Zahavi vs Husserl and Heidegger on I, You and We; For-Meness or Ownness?

Abstract:
Zahavi offers a model of ‘I’, You and We consciousness that is grounded in the transcendental self-awareness, which he calls ‘for-meness’. Zahavi’s formulation of transcendental self-belonging as ‘for me-ness’ relies on the notion of a felt non-changing self-identity accompanying all intentional experiences. Zahavi’s treatment of the subject and object poles of experience as, respectively, self-inhering internality and externality, makes of self-awareness an alienating opposition between a purely self-identical felt for-meness and an external object, a fracture between self-identity and otherness. I argue that for Husserl the pure ego’s unchanging in-itself identity over time is merely an anonymous zero point of activity and is not felt or sensed, and thus there is no experienced for-meness to self-awareness. There is instead a relation of ownness between the ego and the object pole, consisting of a constant, that is, essential, underlying structural feature of the ego’s changing relation to objects of intentional acts. I believe that this essential structural intimacy of associative relationship between the noetic and noematic poles of intentional constitution is what Husserl is attempting to capture when he characterizes the constitution of the subject’s stream of lived-experience in terms of ‘my ownness’. Zahavi thinks that what gives an intended object its ‘mineness’ is the fact that as foreign to me, it is intended by a ‘me’ that is familiar with itself. But this self-familiarity speaks only of my proximity to myself as pure self-identity, not of my proximity to my world. Husserl’s notion of ‘ownness’ understands the subject-object relation not as fracture between self-identity and otherness (“a ruptured structure which is completely foreign to its nature”) but as an intimate synthetic unification and belonging. Heidegger makes an even more radical break with Cartesianism by replacing the subject-object structure of intentionality with the self-world temporal structure of Dasein. In different ways, Husserl’s concept of ‘ownness’ and Heidegger’s notion of ‘ownmost’ capture the profound intimacy of relation between self and world that reveals itself after Zahavi’s idealized internal-external binary has been deconstructed.

Introduction

Zahavi offers a model of ‘I’, You and We consciousness that is grounded in the transcendental self-awareness. Referencing Nagel’s argument that there is something it is like to be a conscious entity, Zahavi insists that consciousness of anything always includes a dimension of ‘for-meness’. In attempting to account for the subjective dimension of awareness, Zahavi argues that the for-meness of consciousness in its most primordial form manifests as a self-affecting pre-reflective minimal self-awareness. He contrasts this subjective self-experience with the apprehension of objects. In the latter act, I attend to, intend, reflect or introspect on an entity. In doing so, the world that I experience appears to me
over a divide, is indirect, mediated, alienated.

Zahavi(2005) says he is among those phenomenologists who “deny that the type of self-consciousness entailed by phenomenal consciousness is intentionally structured, that is, a question of a subject–object relation”. “Any convincing theory of consciousness has to respect the difference between our consciousness of an object, and our consciousness of our own subjectivity, and must be able to explain the distinction between intentionality, which is characterized by a difference between the subject and the object of experience, and self-awareness, which implies some form of identity.”(Zahavi 2004)

Zahavi(2005) argues that treating self-awareness as its own intentional object amounts to reflecting back on it. As reflection, object consciousness is characterized “by an internal division, difference, and alterity”. In reflection “the I qua first-person singular effectuates and suffers a kind of inner pluralization, a dividing self-alienation, in which it distances itself from itself. (Asemissen 1958–59, 262).

Zahavi(2014) says “the experiential self should be identified with the ubiquitous dimension of first-personal character. Although it is not a separately existing entity, it is not reducible to any specific experience, but can be shared by a multitude of changing experiences (p.72-77). “

“Normally, the “what it is like” aspect is taken to designate experiential properties. If, however, our experiences are to have qualities of their own, they must be qualities over and above whatever qualities the intentional object has. It is exactly the silk that is red, and not my perception of it. Likewise, it is the lemon that is bitter, and not my experience of it.” (Zahavi 2005)

While Zahavi finds inconsistent support in Husserl’s work for his model of minimal ‘for-meness’, Zahavi appreciates phenomenologist Michel Henry’s unwavering insistence that pre-reflective self-awareness is a non-ecstatic and radical other to object consciousness.

Zahavi (1999) approvingly paraphrases Henry:

“Unless phenomenology were able to show that there is in fact a decisive and radical difference between the phenomenality of constituted objects and the phenomenality of constituting subjectivity, i.e., a radical difference between object-manifestation and self-manifestation, its entire project would be threatened.”

“Henry conceives of this self-affection as a purely interior and self-sufficient occurrence involving no difference, distance or mediation between that which affects and that which is affected. It is immediate, both in the sense that the self-affection takes place without being mediated by the world, but also in the sense that it is neither temporally delayed nor retentionally mediated. It is in short an event which is strictly non-horizontal and non-ecstatic.”
“Henry does acknowledge that an analysis of subjectivity confronts us with an ontological dualism: in every experience something is given to absolute subjectivity which is different from subjectivity itself.” “To speak of an ontological dualism, to distinguish a pure interiority and a pure exteriority, is by no means to accept a classical Cartesian dualism. It is merely to insist upon the existence of an absolute dimension of subjective self-manifestation, without which no hetero-manifestation would be possible.”

On the other hand, Zahavi(2005) (See also Gallagher and Zahavi 2014) departs from the staunchly irrelational character of Henry’s account of time consciousness in recognizing that there is a co-determinative relation between subject and object poles of intentionality. Self-affection is permeated by hetero-affection.

“Although these two sides can be distinguished conceptually, they cannot be separated. It is not as if the two sides or aspects of phenomenal experience can be detached and encountered in isolation from one other. When I touch the cold surface of a refrigerator, is the sensation of coldness that I then feel a property of the experienced object or a property of the experience of the object? The correct answer is that the sensory experience contains two dimensions, namely one of the sensing and one of the sensed, and that we can focus on either.”

In addition to Henry’s work, Zahavi finds further support of his model of minimal self-consciousness in Husserl’s Ideas II, among other writings, where the pure ego is depicted as unchanging and immutable.

Husserl says:

“We can discern with evidence the sense in which the pure Ego changes in the changing of its acts. It is changeable in its practices, in its activities and passivities, in its being attracted and being repulsed, etc. But these changes do not change it itself. On the contrary, in itself the pure Ego is immutable.”

“...the pure Ego is given in absolute selfhood and in a unity which does not present itself by way of adumbrations; it can be grasped adequately in the reflexive shift of focus that goes back to it as a center of functioning. “(Ideas II)

“...the primal "I,"the ego of my epoche, ...can never lose its uniqueness and personal indeclinability.”(Crisis)

But one must ask at this point, does this immutable, indeclinable pure ego contribute its own affective content to experience, a feeling of familiarity or meness, as Zahavi claims? After all, Husserl argues that “As pure Ego it does not harbor any hidden inner richness; it is absolutely simple and it lies there absolutely clear. All richness lies in the cogito and in the mode of the function which can be adequately grasped therein.”(Ideas II). Husserl describes this pure ego pole as non-perceivable, non-graspable and anonymous. “...the ego which is the counterpart (gegenüber) to everything is anonymous. “ This suggests that for Husserl, the pure ego may function as nothing but an empty zero point or center of activity rather than a consciously sensed feeling of any kind.
“...it is the center whence all conscious life emits rays and receives them; it is the center of all affects and actions, of all attention, grasping, relating, and connecting, of all theoretical, valuing, and practical position-taking, of all enjoyment and distress, of all hope and fear, of all doing and suffering, etc. In other words, all the multi-formed particularities of intentional relatedness to Objects, which here are called acts, have their necessary terminus a quo, the Ego-point, from which they irradiate.” (Ideas II)

My claim in this paper is that for Husserl the pure ego’s unchanging in-itself identity as inner time consciousness is not felt or sensed, either explicitly or implicitly, and thus minimal pre-reflective self-awareness generates no for-meness in the way that Zahavi conceives it. There is instead a relation of ownness between the ego and the object pole, consisting of a constant, that is, essential, underlying structural feature of the ego’s changing relation to objects of intentional acts.

The Bernau Manuscripts and Self-Awareness:

I think Husserl’s modification of his previous account of time consciousness in the Bernau manuscripts is relevant in this regard. It not only challenges Zahavi’s understanding of pre-reflective self-awareness as a non-mediated self-identity, but I believe it accurately captures the direction of thinking Husserl was to maintain the rest of his career. More importantly, it clarifies and advances a thinking that was his from the start, a thinking that doesn’t simply make a “category error” as Zahavi claims. by treating primary self awareness as object consciousness, but departs from Zahavi’s understanding of both the noetic and noematic aspects of consciousness.

By 1917 Husserl’s writing on time consciousness began to treat primal impression as inseparable from the retentional-protentional flow of time constitution rather than as occupying its own present moment of meaning within the temporal stream. Passive anticipatory fulfillment from the subjective, egoic side co-motivates alongside the affective pull of the objective, primal hyletic side of every concrete experience.

Gallagher(2017) writes “primal impression, rather than being portrayed as an experiential origin, “the primal source of all further consciousness and being” (Husserl 1966a: 67), is considered the result of an interplay between retention and protention. Thus, in the Bernau Manuscripts, Husserl defines primal impression as “the boundary between […] the retentions and protentions” (Husserl 2001).

Husserl seems to suggest that the complicated interlacing of retentions and protentions is constitutive of primal impression. Not only is primal impression not self-sufficient, it is a constituted product rather than something that makes a constitutive contribution of its own. This more radical claim is expressed in Husserl’s idea that the initial event of experience is the empty anticipation.”

“First there is an empty expectation, and then there is the point of the primary perception, itself an intentional experience. But the primary presentation [or impression] comes to be in the flow
only by occurring as the fulfillment of contents relative to the preceding empty intentions, thereby changing itself into primal presenting perception.” (Husserl 2001; translated in Gallagher & Zahavi 2014)

The primal impression comes on the scene as the fulfilment of an empty protention; the now, as the present phase of consciousness, is constituted by way of a protentional fulfilment (Husserl 2001).

Zahavi wants to equate temporalization with self-awareness but not in the way that Husserl in the Bernau manuscripts does. He wants it to be a pure self-affection above and beyond its intentional relation to an object, whereas in the Bernau manuscripts Husserl argues that self-awareness is always already a self-othering. Therefore, Zahavi (2004) didn’t hold back in his disagreement with Husserl over the Bernau Time Consciousness manuscript:

“...I do not think the internal object interpretation offers us a satisfactory account of either time-constitution nor of self-awareness. To be even more condemning: I think that the position that is developed in text nr. and elsewhere demonstrates an astonishing confusion, an inability to properly distinguish quite different constitutive contexts.”

“When self-affection is conceived as an ecstatic and self-transcending process it is furnished with a ruptured structure which is completely foreign to its nature.”

“... prior to reflection there is no awareness of internal objects and there is no distinction between the lived self-manifestation of the experiences and the flow of inner time-consciousness. Inner time-consciousness simply is the name of the pre-reflective self-awareness of our experiences.”

For-Meness and Ownness:

In the Bernau manuscripts, Husserl grounds the affectively sensed ego in the object intentionality of time consciousness. While Zahavi believes that there are many points in Husserl’s writing career where he expounds an account of pre-reflective self-consciousness compatible with Zahavi’s, in the Bernau manuscript he feels Husserl strays into an internal object morass. Zahavi believes that this formulation substitutes an alienating, mediated object intentionality of a retention-presentation-protentional streaming for the direct immediate awareness of self. But I would like to offer an alternative reading of the triadic structure of time consciousness that departs from Zahavi’s depiction of it as an alienating internal fracture between subject and object pole.

Zahavi supports the idea of the nowness of the present as differentiated within itself. He recognizes that the present is not properly understood as an isolated ‘now’ point; it involves not just the current event but also the prior context framing the new entity. We don't hear sequences of notes in a piece of music as isolated tones but recognize them as elements of an unfolding context. As James (1978) wrote: “...earlier and later are present to each other in an experience that feels either only on condition of feeling both together” (p.77).

The key question is how this ‘both together’ is to be construed. Is the basis of change within a
bodily organization, interpersonal interaction, and even the phenomenal experience of time itself, the function of an opposition between an intrinsic subjectivity and extrinsic objects? Or does my dynamic ‘now’ consist of a very different form of intentionality, a strange intersecting of a projecting subject and presenting object already changed by each other, radically interbled or inter-affected such that it can no longer be said that they have any separable aspects at all? I contend that Zahavi conceives the ‘both-together’ of the pairing of subject and object poles as a conjunction of distinct self-inherences. I am not suggesting that these poles are considered as unrelated, only that they each are presumed to carve out their own identities. At the most primordial level of constitution, the self pole maintains itself as an affective, or felt, pure self-identity which does not change with changing intentional experiences. The object pole, by contrast, subsists as a rigid identity.

“Self-affection understood as the process of affecting and being affected is not the rigid self-identity of an object, but a subjective movement. A movement which Henry has even described as the self-temporalisation of subjectivity. But as he then adds, we are dealing with a quite unique form of temporalisation, which is absolute immanent, non-horizontal and non-ecstatic. We are dealing with an affective temporality, and even though it seems to involve a perpetual movement and change, nothing is changed. In fact, it would be wrong to characterise absolute subjectivity as a stream of consciousness. There is no streaming and no change, but always one and the same Living Present without distance or difference. It is always the same self affecting itself.”

At higher levels of constitution, the ego pole’s identity changes contingently along with changing experience. At all levels, however, Zahavi (1999) treats both the subjective and the objective sides of intentionality as identities before they are poles of a relation. I have argued that Zahavi’s formulation of transcendental self-belonging as ‘for me-ness’ relies on the notion of a non-changing self-identity alienated from the intentional objects it is paired with. I believe he would do better to treat Husserl’s notion of ‘my ownness’ not as a fracture between self-identity and otherness (“a ruptured structure which is completely foreign to its nature”) but as an essential structure of intimate synthetic unification and belonging.

Central to Zahavi’s notion of the object is the belief that, at levels of constitution beyond the pure self identity of minimal self-awareness, subjective context and objective sense reciprocally determine each other as an oppositional relation or communication between contingent self-inhering contents. By contrast, I am arguing that for Husserl the ‘now’ structure of a construed event is not an intertwining relation between self-inhering interiority and exteriority, but a radical differential intersection implicating a different understanding of psychological movement; intentional object and background context are not adjacent regions (a within and a without) in space or time; they have already been contaminated by each other such that they are inseparably co-implied as a single edge or point of intersection. The current context of an event is not a system of relations between a for-itself internality and an in-itself externality, but an indivisible gesture of passage, a referential differential axis.

Zahavi has succeeded in reducing materialist physicalism to fundamental co-dependency, but still finds it necessary to root intentional processes in a foundation of temporary self-inhering essences. Because he treats this relation between the sensing and the sensed as a pairing of only partially reduced identities, he renders the intentional act as alienating and mediate in comparison
with the supposed immediacy of self-affection.

Husserl offers a foreignness to self that manifests itself as a thematic belonging to self whose self-similarity presupposes and is built from this irreducible foreignness. He introduces a primordial motivational principle in which noetic anticipatory assimilation dominates the foreignness of the noematic object pole. This peculiarly intimate ‘foreignness’ must be understood in different terms than that of the alienating fracture of objective exteriority. It is not a privileging of the same over the different, but rather a situating of the binary ‘same-different’ in a more insubstantial and therefore more intimate space of relationship than that of the alienating relation between an intrinsic subjectivity and an extrinsic object.

Husserl says actual being is constituted originally by harmoniousness of experience as a synthetic unity inseparable from my life and its potentialities. Each intentional sense is “a point of intersection belonging to my constitutive synthesis” (CM). Furthermore, this constitutive synthesis achieves its harmoniousness on the basis of the associative belongingness between the constituting and constituted poles, as a unity of identification, homogeneity, similarity, likeness. It “points back to such experiences of the same intended object or a similar one.” In this fashion the ego constitutes progressively higher levels of ownness from primordial constitutive ownness.

I believe that this essential structural intimacy of associative relationship between the noetic and noematic poles of intentional constitution is what Husserl is attempting to capture when he characterizes the constitution of the subject's stream of lived-experience in terms of ‘my ownness’. I don’t think that Husserl would have chosen to describe intentional objects in general as being constituted ‘within’, ‘inside’, as ‘a part of’, ‘internal to’ my ego, as ‘its very own’ if he meant for the ego pole to function as merely a ‘harbor’ for alienated othernesses as Zahavi claims.

We see the centrality of similarity manifest itself at all levels of constitution, in the subjective achievement of synthetic unities, analogical apperceptive pairing, associative relationality, correlations, harmonious fulfillments, subjective ‘mineness’, variations, flowing multiplicities, congruities, nexuses, coherences, etc. At the the highest constituted level of intersubjective experience, each subjectivity interacts with other subjectivities via their own integral thread of continuous unified experience. Consistent with his subjectivity-based sociality, Husserl’s later writings on ethics is personalistic, striving toward an optimal self-consistency of all subjective values at the highest level. The intersubjective sphere is founded on my aperceptive constitution in empathy of the alter ego. In this apperceptive pairing, my self perception and my apperception of an alter ego “found phenomenologically a unity of similarity” (Cartesian Meditations, p.112).

At the level of the constitution of objects within my own sphere of ownness, where the adumbrating intentionality proceeds in an objectifying instinct, this striving is founded in an interest in the enrichment of the self [of the object], as a unified nexus of appresentations.

“Every apperception in which we apprehend at a glance, and noticingly grasp, objects given beforehand- for example, the already-given everyday world- every apperception in which we understand their sense and its horizons forthwith, points back to a "primal instituting", in which an object with a similar sense became constituted for the first time. Even the physical things
of this world that are unknown to us are, to speak generally, known in respect of their type. We have already seen like things before, though not precisely this thing here. Thus each everyday experience involves an analogizing transfer of an originally instituted objective sense to a new case, with its anticipative apprehension of the object as having a similar sense. To the extent that there is givenness beforehand, there is such a transfer.“ (Cartesian Meditations, p.111)

Grounding these higher constituting achievements is the central role of similarity at the lowest stratum of passive pre-rational primal association. “Once a connection is formed in a stream of consciousness, there then exists in this stream the tendency for a newly emerging connection, similar to a portion of the earlier one, to continue in the direction of the similarity and to strive to complete itself in a total nexus similar to the previous total nexus.”(Ideas II, p.234).

“...consciousness is connected in the most general way to another consciousness by a commonality that is correlatively noetic and noematic; and all connection is connection through "commonality." through uniformity and similarity.”(Passive and Active Synth, p.485)

Underlying and founding all these strata is the assimilative basis of temporal constitution. Protention and retention are included in what Husserl calls a “universal drive intentionality (Treibintentionalität).” As Bernet(2010) says “this originary process, as a life-process, is not simply an automatic process; it has a goal and the tendency to draw near to this goal.”

It is not simply that Husserl claims protension as a general going beyond itself of one’s experience of an object, rather that this going beyond itself has the character of a peculiar implicative consistency. Even in difference, negation, senselessness, irrationality, alterity, there is no experience in consciousness that is not in an overarching way variation on a thematics for Husserl, a similarity-in-difference.

The radical intimacy referentially, linking one moment of experience to the next, is driven not by the positivity of an idealist subjectivity, but, on the contrary, by the insubstantiality of both the presencing and absencing poles of each absolutely new element of experience. The always novel altering repetition of experience has not the power to disturb to the same extent as it lacks, each time, the centering thickness of interiorized content. The formidability of ideal self-identity is necessary to impose the arbitrariness of polarizing conditioning on the movement of experiential process. When the irreducible origin of meaning is thought in terms of the meeting of “an ontological dualism, to distinguish a pure interiority and a pure exteriority”, fracture and alienation are irreducible in its temporalization.

Zahavi(2015) thinks that what gives an intended object its ‘mineness’ is the fact that as foreign to me, it is intended by a ‘me’ that is familiar with itself. He offers “…the best explanation of the sense of familiarity with, and lack of surprise regarding, my concurrent experience is that I was aware of it all along, in that it is built into the very phenomenal character of the experience that it is like something for me.” But this self-familiarity’ speaks only of my proximity to myself, not of my proximity to my world. Zahavi(2009) says “… the experiences I am living through are given differently (but not necessarily better) to me than to anybody else.” In other words, my experiences are given differently to me because my self-identical minimal self-awareness is marked with my signature. But without an underlying thematic, associative consistency in the temporal flow of my
experiences, they cannot be said to be given ‘better’ to me than to others. My ego having been
been transcendentally branded as ‘unique to me’ but lacking associative intimacy with, and thus
having no unique ownership over, intentional objects, Zahavi argues that “I can come to have the
same kind of experiences, thoughts, beliefs and preferences as somebody else without becoming
the other, just as somebody else can come to have the same type of experiences and beliefs as I
have without thereby becoming me.”

In contrast to this thinking, Husserl sees the ‘mineness’ of intended objects as a result of a
proximity between object and subject. That is, intended objects, as constituted senses, maintain a
relation of similarity to the intending ego. They are mine because of the way they are constituted as
modifications, variations, assimilations to the theme that is the temporal flow of experience. There
is a way in which new experience is like previous experience and is familiar and recognizable to
me, and belongs to me inasmuch as it elaborates my own thematics. This belonging of all my
experience to my own ongoing thematics is what brands all my experience as unique to me, or as
Husserl says, belonging to my ownness (Husserl(2001) says “… the style, so to speak, of "what
is to come" is prefigured through what has just past”). Since what belongs to my ownness
thematically, stylistically brands all my experiences as mine and distinguishes them from other
transcendental egos, pace Zahavi, I do not simply ‘come to have the same kind of experiences,
thoughts, beliefs and preferences as somebody else’. They are, instead, always given better, that is
to say, more intimately to me than another’s experience is given to me.

Zahavi and Husserl on the Constitution of Intersubjectivity:

Because Zahavi equates for-meness with ideal self-familiarity, and otherness with the exteriorities
to which that immanent interiority is opposed in an intentional act, my sphere of ownness is a
mere ‘harbor’ for othernesses which have their home at the heart of, but only alongside my unique
subjectivity. Therefore, the transcendence of my self-relation that alter egos represent, and the
social world of second and third personal relations which this transcendence makes possible, is
already anticipated by the self-alienating character of object intentionality at the most reductive
level.

Thus, Zahavi(1996) claims that for Husserl “a radical implementation of the transcendental
reduction leads with necessity to a disclosure of transcendental intersubjectivity”. Husserl insists,
however, that a radical reduction reveals the philosophical solitude of the absolute ego, which is
prior to the constitutive accomplishment of transcendental intersubjectivity.

Since all objects of my intentional acts, including my experience of my body and other selves,
belong to me through primary or secondary apperceptive performances via dimensions of similarity
and likeness, this unique ongoing integrity of my subjective flow of experiencing makes it
impossible for me to ever have direct access to other selves, or my own body, as alien. Thus,
contrary to Zahavi’s (2002) assertion that “in my corporeal existence I am intersubjective and
social from the start”, for Husserl I am never social in Zahavi’s sense of being in direct contact
with alienness. This ‘world for us’, from one to the other to the other, is constituted within
MY(the primal me) subjective process as MY privileged apperception of ‘from one to the other to
the other’.
“...one of the main tasks of pure intentional psychology is to make understandable, by way of the progressive reduction of world-validity, the subjective and pure function through which the world as the "world for us all" is a world for all from my—the ego's—vantage point, with whatever particular content it may have. ...”(Crisis, p.256)

Primordially, the autonomy of being given to others is not directly accessible to me (me as apodictic rather than natural empirical ego). Rather than making the absolute difference between self and Other disappear, intersubjective apperception exposes this unbridgeable gap by allowing only an interpretive mediate access to the alien, from within the singular ‘I’.

“The epoche creates a unique sort of philosophical solitude which is the fundamental methodical requirement for a truly radical philosophy. In this solitude I am not a single individual who has somehow willfully cut himself off from the society of mankind, perhaps even for theoretical reasons, or who is cut off by accident, as in a shipwreck, but who nevertheless knows that he still belongs to that society. I am not an ego, who still has his you, his we, his total community of co-subjects in natural validity. All of mankind, and the whole distinction and ordering of the personal pronouns, has become a phenomenon within my epoche; and so has the privilege of I-the-man among other men. “(Crisis, p.184)

“...it was wrong, methodically, to jump immediately into transcendental inter-subjectivity and to leap over the primal "I," the ego of my epoche, which can never lose its uniqueness and personal indeclinability. It is only an apparent contradiction to this that the ego—through a particular constitutive accomplishment of its own—makes itself declinable, for itself, transcendentally; that, starting from itself and in itself, it constitutes transcendental intersubjectivity, to which it then adds itself as a merely privileged member, namely, as "I" among the transcendental others. This is what philosophical self-exposition in the epoche actually teaches us. It can show how the always singular I, in the original constituting life proceeding within it, constitutes a first sphere of objects, the "primordial" sphere; how it then, starting from this, in a motivated fashion, performs a constitutive accomplishment through which an intentional modification of itself and its primordiality achieves ontic validity under the title of "alien-perception," perception of others, of another "I" who is for himself an I as I am. "(Crisis, p.185)

Zahavi argues that Husserl’s notion of the singular ‘I’ refers to the formal structure of pre-reflective self-awareness, its absolute self-identity. But this determination of ownness addresses only the ego pole, treating its relation to intentional objects as alienating. For Husserl, however, my ownness is not the formal essence of a self-identical ego, but the function of constitutive synthesis. Thus, not only my constituting ego belongs to me, but the constituted psychophysical world of direct sensation and apperceived objects, as well as my apperception of other egos.

Within this general belonging of all experience to my egoic processes, Husserl distinguishes between what is peculiar to me and what is other, that is, between primary and secondary spheres of ownness. What is peculiarly my own belongs to me as a synthetic unity inseparable from the life of my ego and its potentialities.

“Where, and so far as, the constituted unity is inseparable from the original constitution itself, with the inseparableness that characterizes an immediate concrete oneness, not only the constitutive perceiving...
but also the perceived existent belongs to my concrete very-ownness ”(Cartesian Meditations)

What makes the apperception of objects an immediate concrete oneness is the possibility of verification by a corresponding fulfilling presentation. By contrast, the empathized alter ego can never be directly verified through a fulfilling presentation. This indirectness of verification makes my empathetic apperception of another ego a secondary transcendence with respect to concrete experiences belonging to my peculiar ownness. Nevertheless, my experience of others still belongs to me intimately on the basis of a harmonious unity of similarity and likeness that the apperceptive pairing achieves.

Because the constitution of egoic otherness is a secondary, higher order differentiation within my own egoic processes, bracketing off the intersubjectively constituted objective world does not deprive my egoic processes of any of their essential features. The coherent founding stratum of what is included in my ownness includes what is other for me. “...every consciousness of what is other, every mode of appearance of it, belongs in the former sphere”[ of what is included in my ownness]. (Cartesian Meditations, p.100)

“But here something remarkable strikes us : a sequence of evidences that yet, in their sequence, seem paradoxical. The psychic life of my Ego (this "psychophysical" Ego), including my whole world-experiencing life and therefore including my actual and possible experience of what is other, is wholly unaffected by screening off what is other. Consequently there belongs within my psychic being the whole constitution of the world existing for me and, in further consequence, the differentiation of that constitution into the systems that constitute what is included in my peculiar ownness and the systems that constitute what is other.”(Cartesian Meditations, p.98)

The distinction between what belongs to my peculiar ownness, such as my reduced perception of objects and my own body, and what is other to me is a difference within an overarching belonging to self, via dimensions of likeness, of all experience. In this connection, I think it is significant that Husserl analogizes my apperception of an alter ego to the act of recollection, which belongs to my peculiar ownness.

In recollection,

“... the immediate "I" performs an accomplishment through which it constitutes a variational mode of itself as existing (in the mode of having passed). Starting from this we can trace how the immediate "I," flowingly-statically present, constitutes itself in self-temporalization as enduring through "Its" pasts. In the same way, the immediate "I," already enduring in the enduring primordial sphere, constitutes in itself another as other...Thus, in me, "another I" achieves ontic validity as co-present [kompräsent] with his own ways of being self-evidently verified, which are obviously quite different from those of a "sense" perception.”(Crisis, p.185)

From Husserl’s perspective, just as each element in a perceptual system gives birth, via associative synthesis, to the rest of the system as a synthetic unfolding, as participant in an intersubjective community each of my motivated acts gives birth to, that is, frames and orients, my reciprocal interactions with others in my community. This temporal ‘birthing’ constitutes intersubjectivity in such a way that my own subjective thread of continuity runs through and
organizes it. That is to say, hidden within the naive exteriority of my social encounters is a peculiar sort of coherence or implicate self-consistency. However alien to me is a world of fellow egos, each with their own subjective process, all I can ever apperceive of that otherness is what I mediatively, non-inferentially ‘pick out’ in analogical similarity with my own process.

A thread of unified internal integrity runs through my apprehension of an intersubjectively interaffecting world of others. Other egos, reducible to transcendental subjects, are not just figments of my own constitutive process, but exist alongside my own in a system of intentional interpretation. However, an ongoing thread of subjective continuity underlies my (and every other ego’s) participation in interpersonal relations. My contact with another person is not a dialogic ping pong game. Rather than a single game, interpersonal relationality is at least two intertwining games, from my vantage; it is both my integrally variating senses of the other's interpretation of our encounter, and my awareness of the dynamic stability of the difference between his and my outlook (our individual habitual histories of motivated position-taking).

But my perspective and that of another are not to be understood as solipsistically private regions. The interpersonal relation directly remakes my sense of what my 'own' perspective is, as well as what I assume to be the other's integral position. When I apperceptively ‘get inside the other's head’, it is simultaneously they getting inside my head. It is always a new sense of ‘me' and 'other' that emerge in conversation, but as an intertwining correlative movement among internally unitary threads of implication.

My sense of my own identity is relentlessly, but subtly, formed and reformed through direct and indirect social engagement, but in a manner which presupposes and is made possible by the unified synthetic continuity of my motivated history of position-taking. I can passively allow myself to be influenced by others, but this is a superficial, ‘merely external’ type of affecting which does not steer my core motivational processes.

“What comes from others and is "taken over" by me, and is more external or less so, can be characterized as issuing from the other subject, first of all as a tendency proceeding from him and addressed to me, as a demand, to which I perhaps yield passively, perhaps reluctantly, but by which I am still overpowered. Alternatively, I might annex it on my own accord, and then it becomes part of me. In that case it no longer has the character of a mere demand to which I yield and which determines me from the outside; it has become a position-taking that issues from my own Ego and is not merely a stimulus coming from the outside and retaining the character of a borrowing of something that came forth from another Ego, of something that has its primal instauration in him.”(Ideas II, p.281))

Footnote: A number of writers have taken issue with Zahavi’s model of for-meness as pre-social minimal self-identity. Their arguments range from the claim that the primordial sense of self is mediated by interpersonal influences (Ratcliffe 2017) to the more radical view that the self is entirely constructed by interpersonal dynamics (Maclaren 2008, (McGann, and De Jaegher 2009). However, such positions invariably maintain Zahavi’s idealized formulation of object intentionality as a polarizing opposition between temporarily self-inhering contents (see Soffer 2011).

Heidegger on Dasein and Befindlichkeit:
Earlier in this paper I distinguished Husserl’s notion of ‘my ownness’ from Zahavi’s concept of ‘for-menness’. The former, I argued, characterized the primordial ego’s radical solitude as a function of an essential structural unity inhering in all its acts, harmonizing the moments of the temporal flow via likeness and similarity. This essential relational intimacy between subject and object poles only reveals itself when these poles are divested of the intrinsic interior (for-menness) and exterior(alien object) content that Zahavi attributes to them.

If Husserl demonstrated the radical interdependency of subject and object, Heidegger’s questioning of the being of beings sought to locate a more primordial and integral ground than that of subject-object relationality. To show how far Heidegger’s conception of the self strays from Zahavi’s account of subjectivity, I want to compare Zahavi’s reading of Heidegger with my own.

Zahavi(2005) says:

“...it seems reasonable to conclude that Heidegger did, in fact, operate with a form of self-acquaintance that precedes reflection. When understanding his claim that no self-acquaintance can occur independently of, or prior to, our world-disclosure, it is crucial to remember that this world-disclosure contains a dimension of self from the very start and, as well, that it cannot occur independently of or prior to a disclosure of self.”

“...on Heidegger's account every experience involves a primitive sense of self; every experience is characterized by the fact that “I am always somehow acquainted with myself” (Zahavi 2009)

Zahavi isn’t suggesting that Heidegger’s ‘primitive sense of self’ is a non-ecstatic and self-identical self-awareness, only that a self-aware subject pole (albeit not pure and detached) belongs to every intentional experience.

Heidegger(1982) would seem to concur with Zahavi:

“To intentionality belongs, not only a self-directing-toward and not only an understanding of the being of the being toward which it is directed, but also the associated unveiling of the self which is comporting itself here. Formally, it is unassailable to speak of the ego as consciousness of something that is at the same time conscious of itself.”

But he then adds the following warning:

“... But these formal determinations, which provide the framework for idealism’s dialectic of consciousness, are nevertheless very far from an interpretation of the phenomenal circumstances of the Dasein, from how this being shows itself to itself in its factual existence, if violence is not practiced on the Dasein by preconceived notions of ego and subject drawn from the theory of knowledge.”

How, then does the being of Dasein show itself in its factual existence? I think it is a misunderstanding to equate Dasein with the subject pole of a subject-object structure. In the first place, Heidegger does not view Dasein from the vantage of a subject-object binary. If one instead speaks of self and world, then Dasein belongs to both poles. Specifically, the self is a
constantly changing creation. It exists in unveiling itself by projecting itself on a possibility. What it projects itself on is its world. So the self is its world as the possibility that it projects itself into. Put differently, the self is the tripartite structure of temporality as the past anticipating itself into the future.

For Heidegger (1982), temporality as pure self-affection is not the essence of subjectivity but the essence of Dasein, which is not a subjectivity but what lies in between the subjective and the objective.

“The Dasein does not need a special kind of observation, nor does it need to conduct a sort of espionage on the ego in order to have the self; rather, as the Dasein gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world itself, its own self is reflected to it from things. This is not mysticism and does not presuppose the assigning of souls to things. It is only a reference to an elementary phenomenological fact of existence, which must be seen prior to all talk, no matter how acute, about the subject-object relation.”

“To say that the world is subjective is to say that it belongs to the Dasein so far as this being is in the mode of being-in-the-world. The world is something which the “subject” “projects outward,” as it were, from within itself. But are we permitted to speak here of an inner and an outer? What can this projection mean? Obviously not that the world is a piece of myself in the sense of some other thing present in me as in a thing and that I throw the world out of this subject thing in order to catch hold of the other things with it. Instead, the Dasein itself is as such already projected. So far as the Dasein exists a world is cast-forth with the Dasein’s being. To exist means, among other things, to cast-forth a world, and in fact in such a way that with the thrownness of this projection, with the factical existence of a Dasein, extant entities are always already uncovered.”

“To understand means, more precisely, to project oneself upon a possibility, in this projection to keep oneself at all times in a possibility. A can-be, a possibility as possibility, is there only in projection, in projecting oneself upon that can-be.

… If the Dasein projects itself upon a possibility, it is projecting itself in the sense that it is unveiling itself as this can-be, in this specific being. If the Dasein projects itself upon a possibility and understands itself in that possibility, this understanding, this becoming manifest of the self, is not a self-contemplation in the sense that the ego would become the object of some cognition or other; rather, the projection is the way in which I am the possibility.”

What makes this creative act of ‘absencing’ a self, an ‘ownness’, is the intimacy and continuity of the self moment to moment as existing as a change over its past. Heidegger understands that to be radically, irreducibly, primordially situated in a world is to be guaranteed, at every moment, a world that feelingly creatively impinges on me anew as foreign in some aspect. And it is simultaneously, to feel a belonging familiarity) to what impinges on me in its foreignness due to the anticipative, projective futural aspect of temporality. Heidegger’s being-in -the world is always characterized by a pragmatic self-belongingness that he articulates as a heedful circumspective relevance that events always have for Dasein in its world. For Heidegger, self is Dasein, Dasein is attuned understanding, attuned understanding is projection, projection is a happening, an action, historicality, temporality, the over and beyond, self as transcendence, the
unveiling of a specific possibility.

A key feature of Heidegger’s philosophy is his placement of affect, in the guise of befindlichkeit, alongside understanding as the essence of dasein. Befindlichkeit reveals the ‘how’ of Dasein’s relation to itself as the understanding unveiling of possibilities, the way in which Dasein is affected by what it projects itself into. Heidegger (1982) says

“all understanding is essentially related to an affective self-finding which belongs to understanding itself. To be affectively self-finding is the formal structure of what we call mood, passion, affect, and the like, which are constitutive for all comportment toward beings, although they do not by themselves alone make such comportment possible but always only in one with understanding, which gives its light to each mood, each passion, each affect.”...

“... this ‘one is in such and such a way' is not-is never-simply a consequence or side-effect of our thinking, doing, and acting. It is-to put it crudely-the presupposition for such things, the 'medium' within which they first happen.”

Understanding how Heidegger accomplishes this integration of intentionality, affect and will is essential for grasping the radically temporal basis of Being in the world. More importantly, it allows us to see how Zahavi’s idealizing model of subject-object relationality not only alienates the subjective from the objective pole but splits apart the affective and intentional aspects of experience. It is not as if Zahavi follows first generation cognitivism in repeating ‘Descartes’ error’, to borrow Damasio’s phrase, by considering thought and feeling to be functionally independent. On the contrary, he takes pains to present emotion and thought as an indissociable interaction. Cognitive and affective processes are closely interdependent, with affect, emotion and sensation functioning in multiple ways and at multiple levels to situate or attune the context of our conceptual dealings with the world, and affective tonality is never absent from cognition. As Ratcliffe (2002) puts it, “moods are no longer a subjective window-dressing on privileged theoretical perspectives but a background that constitutes the sense of all intentionalities, whether theoretical or practical” (p.290).

A comparison with Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit, however, reveals that Zahavi can hardly be said to have dispensed with the divide between thought and feeling. Zahavi explains that the pre-reflective self-awareness that opposes, but is at the same time inseparably connected with intended objects, is something of the order of a feeling rather than an intentional object. How does Zahavi distinguish between feeling and mood on the one hand, and intentional object on the other?

Zahavi (1999) approvingly cites Michel Henry’s view:

“Henry calls attention to the way in which we are aware of our feelings and moods. When we are in pain, anxious, embarrassed, stubborn or happy, we do not feel it through the intervention of a (inner) sense organ or an intentional act, but are immediately aware of it. There is no distance or separation between the feeling of pain or happiness and our awareness of it, since it is given in and through itself. According to Henry, something similar holds for all of our conscious experiences. To make use of a terminology taken from analytical philosophy of mind, Henry would claim that all conscious experiences are essentially characterized by having a subjective ‘feel’ to them, that is, a certain quality of ‘what it is like’”. 
In settling on feeling as a special sort of entity that does the work of generating immediate self-awareness, Zahavi is harking back to a long-standing Western tradition whereby affective feeling is supposedly instantaneous, non-mediated experience. It has been said that ‘raw’ or primitive feeling is bodily-physiological, pre-reflective and non-conceptual, contentless hedonic valuation, innate, qualitative, passive, a surge, glow, twinge, energy, spark, something we are overcome by. Opposed to such ‘bodily’, dynamical events are seemingly flat, static entities referred to by such terms as mentation, rationality, theorization, propositionality, objectivity, calculation, cognition, conceptualization and perception. “

Because Zahavi makes self-inhering states do most of the work of establishing the awareness of the affectively felt and objectively perceived sides of the bond between the subject and the world, the relation between subject and object becomes a mostly empty middle term, a neutral copula added onto the two opposing sides of the binary. This reification of subject, object and relation as distinct entities or states unto themselves is exemplified in Zahavi’s distinction between for-meness, meness and mineness as the difference between an awareness of an experience, an awareness of an experiencer, and an awareness of the experience as owned by the experiencer. Only the first is supposedly primary and immediate, whereas the other two are derived from the first in secondary and tertiary acts of reflection.

Footnote: Zahavi 2019 explains that for me-ness is pre-reflective self-awareness, in all experience. By contrast, “Me-ness, in short, is when the subject figures in experience as ‘an object of phenomenal awareness” (Guillot 2017: 35), or as Farrell and McClelland rephrase it in their summary of Guillot’s view, as “a thing-that-appears” (2017: 3). Mineness, finally, is when the experience is phenomenally given as mine. On this reading, mineness is the more complex notion, since it not only requires that the subject is aware of her experience, and aware of herself, but also aware of the possessive relation between herself and the experience, i.e., aware that she is owning the experience (Guillot 2017: 31, 43). As Guillot then points out, there is prima facie a fairly clear distinction to be drawn between an awareness of an experience, an awareness of an experiencer, and an awareness of the experience as owned by the experiencer.”

From Heidegger’s perspective, Zahavi’s need to identify and insulate a pure immediacy from the alienating effect of object intentionality is a byproduct of the idealizing way he formulates the issue of subjectivity, and Zahavi’s solution only reaffirms the problem, which is that movement and transformation are treated as secondary to self-inherence, so that the affective and cognate aspects of events are artificially split into separated entities and then have to be pieced together again in an interaction. To ground experience in radical temporality is to abandon the concept of subject and world in states of interaction, in favor of a self-world referential-differential in continuous self-transforming movement. The relation, the in-between is the irreducible basis of Dasein.

For Heidegger, the subjective and the objective, are not primordially understood as belonging to an interaction between immediately felt and mediatively given states of being; they are instead the inseparable features of a unitary differential structure of transition, otherwise known as Dasein’s equi-primordial temporality, attunement and understanding. There are no self-inhering entities, either in the guise of affects or intended objects. The awareness of the relation between self and world is not a secondary or tertiary derivation from a primordial awareness of distinct
subjective and objective manifestations. On the contrary, both feeling and intentional meaning are produced only in and through Dasein’s projective self-world relation. From this perspective it is Zahavi’s notions of subject and object which are derivative and secondary. In the place of Zahavi’s three-part structure of subjective feeling, relational bond and intentional object, Heidegger proposes a unified totality. No relational connector is needed to tie subject and object together when subject and object are no longer assumed as inherences.

**Dasein, Das Man and Intersubjectivity:**

If Dasein’s being-in-the-world is always structured as an intimate, pragmatic self-belongingness, how does Heidegger explain the basis of apparently normatively driven intersubjective ‘we’ contexts? Heidegger’s most systematic treatment of Dasein’s role in a linguistic community appears in his discussion of average everydayness and das man in Being and Time.

Zahavi is among those thinkers who interpret Heidegger’s ‘we-self’ of every day das man as taking precedence over his authentic self of ‘ownmost’ possibilities. As das man, Zahavi claims “group belongingness, rather than being founded upon an other-experience, preceded any such experience.”

“...an everyday being-with-one-another characterized by anonymity and substitutability, where others are those from whom “one mostly does not distinguish oneself” (Heidegger 1996: 11)

He surmises that Heidegger would approve of Schmid’s(2005) assertion that “...the we, the “sense of us” or “plural self-awareness,” precedes the distinction between yours and mine, is prior to any form of intersubjectivity or mutual recognition, and is itself the irreducible basis for joint action and communication.”

Zahavi is far from alone in interpreting Heidegger’s discussions of the discursive practices of Das man as assuming an introjection of norms by a socially created self or a socially conditioned self-affecting subjectivity. Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s model of empathy was taken by many interpreters as evidence that the primacy of being-with for Dasein functions as the conditioning of a self by an outside.

For instance, Rousse(2014) says

“...the particular way I ‘carry out’ my being and relate to myself is unavoidably susceptible to the pressures of the others’ normative expectations.”... inauthenticity is a matter of a person having his practical orientation dominated by ‘outside forces’...the tacitly operative normative expectations about how one ought properly and normally to behave.” “Dasein, as essentially ‘being-with’, initially ‘gets’ its existential answerability by being socialized into the shared behavioral norms of the One. In turn, this enables, even encourages, Dasein to act in accordance with them and to avoid taking its own (‘existentiell’) answerability for how it comports and understands itself. To be responsible, then, is to be the kind of agent who has the possibility to take responsibility for the socially normative determinants of identity.”
By taking for granted the notion of normativity as a shared understanding, Rousse exemplifies the kind of thinking that Heidegger says disguises, covers over, conceals and obscures a genuine understanding. Das man isn’t a matter of simply acting in accordance with norms that are communally understood but a way of thinking that pre-supposes and takes for granted, that the self can internalize and interject meanings from others. It is not about behaving in accordance with norms but believing that norms exist as shared entities in the first place.

Rousse misreads authenticity as a self-reflexive self’s becoming aware of what it has introjected, ‘taken in’ from culture and its attempt to take responsibility for, or embrace its own alternative to, those norms. But for Heidegger what the self discloses to itself in average everydayness is not introjected meanings from a community. The self never simply introjects from an outside to an inside. The radically temporal structuration of Dasein makes such introjection impossible.

Heidegger’s(2010) task is to explain how a Dasein which always understands others in relation to its ownmost aims and goals ends up believing in a cultural world of linguistic practices that appear to be the same for all. “...what purports to be an opening up of the world is in fact its concealment: by appealing to public opinion and tradition, idle talk creates in Dasein the belief that it possesses universally acknowledged and thus genuine truths.”

Heidegger chooses words like average, vague, flattened, confused and ambiguous to describe Dasein’s being as Das Man, to indicate that the heedfulness of Care is still primordially and implicitly operative even when it is explicitly concealed and suppressed. Average everyday discourse has to be vague, approximate, superficial and ambiguous enough to conceal, disguise, cover over, miss, obscure, suppress the fact that the meaning of what is shared is never interpreted identically for each dasein.

“What is talked about is understood only approximately and superficially. One means the same thing because it is in the same averageness that we have a common understanding of what is said.” “Publicness ” does not get to ”the heart of the matter,” because it is insensitive to every difference of level and genuineness.”

“Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without any previous appropriation of the matter. Idle talk, which everyone can snatch up, not only divests us of the task of genuine understanding, but develops an indifferent intelligibility for which nothing is closed off any longer. Discourse, which belongs to the essential constitution of being of Dasein, and also constitutes its disclosedness, has the possibility of becoming idle talk, and as such of not really keeping being-in-the-world open in an articulated understanding, but of closing it off and covering over inner worldly beings. ““Ontologically, this means that when Da-sein maintains itself in idle talk, it is-as being-in-the-world-cut off from the primary and primordially genuine relations of being toward the world, toward MitDa-sein, toward being-in itself.”

“Idle talk conceals simply because of its characteristic failure to address things in an originary way [ursprunglichen Ansprechens]. It obscures the true appearance of the world and the events in it by instituting a dominant view [herrschende Ansicht].”“Usually and for the most part the ontic mode of being-in (discoverture) is concealment [Verdeckung]. Interpretedness, which is speech encrusted by idle talk, draws any given Dasein into 'one's' way of being. But existence in the 'one' now entails the
concealment and marginalization of the genuine self [eigentlichen Selbst]. Not only has each particular given itself over to 'one', 'one' blocks Dasein's access to the state it finds itself in [Befindlichkeit].” (Heidegger 2011)

What is this genuine self, this genuine understanding, this originary and primordial way of appropriating the matter, this “getting to the heart of the matter”, these primordially genuine relations of being toward the world, toward Mit-da-sein, toward being-in itself, that idle talk conceals?

To say that in the mode of average everydayness Dasein disguises, covers over, conceals, obscures its genuine self, a genuine understanding, an originary and primordial way of appropriating the matter, “getting to the heart of the matter,” primordially genuine relations of being toward the world, toward Mit-dasein, toward being-in itself, is to say that Dasein explicitly experiences itself as a constituted self, introjecting norms from other selves, but this awareness pre-supposes and is grounded in an implicit mineness.

Average everydayness of Das man and idle talk shares with what Heidegger calls the ‘present to hand’ the features of being derivative modes of the ‘as’ structure of heedful circumspective significance, functioning as a contextually rich totality of relevance. They also share the feature of being a ‘dwindling down’ of that wider experience.

Even as Zahavi mistakenly critiques Heidegger for giving precedence to “plural self-awareness,” over the distinction between yours and mine, Zahavi’s I-Thou model of sociality falls under the scope of Heidegger’s formulation of Das Man.

Zahavi(2012) says “The I and the you are prior to the we”. The I-you relation “is a reciprocal exchange of address and response that affects and transforms the self experience of the participating individuals... we take over from others (and make our own) a language, roles, attitudes and norms”.

This makes individual behavior in social situations the product of narrative norms, reciprocities, shared practices and social constraints. The presupposition here is that my own subjectivity always functions as a harbor in the reception of social signs. Intersubjectivity is characterized by a reciprocal cobbling and co-ordination between personal history and cultural signs in which the ‘joints’ of such interactive bodily-mental and social practices are simultaneously within my own subjectivity and common to other participants in my community. Zahavi assumes these culturally normed practices that we internalize represent forms of meaning no less robust in significance and relevance to our lives than those which we generate.

In contrast, for Heidegger the social norms and practices that Dasein takes in are specific modifications of meaning on the order of a diminution of significance. The publicness of Das Man and the present to handness of things are modes of Dasein representing a deprivation and trivialization of intelligibility, significance and relevance, and thus a reduction of meaningfulness. Dasein becomes alienated from itself not by being taken over by, introjecting and internalizing an outside but by encountering itself (its ownmost world of possibilities) as almost devoid of sense.
This is self-alienation as senselessness rather than internalization of an other.

“However, alienation cannot mean that Da-sein is factically torn away from itself....this alienation, which closes off to Da-sein its authenticity and possibility, even if only that of genuinely getting stranded, still does not surrender it to beings which it itself is not, but forces it into its inauthenticity, into a possible kind of being of itself.” (Heidegger 2010)

Zahavi’s belief that socialization is a direct introjection and internalization from an outside marks it from Heidegger’s vantage as an inauthentic and confused self-understanding, even if we assume with Zahavi that the subject is an active participant in what it takes in from others (I-Thou).

We saw earlier how for Husserl the alterity and foreignness of other egos is constituted as a variation of my own thematics, via aperceptive transfer. Heidegger understands thematic mineness through the Care structure. Heidegger says average everydayness alienates Dasein from itself, but without Dasein’s therefore being merely conditioned by others.

My being-with-others originates primordially as ‘my ownmost’ being-with, relative to my significant aims and goals, to what matters to me. As the inauthentic mode of average everydayness communication become flattened, leveled down into the vagueness of a ‘we’ understanding, but this average everydayness does not eliminate but only covers over the originary ‘mineness’ of the Care structure of primordial temporality.

The ‘solitude’ of the mineness of the self of Dasein is disclosed most fundamentally for Heidegger in the authentic mood of angst. Angst individualizes and thus discloses Da-sein as "solus ipse." This existential "solipsism," however, is so far from transposing an isolated subject-thing into the harmless vacuum of a worldless occurrence that it brings Da-sein in an extreme sense precisely before its world as world, and thus itself before itself as being-in-the-world. “Together with the sober Angst that brings us before our individualized potentiality-of-being, goes the unshakable joy in this possibility.”

As much as it is the case that Heidegger’s being-with-others is not the precedence of anonymous plural self-awareness over Dasein’s ownness, it is equally true that Dasein’s self-belonging is not a retreat from the immediate contingency of world-exposure, not the choosing of an idealist self-actualization at the expense of robust being with others. Gallagher and Gadamer’s readings of Heidegger appear to fall prey to such a solipsist interpretation.

Gallagher (2010) says: “In Heidegger, and in thinkers who follow his line of thought, we find the idea that a relatively complete account of our embodied, expert, enactive, pragmatic engagements with the world can be given prior to or without reference to intersubjectivity.”

Gadamer (2006) writes:

"Mit-sein, for Heidegger, was a concession that he had to make, but one that he never really got behind. Indeed, even as he was developing the idea, he wasn't really talking about the other at all. Mit-sein is, as it were, an assertion about Dasein, which must naturally take Mit-sein for granted..."Care" [die Sorge] is always a concernfulness [ein Besorgtsein] about one's own being, and...
Mit-sein is, in truth, a very weak idea of the other, more a "letting the other be" than an authentic "being-interested-in-him."

Zahavi, Gallagher and Gadamer are right and wrong in their readings of Heidegger. Gallagher and Gadamer are right that Heidegger makes their notion of primary intersubjectivity a derivative modification of the primary self-understanding of Dasein. But they are wrong to interpret Dasein’s self-understanding as prior to sociality. Being-with is instead the very site of sociality as a referential differential inside-outside. Zahavi is right that Heidegger places being-with as prior to Zahavi’s model of pre-reflective self-awareness, but Zahavi is wrong in treating Das Man as an anonymous plural self. As a referential differential it is a more intimate notion of self-relation than Zahavi’s present-to-hand oppositional subject-object structure.

Heidegger’s ‘ownmost’ shows that a profound irreducible intimacy of relation between self and world reveals itself once idealized binaries like inside-outside, internal-external, the meeting of an in-itself and a for-itself have been deconstructed. A central implication of this thinking for the understanding of intersubjectivity is that while our experience as individuals is characterized by stable relations of relative belonging or alienation with respect to other individuals and groups, the site of this interactivity, whether we find ourselves in greater or lesser agreement with a world within which we are enmeshed, has a character of peculiar self-belonging and ownership. It also has a character of relentless creative activity that undermines and overflows attempts to understand human action based on between-person reciprocities. We may identify to a greater or lesser extent with various larger paradigmatic communities, delicately united by intertwining values. But the contribution of each member of a community to the whole would not originate at the level of spoken or bodily language interchange among voices; such constructs repress as much as they reveal. Even in a community of five individuals in a room, I, as participant, can perceive a locus of integrity undergirding the participation of each of the others to the responsive conversation. In my dealings with other persons, I would be able to discern a thread of continuity organizing their participation in dialogue with me, dictating the manner and extent to which I can be said to influence their thinking and they mine. My thinking can not properly be seen as 'determined' by his response, and his ideas are not simply 'shaped' by my contribution to our correspondence.

I can only shape my actions to fit socially legitimate goals or permitted institutionalized grammatical forms to the extent that those goals or forms can be understood by me as relevant to my ongoing experience. Even then, what is understood by me is not 'the' social forms, but aspects hidden within these so-called forms which are unique to the totality of relevance of my perspective; what I perceive as socially 'permitted' rhetorical argumentation is already stylistically distinctive in relation to what other participants perceive as permitted. Each individual who feels belonging to an extent in a larger ethico-political collectivity perceives that collectivity's functions in a unique, but peculiarly coherent way relative to their own history, even when they believe that in moving forward in life their strategic language moves are guided by the constraints imposed by essentially the 'same' discursive conventions as the others in their speech community.

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