participation of specific bodily sensation. And when an evolving situation brings into play the experience of bodily affects, such activations don’t add any special capacities of hedonic-aesthetic feeling not already involved in the utterly contextual structuration of thought from the start. What so-called specific bodily sensation contributes is a meaningful quasi-thematically elaboration of the already richly felt, globally self-transforming, fully embodied-embedded unfolding of intentional experience. If feeling, understood this new way, is the very core of so-called conceptual and perceptual thought, merging narrative-thematic consistency and global self-transformation, the pre-noetic and the noetic, in the same gesture, then the presumed partial independence of rationality and affect vanishes, and the distinction re-emerges as aspects inherent in each event.

The interaffecting of context and novelty which defines an event simultaneously produces a fresh, particular modulation of change (empirical aspect) and a unique momentum (hedonic component) of self-transformation. From this vantage, the valutative, hedonic (the perceived goodness or badness of things), aesthetic aspect of experience, underlying ‘non-emotional’ appraisals as well as our sadnesses, fears and joys, simply is our vicissitudes of momentum of sense-making through new situations, rather than arising from the content of special objects. Affective valences are contractions and expansions, coherences and incoherences, accelerations and regressions, consonances and dissonances, expressing how effectively we are able to anticipate and relate to, and thus how densely, richly, intensely we are able to move through, new experience. If we can believe that a unique qualitative moment of momentum, ranging from the confused paralysis of unintelligibility to the exhilaration of dense transformative movement, is
intrinsic to ALL events, then perhaps there is no need to attribute the origin of aesthetic pleasures and pains to the functioning of a limited class of entities like bodily affects, even if it is understandable why this kind of assumption has survived for so long in psychology.

(FOOTNOTE: Damasio (1996) writes:

We came to life with a preorganized mechanism to give us the experiences of pain and of pleasure. Culture and individual history may change the threshold at which it begins to be triggered, or its intensity, or provide us with means to dampen it. But the essential device is a given(p.264).

While I agree with Damasio that the capacity for physical and emotional sensation is certainly dependent upon the existence of particular physiological structures, I suggest that the actual functioning of pain and pleasure is not the production of any sort of pre-existing device or content, but is instead the purely contextual expression of the rhythms of momentum of organismic experiencing.)

From the standpoint of verbal expressivity, what has traditionally been called emotion often appears to be a minimalist art, because it is the situational momentum of experiencing slowing or accelerating so rapidly that feelings seem to distill meaning down to a bare inarticulate essence. When the momentum of our reflective thought shifts in such dramatic ways (acceleratively enriched in joyful comprehension, impoverished in grief, ambivalent in fear, alternately disappointed and confident in anger), such so-called emotional events may appear to be a species apart from conceptual reason, a blind intuitive force (surge, glow, twinge, sensation, arousal, energy) invading, conditioning and structuring perceptual and conceptual thought from without as a background field. It is said that such ‘raw’ or primitive feeling is bodily-physiological, pre-reflective and non-conceptual, contentless hedonic valuation, innate, passive, something we are overcome by. At other times, situational change may be intermediate, just modulated and gradual enough that content seems to perpetuate itself in self-cohering narratives. Such situations have been called rational, voluntary, factual, reflective, stable, conceptual, non-aesthetic. However, as I have said, these dichotomies: hedonic versus reflective, voluntary versus involuntary, conceptual versus pre-reflective bodily-affective, are not effectively understood as interacting states of being; they are relative variations in the momentum of a contextually unfolding process which is always, at the same time, within the same event, intentional-reflective and intuitive-affective.

Am I suggesting that emotion be thought as a ‘cognitive’ appraisal, cut off from bodily sensation, movement and expression? On the contrary, it is precisely the treatment of cognition, bodily sensation and expression as separately pre-existing processes (even when treated as mutually structuring each other via ‘intentional-affective’ syntheses) which I am questioning. The point isn’t that bodily responses to experience via such avenues as the endocrine, autonomic nervous system and the motor pathways are irrelevant or peripheral to the intentional experience of emotion, but that, whether we talking about the experience of so-called conceptual appraisal or bodily sensation, the phenomenological scene of emotion (or any other aspect of
bio-psycho-social functioning) does not depend on an arbitrary concatenation or mutual conditioning between discrete components.

Prinz(2004), Colombetti and Thompson(2006), Damasio(1999) and others deny such a thing as a totally disembodied emotion, arguing that the feeling of emotion is affected in degrees concordantly with the severity of damage to avenues of connection with the body. I support their larger claim that experiential processes, including what are called cognitive and affective, function as radically, contextually inter-relational. However, I want to turn their views around a bit. Feeling does not depend on the fact that the brain, as a spatial locale and repository of temporary states of content, always has some access to the body, as a separate locale with semi-independent contents.

I have said that feeling functions from within so-called reflective thought, and that bodily affect is intentional. But if both the former and latter are true, it is not because body sensation structures cognition (or vice-versa). Rather, it is because these stratifying abstractions are but inadequately formulated moments of a process of sense-making uniting the hedonic and the intentional prior to any distinction between, or intertwining of, mind and body. Before I could speak of the occurrence of emotion as mental appraisals structured and conditioned by a background field of physiological energetics and behavioral expressions, I would have to re-figure all of these modes, what would be referred to as the “motoric”, the “sensate”, the “cognitive”, as unstable metaphorical figures emerging contextually out of each other over the course of an indissociably reflective-affective global movement of experience which would imply the unraveling of the basis of categorical distinctions currently orienting the understanding of these terms.

When I am frightened, whether I focus on my attitude toward the world, my rapid heartbeat, my facial expression or bodily preparation for action, each of these aspects emerge out of each other as a fully reflective, metaphoric carrying forward and further transforming of the deepening implications of this tentative, confused situation. All these aspects already belong to, and in fact have their meaning ENTIRELY defined as variations-continuations of the thematic unfolding of my sense of the emerging threat, subtly remaking my entire past while always maintaining a sense, no matter how surprising, unpredictable or disturbing a new present appears, of implicatory belonging to this prior history.

Intermingled with my wandering in and out of significant shifts in experiential momentum, from doubts, terrors, and confusions to later confidences and contentments, will be more subtly self-transforming moments whose continual intuitive shifts of meaning, purpose and affective momentum are hidden so effectively that it may fool me into believing that this more plodding progress of comprehension represents the appearance of a different species from that of pronounced feeling, the realm of affectively neutral (or constant) cognitive states. However, such entities as narrative schemes and conceptual forms may in fact have no actual status other than as empty abstractions invoked by individuals who nevertheless, in their actual use of these terms, immediately and unknowingly transform the hedonically felt senses operating within (and
defining) such abstractions in subtle but global ways. Feeling, the event, the interbleeding of subject and object, transformation without form: all of these terms reference the same irreducible ‘unit’ of experience, concealed by but overrunning what symbols, bits, assemblies, bodies, frames and other states are supposed to do. A ‘single’ sign (whether so-called conceptual or bodily-affective) is already a panoply of intimately changing variations and momenta of felt meanings, in(as) the instant it is accessed, infusing the allegedly conceptual with feeling (and the sensate with intentionality) from within its very core, embodied before any consultation with a separate bodily ‘outside’.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, I suppose the coherence of this paper’s claims concerning metaphor, the relation between consciousness and the unconscious, the basis of interpersonal understanding, cognition and emotion ultimately hinges on the reader’s detection of what I have inadequately described here as a world of integrally and globally inter-affecting textures of felt sense-making hidden within, and functioning beyond, what have been assumed as the irreducible units of bio-psycho-social meaning. FOOTNOTE: Gendlin(1991) has named this more-than-conceptual realm ‘the implicit intricacy’. An interesting difference in our approaches is that, according to Gendlin, concepts and this wider experiential intricacy depend on each other. I suggest, instead, that what are called concepts are but an illusory effect of the more fundamental process of experiencing.

Leaving aside many other questions left unanswered by my very preliminary sketch, I anticipate that resistance on the part of readers to entertaining the possibility of a fine realm of experience alleging itself to be both more intrinsically self-transformative and implicatively self-consistent than current views allow for will be tied less to its transformative impetus than its integrative aspect. That is, the claim for the sort of intricate order I have been making cannot fail to arouse the suspicion that, despite my protestations, a closet idealism, idealism or subjectivism must be operating behind the scenes to justify the radically implicative internal belonging I have emphasized for this perspective. To the anticipated charge of essentialism I can only answer that, from my vantage, it is current psychologies which appear burdened with the weight of an idealism: their belief in temporary discrete states stifles the intimately interactive potential of their embodied, embedded approaches, by making the whole works dependent on irreducible units of formal resistance and polarization.

Events understood as interaffectings of interaffectings, working within and beyond relations among presumed temporary essences (conceptual, affective-bodily, interpersonal), do not achieve their gentle integrative continuity through any positive internal power. On the contrary, they simply lack the formidable ability of static identity necessary to impose the arbitrariness of conditioning, mapping, mirroring, grafting and cobbling, on the movement of experiential process.

References
Personal Construct Theory as Radically Temporal Phenomenology: George Kelly’s Challenge to Embodied Intersubjectivity (2020)

Abstract:

There are many consonances between George Kelly’s personal construct psychology and post-Cartesian perspectives such as the intersubjective phenomenological project of Merleau-Ponty, hermeneutical constructivism, American pragmatism and autopoietic self-organizing systems theory. But in comparison with the organizational dynamics of personal construct theory, the above approaches deliver the person over to semi-arbitrary shapings from both the social sphere and the person’s own body, encapsulated in sedimented bodily and interpersonally molded norms and practices. Furthermore, the affective and cognate aspects of events are artificially split into functionally separated entities, and then have to be pieced together again via interaction. By contrast, pushes and pulls are conspicuously lacking from Kelly’s depiction of the relationship between the construing subject and their world. Kelly complements Heidegger in offering a radically temporal phenomenology and a strongly anticipatory stance. Both authors abandon the concept of subject and world in states of interaction, in favor of a self-world referential-differential in continuous self-transforming movement. A paradoxical implication of Kelly’s radical temporal grounding of experience is that it is at the same time more fully in motion and transition than embodied intersubjective models, and maintains a more intimate and intricate thread of self-continuity and self-belonging.

Introduction

As post-rationalist and post-positivist discourses have increasingly made their way into psychological theorizing in recent years, students of George Kelly’s personal construct psychology have followed suit in uncovering the many consonances between his approach and overlapping post-Cartesian perspectives such as the intersubjective phenomenological project of Merleau-Ponty, hermeneutical constructivism, American pragmatism and autopoietic self-organizing systems theory. What students of Kelly such as John Shotter (2007), Gabrielle Chiari and Trevor Butt find promising in Kelly’s approach is what they see as his attempt to jettison modernist idealist and realist tropes in favor of a non-dualistic, indissociable interaction between subject and world. They also like that Kelly makes affect and intention-cognition inseparable, that thought is embodied in the sense that it is oriented and shaped by felt significance and relevance. The Kelly that they embrace sees cognition as intertwined with bodily feeling, and embedded within interpersonal social dynamics.

I support these readings of Kelly as far as they go, but in this paper I would like to point toward a
more radical Kelly, one who ventured a step or two beyond the limits of the embodied and phenomenological perspectives that a number of his supporters and critics are attempting to connect him to. I am in agreement with Gabriele Chiari and others who argue that, despite Kelly’s protests to the contrary, there are strong commonalities between personal construct theory and phenomenological ideas. In fact, this paper is in part my attempt to make amends for the woeful ignorance of phenomenological philosophy I demonstrated in my first published article on George Kelly in 1990. At that time, my only exposure to Husserl and Heidegger had been through secondary sources, many of the same sources that led Kelly to dismiss phenomenology.

But there are important differences among phenomenological writers, and in order to properly situate this radical Kelly, it will be necessary to distinguish between the approach to phenomenology represented by Merleau-Ponty and what I will call a radically temporal phenomenology, exemplified by Heidegger’s being in the world.

The thesis I will argue is that a crucial dimension of Kelly’s philosophy and psychology is being missed when we read him using Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology as a normative frame of reference. Instead, I argue that Kelly’s approach offers a decisive alternative to that approaches’ explanation of the role of alterity in one’s relationship to one’s body as well as intersubjective engagements.

I propose this radically temporal Kelly because

1) To me he is the most interesting Kelly.
2) this Kelly has not been presented yet in the literature.
3) This reading of Kelly is consistent with certain interpretations of Heidegger, (Derrida’s in particular, which contrasts with Gadamer’s appropriation of him).

Concerns about Personal Construct Theory’s Rationalist-sounding Language

At the same time that embodied writers identify commonalities between personal construct theory and phenomenology, Kelly’s approach differs from embodied, hermeneutic and certain phenomenological approaches in ways that invite concern among advocates of these positions. As I will argue, some of these concerns are legitimate responses to Kelly’s vague and potentially misleading use of language. But I suggest that they are equally the result of a misreading of the underlying assumptions of the theory.

Summarizing the main critiques of personal construct theory from an embodied perspective:

1) Kelly employs an engineering flavored vocabulary that seems to subordinate an empirical and social outside to the ‘top down’ structures of the internal system. Kelly’s terminology contributes to the impression that constructs are rationalistic templates that resist time and otherness. For
instance, Kelly’s talk of the person choosing from among a repertory of constructs gives the impression of stored concepts. He says persons “erect”, “invent” or “devise” a system of constructs and then “select from their personal repertories the constructs they intend to apply to the situation at hand.”(Kelly 1969d).

For this reason it could seem as though Kelly had one foot in rationalism and one foot in a post-realist phenomenology, sounding like an epistemological constructivist in some writings but not in others.

As Trevor Butt (2009) argues:

“What PCT can be read as both a somewhat positivistic cognitive theory, as well as a phenomenological approach. One way of understanding the two readings is to see them as occupying the two poles of the lived world/objective thought construct. PCT is open to a reading that implicitly rests on the natural attitude of dualism and, moreover, on the causal explanations that inhabit the objective thought of the natural sciences.”

He adds that, although Kelly’s theory lends itself to interpretation through an empirical naturalist filter, wherein constructs are behind and responsible for behavior, it can be coaxed in the direction of a thoroughgoing embodied approach.

2) Kelly’s choice corollary’s claim that we always make the elaborative choice seems to be an untestable truism. More importantly, it seems to replace the intersubjective basis of experiencing with an inner directed idealism (an internal regulating gyroscope).

3) Kelly’s depictions of a reality independent of the subject that our constructions progressively approximate seems to suggest a dualistic epistemological realism rather than a thoroughgoing constructivism.

I want to begin addressing these concerns directed against personal construct theory by taking a closer look at Butt’s claim that Kelly’s model can be interpreted as rationalistic.

Butt(1998) writes:

“When the construct is first introduced, it is with this definition: "a way in which things are alike and yet different from others" (Kelly, 1955, p. 104; italics added). The image produced is one of the person standing back and placing interpretations on events in the world rather as they may sort objects.” This “allows (and perhaps even encourages) the reader to think in terms of concepts. The construct is an abstraction that differentiates between ‘things’. In what we may call the ‘later Kelly’ however, the two poles of a construct are not things, but possible courses of action.” (Looking back: George Kelly and the Garden of Eden, The Psychologist, march 2012, vol.25)
For Butt the difference between ‘sorting objects’ and recognizing a new event in primordial fashion is the difference between mechanistically applying a pre-existing program vs finding oneself actively exposed to, affected and changed by an aspect of the world, prior to all reflection, theorization and deliberation.

Even if Butt is correct that in his later writing Kelly moved away from the articulation of construing in terms of what appeared to Butt like a rationalistic sorting function in favor of an emphasis on ‘action’, Kelly never deviated from his defining of anticipation in terms of the replication of events. As late as 1966, Kelly continued to define the construction corollary as:

“A person anticipates events by construing their replications.” (A Brief Introduction to personal construct theory)

In order to get a better understanding of what Kelly intended, we need to take a closer look at the language Kelly(1955) used in the construction corollary:

“a construct is a way in which some things are alike and yet different from others. In its minimum context a construct would be a way in which two things are alike and different from a third. “

“The things or events which are abstracted by a construct are called elements.” (p.95)

In mentioning both things and events, did Kelly mean that there are at least two distinct entities in the world, events and things, and that on some occasions it is events we construe and at other it is ‘things’? No, I think Kelly used ‘things’ as a loose way of referring to events. The word ‘event’ comes up more than 300 times in his first volume, and ‘thing’ or ‘things’ appears 196 times, but predominantly in the context of senses of meaning like ‘things to come’ ‘things that happen’, ‘anticipation of things’, ‘one’s way of seeing things’, ‘knowing things’, ‘doing things’, or as a simile for concrete events.

In many passage of the book, Kelly uses ‘thing’ and ‘event’ interchangeably. For instance:

”...it is not things that a scientist accumulates and catalogues; it is the principles or the abstractions that strike through the things with which he is concerned. Thus a good scientist can penetrate a bewildering mass of concrete events and come to grips with an orderly principle.”

I think since Kelly believed that “The universe is essentially a course of events”, such entities as physical objects are not fundamental to experience but derived abstractions ensuing from the construing of unique events. Still, I think Butt’s main point is not that for Kelly the elements that a person construes in the world are physical things rather than events. His concern is with how the construct system creates meaning and relevance out of those things, events or elements. More specifically, he is concerned with how the construct system is impacted and defined by the world, how being in the world continuously remakes the subject. In other words, the relevant issue here is the relationship between an event and a construct.
To answer this question, let’s begin with what we know about events. We know that events only occur once; they are not temporally extended, self-inHERing objects.

“...any sequence of events is the only sequence of its exact identical sort that ever occurred. It is inconceivable, then, that any sequence could have occurred in any way other than that in which it did without losing its identity. ““Since events never repeat themselves, else they would lose their identity, one can look forward to them only by devising some construction which permits him to perceive two of them in a similar manner.”(Kelly 1955)

What else can we say about events for Kelly other that they only occur once? We can say that, from the perspective of the person experiencing it, the event has no existence apart from, and cannot be separated from, one’s construction of it. But the same is true of the construct we apply to an event. Constructs are only ever experienced in the context of an event that they apply to. Constructs give events meaning and events define constructs.

“In this world-past, present, and future ordered by each of us in his own way, constructs and events are interwoven so that events give definition to constructs and constructs give meaning to events.” (Kelly 1969f)

Thus, a construct without an event is like a subject without an object. Construct and event, the subjective and the objective, are the indissociable poles of every moment of awareness, akin to Husserl’s noetic (subjective) and the noematic (objective) dimensions of an intentional act.

In a personal communication to Dennis Hinkle, Kelly said “the events we so assiduously construe are themselves constructs”. “Construing may itself be considered a sequence of events.”

If any given event of construing only happens once, then the entire superordinate system that defines it only happens once in the particular meaning it has in relation to events. This is because the system as a whole adjusts itself to the novelty that each new event introduces into the system.

”... no construct ever stands entirely alone; it makes sense only as it appears in a network.”

“...while it is events that one seeks to anticipate, one makes one’s elaborative choice in order to define or extend the system which one has found useful in anticipating those events. We might call this ‘a seeking of self-protection’, or ‘acting in defense of the self’, or ‘the preservation of one’s integrity’. But it seems more meaningful to keep clearly in mind what the self is, what it is designed to do, and what integral function is served. Thus we hope it is clear that what we assume is that the person makes his choice in favor of elaborating a system which is functionally integral with respect to the anticipation of events.“ “One’s construction system is never completely at rest. Even the changes which take place in it must themselves be construed. “

Kelly says not every event that we construe leads to the creation of a new construct, leaving the
impression that constructs are static schemes that resist exposure to an outside world:

“...a new act often involves a new construct and one finds himself on the verge of new constructs as a result of his venturesome acts.”...“the successive revelation of events invites the person to place new constructions upon them whenever something unexpected happens.” “...whether a client develops new constructs to channelize his movement, or whether he rattles around in the old slots, the constructs of his system may be considered both as controls and as pathways along which he is free to move.” Without “permeable superordinate constructs he is limited to a more or less footless shuffling of his old ideas.”

What is one doing with one’s construct system when one is not creating a new construct? Apparently slot-rattling. That is, defining one’s current system by rearranging subordinate constructs or repositioning oneself with respect to the poles of certain of one’s constructs.

Events which trigger the creation of new constructs clearly represent a more significant degree of change within one’s system as a whole than events that do not prompt such revisions. But the fact that a person is presumed by Kelly to be always in motion (“... there is no wish to suggest that we are dealing with anything not already in motion. What is to be explained is the direction of the processes, not the transformation of states into processes. We see states only as an ad interim device to get time to stand still long enough for us to see what is going on. “ (Kelly 1966))

implies that even when he is not creating new constructs, he is still creating new meaning in his system as a whole, which is why Kelly refers to the definition of one’s network of constructs (slot-rattling) as an elaboration of the system.

At the superordinate level, such alteration is subtle enough as to allow us to say that for all intents and purposes, the system as a whole remains the same in the face of ordinary everyday happenings. But the system as a whole, and by implication its subordinate elements, never remains identical from moment to moment.

The double essence of a construct as internally generated guidance and externally imposed novelty makes it more appropriate to consider of it as a form of questioning than as an answer. Why is this so? A question implies two dimensions. First, inquiry always takes its direction from a point of view and a context of understanding that projects itself forward through the terms of the question.

Heidegger (2010) expresses this well:

“Every questioning is a seeking. Every seeking takes its direction beforehand from what is sought. Questioning is a knowing search for beings in their thatness and whatness.... As questioning about, . . . questioning has what it asks about. All asking about . . . is in some way an inquiring of... As a seeking, questioning needs prior guidance from what it seeks. The meaning of
being must therefore already be available to us in a certain way. We intimated that we are always already involved in an understanding of being.”

Second, a question implies the possibility that it could be invalidated, and such invalidation can apply either to a subordinate detail within the outlook under which the question was generated, or it could mean an invalidation of one’s entire outlook. The expression “not even wrong “ points to this second possibility.

“...any proposition we contrive must be regarded as a crude formulation of a question which, at best, can serve only as an invitation to further inquiry, and one that can be answered only through personal experience and in terms of the ad interim criterion of anticipated events. Indeed, the answer we get is not likely to be exactly an answer to our question at all, but an answer to some other question we have not yet thought to ask.”(Kelly 1969c)

“To ask a question is to invite a reply. If the question is relevant to anything of human account then presumably the reply will change one's perception of himself and his world. Sometimes one anticipates a reply which will confirm a position he has already taken, that is to say, one from which he has been accustomed to launch his inquiries. But the confirmation, if it occurs, will nonetheless alter his experience only because it puts his position in a more presumptuous light.” (Kelly 1969c)

It is not simply that a construct MAY at some point be subjected to a test of its validity. The radically temporal nature of experience guarantees that such a test will ensue with every new moment of time. We may at times deploy strategies (hostility, constriction, loosening) to stave off the most chaotic of changes in our lives and thereby delay or minimize the emotional impact of a potentially massive invalidation of our outlook, in which case validation may be incidental, vague or fragmentary. But even in these situations, our system remains at some level exposed to, interrogated and modified by the events it warily encounters.

Butt’s concern about a construct system that ‘stands back’ and mechanistically processes, orders and sorts the world doesn’t jibe with the model of constructs, and the entire system of which they are a part, as actively altered by the events they interpret. In the sense that a construct organizes worldly happenings so as to recognize them in terms of familiarity, it can be said to ‘sort’ them. But then, in the embodied approaches Butt endorses, elements of the world are anticipated and recognized also. It is not anticipatory recognition per se that he objects to in the Kellian process of construction, it is the aim of the construct system to recognize the most unusual future “in terms of a replicated aspect of the familiar past“.

**Replication and Strong Anticipation**

The key to understanding the role of anticipation in Kelly’s approach is bound up in the meaning
of ‘replication’, a notion that is indispensable to the understanding of Kelly’s organization, sociality, and choice corollaries, and is closely linked to his notions of validation and elaboration. If we were simply to conclude that an anticipatory tendency characterizes at all levels Kelly’s project, then we could justifiably claim that he has this in common with Merleau-Ponty, whose approach also is oriented around anticipatory temporality. But it is not simply that Kelly claims anticipation as a general going beyond itself of one’s experience of an event, rather that his going beyond itself has the character of a peculiar implicative consistency. Butt is right that Kelly’s organizational dynamics give great emphasis to assimilative subsuming of events within the system.

The fact that anticipation is directed toward replicative themes defines Kelly’s model as strongly anticipatory. Kelly and Butt agree that one’s system, at the same time, in the same moment, recognizes its world and is changed by that world. Where they part company is Kelly’s insistence that an irreducible dimension of belonging characterizes the system’s relation to even the most shockingly chaotic experiences. Even in difference, negation, senselessness, irrationality, alterity, there is no experience in consciousness that is not in an overarching way variation on a thematics for Kelly, a similarity-in-difference. The Construction corollary defines construing in terms of dimensions of similarity. Combined with the organization corollary, we get a system in which differences are subordinated to superordinate themes and relationalities.

Kelly says a person “must develop a system in which the most unusual future can be anticipated in terms of a replicated aspect of the familiar past.”

Kelly (1969c) on how even the most surprising events are anticipated to some degree at a superordinate level: “There are first-time occurrences in the history of mankind too. Again, as in the lifetime of the individual, it is these, rather than the repetitions of history, to which thoughtful appraisal must, in retrospect, attach greater significance. Yet human history records no event as utterly unexpected. The posture of anticipation, which is the identifying psychological feature of life itself, silently forms questions, and earnest questions erupt in actions. Unprecedented consequences ensue. But when the novel contingencies occur, who, knowing how it was they came about, can say they fell wholly outside the realm of human anticipation.”

The title of Kelly’s paper ‘Confusion and the Clock (1960)’, which could have been aptly but more cumbersomely named ‘Impermeable Construing and Anticipatory Temporality’ nicely encapsulates both the theme of that piece and what is most radical about his philosophy. The ‘clock’ refers to the anticipative nature of becoming for Kelly, its irreducible basis in construing as a dimensional way of movement that foresees beyond itself. And ‘confusion’ refers to Kelly’s understanding of such affectivities as guilt, anxiety and hostility as situations of immediate or threatened confusion and chaos resulting from impermeable construing. In the paper, Kelly makes the argument that even the most intense and disorganized forms of emotional suffering and confusion, such as those he experienced after his heart attack, point to an overarching or superordinate thematic of recognizability and foresight within which disturbing events are assimilated.
Kelly (1960) on anticipating his heart attack:

“Was all this that happened something that was, in some measure, anticipated? Had I seen them behind my Cousin Leander’s mask? Yes, I think so... In general, then, was it not, on the one hand, a passage of human experience whose strange unprecedented notes derived significance that early morning from the underlying theme of my life, which they so sharply embellished, and, on the other, one whose meaning stemmed less from the repetitive familiarity of its details than from what it seemed to foretell.”

Kelly’s strongest statement of his faith in the potential of a replicative organization of experience is the following:

“... ordinarily it would appear that there is a closer relationship between the motion of my fingers and the action of the typewriter keys than there is, say, between either of them and the price of yak milk in Tibet. But we believe that, in the long run, all of these events—the motion of my fingers, the action of the keys, and the price of yak milk—are interlocked. It is only within a limited section of the universe, that part we call earth and that span of time we recognize as our present eon, that two of these necessarily seem more closely related to each other than either of them is to the third. A simple way of saying this is to state that time provides the ultimate bond in all relationships. “ (Kelly 1955)

Meaning Organization and Temporality: Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Kelly

How can we understand Kelly’s strong anticipatory approach without resorting to accusations of rationalistic ‘sorting’? Based on Butt’s various writings on phenomenology, when Butt said that personal construct theory could be read as a phenomenological approach, it appears that what he had in mind was Merleau-Ponty’s gestalt-based version of phenomenology. In my view, in order to do justice to the philosophical implications of personal construct theory we need to look beyond Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. The remainder of this paper will explore the hypothesis that Kelly’s notion of replication is at the root of the disconnect between personal construct theory and the critiques I have been discussing. My reading of Kelly’s notion of replication depends on the claim that Kelly’s approach is built upon a principle of psychological movement that differs in fundamental ways from the causative accounts of hermeneutic, pragmatist, autopoetic and radical constructivist approaches, as well as Merleau-Ponty’s corporal intersubjective account.

Kelly’s model of movement is packed into the seemingly benign word ‘way’ as it is used in Kelly’s fundamental postulate:

“a person’s processes are psychologically channelized by the WAY in which he anticipates events”,

and in his definition of a construct:
“The WAY in which two or more events are alike and differ from a third”

What is entailed in being a ‘way’ of making sense, relevance and meaning? We can begin by stating the obvious: constructs, as ways of making sense, are defined by their relation to other ways of making sense belonging to networks of similarities and differences, both within and between individuals and larger social groups. But there is more to say about the primitives of psychological meaning than that their identity is inextricably bound to larger personal and interpersonal ensembles.

Modern phenomenology got its start with Husserl’s assertion that stripping away the layers of historically acquired philosophical and scientific dogma via the reduction, in order to get to ‘the things themselves’, reveals to us an irreducible primitive of immediate present experience. But rather than this primitive subsisting in an objectively present ‘now’ point appearing once before being replaced by another in an infinite series of past and future punctual ‘nows’, Husserl proposed the ‘now’ as a tripartite structure composed of a retentional, primal impression and protentional phase. In doing so, he replaced a temporality justifying objective causation with the temporality of the intentional act. Events don’t appear anonymously as what they are in themselves, they appear to someone, are about something, and reach out (protend) beyond their immediate sense.

So for Husserl, the WAY that we experience a present event is always a complex relating process weaving together past, present and future in an indissociable unity. One can clearly recognize Kelly’s anticipatory person-in-motion in this model. If for Husserl, the isolated self-inhering presences forming the ‘nows’ of objective time are derivative abstractions of the fundamental relationalities composing phenomenological time, there is still more that can be said about what is internal to a moment of time. A way of being a sense of meaning implies a valuative content. What can we say about the internal content of meanings apart from the retentional-protentional structuration within which they are ensconced?

Before I address the way that Kelly’s project deals with this question, I want to introduce Merleau-Ponty’s corporeal intersubjective theory as a point of contrast, since his thinking informs the critiques of personal construct theory that this paper is centered around. Merleau-Ponty adopts Husserl’s tripartite structure of temporality and then inserts into it a gestalt organization as the irreducible ‘way’ of being any kind of valuative content. A figure appears always against a background. The background is the system (ensemble, constellation, environment, setting, scene) that the figure belongs to but also stands out against.

For Merleau-Ponty, there is, outside of memory and anticipation, a concatenation of parts appearing in consciousness in the present moment all at once as ‘this object’. Intrinsic to this ‘all at once’ ensemble, giving it its unity as gestalt, is a dimension common to each part but not reducible to it, a centering identity of the whole configuration both belonging to each part but beyond each particular: A gestalt system is “a signification common to an ensemble of molecular
facts, which is expressed by all the facts and which is not contained completely in any one of
them.” (Merleau-Ponty 1967, p.143). Merleau-Ponty makes internally centered structure irreducible. Gestalt is a founding configuration of experience.

Merleau-Ponty sees intersubjectivity as a simultaneous configuration of parts just as he does perception of objects. Sense always co-implies body, and subjectivity belongs to intersubjectivity. Being in the world for Merleau-Ponty is occupying a position within a shared gestalt (the same world for everyone). I am primordially situated in an intersubjective world. Merleau-Ponty’s notion of intersubjectivity is driven by his founding of the temporal ‘now’ structure as an irreducible gestalt field.

How does Kelly’s approach differ from Merleau-Ponty’s corporeal intersubjective model? To begin with, Kelly’s model of psychological movement unravels the notion of a gestalt background field of meaning framing a foreground. The construct replaces figure and background field with a referential dimension whose two poles together comprise a single unitary sense of meaning. The idea I am advancing is of the irreducible ‘now’ of temporality as a differential SENSE rather than a composed field, body or pattern. In order to get a sense of the difference between Kelly’s starting point in a bipolar referential differential and Merleau-Ponty’s configurational grounding, we have to think of Merleau-Ponty’s gestalt structure as over-stuffed. Merleau-Ponty means to make the configurational ensemble an absolute, irreducible beginning, but what he conceives as primordial may be seen from a wholly different vantage as a derived abstraction of a more intricate, insubstantial beginning.

In Merleau-Ponty’s irreducible gestalt perceptual organization, the whole gives birth to each of the parts, but it does so, not as a history formed out of its elements over time, but simultaneously, equally to all. When I see this textured shape in front of me at this instant of time as a unity of mutually configured elements, each part is dependent on the SAME genesis, and because each part is at the same time different from each other, this comes down to saying that, in a single moment of perception, these senses are independent of each other even as they are united by the whole. In other words, Merleau-Ponty’s dependent pieces of a whole function as a plurality of related independent parts. The thinking of plural structure as a simultaneous spatial unity implies a multiplicity of parts or senses (even if completely dependent on the whole), captured in that present instant of the now that is sandwiched between retention and protention.

Whereas Merleau-Ponty finds it necessary to begin from configurational structure in order to assure that an element of meaning is carved out of otherness rather than solipsist positivity, the construct as an irreducible WAY of likeness and difference is a sense of meaning that is so minimal that it has no patterned or configured internality, no properties, or textures within itself. It has no essential internal valuative content beyond what is necessary to distinguish it from other meanings. Everything that we associate with affectively and cognitively relevant and significant meaning is dependent on process, on how intimately, multidimensionally and assimilatively we embrace new experience, and none of it on content. It is true that a construct’s bipolar ‘way’ of
sense acts as a unique node of relational possibilities and constraints, otherwise there would be no benefit to re-construing meanings. But it is the organizational integrity and coherence of the relations that constructs afford that give us our passions, our loves and hates and ambitions, not the valuative content of their internal sense. For instance, the construct freedom vs security demonstrates its usefulness, meaningfulness and contribution to our happiness via its effectiveness at relating to and interpreting new experience replicatively, assimilatively, and not in any extent because of what it means ‘in itself’.

The consequences of Merleau-Ponty’s derived starting point is that it masks a more fundamental, intricate and intimate notion of movement and relationality beneath a dynamic that is at the same time too fat with content, and too resistant to change, and on the other hand too polarizing in its transitions. The ‘overstuffed’ content inserted into the tripartite structure of temporality makes Merleau-Ponty’s gestalt model and related embodied approaches targets of Kelly’s critique of push and pull psychologies as being beholden to inner and outer demons.

“...to allow ourselves to become preoccupied with independent forces, socio-dynamics, psychodynamics, leprechaun theory, demonology, or stimulus-response mechanics, is to lose sight of the essential feature of the whole human enterprise.”(Kelly 1969e)”

Heidegger offers a particularly compelling complement to the approach I am imputing to Kelly. Heidegger preceded Kelly in doing away with categorical distinctions between affect, willing and cognition. Like Kelly, he begins not from bodily ensembles but a simple differential, what in Being and Time he calls variously and equi-primordially Temporality, the ontological difference and Care. What are traditionally divided up into sensation, perception, cognition, and affect and motivation are united for Heidegger as temporality. Understanding is the cognate aspect, and Befindlichkeit, which literally translates as ‘self-findingness’, but has frequently been defined as affective ‘attunement, is the motivational-affective aspect of experiencing.

While Kelly emphasizes that we find ourselves always already in motion, already thrown into the midst of constantly changing contexts of experience, Heidegger makes clearer both the sense of active, willful decision and choice, and passivity indissociable in every moment, showing that in finding ourselves in action, we are ‘thrown’ into the world, we ‘fall prey to’ what we anticipatingly project ahead of ourselves as new experience. Choice, voluntary action and will are active in that we anticipate ahead, but are equally passive in that we fall prey to, are surprised by, thrown into, must adapt to the foreign aspect of what we anticipate ourselves into via construing. Kelly(1955) acknowledges this foreign aspect of all events when he points that, while a construct abstracts the aspect of likeness between a present event and a previous one, this also implies a way in which a new event differs from previous happenings.

“When we say that two things are ‘alike’ or ‘identical’, we obviously mean that they are alike in some particular way or ways, but, of course, never in every way... there has to be some distinguishing feature between them, else they would not be two separate events in the first place.
..likeness always implies a difference.”

A paradoxical implication of a radical temporal grounding of experience is that it is at the same
time more fully in motion and transition than embodied models, and maintains a more intimate
and intricate thread of self-continuity and self-belonging. Heidegger understands that to be
radically, irreducibly, primordially situated in a world is to be guaranteed, at every moment, a
world that feelingly, creatively impinges on me anew as foreign in some aspect. And it is
simultaneously, to feel a belonging familiarity) to what impinges on me in its foreignness due to
the anticipative, projective futural aspect of temporality. Reminiscent of Kelly’s replicative
anticipated anticipatory process, Heidegger’s being-in-the-world is always characterized by a pragmatic self-
belongingness that he articulates as a heedful circumspective relevance that events always have
for Dasein in its world.

Heidegger(2010) writes:

"In its familiar being-in-relevance, understanding holds itself before that disclosure as that within
which its reference moves. Understanding can itself be referred in and by these relations. We shall
call the relational character of these referential relations signifying. In its familiarity with these
relations, Da-sein "signifies" to itself. It primordially gives itself to understand its being and
potentiality-of-being with regard to its being-in-the-world. The for-the-sake-of-which signifies an
in-order-to, the in-order-to signifies a what-for, the what-for signifies a what-in of letting
something be relevant, and the latter a what-with of relevance. These relations are interlocked
among themselves as a primordial totality. They are what they are as this signifying in which
Da-sein gives itself to understand its being-in-the-world beforehand. We shall call this relational
totality of signification significance. It is what constitutes the structure of the world, of that in
which Da-sein as such always already is.”

Note: Although his work is beyond the scope of this paper, Derrida’s differance is allied with the
referential-differential structure of Heidegger’s Dasein.

“...there is no experience consisting of pure presence but only of chains of differential marks.”
“The iterability of an element divides its own identity a priori, even without taking into account
that this identity can only determine or delimit itself through differential relations to other
elements and hence that it bears the mark of this difference. It is because this iterability is
differential, within each individual "element" as well as between "elements", because it splits each
element while constituting it, because it marks it with an articulatory break, that the remainder,
although indispensable, is never that of a full or fulfilling presence; it is a differential structure
escaping the logic of presence..(Derrida 198, p.53)”

**Kelly on Role, the Social and Validation**

An important implication of the difference between grounding experience in a gestalt field and
situating it as a bipolar referential differential can be demonstrated by comparing Kelly’s idea of the social with Merleau-Ponty’s. I mentioned that for Merleau-Ponty, the person cannot be extracted from a social ensemble any more than the figure of a perceptual object can be understood apart from its ground. For Merleau-Ponty, when a gestalt configuration changes, even though it is true that all the elements comprising that configuration are altered, there is really only one change, that of the field as an irreducible totality. If the elements of that field are persons, then in intersubjective communication each participant’s alteration is an aspect of the total change in the social configuration. There is one change, that of the totality, and each person is only an element of that change. As Merleau-Ponty says:”as the parts of my body together comprise a system, so my body and the other’s are one whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon, and the anonymous existence of which my body is the ever-renewed trace henceforth inhabits both bodies simultaneously.”(P. Of Perception, p.412)

Merleau-Ponty writes:

”My friend Paul and I point out to each other certain details of the landscape; and Paul’s finger, which is pointing out the church tower, is not a finger-for-me that I think of as orientated towards a church-tower-for-me, it is Paul’s finger which itself shows me the tower that Paul sees, just as, conversely, when I make a movement towards some point in the landscape that I can see, I do not imagine that I am producing in Paul, in virtue of some pre-established harmony, inner visions merely analogous to mine: I believe, on the contrary, that my gestures invade Paul’s world and guide his gaze. When I think of Paul, I do not think of a flow of private sensations indirectly related to mine through the medium of interposed signs, but of someone who has a living experience of the same world as mine, as well as the same history, and with whom I am in communication through that world and that history.”(Phenomenology of Perception, p.471)

“In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and myself a common ground; my thought and his are inter-woven into a single fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of the discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator. We have here a dual being, where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of behavior in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist through a common world. In the present dialogue, I am freed from myself, for the other person’s thoughts are certainly his; they are not of my making, though I do grasp them the moment they come into being, or even anticipate them. And indeed, the objection which my interlocutor raises to what I say draws from me thoughts which I had no idea I possessed, so that at the same time that I lend him thoughts, he reciprocates by making me think too. It is only retrospectively, when I have withdrawn from the dialogue and am recalling it that I am able to reintegrate it into my life and make of it an episode in my private history”. (Phenomenology of Perception, p.413))

Butt (1998a) concurs with Merleau-Ponty that "sociality can be seen as more primitive for humankind than individuality, when our status as body-subjects is appreciated and dualist ideas are abandoned.”

By sociality, Butt means joint ownership of meaning, which he opposes to the cognitivist presumption of a computer-like subject controlling their own thoughts.
Chiari (2015) adds: “In other words, it is possible to conceive the relationship between two or more persons not in terms of "interacting" individuals, but of elements of an inseparable system in which the relationship precedes the individual psychologies.”

Along similar lines, but from a realist rather than postmodern perspective, Harry Procter has proposed the heuristic of a ‘family construct system’, wherein relationship dynamics among the individual members of a family function comparably to the elements of an individual’s personal construct system.

Shaun Gallagher (2017), a writer embracing hermeneutic as well as Merleau-Ponty themes, offers a co-conditioning model of sociality that accords with Butt’s depiction of construing as intersubjective:

On ‘socially distributed cognition’, he writes:

“To the extent that the instituted narrative, even if formed over time by many individuals, transcends those individuals and may persist beyond them, it may loop around to constrain or dominate the group members or the group as a whole.”

“Collective (institutional, corporate) narratives often take on a life (an autonomy) of their own and may come to oppose or undermine the intentions of the individual members. Narrative practices in both extended institutional and collective structures and practices can be positive in allowing us to see certain possibilities, but at the same time, they can carry our cognitive processes and social interactions in specific directions and blind us to other possibilities.”

The above treatments of the social space as centered configuration makes individual behavior in social situations the product of narrative norms, reciprocities, shared practices and social constraints. The presupposition here is the belief that essentially the same social signs are available to all who interrelate within a particular community, that there are such things as non-person-specific meanings, originating in an impersonal expressive agency. I’m not suggesting that joint activity implies a complete fusion of horizons amenable to a third-person perspective, except perhaps in the case of Procter’s group construct system. Rather, the first-personal stance becomes subordinated to a second-personal ‘we’, as “an inseparable system in which the relationship precedes the individual psychologies.”

This is not to say that these accounts deny any role to individual psychological history in the reception of social signs, only that intersubjectivity is characterized by a reciprocal cobb'ing and co-ordination between personal history and cultural signs in which the ‘joints’ of such interactive bodily-mental and social practices are simultaneously within my own subjectivity and common to other participants in my community.

Merleau-Ponty (1962) writes “Although [the other’s] consciousness and mine, working through
our respective situations, may contrive to produce a common situation in which they can communicate, it is nevertheless from the subjectivity of each of us that each one projects this ‘one and only’ world.”

Chiari (2015) believes that Kelly, too, understood intersubjectivity as an inseparable second-person system.

“If in Kelly an explicit consideration of role relationships from an intersubjective viewpoint is missing, the importance he attaches to intersubjectivity and inter-corporeality can be easily inferred from the value he gives to certain psychotherapeutic techniques having the structure of role playing – in particular, fixed-role therapy and enactment. The assumption for their utilization in psychotherapy beside the therapeutic conversation rests on the above consideration of the construction process as a social process, rather than as a mere individual and intellectual operation.”

The following comment by Kelly would seem to provide evidence in favor of Chiari’s interpretation of personal construct theory as a psychology of irreducible intersubjectivity.

“To suggest that each man contrives his own system and plots events within it is not to say that each of us is bottled up forever in his own private world. Different men can construe the same events, though each starts out by doing it in his own way. Two people, say a mother and a newborn child, may not have a full intellectual meeting of minds the first time they try to enter into a discourse with each other in the maternity ward. But by sharing their encounter with events-including the events produced by their own behavior-some mothers and daughters do develop a fair understanding, each of what the other is talking about. Each may rely upon her own system, but the constructs of one system can be devised to plot the approximate positions of those of the other. Children and men, therefore, cease to be altogether alone when they try to see events through the spectacles others use, even while reserving the privilege of using their own. “(Kelly 1969c)

But I think Kelly’s perspective on sociality departs in significant ways from Chiari’s reading of it. The ‘meeting of minds’ Kelly is describing above, it seems to me, is of the order of a superficial or incidental construing, similar to Kelly’s depiction of drivers attempting to anticipate the behavior of fellow drivers in traffic. For Kelly, the extent to which meaning appears to be reciprocally shaped is in inverse proportion to the superordinacy of the kind of social meaning involved. In other words, the sorts of situations where persons seem to succeed at negotiating a shared basis of understanding are likely to involve superficial matters, such as traffic navigation, where only a superficial understanding of others behavior is required.

Such phenomena as joint attention, distributed cognition and collective intention only appear to involve shared meanings and feelings when we view them from the most general, abstractive perspective. That way, the appearance of a shared experience masks the interpersonal differences
in interpretive meaning of the event.

“There are different levels at which we can construe what other people are thinking. In driving down the highway, for example, we stake our lives hundreds of times a day on our accuracy in predicting what the drivers of the oncoming cars will do. The orderly, extremely complex, and precise weaving of traffic is really an amazing example of people predicting each other’s behavior through subsuming each other’s perception of a situation. Yet actually each of us knows very little about the higher motives and the complex aspirations of the oncoming drivers, upon whose behavior our own lives depend. It is enough, for the purpose of avoiding collisions, that we understand or subsume only certain specific aspects of their construction systems.

If we are to understand them at higher levels, we must stop traffic and get out to talk with them. If we can predict accurately what others will do, we can adjust ourselves to their behavior. If others know how to tell what we will do, they can adjust themselves to our behavior and may give us the right of way. This mutual adjustment to each other’s viewpoint takes place, in the terms of the theory of personal constructs, because, to some extent, our construction system subsumes the construction systems of others and theirs, in part, subsumes ours. Understanding does not have to be a one-way proposition; it can be mutual. For the touch and go of traffic it is not necessary for the motorists to have an extensive mutual understanding of each other’s ways of seeing things but, within a restricted range and at the concrete level of specific acts represented by traffic, the mutual understandings must be precise.

For the more complicated interplay of roles—for example, for the husband-and-wife interplay—the understanding must cover the range of domestic activities at least, and must reach at least a level of generality which will enable the participants to predict each other’s behavior in situations not covered by mere household traffic rules.”

A key to explaining the resistance of a person’s system to fusion within a social ensemble is understanding the role of validation in reacting to the behavior of others, Kelly says that in forming my social role, I use others’ behavior as a source of validational evidence. I think this points to quite different implications than what is implied by being co-conditioned by one’s interaction with others’ behavior in Merleau-Ponty’s sense.

Kelly (1961) writes:

“In some respects validation in personal construct theory takes the place of reinforcement, although it is a construct of quite a different order. Validation is the relationship one senses between anticipation and realization, whereas in conventional theory reinforcement is a value property attributed to an event.”

The relevance here for embodied intersubjective approaches following Merleau-Ponty is that, while these approaches reject stimulus-response reinforcement models, their construal of social relations in terms of semi-arbitrary reciprocal shapings requires that the value properties of
mutually negotiated social events play as much of a role in affecting individuals as does the integrity of the relation (anticipatory dynamics) between that event and the subject.

In order to understand the crucial distinction between using the social sphere as validational evidence and having one’s behavior normatively shaped in joint action, we have to keep in mind that the meaning of validation is closely tied to the replicative anticipatory aim of the construct system. However directly I attempt to connect with a world of fellow persons, each with their own subjective systems, all I can ever experience of that otherness is what I anticipatively, replicatively construe as consonant with my own system. As participant in an intersubjective community my construals frame and orient my reciprocal interactions with others in such a way that my own subjective thread of continuity runs through and organizes it. That is to say, hidden within the naive exteriority of my social encounters is a peculiar sort of coherence or implicite self-consistency.

In Kelly’s approach, even when someone lives in a culture which is tightly conformist, one neither passively absorbs, nor jointly negotiates the normative practices of that culture, but validates one’s own construction of the world using the resources of that culture.

“Perhaps we can see that it is not so much that the culture has forced conformity upon him as it is that his validational material is cast in terms of the similarities and contrasts offered within and between segments of his culture. “ (Kelly 1955, p. 93).

“It may be difficult to follow this notion of culture as a validational system of events. And it may be even more difficult to reconcile with the idea of cultural control what we have said about man not being the victim of his biography. The cultural control we see is one which is within the client’s own construct system and it is imposed upon him only in the sense that it limits the kinds of evidence at his disposal. How he handles this evidence is his own affair, and clients manage it in a tremendous variety of ways.”

One can see how the ‘tremendous variety of ways’ that participants are capable of interpreting the ‘same’ cultural milieu makes any attempt to apply a group-centered account of social understanding pointless.

Kelly (1955) says: “You can say [a person] is what he is because of his cultural context. This is to say that the environment assigns him his role, makes him good or bad by contrast, appropriates him to itself, and, indeed, his whole existence makes sense only in terms of his relationship to the times and the culture. This is not personal construct theory...”

Kelly (1955) opposes personal construct theory to perspectives which see a person “helplessly suspended in his culture, and is swept along with the tides of social change”.

“...no psychologist, I think, is all that he might be until he has undertaken to join the child's most audacious venture beyond the frontiers of social conventions and to share its most unexpected
Kelly’s Sociality Corollary ("to the extent that one person construed the construction processes of another, he may play a role in a social process involving the other person") spells out the organizational implications of a being-with-others defined and validated by the intimate assimilative processes of replicative anticipation.

To construe another’s construction processes is to subsume them as variants of one’s own system. To the extent that one is successful, one will have embedded one functionally integral theme (the other person’s outlook) within another (one’s superordinate system). If both parties are successful, is there then an overlap of horizons, as Barison (1990) writes?

“In hermeneutic dialogue there are not a subject and an object, but there is the encounter of two horizons, which combine with each other in a new horizon, formed by a change of both of them in the moment of interpretation.” (Barison, F. (1990). La psichiatria tra ermeneutica ed epistemologia [Psychiatry between hermeneutics and epistemology]. Comprendre, 5, 27-33)

This meeting of minds is not a fusion or even overlapping of themes, the other’s and my own. Rather, the two persons remain distinct but related worlds of thinking. Since there is no actual point of contact between construction systems, only each person’s version of the other’s world, there would be no overarching vantage point from which to glimpse anything like a “unified group dynamic” or Merleau-Ponty’s “same world”. My ability to enter into second person ‘I-Thou’ relations with another presupposes and is a derivative of my first personal stance. The relationship is not a single entity preceding my individual psychology, it is my version of the relationship alongside the other’s version of the ‘same’ relationship, and this must be multiplied by the number of participants in a community.

It is true that each party’s participation in interaction changes the other’s way of being, but the question is whether there is not an underlying thematic consistency that is maintained in each person throughout all their interactions, a self-consistency that resists being usurped by a larger self-other ‘system’. For Kelly a mutuality, fusion, jointness cannot be assumed simply because each party is in responsive communication with the other. One party can be affected by the interaction by succeeding in subsuming the other’s perspective and as a result feeling an intimate and empathetic bond with the other. At the same time, in the same ‘joint’ encounter, the other party may become more and more alienated from the first, having failed to subsume the first party’s system and finding the first party to be angering, upsetting and threatening.

In both situations of superficial mutual understanding and those where core role meanings are involved, those that pertain to issues deeply important to a person, a ‘meeting of minds’ is not a matter of shared understanding in the sense of a same or similar meaning becoming disseminated among the members of the group. Instead, effective social understanding requires the successful subsuming of each other’s construct systems by each participant in the group. When I subsume another’s outlook within my system, for instance as a therapist understanding a client, or a parent
dealing with a young child, I am not converging on the same or similar way of looking at the world as the other. My system may remain very different from theirs as I understand them from within my own vantage point.

“One person may understand another better than he is understood. He may understand more of the other’s ways of looking at things. A therapist-client relationship is one which exemplifies greater understanding on the part of one member than on the part of the other.” (Kelly 1955)

Kelly says:

“...for people to be able to understand each other it takes more than a similarity or commonality in their thinking. In order for people to get along harmoniously with each other, each must have some understanding of the other. This is different from saying that each must understand things in the same way as the other.”
“In order to play a constructive role in relation to another person one must not only, in some measure, see eye to eye with him but must, in some measure, have an acceptance of him and of his way of seeing things. We say it in another way: the person who is to play a constructive role in a social process with another person need not so much construe things as the other person does as he must effectively construe the other person’s outlook...social psychology must be a psychology of interpersonal understandings, not merely a psychology of common understandings.”

Acceptance for Kelly does not simply mean being genuinely open and receptive to engaging with another person. Openness does not by itself produce an intimate connection with them; to achieve this one must be able to follow their way of thinking, from their vantage, but interpreted via one’s own outlook. Gabriele Chiari describes Kellyian social interaction as “joint action” but this is misleading. The first party can construe the second party more effectively than the other way around, by more effectively subsuming the second party’s construction system. This asymmetry is revealed when one allows the social to begin from within each person’s system rather than BETWEEN them. Heidegger’s Being-with-others, like Kelly’s notion of sociality, when understood via the mode of authentic thinking, deconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s primary intersubjectivity. Gallagher(2010) acknowledges Heidegger’s departure from Merleau-Ponty’s account, without seeming to grasp how the inherent sociality of Dasein exposes Gallagher’s concept of primary intersubjectivity as a derived abstraction. “In Heidegger, and in thinkers who follow his line of thought, we find the idea that a relatively complete account of our embodied, expert, enactive, pragmatic engagements with the world can be given prior to or without reference to intersubjectivity.” Dasein’s ownmost possibilities of being would be leveled down and obscured if the relation to others were forced into the mode of thinking of joint action.

But let’s not misunderstand what I mean by making this distinction between a WITHIN-person and a BETWEEN-person dynamic. The within-person dynamic is already a between in that it is a thoroughgoing exposure to, and continuous self-transformation via an outside, an alterity, an otherness. For Kelly and Heidegger, the radically inseparable interaffecting between my history
and new experience exposes me to the world, and modifies who I am, in an immediate, constant and thoroughgoing manner. I am not arguing that the meaning of social cues is simply person-specific rather than located intersubjectively as an impersonal expressive agency. Before there is a pre-reflective personal ‘I’ or interpersonal ‘we’, there is already within what would be considered THE person a fully social site of simultaneously subjective and objective process overtaking attempts to understand human action based on either within-person constancies or between-person conditionings.

“... each of us represents a rather large chunk of his own environment”(Kelly 1969h).

So, rather than a retreat from a thoroughgoing notion of sociality, Personal construct theory would be a re-situating of the site of the social as a more originary and primordial grounding than that of the over-determined abstractions represented by discursive intersubjectivities. Those larger patterns of human belonging abstracted from local joint activity, which Merleau-Ponty’s intercorporeal approach discerns in terms of cultural language practices, hide within themselves a more primary patterning. While our experience as individuals is characterized by stable relations of relative belonging or alienation with respect to other individuals and groups, the site of this interactivity, whether we find ourselves in greater or lesser agreement with a world within which we are enmeshed, has a character of peculiar within-person continuity. It also has a character of relentless creative activity that undermines and overflows attempts to understand human action based on between-person configurations or fields. We may identify to a greater or lesser extent with various larger paradigmatic communities, delicately united by intertwining values. But the contribution of each member of a community to the whole would not originate at the level of spoken or bodily language interchange among voices; such constructs repress as much as they reveal. Even in a community of five individuals in a room, I, as participant, can perceive a locus of integrity undergirding the participation of each of the others to the responsive conversation. To find common ground in a polarized political environment is not to find an intersect among combatants, a centrifugal ground of commonality, but to find as many intersects as there are participants. Each person perceives the basis of the commonality in the terms of their own construct system.

In my dealings with other persons, I would be able to discern a thread of continuity organizing their participation in dialogue with me, dictating the manner and extent to which I can be said to influence their thinking and they mine. My thinking can not properly be seen as 'determined' by his response, and his ideas are not simply 'shaped' by my contribution to our correspondence. The extent to which I could be said to be embedded within a particular set of cultural practices would be a function of how closely other persons I encounter resonate with my own ongoing experiential process. I can only shape my action to fit socially legitimate goals or permitted institutionalized forms to the extent that those goals or forms are already implicated in my ongoing experiential movement. Even then, what is implicated for me is not 'the' social forms, but aspects hidden within these so-called forms which are unique to the organizational structure of my construct system; what I perceive as socially 'permitted' rhetorical argumentation is already
stylistically distinctive in relation to what other participants perceive as permitted. Each individual who feels belonging to an extent in a larger ethico-political collectivity perceives that collectivity's functions in a unique, but peculiarly coherent way relative to their own history, even when they believe that in moving forward in life their behavior is guided by the constraints imposed by essentially the 'same' discursive conventions as the others in their community.

Autopoietic Systems: Temporality as Reciprocal Causality

In order to give a better sense of the important differences that separate the radically temporal perspectives of Kelly and Heidegger from Merleau-Ponty’s brand of intersubjectivity, I want to turn my attention to writers who have adapted his ideas in a naturalistic direction. This group includes Radcliffe, Gallagher, Maturana and Varela. Chiari offers what he calls a hermeneutic constructivist narrative interpretation of Kelly, which he believes “shows striking similarities” with Maturana and Varela’s autopoietic approach and with Heidegger. Their “ontology of the observer is in line with a constructivism of hermeneutic type, and which shows aspects of similarity with Heidegger’s hermeneutics (Winograd & Flores, 1986). Recently, I tried to show the many aspects of similarity between the theory of autopoiesis and the very PCT” (Chiari, 2016).

I believe that, while autopoietic self-organizing systems approaches share with personal construct theory the conviction that meanings are the product of construction rather than objective representation (Chiari (2015) gives a helpful summary of their commonalities), they fall significantly short of it with regard to their understanding of the relation between affect and intention, and the structure of sociality. Specifically, I argue that they allow internal affective and external social influences to shape the person in polarizing ways that violate the intimate sense of Kelly’s replicative construing. As was the case with Merleau-Ponty, the issue comes down to the internal structuration of temporality. Is the basis of change within a bodily organization, interpersonal interaction, and even the phenomenal experience of time itself, the function of a collision between a separately constituted subjective context and present objects, or is it instead an interweaving of a subject and object already changed by each other, radically interbled or interaffected, as referential differential? I contend that for Varela and Thompson it is the former, that they conceive the ‘both-together’ of the pairing of subject and object as a conjunction of separate, adjacent moments. I am not suggesting that these phases are considered as unrelated, only that they each are presumed to carve out their own temporary identities.

This thematic appears within Varela and Thompson’s psychological approach as a linkage of self-affection to an embodied neural organization of reciprocally causal relations among non-decoupleable parts or sub-processes. Varela’s autopoietic system is a reciprocal system of contextually changing states distributed ecologically as psychologically embodied and socially embedded, in continuous inter-relational motion. It is founded on interactions among innumerable, dumb bits which may only exist for an instant of time. But this seemingly
insignificant property of stasis built into these dumb bits of a dynamical, embodied and embedded ecological system expresses itself at a macro level as homunculi-like schemes, assemblies and narratives (sensory-motor, emotive, perceptual, conceptual and interpersonal) whose creative interplay and thematic consistency may be restricted by the presumption of a distinction between their existence and interaction. I contend that the temporality underlying Varela’s naturalized inter-subjectivity conceives the ‘both-together’ of the pairing of past and present as a conjunction of separate, adjacent phases or aspects: the past which conditions the present entity or event, and the present object which supplements that past. I am not suggesting that these phases are considered as unrelated, only that they each are presumed to carve out their own temporary identities.

While these components interact constantly (Varela(1999b) says “.in brain and behavior there is never a stopping or dwelling cognitive state, but only permanent change punctuated by transient [stabilities] underlying a momentary act”(p.291) , it doesn’t seem as if one could go so far as to claim that the very SENSE of each participant in a neural organization is intrinsically and immediately dependent on the meanings of the others. I suggest it would be more accurate to claim that each affects and is affected by the others as a collision of temporary bodies. Varela(1999a) offers "lots of simple agents having simple properties may be brought together, even in a haphazard way, to give rise to what appears to an observer as a purposeful and integrated whole"(p.52 ). The bare existence of each of these agents may be said to PRECEDE its interaction with other agents, in that each agent occupies and inheres in its own state, presenting its own instantaneous properties for a moment, apart from, even as it is considered conjoined to, the context which conditions it and the future which is conditioned by it.

Perhaps I am misreading Varela and other enactivist proponents. Am I saying that these contemporary accounts necessarily disagree with Merleau-Ponty’s(1968) critique of the idea of the object-in-itself?

...the identity of the thing with itself, that sort of established position of its own, of rest in itself, that plenitude and that positivity that we have recognized in it already exceed the experience, are already a second interpretation of the experience...we arrive at the thing-object, at the In Itself, at the thing identical with itself, only by imposing upon experience an abstract dilemma which experience ignores(p.162).

On the contrary, as different as Merleau-Ponty’s and various enactivist accounts may be in other respects, it seems me that they share a rejection of the idea of a constituted subjectivity encountering and representing an independent in-itself. In fact, the suggestion of such an orientation is precisely what concerns them about Kelly’s terminology. In a very general sense, what is articulated by Varela, Gallagher and others as the reciprocal, non-decoupleable interconnections within a dynamical ecological system functions for Merleau-Ponty as the ‘flesh’ of the world; the site of reciprocal intertwining between an In Itself and a For Itself, subject and object, consciousness and the pre-noetic, activity and passivity, the sensible and the sentient, the touching and the touched.
My point is that current accounts may also have in common with Merleau-Ponty the belief that subjective context and objective sense reciprocally determine each other as an oppositional relation or communication (Merleau-Ponty calls it an abyss, thickness or chiasm) between discrete, temporary and contingent contents. “…that difference without contradiction, that divergence between the within and without ... is not an obstacle between them, it is their means of communication (Merleau-Ponty 1968 ,p.135).”

By contrast, I am arguing that for Kelly the ‘now’ structure of a construed event is not an intertwining relation between contingent, non-decoupleable identities, states, phases, ensembles, but a radical differential intersecting implicating a different understanding of psychological movement; intentional object and background context are not adjacent regions(a within and a without) in space or time; they have already been contaminated by each other such that they are inseparably co-implied as a single edge (Try to imagine separating the ‘parts’ of an edge. Attempting to do so only conjures a new edge ). The current context of an event is not a system of relations between entities, states, patterns, but a nearly content-free indivisible gesture of passage, what Kelly describes as a referential axis, or construct.

Varela, Ratcliffe and Zahavi vs Kelly on Affect and Intention

We may gain a better understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of the split between state and function, content and change instantiated in enactive accounts by investigating their treatment of the relation between affectivity and intention.

One of the most striking features of Kelly’s theory is his declaration that “the classical threefold division of psychology into cognition, affection, and conation has been completely abandoned in the psychology of personal constructs. “(Kelly 1955). It is not that affect, emotion and intention vanish from personal construct theory , but rather that Kelly finds a way to integrate the aspects of behavior these terms point to. Understanding how Kelly accomplishes this is essential for grasping the basis of the personal construct, and for recognizing how embodied approaches fall short in this regard. It is not as if embodied accounts follow first generation cognitivism in repeating ‘Descartes’ error’, to borrow Damasio’s phrase, by considering thought and feeling to be functionally independent. On the contrary, these writers take pains to present emotion and thought as an indissociable interaction. They insist that cognitive and affective processes are closely interdependent, with affect, emotion and sensation functioning in multiple ways and at multiple levels to situate or attune the context of our conceptual dealings with the world , and that affective tonality is never absent from cognition. As Ratcliffe(2002) puts it, “moods are no longer a subjective window-dressing on privileged theoretical perspectives but a background that constitutes the sense of all intentionalities, whether theoretical or practical”(p.290). In affecting reason, feeling affects itself.

A comparison with Kelly’s approach to subjectivity, however, reveals that, unlike Kelly , they can hardly be said to have dispensed with the divide between thought and feeling. To see why this is
so, I would like to focus on Zahavi’s phenomenological reading of the relation between feeling and thinking. While Zahavi’s position is only one among a variety of proposed solutions to the problem of subjective awareness among embodied perspectives, I mention it here because I think it spotlights a fundamental theoretical weakness common to hermeneutic, enactivist, and certain phenomenological writers, including Scheler, Stein, Henry, Zahavi and Sartre, with regard to the integration of feeling and intention.

Zahavi, like Kelly, recognizes the subjectively personal nature of experiencing. Referencing Nagel’s argument that there is something it is like to be a conscious entity, Zahavi insists that consciousness of anything always includes a dimension of ‘for-meness’. (Variants of this idea include Goldie’s feeling towards, Thompson’s pre-intentional reflexive awareness and Ratcliffe’s existential feeling.) In attempting to account for the subjective dimension of awareness, Zahavi argues that the for-meness of consciousness in its most primordial form manifests as a self-affecting pre-reflective minimal self-awareness. He contrasts this subjective self-experience with the apprehension of objects. In the latter act, I attend to, intend, reflect or introspect on an entity. In doing so, the world that I experience appears to me over a divide, is indirect, mediated, alienated.

Zahavi posits that my awareness of myself, however, cannot fundamentally be comparable to my experience of an object. For one thing, if it were mediated in this same way it would lead to an infinite regress. The I that views my subjectivity implies another I that experiences this I, and so on. Even more damaging to the claim that self-awareness is the intending of an object is that it presupposes what it is designed to explain. "..a mental state cannot be imbued with for-me-ness simply as a result of being the object of a further mental state. Rather, if awareness of awareness is to give rise to for-me-ness, “the first order state” must already be “imbued with some phenomenally apparent quality of mine-ness” (Howell and Thompson 2017)

To avoid the specter of an infinite regress, the subjective pole of intentional awareness must be of a qualitatively different nature than the object pole, goes Zahavi’s argument. He explains that the pre-reflective self-awareness that opposes, but is at the same time inseparably connected with intended objects, is a peculiar sort of experience, something of the order of a feeling rather than an objective sense.

Zahavi (1999) approvingly cites the phenomenologist Michel Henry’s view:

“When we are in pain, anxious, embarrassed, stubborn or happy, we do not feel it through the intervention of a (inner) sense organ or an intentional act, but are immediately aware of it. There is no distance or separation between the feeling of pain or happiness and our awareness of it, since it is given in and through itself. According to Henry, something similar holds for all of our conscious experiences. To make use of a terminology taken from analytical philosophy of mind, Henry would claim that all conscious experiences are essentially characterized by having a subjective ‘feel’ to them, that is, a certain quality of ‘what it is like’."
I want to take note of the fact that Zahavi treats both the subjective and the objective sides of intentionality as self-inhering interiorities, states, identities, before they are poles of a relation. Because he makes self-inhering content do most of the work of establishing the awareness of the affectively felt and objectively perceived sides of the bond between the subject and the world, the relation between subject and object becomes a mostly empty middle term, a neutral copula added onto the two opposing sides of the binary. In settling on feeling as a special sort of entity that does the work of generating immediate self-awareness, Zahavi is harking back to a long-standing Western tradition connecting affect, feeling and emotion with movement, action, dynamism, motivation and change. Affect is supposedly instantaneous, non-mediated experience. It has been said that 'raw' or primitive feeling is bodily-physiological, pre-reflective and non-conceptual, contentless hedonic valuation, innate, qualitative, passive, a surge, glow, twinge, energy, spark, something we are overcome by. Opposed to such ‘bodily’, dynamical events are seemingly flat, static entities referred to by such terms as mentation, rationality, theorization, propositionality, objectivity, calculation, cognition, conceptualization and perception.

Note: Eugene Gendlin’s radically temporal account, like Kelly’s and Heidegger’s models, replaces Zahavi’s notion of a pre-reflective, reflexive, self-affecting self-consciousness with an irreducibly differential implicit process.

“There are not two consciousnesses, the implicit one and attention. Rather, attention is the one occurring which results from the crossed multiplicity of implying. Any single thing of which we are explicitly aware is an occurring produced by an implicitly functioning process. The implicit cannot be called “pre-reflective” or “pre-verbal” since it includes what previously came with attention, perception, cognition, and words. Implicit functioning is not pre-reflective or pre-verbal. It is pre-verbal only in regard to the next set of words, and pre-reflective only in regard to the next act of reflection.”(The Implicitly Functioning Body, 2008 http://mikefinch.com/)

For Kelly, these dichotomous features: hedonic pre-reflective versus reflective, voluntary versus involuntary, conceptual versus bodily-affective, are not effectively understood as belonging to interacting states of being; they are instead the inseparable features of a unitary differential structure of transition, otherwise known as a construct. In personal construct theory, there are no self-inhering entities, neither in the guise of affects nor intended objects. In the place of Zahavi’s three-part structure of subjective feeling, relational bond and intentional object, Kelly proposes a two-part structure manifested by the bi-polar construct. For Kelly subjective affect and objective intention are equi-primordial features of a construct’s referential differential hinge. Put differently, every construed event is already both feeling and object of sense. This being the case, there is no synthetic relational connector needed to tie subject and object together.

Heidegger’s approach complements Kelly’s. He critiques Western notions of propositional relation as external bond, tracing it back to Aristotle. As an "ontologically insufficient interpretation of the logos", what the mode of interpretation of propositional statement doesn't understand about itself is that thinking of itself as external 'relating' makes the propositional 'is' an
inert synthesis, and conceals its ontological basis as attuned, relevant taking of 'something AS something'. In accordance with this affected-affecting care structure, something is understood WITH REGARD TO something else. This means that it is taken together with it, but not in the manner of a synthesizing relating.” Instead, taking something as something means transforming what one apprehends in the very act of apprehension. This integral structure of self-temporalization implies equi-primordially and inseparably affective (Befindlichkeit) and intentional-cognitive aspects.

From Kelly’s and Heidegger’s perspectives, Zahavi’s concerns about an infinite regress is a byproduct of the way the issue of subjectivity is being formulated, and Zahavi’s solution only reaffirms the problem, which is that the affective and cognate aspects of events are artificially split into separated entities, and then have to be pieced together again in an interaction. To ground experience in radical temporality is to abandon the concept of subject and world in states of interaction, in favor of a self-world referential-differential in continuous self-transforming movement. The functioning of a construct within a hierarchical system allows Kelly to maintain along with Zahavi that one is intrinsically self-aware in every construal, whether that construction is specifically directed toward the self or an event in the world. But unlike for Zahavi, the self component of awareness is not a self-inhering feeling state. Rather, the ‘for-meness’ aspect of a construed event is the contribution my construct system as a unified whole makes to the discernment of a new event in terms of likeness and difference with respect to my previous experience. In other words, the ‘background’ (contrast pole) against which a new event emerges is not only a previously experienced subordinate element that the current event refers to, but it is more broadly the superordinate system as a whole that participates in the construal in an implicit sense. As discussed earlier in this paper, Kelly’s organization corollary indicates that the system is functionally integral, which I interpret to mean that one’s superordinate outlook is implicit in all construals.

Let’s see how Zahavi’s grounding of affect and intention in synthetic interaction between subjective and objective self-inhering states realizes itself in the naturalized embodied models of Varela and Ratcliffe. The general understanding Varela indicates of the relation between affective movement and the thinking which it affects seems to depend on the idea of emotion as the change of a temporarily persisting stance (scheme, state, dispositional attitude). Conceptual narratives are assumed to have a self-perpetuating schematic tendency about them, requiring outside intervention from time to time to produce qualitative change.

Varela (1999b) suggests that affective dynamics initiate gestalt shifts in thought and action. Unlike older views, for Varela intentionality is not assumed to rely on an outside mechanism in order to stir itself into motion. Nevertheless, cognition still relies on such intervention in order to significantly change its direction of movement. A person’s psychological processes cannot be counted on to be intrinsically self-motivated in the way that Kelly’s Choice corollary dictates, but must be channelized into changes in direction of action and conceptualization by extrinsic motivating sources.
Complementing Varela’s model, Ratcliffe’s notion of existential feeling founds affect and intention as distinguishable structural aspects of a reciprocally causal model. Ratcliffe says emotion and embodiment are “incorporated as essential components in cognition”, but emotion and cognition are clearly not identical; “...emotions and moods are not explicitly cognitive but neither are they independent of cognition”(Ratcliffe 2002, p.299). They originate as bodily sensations structuring cognition from outside of it. Emotion and cognition can 'conflict' and emotion can “override cognitive judgement”(p.299). Ratcliffe cites Ramachandran’s clinical observations of individuals with anosognosia, who apparently distort environmental information which contradicts an internally generated narrative. Ramachandran and Ratcliffe attribute this behavior to damage to connections between emotion and cognitive centers. Ratcliffe concludes from this that, in typically functioning persons, emotion signals from the body are presumed to pack a contentful punch large enough to break through a psychological narrative's resistances where weaker percepts from the environment cannot.

It seems, then, that for Ratcliffe and Varela, intention is a capacity for manipulating objects of thought, but emotion, as conditioning valuative valence, provides the criteria for such processing. They are apparently not able to find the resources strictly within what they think of as intentional thought to de-center thinking processes, because they treat cognition as tending to form temporarily self-perpetuating narratives which can distort or keep out contradictory input from the world. So they rely on the body, in the form of emotion cues, to come to the rescue and bring the stalled cognitive apparatus back in touch with a dynamically changing world. The mechanism of emotion is assumed to intervene in order to infuse a stagnant narrative with a new direction and meaning.

In sum, affective and intentional situatedness, understood by Ratcliffe and Varela as globally patterned inter-causal states (existential feeling), functions as a structure of entrenchment and self-conservation, inhering in itself and resisting its own transformation. A global change in bodily feeling is thus required to infuse supposedly stagnant affective-intentional narratives with a new direction and meaning, disrupt entrenched patterns, dissolve the conditioning glue holding them together, reveal their contingency and open up new possibilities. Interaffecting causation, the glue that holds together Zahavi, Ratcliffe and Varela’s minimal self, is a secondary concept of organization, a naturalized abstraction derived from the primary temporal structuration of affectivity-intention.

The lesson that a comparison of Kelly and enactivist models teaches is that when dispositions to act and acts themselves, being and becoming, feeling and intention, state and function, body and mind are treated as separate moments, then their relations are rendered secondary and arbitrary, requiring extrinsic causations to piece them together. What DeJaegher, critiquing Gallagher’s primary intersubjectivity account, writes in that narrower context, could apply more generally to autopoietic and enactivist positions: “first we carve nature up at artificial joints – we split mind and body apart – and then we need to fasten the two together again, a task for which the notion of embodiment is, according to Sheets-Johnstone’s assessment, used as a kind of glue. But glueing the two back together does not bring back the original ‘integrity and nature of the whole’” (De

Note: Some in the personal construct theory community consider Kelly’s approach to be closely aligned with John Dewey’s pragmatism, whose influence on personal construct theory Kelly acknowledges, but I think Dewey’s treatment of the relation between affect and intention suffers from the same dualistic tendency as that of Zahavi, Ratcliffe, and Varela.

The Unconscious vs Implicit Consciousness

In my investigation of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking about inter-subjectivity, and embodied naturalized approaches to affectivity, I have endeavored to show that the nature of movement in a model of experience that places gestalt bodies, ensembles and fields as its irreducible basis is inherently polarizing in its temporal transitions and relations. Relations in such a system rely on the arbitrary valuative content of ensembles and fields to condition and reinforce bodily and social practice. Merleau-Ponty characterizes this polarization as the ‘ambiguity’ of being in the world, which articulates itself as a post-Freudian repressed unconscious. Rather than a Freudian ‘vertical unconscious’ of hidden drives and desires within a psychic system, this would be a ‘horizontal unconscious’ of a past, present and future which are not fully transparent to each other.

Fuchs, in ‘Body Memory and the Unconscious’, draws upon Merleau-Ponty’s intercorporeal gestalt model to form his notion of the bodily unconscious:

“In body memory, the situations and actions experienced in the past are, as it were, all fused together without any of them standing out individually. Through the repetition and superimposition of experiences, a habit structure has been formed: well-practiced motion sequences, repeatedly perceived gestalten, forms of actions and interactions have become an implicit bodily knowledge and skill.” (Fuchs 2011)

“From the point of view of a phenomenology of the lived body, the unconscious is not an intrapsychic reality residing in the depths "below consciousness". Rather, it surrounds and permeates conscious life, just as in picture puzzles the figure hidden in the background surrounds the foreground, and just as the lived body conceals itself while functioning.”

“Unconscious fixations are like certain restrictions in a person's space of potentialities produced by an implicit but ever-present past which declines to take part in the continuing progress of life.”

I believe this is the recalcitrant normative past. Butt (1998) references in his assertion that “...our natural inter-subjectivity leads to us feeling bound to our past, our relationships, and our social practices.”

Merleau-Ponty conveys the irreducible violence of sense-making in such a system:
“In all uses of the word sens, we find the same fundamental notion of a being orientated or polarized in the direction of what he is not, and thus we are always brought back to a conception of the subject as ek-stase, and to a relationship of active transcendence between the subject and the world. Action is, by definition, the violent transition from what I have to what I aim to have, from what I am to what I intend to be...This is the price for there being things and ‘other people’ for us, not as the result of some illusion, but as the result of a violent act which is perception itself. “”(Phenomenology of Perception, p.499).

From their vantage, a sense making process that is grounded on radical self-belonging must be a subjectivity artificially split off from the world in an inner rationalist solipsism, purely transparent to itself. For instance, Fuchs says that for Husserl there can be no unconscious, and reads this as Cartesianism:

“...the unconscious had to be viewed as restricted to an implicit awareness that remained potentially accessible to consciousness or reflection, and, in any case, could not basically be foreign to the subject. In Husserl's words:

"What I do not 'know', what in my experience, my imagining, thinking, doing, is not present to me as perceived, remembered, thought, etc., will not 'influence' my mind. And what is not in my experience, be it ignored or implicitly-intentionally decided, does not motivate me even unconsciously (Ideas II, p.243)

Fuchs concludes:

“...psychoanalysis and phenomenology...have a common starting point: it is in the Cartesian view of consciousness as "clear and distinct perception", the assumption that consciousness is transparent to itself insofar as its own contents are concerned. “

Kelly’s view of the unconscious echoes Husserl. Kelly understands the notion of the unconscious in terms of levels of awareness. : “We do not use the conscious-unconscious dichotomy, but we do recognize that some of the personal constructs a person seeks to subsume within his system prove to be fleeting or elusive. Sometimes this is because they are loose rather than tight, as in the first phase of the creative cycle. Sometimes it is because they are not bound by the symbolisms of words or other acts. But of this we are sure, if they are important in a person’s life it is a mistake to say they are unconscious or that he is unaware of them. Every day he experiences them, often all too poignantly, except he cannot put his finger on them nor tell for sure whether they are at the spot the therapist has probed for them.”(Kelly 1969a)

Kelly(1955) explains that repression is not a useful construct in personal construct theory
“Our theoretical position would not lead us to place so much emphasis upon what is presumably ‘repressed’. Our concern is more with the constructs which are being used by the client to structure his world. If certain elements have dropped out of his memory it may be simply that he has ceased to use the structures which imbued these elements with sense. We do not see these abandoned elements as covertly operating stimuli in the client’s life.”

Butt (1998) responds to Kelly as Fuchs did to Husserl, with a charge of Cartesianism:

“Constructs are abstractions from the concrete world of events (1955, p. 110). Thus we gain the idea that constructs are in some way behind and responsible for behavior. Deliberation might reveal our intentions, which are ultimately available for our inspection and not subject to a process of repression.” “When constructivists accept the ambiguity of the lived world they can contribute significantly to the understanding of it, while at the same time forgoing the inevitably disappointing project of trying to mechanistically explain it.”

It is not that for Kelly the day to day changes in my thinking are necessarily inferentially tied to previous changes in a unitary temporal flow. His Fragmentation Corollary allows that “new constructs are not necessarily direct derivatives of, or special cases within, one’s old constructs.” “A man may move from an act of love to an act of jealousy, and from there to an act of hate, even though hate is not something that would be inferred from love, even in his peculiar system.” “We can be sure only that the changes that take place from old to new constructs do so within a larger system.”

While fragmentation may characterize my transition between constructs, there is no such split within the bipolar terms of a single construct. A construct is a ‘referential differential’, whereas Merleau-Ponty’s and Fuchs’ bodily unconscious is a communication across a chiasm, manifested as the ambiguous relationship between figure and ground. From this important distinction follows the fact that even the inferentially incompatible changes in the construct system from day to day that the fragmentation corollary references presuppose an underlying temporal integrity missing from other approaches. For Kelly, then, to claim that thinking is never unconscious to itself is not to render it rationalistically self-transparent. Rather, it is to say that its ongoing self-transformations maintain a thematics of pragmatic relevance.

**Beyond Philosophies and Psychologies of Blame: Kellian Hostility and Guilt**

In fact, the way that Kelly treats moving from an act of love to an act of hate, via his formulation of the construct of hostility, may indicate how far apart Kelly’s model and embodied approaches stand concerning the issue of the fundamental integrity of experiencing. All feeling and emotion for Kelly expresses an awareness of the relative ongoing success or failure in relating new events to one’s outlook. But his definition of hostility stands out from his account of guilt, anxiety, fear and threat in that it consists of a two-stage process.
Kelly defines hostility as “the continued effort to extort validational evidence in favor of a type of social prediction which has already proved itself a failure.”

Notice that this definition combines awareness of a validational event (invalidation) with a response to that event (extortion of evidence). Furthermore, as we will see, the way in which the first step is understood determines the sense of the second step, and vice versa. The crucial importance of interpretation in fathoming what Kelly meant by hostility can be demonstrated in the following questions:

How far-reaching did he mean his definition to be? Is hostility the same thing as anger, and if so, is there such a thing as healthy, adaptive, anger, or do all forms of anger extort evidence? And what about subtle forms of affective perturbation like irritation and annoyance? Are these also forms of hostility?

One would have to look carefully through Kelly’s writings in order to find him using what may be synonyms for hostility. Words like annoyed, angry, rage and furious appear in the context of some of his discussions of hostile behaviors. For instance, “By this time John, frustrated in his efforts to be manly, is furious at himself, the girl, and about everything in sight, and he is in no mood to listen to advice. He turns his rage on the father, as if somehow here was the fiend behind this maddening woman. In a moment the old man, who I am sure only wanted to be helpful, is dead, the victim of John's nimble sword and wildly diffused hostility.” (Kelly 1969g)

Such passages don’t go far in clearing up matters, though, because Kelly wasn’t very helpful in clarifying how he intended his readers to link his idiosyncratic definition of hostility with more conventional uses of that term. Readers of Kelly are left to construct an understanding of hostility consistent with their own vantage on his work as a whole. Let us see, then, how embodied intersubjective positions are likely to treat Kellian hostility, given the way I have represented them in this paper. I want to contrast these perspectives with the radically temporal interpretation I have been advancing. I have thus far argued that for the embodied intersubjective crowd, values are contents with which we are co-infected, indoctrinated, jointly conditioned and shaped via our participation within cultural norms and practices. Another way of stating this is to say that as an actor in an always shifting social ensemble I am always vulnerable to caprice and temptation, to being swayed in one direction or another semi-arbitrarily in what I care about. As this ambiguous being who is not fully conscious to myself, my potential for capriciously motivated behavior is what I would like to call my fundamental blamefulness.

Now let us say that I have been hurt and disappointed by someone I care deeply about, and as a result I become angry with them. They now approach me and say “I know I let you down. I was wrong and I’m sorry“ (regardless of whether I prompted them or not). One could say that the other’s sense of their guilt and culpability is the mirror image of my anger. The essence of the anger-culpability binary here is the two parties coping, as victim and perpetrator, with their perception of an arbitrary lapse in values, a socially catalyzed drift in commitment to the relationship on the part of the one, and the recognition of this caprice by the other.
Let us then suppose that the hurt party believes that the always present possibility of the other’s straying, succumbing to, being overcome by alienating valuative motives, is an expression of human motivation in general as dependent on arbitrary bodily and intersocial determinants. This being the case, it would not be unreasonable for the hurt individual to formulate the hopeful notion that the blameful, that is, capricious, behavior of the other can be coaxed back to something close to its original alignment, so that the relationship’s intimacy can be restored. The hopeful quality of the anger, then, is driven by a belief in the random malleability of human motives. I am going to call this hopeful intervention ‘adaptive anger’.

How does this scenario fit in relation to Kelly’s hostility definition? Although it begins with an experience of invalidation (hurt and disappointment), we would not seem to be justified in considering the consequent hopeful intervention (adaptive anger) as an example of extortion of validational evidence. After all, the angered party isn’t denying that the dynamics of the relationship have changed. One can argue that they are merely making use of their perception of the substantial randomness in the shaping of human motives in order to attempt to reshape matters in a more favorable direction from their vantage, and this attempt may very well be successful in eliciting the other’s contrition and maybe even a plea for forgiveness of their deviation.

More precisely, the angered person’s belief that behavior is capricious will make it appear to them that their view of the wayward other as susceptible to outside influences has been vindicated regardless of whether their interventionist attempts succeed in getting the other to apologize, express remorse, mend their ways. The conflictual relationship scenario I sketched above was intended to capture what I believe to be a fundamental tenet of any philosophical or psychological approach that is founded on the belief in the irreducibility of blame. Since I claim that the embodied intersubjective perspectives mentioned in this paper fit that description, it seems to me that the idea of an ‘adaptive’ anger or related blameful response to invalidation is absolutely vital to such perspectives. Any theory asserting that motive can be hostage to, conditioned by, arbitrary deviations in interest and caring, especially the valuing of another person, would be unable to endorse the idea that all forms of anger, irritation, condemnation or contempt are forms of hostility representing extortion of evidence in favor of a failed outlook.

For instance, Gendlin, a phenomenological psychologist allied with Merleau-Ponty, considers anger to be potentially adaptive. He says that one must attempt to reassess, reinterpret, elaborate the angering experience via felt awareness not in order to eliminate the feeling of anger but so that one’s anger becomes “fresh, expansive, active, constructive, and varies with changes in the situation”. “Anger may help handle the situation because it may make the other change or back away. Anger can also help the situation because it may break it entirely and thus give you new circumstances.” “Anger is healthy, while resentment and hate are detrimental to the organism.”

The social constructionist Ken Gergen writes that anger has a valid role to play in social coordination “There are certain times and places in which anger is the most effective move in the dance.”
Merleau-Ponty scholar John Russon (2020) offers:

“Anger can be unjustified, to be sure, and in that case it enacts a fundamentally distorted portrayal of the other. But anger can also be justified, and in that case it can be the only frame of mind in which the vicious and hateful reality of the other is truly recognized.” (The Place of Love).

Robert Solomon (1977), champion of the view that emotions are central to meaning and significance in human life, says that anger can be ‘right’.

“Anger, for example, is not just a burst of venom, and it is not as such sinful, nor is it necessarily a “negative” emotion. It can be “righteous,” and it can sometimes be right.”

McCoy (1977) upheld Kelly’s definition of hostility and anger as products of invalidated construing but found it necessary to exclude contempt from this description. She defined contempt as “awareness that the core role of another is comprehensively different from one’s own and or does not meet the norms of social expectation” (P 97.).

Contempt, on her reading, represents validated construing, because “contempt predicts that it’s object will experience guilt “(P 98). Thus, the threatened structure is relieved of the threat caused by the others social deviation by a reaffirmation of the present system.

Let’s now see how the above accounts compare with my radically temporal reading of Kellian hostility. If, for any psychology, the arbitrariness of blame is irreducible in direct proportion to the belief that the in-itself valuative content of our experiencing contributes to a shaping of our motives and behavior in a way that we are not explicitly or implicitly aware of (Fuchs’ horizontal unconscious), then this would seem to be incompatible with the spirit of Kelly’s Choice corollary, which states that a person chooses for themself that alternative in a dichotomized construct through which they anticipate the greater possibility for extension and definition of their system.

The Choice Corollary exemplifies the central importance of process, and the near irrelevance of valuative content, in the organization of the construct system. The direction of motivation is driven by the anticipatory integrity of the relationships between near-meaningless-in-themselves contents, not by the supposed value-substance of the contents themselves, whether perceived as motivational entities like incentives, needs, drives or reinforcements. Kelly(1969a) says

“…it would have been too easy for us…to blame our difficulties on the motives of the client. When we find a person who is concerned about motives, he usually turns out to be one who is threatened by his fellow men and wants to put them in their place.”

“As in all cases of hostility, the frustrated therapist starts to see the hazard as inherent in the elements which he has been unable to construe successfully rather than in his construction of them.” (Kelly 1955)
As I have written, to say that pleasure is what motivates us in our choices is as much as to say that improvement in anticipatory efficacy, what Kelly calls elaboration, motivates our behavior. In his process approach, all behavior is oriented toward making our world more intimately understandable. It is true that personal construct theory does not view pain and pleasure through a reinforcement lens, but this is because stimulus-response theory considers hedonic feeling to be the content of a physiological event. For Kelly, pleasure, pain and all other variants of affective valuation, are not properties of internal, external, nor socially shared value contents, but are a function of how intimately, and how multi-dimensionally, we relate events to each other. Validational evidence is just another way of describing the affectively felt assimilative coherence of the construed flow of events and therefore it is synonymous with feeling valence. If one avoids collapsing into emotional confusion as a result of an invalidating event, it is not because validation and feeling can be separated, but because the invalidation impacted a relatively subordinate portion of the construct system.

Kelly wrote: “It is not merely the invalidation of a construct that produces anxiety. Anxiety appears only if the construct is abandoned—appears no longer relevant—and there is nothing to take its place.”

Believing that motivation is a function of semi-arbitrary shapings arising out of our sedimented participation in social interactions intertwined with bodily dynamics, the approaches I have been critiquing do not see hedonic valuation as necessarily synonymous with the pragmatic efficacy of construing. For instance, Butt (1998) splits off hedonic valence from the organizational integrity of experiencing. He believes that personal motivation is at the mercy of influences outside our control. Thus, we can be motivated to make choices that are self-defeating, not within our control, not in our best interest.

“...there is surely a danger that the constructivist assumes a good reason for every action, that every action represents an elaborative choice.” “Kelly does not seem to entertain the possibility that the person ever makes non-elaborative choices.” In situations of personal distress, “the client might not be able to make any sense of the concept [of elaborative choice]. His or her experience is usually of being out of control, at the mercy of mysterious impulse. “

Such impulses do not originate from an internal construct system or other persons in a unidirectional manner, but are the product of joint action emerging from the social flow.

“Being respectful of their choices does not mean implying that they have a cognitive system operating silently in their best interests beneath their awareness. It means helping them realize how they are sedimented in their interactions with the world, particularly the social world. If they opt for change, the system that will need to accommodate to it is social rather than cognitive.”

Butt’s grounding of motive in socially shared value content threatens to turn Kelly’s elaborative
choice into a bouncing between the repressiveness of entrenched sedimented habit and the chaos of a leap in the dark. Butt fails to see that the construct system does not achieve its integrative continuity through any positive internal power. On the contrary, it simply lacks the formidability of value content implied by socially embedded sedimentation necessary to impose the arbitrariness of polarizing conditioning on the movement of experiential process. What drives choice in Kelly’s Choice corollary isn’t a rationalist ‘gyroscope’ but the opposite, the replacement of polarizing value content with constructive process. From Kelly’s perspective it is Butt’s sedimented, habitual social gestalt that fits the description of a dominating gyroscope. Beneath the apparent chaos and whim of blame (being ‘at the mercy of mysterious impulse’) lies a radically temporal order in psychological movement that proves why neither my own nor another’s processes are capable of the content-driven arbitrariness that could lead to the ‘thoughtlessness’ of anger-producing culpability.

Why can one’s own processes never be ‘thoughtless’ enough to produce culpability in oneself and justify anger on the part of another? Because Kelly’s elaborative choice reflects the fact that definition or extension of one’s system defines or extends dimensional senses with not enough substance, force, power within themselves to arbitrarily polarize, disrupt, condition and repress. Polarization, force, capriciousness, repression are required as irreducible in experiencing in order for the blamefulness hostility and anger to be primordially justified. What makes Kelly’s definition of hostile so remarkable, then, is that it implies that ALL situations that I interpret as apparent capriciousness NECESSARILY represent an invalid construal of the situation on my part, and that, even if I am unable to arrive at a crisp construction that instantly dispels the justification for my hostility, there is such an explanation OF NECESSITY. Blame is an impermeable construct, one that must be abandoned once it is understood that intention could never be arbitrary or capricious.

“Some day we may know who to blame for a child's troubles, or we may give up the construct of "blame" altogether.”(Kelly 1963)

As in the scenario I described of the hopeful interventionist impulse of ‘adaptive’ anger, I interpret the extortionist impulse of hostility as rooted in the hopeful desire to influence the other back where I think they should have been, even when there is no communication with another, either verbal, gestural or physical. The attempt at extorting evidence begins with the hopeful thought that my attempt at influencing the other may be effective. Even the most subtle variants of anger are inconceivable without my sense that the person who disappointed me can be coaxed by me, whether gently or not so gently, back to where we believe they should have been.

For this reason, I believe that Kelly intended his definition of hostility to apply to all feelings and expressions of blame aimed at another (or oneself in self-anger). These include: irritation, annoyance, disapproval, condemnation, feeling insulted, taking umbrage, resentment, exasperation, impatience, hatred, ire, outrage, contempt, righteous indignation, ‘adaptive’ anger, perceiving the other as deliberately thoughtless, lazy, culpable, perverse, inconsiderate, disrespectful, disgraceful, greedy, evil, sinful, criminal. Any of the above feelings represent a
failure to understand what is in principle understandable without blame via a reorganization of one’s construct system.

At the heart of blameful feeling is an unanswered question. What is the rationale behind the perpetrator’s unfathomable behavior? Unable to come up with any workable justifiable explanation of the other’s seemingly perverse shift in motive, the offended person attempts to coerce the other into feeling self-blame, to ‘knock some sense back into them’. But since we don’t know why they violated our expectation of them, why and how they failed to do what our blameful anger tells us they ‘should have’ according to our prior estimation of their relation to us, this guilt-inducing process is tentative, unsure.

Even if we succeed in getting the blameful other to atone and re-establish their previous intimacy with us, we understand them no better than we did prior to their hostility-generating action, and thus our hostility provides an inadequate solution to our puzzlement and anxiety. All we have learned from the episode is that they other is potentially untrustworthy, unpredictable. The ineffectiveness of this approach can be seen in the fact that even if contempt succeeds in getting the perpetrator to mend their ways, an adequate understanding of his or her puzzling motives has not been achieved. The very success of the contempt delays the pursuit of a permeable construction within which the other’s apparently arbitrary disappointing deviation from what one expected of them can be seen as a necessary, adaptive elaboration of their way of construing their role in the relationship.

When confronted with behavior of another that is comprehensively different from our own, a mystery to us, and especially when it disturbs us, we are challenged by Kelly to bridge the gap between ourselves and the other not by attributing the problem to the other’s being at the mercy of capriciously wayward motives which we may hope to re-shape, but by striving to subsume the other’s outlook within a revised version of our own system. What is left of the construct of hostility if blaming another can be adaptive rather than always an extortion of evidence? It becomes a toothless irrationality, a not being willing to accept that another has hurt me, let me down, disrespected me, fallen out of love with me. Hostility would be strictly an attempt to prove to oneself that the immediate insult never took place.

But even when one is convinced that the insult did indeed take place and can never be undone or denied, even when one pleads with, cajoles and threatens the other to reconsider their actions and apologize, even when one succeeds in eliciting the other’s remorse, even when one forgives the other’s transgression and prepares themself to start afresh in the relationship, all these changes in construing amount to no more than a retrenchment of the original inadequate outlook. Contrary to McCoy’s (1977) contention that contempt, which she defines as the expectation that the other will experience guilt, represents validated construing, such an expectation, as a hopeful wish, would express the very essence of hostility. The intensity of our feeling of contempt is in direct proportion to the unwillingness of the other to display guilt. Thus, the essential quality of contempt is the need to make the other feel guilty.
That Kelly (1955) was not a fan of the cycle of blame, apology and forgiveness is suggested in the following:

“Punishment may occasionally be used to make a person feel guilty and anxious in the honest hope that he will mend his ways. Sometimes we say that we ‘punish the crime and not the criminal’. This is silly; the ‘criminal’ gets punished nonetheless. We hope, however, that he will see that it is only a part of him that is condemned. The epigrammatic slogan may be a semantic device for leaving the door open for him to reestablish his role in our society rather than going out and establishing a core role which is outside our society.”

For Kelly, transcending anger by revising one’s construction of the event means arriving at an explanation that does not require the other’s contrition, which only serves to appease the hostile person rather than enlighten him. For the same reason, Kelly eschewed forgiveness and turning the other cheek. Such gestures only make sense in the context of blame, which implies a belief in the potential arbitrariness and capriciousness of human motives. Seeking the other’s atonement is not considered by Kelly to reflect an effective understanding of the original insult. Recounting a parable of Jesus and a woman “He didn't even forgive her; that sort of unction didn't seem to be called for.” (Kelly 1961)

From Kelly’s vantage, if, rather than getting angry or condemning another who wrongs me, I respond with loving forgiveness, my absolution of the other presupposes my hostility toward them. I can only forgive the other’s trespass to the extent that I recognize a sign of contrition or confession on their part. Ideals of so-called unconditional forgiveness, of turning the other cheek, loving one's oppressor, could also be understood as conditional in various ways. In the absence of the other's willingness to atone, I may forgive evil when I believe that there are special or extenuating circumstances which will allow me to view the perpetrator as less culpable (the sinner knows not what he does). I can say the other was blinded or deluded, led astray. My offer of grace is then subtly hostile, both an embrace and a slap. I hold forth the carrot of my love as a lure, hoping thereby to uncloud the other's conscience so as to enable them to discover their culpability. In opening my arms, I hope the prodigal son will return chastised, suddenly aware of a need to be forgiven. Even when there is held little chance that the sinner will openly acknowledge his sin, I may hope that my outrage connects with a seed of regret and contrition buried deep within the other, as if my ‘unconditional' forgiveness is an acknowledgment of God's or the subliminal conscience of the other's apologizing in the name of the sinner.

Kelly’s formulation of hostility as an extortionistic irrealism may have left the door open for personal construct theory writers to interpret it narrowly as an outright denial of a reality staring a person in the face. Indeed, his use of those terms implies that the hostile person is aware at some level that their attempts at attaining evidence to confirm their original hypothesis is misguided, that they are pretending to themselves that their original assessment of the situation is still valid when a part of themselves already knows better. This seems to have encouraged a tendency among some personal construct theory writers to turn
hostility into what sounds to me more like a psychoanalytic-style defense mechanism than an elaborative choice.

By this I mean I don’t think hostility’s extortionist impulse should be read as self-deceptive denial that one was significantly surprised and disappointed by another’s actions, so much as a settling for an inadequate explanation for the reasons behind the other’s unpredictability. That is to say, when in anger I seek to extort evidence, what I am attempting to validate is my impermeable construal of the other’s intent as ambiguous, obstinate and perverse. My anger is motivated by, and looks for further confirmation of, my pre-existing belief that the people I care about are susceptible to behaving in recalcitrant, dangerous ways.

“The hostile person insists that it is the elements which must be recalcitrant rather than his own thinking. Since many of his elements are people, he sees them as recalcitrant....he feels that the hazard lies in the people with whom he allowed himself to get mixed up. He thinks it is the people who are dangerous, not his construction of them. Thus he sees his difficulty as arising out of his ill-considered experimentation with inherently dangerous elements.” (Kelly 1955)

In one sense, this is a valid assessment, given the starting premise of the unfathomability of human motives. But because that starting premise is an ineffective guide for subsuming others’ behavior, it leaves the person who relies on it vulnerable to all manner of future traumatic surprises. In this sense it is a failure as an anticipatory device, and the extorting of the other’s contrition and apology only reaffirms this failure. For instance, Trevor Butt’s belief that the experience of a person in distress “is usually of being out of control, at the mercy of mysterious impulse“ implies that an intervention that he might recommend in response to a client’s seemingly unpredictable ‘self-defeating’ behavior would be based on blaming ‘mysterious impulses’ for the client’s actions. Although such a response would fit Kelly’s definition of hostility, it seems a bit excessive to treat Butt’s construal as self-deceptive. Rather, the blameful intervention would be driven by a valid but somewhat impermeable construal of the client’s outlook.

Just as the person who understands personal construct theory can no longer believe in the blamefulness of anger, he can also no longer believe in the self-blame of guilt. This doesn’t mean he doesn’t experience the pain of knowing his loss of role was responsible for another’s potential or actual suffering, or his own. Kelly defines guilt as the perception of one’s apparent dislodgment from one’s core role structure. Whatever one does in the light of his understanding of others’ outlooks may be regarded as his role. In guilt, our falling away from another we care for could be spoken of as an alienation of oneself from oneself. When we feel we have failed another, we mourn our mysterious dislocation from a competence or value which we associated ourselves with. One feels as if “having fallen below the standards [one has] erected for himself”(Kelly 1961).

It follows from this that any thinking of guilt as a ‘should have, could have’ blamefulness deals in a notion of dislocation and distance, of a mysterious discrepancy within intended meaning, separating who we were from who we are in its teasing gnawing abyss. But to have assimilated
the lessons of personal construct theory is to perceive one’s guilt as a paired-down suffering because it is a responsibility without self-blame.

What’s the difference between a blameful and a non-blameful awareness that one’s construction of one’s role with respect to another has lost a former intimacy and coherence? It is the flip side of blameful hostility at the other’s changed construction of their role in relation to me. In both cases, the philosophies of blame attribute an aspect of value to the intrinsic content of an element of meaning, so one can be conditioned by an outside influence to arbitrarily lose or lessen one’s ability to care about another. My anger then tries to recondition that feeling of caring back into the other person (knock some sense back into them). But for Kelly, value and caring is never an attribute or property of a content of meaning, but is instead a function of the assimilative intricacy and permeability of the movement from one moment of experience to the next. The good therapist “does not become annoyed with his data! “ “...he seeks to bring about changes which are based on understanding rather than on blame.”

The Choice corollary guarantees that the behavior that one later feels guilty about was the best one could do at the time to elaborate one’s system. Kelly’s elaborative choice determines the direction of this temporal flow as always either toward increased understanding, or at least preservation of one’s current level of understanding. When Kelly talked about sin and guilt in terms of mistakes, he invariably added a caveat that what appears as a mistake from some external perspective can just as well be seen as a deviation from the conventional or the basis of a new outlook. Speaking of his feelings of guilt after his heart attack:

“ Besides, I still could not put my finger on where all my mistakes had been - mostly I knew only where I had deviated from convention - or whether all of them had actually been mistakes; nor did I know what could readily be done even if they had been mistakes. Naturally, I had some clues, here and there, but, in the main these were questions it would take years to work out, and, if I did well with them, they would be followed by further, more perspicacious questions.” (Kelly 1960)

Ontological Acceleration: Kelly’s ‘Realism’ as Constructive Development

I have suggested that Kelly’s notion of hostility and guilt as the failure to understand what is in principle understandable without recourse to blame justifies itself on the basis of a fundamental organizational principle of personal construct theory: construction processes are inherently too integral to be capable of the arbitrariness and capriciousness implied by blame, regardless of the status of their permeability. Whatever Kelly envisioned the ‘end’ of history to look like, I take his definitions of hostility and guilt, his choice corollary and articulation of anticipation as replicatively oriented, to constitute an unwavering statement about the fundamental order driving psychological functioning. If assimilating the lessons of personal construct theory means I need never be hostile, it is not because I can guarantee I will be always be able to flawlessly reconstrue another’s action such that I no longer see them as culpable. Rather, personal construct theory tells me that, in principle, the organization of psychological processes is too integral to
justify the abyss of blame. As long as I am able to take this as a matter of faith, that is, as an ongoing hypothesis, and as long as I don’t find this supposition invalidated, then it is irrelevant whether or not in any specific instance I am able to come up with precise reasons why other person was not culpable for my disappointment.

Let’s see if we can tie this organizational a priori to Kelly’s statements about the nature of the universe. Perhaps we might also clarify Kelly’s seemingly contradictory statements about the nature of reality within a radically temporal perspective. In the introduction to his 1955 text, Kelly says:

“The universe that we presume exists has another important characteristic: it is integral. By that we mean it functions as a single unit with all its imaginable parts having an exact relationship to each other. This may, at first, seem a little implausible, since ordinarily it would appear that there is a closer relationship between the motion of my fingers and the action of the typewriter keys than there is, say, between either of them and the price of yak milk in Tibet. But we believe that, in the long run, all of these events—the motion of my fingers, the action of the keys, and the price of yak milk—are interlocked. It is only within a limited section of the universe, that part we call earth and that span of time we recognize as our present eon, that two of these necessarily seem more closely related to each other than either of them is to the third. A simple way of saying this is to state that time provides the ultimate bond in all relationships.”

Kelly says all events in the universe are interlocked via temporal succession. What does he mean by interlocked? He says “all its imaginable parts have an exact relationship to each other”, but by ‘exact’ he doesn’t appear to mean an objectively causal exactitude, even though he describes it as all working “together like clockwork”. The order of material causality is dictated by the empirical content, which is inherently arbitrary. A car engine’s parts have an exact causal relationship with each other, but not an inferential one. If one part were removed, the others would retain their identity, even if the engine no longer worked. By contrast, in Kelly’s form of interlocking, any two events are just as closely related to each other as either of them is to the third. In other words, all events are inferentially, relevantly, motivationally, replicatively related to each other like an optimally enlightened construct system, which is different than saying they are just causally connected.

To Chiari(2017) Kelly’s talk of a convergence between the psychological system and reality suggests an epistemological constructivism, a speculation on the specific content or form of reality external to the construing person.

“I believe that Kelly indeed spread his wings from a realistic view of knowledge towards a view that nowadays can be considered constructivist, yet remaining suspended in mid-air, that is, without transcending once and for all the opposition between realism and idealism, and this for two reasons. The first is his personal rooting in a rationalistic view of science, of which his early formation in engineering and mathematics is evidence. The second is his limited knowledge of
phenomenology, he regarded as a form of idealism portraying “environment as a figment of […] imagination” (Kelly, 1969/1965, p. 219).

Certainly Kelly never gave up a realist-sounding language that spoke of a universe seemingly ‘out there’ and which we are mirroring more and more accurately through successive approximations, but is this a symptom of a theoretical limitation or a weakness of articulation, the product of looseness in Kelly’s verbalization of what he believed? If one follows the implications of the theory itself, it seems to me what one ends up with is not a correspondence theory of truth, but rather a developmental teleology of intentionality itself directed toward endlessly increasing internal integration. This subordinates what would be external’ in reality to relational activity between subject and world. I think that’s what Kelly(1955) was aiming at with the following awkward rendering:

“The truths the theories attempt to fix are successive approximations to the larger scheme of things which slowly they help to unfold.”

Notice that Kelly does not say our approximations UNCOVER what was presumed to be already there in an independently existing world. Rather, our approximations help to UNFOLD that reality. I interpret this to mean that our approximations co-create the ‘larger scheme of things’. This sounds like a constructivist rather than a realist idea. The asymptotic convergence of ‘outer reality’ and human formulations, then, far from being a progressively more exact inner mirroring of an outer causal machine, has the character of Kelly’s Organization corollary, the events of the universe functioning as sequential variations on a moving superordinate theme. The content of the theme seems to be beside the point. In fact content doesn’t seem to play a significant role either on the side of the subject or the world. A psychology in which the in-itself content of events plays second fiddle to the relationship between events and the psychological system is not much of a realism. By the same token, a construct system guided by no ‘internal gyroscope’ other than the abstracting of events along dimensions of similarity and difference doesn’t seem to accord with the kind of inner content-based rationalism that his critics attribute to him.

The content-impoverished nature of a construed universe implies that at the same time the construct system aims toward ever greater harmony and multi-dimensional correlation and similarity to experiencing, the irreducible structural basis of this movement is from the start already constituted as a radical intimacy even in experiences of chaos, hostility, and other forms of emotional suffering and trauma. I think it is the progressively self-organizing movement of this subjective-objective relationality that Kelly was struggling to convey in his talk about the knower’s approximation of, or convergence with, a real world.

In this 1963 passage, Kelly confuses us by waffling on the question of an ordered universe.

“Do I not believe the universe is organized? My answer to that is that I would not claim to know that it is. Whether it is organized or not is still one of those things that are unknown. I don't even know whether it is a good question or not.”
If it is not a good question, is that because Kelly was groping toward a way to articulate the idea that the world is better understood as structurally coupled with our construals of it than as independently existing?

Kelly continues: “But while I don't know the answer to the question, I need not be immobilized. There is a psychology for getting along with the unknown. It is a psychology that says in effect, "Why not go ahead and construe it to be organized-or disorganized, if you prefer-and do something about it.” (Kelly 1963)

Earlier in the same paper, he clarifies what I think was always his real aim.

“Let us say that the whole of truth lies ahead of us, rather than that some parts of it ahead and some behind. What we possess, or what we have achieved so far, are approximations of the truth, not fragments of it. Hopefully we are getting closer, in some sort of asymptotic progression, and, at some infinite point in time, science and reality may indeed converge.“

It was never a pre-schematized external reality that he had in mind, but rather an intricately developmental constructive process. The universe, then, is not out there, but in the in-between. Nevertheless, this in-between is a teleological arrow, a self-reflexively progressive movement.

A consistent theme in his work since his 1930 thesis at Edinborough(The Social Inheritance) is that of an accelerating tempo of human invention.

“... the pace of sequential transformation is accelerating, causing the task of the Darwinian psychologist, who assumes the evolution of human behavior has leveled off, to get so far out of hand he is threatened with extinction.” (Kelly 1969c)

“...human behavior falls into a progressively moving sequence, an orbit of infinite proportions...”

As itself a development, our understanding of the universe is accelerating toward infinitely integral correlation:

“The more independent [reference] axes upon which we project an event the greater the psychological depth in which we see it, and the more meaningful it becomes to us.“

“Consider the coefficient of correlation between two variables. If that coefficient is anything but zero and if it expresses a linear relationship, then an infinite increase in the variance of one of the variables will cause the coefficient to approach unity as a limit. The magnitude of the coefficient of correlation is therefore directly proportional to the breadth of perspective in which we envision the variables whose relationship it expresses. This is basically true of all relationships within our universe.”(Kelly 1955)
Conclusion

As much as Kelly’s theory traffics in a vocabulary evocative of engineering mechanics, any attempt to pigeonhole personal construct theory as rationalist or realist is faced with a quandary. Idealism and empirical realism belong together as opposite poles of a Cartesian subject-object split. As Merleau-Ponty (1962) explained:

“...its intellectualist [idealist] antithesis is on the same level as empiricism itself. Both take the objective world as the object of their analysis, when this comes first neither in time nor in virtue of its meaning; and both are incapable of expressing the peculiar way in which perceptual consciousness constitutes its object.”

As such, the divide between inside and outside they instantiate results in an articulation of experience in terms of polarizing internal or worldly contents arbitrarily forcing themselves on the experiencing person, what Kelly called ‘pushes’ and pulls’. Beck’s cognitive therapy and Ellis’ rational emotive therapy exemplify the oppositional relationship between a rationalist interpretive template and an assumed independently existing reality that commandeers that schematics. But any search for evidence of such forces in the organization of the personal construct system will come up empty-handed. Pushes and pulls are conspicuously lacking from Kelly’s depiction of the relationship between the construing subject and their world. The Sociality corollary rejects the idea of a reciprocally conditioned second person vantage, while the Choice corollary and Hostility definition eschew the notion of blameful, capricious motivating demons.

In fact, in comparison with the organizational dynamics of personal construct theory, it is the embodied intersubjective perspectives I have cited in this paper which deliver the person over to semi-arbitrary shappenings from both the social sphere and the person’s own body, encapsulated in sedimented bodily and interpersonally formed norms and practices. It is worth repeating my earlier claim: The construct system does not achieve its integrative continuity through any rationalist internal power. On the contrary, it simply lacks the formidability of value content implied by socially embedded and physically embodied sedimentation necessary to impose the arbitrariness of polarizing conditioning on the movement of experiential process. It is up to the reader to determine whether this radically temporal approach amounts to omitting a vital feature of the experienced world, or if it instead captures the nature of reality in a more profound and intimate fashion.

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Abstract

Iterability, the repetition which alters the idealization it reproduces, is the engine of deconstructive movement. The fact that all experience is transformative-dissimulative in its essence does not, however, mean that the momentum of change is the same for all situations. Derrida adapts Husserl's distinction between a bound and a free ideality to draw up a contrast between mechanical-mathematical calculation, whose in-principle infinite enumerability is supposedly meaningless, empty of content, and therefore not in itself subject to alteration through contextual change, and idealities such as spoken or written language which are directly animated by a meaning-to-say and are thus immediately affected by context. Derrida associates the dangers of cultural stagnation, paralysis and irresponsibility with the emptiness of programmatic, mechanical, formulaic thinking. This paper endeavors to show that enumerative calculation is not context-independent in itself but is instead immediately infused with alteration, thereby making incoherent Derrida's claim to distinguish between a free and bound ideality. Along with the presumed formal basis of numeric infinitization, Derrida's non-dialectical distinction between forms of mechanical or programmatic thinking (the Same) and truly inventive experience (the absolute Other) loses its justification. In the place of a distinction between bound and free idealities is proposed a distinction between two poles of novelty; the first form of novel experience would be characterized by affectivities of unintelligibility, confusion and vacuity, and the second by affectivities of anticipatory continuity and intimacy.

Jacques Derrida may be said to be the pre-eminent thinker of movement today. His work demonstrates that no experience can take place outside of the process of its own transformation. If to be self-present is to have an enduring meaning transcending the transformative effect of immediate context, deconstructive dynamics show us that all events of sense and meaning are radically not present to themselves. They are deprived of their claim to be self-persisting forms by virtue of their absolute structural dependence on other events for their very determination. Each singular event of 'writing' (Derrida's term for experience in general) is not what it is except in view of another such singular event, and so on. What appears and passes away as a signifier is not the stand-in for an originating presence, but the repetition of an original undecidability and mobility. The engine of this deconstructive movement is the indissociable play of repetition and alteration dubbed by Derrida as iterability, the repetition which alters the idealization it reproduces.
Derrida writes, "an element functions and signifies, takes on or conveys meaning, only by referring to another past or future element in an economy of traces" (Writing and Difference, p.29).

And:

The play of differences supposes, in effect, syntheses and referrals which forbid at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple element be present in and of itself, referring only to itself (p.26).

The fact that all experience is transformative-dissimulative in its essence does not, however, mean that the momentum of change is the same for all situations. It is true that many of Derrida's writings on iterability, the dynamics of what he variously calls the mark, trace, hymen and differance, appear to pertain to situations where active and continual contextual change is presupposed. These include speech and reading situations where intentional desire or 'meaning-to-say' drives the passage of text. But these situations do not express the only typology of iterability. Derrida in fact speaks of forms of iterability ranging from experiences of stiflingly narrow repetitiveness to those of thoroughly displacing fields of cultural programmatics. In numerous writings, Derrida demonstrates how cultural hegemonies dominate via the politics of calculative programmatics of the Same. For instance, within a modern thinking of invention,

...there is a deep continuum of homogeneity, whether we are considering civil or military technoscientific research, or programming, private or governmental, of the sciences and arts. This homogeneity is homogeneity itself, the law of the same, the assimilatory power that neutralizes novelty as much as chance (Psyche: Invention of the Other, p.56).

He also speaks of how such programmatic effects are disrupted from time to time by an intervening, surprising gesture of rupture and displacement: "...one must, at a given moment, stand at the edge of catastrophe or of the risk of loss. Otherwise, one is only applying a surefire program" (Points, p.198). And "A future that would not be monstrous would not be a future; it would already be a predictable, calculable, and programmable tomorrow (Ibid, 387)."

The aim of this paper is twofold:

1) To analyze Derrida's account of mathematical idealization, which will be shown to provide the conceptual basis for the myriad sorts of formulaic and unoriginal thinking which Derrida equates with moral irresponsibility and cultural paralysis.

2) To question Derrida's claim that mathematical idealization is in its essence context-free, that is, devoid of active intentional animation. If, as this paper will argue, Derrida's concept of numeric infinity as repetition of 'same thing, different time' is incoherent, then Derrida's attempt to tie the ethical thrust of deconstruction to the distinction between forms of mechanical or programmatic thinking (the Same) and truly inventive experience (the absolute Other) loses its justification. If there is no such thing as Infinitude of the Same, the violence of deconstructive transit can no longer know itself as the force of resistance.

Let us begin by examining the relation between mathematical and non-mathematical forms of repetition in Derrida's work. Of the various typologies of iterability Derrida discusses, how is
mechanical repetition to be understood in relation to other forms of iterability? A mechanical or mathematical iteration (the 'mathematical' in this paper refers to the primordial act of counting, the symbolization of 'same thing different time') apparently presents a different type of iteration in comparison with that of active intentional experience, where contextual alteration intervenes from instant to instant. Derrida has found it useful to enlist the aid of Husserl in articulating this distinction between mechanical and other varieties of temporalizing experience.

Some readers of Derrida would doubtless suggest that Godel's work on undecidability is a more significant influence on Derrida's philosophy of the mathematical than that of Husserl. Indeed, in Dissemination, Derrida uses Godel's notion of an undecidable proposition in analogy with his own use of the term 'undecidability' (which is itself closely linked with 'iterability').

An undecidable proposition, as Godel demonstrated in 1931, is a proposition which, given a system of axioms governing a multiplicity, is neither an analytical nor deductive consequence of those axioms, nor in contradiction with them, neither true nor false with respect to those axioms (Dissemination, p. 219).

Not only does the above quote appear, in a general sense, to capture the dynamic of iterability as a self-dissimulating repetition, but, in 'Origin of Geometry', Derrida notes that Husserl apparently, at one time, adopted a view, corrected by Godel's results, that axiomatic systems could be exhaustively grounded.

However, in 'Origin of Geometry' (p. 54), Derrida recognizes it is from a more primordial thinking that Husserl approaches the general issue of mathematical objectivity, from which the issue of axiomatic decidability gets its ultimate sense. Relative to this aim, Husserl's pre-Godelian belief in a completely formalizable systemization of axiomatic statements in mathematics was an entanglement in a 'secondary grounding' of mathematical ideality, not to be confused with the fundamental task of phenomenology as the uncovering of the conditions of possibility of objectivity in general. Thus, given the goals of Husserl's analyses, it didn't matter whether he got it right or wrong concerning the limits of the deductive formalizability of axiomatic systems. Derrida writes

Even if Husserl at one time adopted the conception of grounding axiomatics and even proposed it as the ideal for "all 'exact' eidetic disciplines" (Ideas I, §7, p. 56), it seems he only considered this to be a SECONDARY grounding. There is no doubt, in any case, that the kinds of primordial evidence he investigates here are for him prior to those of axioms and serves as their ground (Of Grammatology, p. 55).

Derrida is presented, on the one hand, with Husserl's bracketing of Godelian mathematical analysis according to the method of a phenomenological reduction which Derrida finds to be mired in metaphysical presuppositions. On the other hand, Godel's work is guided by his self-declared mathematical Platonism, his belief that humanly-created formal systems are 'undecidable' only in being incomplete approximations of absolute mathematical truths (footnote 1). Derrida seems to recognize that the phenomenological move, even in its failure to extricate itself from its own version of transcendental idealism, effectively questions the philosophical naivety on which Godel's theory of the object rests.

As Derrida underscores, Husserl refuses "to accept the intelligibility and normativity of this universal structure [of arithmetic] as...an eternal truth created by an infinite reason" (Writing and
Derrida's notion of undecidability may be properly understood as a deconstruction of the assumptions of mathematical objectivity grounding Gödel's thesis. Toward this end, Derrida has been aided in certain ways by phenomenology, even if Derrida has had to leave it behind at a certain point.

Bound vs Free Idealities:

In recent comments, Derrida affirmed his qualified dependence on Husserl concerning this issue:

…I am very interested in and indebted to Husserl's analysis of idealization. One could say that I 'borrow' from him while leaving him at a certain point, and what I borrow from him is the analysis of what he calls 'idealization' (Arguing with Derrida, p.103).

Specifically, Derrida's groundbreaking reading of 'Origin of Geometry' pursues the implications of Husserl's transformation of the Kantian thesis that an ideal object of any kind is an ideality in the extent to which it is identically reproducible again and again. As Derrida puts it, "Absolute ideality is the correlate of a possibility of indefinite repetition." (Speech and Phenomena, p.52). Derrida takes up Husserl's interest in this process of idealization, borrowing from Husserl a distinction between bound and free idealities (footnote 2). Derrida deconstructs the Husserlian usage of these terms, transforming them into species of iterability. Spoken and written language, and all other sorts of gestures and markings which intend meaning, exemplify bound idealities. Even as it is designed to be immortal, repeatable as the same apart from any actual occurrences made at some point, the SENSE of a spoken or inscribed utterance, what it means or desires to say, is always tied to the contingencies of empirical circumstance. Derrida explains:

Iterability makes possible idealization-and thus, a certain identity in repetition that is independent of the multiplicity of factual events-while at the same time limiting the idealization it makes possible: broaching and breaching it at once...the possibility of its being repeated another time-breaches, divides, expropriates the “ideal” plenitude or self-presence of intention,...of all adequation between meaning and saying. Iterability alters...leaves us no room but to mean (to say) something that is (already, always, also) other than what we mean (to say) (Limited, Inc.,p.61)... It is not necessary to imagine the death of the sender or of the receiver, to put the shopping list in one's pocket, or even to raise the pen above the paper in order to interrupt oneself for a moment. The break intervenes from the moment that there is a mark, at once. It is iterability itself, ...passing between the re- of the repeated and the re- of the repeating, traversing and transforming repetition(p.53).

In the case of a bound ideality, what repeats itself as self-identical returns to itself as 'the same' subtly differently each time; the immediate effects of contextual change ensure that alteration is intrinsic to the repetition of an intentional meaning.

But what if, instead of the spoken repetition of the same word again and again, we use as our example an arithmetic counting? A mechanical-mathematical series would exemplify a free ideality. Derrida approvingly summarizes Husserl's belief that

I can manipulate symbols without animating them, in an active and actual manner, with the attention and intention of signification (crisis of mathematical symbolism, according to Husserl)...the emptiness of mathematical meaning does not limit its technical progress (Limited, Inc.,p.11)
Mathematical idealization is unbound (within the strict limits of its own repetition); no contextual effects intervene such as was the case in the attempt to repeat the same word meaningfully. Contextual change implies change in meaning-to-say, and a mathematical ideality can be manipulated without being animated, `in an active and actual manner, with the attention and intention of signification'. Such an ideality can be repeated indefinitely without alteration, because its meaning is empty. Derrida expands on this concept of numeration as emptied of intentional meaning in Dissemination:

Now, Numbers, as numbers, have no meaning; they can squarely be said to have no meaning, not even plural meaning (footnote 3). At least, in their movement (writing squared, writing about writing, which covers all four surfaces and is not plurivocal for the simple reason that it does not reside essentially in the vox, in the word), Numbers have no present or signified content. And, a fortiori, no absolute referent. This is why they don't show anything, don't tell anything, don't represent anything, aren't trying to say anything (Dissemination, p.350).

However, while pure idealities are pure, or 'free', in being themselves devoid of specific content and unaffected by any determined context, we must trace their ultimate source to a prior animating intention. After all, there is always a reason for which we calculate. Considerations as when to begin a counting for various purposes, when to halt it, via which mathematical schemes or operators to relate series of numbers to each other, these decisions all relate to intentional factors and thus are themselves subject to contextual alteration. Thus, according to Derrida, while the simple possibility of self-identical counting is itself independent of such intercontextual factors, the fact that an in-principle infinite counting is linked to a prior animating intention implies that it be subject to its own death via subsequent mutation of intentional context. The so-called freedom of mathematical infinity is primarily limited, then, not within its own self-same repetition, but with respect to the animating intentionality on which it depends, and which intentionality, or meaning-to-say, is in turn bound and divided apriori through its reference to another meaning, and so on.

For Derrida, as for Husserl, the ideality of number, as 'the same again and again', has its ultimate origin in the structural-genetic basis of the movement of experience itself. Derrida links mathematical repetition to the presence-absence structure of iterability, also referred to as differance, among other names. Husserl, however, grounds the exactitude of calculation in the Absolute living present, as the infinite repetition of the retentional-protentional structure of time-consciousness.

Derrida notes that according to Husserl,

The 'again and again' which hands over exactitude inscribes the advent of mathematics within the prescription of the infinite task. And the latter is grounded...in the movement of primordial phenomenological temporalization (Origin of Geometry, p.136).

Derrida emphasizes that, in one sense, for both himself and Husserl (and pace Godel) the basis of pure idealization is not "the access to some possibility that is itself ahistoric yet discovered within a history" (Origin of Geometry, p.131). Absolute transcendental subjectivity is "pure active-passive temporality,.. pure auto-temporalization of the Living Present" (p.152), the "discursive...intersubjectivity of Time with itself".

If Derrida is in agreement with Husserl concerning the non-worldly basis of number as a free ideality and its origination in the indeterminate intersubjective movement of temporality, where does Derrida’s account of idealization presume to leave Husserl behind? A key objection stated by Derrida in ‘Origin of Geometry’ is that Husserl treats the ideality of the structure of intentionality as the preservation or mastery of presence in repetition, what Husserl calls an ‘Idea in the Kantian sense’.
What Is A Number...

Derrida claims that for Husserl the self-repeating flow of temporality is the repetition of an originating ideal object, the now as pure source-point, (the living present) which stands in front of, is present before the act of repetition (Vor-stellung) (footnote 4). While Husserl thinks the infinite structure of time-consciousness via the regulating telos of an Idea in the Kantian sense, for Derrida the 'now' structure originating experience does not conform to such an Absolute. The structure of temporality has not an Ideal but a quasi-Ideal, or quasi-transcendental character. Rather than a pure unity continually present to itself in its repetition, the NOW is immediately divided within itself as iterability, simultaneously repeating and transforming its sense.

Donn Welton and J. Claude Evans, among others, have disputed Derrida's influential early reading of Husserl. Welton points out that Derrida's analysis of Husserl in Speech and Phenomena was written between 1953 and 54, when only the first six volumes of the Husserliana were available and none of the lecture and manuscript materials from the 1920's were in print. According to Welton, Derrida's determination of Husserl's phenomenology as a new form of Cartesianism does not venture beyond Ideas I, leading Derrida to believe that Husserl's analyses slighted the genetic and historical in favor of a static transcendentalism of purified transparent givens (a pure present), thus making alterity inessential to consciousness. Welton argues that Husserl was moving toward a fully intersubjective transcendental philosophy in which indication and expression are not opposed to each other and recollection is contingent rather than apodictic.

There is not space in this article to deal adequately with Derrida's announced differences with Husserl or the controversies surrounding them. It is important to grasp, however, in order to properly situate the argument of this paper concerning Derrida's treatment of idealization, why even the most generous reading of Husserl, such as that of Donn Welton, while perhaps undermining a number of Derrida's early charges against Husserl, fall short of the radicality of Derrida's account. Even if the later Husserl does not consider phenomenology's infinite beginning to be grounded in a regulating telos (an Idea in the Kantian sense), the issue for the purposes of this paper is the extent to which for Husserl the NOW as source point is able to protect itself from the immediacy of contextual influence. Derrida objects to phenomenology's formulation of experience as a perceiving, the appearing of an object before a subject. Husserl's later writing does not escape this formulation of experience as a reciprocally adaptive interaction between subject and object, even if it contextualizes its subjective and objective sides (footnote 5). The percept is still seen as a kind of dividing screen wherein subject-object coupling is a function of perception understood as the receiving of, attending to, turning toward, or being affected by a datum of sense by the 'subject' which receives it. The presencing of an element of experience as a perceiving reifies itself, even if just for a moment, as itself before it is then EXPOSED to or AFFECTED by an other.

For Derrida, an element of significance as subject or object does not first exist, even for a moment, and then interact. The present is IN ITSELF a 'from here to there', an inside and an outside, simultaneously an absencing or effacement of a previous element and the presencing of a qualitatively new and different element. The here and now is ITSELF motion, transit. The famous Derridean mantra, 'there is nothing outside the text', refers to a radically temporal understanding of context, a dynamic of inscription more general than the concept of language as symbolic verbal, written or
gestural communication. Context is not something which events are embedded within, in the sense of a co-existing spatial frame, background, scheme or body. We are not in a spatial field, we spatialize-temporalize. In this sense, experience is not embodied but de-bodied (footnote 6).

Appreciating the manner in which Derrida has radicalized the Husserlian conception of context is a necessary prelude to a further step away from Husserl's theory of ideality, a step Derrida does not seem to have been prepared to take but which is already foreshadowed in his notion of iterability. As we have seen, Derrida retains from Husserl's phenomenological investigation of idealization the notion that the exactitude of pure (numeric) ideality is a way of being that is irreducible to the contingency of empirical reality. Derrida agrees with Husserl that "...the meaning of the number...[its "ideal objectivity and normativity"] is precisely independent from any factual consciousness" (Writing and Difference, p. 158). It is this belief in the noncontingency of number in its own sphere that we want to challenge. In so doing, we will be putting into question the general principle of iterability which authorizes it. However, matters are not so simple. In point of fact, Derrida's account of iterability imparts an ambivalence to his thinking of numeric infinitization. Specifically, it is not strictly true that for Derrida number in itself is entirely devoid of contingency. Let us see why not.

We have argued that for Derrida a numeric infinity is ultimately finite due to its dependence on the contingency of a prior animating intentionality, but what about status of transformation within a counting? We have said that the repetition of a numeric object is in itself not affected by context. This would appear to exempt such a pure ideality from the status of what Derrida calls iterability (a repetition which alters what it reproduces). But in fact numeric counting seems to evince a peculiarly silent kind of supplementarity or dissemination. Derrida explains:

Number is always just beyond or just short of itself, in the "deviation" or "spread" that the machine is designed to read. The plus and the minus, excess and lack, proliferate and condition each other in the supplementary articulation of each with the other. Number, the trace, the frame-each is at once itself and its own excess facing (Dissemination, p. 364).

Even in a so-called pure counting, the would-be self-plenitude of the origin is divided by its referential dependence on the previous and next element in the counting. This makes each number in a certain sense unique with respect to the series of numbers to which it is enchained. While it is independent of meaningful, and thus contextual, change (change in intention or meaning-to-say) and thus active alterity, numeration dislocates sense in an empty sort of way, and in this sense number is an iterable mark.

Let us now form some conclusions concerning the relationship between Derridean infinity and iterability. We have revealed an ambivalence in Derrida's notion of number, preventing its movement from taking on the status of pure non-contingency. Number, along with all other sorts of marks, is essentially constituted-reconstituted by a self-dividing lack and excess. However, it does not seem that such a dislocation operating between-and-as numbers is iterable in the way that an intentional meaning is iterable. Derrida's descriptions of number are not simply a general explication of iterability itself, but of a peculiar sort of dissemination or mobility, a passage through units activated
by a particular purpose which number's in-principle infinite extension dislocates but never abandons for another meaningful purpose as long as it simply continues along its self-identical course. A particular counting originates from a specific context of meaning-to-say. One, two, three are always OF something, motivated by an intention which they supplement and decenter.

Compared with the iteration of contextually changing semantic elements, can we really say that a counting frees itself from what is being counted, even if we acknowledge that a counting dislocates by absencing a motivating meaning-to-say from its sense? (7). Can we not then say that the otherness of calculative repetition, in bypassing meaning, is more 'conservative' in comparison with the alterity expressed by contextual transformation, that is, of meaning to say otherwise that what we mean? We couldn't say the numeric mark is dead because it textualizes, but neither can we say that it is animated in the way that a meaningful intention is. It would seem, then, that the empty textuality of numeration helps us to understand the basis of the kind of experience which for Derrida opposes the novelty of a truly inventive event. This feature of counting as empty excess-lack would crucially link it to the basis of cultural stagnation as Derrida understands it. That is, the sameness of programmatic, formulaic, mechanically redundant, authoritarian reaches of culture may be grasped via this link to the self-sameness of numeration.

In many of Derrida's writings we see the role of mechanical reproduction in conjunction with the repressive potentiality of experience. Even as continually shifting lines of differential forces deprive even the most totalitarian system from anything more than a provisional stability moment to moment, Derrida frequently speaks of dominant codes, machines, apparatuses, programmatics recycling themselves alone and in combination over a period of time. For instance, in "Psyche: Invention of the Other", he says of cultural attempts to program invention that

the aleatory margin that they seek to integrate remains homogeneous with calculation, within the order of the calculable; it devolves from a probabilistic quantification and still resides, we could say, in the same order and in the order of the same. An order where there is no surprise... (p.51) "...it unfolds only the dynamics of what was already found there... (p.59).

One could say that a certain affective thematics are associated with the region of iterability which Derrida associates with the programmatic, the formulaic, the calculable, the countable. Affectivities of the too-same, of relative redundancy, monotony, vacuity, stagnation, and paralysis would be associated with the ongoing experience of the 'same over and over again'. On the other hand, the dramatic transformation-displacement of these monorhythms and monocodes manifests an affective thematics of the surprising, the shocking, the disturbing and traumatic, strangeness and monstrosity.

The Incoherence of Number:

We must now ask: Can one justifiably link the affective thematics of the 'too-same' with numeration as a whole? And are the sensibilities of surprise and disturbance directly and necessarily to be connected with inventive experience? Let us address the first of these questions now. Our claim is that, with regard to the counting of number, the self-plenitude of the origin is divided not simply because it is supplemented by a next instance of the counting, but because context intervenes (not accidently) in the same way as in any meaningful, intentional experience. In other words, the minimal
condition of supplementation-dissemination is not simply that an identical copy supplements, makes up for an essential lack in an origin, but that repetition always involves, and is in fact co-determined by, contextual transformation, not accidentally but necessarily. An illustration of this idea would be to imagine attempting to count in one's head to 100 by increments of 1. The task would find one's attention and mood subtly shifting almost immediately, and this should not be construed as simply accidental interferences in a task which could conceivably be kept protected from such distractions. The very sense of what it would mean to be counting, the originating concept of the count, would change instant to instant along with these shifts in mood and attention.

If we then expanded this illustration to apply in a general fashion to any instances and types of concepts of counting, we would have to conclude that there is no such thing as numerical infinitization as it would be understood according to Derrida. Any time and anywhere we experienced the event of a programmatics, a formula, a calculated invention, whether in the actual operation of a device as we experienced it, or in our imagining of a mathematics, we would be experiencing a scene whose temporalizing self-sameness could not be thought of as simply an empty self-dividing supplementation. No general distinction could be made between the iteration of spoken language and that of mechanical counting on the basis of the contribution (or lack) of contextual change.

Derrida continues the philosophical tradition of assessing the meaning of mathematical calculation itself by theorizing the nature of the subjective-objective origins of, and relations to, the self-identical repetition of counting (number as synthetic a priori, number as empirical symbolization, number as pure ideality, number as iterable mark, etc.). But like previous philosophers, Derrida takes as a given the formal constancy of the sense of what counting means WITHIN ITSELF. The present argument is not one concerning the manner in which one should characterize the relation between number and what it refers to.

That is, the question for us is not what kind of notion of infinity (mathematical versus dynamical, for instance) is to be applied to experience. The issue here is a much more radical one. It is, simply stated, whether the very idea of simple infinity, as 'same again and again', has a stable meaning. It is important to see that if the concept 'same thing different time' doesn't have the coherence it is assumed to have, then this makes irrelevant from the start the issue of what in the world of homogeneous or heterogeneous empirical, transcendental, or quasi-transcendental objects a numeric repetition is a counting OF.

A so-called additive series re-instates itself each repetition as a subtly different philosophy of addition and thus a subtly different philosophy of the world. What are called procedural, mechanical, formulaic, logic-mathematical forms of repetition are ways of thinking which fail to recognize overtly that any supposedly rote sequencing or regurgitation of a prior scheme drifts slightly askance from its prior sense and intention in each moment of its recurrence. What is it we are doing when we think a concept like 'infinity'? The thinking of 'same object, different time', the supposed definition of infinity, is just something we say, a contingent utterance which, when we come back to it again the next instant, now says something slightly other. By this reasoning, 'different time' does not really mean different, because if each time in which an infinitely repeating object appeared were really, contextually different from the previous, the meaning of the object would change from one
instantiation to the next and thus so would the meaning of infinite.

Infinity implies the ability to think the multiple at once. Of course, an element is only itself by being divided from itself and in this sense singularity is intrinsically a double concept. But this singular hinged structuration of traceness is not in itself enough to know a concept like infinity. Infinity must know what it is to count more than one in-between. Before any idea of eternity, or even large magnitude, all notions of infinity begin from the assumption of exact duplication. All that is needed in order to allege the transcendence of the finite is to suppose the production of a single identical copy. 'From one to the next to the next'; this, it seems, is a minimal basis of infinity, the common denominator of cumulative reference. It shouldn't matter whether one counts one instance of repeated self-identity or one million. Fundamentally, infinity is the very possibility of 'same object, different time'. It is 'writing squared', as Derrida put it, the ability to know what groupness in general means, a self-same again and again.

The concept of numeration, of infinitization, would seem to necessitate a comparison between at least three elements of a succession in order to conceive of such a thing as 'same object, different time'. For instance, comparing the interval between zero and one, with the interval between one and two, would tell us that this was the exact same interval but two different times. Thus, one would need both the differential relation between a mark and a previous mark (this would constitute the sense of a singular element), and the relation between that previous mark and a mark previous to that one. Most importantly, one would have to be able to think together, at once, both pairs of marks, in order to know that they were the same. In this way we could compare singular elements in order to judge them the same. Without the ability to think groupness at once, simultaneously, experience must be recognized as always a particular 'from this to that' with no room for an 'all of these' or 'more than these'. The numbers 8 or 2 are recognized in their immediate relation to what precedes them or follows them in a thinking, but not as members of what could be conceived as a self-same series whose empty meaning presumably knows itself, is empirically unchangeable. The inability to know 8 or 2 as belonging to ongoing self-sameness deprives them of their claimed categorical distinction, as number, from other types of marks or words.

If a supposed counting from one to ten is at the same time a repetition of supplement of degree and of kind then it is no longer (and never was) within numerical calculus, presumed as a self-evident exercise. As soon as a thinking of moreness as pure difference of degree is destabilized, number is seen as having already transgressed the authority of self-identical accumulation before it can enumerate. Calculation reaches the limit of its totalization before it can simply count. As soon as there is a counting of one, we are thrown back into the origin, differently, so that there is never a counting past one (as bifurcated singular). The one, the first and only one, is also the last one as doubled origin and its repetition. The instant of experience returns to the same magnitude differently, which is other than the supposed simple coherence of number.

Derrida's acceptance of such a thing as numeration or infinity depends on his assumption of an irreducible thickness or stasis within the structure of a trace (element) of meaning. There is an indissociable relation between his conceptualization of infinity and his concept of desire. The
conservatism of cultural stagnation, linked as it is to the alleged emptiness of mechanization, 
formalization, numeration, has its ultimate justification in that within the trace which functions as 
conservatism itself. The singular trace thinks it knows what infinity is, and so in a sense the singular 
is already plural; infinity is presupposed by a singular event before anything is actually counted. 
Derridean singularity would be something like an infinite line (fold, margin, surface, force, frame, 
border). This is not to suggest that one could fit any particular geometry to a trace.

The presupposed thickness of an element of meaning, an infinite numeric thickness of 
presencing alongside an infinite numeric thickness of absencing, makes the Derridean mark or trace 
blind to a varied movement of gentle, insubstantial affective texture which immediately overruns 
the concept of infinitization. The attempt to count self-identically unknowingly succumbs to a 
destabilization before it can think a single instance of its counting. The Derridean notion of infinity 
as something more than just a contingent intentional-semantic sense depends on the so-called 
repetition of a presence which never changes via an absencing which only occurs once; his infinity 
is just a contingent placemark with no real activity. `Same thing, different time' functions always as 
the same different time and thus as no difference at all, that is, no experience at all, beyond a first 
declaration of `this infinite counting'. The supposed determinativeness of the process of infinitization 
reveals itself as phantasm repressing a more intimate, unformidable series of effects. To recognize that 
it is always a contextually different concept of number which returns to itself each time is to 
understand why there is no such thing as number in the sense of an infinitization of self-same 
intervals.

In asserting that the concept of infinity, as repetition of `same thing, different time' is 
incoherent, we are not privileging finitude, but suggesting that the finitude/infinitude couplet assumes 
too much polarizing substantiality for an element of meaning. The movement of experience can only 
recognize multiplicity in the form of the singular relation from this to that, from a here to a there, in 
the in-between constituting adjacent elements of meaning. As soon as one moves from this singular 
differential to the relation to a new element the count begins anew. This does not mean that we cannot 
think such terms as groupness, plurality and even infinity, but that what we are doing when we think 
these terms is to name contingent and unique figures within a contextually changing movement whose 
vicissitudes of momentum exceed any prefabricated notion of what counting is.

We must be sharply attuned to affectivities in order to see this richness. A supposed 
numeration is nothing but its affectivities. Wherever in culture Derrida would see simply the effects 
of the black hole of infinite mechanism, we see an intricate undulation of textured senses-affectivities. 
The acuteness of Derrida's blindness in this regard is exemplified by his failure to see that it is via the 
very experiences of predictability, anticipation and familiarity he associates with stagnation that 
novelty may be most intensely available to us. By the same token, affects of shock, surprise, 
strangeness, monstrosity, which Derrida directly associates with the experience of the absolute other, 
can be seen in a certain way as the essence of stagnation itself.

Note these comments of Derrida:

...a philosophical discourse that would not be provoked or interrupted by the violence of an appeal from the other, from an experience 
that cannot be dominated, would not be a very questioning, very interesting philosophical discourse (Points, p. 381). A future that would 
not be monstrous would not be a future; it would already be a predictable, calculable, and programmable tomorrow. All experience open
to the future is prepared or prepares itself to welcome the monstrous arrivant, to welcome it, that is, to accord hospitality to that which is absolutely foreign or strange, but also, one must add, to try to domesticate it (p.387)...All of history has shown that each time an event has been produced, for example in philosophy or in poetry, it took the form of the unacceptable, or even of the intolerable, of the incomprehensible, that is, of a certain monstrosity. When it is alive in some way, when it is not sclerotically enclosed in its mechanics, the philosophical discourse goes from jolt to jolt, from traumatism to traumatism(p.381).

Here we see Derrida associating the thinking of numeric self-sameness with affectivities of emptiness, meaninglessness, paralysis, boredom, immobility, complacency. Meanwhile, the experience of an absolute other is heralded by affects of shock, surprise, trauma, strangeness, monstrosity, risk. Derrida's linking of redundancy with infinitization leads him to oppose the self-enclosed mechanics of the same to the displacement of a mechanics. We saw that for Derrida so-called wearingly redundant experience is experience which clings too tightly to an (non-original) originating conceptual frame or code. But we have insisted that the concept of numeric sameness motivating this thinking is necessarily incoherent, painting a whole vicinity of varied affective textures with one brush. We need to extricate affectivities of stagnation from the concept of Sameness (the possible), which doesn't tell us anything. In like manner, we need to wean senses of traumatic, disturbing displacement from their dependence on an incoherent concept of Otherness (the impossible).

If there is only ever experience of contextual transformation, the would-be distinction between mechanical repetition and inventive alterity can be re-thought as a distinction between two types or momenta of novelty. Experiences of unintelligibility and meaninglessness represent a type of movement characterized by apparent emptiness and paralysis. Boredom, monotony, weariness and exhaustion connected with redundant experience would be, paradoxically, of the same species as the shock and trauma of dramatic otherness. As counterintuitive as it may seem, repetition of experience could only be perceived as redundant to the extent that such monotonous experience disturbs us by its resistance to intimate readability. Boredom and monotony are symptoms not of the too-predictable, but of a previously mobile, fluidly self-transformative engagement beginning to become confused, and thus seemingly barren of novelty.

So-called wearingly redundant or vacuous experience evinces the same pathology as the shocking and disturbing because these two types of events are variants of the same condition; an ongoing dearth of coherence or comprehensibility. The confusion, incoherence and mourning at the heart of experiences of monotony and exhaustion as well as shock and surprise manifest a referential-differential chain of barely registerable elements, a strange territory barren of recognizable landmarks. The 'too same' and the 'too other' are forms of the same experience; the terrifying mobility of the near-senseless, the impoverishment, moment to moment, of the meaning of each new event. It is AS IF the rate of repetition of novelty has been decelerated during experiences of crisis. We know that we are no longer what we were in such states, but we cannot fathom who or what we, and our world, are now; we are gripped by a fog of inarticulation. While still representing transit, such a destitution or breakdown of sense seems like an ongoing redundancy, a death of sense.

If the affectivities of disturbance and incomprehensibility Derrida associates with significant novelty are in fact symptoms of apparent stagnation and paralysis (but not the alleged infinitude of the Same) , which sorts of affects are indications of effective novelty? The unknown, the absolutely novel, may
be most intensely available to us to the degree that we anticipate the unanticipatable, which is only to say that a certain intimacy, continuity and gentleness pervade our most effective movement through repeated novelty. It is not affectivities of the shocking, the surprising or the strange which inaugurate our escape from the monotony and complacency of perceived authoritarian, vacuous repetition, since the latter are precisely species of the former. It is affectivities of joyful, interested engagement which express an acceleratively mobile engagement with otherness. The most stimulatingly fresh pathways imaginable are direct measures not of the confused incomprehension of disturbance but of the intimacy of familiar anticipation. Activities associated with programmatic and formulaic calculation cannot exclusively be correlated with either of the above two types of movement. Whether such an activity is deemed an impoverishment or an acceleration of novelty depends on the particular affectivities associated with that activity determining its shifting purpose and sense, and not on the presumed self-evident fact of the experience of the so-called calculative order itself.

In coming back to itself moment to moment as the familiar, the anticipatable, the predictable, desire may continue to reaffirm its preference even as, or precisely because, the very basis of that objective is subtly re-invented in each instantiation of it. Since we are in (we exist as) transit before we could ever choose to motivate ourselves, the variability of motive resides in the relative perceived continuity of the movement of our experience, event to event. The option we face is between a more or less (non-countably) accelerated experience of movement through what is always, moment to moment, utterly fresh experiential terrain. Shocking, threatening and even boring events manifest a seemingly paralyzed trudge through the chaos and confusion of the unintelligible, while interesting and enjoyable situations express a (non-countably) denser rhythm of change. We always and only find ourselves preferring, and preferring more and more intensely (differently moment to moment), more and more richness (density, continuity) of novelty. Desire is always the desire to make sense, and to make sense is always to make new sense. Narcissism is not the love of redundancy but the love of novelty in its guise as presence. The impetus of narcissism is toward otherness itself in its most accelerative manifestations.

A Politics of Intimacy:

The deconstructive play of Same and Other involves an irreducible violence and polarization. Concealing the vicissitudes of an intimate experiential movement, it always comes too late, noticing and endorsing a wrenching extrication that it reifies as a necessarily traumatic disruption-displacement. A radicalized thinking of differance must place in question a comment of Derrida's like the following: "When it is alive in some way, when it is not sclerotically enclosed in its mechanics, the philosophical discourse goes from jolt to jolt, from traumatism to traumatism"(Points,p.381)(8). As a most insubstantial play, the pivot of sense does not have the power to jolt. This peculiarly gentle intimacy of transit must be seen as underlying not just experiences of joy and contentment but also those events characterized by confusion and suffering.

Danger, risk and terror are adjectives Derrida comes back to time and time again to illustrate what it is like to break from the vacuousness of mechanical self-sameness, the merely possible. But these terms of violence are too lugubrious to do justice to a transit which can no longer be understood as resistance to the Same. If there is no such thing as Infinitude of the Same, or the 'possible', then
the violence of deconstructive transit can no longer know itself as the force of resistance. Unavailable to the overt articulations of deconstruction is a peculiarly gentle notion of alteration whose functioning, throughout experiences of joy and suffering, is that of sense's return to itself differently-but-integrally, a carrying-forward which re-invents its direction and sense every moment without rending the intimate fabric of its anticipative continuity. It is important to understand that this conception of novelty as assimilative is not at all what Derrida has in mind when he thinks of the anticipatable, the predictable, the familiar, the possible as an arrest of inventive experience. We agree with Derrida that the intimacy of experience is not effectively measured by its presumed sustained reproduction of an origin.

The radical intimacy we are speaking of, referentially linking one moment of experience to the next, is driven not by a deductive mechanics, but by the utter insubstantiality of both the presencing and absencing poles of each absolutely new element of experience. The always novel altering-repetition of experience has not the power to disturb to the same extent as it lacks, each time, the thickness of Derridean presencing.

It is important to question the necessity for a language requiring the forceful or resistant intervening in supposedly entrenched regions of power when a radical, subliminal weave of continuity-novelty already functions from within those communities to keep experience mobile. Even within the most supposedly foundational, fundamentalist community of belief or institution of power, each singular individual, in reaffirming the so-called norms and programmatics of that community, is doing this differently each moment of experience, finding their own intention subtly exceeding itself from within in the instant of its affirmation. Given this intricately, constantly mobile relationship of individuals to a particular cultural institution, and more importantly, to themselves moment to moment, one could not in fact locate any aspect of institutional practice, regardless of (and in fact because of) how rigidly rule governed it intends its programmatics to be, which would not avail itself to continual, if subtle, re-formulation (or, more precisely, re-sensing) for each individual each instant.

A foundational choice, rule, mechanics, is always, for every individual and at every moment, reaffirmed differently, as the transit or carrying forward of something that in each iteration is other than a mechanics. Programmatics, mechanics, institutional repetitions and norms never actually mean anything except as terms of language favored by individuals who nevertheless, in their use of these terms, immediately and unknowingly multiply the terms' senses. This ongoing transformation of the sense of a norm, standard or rule in its moment to moment usage may simultaneously ensure its continuity and reintroduce it to itself as a new philosophy of itself. This stability, when it is not thrown into crisis, is the reliability of innovation, not the stricture of redundancy. In this light, we would not follow Derrida's observation that in attempting to oppose oneself dialectically to a point of view, this "reversal reproduces and confirms through inversion what it has struggled against" (Points, p. 84). Derrida believes one remains wedded to that system of thought which one wishes to overcome, dialectically or otherwise, 'once and for all'. But, examined more closely, it becomes clear that one's opposition to a given way of thinking expresses a transformative shift in one's relation to that which one remains related-through-protest. The dialectician doesn't simply 'reproduce and confirm' what he struggles against, but reproduces and confirms differently.
The totalizing schemes of the Hegelian dialectician, or any applied programmatics, evince continuous alteration within themselves instant to instant, not in spite of, but in accord with their impetus, which we have identified as a striving for the effective continuity of the new. Desire IS desire for intelligible novelty. The fundamental reality of an allegedly formulaic thinking is not at all that it expresses a less than meaningful otherness each moment of its repetition, but that our experiencing of such a series (and there is no apparatus of supposed duplication, no ‘physical’ machine, apart from our contingent experience of it) is open to an indefinite range of affectivities of momentum, from the confused paralysis of unintelligibility to the exhilaration of dense transformative movement. Which particular range of momenta of experience reveals itself within what would monolithically be called formulaic or mechanical thinking is determinable via an intricately subtle examination of its affective or sense modulations.

Whether one embraces what would be called repression, a status quo or revolution, one finds oneself preferring the most permeable navigation through experience that appears to be available. The most restrictive conservatism (not regardless of what a so-called dogmatist says, but inherent in what he means) wishes, precisely via the imposition of rules, conventions and contracts, to protect the intimacy of transitivity from the stultifying fog of disorientation as he sees it. Belief in pure conceptual repetition, and even the brief stasis of scheme, is seen by those who subscribe to such notions in relation to less mobile possibilities. It is not that they perceive at some unconscious level and then reject a fresh thinking, an other heading, but that such an alternative does not yet exist for them. What is attacked or opposed, often violently, is not novelty-arity but the perceived threat of a return to a discredited, stultifying past. The totalitarian dangers Derrida associates with what he sees as too restrictive social programmatics are not the consequence of the stabilizing (but not absolute) hold of a thematics on experience, but, on the contrary, of a disintegration of that thematics.

The enormous variety of thinking depending on myriad sorts and degrees of totalitarianism of the concept, on programmatic mechanisms, on the self-presence of the intending subject, is in each case an internally decentering thinking which may in this or that circumstance be characterized by a relative interruption of experienced momentum, but such experience of confusion and inarticulation must be determined from within that cultural scene via the internal experience of crisis in comprehension, rather than judged in relation to its supposed enslavement to programmatics of the Same. The possibility of altering an ethico-political stratum proceeds, individual by individual, as either participation in overcoming an already perceived crisis, or else in embracing and furthering the effective movement of individuals. There is no room for an intervention from an outside which supposes itself to confront or resist a hegemonic mechanics. But is it fair to characterize deconstructive intervention this way? Derrida writes:

The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one always inhabits and all the more when one does not suspect it. Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old structure... (Of Grammatology, p.24).

Is deconstruction really operating from the inside when it misses the affective, meaningful variability hidden within terms like ‘programmatics’? Deconstruction remains in a certain state of estrangement
and incomprehension in relation to itself and others precisely when it believes it is effectively inhabiting the other's thinking. A radical intimacy and empathy is unavailable to such a thinking when it determines the basis of experience as an irreducibly violent, subversive and traumatic transit between events. Deconstruction, having no choice but to plunge the other into a chaotic transformation, stunts the fluidity of the other's self-transformative efforts. Rather than coaxing the other into crisis by 'resisting' and subverting the rhythm of their supposedly intransigent, complacent, irresponsible thematics, we may instead recognize a subliminal mobility in the other's motives and plans unacknowledged by deconstructive thinking. Rather than forcing the other to another heading, we may more gently move with and from their already subliminally self-transforming heading.
Footnotes

1.) See Roger Penrose's The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds and the Laws of Physics, p.113.

2.) See "Origin of Geometry", pp.72-74

3.) These quotations are extracted from 'The Supernumerary' chapter of Dissemination, in which Derrida's thought intertwines itself with a work (among others) from Phillipe Sollers called 'Numbers'. One must pay particular attention to Derrida's usage of the word 'numbers' here, since Sollars' text is not generally devoted to a literal analysis of numeration. When Derrida refers directly to Sollers' text, he italicizes the word 'numbers' and capitalizes its first letter. When Derrida uses the word 'number', 'numbers' or related derivations without italics, he is apparently speaking of a general concept of number. The quote this reference points to mentions 'numbers' both with and without italics.

4.) In Speech and Phenomena, Derrida relates Husserl’s formalistic account of infinity to his theory of language. Derrida argues that Husserl's distinction between the indicating and expressing function of language reflects the belief that the pure or ideal expressive function of language can be more or less protected from the altering effect of language's role as indication. This in turn implies that an originating sense or meaning is directly transmissible and reproducible across time as self-identical, without being OF NECESSITY contaminated by impurities.

5.) Amid the clamor of voices defending phenomenology against deconstruction, one can locate writers such as Bernard Stiegler and Richard Bearsworth treating deconstruction as if it were itself a phenomenological anthropology. See Bennington's critical essay 'Emergencies', in Interrupting Derrida(2000).

6.) Don Welton, like Husserl, clings to the idea of language as a conceptual schematism.. Welton understands language in a formal sense in which words are interpretive devices defined within semantic fields in a kind of Saussurian structuralism of relations of similarity and contrast between signs, prototypes, abstract categories. This allows him to distinguish between the supposedly derived nature of language and the originality of perception. Welton says "We have a type of involvement with things that does not require the mediation of language; things have a sense or significance that is not reducible to a function of meaning...the notion of background carries us beyond the limits of language"(The Other Husserl,p.392).

7.) Derrida claims the repetition of a prior animating intention through mathematical idealization does not preserve but interrupts its sense. The would-be preservation of an intended meaning is expropriated "by the mark of numbers, whose nonphonetic operation, which suspends the voice, dislocates self-proximity, a living presence that would hear itself represented by speech.(Dissemination,p.331)."

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Works Cited


