NIETZSCHE’S DISCOURSE ON NIHILISM
VIS-À-VIS HIS CRITIQUE OF METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY

BY
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<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>The Anti-Christ</td>
<td>Written in September 1888, published in 1895</td>
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<td>BGE</td>
<td>Beyond Good and Evil</td>
<td>Published in 1886</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>The Dawn</td>
<td>Published in 1881, 2nd edition published in 1886</td>
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<td>EH</td>
<td>Ecce Homo</td>
<td>Written in the autumn of 1888, published in 1908</td>
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<td>GM</td>
<td>On the Genealogy of Morals</td>
<td>Published in 1887</td>
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<td>GS</td>
<td>The Gay Science</td>
<td>Published in 1882, 2nd, expanded edition published in 1887.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HA I</td>
<td>Human, All Too Human Vol I</td>
<td>Published in 1878,</td>
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<td>HA II</td>
<td>Human, All Too Human Vol. II</td>
<td>Published in 1880</td>
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<tr>
<td>TI</td>
<td>Twilight of the Idols</td>
<td>Written in the summer of 1888, published in 1889</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSZ</td>
<td>Thus, Spoke Zarathustra.</td>
<td>Part I and II published in 1883; Part III published in 1884; Part IV written in 1885 and published in 1892.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TWP</td>
<td>The will to power</td>
<td>(Notes written 1883-1888)</td>
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<td>SE</td>
<td>Schopenhauer as educator</td>
<td>Written in 1874</td>
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<td>WLN</td>
<td>Writings from the Late Notebooks</td>
<td>1885-1888</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTAG</td>
<td>Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks</td>
<td><em>Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks,</em> is an unfinished text composed in the spring of 1873 and based upon the texts of his lectures. A fair copy of this draft was made by a student of his in 1874, to which Nietzsche made some minor corrections in 1879. However, it was never published in Nietzsche’s lifetime.</td>
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<td>ADH</td>
<td><em>On The Advantage And Disadvantage Of History For Life</em></td>
<td>Published in 1873</td>
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<tr>
<td>PN</td>
<td>Portable Nietzsche</td>
<td>Letters and notes of Nietzsche selected and translated, with an Introduction, prefaces, and notes by Walter Kaufmann</td>
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ABSTRACT

Friedrich Nietzsche’s contribution to philosophy is mostly recognized in relation to moral philosophy. His distinction of master and slave morality, critique of the Judeo-Christian morality is what is commonly considered as the main contribution of his philosophy. However, on the other hand, his examination of metaphysics and epistemology comprises fundamental constituents to apprehend his philosophy. Accordingly, it can be said, Nietzsche’s approach towards morality and politics is a demonstration of his analysis of metaphysics and epistemology. Since the construction of metaphysical and epistemological grounds precedes the construction of ethical systems, the critique of morality is presupposed by the critique of its metaphysical and epistemological foundations.

Therefore, the focus of this paper will not be Nietzsche’s critique of morality and politics. Rather, it will critically examine his criticism of the metaphysical and epistemological basis that by virtue of their structural fundamentality acquired the generative potential of values (moral, political, economic, etc.). In view of that, by exposing the vitality of Nietzsche’s critique in his discourse on nihilism, the analysis will try to claim the conceptual centrality of nihilism in his philosophy. Furthermore, assert the possible understandability of his critique and discourse, which is mostly concentrated on the advent of European nihilism and its countermovement.
I

NIETZSCHE

WRITINGS AND CONCEPTS

1.1 THE INFLUENCE OF SCHOPENHAUER

The stream of philosophy has been flowing for thousands of years with its line of great minds toiling to unriddle the world and man’s place in it. To go through the books of a philosopher recalls the journey of millennia—it seems like pulling a string that holds together the products of longstanding brilliance. Hence, to discuss Schopenhauer’s influence on Nietzsche at least involves the remembrance of the German idealism—a philosophical movement in which Schopenhauer was the last great representative (IEP 2000). This movement is generally associated with Immanuel Kant’s philosophy primarily instigated by the rationalist-empiricist debate. This debate mainly concentrated on what constitute our understanding; accordingly, the rationalist camp asserted the primacy of reason and the deceitful tendency of the senses in the edification of knowledge; moreover, this camp contended the prevalence of innate ideas. On the other hand, the empiricist camp (except George Berkeley)\(^1\) asserted the senses are the primary source of knowledge, and challenged the presence of innate ideas. Among the empiricist philosophers, David Hume’s devastating critique of rationality interrupted Kant’s “dogmatic slumber, and gave his investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction” (Prolegomena To

\(^1\)However Berkeley was an empiricist he accepts the Cartesian self
Any Future Metaphysics, 7). With the aim of resolving the debate, Kant proclaimed the limits of pure reason. He asserted the presence of the “Noumenon” and “Phenomenon” the former representing the “thing-in-itself” a realm that we can know nothing and the later indicating “thing as it appears”. Furthermore, Kant contended that “knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience” (The Critique of Pure Reason). In his attempt to circumscribe the limits of pure reason, Kant has identified three kinds of ideas that go beyond the capability of reason. These ideas include the psychological, the cosmological and theological idea. In the case of psychological ideas, reason tries to go beyond its limits in search of the ultimate subject or absolute substance. On the other hand, cosmological idea is the result of the search for the ultimate condition. Finally, in theological idea reason attempts to go beyond its limits and comprehend a highest, most perfect, primeval, original Being (Wikipedia). For Kant, these unsuccessful attempts of pure reason have hampered the development of metaphysics; the reason behind is the wrong use of reason beyond the realm of experience—trying to know the “Noumenon” or the thing-in-itself. Another important figure in German Idealism that has a prominent influence on Schopenhauer is Friedrich Hegel. Hegel’s significant contribution in the philosophical movement is related to the dialectical method. After Kant’s critique of pure reason, Hegel tried to reestablish the power of reason. He contended that with pure logic (in his case dialectical reasoning) we could know our past and anticipate our future. For Hegel, history is ruled by rational process; hence, its goal is determined by this underpinning rationale. Schopenhauer’s appearance in the scene can be understood in reaction to the assertions of Kant and Hegel. He agreed with Kant’s assertion of “Phenomenon” world as an appearance of things produced by faculties of the individual from experiential realm; however, Schopenhauer departed from Kant by denying the “Noumenon” or thing-in-itself as the objective basis of the phenomenal world.
He rejected the position that asserted our sensations have an external cause in the sense that we can know there is some epistemologically inaccessible object—the thing-in-itself—that exists independently of our sensations and is the cause of them. Accordingly, for him, Kant's reference to the thing-in-itself as a mind-independent object (or as an object of any kind) is misleading. Schopenhauer maintains that if we are to refer to the thing-in-itself, then we must come to an awareness of it, not by invoking the relationship of causality—a relationship where the cause and the effect are logically understood to designate different objects or events (since self-causation is a contradiction in terms)—but through another means altogether. Rather, he asserted a “universal will” as the source of human intelligence and the phenomenal world. This will for Schopenhauer is a blind, illogical, aimless impulse, without any original ethical tendency whatsoever (IEP). This assertion of Schopenhauer also opposed Hegel’s rational and teleological account of history. It now becomes an irrational and endless progression, and “Ethics, as the philosophy of the ultimate purpose of the world can only proclaim the aimlessness of the cosmic process and seek to put an end to it by stilling the will. This quietizing of the will is effected by recognizing the aimlessness of the process and resigning oneself to it completely.” (SEP) Schopenhauer discussed this position in his book titled *The World as Will and Representation*, he used the phrase “world as will” to describe the “universal will” behind human intelligence and the phenomenal world, and “world as representation,” to signify the world as it appears to the senses. Furthermore, he asserted, we must look behind appearances to see the wills at work in nature (SEP). This book of Schopenhauer was published in 1819, twenty-five years before Nietzsche’s birth. Nietzsche read *The World as Will and Representation*, forty-six years after its publication. Until 1865, Nietzsche considered himself as a wanderer in search of a true philosopher as an educator who could raise him above his insufficiencies. After reading the book, Nie-
Nietzsche briefly inscribed his picture of Schopenhauer by considering it from two dimensions. The first picture embeds Schopenhauer as a writer and the second as a philosopher, with these two pictures Nietzsche paints “Schopenhauer as educator”. In his book titled *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche looked back to his essay published 14 years ago with the title *Schopenhauer as Educator*, and remarked, “I do not wish to deny that at bottom they speak only of me… in Schopenhauer as Educator my innermost history, my becoming, is inscribed. Above all, my promise!” (EH, 281). These words by themselves can proclaim how profoundly Schopenhauer influenced Nietzsche’s philosophical journey.

Nietzsche’s portrayal of Schopenhauer the writer has three significant qualities, namely, honesty, cheerfulness and steadfastness. Nietzsche found honesty in Schopenhauer’s works because he writes to himself and for himself. He does not consciously imply deceptive means, he was “a philosopher who has made it a rule for himself: deceive no one, not even yourself!” (SE, 134) Nietzsche’s admiration for the honesty of Schopenhauer implicates the lack of such writers in his time. The second quality, i.e. cheerfulness involves Schopenhauer’s conquest of the hardest task by thinking and his way of expressing his thoughts with certainty and simplicity, courage and strength, perhaps a little harshly and valiantly. The third quality, i.e. steadfastness includes Schopenhauer’s firm and agile journey that was calm and un-wavered by the external initiation (SE, 135). On the other hand, Nietzsche’s admiration for Schopenhauer (as a philosopher), emanates from the three constitutional dangers he endured, namely, isolation, despair of the truth, as well as the melancholy and longing caused by discovering limitation in himself. In *Schopenhauer as Educator*, Nietzsche states, “I profit from a philosopher only insofar as he can be an example…” (SE, 136). For him Schopenhauer was a philosopher who lived what he thought and wrote. Schopenhauer was isolated; he lived trying to be independent of the society and the scholarly
The above words of Nietzsche indicate the even greater dangers found in isolation. Schopenhauer endured these dangers. His philosophy developed throughout the encounters. Schopenhauer’s deviation from the scholarly caste mainly signifies his rejection of the Kantian picture of man. Nietzsche expresses this picture as “mere clattering thought- and calculating- machine” (SE, 140). For him every thinker who deviates from Kantian philosophy attends this danger provided he is a vigorous and whole man in suffering and desire and not a mere clattering thought- and calculating- machine. This point of departure involves despair of the truth, which is the second constitutional danger of Schopenhauer. Nietzsche explains this despair in relation to what he calls the challenge of every great philosophy, “which as a whole always says only: this is the picture of all life, and learns from it the meaning of your own life. And the reverse: only read your own life and comprehend from it the hieroglyphics of universal life.” (SE, 142) Schopenhauer lived through the latter approach. Nietzsche states, Schopenhauer's philosophy should always be interpreted at first: individually, by the individual only for himself, so as to gain insight into his own want and misery, into his own limitedness, so as then to learn the nature of his antidotes and consolations. (SE, 142) This feature of Schopenhauer is related to his honesty as a writer. Nietzsche elucidates it in relation to the third danger. He states, “Every human being is accustomed to discovering in himself some limitation, of his talent or of his moral will, which fills him with melancholy and longing” (SE, 142) this discovery is achieved through introspection that is per-

 caste. Nietzsche states,

For philosophy offers an asylum to a man into which no tyranny can force its way, the inward cave, the labyrinth of the heart: and that annoys the tyrants. There the solitaries conceal themselves: but there too lurks their greatest danger. (SE, 139)
formed individually. When one turns his eyes into oneself, when his sight is unmediated by “hieroglyphics of universal life”, he will confront his naked existence—an uncompromised existence. Nietzsche found this state in the work of Schopenhauer. He was astonished by Schopenhauer’s strength, he states, and “how inconceivably whole and unbreakable must Schopenhauer’s nature have been if it could not be destroyed even by this longing and yet was not petrified by it!” (SE, 143) Moreover, Schopenhauer’s “unscientific” approach has profoundly influenced Nietzsche. This “unscientific-ness” is not used pejoratively, rather it signifies a mode of understanding that involves humanness. Nietzsche laments the situation of his time by saying, “nowadays, however, the whole guild of the sciences is occupied in understanding the canvas and the paint but not the picture” (SE, 141)

As stated before Schopenhauer’s appearance in philosophy can be conceived in relation to German idealism. Accordingly, his influence on Nietzsche also covers Nietzsche’s stand in this philosophical movement. In his book titled *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology To Thought*, William Richardson states, “Between Hegel and Nietzsche stood Schopenhauer”. (2003, 361) Considering this, the works of Schopenhauer can be said to shape the influence of Hegelianism on Nietzsche. Since Schopenhauer marks the culminating stage of German idealism, Nietzsche’s approach towards Hegelian rational-teleological feature of history and human existence in it is schematized by the position of Schopenhauer. Accordingly, Nietzsche’s reaction towards the step taken by Schopenhauer in relation to Kantian and Hegelian foundations of German Idealism induces the beginning of his own philosophy. Despite this influence, Nietzsche’s departure from his educator involves an irreconcilable difference. In spite of the previously mentioned merits, Nietzsche considered Schopenhauer as honest representative of his age. Nietzsche’s approach towards the 18th century could indicate how Nietzsche approached Schopenhauer philo-
sophically. Accordingly, Nietzsche strongly opposed and renounced most philosophers who have lived in this century, also noting he has reproached the centuries before with the exception of the pre-Socratic philosophers (and among them, of Heraclitus). Nietzsche considered his age as the dead-end of the road on which philosophers of millennia contemplated upon, this philosophization, for Nietzsche could have not taken the meditators towards another destination but the one that is honestly represented by Schopenhauer, an age marked by the advent of nihilism—the devaluation of the hitherto highest values. For Nietzsche this devaluation and reigning meaninglessness is not a mere coincidence or inexplicable phenomenon, rather the necessary logical and psychological conclusion of a philosophization sustained for millennia.

Besides his astonishing merits, Nietzsche criticized Schopenhauer for following the same path. In *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche examines this similarity by analyzing the extent of Schopenhauer’s atheistic philosophy follow from the same ideal that created Christian theism. According to Nietzsche this ideal has created a thinking climate where, “One felt so certain about the highest desiderata, the highest values, the highest perfection that the philosophers assumed this as an absolute certainty, as if it were a-priori: "God" at the apex as a given truth.” (TWP, 15) However, Schopenhauer has attempted to deviate from this way, Nietzsche asserts, Schopenhauer’s departure from the ideal posed by Christian theism was unsuccessful. For Nietzsche found the essential constituents of the ideal in the atheistic philosophy of Schopenhauer. These vital constituents include, the search for “the true ‘reality,’ the ‘thing-in-itself’ compared to which everything else is merely apparent.” (TWP, 15) Moreover, this idealization involves a “dogma that our apparent world, being so plainly not the expression of this ideal, cannot be ‘true’—and that, at bottom, it does not even lead us back to that metaphysical world as its cause.” (TWP, 15) This dogma also encompasses a dichotomy incorporating estimation such
as, “the unconditional, representing that highest perfection, cannot possibly be the ground of all that is conditional.” (TWP, 15) In view of that, Nietzsche asserts the failure of his educator’s attempt to depart from the tradition of millennia by stating,

Schopenhauer wanted it otherwise and therefore had to conceive of this metaphysical ground as the opposite of the ideal—as "evil, blind will": that way it could be that "which appears," that which reveals itself in the world of appearances. But even so he did not renounce the absoluteness of the ideal—he sneaked by2.—(Kant considered the hypothesis of "intelligible freedom" necessary in order to acquit the Perfect being of responsibility for the world's being such-and-such—in short, to account for evil and ills: a scandalous bit of logic for a philosopher.—) (TWP, 15)

Schopenhauer has failed to renounce the ideal, for the essential constituents persisted in his own philosophy. His abandonment of the ideal remained as a rejection of the ideal as it is created by Christian theism. Accordingly, he failed to renounce the ideal itself—he atheistically re-created the ideal, retaining its absoluteness. Nietzsche’s recognition of this failed attempt and the advent of nihilism mark the outset of his own philosophy. In relation to this recognition Nietzsche states,

I was the first to see the real opposition: the degenerating instinct that turns against life with subterranean vengefulness (Christianity, the philosophy of Schopenhauer, in a certain sense already the philosophy of Plato, and all of idealism as typical forms) versus a formula for the highest affirmation, born of fullness, of overfull-ness, a Yes-saying without reservation, even to suffering, even to guilt, even to everything that is questionable and strange in existence. (F. Nietzsche, EH 1989, 272)

2 My emphasis
Nietzsche’s philosophy involves a confrontation with a tradition that has reigned for two millennia in western philosophy. In the coming sections this confrontation will be briefly discussed.

1.2 THE TRANSVALUATION AND REVALUATION OF VALUES

Nietzsche in his most famous declaration of the *divine decomposition* uncovers the greatest deed in history. Through his madman he proclaims, “God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.” (GS, 181) This statement of Nietzsche does not signify the actual death of God, because for him God has never in fact existed. In a narrower understanding it means, “The belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable… some ancient and profound trust has been turned into doubt; to them our old world must appear daily more like evening, more mistrustful, stranger, ‘older’.” (GS, 279) On the other hand, besides the historical event i.e. the fading away of the Christian God Europe, a broadened understanding of Nietzsche induces the more basic, and ahistorical features that can be called essential-collapsibility of the constitution (wherever and whenever it is constituted). This point will be discussed in detail in the coming chapter, thus for this time the narrower / historical understanding will considered. Accordingly, the death of God represents the undermined faith; it signifies the bold attempts of man to make sense of the world without an underpinning belief in God. It is the diminishment of Christian ideals as instructing force in the valuation of existence. Through his mouthpiece (the madman), Nietzsche is describing an event that is marking the collapsing of a foundation that maintained the edifice that served to *value* human existence. The belief in God shaped the interaction of man with himself, other men, and the external world. Nonetheless, with the achievements of science, notable numerosity of atheist and agnostic thinkers, the faith in God became weaker. Nietzsche recognized the cracking and eventual demolition of a foundation and dubious approaches towards its edifice.
In his words, “what was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives…” (GS, 181) Nietzsche characterized his mouthpiece as a madman to signify how he was approached by his contemporaries. He states,

“I have come too early,’… ‘My time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder require time; the light of the stars requires time; deeds, though done, still require time to be seen and heard. (F. Nietzsche, GS 1974, 182)

Knowing the oblivious stance of his contemporaries in relation to the eventual unfolding of this tremendous event and the magnitude of its consequences, Nietzsche embarked a project that includes two major phases—transvaluation and revaluation. These two stages are hierarchically situated; i.e. revaluation psychologically and logically presupposed transvaluation. For its most part, the project is concentrated on morality. Accordingly, Nietzsche approaches morality from different angles—morality as a cause as well as a consequence. In the former case, he considered morality as means of compulsion, “morality as remedy, as stimulant, as restraint, as poison.”(GM, p. 20) On the other hand, in the latter sense, Nietzsche considered “morality as symptom, as mask; as Tartuffe, as illness, as misunderstanding” (GM, p. 20) In relation to our subject the discussion will concentrate on the later approach of Nietzsche. To consider morality as a consequence brings the question “of what?” for the philosopher this demand incites too much work.

In the *Gay Science* Nietzsche explains what is on the table by saying,

Whatever men have so far viewed as the conditions of their existence—and all the reason, passion, and superstition involved in such a view—has this been researched exhaustively? The most industrious people will find that it involves too much work simply to observe how differently men’s instincts have grown, and might yet grow, depending on different moral climates. It would require whole
generations, and generations of scholars who would collaborate systematically, to exhaust the points of view and the material. The same applies to the demonstration of the reasons for the differences between moral climates (“why is it that the sun of one fundamental moral judgment and main standard of value shines here and another one there?”). And it would be yet another job to determine the erroneousness of all these reasons and the whole nature of moral judgments to date.³ (F. Nietzsche, GS 1974, 82)

Nietzsche engaged in this rigorous examination of morals within a strategy that involves departmentalization of the problem of morality; he distinguished ages, peoples, and degrees of rank among individuals. Morality as a developing phenomenon that has a cause other than what has been often associated with it, Nietzsche says, “the project is to traverse with quite novel questions, and as though with new eyes, the enormous, distant, and so well hidden land of morality—of morality that has actually existed, actually been lived…” (GM, 21). Through this approach towards morality, Nietzsche discovered differentiation of acts and thoughts, as good and bad, as well as good and evil. However, these differentiations were not the substantial ground; he dug further, the result showed the prevalence of Valuation beneath these values that has been conceived as given so far. Transvaluation and revaluation emerged as underpinning moralizations, as an explanation of the past and the anticipation of the future of morality. Nietzsche approached the prevailing Christian-European morality of his day with the aforementioned framework. Accordingly, behind the development of Christian-European morality, he claimed to discover a collision of the knightly-aristocratic value judgments and the priestly-noble mode of valuation. Since the latter arose from Israel, Nietzsche called it the “Jewish revaluation”⁴ he states, “with

³ My emphasis
⁴ Nietzsche has been associated with anti-Semitism, especially after his death his writings were used to propagate the atrocities of Nazi regime on Jews. However, in a letter he wrote to his sister Nietzsche condemns his sister (Elis-
the Jews there begins the slave revolt in morality: that revolt which has a history of two thousand years behind it and which we no longer see because it—has been victorious. (GM, 34) Nietzsche’s name is mostly related to the criticism of this revaluation that is followed by a call for the revaluation of the values posed by the “Jewish revaluation”. His thought has been misunderstood in this manner—his denunciation of Jewish revaluation has been considered as denouncing the Jewish people. Regardless of this confusion, what Nietzsche recognized in it is important to understand his reproach towards the Jewish revaluation. The philosopher’s denunciation mainly aims at the mode of valuation within. It targets the lamentable psychological state contained by the slave revolt in morality. In the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche says,

The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge. While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is “outside,” what is “different,” what is “not itself;” and this No is its creative deed. (F. Nietzsche, GM 1989, 36)

Nietzsche asserts the slave revolt in morality is a transfiguration of ressentiment. For him this interwoven element of the revolt indicates the prevalence of a concealed creative force that logically and psychologically molded the revaluation of the values of the noble morality. Nietzsche

abeth Forster-Nietzsche) he states, “You have committed one of the greatest stupidities—for yourself and for me! Your association with an anti-Semitic chief expresses foreignness to my whole way of life, which fills me again and again with ire or melancholy… It is a matter of honor with me to be absolutely clean and unequivocal in relation to anti-Semitism, namely, opposed to it, as I am in my writings. I have recently been persecuted with letters and Anti-Semitic Correspondence Sheets. My disgust with this party (which would like the benefit of my name only too well!) is as pronounced as possible, but the relation to Forster, as well as the aftereffects of my former publisher, the anti-Semitic Schmeitzner, always brings the adherents of this disagreeable party back to the idea that I must belong to them after all… It arouses mistrust against my character, as if publicly I condemned something which I favored secretly—and that I am unable to do anything against it, that the name of Zarathustra is used in every Anti-Semitic Correspondence Sheet, has almost made me sick several times…” (PN 1982, 456-457)
denounced *ressentiment* and all that is begotten through it, when he says, “enough! enough! I can’t take any more. Bad air! Bad air! This workshop *where ideals are manufactured*—it seems to me it stinks of so many lies.” (GM, 47) The philosopher’s discovery of something essentially suffocative became audible. Nietzsche identified reactivity at the heart of *ressentiment* as creative force. He states, “Slave morality always first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all—its action is fundamentally reaction”. (GM, 36) For Nietzsche the triumph of the slave revolt is the result of the vengeful cunning of impotence. Nietzsche dramatized the oppressed saying,

“…let us be different from the evil, namely good! And he is good who does not outrage, who harms nobody, who does not attack, who does not requite, who leaves revenge to God, who keeps himself hidden as we do, who avoids evil and desires little from life, like us, the patient, humble, and just”—this, listened to calmly and without previous bias, really amounts to no more than: “we weak ones are, after all, weak; it would be good if we did nothing *for which we are not strong enough*”... (F. Nietzsche, GM 1989, 46)

Through cursing and demonizing of the noble, the slave becomes blessed. Accordingly, the *values* generated by it are the transfiguration of something that is believed to be unchangeable into something that must not be changed, i.e. “Those slow in knowledge suppose that slowness belongs to knowledge”. (GS, p. 212) Nietzsche demands of revaluing the values that are generated in this way, most importantly the very mode of valuation that gave birth to the great ideals, because it necessarily takes to the deadlock of human existence. Nietzsche symbolized the occurrence of this tremendous event in Europe as *the death of God*. However, referring to Buddhism he states, “The same evolutionary course in India, completely independent of ours, should prove something: the same ideal leads to the same conclusion…” (GM, 160). As discussed above, as a
thinker Nietzsche felt alone, he regarded his contemporaries as unmindful of the lightning and thunder, so he considered himself as a philosopher having a duty to engage in unfolding the advent of Nihilism, as well alerting the lurking crisis of the need for philosophical preparation. He conceived himself “to be the first decent human being … to stand in opposition to the mendaciousness of millennia … the first to discover the truth by being the first to experience lies as lies” (EH, 327). Moreover, (also above all) as the first philosopher who embarked the attempt at a Revaluation of All Values—the formulation of the counter-movement which will take place in some future. Before discussing these two cornerstones of Nietzsche’s philosophy, lets shortly discuss the philosopher’s torch that illuminated his journey into the underworld of the ideal—the human, all too human outlook.

1.3 HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN

In the discussion of Nietzsche’s project of transvaluation and revaluation of values it has been stated that his famous proclamation, “God is dead” does not signify the actual death of God, because God has never in fact existed. This stance incites the question what was substrate of God. An attempt to unriddle the scene at the proclamation might help to expose possible insights in answering the question on God’s substrate. In the Gay Science Nietzsche states, “Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the marketplace, and cried incessantly: “I seek God! I seek God!” (GS, 181). Through this riddle, at least three messages are conveyed, the “madness” of the madman representing untimely presence of Nietzsche’s philosophy. The bright morning symbolizing the oblivious stance of his contemporaries about the Sunset, the darkening—the death of God. Moreover, the marketplace indicates the numerosity of his contemporaries, the incessancy signifying the magnitude of the event, the tre-
mendousness of the future. Lastly, *crying* representing Nietzsche’s discovery of an event (the Sunset—the death of God) that have two-folded implication for better and for worse: the darkening (the advent of nihilism) and the dawning (the opening of new horizon). In the next paragraph, after stating, “God is dead, God remains dead and we have killed him” the *madman* asks anticipatory questions\(^5\) demanding a means of overcoming the overwhelming time to come. After enumerating the type of (otherworldly) solution *with a question mark*—since the origin through which all these solutions got their efficiency is dried, Nietzsche proposes *another* type of solution (still holding question mark) *resolution* signifying the desperateness to overcome the greatest deed. The *madman* states, “Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?” (GS, 181).

The human, all too human outlook resonates in this dramatized expression of Nietzsche. Even though in the pragmatic sense, he used the death of God as “the belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable”. (GS, 279) It is noted that with this proclamation Nietzsche wanted to convey more than this, i.e. something profound—*the same ideal leads to the same conclusion*. Taking this into account, “the belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable” can be appropriated as the belief in such ideals and above all, such idealization has become unbelievable. This more inclusive interpretation incites suspicion about the prevalence of a paradigm, in Nietzsche’s words: “Where you see ideal things, I see what is—human, alas, all-too-human!”—I know man better. (EH, 283) This point connects the points that has been made so far, it is worth marking one more point to enrich it,

\(^5\) “How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it? (F. Nietzsche, GS 1974, 181)
Long experience, acquired in the course of such wanderings in what is forbidden, taught me to regard the causes that so far have prompted moralizing and idealizing in a very different light from what may seem desirable: the hidden history of the philosophers, the psychology of the great names, came to light for me. (F. Nietzsche, EH 1989, 218)

The message behind Nietzsche saying, “Where you see ideal things, I see what is—human, alas, all-too-human!” can now be explained as meaning, where you see ideal things I see the causes that so far have prompted the moralization and idealization. Moreover, beneath this penetrating approach Nietzsche’s saying, “I know man better” bears his reason of calling the moralizing and idealizing as “human, all too human!” Nietzsche assimilated the psychology of the idealizers and moralizers—most importantly the philosophers. This unlishing of the ideals as idealized (by humans) reminds him saying, “I was the first to discover the truth by being the first to experience lies as lies” (EH, 327). In the history of philosophy, Nietzsche pronounced himself as the first to discover the truth by being the first to experience the ideal things as idealized (by humans).

The “human, all too human” outlook resonates throughout the writings of Nietzsche as a concealed force—from his opposition of the mendaciousness of millennia unto his attempt at a Revaluation of All Values. However, what caused its philosophical significance? In short, its penetrating ability can be considered as a merit of its vital philosophical significance in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Here, the philosopher approaches unmercifully, digging, mining, undermining the ultimate safety of everything that had been believed, demanded, hallowed so far. In the preface of Human, all too human6 Nietzsche states the significance of the outlook by saying, “What? Everything only - human, all too human? It is with this sigh that one emerges from my writ-

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6 Published in two volumes 1878 and 1880
ings…” (HA I, 5). Accordingly, the next section will contain a prefatory analysis of Nietzsche books: *Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits.* (1878 and 1880), *The Gay Science* (1882), and *The Will to Power* (*Notes written 1883-1888*) with the aim of demonstrating the philosophical significance of the outlook “human, all too human”

1.4 WRITINGS OF NIETZSCHE: A PREFATORY ANALYSIS

1.4.1 *Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits*

In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche inscribed the intellectual environment wherein he wrote his books. Accordingly, he portrayed the beginning of *Human All Too Human* in relation to a profound alienation from everything that surrounded him; resembling his feeling with an awakening from dreaming. Nietzsche states, “Wherever was I? There was nothing I recognized; I scarcely recognized Wagner.” (EH, 284) This statement incites a question—who is Wagner? Precisely asking—why does Nietzsche mention this name in an event that has a momentous significance in his philosophical journey? To enquire the philosophical significance of the mentioning of Richard Wagner7, let us briefly discuss Nietzsche’s long companionship with Wagner. In 1876, Nietzsche wrote an essay with the title *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth* that was later published as book (including other three essays) with the title *Untimely Meditation*. In this book, he paid tribute to Wagner and Schopenhauer. However, after twelve years, he wrote another essay concerning Wagner with the title *Nietzsche Contra Wagner*. The content of the latter essay is clearly manifested on the title—Nietzsche against Wagner. Before discussing, the preface of *Human All Too Human* let us refer to what Nietzsche’s intent is when he reproaches individuals (*attack persons*

7 Richard Wagner (1813-83), the composer and dramatist who was, like Schopenhauer, an object of the youthful Nietzsche’s admiration
as in the case of *Nietzsche Contra Wagner*). In discussing the principles of his *war*\(^8\) Nietzsche states,

> I never attack persons; I merely avail myself of the person as of a strong magnifying glass that allows one to make visible a general but creeping and elusive calamity\(^9\)… Thus I attacked Wagner—more precisely, the falseness, the half-couth instincts of our “culture” which mistakes the subtle for the rich, and the late for the great. (F. Nietzsche, EH 1989, 232)

Considering this, let us recall Nietzsche saying, “Wherever was I? There was nothing I recognized; I scarcely recognized Wagner.” (EH, 284) Now one can see when Nietzsche *barely recognized Wagner*, he precisely meant, he scarcely recognized “the falseness, the half-couth instincts of the “culture” which mistakes the subtle for the rich, and the late for the great.” Remark- ing Nietzsche’s long companionship with Wagner, the beginning of *Human, All Too Human* also coincides with his retirement from the professorship at University of Basel. However, for Nietzsche the retirement from professorship and break with Wagner involves a more profound message than resigning from job and friendship. He states,

> “Whether Wagner or the professorship at Basel, were mere symptoms. I was overcome by *impatience* with myself; I saw that it was high time for me to recall and reflect on myself. All at once, it became clear to me in a terrifying way how much time I had already wasted—how useless and arbitrary my whole existence as a philologist appeared in relation to my task. I felt ashamed of this *false* modesty.” (EH, 286)

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\(^8\) Nietzsche’s statements of *warrior-like philosophization* mostly manifests the stance that he stated in *Ecce Homo*, regarding the spirit within the Human, All Too Human outlook, Nietzsche proclaims: “This is war, but war without powder and smoke, without warlike poses…” (F. Nietzsche, EH 1989, 283)

\(^9\) My Emphasis
These regretful words resonate in the preface of *Human All Too Human*, loudening until the philosopher *reconciles* with himself by saying “one *remains* a philosopher only by—keeping silent. (HA I, 11) In the preface of this book, Nietzsche included significant points, which he developed in his latter writings. In the beginning of this chapter, we have discussed Nietzsche’s admiration of his educator (Schopenhauer) for his honesty, cheerfulness and steadfastness, as well as for his endurance of what he called the constitutional dangers—iso- lation, despair of the truth, and the melancholy and longing caused by discovering limitation in himself. In *Human, All Too Human* Nietzsche emerges not as pupil but as educator. The profoundly suspicious approach towards the world marks the outset of the philosopher’s reflection on himself—the first step into the destruction of the false modesty. Nietzsche described the falseness of the modesty as follows:

In an effort to recover from myself, as it were to induce a temporary self-forgetting, I have sought shelter in this or that—in some piece of admiration or enmity or scientificality or frivolity or stupidity; and why, where I could not find what I *needed*, I had artificially to enforce, falsify and invent a suitable fiction for myself. What I again and again needed most for my cure and self-restoration, however, was the belief that I was *not* thus isolated, not alone in *seeing* as I did - an enchanted surmising of relatedness and identity in eye and desires, a reposing in a trust of friendship, a blindness in concert with another without suspicion or question-marks, a pleasure in foregrounds, surfaces, things close and closest, in everything possessing color, skin and appari-tionality. (F. Nietzsche, HA I 1996, 5)

Nietzsche now embarked into his own journey—in solitude, honesty, and steadfastness. However, in relation to those he venerated in his youth, he claimed to employ a certain amount of ‘art’ of closing his eyes or deceiving himself. In view of that, while having a sufficiently clear-sight about morality he claims to have closed eyes before Schopenhauer's blind will to morality, as
well, let himself to be deceived over Richard Wagner's incurable romanticism, as though it were a beginning and not an end (HA I, 6). However, this false modesty tensed up the philosopher culminated with an “enough” to the beginning of his own journey. Nietzsche states,

Supposing, however, that all this were true and that I was reproached with it with good reason, what do you know, what could you know, of how much cunning in self-preservation, how much reason and higher safeguarding, is contained in such self-deception - or of how much falsity I shall require if I am to continue to permit myself the luxury of my truthfulness? (F. Nietzsche, HA I 1996, 6)

After realizing, his sheltered, arbitrary and useless existence, Nietzsche directed his journey with the afore-quoted questions. In his philosophy, these questions mark his declaration of independence—“better to die than to go on living here… this 'here', this 'at home' is everything it had hitherto loved!” In his preface, Nietzsche marked this outbreak as the sowing of the “free spirit” a kind that do not exist, did not exist at his age and before. Nonetheless, Nietzsche embarked on the history of the great liberation; with the strength and will to self-determination—to evaluating on one's own account, as well as, a pursuit of demonstrating his mastery over things, and steadfastness to endure the bad and painful parts of the journey. Acquiring the courage to doubt what has been loved and admired appears to the first victory for the philosopher; however, from psychological point of view it poses as a questionable victory declared halfheartedly, with an inwardly exultant shudder, which betrays that a victory has been won - a victory? over what? over whom?” (HA I, 7). With this first victory, the perilously curious rebel proceeds to strengthen his position, this is also the point where Nietzsche moves stealthily around the things most forbidden—ask questions with the sense of tempting and experimenting.
'Can all values not be turned round? And is good perhaps evil? And God only an invention and finesse of the Devil? Is everything perhaps in the last resort false? And if we are deceived, are we not for that very reason also deceivers? Must we not be deceivers? (F. Nietzsche, HA I 1996, 7)

The examination of these questions requires a means of knowledge that allows wandering with the purported possibilities. Accordingly, at this point Nietzsche introduces his notion of Perspectivism\(^\text{10}\). Presupposed by the declaration of independence from what one use to venerate, this means and fishhook of knowledge involves an inclusive feature that permits access to many and contradictory modes of thought (HA I, 8). Moreover, this comprehensiveness excludes the danger that the spirit may even on its own road perhaps lose itself and become infatuated and remain seated intoxicated in some corner or other (Ibid., 8). Within this expansive context, the philosopher “unseals” what has been wrapped by dogmas and prejudices. In the preface, after such dangerous activities Nietzsche asks decisive questions that could jeopardize the journey he has undertaken so far. This moment poses a challenge on the steadfastness of the wanderer, also on the wherefore of the wandering, “‘Why so apart? So alone? Renouncing everything I once reverenced? Renouncing reverence itself? Why this hardness, this suspiciousness, this hatred for your own virtues?’” (Ibid., 9) For a person who has gone out of a shelter where he used to get comfort (though unsatisfying), the loneliness in the expedition, the long way ahead inflicts a fundamental question mark on the necessity of upholding the wandering. For the castaway philosopher in search of consolation with himself, overcoming such moments can be regarded as a triumph over weariness. Nietzsche asserts,

\(^{10}\) In the next section, Nietzsche’s notion of Perspectivism will be briefly discussed
'You shall become master over yourself, master also over your virtues. Formerly they were your masters; but they must be only your instruments beside other instruments. You shall get control over your for and against and learn how to display first one and then the other in accordance with your higher goal. (F. Nietzsche, HA I 1996, 9)

We have read Nietzsche’s regretful words of his time wasted under false modesty, moreover, about how it culminated in an existential crisis. In the beginning of the journey, Nietzsche states the causes of the overwhelming, nauseated feeling of uselessness of existence resides in not being isolated and not seeing with his own eyes. However, the realization of these manifestations indicates the prevalence of underpinning. For the philosopher this signal opens the inner world called ‘man’ with a tremendous long ordering—with mastery and servitude. In the above quotation, Nietzsche asserts the necessity of circumnavigating and overcoming this inner world—man. In the preface of the second volume Nietzsche states, “My writings speak only of my overcomings: ‘I’ am in them, together with everything that was inimical to me, my very own self, indeed, if a yet prouder expression be permitted, my innermost self” (HA, 209). These words of Nietzsche convey the archetype beneath his writings that are open to various interpretations. His writings the recognition of these contexts could appropriate our understanding. Another important point in the preface involves his perspectival shift that is manifested in his renunciation of romantic pessimism “Optimism, for the purpose of restoration, so that at some future time I could again have the right to be a pessimist” (Ibid., 212). To understand the philosophical implication of this shift, knowing what romantic pessimism meant for Nietzsche is important. In The Will to Power, Nietzsche discusses about romantic pessimism in relation to eternalization, he identifies two forms in which eternalization could proceed. In the first form, eternalization performs as an Art of Apotheosis and in the second as romantic pessimism. Concerning the first
form of eternalization, Nietzsche states,

proceed from gratitude and love—an art of this origin will always be an art of apotheosis, dithyrambic perhaps with Rubens, blissful with Hafiz, bright and gracious with Goethe, and shedding a Homeric aureole over all things (F. Nietzsche, TWP 1968, 446)

Considering this, he discusses the other form of eternalization, i.e. romantic pessimism. In this case, through eternalization, the pessimism of the renunciators takes revenge on all things. Nietzsche states,

The tyrannic will of a great sufferer who would like to forge what is most personal, individual, and narrow—most idiosyncratic—in his suffering, into a binding law and compulsion, taking revenge on all things, as it were, by impressing, forcing, and branding into them his image, the image of his torture. (F. Nietzsche, TWP 1968, 446)

Nietzsche states Schopenhauerian philosophy of will or Wagnerian music as the most expressive form of the second form of eternalization (Ibid., 446). Taking this into account, Nietzsche states his “perspectival shift” by saying,

I conducted with myself a patient and tedious campaign against the un-scientific basic tendency of that romantic pessimism to interpret and inflate individual personal experiences into universal judgments and, indeed, into condemnations of the world (F. Nietzsche, HA II 1996, 212)

Accordingly, the philosophical significance of Nietzsche’s perspectival shift resides in mastery over the given. Similarly, Nietzsche’s opposition of romantic pessimism resides in their lack of “a will there stands courage, pride, the longing for a great enemy” and consequently their romanticism spreading the pessimism resulting from defeat and failure. This stance indicates the spirit
of Nietzsche’s writings, he states,

Here a sufferer and self-denier speaks as though he were not a sufferer and self-denier. Here there is a determination to preserve an equilibrium and composure in the face of life and even a sense of gratitude towards it, here there rules a vigorous, proud, constantly watchful and sensitive will that has set itself the task of defending life against pain and of striking down all those inferences that pain, disappointment, ill-humor, solitude, and other swamp-grounds usually cause to flourish like poisonous fungi. (F. Nietzsche, HA II 1996, 212)

The preface of The Gay Science can be the archetype of Nietzsche’s perspectival shift and its philosophical significance. Moreover, it also demonstrates how individual personal experiences can be interpreted and inflated into universal judgments, and into condemnations of the world.

1.4.2 The gay science

The preface of the Gay Science involves Nietzsche’s attempt to shed light on the relation between health and philosophy. Within this context, he tries to reflect on the psychology of philosophers in relation to the concealed factors that presupposed their philosophies. Similarly, Nietzsche also explains the difference between philosophies by distinguishing two types of philosophizations that are found in the history of philosophy. The first types of philosophers are those whose deprivation philosophizes and the second type is philosophers whose riches and strengths philosophize. The basic question demands “what will become of the thought itself when it is subjected to the pressure of sickness?” For Nietzsche, the answer of this question involves possible explanation on the difference among philosophies. The philosophizing of deprivation necessitates philosophy, whether as a prop, a sedative, medicine, redemption, elevation, or self-alienation. On the other hand, for those philosophizers of riches and strengths philosophy is
merely beautiful luxury-in the best cases, the voluptuousness of a triumphant gratitude that eventually still has to inscribe itself in cosmic letters on the heaven of concepts. Nietzsche relates this distinction of philosophies to the actual history of philosophy, he states,

But in the former case, which is more common, when it is distress that philosophizes, as is the case with all sick thinkers—and perhaps sick thinkers are more numerous in the history of philosophy—what will become of the thought itself when it is subjected to the pressure of sickness?. (F. Nietzsche, GS 1974, 34)

The above differentiation of philosophies puts a sharp distinction in relation to their presence in the history of philosophy. It also covertly indicates the possible metaphysic, epistemic, ethic and aesthetic edifice that could emerge because of the philosophizing type. Noting this approach consolidates the “human, all too human” outlook, Nietzsche’s examination of the relation between health and philosophy sheds light on the exploration of seeing what is human in the idealization and moralization. Let us add one more point that enriches its demonstrability, Nietzsche states,

Behind the highest value judgments that have hitherto guided the history of thought, there are concealed misunderstandings of the physical constitution—of individuals or classes or even whole races. All those bold insanities of metaphysics, especially answers to the question about the value of existence, may always be considered first of all as the symptoms of certain bodies. (F. Nietzsche, GS 1974, 35)

Through the first passage, Nietzsche develops the basic distinction of philosophizations, namely the philosophization of deprivation and of riches as well strength. In the second quotation, by retaining the distinction he deploys an estimative mechanism that evaluates the aforementioned philosophizations concerning the misunderstanding or understanding of the body. In view of that,
Nietzsche asks is it your deprivation that is “philosophizing” or your riches and strength. While answering this question Nietzsche tells us, most of the philosophers before him are in some sense urged, pushed, and their spirit lured towards the sun, stillness, mildness, patience and medicine by their sick body. (1974, 34) In The Will to Power, Nietzsche makes an assertion that can elucidate this point. According to Nietzsche in the philosophies of these philosophers, “What is inherited is not the sickness but sickliness: the lack of strength to resist the danger of infections, etc., the broken resistance; morally speaking, resignation and meekness in face of the enemy.” (1968, 28) In this remark, Nietzsche distinguishes sickness from sickliness to indicate the prevalence of something that is essential exhibited in their philosophy. Through their philosophy they transfigure—eternalization, dogmatization and moralization of their sickness sickliness. For Nietzsche this kind of philosophization has dominance in the history of philosophy. In the preface of The Gay Science, Nietzsche identifies the ethic, metaphysics, and aesthetics of such philosophers as:

Every philosophy that ranks peace above war, every ethic with a negative definition of happiness, every metaphysics and physics that knows some finale, some final state of some sort, every predominantly aesthetic or religious craving for some Apart, Beyond, Outside, Above, permits the question whether it was not sickness that inspired the philosopher. (GS, 34)

Recalling Nietzsche’s distinction of philosophizations (of deprivation and of riches) as well as his claim of why philosophy is needed in these two types, the above quote sheds light on the philosophies of millennia—it is the philosophization of sickness. However, this kind of assertion incites a question, is deprivation a drive independent of the philosopher? Or who is responsible for the numerous “philosophizations of sickness”? This question leads to recall what Nietzsche asserted in the preface of Human, All Too Human—“You shall become master over yourself, master also over your virtues” (HA I, 9). Nietzsche’s recognition of the inner world called ‘man’
and his notion of overcoming, helps to answer this question. Accordingly, the numerous philosophers, in whom their deprivation philosophizes, are men who have not overcome their deprivation—who did not master themselves. In terms of man as “inner world”, it is to mean deprivation underpins the metaphysic, ethic and aesthetic edifies of these philosophers. What is important is that the underpinning of deprivation is not willed, as in the case where the thinker consciously and willingly deploys deprivation retaining his control to put it aside. In the preface of the *Gay Science* Nietzsche emphasizes the possibility of developing this mastery, he states,

> In the end, lest what is most important remain unsaid: from such abysses, from such severe sickness, also from the sickness of severe suspicion, one returns **newborn,***11 having shed ones skin, more ticklish and malicious. with a more delicate taste for joy, with a tenderer tongue for all good things, with merrier senses, with a second dangerous innocence in joy, more childlike and yet a hundred times subtler than one has ever been before. (F. Nietzsche, GS 1974, 37)

Noting he was a man who has spent most of his life with a fluctuating physical health, as well as the sickness of severe suspicion (as discussed in last section), it is appropriate to examine how he stood up. However, we need not go far but read the *Gay Science*. Nietzsche states,

> I am very conscious of the advantages that my fickle health gives me over all robust squares. A philosopher who has traversed many kinds of health and keeps traversing them, has passed through an equal number of philosophies he simply cannot keep from transposing his states every time into the most spiritual from and distance: this art of transfiguration is philosophy. (F. Nietzsche, GS 1974, 35)

The *Gay Science* inscribes Nietzsche’s celebration of sickness and recovery. With this book, he

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11 My emphasis
transfigured his health into a philosophy—for philosophy is the art of transfiguration (1974, 35). The philosopher experiences each phase of deterioration and recovery of health illness and vigorousness as entrances to perspectives—source of philosophy. Concerning the theme of the Gay Science Nietzsche states,

This whole book is nothing but a bit of merry-making after long privation and powerlessness, the rejoicing of strength that is returning, of a reawakened faith in a tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, of a sudden sense and anticipation of a future, of impending adventures, of seas that are open again, of goals that are permitted again, believed again. (F. Nietzsche, GS 1974, 32)

This ‘art’ of the philosopher recurs in all his books. The following section will briefly discuss the preface of The Will to Power—a foreword of prophecy.

1.4.3 The will to power

In the preface of this book, Nietzsche speaks prophetically, ringing the warning bell, he states, “Of what is great one must either be silent or speak with greatness, with greatness—that means cynically and with innocence” (TWP, 3). For Nietzsche, cynicism involves an essence that is most needed in times when no one speaks while calamity is impending. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche describes cynicalness as honest approach without shame or a scientific satyr (BGE, 38). Accordingly, in the preface of The Will to Power Nietzsche relates “the history of the next two centuries. He describes what is coming, what can no longer come differently: the advent of nihilism¹² (TWP, 3). Accordingly, Nietzsche uses the slipping European culture as an

¹² Here, historicity seems to put a spatiotemporal limitation on the prevalence of the advancing nihilism. However, in the coming chapters I will try to show how Nietzsche transfigures a philosophy from a historical happening—how his claim goes beyond European culture and encompass the abstract underpinnings of human existential valuations.
input to reflect on a matter that has broader axiological implication. Noting this, the most signifi-
cant point in the preface regards the essence of the inevitably advancing nihilism and Nietzsche’s
approach. He states,

He that speaks here, conversely, has done nothing so far but reflect: a philosopher
and solitary by instinct, who has found his advantage in standing aside and
outside, in patience, in procrastination, in staying behind; as a spirit of daring and
experiment that has already lost its way once in every labyrinth of the future; as a
soothsayer-bird spirit who looks back when relating what will come; as the first
perfect nihilist of Europe who, however, has even now lived through the whole of
nihilism, to the end, leaving it behind, outside himself. (Ibid. , 3)

Nietzsche speaks of the advancing European nihilism as if it has passed. He appears to have ex-
perienced what is going to-be-experienced in the future. Through this ironic expression of pro-
phetical pronouncement of the past, Nietzsche conveys the essential feature of nihilism and his
philosophy. Nietzsche speaks,

For one should make no mistake about the meaning of the title that this gospel of
the future wants to bear. "The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of All
Values"--in this formulation a countermovement finds expression, regarding both
principle and task; a movement that in some future will take the place of this
perfect nihilism--but presupposes it, logically and psychologically, and certainly
can come only after and out of it. For why has the advent of nihilism become
necessary? Because the values we have had hitherto thus draw their final
consequence; because nihilism represents the ultimate logical conclusion of our
great values and ideals--because we must experience nihilism before we can find
out what value these "values" really had.--We require, sometime, new values.
(Ibid. , 4)

The above quote undermines contentions regarding Nietzsche as a nihilist philosopher. In addi-
tion, marks his concept of transvaluation and revaluation of values, which aims at exhausting ni-
hility and finally formulating a countermovement. Accordingly, the following section will briefly
discuss Nietzsche’s key concepts that amalgamate what we discussed so far and as springboard
for the coming chapter.

1.5 MAJOR CONCEPTS

1.5.1 Will to Power

Nietzsche has tried to demonstrate the concept of will to power in relation to its manifold modes
of expression. Nevertheless, despite its seemingly different reference, the concept appears to lie
beneath what has been said so far. Let us begin from its broadest manifestation and narrow down
to its appropriation within Nietzsche’s philosophy. In its extensive mode the will to power ap-
pears as the essence of life. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche states, “for, what is not cannot
will; but what is in existence, how could this still will to exist! Only where life is, is there also
will; but not will to life, instead – thus, I teach you – will to power!” (TSZ, 90) This conception
of Nietzsche sets the will to power as an origin, even to the will to life. Accordingly, he also op-
opposes Schopenhauer’s positing of the “will to life” as the originative will, he states, “for life is
merely a special case of the will to power; -it is quite arbitrary to assert that everything strives to
enter into this form of the will to power” (TWP, 369). Hence, in its broadest mode of expression,
the will to power poses at the foundation. However, this indispensability of the will creates con-
fusion with regard to the instinct of self-preservation; considering this Nietzsche states,

the wish to preserve oneself is the symptom of a condition of distress of a
limitation of the really fundamental instinct of life which aims at the expansion of
power and, wishing for that, frequently risks and even sacrifices self-preservation
… and in nature it is not conditions of distress that are dominant but overflow and squandering, even to the point of absurdity. The struggle for existence is only an exception, a temporary restriction of the will to life. The great and small struggle always revolves around superiority around growth and expansion, around power: in accordance with the will to power which is the will of life. (F. Nietzsche, GS 1974, 291-292)

Nietzsche attempted to resolve the question of fundamentality between the will to power and the struggle for existence (of self-preservation) by posing the will to power, as a most fundamental will. He demonstrated his argument by stating the conditions in which the self-preservation is jeopardized and sacrificed for the sake of expansion of power. Moreover, for Nietzsche, the endangerment of existence also does not show the fundamentality of the will to life but the restriction of the manifold modes of expression of the will to power. Hence, in this case the will to power is restricted to be manifested only as the will to life. In its part, this point arouses curiosity, precisely if life is necessarily clung to its “exploitative aspects”. In response to this enigma Nietzsche states,

life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowered of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one’s own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation—but why should one always use those words in which a slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages? (F. Nietzsche, BGE 1966, 203)

Nietzsche poses a question, he requests the questioner his reason to situate the strife in life as unnecessary—as eradicable. He demands our consistent pejorative usage of terms denoting the strife. He continues by saying,
Here we must beware of superficiality and get to the bottom of the matter, resisting all sentimental weakness: Even the body within which individuals treat each other as equals, as suggested before—and this happens in every healthy aristocracy—if it is a living and not a dying body, has to do to other bodies what the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other; it will have to be an incarnate will to power, it will strive to grow, spread, seize, become prominent—not from any morality or immorality but because it is living and because life simply is will to power … everywhere people are now raving, even under scientific disguises, about coming conditions of society in which “the exploitative aspect” will be removed—which sounds to me as if they promised to invent a way of life that would dispense with all organic functions. “Exploitation” does not belong to a corrupt or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the essence of what lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of the will to power, which is after all the will of life. If this should be an innovation as a theory—as a reality, it is the primordial fact of all history: people ought to be honest with themselves at least that far. (F. Nietzsche, BGE 1966, 203)

Nietzsche demands honesty in regarding the necessity or dispensability of “exploitation”. He appears to be alerted by how one would be conceived when one speaks of “exploitation” far from its pejorative usage. However, for him such contention appears to be an invention. From what?—history. This point seems to cohere with those hawkish pictures of Nietzsche—the war instigator, and the demonized depiction of his Übermensch (Overman). Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s discourse about life in general and man in particular appears to involve distinctions. His proposition, to go beyond man indicates this tendency. Similarly, the prevalence of the will to power within man embeds peculiarities. Accordingly, the coming pages will contain a brief discussion of the will to power, human beings and the Overman. In his most celebrated book Thus Spoke Zarathustra, he states,
Wherever I found the living, there I found the will to power; and even in the will of the serving I found the will to be master … And where there are sacrificing and favors and love-looks, there too is the will to be master. Along secret passages the weaker sneaks into the fortress and straight to the heart of the more powerful—and there it steals power. And this secret life itself spoke to me: “Behold,” it said, “I am that which must always overcome itself. (F. Nietzsche, TSZ 1966, 89)

The above reference of the will to power involves an intertwined prevalence with life and overcoming. Moreover, this link embeds an identification of life as the will to power manifested through constant overcoming. Here noting Nietzsche’s remark about the book (Thus Spoke Zarathustra) seems important, in Ecce Homo he states,

My whole Zarathustra is a dithyramb on solitude or, if I have been understood, on cleanliness.—fortunately not on pure foolishness?—those who have eyes for colors will compare it to a diamond.—Nausea over man, over the “rabble,” was always my greatest danger. (F. Nietzsche, EH 1989, 234)

The previous quotes and Nietzsche’s statement about Zarathustra allows a conceptual link with what we have discussed throughout the last section. In the prefaces of Human All Too Human, The Gay Science and The Will to Power Nietzsche appears to assert and reassert the identification of life as the will to power manifested through constant overcoming. However, he does not use the term “will to power” in the first two prefaces; Nietzsche’s philosophical journey orbits constant self-overcoming. Moreover, this intertwinement also resonates in Nietzsche's recognition of the inner world called ‘man’

as adventurers and circumnavigators of that inner world called 'man', as surveyors and guagers of that 'higher' and 'one upon the other' that is likewise called 'man'-penetrating everywhere, almost without fear, disdaining nothing, losing nothing, asking everything, cleansing everything of what is chance and accident in it and
as it were thoroughly sifting it- until at last we had the right to say, we free spirits: 'Here - a new problem! Here a long ladder upon whose rungs we ourselves have sat and climbed - which we ourselves have at some time been! Here a higher, a deeper, a beneath-us, a tremendous long ordering, an order of rank, which we see: here- our problem!' -- (F. Nietzsche, HA I 1996, 10)

Accordingly, this constant self-overcoming manifests the prevalence of the will to power—becoming more powerful through knowing oneself, mastering oneself and developing control over one’s virtues. In Zarathustra Nietzsche expresses the destination of the journey as the Overman. He states, “I teach you the Overman, Human being is something that must be overcome.” (TSZ, 5). Noting this, recalling Nietzsche’s statement about his writings could enrich our discussion; he says:

“My writings speak only of my overcomings: 'I' am in them, together with everything that was inimical to me, my very own self, indeed, if a yet prouder expression be permitted, my innermost self” (HA, 209).

All previously quoted contentions of Nietzsche encompass the concept what he later called the will to power. The philosopher appears to have exemplary role in his teachings, the romanticized (perhaps, demonized) picture of Nietzsche’s Overman also gives the idea of the conqueror of his own inner world—‘man’. In relation to the Overman, one essential feature of the will has to be acknowledged, i.e. the will to power is a creative force. For instance, in the constant self-overcoming a new species of man emerges, however the difference between man and Overman is manifested in his control over oneself, or in his mastery over one’s virtues. Nietzsche states,

I assess the power of a will by how much resistance, pain, torture it endures and knows how to turn to its advantage; I do not account the evil and painful character
of existence a reproach to it, but hope rather that it will one day be more evil and painful than hitherto— (F. Nietzsche, TWP 1968, 206)

This assertion of Nietzsche elucidates the introspective and individual character of the Overman, as well as, suggests the meditative stance of the journey. Here, it seems appropriate to recall that, for Nietzsche it is unusual usage of the term “exploitation”, which goes up to asserting its indispensability, and relates it with his demand of constant self-overcoming. In view of that, to picture of an anti-Semite philosopher, who inspired legions of bloodthirsty soldiers, appears to become difficult. In the preface of Ecce Homo, Nietzsche wrote, “I never speak to masses…” (EH, 326). Accordingly, it becomes clearer what the philosopher tried to assert regarding the will to power within man—constant self-overcoming of ‘man’ unto the Overman. This being Nietzsche’s first reference of the will to power, the second will regard its prevalence within his other concept—human, all too human. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche demonstrates this presence through the relation between the will to power and philosophy. He states,

As soon as any philosophy begins to believe in itself. It always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise. Philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the “creation of the world,” to the causa prima (First cause). (BGE, 15-16)

Nietzsche’s assertion of a relation between the will to power and philosophy magnifies the creative potency of the will. In the same book, he consolidates it by using the stoic imperative “live according to nature”. Accordingly, for him, this imperative of the Stoa is an imposition of the morality and ideal stoicism on nature. Beneath, there is a strong drive to create all existence to exist only after the eternally glorified and generalized image of Stoicism. In view of that, Nietzsche asserts how, when philosophy begins to believe in itself, “creation of the world” follows
by saying,

For all your love of truth, you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently, so rigidly-hypnotically to see nature the wrong way, namely Stoically, that you are no longer able to see her differently. And some abysmal arrogance finally still inspires you with the insane hope\(^1\) that because you know how to tyrannize yourselves—Stoicism is self-tyranny—nature, too, lets herself be tyrannized: is not the Stoic—a piece of nature? (BGE, 15)

For Nietzsche, this “creation of the world” characterizes hitherto philosophies. Accordingly, he contends “Genuine philosophers...are commanders and legislators: they say, “Thus it shall be!”… Their “knowing” is creating, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth is—will to power (BGE, 136).

Another important point in Nietzsche’s discussion of the will to power is its relation to the ‘slave revolt in morality’. In Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche called this specific manifestation as “the will to power of the weakest” (GM, 122-123). As discussed before Nietzsche states, “the slave revolt in morality” begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge.” (Ibid., 36) Accordingly, within this ‘imaginary revenge’ the same active force is at work, though on a grander scale. “It creates for itself a bad conscience and builds negative ideals—namely, the instinct for freedom (in my language: the will to power) (Ibid., 122). According to Nietzsche, in this case the creativeness of the will appears to involve reactivity at its outset. Nietzsche states,

\(^1\) My emphasis
“We alone are the good and just,” they say, “we alone are Men of good will.”… The will of the weak to represent some form of superiority, their instinct for devious paths to tyranny over the healthy—where can it not be discovered, this will to power of the weakest! (GM, 123)

This prevalence of the will to power reminds Nietzsche’s Zarathustra saying, “The weaker sneaks into the fortress and straight to the heart of the more powerful—and there it steals power.” (TSZ, 89) Here, it has to be noted that despite the prevalence of the will in the living, its mode of expression become to have manifold manifestation that have a complex and deceiving mechanisms. Likewise, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche demonstrates this manifestation of the will in relation to the rise of the saint. In this case, the powerful of the world encounters a new, strange, yet unconquered enemy. With the saint, the will to power reveals as self-conquest and deliberate final renunciation. This manifestation of the will involves a typical peculiarity that surmounts by virtue of its enigma—as long as it remains an enigma. Accordingly, the next section will discuss Nietzsche’s notion of Perspectivism in relation to its significance as a means of knowledge and the manifold expressivity of the will to power.

1.5.2 Perspectivism

In discussing the preface of Human All Too Human, we have read Nietzsche stating, “means and fishhook of knowledge involves an inclusive feature that permits access to many and contradictory modes of thought” (HA I, 8). These words convey the peculiarity of his notion. With this eye, Nietzsche challenges one of the most hitherto valued concepts in philosophy. In Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche stood against what he called “dangerous old conceptual fiction” by saying:

Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a "pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing
subject"; let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as "pure reason," "absolute spirituality," "knowledge in itself": these always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense. (F. Nietzsche, GM 1989, 119)

While criticizing the epistemic edifies of the philosophies of millennia, Nietzsche also indicates the constituents of Perspectivism—by going against the dangers lurking in the old conceptual fiction, he also undermines the purported existence of an objective Truth that is claimed to be founded through such type of knowing subject. In the place of a pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject Nietzsche asserts the perspectivist. Consequently, in the place of "pure reason," "absolute spirituality", "knowledge in itself" of he asserts, Perspectivism—"the more complete will our 'concept' of this thing, our "objectivity", (Ibid. , 119). According to him, knowledge should be approached by the knower in relation to its manifold presence, "there is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective "knowing"; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes; we can use to observe one thing” (Ibid. , 119).

This stance of Nietzsche bestows inclusiveness on the acquisition of knowledge that was lacking in the former approaches. Moreover, with this point, Nietzsche attacks conventionalism. In Human All Too Human, he describes its constituents by saying,

Conviction is the belief that on some particular point of knowledge one is in possession of the unqualified truth. This belief thus presupposes that unqualified truths exist; likewise, that perfect methods of attaining to them have been
discovered; finally, that everyone who possesses convictions avails himself of these perfect methods.\(^{14}\) (F. Nietzsche, HA I 1996, 199)

Accordingly, there are three lurking dangers that are necessarily found within conventionalism that corresponds with the branches of philosophy: metaphysically—the purported existence of unqualified truth, and epistemologically—the presumed presence of perfect methods to acquire the supposably existing unqualified truth. and the last corresponds to ethics (since it regards the relation among people), regarding this Nietzsche states, “It is not conflict of opinions that has made history so violent but conflict of belief in opinions, that is to say conflict of convictions” (Ibid., 199) The philosopher even questions if anyone has sacrificed himself for truth. He says, “Those countless numbers who have sacrificed themselves for their convictions thought they were doing so for unqualified truth. In this, they were all wrong: probably a man has never yet sacrificed himself for truth” (Ibid., 199). Taking this into account, the remedies within Nietzsche’s notion of Perspectivism becomes laudable, “it excludes the possible danger that the spirit may even on its own road perhaps lose itself and become infatuated and remain seated intoxicated in some corner or other” (Ibid., p. 8). Moreover, this element also permits another important feature, i.e. experimentalism. This approach is signified by the freedom of the spirit. Freedom from what?—from unconditional submissiveness to a convention harbored by people in authority (fathers, friends, teachers, princes), that has penetrated to the extent of arousing a kind of pang of conscience if one fails to do so. (Ibid., 200) On the other hand, Perspectivism allows as much different eyes as possible—retaining the independence of the spirit from remaining clung in one eye or the other. In relation to the discussion so far, Nietzsche appears to have clear stand on dogmatism. However, his stance on dogmatism and conviction cannot be left without

\(^{14}\) My emphases
anticipating the quest on their conceptual opposites—skepticism. It seems sound to look at his stance on skepticism, in *Beyond Good and Evil*, which states,

For the skeptic, being a delicate creature, is frightened all too easily; his conscience is trained to quiver at every No, indeed even at a Yes that is decisive and hard, and to feel as if it had been bitten. Yes and No—that goes against his morality; conversely, he likes to treat his virtue to a feast of noble abstinence, say, by repeating Montaigne’s “What do I know?” or Socrates’ “I know that I know nothing.” Or: “Here I don’t trust myself, here no door is open to me.” Or: “Even if one were open, why enter right away?” Or: “What use are all rash hypotheses? Entertaining no hypotheses at all might well be part of good taste. Must you insist on immediately straightening what is crooked? on filling up every hole with oakum? Isn’t there time? Doesn’t time have time? O you devilish brood, are you incapable of waiting? The uncertain has its charms, too…” (F. Nietzsche, BGE 1966, 129-130)

Nietzsche’s admiration of skepticism involves the recognition of a constitution that allows the independence of the spirit. As he states in *The Gay Science*, “the more mistrust, the more philosophy” (286) in skepticism Nietzsche entertains the un-submissiveness—allowing unobstructed questioning of *everything*. Likewise, the freedom found in skepticism also coheres with his experimentalism. Accordingly, he states, “I favor any skeptics to which I may reply: "Let us try it!" But I no longer wish to hear anything of all those things and questions that do not permit any experiment. This is the limit of my "truthfulness"… (GS, 115). Regarding this point raises an important question—what is knowledge for the perspectivist? Nietzsche states,

In so far as the word "knowledge" has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings. "Perspectivism." It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their for and against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that
it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm. (F. Nietzsche, TWP 1968, 267)

The philosopher defines knowledge with interpretation. The knowability of the world residing in its interpretability, beneath this conception underlies an opposition to viewpoints that anticipate the prevalence of one and only Meaning. However, while rejecting this, it has to be noted that Nietzsche is asserting a path that regards every purported Meaning as a part of countless meanings. In view of that, Nietzsche contends,

No limit to the ways in which the world can be interpreted; every interpretation a symptom of growth or of decline. Inertia needs unity (monism); plurality of interpretations a sign of strength. Not to desire to deprive the world of its disturbing and enigmatic character! (Ibid., 326)

Accordingly, the world is an enigma, the enhancement of our knowledge also moves to the extent of our recognition of its disturbing and enigmatic character. For this, the spirit shall be free and cautious not to become infatuated and remain seated intoxicated in some corner or other—it needs a perspectival eye that adheres the enigmatical character, and that do not seek shelter from the disturbance with denial through conceptual fiction. In the next section I will briefly discuss the Genealogical approach of Nietzsche, which can be considered as an amalgamation of his major concepts—the will to power and Perspectivism.

1.5.3 Genealogy

Genealogy is an account of the origin and historical development of something, or it is the study of lines of descent. These phrases convey the broadest definition of genealogy, but also blur the distinct lines that are marked with novelty. Nietzsche’s version of genealogy appears novel enough to have a significant distinction that is conceptually intertwined with the “human, all too
human” outlook as well as the will to power and Perspectivism. In our discussion of transvaluation and revaluation of values, we have read Nietzsche saying, “with the Jews there begins the slave revolt in morality: that revolt which has a history of two thousand years behind it and which we no longer see because it—has been victorious. (GM, 34) Similarly, in his demonstration of the will to power, we have discussed how he explored the revolt as representing the will to power of the weakest, i.e. ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values. Moreover, with regard to Perspectivism we have discussed Nietzsche’s criticism on conventionalism for its obstruction of knowledge with its belief in the existence of unqualified truth. Let us note what he states in the preface of *On the Genealogy of Morals* regarding the novelty of a genealogical approach towards moral values, he says:

Let us articulate this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves must first be called in question—and for that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they grew, under which they evolved and changed … a knowledge of a kind that has never yet existed or even been desired… One has taken the value of these “values” as given, as factual, as beyond all question… (F. Nietzsche, GM 1989, 20)

If one looks closely, one will recognize the prevalence of an approach that rejects given-ness, there stands a diagnostician with searching for the veiled setting of the beginnings that have mystified to the extent of having no such outset. In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche briefly portrays the unfolding of the setting by stating,

Every time a beginning that is calculated to mislead: cool, scientific, even ironic, deliberately foreground, deliberately holding off. Gradually more unrest; sporadic lightning; very disagreeable truths are heard grumbling in the distance—until eventually a tempo feroce is attained in which everything rushes ahead in a
tremendous tension. In the end, in the midst of perfectly gruesome detonations, a *new* truth becomes visible every time among thick clouds. (F. Nietzsche, EH 1989, 312)

Even though, Nietzsche has had the idea of his genealogical approach, a publication of Paul Rée’s book titled *The Origin of Moral Sensations* appears to trigger the integration and clarification of his thoughts concerning genealogy (of morals). In this book, Rée tried to explain the occurrence of altruistic feelings in human beings, and the interpretative process, which denoted altruistic feelings as moral. Rée argued that acquired habits could be passed to later generations as innate characteristics. Accordingly, he claimed altruism was among the inherited human drives that over the course of centuries have been strengthened by selection. Considering the interpretative process that denoted altruistic feelings as moral, Rée contended that the behavior was so beneficial, it came to be praised unconditionally, as something good in itself, apart from its outcomes (Wikipedia Contributors; 2013). Regarding the genealogical approach Rée followed, Nietzsche states:

> The Darwinian beast and the ultramodern unassuming moral milksop who “no longer bites” politely link hands, the latter wearing an expression of a certain good-natured and refined indolence, with which is mingled even a grain of pessimism and weariness … (F. Nietzsche, GM 1989, 21)

According to Nietzsche, Rée’s genealogical approach lacked the perceptiveness that could have led to a better direction than the Darwinian-*ization* of morality. Following this unsuccessful attempt, Nietzsche began to advance his own genealogical hypothesis that involves the analysis of hieroglyphic record of the moral past of humankind. In our discussion of transvaluation and revaluation of values, we have read Nietzsche stating the vastness of this examination as requiring whole generations, and generations of scholars, accordingly his genealogical study of morals fo-
cused on the origin of morality. Similar to Rée, Nietzsche rejected the given-ness of moral values, however, his rejection stood on a different angle. Nietzsche directed his study towards questioning the values of the moral values. The examination stands at the heart of his version of genealogy, it also integrates the “human, all too human” outlook, the will to power and Perspectivism. In the preface of *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche states:

…under what conditions did man devise these value judgments good and evil? and what value do they themselves possess? Have they hitherto hindered or furthered human prosperity? Are they a sign of distress, of impoverishment, of the degeneration of life? Or is there revealed in them, on the contrary, the plenitude, force, and will of life, its courage, certainty, future? Thereupon I discovered and ventured diverse answers; I distinguished between ages, peoples, degrees of rank among individuals; I departmentalized my problem; out of my answers there grew new questions, inquiries, conjectures, probabilities—until at length I had a country of my own, a soil of my own, an entire discrete, thriving, flourishing world, like a secret garden the existence of which no one suspected. (F. Nietzsche, GM 1989, 17)

Within these questions, Nietzsche inscribes the integration of “human, all too human”, the will to power and Perspectivism. One possible demonstration of this view is to recognize the underpinning approach of the “value” of moral values as the products of human beings—as not given, factual and beyond all questioning, in Nietzsche’s words, seeing what is human, when one should see the ideal. Until the philosopher acquires this eye, the possibility of an examination of the conditions in which value judgments of what good and evil emerged appears implausible. Once the genealogical approach incorporates this outlook, the precision of possible factors that induced the difference among developments of moral value judgments, as well as the “values” embedded within becomes conceivable. Moreover, at this point the genealogy comprises the will
to power. In his book, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Gilles Deleuze explains the will to power as “essentially creative and giving... power is in the will as "the bestowing virtue", through power the will itself bestows sense and value.” (Deleuze, 85) In Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis, the will is incorporated in the bestowal of the “values” which are possessed by moral value judgments (of good and evil). Let us recall our discussion of the *Jewish revaluation* or the *slave revolt in morality* to clarify the bestowal of value on moral value judgments (good and evil). Deleuze states,

Here are the two formulae: "I am good, therefore you are evil" — "You are evil therefore I am good"... Who utters the first of these formulae, who utters the second? And what does each one want? The same person cannot utter both *because the good of the one is precisely the evil of the other... We ask: who is it that begins by saying: "I am good"? It is certainly not the one who compares himself to others, nor the one who compares his actions and his works to superior and transcendent values: such a one would not begin. The one who says: "I am good", does not wait to be called good. He refers to himself in this way, he names himself and describes himself thus to the extent that he acts, affirms and enjoys.

(Deleuze 1983, 121)

The two formulae represent the outcome of Nietzsche’s genealogical study of morality—his distinction of master and slave morality. The first utterer who says, "I am good, therefore you are evil” signifies the master morality, on the other hand, the second utterer who pronounces, "You are evil therefore I am good" represents the slave morality. Fundamentally the same active force is at work—the will to power. In the case of slave morality, the bestowal of value on moral value judgments involves reactivity, i.e. its activity appears predetermined by the actions of an outsider. Accordingly, the master-ness and slave-ness of the moralities also emanates from how the will to power is exerted. The latter always needs the initiation of the former, on the other hand,
the former do not need the initiation of the latter. Nietzsche was also careful of the terminology, in the case of the master morality; the moral judgment appears as *good and bad*, while in among the slave it is *good and evil*. Nietzsche states,

…how different these words “bad” and “evil” are, although they are both apparently the opposite of the same concept “good.” But it is not the same concept “good”: one should ask rather precisely *who* is “evil” in the sense of the morality of *ressentiment*. The answer, in all strictness, is: precisely the “good man” of the other morality, precisely the noble, powerful man, the ruler, but dyed in another color, interpreted in another fashion, seen in another way by the venomous eye of *ressentiment*. (F. Nietzsche, GM 1989, 40)

At this point Nietzsche’s genealogical approach as the integration of the “human, all too human” outlook and the will to power appears more vivid. Within the genealogy of morals Nietzsche sought what is human, and in seeking what is human he discovers the will to power—with the will to power, he discloses different moral climates of different psychologies. Likewise, if one looks closer, one will find an eye capable of this pursuit—a perspectival eye. As remembered, through Perspectivism Nietzsche proclaims, “there is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective "knowing"; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes; we can use to observe one thing” (Ibid., 119). Accordingly, he describes the incorporation of Perspectivism within his genealogical analysis as seeing extra-morally.—“There are no moral phenomena, there is only a moral interpretation of these phenomena. This interpretation itself is of extra-moral origin.” (TWP, 149)
II

NIETZSCHE’S DISCOURSE ON NIHILISM

VIS-À-VIS HIS CRITIQUE OF METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY

2.1 NIETZSCHE’S DISCOURSE ON NIHILISM

“Gradually, man has become a fantastic animal that has to fulfill one more condition of existence than any other animal: man has to believe, to know, from time to time why he exists; his race cannot flourish without a periodic trust in life—without faith in reason in life.” (GS, 75)

These words of Nietzsche convey the uniqueness residing within being human; it isolates the human existence from other living things with its additional requirement. However, this distinct extra-condition demarcates a point of departure, it distinguishes the course of human existence with its interminable need for ground that vitalize and revitalize its motives and reassure the worthiness of life. As Nietzsche states in the Gay Science, “again and again the human race will decree from time to time: ‘There is something at which it is absolutely forbidden henceforth to laugh’.” (Ibid. ). Within this peculiarity, i.e. the posit-ability of the meaning in existence—periodic trust in life, lurks a danger—collapsibility. Accordingly, for Nietzsche:

Nihilism appears at that point, not that the displeasure at existence has become greater than before but because one has come to mistrust any "meaning" in
suffering, indeed in existence. One interpretation has collapsed; but because it was considered the interpretation it now seems as if there were no meaning at all in existence, as if everything were in vain. (TWP, 35)

Let us take a moment and reflect on what has been shortly discussed. The above quotes of Nietzsche convey the crux of his discourse on nihilism, how he thought about human existence and its meaning, as well as, how man conceived it from time to time. Moreover, it portrays an entangled image of the existential history of humanity; it sheds light on the difficulties that have passed, and awaiting to take place. Above all, the previously mentioned points necessitate recalling every section of the previous chapter. Perhaps, it appears the philosopher of “human, all too human” and his noble concepts (the will to power, Perspectivism, and genealogy) reach their fullest meaning and vivacity within his discourse on nihilism. Moreover, *The Eternal Recurrence*, another novel idea of Nietzsche also appears exuberant when considered interwoven-ly with his discourse on nihilism. If this is considered the case, a brief discussion of Nietzsche’s demonstration of nihilism shall be the first of all that will follow.

In *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche defined nihilism by stating, “What does nihilism mean? That the highest values devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking; ‘why?’ finds no answer.” (TWP, 9).

At the beginning of this section, we have read how Nietzsche identified man’s existence, i.e. “man has to believe, to know, from time to time, why he exists…” this unique condition of human existence is posed as a necessity; hence, without it the human race could not flourish. When we relate this additional condition of human existence with the above definition, nihilism marks a state where the flourish-ment of human race is in jeopardy. By considering men from within, Nietzsche states:
Whether I contemplate men with benevolence or with an evil eye, I always find them concerned with a single task, all of them and every one of them in particular: to do what is good for the preservation of the human race. Not from any feeling of love for the race, but merely because nothing in them is older, stronger, more inexorable and unconquerable than this instinct—because this instinct constitutes the *essence*\(^{15}\) of our species, our herd. (GS, 73)

Nietzsche wrote the above words under the title “*The teachers of the purpose of existence*” wherein he recognizes the preservers of the species who “wants to make sure that we do not *laugh* at existence, or at ourselves—or at them…” (Ibid., 75). For him, the founders of moralities and religions, the instigators of fights over moral valuations, the teachers of remorse and religious wars; as he called them “the tragedians”, they too, “by promoting *the faith in life*. 'Life is worth living,’ every one of them shouts; there is something to life, there is something behind life, beneath it; beware! (Ibid., 74). However, as it is said before, within the additional condition of existence, which is the posit-*ability* of the meaning in existence—periodic trust in life, lurks a danger—collapsibility. Let us consider two quotes, the first marking the posit-*ability* and the latter regarding the collapsibility of what has served in the bestowal of trust and worthiness of life. Accordingly, on the posit-*ability* Nietzsche states,

> Whenever “the hero” appeared on the stage, something new was attained: the gruesome counterpart of laughter, that profound emotional shock felt by many individuals at the thought: "Yes, I am worthy of living!" Life and I and you and all of us became *interesting* to ourselves once again for a little while. (Ibid., 75)

Nevertheless, the spring of enthusiasms in life withers, and takes away all its charm and efficiency—henceforth, the collapsibility of the posited supreme values appears clearer. In Nietzsche’s

\(^{15}\) Nietzsche’s emphasis
words, “There is no denying that in the long run every one of these great teachers of a purpose was vanquished by laughter, reason, and nature: the short tragedy always gave way again and returned into the eternal comedy of existence\textsuperscript{16}” (Ibid.) Yet, the additional condition of existence remains a necessity—man wallowing in anticipation to see something new, to stand firmly.

Accordingly for Nietzsche,

In spite of all this laughter which makes the required corrections, human nature has nevertheless been changed by the ever new appearance of these teachers of the purpose of existence: It now has one additional need—the need for the ever new appearance of such teachers and teachings of a "purpose." (GS, 75)

Let us recollect points made in the previous chapter\textsuperscript{17}, in which we read Nietzsche self-proclaiming “as the first perfect nihilist of Europe who, however, has even now lived through the whole of nihilism, to the end, leaving it behind, outside himself”. (TWP, 3). Moreover, we have also noted him involving in “the formulation a countermovement … regarding both principle and task; a movement that in some future will take the place of this perfect nihilism—but presupposes it, logically and psychologically, and certainly can come only after and out of it. (Ibid. , 4)

These two statements unveils the twofold aspect of Nietzsche’s approach towards nihilism—the first marking his journey into nihilism and the second against nihilism. With the former approach, the philosopher becomes the perfect nihilist of Europe. And with the latter, that necessarily follows from the former he attempts to overcome nihilism. Furthermore, in discussing this twofold approach, the recalling of Nietzsche’s madman appears inevitable. Because, through his madman, Nietzsche declares the death of God, i.e. he became conscious of something tremen-

\textsuperscript{16} My emphasis

\textsuperscript{17} While discussing the preface of The Will to Power.
dous, he recognizes the advent of nihilism—through his mouthpiece, Nietzsche asks, “Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space?” (GS, 182). Bearing this in mind, as well as the two-folded approach towards nihilism, let us add another crucial point, namely, the necessity of complete nihilism. In the Will to Power, Nietzsche asserts the necessity of complete nihilism by identifying the lurking dangers of incomplete nihilism. He states, “Attempts to escape nihilism without reevaluating our values so far\textsuperscript{18}: they produce the opposite, make the problem more acute.” (TWP, 19) Accordingly, for Nietzsche attempts to escape nihilism, would not serve the overcoming of it but its severity. Another ground for the completion of nihilism is related with acquiring axiological clarity, i.e. “we must experience nihilism before we can find out what value these ‘values’ really had.” (Ibid., 4) Regarding these assertions as whys of the philosopher’s journey into nihilism, let us proceed to his critique of metaphysics of transcendence, by using his philosophical diagnosis of nihilism as a psychological state as springboard.

2.1.1 Nihilism and the Critique of Metaphysics of Transcendence

In his analysis of nihilism as a psychological state, Nietzsche demonstrates what has been discussed at the beginning of this chapter, i.e. the positing and collapse of man’s unique condition of existence. Through his diagnosis, the philosopher discloses the groundwork of nihilism that has underpinned the supreme values that has bestowed vitality on this unique condition; he unveils its critical constituents that served its efficient sustenance of fulfilling man’s periodic trust in life, and knowledge on the why of his existence. Moreover, with this analysis, Nietzsche stands against the “mendaciousness of millennia”.

\textsuperscript{18}I.e. Incomplete nihilism
Considering these, the philosopher contends the declining of three categories (namely, of “aim”, “unity” and “truth”) as the cause of nihilism. Precisely speaking, the realization of their absence constitutes nihilism as psychological state. In the case of the first category, i.e. “aim”, resides the presumption of a goal in the process of becoming—it entails that something is to be achieved through the process. Similarly, in the second case, i.e. “unity”, resides an alleged presence of a totality, systematization, indeed any organization in all events. The decline of the two categories is conceptually interconnected. Let us add one point that sheds light on this connection. Regarding the advent of nihilism in relation to the fist category Nietzsche states,

“And now one realizes that becoming aims at nothing and achieves nothing. — Thus, disappointment regarding an alleged aim of becoming as a cause of nihilism… (Man no longer the collaborator, let alone the center, of becoming).”  
(TWP, 12)

With this disappointment, regarding the absence of the alleged aim in the process of becoming unfolds the crumbling of the purported unity, wherein man acquired a special place. For the aim of becoming to be achieved, requires an organization in all events. And since this unity and totality underpins the achievability of the aim, most importantly assigns task to man’s life and bestow a meaning on his existence. Hence, with the disappointment considering the alleged aim crumbles the unity. This realization appears to involve agonizing sigh—“for what it is united?” Nihilism, then, is the recognition of the long waste of strength; at this point, “man has lost the faith in his own value when no infinitely valuable whole works through him; i.e., he conceived such a whole in order to be able to believe in his own value”  
(Ibid. ). With the realization of these, comes the third category, i.e. “truth”. Here, the philosopher’s demonstration becomes interesting; he presents the “truth” as an escape. The disappointed creature “passes sentence on this whole
world of becoming as a deception and to invent a world beyond it, a \textit{true} world.” (Ibid. )

Let us take a moment and reflect on what has been shortly discussed. In his analysis of nihilism as psychological state, the philosopher has identified three crucial events; the realization of absence of alleged “aim” in the process of becoming, followed by the denunciation of the purported “unity” underlying it. Moreover, he has demonstrated the desperate attempt to seek refuge from the trauma caused by the realization—the invention of a world beyond it, a \textit{true} world. What has been passed so far seems capable of crashing, but as he states at the beginning of preface of \textit{The Will to Power}, one should not sympathize. In his words, “Of what is great one must either be silent or speak with greatness. With greatness-that means cynically and with innocence.” (Ibid. , 3)

With this manner, the philosopher drops the greatest of all—Man disappointed by the absence of “aim” and “unity”, and attempting an escape to the \textit{beyond} arrives at the last form of nihilism. Beneath this form of nihilism underlies the experiencing of first and second forms of nihilism (the devaluation of three categories). Moreover, with this last form, a foundation unfolds, an ultimate realization that transcendence specificity, Nietzsche states,

“As soon as man finds out how that world is fabricated solely from psychological needs, and how he has absolutely no right to it, the last form of nihilism comes into being: it includes disbelieve in any metaphysical world and forbids itself any belief in a \textit{true} world.\textsuperscript{19}” (Ibid. , 13).

Accordingly, the last form marks a dead-end—an exhaustion of faith through which man’s unique condition of existence acquired its meaning. Here the believer awakes from the dogmatic slumber—for he becomes conscious of “the \textit{hyperbolic naiveté} of man: positing himself as the

\footnote{19 My emphases}
meaning and measure of the value of things.” (TWP, 14) Let us add one more point from his book *Human, All Too Human*, wherein Nietzsche exclaims the *hyperbolic naiveté* of man by saying “the creature which calls *its* history world history!—man is the vanity of vanities.” (HA II, 307) Considering this point, let us enrich our discussion by relating it with Nietzsche’s stand against the mendaciousness of millennia.

In his essay, *Philosophy in the Tragic Ages of the Greeks*, Nietzsche describes how Thales of Miletus becomes the first Greek philosopher. According to him, to take a serious notice at Thales’ main proposition (*water* is the primal origin and the womb of all things) could provide us with insights of how he comes to be first of ancient Greek philosophers. For Nietzsche, with this simple proposition, Thales tells something about the primal origin of all things; moreover, it does so in language devoid of image or fable, and finally, contained in it, if only embryonically, is the thought, "all things are one" (PTAG, 38-39). Considering these, Nietzsche asserts even though the first feature of Thales’ proposition leaves him in the company of the religious and the superstitious; the second takes him out of such company and shows him as a natural scientist, but the third makes him the first Greek philosopher. (Ibid. ) At this point, Nietzsche’s conception of what philosophy signifies unfolds; he asserts the uniqueness of philosophy resides in its selectivity—by its emphasis on the useless. In view of that, Thales through his unity hypothesis (all things are one) passed over the horizon of his time. In relation to the unity hypothesis, besides being the ground to identify Thales the first Greek philosopher, Nietzsche claims it consistent prevalence in every philosophy, together with the ever-renewed attempts at a more suitable expression, this proposition that "all things are one." (Ibid. , 39). Moreover, he identifies a metaphysical conviction, which had its origin in a mystic intuition as the source of the unity hypothesis. Nietzsche states,
The Greeks, among whom Thales stood out so suddenly, were the very opposite of realists, in that they believed only in the reality of men and gods, looking upon all of nature as but a disguise, a masquerade, or a metamorphosis of these god-men. **Man for them was the truth and the core of all things; everything else was but semblance and the play of illusion.**

(PTAG, 41)

Keeping this development of the unity hypothesis in mind, let us proceed to another important figure in the history of philosophy—Anaximander of Miletus. Here again Nietzsche refers to the crucial words of the other Miletian philosopher pronouncing, "Where the source of things is, to that place they must also pass away, according to necessity, for they must pay penance and be judged for their injustices, in accordance with the ordinance of time." Considering this, Nietzsche claims with Anaximander the way of dealing with the origin of this world make a turn. Anaximander postulated it as the ultimate unity of "the indefinite", the womb of all things. The philosopher was no longer dealing with the question of the origin of this world in a purely physical way. Referring “the indefinite”, Nietzsche remarks, “the immortality and everlastingness of primal being does not lie in its infinitude or its inexhaustibility … but in the fact that it is devoid of definite qualities that would lead to its passing” (Ibid., 47). Moreover, in relation to Anaximander’s stance regarding “the indefinite” Nietzsche **empathizes** by saying, “it may not be logical, but it certainly is human, together with Anaximander, all coming-to-be as though it were an illegitimate emancipation from eternal being, a wrong for which destruction is the only penance.” (Ibid., 46). For Nietzsche, besides making a shift from the purely physical way of deal-

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20 My emphasis

21 Nietzsche states we may look upon it as the equal of the Kantian “thing as it is in itself” (not mediated through perception by the senses or conceptualization, and therefore unknowable.) (PTAG, 47)

22 Later on, the negative atmosphere wherein the philosopher approached all coming-to-be will be discussed in relation to its consistent prevalence in the history of philosophy.
ing with the question of the origin of this world, Anaximander stands as the first Greek philosopher to comprehend the profoundest problem in ethics. Nietzsche asserts, Anaximander “saw in the multiplicity of things that have come-to-be a sum of injustices that must be expiated, he grasped with bold fingers the tangle of the profoundest problem in ethics. He was the first Greek to do so.” (Ibid., 48) Let us shortly discuss how Anaximander’s realization of becoming inter-twines with his recognition the profoundest problem of ethics. Recalling his departure from purely physical way of approaching the question of the origin of this world, we have read Anaximander saying, "Where the source of things is, to that place they must also pass away, according to necessity". Noting, this coming-to-be and passing away embraces the human life. Nietzsche underlines Anaximander’s gloomy words saying,

"What is your existence worth? And if it is worthless, why are you here? Your guilt, I see, causes you to tarry in your existence. With your death, you have to expiate it. Look how your earth is withering, how your seas are diminishing and drying up; the seashell on the mountaintop can show you how much has dried up already. Even now, fire is destroying your world; someday it will go up in fumes and smoke. But ever and anew, another such world of ephemerality will construct itself. Who is there that could redeem you from the curse of coming-to-be?"

(PTAG, 48)

Not comprehending it firsthand but reading these words of the philosopher inflict agony. However, there remains some question. Anaximander states, “Why hasn't all that came-to-be passed away long since, since a whole eternity of time has passed? Whence the ever-renewed stream of coming-to-be?” At this point Anaximander seemed to acquire a way-out, which Nietzsche claims as mystic possibility. The Miletian philosopher lamented, the conditions for the fall from being to coming-to-be in injustice are forever the same; the constellation of things is such that no end
can be envisaged for the emergence of individual creatures from the womb of the "indefinite". At this point, Nietzsche discovers a line of philosophers, wherein they attempted to get closer to the problem of how the definite could ever fall from the indefinite, the ephemeral from the eternal, and the unjust from the just. Nietzsche asserts, the more they attempted to do so the deeper grew the night. (PTAG, 50)

One important figure discussed in Nietzsche’s essay is Heraclitus of Ephesus. According to Nietzsche, the philosopher from Ephesus illuminated the problem of becoming by a “divine stroke of lightning. Heraclitus exclaimed, ‘‘Becoming’ is what I contemplate, and no one else has watched so attentively this everlasting wave beat and rhythm of things. And what did I see? Lawful order, unfailing certainties, ever-like orbits of lawfulness, Erinnyes.” (PTAG, 50-51). In relation to his predecessor, Heraclitus’ way of dealing with the problem of becoming involved two fundamental negations. He denied the duality of totally diverse worlds, (i.e. He no longer distinguished a physical world from a metaphysical one, a realm of definite qualities from an undefinable “indefinite”) and consequently, he altogether denied being—for this one world which he retained. (Ibid., 51) Moreover, Heraclitus’s way of dealing with the problem of becoming embeds an epistemological constitution, which according to Nietzsche is the regal possession of the philosopher. Heraclitus thought intuitively, and through it he stood against the other type that is reason, a type of thinking that is accomplished in concepts and logical combinations. Nietzsche contends the regality of the intuitive thinking by identifying two constituents that are overlooked by Aristotle’s criticism of it as a sin against the law of contradiction. Accordingly Nietzsche states,

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23 (classical mythology) the hideous snake-haired monsters (usually three in number) who pursued unpunished criminals
intuitive thinking embraces two things: one, the present many-colored and changing world that crowds in upon us in all our experiences, and two, the conditions which alone make any experience of this world possible: time and space. For they may be perceived intuitively, even without a definite content, independent of all experience, purely in themselves. (PTAG, 52)

Accordingly, through this eye Heraclitus contemplated only becoming—of coming to be and passing away. He envisioned the truth as lacking rigidity, completeness and permanence. In view of that, he proclaimed the strife of the opposite gives birth to all that comes-to-be. In truth, says Heraclitus, “light and dark, bitter and sweet are attached to each other and interlocked at any given moment like wrestlers of whom sometimes the one, sometimes the other is on top.” (Ibid. ) Hence, for the philosopher the definite qualities, which look permanent to us, express the momentary ascendency of one partner, which by no means signifies the end of the war; the contest endures in all eternity. (Ibid. ) Like his predecessor, Heraclitus believed in the ceaselessly repeated end and ever-renewed rise of the world. Considering this point, Nietzsche puts a question mark on how Heraclitus' interpreted the renewed rise of the world. What makes this question more serious is Heraclitus’ depiction of the end of the world through conflagration as satiety. By recalling the Greek proverb, "Satiety gives birth to hubris" and the prominence of the word hubris for every Heraclitean, Nietzsche wonders whether Heraclitus interpreted the renewal of the world as hubris. If this is the case, then the entire world process now an act of punishment for hubris, and the many the result of evil-doing, as well as the transformation of the pure into the impure the consequence of injustice. Accordingly, by reclaiming the intuitive thinking Nie-

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24Heraclitus re-interprets the Anaximandrian warm as warm breath, dry vapor, in other words, as fire. Of this fire, he now says what Thales and Anaximander had said of water; that it coursed in countless transformations through the orbits of becoming; above all, in its three major occurrences as warmth, moisture and solidity. For water is transformed into earth on its way down, into fire on its way up, ... The pure vapors are the transformation of water into fire, the impure ones the transformation of earth to water. (PTAG, 59)
tzsche asserts, since Heraclitus lived consciously by the standards of the logos and the all-
compassing eye, for him all contradictions run into harmony. More precisely, according to
Nietzsche, Heraclitus understood the ever-renewed rise of new world, not as hubris but an instant
of satiety (Ibid., 62). Above all, according to Nietzsche in the philosophy of Heraclitus, what
outshines is a philosopher describing the world as it is and taking the same contemplative pleas-
ure in it that an artist does when he looks at his own work in progress. Moreover, with him what
comes into light is a coming-to-be and passing away, without any moral additive, in forever-
equal innocence (Ibid.). In view of that Nietzsche asks, “Who could possibly demand from such
a philosophy an ethic with its necessary imperatives "thou shalt"? From a philosophy that de-
scribes the world and exclaims, "It is a game, don’t take it so pathetically and—above all-don't
make morality of it!" (Ibid., 64)

Another significant philosopher Nietzsche discussed in his Philosophy in the Tragic Ages of the
Greeks is Parmenides of Elea. According to Nietzsche, when one compares Parmenides with his
predecessors, one finds totally different point of view. As we previously discussed, Anaximander
condemned the world as the place of wickedness and simultaneously of atonement for the un-
justness of all coming-to-be. On the other hand, gazing at that world doomed by Anaximander
Heraclitus, discovered a wonderful order, regularity and certainty manifested themselves in all
coming-to-be, which by itself could not be anything evil or unjust. Parmenides gazed at the same
world as his predecessors, according to Nietzsche, the Eleatic philosopher followed a totally dif-
ferent orientation, i.e. he compared the qualities and believed that he found them not equal, but
divided into two rubrics… he differentiated between positive and negative qualities, seriously
attempting to find and note this basic contradictory principle throughout all nature (Ibid., 72). In
advancing this categorization, Parmenides two opposite qualities, the first signifying positive and
the latter, negative qualities. Moreover, he explained the relation between the two qualities by asserting the latter (negative qualities) are just the absence of the former, (positive qualities)—this correlation of the qualities is clearly represented in his reference of the positive qualities as *existent* and the negative qualities as *nonexistent*. Henceforth, Parmenides’ approach towards the problem of becoming shaped within this differentiation; his investigation on the essential of existent and nonexistent induced a tautology, with the question, “can something which is not, be a quality?” or can something which is not, be? Parmenides proclaimed, “What is, is. And what is not, is not”. This tautology further complicated the problem of becoming. For Nietzsche, at this point, Parmenides “really dipped into the cold bath of his awe-inspiring abstractions” (Ibid. , 78).

He stated, the existent could not have come-to-be, for out of what could it have come? From the nonexistent, but what is not, is not—it cannot produce anything. Discarding the nonexistent, he tested the possibility of the existent as a source. Nevertheless, this would reproduce nothing but itself. It is the same with passing-away. Parmenides went even deeper, he proclaimed,

> “Passing away is just as impossible as coming-to-be, as is all change, all decrease, all increase. In fact, the only valid proposition that can be stated is "Everything of which you can say 'it has been' or 'it will be' is not; of the existent you can never say 'it is not.'" The existent is indivisible, for where is the second power that could divide it? It is immobile, for where could it move to? It can be neither infinitely large nor infinitely small, for it is perfect, and a perfectly given infinity is a contradiction. Thus it hovers: bounded, finished, immobile, everywhere in balance, equally perfect at each point, like a globe, though not in space, for this space would be a second existent. But there cannot be several existents… Thus there is only eternal unity.” (Ibid. , 78)

In addition to the differentiation of being and nonbeing, the invalidation of coming-to-be and passing away, Parmenides’ philosophy embraced another stand that has crucial influence on the
latter history of philosophy—the first critique of man's apparatus of knowledge, i.e. the sense. As for him, all sense perceptions, yield but illusions. And their main illusoriness lies in their pre-tense that the nonexistent coexists with the existent, that Becoming, too, has Being (PTAG, 79).

On the consistent prevalence of this standpoint in the history of philosophy, Nietzsche states,

This is a critique as yet in-adequate but doomed to bear dire consequences. By wrenching apart the senses and the capacity for abstraction. In other words by splitting up mind as though it were composed of two quite separate capacities, he demolished intellect itself, encouraging man to indulge in that wholly erroneous distinction between "spirit" and "body" which, especially since Plato, lies upon philosophy like a curse. (Ibid., 79)

For Nietzsche Parmenides represented a significant turn in the history of philosophy. By him magnificent wall is erected, how he attempted to deal with the problem of becoming has determined the direction of philosophy. Nietzsche states,

When one makes as total a judgment as does Parmenides about the whole of the world, one ceases to be a scientist, an investigator into any of the world's parts. One's sympathy toward phenomena atrophies; one even develops a hatred for phenomena including oneself, a hatred for being unable to get rid of the everlasting deceitfulness of sensation. Henceforward truth shall live only in the palest, most abstracted generalities, in the empty husks of the most indefinite terms, as though in a house of cobwebs. And beside such truth now sits our philosopher, likewise as bloodless as his abstractions, in the spun out fabric of his formulas. (PTAG, 80)

Let us hold our discussion with one last point to smoothen the remembrance of our main concern, i.e. his discourse on nihilism, vis-à-vis the critique of metaphysics and epistemology. Regarding “the Parmenidean effect” in the history of philosophy, likewise Nietzsche states,
all subsequent philosophers and nature investigators. They all deny the possibility
of coming-to-be and passing-away, as ordinary people imagine it and as
Anaximander and Heraclitus had assumed it with more profound reflectivity, yet
still unreflectively. Such mythological origin in nothingness, disappearance into
nothingness… but so was, and for the same reasons, the origin of the many in the
one, of manifold qualities in the one primal quality, in short the whole derivation
of the world from a single primal substance as Thales and Heraclitus had taught it.
(PTAG, 90)

Nietzsche wrote this in the 19th century, thousands of years after Thales, Anaximander, Heracli-
tus, and Parmenides. Even though in this time numerous philosophers have arrived, contemplat-
ed and dealt with the problem of becoming. Nonetheless, for him none of them could surpass the
novelty of the pre-Socratics. Perhaps in his Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche appears to convey
this lack of novelty by paying tributes to Heraclitus of Ephesus for standing in difference from
what followed him regarding the credibility of the testimony of the senses. Even though both
Heraclitus and Parmenides rejected the testimony of the senses, the former rejected their testi-
mony because it represented things as if they had permanence and unity, whereas the later assert-
ed the opposite as his reason. At this point, to ask the philosophical significance of the problem
of becoming seems important, as well as, whether it is relevant to Nietzsche discourse on nihil-
ism.

In our previous discussion, we have read Anaximander asking, “Who is there that could redeem
you from the curse of coming-to-be?” this question of the philosopher, appears to reproach to-
wards coming-to-be. With the exception of Heraclitus, philosophers reproached coming-to-be
and passing away, in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche dramatize the case by stating,
What is, does not become; what becomes, is not . . . So they all believe, desperately even, in being. But since they cannot get hold of it, they look for reasons why it is kept from them. 'There must be some deception here, some illusory level of appearances preventing us from perceiving things that have being: where is the deceiver?' - 'We've got it! ‘They shout in ecstasy, 'it is in sensibility! (Ibid., 167)

Let us relate this reproach towards becoming with Nietzsche’s analysis of nihilism as psychological state. Accordingly, few pages back, we have read Nietzsche identifying three forms of nihilism: the first marked by the realization of absence of alleged “aim” in the process of becoming, followed by the denunciation of the purported “unity” underlying it. And the third form of nihilism marked by the attempt to escape by passing sentence on this whole world of becoming as a deception and to invent a world beyond it, a true world. Followed man’s comprehension of the true world as his own invention derived initiated by his psychological needs, as well as the realization of how he has absolutely no right to it. At the end, i.e. this third and last form of nihilism involves man’s abandonment of any belief in any metaphysical world.

Anaximander has viewed all coming-to-be as though it were an illegitimate emancipation from eternal being, a wrong for which destruction is the only penance. Heraclitus has described it as the only thing he contemplated and Parmenides has invalidated it as the illusion of the senses. In Nietzsche’s discussion of nihilism, another way of dealing with becoming is presented, i.e. the alleging of a goal, or purporting that something is to be achieved through the process. Nietzsche states,

one realizes that becoming aims at nothing and achieves nothing.—Thus, disappointment regarding an alleged aim of becoming as a cause of nihilism: whether regarding a specific aim or, universalized, the realization that all previous
hypotheses about aims that concern the whole "evolution" are inadequate (man no longer the collaborator, let alone the center, of becoming). (TWP, 12)

Here we should note that Nietzsche’s italicizations of the words “achieved” and “nothing” signifies that the achievable aim is not a certified aim of becoming, which would not require postulation. Rather, it is “human, all too human”—allegedly posited by human, and allegedly “not found” by human. What is more interesting in this analysis is, Nietzsche’s understanding of the human psychology. When man allegedly purports an aim in the process of becoming, in other words, when man desires the process of becoming to achieve something; there will be another interwoven demands—the need to acquire a special place in the process than every other thing in the process.

The second form of nihilism also essentially exhibits a stand exposed in the first form but here other ingredients are found. In this form of nihilism, man posits a totality, a systematization, indeed any organization in all events, and underneath all events. This postulation involves sophistication—man attends the totality as a soul that longs to admire and revere has wallowed in the idea of some supreme form of domination and administration. (Ibid.) Nietzsche states, herein man acquires a deep feeling of standing in the context of, and being dependent on, some whole that is infinitely superior to him, and he sees himself as a mode of the deity. (Ibid.) However, as the first demanded “aim” of the process of becoming here again man finds himself to be no different but him playing with himself—like a child’s play. Accordingly, the realization of this vanquishes the alleged “whole” wherein man acquired special position. Similarly, Nietzsche’s knowledge of human psychology is deployed here, indicating the human fingerprint in the alleged “system” Nietzsche sarcastically states, “If the soul be that of a logician, complete consistency and real dialectic are quite sufficient to reconcile it to everything”. (TWP, 12) Let us
recall his comment on Anaximander’s melancholic reaction to coming-to-be, where Nietzsche empathized “It may not be logical, but it certainly is human, to view now, together with Anaximander, all coming-to-be as though it were an illegitimate emancipation from eternal being, a wrong for which destruction is the only penance.” (PTAG, 46) Nietzsche who is also a man shares the misery of Anaximander. Nevertheless, becoming, (coming-to-be and passing away) is “heartless” and do not recognize man as he recognizes with others.

Before proceeding to the third form of nihilism, let us enrich our discussion by embracing the conceptual development of the posited “aim” and “unity” within the process of becoming. In view of that, it appears necessary to recall the “Parmenidean effect”. As it can be remembered in Nietzsche’s discussion of Parmenides, he identified the Parmenidean critique of the senses as a “significant first critique of man's apparatus of knowledge, a critique as yet inadequate” (PTAG, 79). This assertion demands the discussion on the advancement of Parmenides’ critique that would make it an adequate critique. Therefore, let us began the development with Nietzsche words stating,

“By wrenching apart the senses and the capacity for abstraction. In other words by splitting up mind as though it were composed of two quite separate capacities, he demolished intellect itself, encouraging man to indulge in that wholly erroneous distinction between "spirit" and "body" which, especially since Plato, lies upon philosophy like a curse.25 (Ibid. )

Here, Nietzsche mentions the name of a great philosopher that has tremendously influenced the history of philosophy—Plato. For Nietzsche, with Plato “something entirely new has its begin-

25 My emphasis
ning.” At this point, it seems appropriate to ask what Nietzsche discovers in the philosophy of Plato. Considering this, in the preface of his book *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche asserts,

> “the worst, most durable, and most dangerous of all errors so far was a dogmatist's error-namely, Plato's invention of the pure spirit and the good as such… To be sure, it meant standing truth on her head and denying *perspective*, the basic condition of all life, when one spoke of spirit and the good as Plato did.”  

(BGE, 3)

Plato’s philosophy establishes a metaphysics of transcendence and an epistemology of dogmatism (the denial of ‘perspectivity’). His metaphysics of transcendence posited hierarchically the world of Forms, Abstract objects and mathematics, the sensible world and images. Accordingly, he proclaimed the epistemological supremacy of the knowledge of the Forms over all the rest. In proclaiming, the metaphysical and epistemological supremacy of the world of Forms, and Abstract objects and mathematics, Plato grounded on their eternality and *un*-changeability. On the other hand, for Plato, the effect of time and change belongs to the sensory world. For Nietzsche this position of Plato involves notable differences from his predecessors. In *Philosophy in the Tragic Ages of the Greeks*, he asserts, while his predecessors “fled from an over-abundant reality as though it were but the tricky scheming of the imagination, into the rigor mortis of the coldest emptiest concept of all, i.e. the concept of being.” Plato took flight into, “the land of eternal ideas, into the workshop of the world-creator, feasting one's eyes on the unblemished unbreakable archetypes” (PTAG, 80). Another crucial development in Plato’s philosophy, which Nietzsche identifies as a great influence on the history of philosophy is the postulation of the Form of the Good in the world of Forms as the setter of objective standard for morality, accordingly Plato proclaimed the absolute truthiness of moral values. Again, with this position Plato laid a foundation of morality that dominated philosophy henceforward (TWP, 222).
In praxi, this means that moral judgments are torn from their conditionality, in which they have grown and alone possess any meaning, from their Greek and Greek-political ground and soil, to be denaturalized under the pretense of sublimation. The great concepts "good" and "just" are severed from the presuppositions to which they belong and, as liberated "ideas," become objects of dialectic. One looks for truth in them, one takes them for entities or signs of entities: one invents a world where they are at home, where they originate—(F. W. Nietzsche 1968, 234-235)

Up to this point, Nietzsche has identified three major advancements triggered by Plato, namely, metaphysics of transcendence, dogmatism (the denial of perspectives) and morality. However, regarding moral interpretations, one has to note that Nietzsche is not claiming, “Plato started everything from nothing”, for his predecessors such as Anaximander and Heraclitus (though inadequately)26 have introduced the standpoints, which he latter grandly established. Yet, we should also note the variances exhibited in the influences of the predecessors. Among these, what Nietzsche underlines regarding Parmenides’ flight appears remarkable; he identified its peculiarity with its total lack of religiosity and ethical warmth. Moreover, unlike the philosophies of Pythagoras and Empedocles, Nietzsche admires the flight of Parmenides, for its lack of the dark intoxicating fragrance of Hindu wisdom—that is evoked by a profound religious conviction as to the depravity, ephemerality and accursedness of human existence (PTAG, 81). For Nietzsche, the ultimate goal of Parmenides’ flight i.e. peace in being, was not striven after as though it were the mystic absorption into one all-sufficing ecstatic state of mind, which is the enigma, and vexation of ordinary minds. (Ibid. , 81)

26 i.e. with Anaximander, the perishing of all things as punishment for their emancipation from pure being; with Heraclitus, the regularity of phenomena as witness to the moral-legal character of the whole world of becoming. (F. Nietzsche, TWP 1968, 222)
Let us take a moment and recall the conceptual flow of what has been discussed so far. At the beginning of the chapter, we have read Nietzsche’s identification of man’s uniquely required condition of existence, through which he fulfills the why of his existence—his faith in life. Moreover, secondly we have noted the posit-ability and consequently the essential collapsibility of this meaning of existence through which man acquires the periodic trust in life. In view of that, we have identified nihilism as the collapse of the posited meaning of existence. Then by embracing Nietzsche’s proclamation of being “the first prefect nihilist of Europe”, we have identified his discourse on nihilism as having twofold aspects—into nihilism and against nihilism. With the division of the discourse, his claim of the necessity to complete and not attempt escape has been underlined. After this, we have proceeded to discuss his journey into nihilism by involving his analysis of nihilism as psychological state, through which he demonstrated the phenomenon of nihilism in relation to the realization of the absence the three categories (“aim”, “unity” and “truth”) which were postulated as if embedded in the process of becoming. Moreover, in this analysis we have read Nietzsche ascribing the attempt to escape the nihilism inflicted by the realization through seeking refuge into the metaphysical world—the beyond or true world; Followed by man’s discovery of his psychological needs as its source, and the consequent renunciation of any metaphysical world. Lastly, we have embraced the conceptual development of what Nietzsche later called “the mendaciousness of millennia”, in view of that we have briefly reviewed his analysis of the pre-Socratic philosophers (Thales, Anaximander, Heraclites and Parmenides) in relation to their ways of dealing with the process of becoming. Then we proceeded to discuss the remarkable ideas of Plato which Nietzsche claimed as tremendously influenced the latter history of philosophy—metaphysics of transcendence, dogmatist epistemology and the postulation of moral values in his world of forms. Considering the last point, in identifying Pla-
to’s influence on the latter history of philosophy, one has to be aware of its manifold appearance. Perhaps, this implication can be explained with the distinction of “Plato” and “Platonism”, accordingly, while in referring “Plato” what should come into our mind be his world of Forms, Abstract objects and mathematics, the sensible world and images. Respectively, when referring to “Platonism” the metaphysics of transcendence. Similarly, we will refer to dogmatism (the denial of perspective) and an ethic that is dictated by such metaphysics and epistemology—as the rhythms of Platonism. Nietzsche perceived these hallmarks of Platonism melodized in Christianity and the philosophies of millennia going more and more mendacious unto the death of God. As he proclaims in the preface of Ecce Homo,

One has deprived reality of its value, its meaning, its truthfulness, to precisely the extent to which one has mendaciously invented an ideal world. The “true world” and the “apparent world”—that means: the mendaciously invented world and reality. The lie of the ideal has so far been the curse on reality; on account of it, mankind itself has become mendacious and false down to its most fundamental instincts—to the point of worshipping the opposite values of those which alone would guarantee its health, its future, the lofty right to its future. (EH, 217-218)

The echo of the metaphysics of transcendence acquires its peculiar tone with its division of worlds. Among the most entertained division of this metaphysics the distinction of the “true world” and the “apparent world” served as a concealed substructure beneath the systems that shaped how man perceived his existence—its meaning and purpose. Moreover, for Nietzsche, the epistemological, religio-moral, political and aesthetical edifices developed upon this metaphysics of transcendence has gone as far as positing the “opposite”. Here the notion of opposition prompts us to ask what the edifies are opposed to. How shall we understand this claim? Before addressing this question let us, enrich our discussion with Nietzsche’s demonstration of the
metaphysics of transcendence. In his book *Human, all too human* Nietzsche identifies two ways philosophizations that seemed to have foundational difference, yet remained foundationally the same. Accordingly, in the case of the first type the philosophers station themselves before life and experience (or the “apparent world”). Regarding it as apparent or in Nietzsche’s words “a painting that has been unrolled once and for all and unchangeably depicts the same scene” (HA, 19). However, for the philosophers, the extraction of the final and unchanging depiction (the “true world”) requires further contemplation—a correct interpretation of the “apparent world”. Hence, through this process of interpretation the philosophers draw the conclusion of the nature of the being that produced the picture. What is more is that, this type of philosophization recognizes the metaphysical world resulting from the correct interpretation “as the sufficient reason for the existence of the world of appearance” (Ibid.). On the other hand, the second type of philosophization (which Nietzsche regarded as more rigorous) denies the acclaimed connection between the unconditioned (the metaphysical world) and the world we know. Nietzsche asserts this philosophization retains a clearer identification of the metaphysical world as the unconditioned, consequently, also unconditioning. Hence, “what appears in appearance is precisely not the thing in itself, and no conclusion can be drawn from the former as to the nature of the latter” (Ibid.).

The difference between the two types of philosophizations remained within the realm of the metaphysics of transcendence. While both accepted the division of the world as “the metaphysical world” and “the world we know”, the first type asserted the former world as the sufficient reason for the existence of the latter. On the other hand, the second type rejected this connection. Considering this, let us consider the question raised above, it is stated that for Nietzsche, the epistemological, religio-moral, political and aesthetical edifices developed upon this metaphysics of transcendence has gone as far as positing the “opposite”. And we have asked “opposed to what?”
Concerning this point, what Nietzsche states regarding the two kinds of philosophization can shed light on Nietzsche’s position vis-à-vis the metaphysics of transcendence. Accordingly, he states

Both parties, however, overlook the possibility that this painting - that which we humans call life and experience - has gradually become, is indeed still fully in course of becoming, and should thus not be regarded as a fixed object on the basis of which a conclusion as to the nature of its originator (the sufficient reason) may either be drawn or pronounced undrawable. (HA, 20)

These words of Nietzsche aim at the foundation of the metaphysics of transcendence, while the two types of philosophizations fundamentally accept the division of the world. Nietzsche puts a question mark on the possibility of such division. Above all, in doing so, he acclaims an essential characteristics that is overlooked by the foundation of the metaphysics of transcendence—the process of becoming. Moreover, Nietzsche’s saying of “this painting - that which we humans call life and experience” needs to be remarked, since with it he is indicating a crucial constituent in his discourse on nihilism as well as his critique of metaphysics and epistemology. With this point the philosopher exposes a place where philosophers of the last millennia gazed at the world—he marks the juxtaposition of “man and the world” in the genesis of thought. This point also marks the philosopher’s stand in opposition to the mendaciousness of millennia. Accordingly, in The Will to Power, Nietzsche asserts-

The aberration of philosophy is that, instead of seeing in logic and the categories of reason means toward the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends (basically, toward an expedient falsification), one believed one possessed in them the criterion of truth and reality ... The naiveté was to take an anthropocentric idiosyncrasy as the measure of things, as for determining "real" and "unreal": in
short, to make absolute something conditioned. And behold, suddenly the world fell apart into a "true" world and an "apparent" world: and precisely the world that man's reason had devised for him to live and settle in was discredited. Instead of employing the forms as a tool for making the world manageable and calculable, the philosophers divined that in these categories is presented the concept of that world to which the one in which man lives does not correspond— The means were misunderstood as measures of value, even as a condemnation of their real intention— (TWP, 314-315)

In the above passage, Nietzsche advances his argument against the metaphysics of transcendence in relation to its deviant presence in philosophy caused by the error of the philosopher. As remembered, in the last chapter we have discussed Nietzsche stating the inclination that advances when “any philosophy begins to believe in itself, it always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise” (BGE, 16). However, when such “believe” and such “creation of world” prevails in fertile foundations capable of shaping the history of philosophy, its consequences—the poison and antidote will be tremendous. The case of the metaphysics of transcendence, demonstrates this supposition. Nietzsche identifies three significant conditions of its reappearance through the philosopher, the religious man and the moral man. Accordingly, by retaining its essential presumptions, mainly the division of the world and its valuation (i.e. the “other world” as criterion of truth and reality, whereas the one in which man lives weighs less), the metaphysics of transcendence has persisted by the philosopher as “true” world—as world of reason, where the logical functions and reason suffice. On the other hand, by the religious man, as the "divine world"—“denaturalized, anti-natural”; as well as, by the moral man, as "free world"—"good, perfect, just, holy" world (TWP, 322). All three manifestation exhibits the aberrance Nietzsche identified, i.e. naiveté to take an anthropocentric idiosyncrasy as the measure of things—to make absolute something conditioned (Ibid., 315). At this point, it seems appropriate to ask on what
ground Nietzsche is making such a claim. In answering this question, the discussion of his analysis on the psychology of metaphysics seems appropriate. Let us recall what we noted from the preface of The Gay Science regarding “the involuntary detours, side lanes, resting places, and sunny places of thought to which suffering thinkers are led and misled on account of their suffering” (GS, 34). In his analysis of the psychological foundation of hitherto metaphysics, Nietzsche sought to discover encoded conditions of human existence, and modes of valuation. Accordingly, he discovered what he called “blind trust in reason” signified with its presumption “if A exists, then the opposite concept B must also exist”. The prevalence of such assumption in the metaphysics of transcendence determined the relation between the two worlds. For Nietzsche, this point gave birth to false conclusions such as, This world is apparent: consequently there is a true world; and this world is a world of becoming: consequently there is a world of being (TWP, 310). Within the context of the metaphysics of transcendence, the former worlds (the apparent, and the world of becoming) acquired less value than their counter-worlds (the true, and world of being). This in turn incites wonderment whether there is anything behind such division and valuation. Let us first discuss the distinction and valuation of “the world of becoming” and “the world of being”. Noting this analysis as having great importance in Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics, as well as his criticism of hitherto philosophers, he conceived the division of the world as “of becoming” and “of being”, correspondingly, the valuation beneath as the objection of the former by the postulation of the latter. In Twilight of The Idols, Nietzsche states about hitherto philosophers (with the exception of Heraclitus of Ephesus) as using only mummified concepts. He states, “they see death, change, and age, as well as procreation and growth, as objections, - refutations even. What is, does not become; what becomes, is not ... So they all believe, desperately even, in being” (TI, 167). This problem, i.e. of coming-to-be and passing away
lingered throughout the history of philosophy; however, after Plato’s way there seems to be no fundamental difference in the philosophers’ approach. What Nietzsche called “the aberration of philosophy” remained unnoticed. Likewise, what came with the philosophy of Hegel and later of Schopenhauer failed to approach it in a way that fundamentally differs from the thousand year’s tradition of approaching the problem of becoming. Hegel employed a logico-metaphysical way of dealing with the problem. Despite this slightly different approach if one wonders whether Hegel was facing the problem of becoming with its simplicity as Plato did. Because, chronologically the age Plato lived in provides with the possibility of contemplating the problem of becoming with the freshness as Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides—uncomplicated by voluminous philosophies. On the other hand, between the pre-Socratics and Hegel, numerous hands of the “geniuses” have left their fingerprint. This lengthily journey is depicted in Hegelian way, which according to Nietzsche is, “a piece of romanticism and reaction, at the same time a symptom of the historical sense, of a new strength: the ‘spirit’ itself is the ‘self-revealing and self-realizing ideal’: more and more of this ideal in which we believe manifests itself in the course of its ‘process’, in ‘becoming’ ” (TWP, 147). For Nietzsche, the Hegelian way of dealing with the problem of becoming incites his longing for the “return” of the Greeks, looking back to antiquity Nietzsche states,

How far it takes one from "pressure and stress," from the mechanistic awkwardness of the natural sciences, from the market hubbub of "modern ideas"! One wants to go back, through the Church Fathers to the Greeks, from the north to the south, from the formulas to the Forms; one still relishes the exit from antiquity, Christianity, as an entrance to it, as in itself a goodly piece of the old world, as a glittering mosaic of ancient concepts and ancient value judgments. (TWP, 225)
Nietzsche marks the developing mechanistic natural science and Christianity standing on the way back to the Greeks. For the enrichment of our discussion, let us consider the role of Christianity, i.e. its intertwinement with the metaphysics of transcendence, and the denaturalization of moral values. Noting the occurrence of Christianity has significantly shaped the later influences of the Greeks in the later history of philosophy. Furthermore, at this point, we should remark Nietzsche’s assertion of how on account of the metaphysics of transcendence “mankind has become mendacious and falls down to its most fundamental instincts—to the point of worshipping the opposite values of those which alone would guarantee its health, its future, the lofty right to its future” (EH, 217-218). Moreover, here the mentioning of Nietzsche’s psychological analysis of metaphysics is important. In discussing his investigation of the psychological drives within metaphysics, to be aware of his backward inference is crucial. In The Gay Science, he explains this eye by stating, “the backward inference from the work to the maker, from the deed to the doer, from the ideal to those who need it, from every way of thinking and valuing to the commanding need behind it”27 (GS, 329). Employing this insight in the investigation of the psychological foundations metaphysics of transcendence would unfold the obscured division and valuation within hitherto philosophy and religio-moral system. In Nietzsche’s philosophy, this insight has served a great significance—in the transvaluation and revaluation of value, also underpins the “human, all too human” outlook. In The Will to Power, Nietzsche applies his method of backward inference and tries to claim hatred and fear as psychological drives behind the invention of God as antithesis of evil and being-in-it-self. He states,

27In the previous chapter, we have read Nietzsche making distinction among philosophers and philosophies, i.e. “In some it is their deprivations that philosophize; in others, their riches and strengths. The former need their philosophy, whether it be prop, a sedative, medicine, redemption, elevation, or self-alienation. For the latter it is merely a beautiful luxury-in the best cases, the voluptuousness of a triumphant gratitude that eventually still has to inscribe itself in cosmic letters on the heaven of concept” (GS, 33-34)
That which has been feared the most, the cause of the most powerful suffering (lust to rule, sex, etc.), has been treated by men with the greatest amount of hostility and eliminated from the "true" world. Thus they have eliminated the affects one by one — posited God as the antithesis of evil, that is, placed reality in the negation of the desires and affects (i.e., in nothingness). In the same way, they have hated the irrational, the arbitrary, the accidental (as the causes of immeasurable physical suffering). As a consequence, they negated this element in being-in-itself and conceived it as absolute "rationality" and "purposiveness." (TWP, 309-310)

These flights to God (as anti-thesis of “evil”) and being-in-it-self as a negation of the irrational, the arbitrary, the accidental; incites suspicion on hitherto metaphysics. However, according to Nietzsche, on the account of metaphysics of transcendence, humankind has become mendacious to the point of worshipping the opposite values of those, which alone would guarantee its health and its future. It has prepared the way for the fatal kind of megalomania there has ever been on earth—Christianity28 (TWP, 118). In relation to the metaphysics of transcendence, Christianity stands as a religio-moral system that practically demonstrated the dangers lurking in the metaphysics of transcendence. Nietzsche denounces Plato by saying, “the great viaduct of corruption, who first refused to see nature in morality, who had already debased the Greek gods with his concept "good," who was already marked by Jewish bigotry (—in Egypt?)” (Ibid., 118). As we discussed in the previous chapter under the section “The transvaluation and revaluation of values”, beneath Nietzsche’s reproach towards the religio-moral system of Christianity, his criticism

28 The discussion of Nietzsche’s approach towards Christianity by itself requires its own examination. However, one should remark his distinction of Jesus Christ and institutionalized Christianity. For Nietzsche, “One should not confuse Christianity as a historical reality with that one root that its name calls to mind: the other roots from which it has grown up have been far more powerful. It is an unexampled misuse of words when such manifestations of decay and abortions as "Christian church," "Christian faith" and "Christian life" label themselves with that holy name. What did Christ deny? Everything that is today called Christian. (TWP, 97-98)
of the mode of valuation and division of the world, in other words, the shrewd use of the metaphysics of transcendence resides as the springboard of declaring its devaluation and revaluation. Moreover, we have also discussed Nietzsche’s deployment of backward inference the prevalence of anthropocentric idiosyncrasies within the “otherworldly” transcendence of the Christian religio-moral system—namely ressentiment. This concealed driving force, according to Nietzsche is obscured to the extent of hampering the understanding of Christianity, since as a matter of principle religio-moral system fights against ressentiment, he states as the Masterstroke—“to deny and condemn the drive whose expression one is, continually to display, by word and deed, the antithesis of this drive” (TWP, 109).

In spite of criticizing Christianity as never before, Nietzsche acknowledges its service of being the great antidote against practical and theoretical nihilism (TWP, 10). In other words, the Christian moral hypothesis has served the fulfillment of man’s unique condition of existence—it has provided man a periodic trust in life, i.e. belief and knowledge of why he exists. However, one should be careful not to regard this acknowledgement as a confirmation. In view of that, in The Will to Power, Nietzsche identifies the cruxes that underpinned the Christian moral hypothesis as the antidote of practical and theoretical nihilism. Accordingly, the bestowal of absolute value of man in the flux of becoming and passing away, marks the first recipe of its remedial-ness. From our discussion so far, this appears an extraordinary achievement, since the problem of becoming has been ground shaking for Greek philosophers. Now with Christianity, man has acquired absolute value as opposed to his smallness and accidental occurrence in the flux. The second recipe of the antidote involves the positing of man as having knowledge of absolute values of what is most important. Even though, these two would be the source of great consolation, the other package of solaces arrived. The protection of man from despising himself as man, from taking
sides against life, from despairing of knowledge (TWP, 9-10), but these remedies incites wonderment—how could all these be possible? There should be something untold, perhaps, something to pay?

In *Twilight of the Idols* Nietzsche attempts to uncover the foundation of the system that comforted humankind with its antidotes. He states, “Christianity is a system, a carefully considered, integrated view of things. If you break off a main tenet, the belief in God, you smash the whole system along with it: you lose your grip on anything necessary” (TI, 6). With Christianity, the philosophers’ struggle of comprehending coming-to-be and passing away makes a radical shift that remolded the influence of the Greeks—Christianization of the pagan philosophers. In our discussion of Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides the problem of becoming appeared first-hand, i.e. with its entire enigmas. Furthermore, this spirit resonated within the later Greeks, compared to what came with Christianity the curiosity regarding coming-to-be and passing away stands racking the philosophical minds. On the other hand, with Christianity what Nietzsche called “the aberration of philosophy” resonated louder and louder. Within the moral metaphysics of transcendence prevailed as moral interpretation. After millennia, tombstone of the enigma (of coming-to-be and passing away) began to crack. Within German idealism, first Kantianism and then Hegelianism made the most desperate attempts to cement the cracking tombstone. The former embarked epistemological movement that declared “God is unknowable for us and not demonstrable by us—the hidden meaning of the epistemological movement” (TWP, 147). While the latter followed different approach (yet, seen from the angel of metaphysics of transcendence it exhibited the same ground), and advanced counterargument that is a historical movement, which proclaims, “God is demonstrable but as something in process of becoming, and we are part of it, as witness our impulse toward the ideal” (Ibid.). As one would note, the
two philosophical attempts remained within the metaphysics of transcendence, i.e. neither of the
criticism is directed at the ideal itself, but only at the problem, where the opposition to it origi-
nates—why it has not yet been achieved or why it is not demonstrable in small things and in
great (Ibid.). This lack of fundamental difference of philosophization is also manifested in their
approach of moral values. Accordingly, while Kant asserted the realm of moral values are with-
drawn from us, invisible but real. Hegel argued demonstrable development, a becoming-visible
of the moral realm (TWP, 223). As it appeared in the case of God, the differences of the two phi-
losophies overlooked the questioning of the very existence of the realm of moral values—i.e.
neither of the criticism is directed at the ideal itself. For Nietzsche, even though it sustained the
immunity of the ideal, the Hegelian way out contains a feature distinct enough to be recognized
in relation to Plato. With this feature, i.e. the inclusion of historicity, Hegelianism attempted the
exhumation of the buried legend—the process of becoming. Yet, it later reinstated its faith to the
ideal and offered the legend as a sacrifice—as the locomotive system of the ideal. As we have
noted before, Christianity has significantly shaped the influences of the Greeks in the later histo-
ry of philosophy. This influence is mainly manifested in the deployment of ecclesiastical inter-
pretations on the philosophies of the Greeks, with a special emphasis on the consolidation of the
“moral world order”—the Christianization of the Pagans. The metaphysics of transcendence, de-
nial of perspective and denaturalization of moral values redesigned ecclesiastically. Accordingly,
in relation to Nietzsche’s discourse on nihilism, the nearest appearance of the influence of Chris-
tianity is signified by the philosophy of Hegel. Beneath all the sophisticated construction of his
logico-metaphysical edifice, Nietzsche found a pious philosopher. Considering this in The Gay
Science, Nietzsche criticized Hegel as “the delayer par excellence of triumph of atheism” (GS,
306). For him Hegel “with his grandiose attempt to persuade us of the divinity of existence, ap-
pealing as a last resort to our sixth sense, the historical sense," (Ibid. , 306). As we have noted before, the Christian moral hypothesis has prevented man from practical and theoretical nihilism. Accordingly, with the faith in the posited Christian religio-moral system certain fundamental question of existence remains hidden. Even if the fundamental questions of existence is asked by the believer, his faith would prevent him (perhaps, “protect” him) from approaching the question un-moderated—rather with all the lightning and thunder. Nietzsche states, “as we thus reject the Christian interpretation and condemn its “meaning” like counterfeit, Schopenhauer’s question immediately comes to us in a terrifying way: Has existence any meaning at all?” (Ibid. , 308).

For Nietzsche, the philosophy of Schopenhauer signifies “the unchristian” eye gazing at the world. Among the German philosophers, Schopenhauer stands as the first admitted and inexorable atheist (Ibid. , 306). In his essay titled, On The Sufferings Of The World, Schopenhauer declares:

I shall be told, I suppose, that my philosophy is comfortless—because I speak the truth; and people prefer to be assured that everything the Lord has made is good. Go to the priests, then, and leave philosophers in peace! At any rate, do not ask us to accommodate our doctrines to the lessons you have been taught. That is what those rascals of sham philosophers will do for you. Ask them for any doctrine you please, and you will get it. (On The Sufferings Of The World, 7)

In relation to what we have discussed in this chapter, these words of Schopenhauer involve his departure from the Christianized metaphysics of transcendence. Nonetheless, Schopenhauer asserts his philosophy goes deeper into resolving the prolonged philosophization signified by the moral interpretation of the world,

\[29\] Nietzsche identifies the leap in Schopenhauer’s philosophy

\[29\] “… The problem raised since the time of Socrates is now actually solved for the first time, and the demand of our thinking reason, that is directed to what is moral, is satisfied. But I have never professed to
that have inhibited it from reaching such profounder level. In *The Will to Power* Nietzsche states,

Schopenhauer was still so much subject to the dominion of Christian values that, as soon as the thing-in-itself was no longer "God" for him, he had to see it as bad, stupid, and absolutely reprehensible. He failed to grasp that there can be an infinite variety of ways of being different, even of being god. (TWP, 521)

Accordingly, for Nietzsche, despite his remarkable advancement in the critique of the Christianized metaphysics of transcendence, i.e. for one has unlearned the habit of conceding to this posit-ed ideal the reality of a person; one has become atheistic (Ibid., 15). The philosophy of Schopenhauer remained entangled. Since the liberation from the entrapment in the metaphysics of transcendence requires the renunciation of the absoluteness of the ideal. Yet, in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, the ideal still reigns as the opposite of the Christianized ideal, i.e. "evil, blind will". Hence, it has failed to overcome the foundation of the edifice dominating thousand years of philosophization. Nonetheless, to the extent of renouncing the Christianized ideal, Nietzsche identifies Schopenhauer as a nihilist, however, not the “perfect nihilist” as he latter proclaimed himself.

2.1.2 Nihilism and the Critique of Epistemology

So far, we have briefly discussed Nietzsche’s critique on metaphysics of transcendence, and hereafter we will involve his critique of epistemology. Noting the notion of epistemology is wider than how Nietzsche conceived it, henceforth, the reference of the term shall be regarded in re-

propound a philosophy that would leave no questions unanswered. In this sense, philosophy is actually impossible; it would be the science of omniscience. But ‘There is a limit up to which one can go, even if one cannot go beyond it.’ there is a limit up to which reflection can penetrate, and so far illuminate the night of our existence, although the horizon always remains dark. This limit is reached by my doctrine in the will-to-live that affirms or denies itself in its own phenomenon. To want to go beyond this is, in my view, like wanting to fly beyond the atmosphere. We must stop here, although new problems arise from those that are solved... (The World As Will And Representation (Vol II), 592)
lation to the metaphysics of transcendence. Accordingly, let us begin our discussion with the words of the philosopher of “human, all too human” stating,

It is true, there could be a metaphysical world; the absolute possibility of it is hardly to be disputed. We behold all things through the human head and cannot cut off this head; while the question nonetheless remains what of the world would still be there if one had cut it off … (HA I, 15)

These words of Nietzsche, sarcastically puts question mark on the hitherto purported existence of metaphysical world independent of the human mind. Moreover, without omitting the question mark, it poses the possibility of the human intellect as the origin and residence of the metaphysical world. Figuratively questioning what of the metaphysical world would remain without the presence of the human intellect, yet, this by itself is another riddle—*who* can answer that. On the other hand, if considered leaving out the sarcasm and the figure of speech, the message of the philosopher conjures up against *everything* that had been believed, demanded, hallowed so far. Accordingly Nietzsche states,

all that has hitherto made metaphysical assumptions *valuable, terrible, delightful* to them, all that has begotten these assumptions, is passion, error and self-deception; *the worst of all methods of acquiring knowledge, not the best of all, have taught belief in them.*

30 When one has disclosed these methods as the foundation of all extant religions and metaphysical systems, one has refuted them! (HA I, 15)

This exclaimed pronouncement unfolds a sketch of Nietzsche’s discovery of foundational intertwinement of hitherto metaphysical systems and religions with their corresponding epistemologi-

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30 My emphasis
cal paths, i.e. methods of acquiring knowledge. In this way, the philosopher identified a method that has reigned over the history of human knowledge—dogmatist epistemology. For millennia, the metaphysics of transcendence and the dogmatist epistemology predominantly underpinned man’s value systems. Specially, through moral valuation they have determined his daily life. According to Nietzsche, the covenant that sealed the marriage of metaphysics of transcendence and dogmatist epistemology has devastatingly hampered the expedition of human knowledge. Considering this in Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche states,

But if all those who have thought so highly of their convictions, brought to them sacrifices of every kind, and have not spared honour, body or life in their service, had devoted only half their energy to investigating with what right they adhered to this or that conviction, by what path they had arrived at it, \(^{31}\) how peaceable a picture the history of mankind would present! How much more knowledge there would be! (HA I, 200)

The above passage of the philosopher contains his regret in behalf of the possible enrichment of human knowledge that would have been realized, if it were not bound by metaphysics of transcendence and dogmatist epistemology. Yet, the philosopher did not allow to be tormented by this despairing rather attempted to overcome it by speculating the origin of the “with what right one adheres to this or that conviction, by what path one had arrived at it”. Noting this investigation holds significance in Nietzsche’s critique of epistemology, as well as in his journey into nihilism, we will proceed to a brief discussion of the philosopher’s expedition, with his statement from Human, All Too Human,

\(^{31}\) My emphasis
this world has gradually become so marvelously variegated, frightful, meaningful, soulful, it has acquired color - but we have been the colorists it is the human intellect that has made appearance appear and transported its erroneous basic conceptions into things. 

In this passage, the philosopher becomes conscious of juxtaposition the worlds (as colorized by the human intellect) the colorable world. As we have noted before (with what Nietzsche called “the aberration of philosophy”), the dogmatist epistemology taught, “to take an anthropocentric idiosyncrasy as the measure of things” (TWP, 315). For Nietzsche, among all human beings who submitted under such kind of naïveté, the philosopher’s submission poses as accountable—for among all human beings he (the philosopher) should have stood alerted. Accordingly, if we revisit Nietzsche’s words in Ecce Homo, the criticizable of the philosopher resides in overlooking the aberration. In his attempt to become such philosopher, Nietzsche asks

…But who is it really, who tells us that the apparent world must be of less value than the true one? … Above all: how do we arrive at the idea that our world is not the true world? … And finally: what gives us the right to posit, as it were, degrees of reality? (TWP, 321)

Let us reconsider, Nietzsche saying “this world has acquired color - but we have been the colorists it is the human intellect that has made appearance appear and transported its erroneous basic conceptions into things” (HA I, 20). What Nietzsche asserts about the human intellect in his es-

32 Because we have for millennia made moral, aesthetic, religious demands on the world, looked upon it with blind desire, passion or fear, and abandoned ourselves to the bad habits of illogical thinking, this world has gradually become so marvelously variegated, frightful, meaningful, soulful, it has acquired color - but we have been the colorists it is the human intellect that has made appearance appear and transported its erroneous basic conceptions into things. (HA I, 20)

33 “The lie of the ideal has so far been the curse on reality; on account of it, mankind itself has become mendacious and falls down to its most fundamental instincts—to the point of worshipping the opposite values of those which alone would guarantee its health, its future, the lofty right to its future. (EH, 217-218)
say titled On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, could help shed the light on this reconsideration.

There have been eternities when it (the human intellect) did not exist; and when it is done for again, nothing will have happened. For this intellect has no further mission that would lead beyond human life. It is human, rather, and only its owner and producer gives it such importance, as if the world pivoted around it. (TLE, 1)

The understanding of this assertion requires a different perspective; one way of interpreting the philosopher’s words is to wonder the lonely existence of man and his adorned intellect. The human intellect is lonely in the sense of “not having other species of intellect” that would enable the vis-à-vis evaluation of it. Hitherto, man has been valuing himself; he has been making mistakes and correcting his mistakes. Hitherto, man has been the writer, the reader; he has been the critic as well as the appraiser. Nietzsche is trying to make him conscious of this, as he said it in Ecce Homo the philosopher is regarding “the causes that so far have prompted moralizing and idealizing in a very different light from what may seem desirable: the hidden history of the philosophers, the psychology of the great names, came to light for me” (EH, 218). His critique of hitherto metaphysics and epistemology, have to be understood in this light. Let us add one statement of the philosopher that would elucidate the atmosphere of his critique. In The Will to Power, Nietzsche states, “We possess no categories by which we can distinguish a true from an apparent world. (There might only be an apparent world, but not our apparent world.)” (TWP, 313). In this quoted statement, the word “our” is italicized; the philosopher is trying to tell something. Since the apparentness of our apparent world is determined in relation to

34 My emphases
the true world, and since the true world is our true world (our—humanly, all too humanly true world); the possible existence of an apparent world (without the adjective “our”) will remain indemonstrable and every time we try to demonstrate it, the adjective “our” will simultaneously be implied. Hence, when Nietzsche says, “We possess no categories by which we can distinguish a true from an apparent world.” it is important to note he is not saying, We possess no categories by which we can distinguish our true from our apparent world. Hence, as long as the “our-ness” of our metaphysical assumptions is at all times considered, there, the aberration of philosophy, i.e. the naiveté of making anthropocentric idiosyncrasies the measure of things and the teaching of belief in them will be exhausted. Here, it seems appropriate to wonder whether Nietzsche is a skeptic, however, despite his repeated admiration of the spirit of skepticism, in The Will to Power he identifies three reproachable types of skepticisms. The first marks the philosopher who uses skepticism to be able to speak dogmatically about his main interest (TWP, 247). The second type signifies, the skeptic who is inspired by the Haired of the dogmatist—or a need for rest, weariness (TWP, 250) Third, Skepticism with a "for"—disintegrates to restore (TWP, 229). Considering these, one can rule out suspecting Nietzsche of these kinds of skepticism. Moreover, the proceeding discussion of the philosopher’s pronouncement in The Gay Science will shed light regarding his stance as a “skeptic”. With this discussion, we will also finalize Nietzsche’s journey into nihilism. Here, the philosopher becomes conscious and reflect not as individuals but as mankind. Accordingly, Nietzsche writes, “this world is anything but divine; even by human standards it is not rational, merciful, or just. We know it well; the world in which we live is ungodly, immoral, ‘inhuman’” (GS, 286). These words convey the philosopher’s stance in the hitherto idealization of the world, it is a conclusive denouncement of the possibility of idealization beyond anthropocentric inclinations. On the other hand, reading the
philosopher’s assertion of the world as “ungodly, immoral, ‘inhuman’” one might misled to the pejoratively overladen connotation of these words. Accordingly, Nietzsche’s assertion of the “ungodliness” of the world should not be considered as the opposite of “godliness” for their relation in this context involves opposition. The same caution works on “immoral” as the opposite of “moral” and “inhuman” as the opposite of “human”. On the other hand, these words should be understood as representing the essential irrelevancy of ascribing such judgments. As he states, “the world is neither perfect nor beautiful, nor noble, nor does it wish to become any of these things; it does not by any means strive to imitate man. None of our aesthetic and moral judgments apply to it (Ibid. , 168). Regarding this point and what follows from it, one should always remember what Nietzsche called “the aberration of philosophy”, accordingly he states,

We are far from claiming that the world is worth less; indeed it would seem laughable to us today if man were to insist on inventing values that were supposed to excel the value of the actual world. This is precisely what we have turned our backs on as an extravagant aberration of human vanity and unreason that for a long time was not recognized as such. (Ibid. , 286)

These words of the philosopher sheds light on Nietzsche’s discourse on nihilism, since it puts sign on the philosopher’s vantage point in his criticism of hitherto metaphysics of transcendence and dogmatist epistemology. Accordingly, with the disentangling of the world from the anthropocentric idiosyncrasies that was hitherto attributed to the world as its essence and used to judge it (without recognizing the anthropomorphism beneath) the valuation of it (as worthy or worth

35The aberration of philosophy is that, instead of seeing in logic and the categories of reason means toward the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends (basically, toward an expedient falsification), one believed one possessed in them the criterion of truth and reality ... (TWP, 314)
less) comes to end. We have noted how Nietzsche described the vanity of man\(^{36}\), with his oblivious immersion into the valuation of the world in a way that eluded (the essential prevalence of human perspective) and thought of his valuation as excelling the human, all too human. With this point the philosopher acquires his unique stand in the hitherto history of philosophy, the renunciation of “the juxtaposition of ‘man and world’ separated by the sublime presumption of the little word ‘and’” (Ibid., 287). This little word “and” signifies the aberration; it raises the wonderment on whether such a stand is still possible? Above all, with this point an opposition is revealed—“an opposition between the world in which we were at home up to now with our reverences that perhaps made it possible for us to endure life, and another world that consists of us—” (Ibid.). Noting what we have discussed so far, the sustenance of such stationing prevented man from falling into the abyss of nothingness. At this point, it is appropriate to recall Nietzsche’s critique of Schopenhauer, for Schopenhauer has philosophized in the same path. However, he was unable in the discovering of the profounder substrate of what he denounced—the Christian god. Considering this let us discuss if Nietzsche has discovered this substrate. As Schopenhauer has gone beyond Christianized metaphysics, Nietzsche has gone beyond metaphysics, with his human, all too human; with his discovery of the aberration of philosophy; and with his consciousness of the vanity of man Nietzsche looked down at the why of man’s existence—thus spoke his Zarathustra:

Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer shoot the arrow of his longing beyond man, and the string of his bow will have forgotten how to whir! … Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer give birth to a star. Alas, the time of

\(^{36}\)“The creature which calls its history world history!—man is the vanity of vanities.” (HA II, 307)
the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to despise himself. Behold, I show you the last man. (TSZ, 17)

The underlined words of Nietzsche convey the nothingness; behold the emptiness in the philosopher’s portrayal of the last man, unable to despise oneself—for on what base can he do that. Similarly, Nietzsche’s philosophy also stands on such enigma; it represents the point of departure. His place is depicted in The Gay Science where he states, “Ours is no longer the bitterness and passion of the person who has torn himself away and still feels compelled to turn his unbelief into a new belief, a purpose, a martyrdom” (GS, 286). In relation to the hitherto history of philosophy, in the line of the hitherto brilliance this compulsion has served as initiation. Moreover, to withdraw such compulsion appears to distort the philosophization, which prompts the question—is philosophy possible after such annihilation in grand style? In the face of such question, the remembrance of Nietzsche’s philosophical analysis of nihilism as psychological state would help us to get nearer to the answer. However, this time we will revisit it with a more enriched eye, sharpened by the philosopher’s journey into nihilism.

In his analysis of nihilism as a psychological state, the philosopher has identified three crucial events; the realization of absence of alleged, “aim” in the process of becoming, followed by the denunciation of the purported “unity” underlying it. Moreover, he has pointed the desperate attempt to seek refuge from the trauma caused by the realization—the invention of a world beyond it—the “truth” as an escape. The disappointed creature “passes sentence on this whole world of becoming as a deception and to invent a world beyond it, a true world.” (TWP, 13). Lastly, this man (who has been through the aforementioned events) will realize “how that world is fabricated

37 My emphasis
solely from psychological needs, and how he has absolutely no right to it” (Ibid. ). This last form of nihilism includes the *disbelief* in any metaphysical world and forbids itself any belief in a *true* world.” (Ibid. , 13). What Nietzsche states after this disbelief involves a great importance in the following discussion, he states “having reached this standpoint, one grants the reality of becoming as the *only* reality, forbids oneself every kind of clandestine access to afterworlds and false divinities—but *cannot endure this world though one does not want to deny it.*” (Ibid. , 13). Considering these events, let us try to interpret the journey as an expedition that took thousands of years. Throughout this chapter, we have seen the positing of “aim”, “unity” and “truth” (via metaphysics of transcendence and dogmatic epistemology); moreover, we have also noted how the Christian religio-moral system\(^\text{38}\) refurnished these three concepts, prevented man from despair and the leap into nothing. In addition, we have remarked the thousands years triumph of the Christian moral hypothesis within philosophy, which reached its climax of sophistication with Hegel’s intertwinment of “aim”, “unity” and “truth” with the Christian God. In relation to the events within nihilism as a psychological state, Schopenhauer’s atheistic philosophy has passed through the realization of the absence of alleged “aim” in the process of becoming, the denunciation of the purported “unity” underlying it. However, it fails short to reach the third stage—the *disbelief* in any metaphysical world and forbids itself any belief in a *true* world. On the other hand, as we discussed Nietzsche, with his journey *into* nihilism reached this stage. Accordingly, it can be said the philosopher is the one who is encountered by the dilemma rising in the last

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\(^{38}\) *In The Will to Power,* Nietzsche identified the advantages of the Christian moral hypothesis as the great antidote against practical and theoretical nihilism: (1) It granted man an absolute value, as opposed to his small- ness and accidental occurrence in the flux of becoming and passing away. (2) It served the advocates of God insofar as it conceded to the world, in spite of suffering and evil, the character of perfection—including "freedom": evil appeared full of meaning. (3) It posited that man had a knowledge of absolute values and thus adequate knowledge precisely regarding what is most important. (4) It prevented man from despising himself as man, from taking sides against life; from despairing of knowledge: it was a means of preservation. (TWP, 9-10)
form of nihilism—one *cannot endure this world though one does not want to deny it*” (TWP, 13). As it can be recalled, we have attempted to understand Nietzsche’s discourse on nihilism as having twofold aspects, namely *into nihilism* and *against nihilism*. Moreover, we have also remarked his distinction of nihilism as complete nihilism and incomplete nihilism. Besides these, Nietzsche has also identified other standpoints from which one could analyze nihilism. Accordingly, besides complete and incomplete nihilism, Nietzsche identifies active and passive nihilism, radical nihilism, and lastly Nihilism as a transitional stage. Throughout these distinctions of nihilism, the philosopher demonstrates nihilism in ways that involve striking difference. Accordingly, let us discuss his distinction of nihilism as active and passive nihilism.

One way of understanding the distinction of nihilism as “active” and “passive” is to conceive the former “as a sign of increased power of the spirit” and the latter as decline and recession of the power of the spirit (TWP, 17). Accordingly, nihilism in its active sense involves the growth of the human condition of existence beyond the conviction and faith under which one flourishes; on the other hand, nihilism in its passive presence denotes the lack of strength, “to pose for oneself ‚productively, a goal, a why, or faith”. Nietzsche’s identification of passive nihilism goes further into the discovery of a sense of strength constrained within the passivity. Accordingly, this strength of passive nihilism reaches its maximum level as a force of destruction. However, this “active state” of passive nihilism has its opposite—weary nihilism. This weary state of passive nihilism abstinence—it no longer attacks. Nietzsche regards Buddhism as a typical instance of it—as a sign of weariness.

Placing our question mark under which category Nietzsche’s approach toward nihilism falls, let us enrich our discussion by including radical nihilism. This nihilism says Nietzsche, involves
“the conviction of an absolute untenability of existence when it comes to the highest values one recognizes; plus the realization that we lack the least right\textsuperscript{39} to posit a beyond or an in-itself of things that might be "divine" or morality incarnate.” (TWP, 9)

Noting the possible cohesiveness of radical nihilism in relation to the distinction of nihilism as active and passive, let us add Nietzsche’s identification of nihilism “as a transitional stage”. In this sense, nihilism represents a pathological insight regarding the existence of values: that is manifested in “the tremendous generalization that there is no meaning at all”. Moreover, this remains to be the case whether the productive are not yet strong enough or whether decadence still hesitates and has not yet invented its remedies (Ibid. , 18). According to Nietzsche, the presupposition under this tremendous generalization is that “there is no truth, that there is no absolute nature of things nor a ‘thing-in-itself’” (Ibid. , 14). Furthermore, with this supposition, “it places the value of things precisely in the lack of any reality corresponding to these values and in their being merely a symptom of strength on the part of the value-posit-ers (Ibid. ).

Taking this classification of nihilism into our account, let us reconsider Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics of transcendence and epistemology of dogmatism under the light of the classification. Accordingly, the first point concerns radical nihilism, in exposing the relation between Nietzsche’s critique and his depiction of radical nihilism the remembrance of nihilism as psychological state is worthwhile, since radical nihilism represents the last form of nihilism in which “one forbids oneself every kind of clandestine access to afterworlds and false divinities” (Ibid. , 13). However, the radical-\textit{ity} of this nihilism is embedded in the “\textit{conviction of an absolute untenability} of existence of highest values one recognizes” and in the “\textit{lack the least right} to posit a be-

\textsuperscript{39} My emphases
yond or an in-itself of things that might be ‘divine’ or morality incarnate.” And from our discussion so far, the understanding of such claims must be conceptualized vis-à-vis Nietzsche critique of metaphysics of transcendence (through which the tenable existence of highest values is established, and the right to posit a beyond or an in-itself of things that might be ‘divine’ or morality incarnate is presumed). Above all, our understanding of radical nihilism should embrace the “human, all too human” outlook, for it develops in it. With this outlook a limit is disclosed, first, the naïveté in any claim of un-anthropocentric “right” to posit a beyond or an in-itself of things that might be ‘divine’ or morality incarnate and second naïveté of believing in the un-anthropocentric tenable existence of highest values comes to light. In summa, the radical-ity of this nihilism resides in the becoming conscious of the anthropocentric megalomania idiosyncrasies within making such claims excelling the human intellect.

The other case of nihilism (as a transitional stage), represents the setting after such contemplation. Nietzsche has identified the tremendous generalization projecting nothingness as the recognizable feature of this state. However, in exposing the development such outlook he has highlighted the base that inflicted the nothingness, namely, the absence of truth, absolute nature of things and a ‘thing-in-itself’. The understanding of this point entails the remembrance of our discussion on the aberration of philosophy, i.e. the cause of nihilism is not a loss of something that really and universally existed apart from man, rather, it is the becoming conscious of anthropomorphism within the hitherto ideals—truth, absolute nature of things and ‘thing-in-itself’. After such contemplation, the nihilist under transition comes to recognize those concepts consider independent of human intellect as mere symptom of strength on the part of the value-posit-ers, a simplification for the sake of life. Accordingly, Nietzsche’s consideration of nihilism as transitional stage represents his critique of the covenant that sealed the marriage of metaphysics of
transcendence and dogmatist epistemology—the idealizer and the dogmatizer of the ideal.

Considering these, let us proceed to discuss Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics and epistemology vis-à-vis his distinction of nihilism as active and passive. To determine whether Nietzsche approached nihilism in the sense of active or passive the reconsideration of the cornerstone of his critique of metaphysics and epistemology in the light of the peculiar characters of each case of nihilism is appropriate. In doing so, we place three question marks—Does Nietzsche’s journey into nihilism get its relative strength as a force of destruction? (If so, this will be the active state of passive nihilism.) On the other hand, is it the weary state of passive nihilism, which expresses Nietzsche’s nihilism? Finally, we place our third question mark on whether Nietzsche’s approach coheres with the peculiarity of active nihilism (i.e. the growth of the human condition of existence beyond the conviction and faith under which one flourishes). In answering this question let us read, what Nietzsche states in *The Gay Science*,

> Indeed, we philosophers and "free spirits” feel, when we hear the news that “the old god is dead,” as if a new dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, premonitions, expectation. At long last the horizon appears free to us again, even if it should not be bright; at long last our ships may venture out again, venture out to face any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an "open sea." (GS, 280)

The spirit within these words of Nietzsche resonates throughout his approach towards nihilism. Nietzsche did not stop by saying, “Alas, the time of the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to despise himself. Behold, I show you the last man.” (TSZ, 17). For him the “last man” represented an end, however, this end is not signifying termination, but a new beginning, thus speak his Zarathustra, "Dead are all gods: now we want the Overman to live”—on that
great noon, let this be our last will (Ibid., 79). This spirit unclogs Nietzsche’s nihilism from the peculiar feature of “passive nihilism”, and this remains to be the case in the active state of passive nihilism, which reaches it relative strength as a force of destruction. Nevertheless, the philosopher we discussed in chapter one goes furtherer, i.e. in the case of Nietzsche destruction (critique) marks a certain stage, thus speak his Zarathustra,

God is a conjecture; but I desire that your conjectures should be limited by what is thinkable. Could you think a god? But this is what the will to truth should mean to you: that everything be changed into what is thinkable for man, visible for man, feelable by man. You should think through your own senses to their consequences. (Ibid., 79)

Accordingly, the critique of metaphysics and epistemology does not mark the end of philosophy, similarly the last man do not recognize the end man as such. For the philosopher, the tremendous event, besides its crisis, presents an opening—the dawn. For those who can only survive in water and for those who can only survive on land, nihilism brings nothingness. However, there remains one type—the amphibian. What is nihilism for him? Well, for him nihilism is something to overcome. Likewise, the last man is simply something to overcome. As Nietzsche states, “one interpretation has collapsed; but because it was considered the interpretation40, it now seems as if there was no meaning at all in existence, as if everything were in vain” (TWP, 35). Note that, the philosopher does not say “everything were in vain,” he adds the “as if” and this words show that it is not the end, nihilism is not something to be idealized as it has been in the case of the “beyond” and “thing in itself”, and it is not something to be believed as the truth. Let us add one last point that would enrich our discussion, in The Gay Science, Nietzsche discusses the possible lin-

40 My emphasis
gering of metaphysics of transcendence and epistemology of dogmatism under the title Believers And Their Need To Believe, he states,

Metaphysics is still needed by some; but so is that impetuous demand for certainty ... The demand that one wants by all means that something should be firm ... this too, is still the demand for a support, a prop, in short, that instinct of weakness which, to be sure, does not create religious, metaphysical systems, and convictions of all kinds but—conserves them. (GS, 288)

For Nietzsche, nihilism can be dealt within such context, i.e. nihilism can be “conserved”. Yet, one might wonder, how? The philosopher answers,

The vehemence with which our most intelligent contemporaries lose themselves in wretched nooks and crannies, for example, into patriotism (what the French call “chauvinisms” and the Germans "German") or into nihilism à la Petersburg (meaning the belief in unbelief even to the point of martyrdom) always manifests above all the need for a faith, a support, backbone, something to fall back on. (Ibid., 288-289)

For the philosopher, the belief in unbelief even to the point of martyrdom is “laughable”. It is the same idolater, idealizing unbelief and the dogmatizers dogmatizing the belief in it. We have discussed Nietzsche as radical nihilist but we have also noted in what sense the radical-ity resides. Yet, it is important to shed light on what he called “the most terrible form of nihilism”, which is “the eternal recurrence” of nihilism—the nothing (the "meaningless"), eternally! (TWP, 35). Before discussing the thought of nihilism in relation to the eternal recurrence, let us enrich our conception of Nietzsche’s idea of “the highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable” or the eternal recurrence, with a section from The Gay Science, titled the greatest weight. In this section the philosopher pushes everything in coming to be and passing away to its edge (to eternity),
with the *single* question, “Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?”. The “eternal recurrence” is a question of the loneliest loneliness, where no one will have any one and anywhere to hide. Moreover, there will be no one to intimidate and pressure you, except yourself. With the eternal recurrence, one’s life will be rewritten. —The *same* life you wrote will be rewritten with the pen of perpetuity, with a *single* question at the end of the paper stating, "Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?" (Remember, there will be no one there—it is *your* loneliest loneliness.) The philosopher confronts us with eternal repetition of everything, and to choose what is included and left out is not an option, it is a *game* of “take it or leave it”. i.e. take every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life, or leave it. The deployment of this perspective on nihilism unfolds the thunder and lightning within. It makes the thought of it as shocking as possible, the meaninglessness becomes meaningless as possible, it would make un-postponable. In addition, as a philosopher, the idea of the “eternal recurrence” marks Nietzsche’s “active nihilism” for it poses the human existence the greatest weight as it has never been before.

Considering this, the next chapter will revisit what we have discussed so far in the light of exposing the fundamental conceptual indispensability of the critique of metaphysics and epistemology in Nietzsche discourse of nihilism. Likewise, this chapter will attempt to critically expose the fundamental conceptual indispensability of Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics and epistemology in his critique of morality. Following these discussions, it will shed light on Nietzsche’s discourse on nihilism vis-à-vis his critique of metaphysics and epistemology as having centrality in the understanding of his philosophy. The last section of the chapter will contain a commentary concerning the possible understandability of Nietzsche from *non-European perspective*. In view of that, this last section will demonstrate how the philosopher we discussed so far retains profun-
dity that surpasses *mere* historicism and continental-*ism*. Taking these into account, let us proceed to discuss the fundamental conceptual indispensability of Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics and epistemology in his discourse of nihilism as well as in his critique of morality.
There is a lake which one day refused to flow off and erected a dam where it had hitherto flowed off: ever since, this lake has been rising higher and higher. Perhaps that very renunciation will also lend us the strength to bear the renunciation itself; perhaps man will rise ever higher when he once ceases to flow out into a god. (GS, 230)

Nietzsche inscribed these words in *The Gay Science*, through it the philosopher looks back and forth. When he looks back, he conceives a lake, yet unlike other lakes, this lake has a different origin. One way of understanding its history takes us thousands of years back, wherein a philosopher declares, “You cannot step twice into the same river” this “river” of Heraclitus bears kinship with the “lake” of Nietzsche, amid these distant relatives, a dam stands with magnificence—with its erection the river becomes the lake. Yet this did not make the metaphor of Heraclitus, for with the erection of the dam the river ceases to be a river, hence whatever is said in reference to the dammed river finds its expression in the lake, one might say “You can step twice and innumerable times into the same lake”. The previous chapter tried to expose the riddle in the tale of the River and the Lake—i.e. of Becoming and Being. It has tried to show Nietzsche’s attempt to expose the forgotten river and the legend of the lake that has been hallowed as the lifeline of the
inhabitants around. Despite the prevalence of earlier accounts, the last chapter mostly focused on the development of discourses in ancient Greece, wherein Thales of Ionia presented his proposition that claims water as the primal origin of the world\textsuperscript{41}. Yet, instead of Thales, the discourse of becoming and being finds its expression in the philosophy of Anaximander. Compared to his predecessor who dealt with the physical aspect of the origin of the word; Anaximander represents a shift that attempted to incorporate nonphysical aspects in the examination of the origin of the world. In view of that, we have remarked his discovery of coming to be and passing away at the heart of all things. In relation to the later development of the discourse of being and becoming, Anaximander, with his shift, stands as the inaugurator of an enigma that sought answer for the problem of how the definite could ever fall from the indefinite. Besides this, with Anaximander we have noted the postulation of the profound problem of ethics vis-à-vis his interpretation of becoming.\textsuperscript{42} Noting the Milestian philosopher as the first, the second significant development appeared in the discourse of becoming and being in the philosophy of Heraclitus of Ephesus. Unlike his predecessor Heraclitus denied the duality of totally diverse worlds (i.e. He no longer distinguished a physical world from a metaphysical one, a realm of definite qualities from an undefinable “indefinite”) consequently, he altogether denied being—for this one world which he retained. (PTAG, 51). Moreover, upon this denial, Heraclitus envisioned the truth as lacking rigidity, completeness and permanence as dictated by the metaphysical edifies of Anaximander. Moreover, unlike his predecessor, Heraclitus conceived lawful order, un failing certainties, and

\textsuperscript{41} Thales tells something about the primal origin of all things; moreover, it does so in language devoid of image or fable, and finally, contained in it, if only embryonically, is the thought, "all things are one" (PTAG, 38-39).

\textsuperscript{42} Note that, with Anaximander the relation between metaphysics, epistemology and ethics comes forward. i.e. by metaphysics he discovers coming to be and passing away; by epistemology he interprets it and upon this interpretation he poses the profound problem of ethics. —““Where the source of things is, to that place they must also pass away, according to necessity, for they must pay penance and be judged for their injustices, in accordance with the ordinance of time”. (PTAG, 48)
ever-like orbits of lawfulness. In relation to this, one should note Nietzsche’s shift of perspective vis-à-vis the moral interpretation of the world, formerly, Nietzsche conceived Heraclitus as the “describer of the world”—freer from moral interpretation. However, later Nietzsche asserts Heraclitus also extracted moral-legal character of the whole world of becoming. Besides these, Heraclitus remained distinct in his critique of the senses; this distinctiveness becomes clearer in reference to the latter history of the discourse of becoming and being vis-à-vis the role of the senses. Accordingly, he threw out the testimony of the senses because it made things look permanent and unified. As stated before, the uniqueness of Heraclitus becomes clearer in relation to the later development of the discourse, among the pre-Socratics, the significant opposition to Heraclitus unfolded with the philosophy of Parmenides of Elea. With his philosophy, by establishing concept of being as opposed to becoming, Parmenides overthrow the process of becoming, he pronounced "Everything of which you can say 'it has been' or 'it will be' is not; of the existent you can never say 'it is not.'” Likewise, this approach of the philosopher also shaped his critique of the senses, unlike Heraclitus, Parmenides threw the testimony of the sense as illusive representation of the coexistence of nonexistent and existent—i.e. as if Becoming, too, has Being. It was the pre-Socratics who inaugurated the irreconcilable contradiction between being and becoming—the river and the lake. In view of that, among them, the spirit of Parmenides triumphed over Heraclitus—for the former outshined the latter in the development of the discourse on being and becoming. Accordingly, throughout the history of this discourse, the most reconciliatory insight of the two philosophers found the middle ground by moderating their radical positions. In the previous chapter, we have discussed Nietzsche’s reflection on the hitherto attempt by marking Plato as the point of departure—the mingling of Heraclitean and Parmenidean constituents.\footnote{In addition to Heraclitus and Parmenides, the philosophy of Plato also bears the influence of other pre-Socratic}
guishing the denial of being as distinctive to Heraclitus, and the denial of becoming to Parmeni-
des, the mingling of Plato placed the former at the bottom and the latter at the top. As we dis-
cussed before, Heraclitus has thrown the testimony of the sense for their deceptive representation
of stability, whereas, Parmenides did the same upon the opposite ground—i.e. the illusory testi-
monial of flux. Hence, in reconciling these two extremes a critique of the senses seemed inevita-
able. As we discussed in the previous chapter, Plato attempted to resolve the contradiction be-
tween becoming and being via his theory of forms, and in postulating degrees of realities he uti-
lized his predecessors’ critique of the sense vis-à-vis the hierarchical edifice of the degrees of
realities. Besides these legacies of Platonism, we have noted Nietzsche’s criticism of Plato re-
garding the idealization of moral values. In this respect, it is worthy of remarking the influence
of Socrates, which induced "practical" philosophy to the fore—the inauguration of morality and
religion as chief interests. Considering this, to reexamine whether the “legacies” of Plato are ex-
clusive to him is important—is Plato an exception or a strong magnifying glass that makes a
general but creeping and elusive calamity visible. If the latter is the case, then, what did Nie-
tzsche discover in Plato, could we trace back the prevalence of the Platonic legacies before Pla-
to, perhaps, before the Greeks? The answer seems affirmative. For instance, in Ecce Homo Nie-
tzsche inscribed his testimony regarding what Zarathustra means in his mouth, he shows the con-
cealed meaning that is found in the relation between the Zarathustra of Persia and the Zarathustra
in his most celebrated work Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Accordingly, Nietzsche states the Zarathus-
tra of Persia “was the first to consider … the transposition of morality into the metaphysical

philosophers such as Pythagoras.
realm, as a force, cause, and end in itself, is his work (EH, 329) and the Zarathustra in Thus Spoke Zarathustra performing the opposite. He asserts Zarathustra (of Persia) created the most calamitous error that is morality; consequently, “he must also be the first to recognize it”. (Ibid.). Hence, this implies the relation between the critique (of metaphysics of transcendence and epistemology of dogmatism) and the discourse (on nihilism) is profounder than the context of commonly called western philosophy. In the preface of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche sheds light on the earlier presence of the dogmatist philosophy and its “supra-terrestrial” claims, by saying, “we owe the grand style of architecture in Asia and Egypt” (BGE, 2). Nonetheless, one might ask why we would bother ourselves with this historical aspect. The answer appears simple and clear, when we unclog the development of what is called metaphysics of transcendence and epistemology from mere Occidentalist, and recognize at least one more root, what we discussed so far considering Nietzsche gets profounder. In other words, by historicizing our study, we de-historicize it—for the realization of a wider prevalence gives us profounder insights on the basis of humanness (lessening the impact of the specific conditions). Likewise, to revisit Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics and epistemology vis-à-vis his discourse on nihilism with this eye would provide an understanding of Nietzsche as human being—his confrontation as of humanity. Bearing this, let us return to Nietzsche’s discovery of other roots of what Plato built in Europe. In the

44 I have not been asked, as I should have been asked, what the name of Zarathustra means in my mouth, the mouth of the first immoralist: for what constitutes the tremendous historical uniqueness of that Persian is just the opposite of this. Zarathustra was the first to consider the fight of good and evil the very wheel in the machinery of things: the transposition of morality into the metaphysical realm, as a force, cause, and end in itself, is his work. But this question itself is at bottom its own answer. Zarathustra created this most calamitous error, morality; consequently, he must also be the first to recognize it. Not only has he more experience in this matter, for a longer time, than any other thinker—after all, the whole of history is the refutation by experiment of the principle of the so-called “moral world order”—what is more important is that Zarathustra is more truthful than any other thinker. His doctrine and his alone, posits truthfulness as the highest virtue; this means the opposite of the cowardice of the "idealist" who flees from reality; Zarathustra has more intestinal fortitude than all other thinkers taken together. To speak the truth and to shoot well with arrows that is Persian virtue—Am I understood?—The self-overcoming of morality, out of truthfulness; the self-overcoming of the moralist, into his opposite—into me—that is what the name of Zarathustra means in my mouth. (EH, 329-330)
preface of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche asserts “supra-terrestrials-ism” and dogmatism as “monstrous and frightening masks serving to inscribe ‘all great things’ in the hearts of humanity with eternal demands” (Ibid., 3). This view takes us back to the beginning of chapter two wherein Nietzsche states the one more condition of existence, precisely, to his view, which indiscriminately acknowledges the hitherto endeavors of men upon the basis of the one more condition of existence. Among such masks, Nietzsche identifies the Vedanta doctrine in Asia and Platonism in Europe. This makes us wonder why he passed the pre-Socratic philosopher from representing such a mask. In Philosophy in The Tragic Age of the Greeks, Nietzsche states the “Greeks justify philosophers. Only among them, they are not comets” (PTAG, 34) In other words, with the Seven Sages the Greeks marked the cessation of the “philosopher comet”—the random wonderer. Moreover, Nietzsche distinguishes the Greeks from other people, for while “other peoples have saints; the Greeks have sages” (Ibid., 32). Even though, the Greeks have learnt abroad, yet they used everything they learn as a foothold, i.e. they knew how to pick up the spear and throw it onward from the point where others had left it (Ibid., 30). It is very important to note with regard to Nietzsche’s salute of the pre-Socratic, since the most admired qualities marks magnificent solitude devoid of conventionality of philosophic or academic professionalism. These features of the pre-Socratic bring to mind Nietzsche’s admiration of

45 It is easy enough to divide our neighbors quickly, with the usual myopia, from a mere five paces away into useful and harmful, good and evil men; but in any large-scale accounting, when we reflect on the whole a little longer, we become suspicious of this neat division and finally abandon it. Even the most harmful man may really be the most useful when it comes to the preservation of the species: for he nurtures either in himself or in others, through his effects, instincts without which humanity would long have become feeble or rotten … What is the meaning of the ever new appearance of these founders of moralities and religions, these instigators of fights over moral valuations, these teachers of remorse and religious wars? … It is obvious that these tragedians, too, promote the interests of the species, even if they should believe that they promote the interest of God or work as God’s emissaries. They, too, promote the life of the species, by promoting -the faith in life. “Life is worth living,” everyone of them shouts; “there is something to life, there is something behind life, beneath it; beware!” (GS, 74)

46 Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Democritus and Socrates
Schopenhauer, yet, as he stood against him, he also stands opposed to their thoughts. Perhaps in understanding Nietzsche’s admiration of the pre-Socratics, the examination of later development of philosophy bears significance. Perhaps, Nietzsche’s longing for the Greeks may signify the freshness of their environment to philosophize. This standpoint becomes more vivid in relation to the extent and profundity of Nietzsche’s journey into nihilism. In a letter written to his friend (Overbeck) Nietzsche stated, “…what I experience as "solitude" really did not yet exist…” (PN, 441). One might wonder, the extent of the philosopher’s isolation that initiated such strong expression, perhaps, our question should also place the possibility of a solitude that is different in kind—perhaps a new experience of solitude. But, before examining this, let us reflect on the different roots of “supra-terrestrial-ism” and dogmatism. In view of that, we have noted Zarathustra of Persia and the Vedanta doctrine as examples of their earlier prevalence, yet in his The Will to Power, Nietzsche goes back and forth in exposing the reemergence. Accordingly, he identifies Mohammedanism as an example of super-terrestrial-ism and dogmatism, yet, Mohammedanism is relatively young compared to the oldness of the character trait it exemplify, there we found its prototype—Christianity. Again, the birth of Christianity also stands younger. In view of that, Nietzsche identifies three origins of antiquity of ancient Asia, Plato, but above all the Egyptians (TWP, 92-93). Considering the relative remoteness of the Asiatic and Egyptian roots, the Platonic roots of “supra-terrestrial-ism” and dogmatism can be identified as its robust manifestation that served as the fertile soil of the legendary religio-moral system—Christianity47. In the preface

47 An artist cannot endure reality, he looks away from it, back... he believes that the more subtilized, attenuated, transient a thing or a man is, the more valuable he becomes; the less real, the more valuable. This is Platonism, which, however, involved yet another bold reversal: Plato measured the degree of reality by the degree of value and said: The more "Idea," the more being. He reversed the concept "reality" and said: "What you take for real is an error, and the nearer we approach the 'Idea,' the nearer we approach 'truth.' "—Is this understood? It was the greatest of rebaptisms; and because it has been adopted by Christianity we do not recognize how astonishing it is. (TWP, 308)
of *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche expresses the relation between Platonism and Christianity by saying, “Christianity is Platonism for ‘the people’”. However, before proceeding to Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity (as Christian-ecclesiastical pressure of millennia), let us comment on whether we should identify Nietzsche’s solitude in relation to the depth of its penetration or in relation to a new solitude that emerged with his journey into nihilism. In view of that, what Nietzsche inscribed in *The Gay Science* would shed light on the state of the philosopher’s experience of solitude. Nietzsche states, “for the pious there is as yet no solitude; this invention was made only by us, the godless” (GS, 324). Considering being godless as the distinguishing element of what Nietzsche meant by solitude, let us note, his expression of godlessness, since this word also denote wickedness. In the same book, Nietzsche inscribed his “godlessness” as a state wherein one “will never pray again, never adore again, never again rest in endless trust…” above all, godlessness denotes “denying oneself any stopping before ultimate wisdom, ultimate goodness, ultimate power…” (Ibid., 230). Accordingly, in this case, to be godless involves a renunciation—namely, final renunciation. Yet, this may not give us the clearest understanding of what Nietzsche experienced as solitude—what he called godlessness. At this point, the inclusion of the anti-metaphysician besides the godlessness appears inducive to a clearer understanding. In the previous chapter, we have noted Nietzsche’s critique of Schopenhauer, based on his failure in renouncing the absoluteness of the ideal. Even though Schopenhauer renounced the Christian God, and pronounced atheism, he later slipped into the same ideal. Schopenhauer is godless, yet he is not anti-metaphysician, for the latter involved the renunciation of metaphysical faith—the lacuna in every philosophy. This faith remained a lacuna, “because truth was posited as being, as God, as the highest court of appeal”, thus, for Nietzsche the value of truth has never been questioned. In *The Genealogy of Morals* Nietzsche states, “truth
was not permitted to be a problem at all, is this "permitted" understood?” (GM, 152-153). Perhaps the understanding of what this “permitted” denotes will take us closer, for this kind of questioning requires an eye that has ever existed. This eye is the eye of the anti-metaphysician, when one looks through it one will experience what Nietzsche called “solitude”. The solitary traveler stands lonely even amid the loneliest travelers who somehow still had a "God" for company (PN, 441). However, in the “solitude” of Nietzsche—therein, everything is human, all-too-human!

Noting Nietzsche’s journey into nihilism as discussed in the previous chapter represents this “solitude” (the godless and anti-metaphysician), let us now proceed to discussing the relation between Nietzsche’s critique of Christian morality under the light of what has been stated so far regarding his discourse on nihilism vis-à-vis his critique of metaphysics and epistemology.

3.1 THE DISCOURSE ON NIHILISM AND THE CRITIQUE OF MORALITY

Tragic wisdom was lacking; I have looked in vain for signs of it even among the great Greeks in philosophy, those of the two centuries before Socrates. ... I retained some doubt in the case of Heraclitus, in whose proximity I feel altogether warmer and better than anywhere else. The affirmation of passing away and destroying ... saying Yes to opposition and war; becoming, along with a radical repudiation of the very concept of being... (EH, 273)

These words of the philosopher glue what has been discussed so far. Above all, it provides us with enriched insights on our subject that focuses on the exposition of the fundamental presence of the philosopher’s journey into nihilism under his critique of morality. In view of that, this section will cover how Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics and epistemology that is summed-up under the “human-all-too-human” outlook underpins the subject matter, which has taken much of his writings, i.e. the examination of morality. In view of that, this section will reflect on the mor-
alization of the morals, on the transposition of the moral values in the metaphysical realm. In other words, Nietzsche’s critique of morality as the body part of his critique of metaphysics and epistemology—Morality, too is human all too human. Hence, unless we understand how Nietzsche criticized metaphysics and epistemology, we will never comprehend his discourse on morality; furthermore, his opposition to the Christian moral hypothesis necessarily requires the understanding of morality as all too human. Let us advance this standpoint by involving Nietzsche’s Dionysian philosophy into the discussion. For the philosopher, Dionysian represents a uniqueness that finds its expression in his philosophy. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche recognizes Heraclitus’ proximity to his Dionysian philosophy for his affirmation of passing away and destroying. However, Nietzsche’s admiration of Heraclitus is marked with proximity (compared to other philosophers), i.e., within the affirmation of passing away and destroying Heraclitus has also passed judgment upon the whole world—as the regularity of phenomenon, as witness for the moral-legal character of the whole world of becoming. Since it can be said, Heraclitus did not repudiate being and affirm becoming through the eye of the all-too-human. In other words, his rejection of being is as dogmatic as his affirmation of becoming, likewise, his criticism of the senses is also as dogmatic as Parmenides’ critique of the senses. Hence, even Heraclitus’ philosophy remained one among the mendaciousness of Millennia. Previously we have discussed the connection between Nietzsche’s journey into nihilism under the light of his realization of the all-too-human, which finds its expression in his critique of metaphysics and epistemology. Yet, as we slightly remarked, the understanding of their fundamentality stands as a prerequisite to comprehend his discourse on morality, as well its distinctiveness also comes into light vis-à-vis his journey into nihilism. In view of that, at this point the anti-metaphysical and the perspectivist becomes the immoralist—in the extra-moral sense, beyond good and evil. Above all, the immo-
rality of this immoralist resides in his daring to take morality as a problem, as problematic—for “to criticize morality itself, to regard morality as a problem, as problematic: what? Has that not been—is that not—immoral?” (D, 2) Considering this, it is appropriate to wonder whether Nietzsche’s denotation of morality as in itself imply the existence of morality as something independent from the all-too-human phenomena. One way of elucidating this confusion is to look at the expansive ground upon which Nietzsche examined the Christian moral hypothesis—as prototype of morality. Upon the first and the broadest ground, Nietzsche investigates the moral hypothesis in relation to its subjection to supra-terrestrial-ism and conviction-ism, which reappeared through metaphysics of transcendence and epistemology of dogmatism. On the other hand, the second narrower ground examines the psychological conditions that prompted the moralization. In view of that, Christian morality is first and foremost an all too human phenomenon and secondly a manifestation of specific condition of certain psychological state, which is demonstrated in Nietzsche’s distinction of “master” and “slave” morality. In being all too human, Christianity follows the supra-terrestrial-ism and dogmatism of Zarathustra of Persia, ancient Egyptians, the Vedanta doctrine of Asia, and Platonism. In other words, in being all too human, the Christian moral hypothesis stands as the renewed appearance of an ancient faith. On the other hand, in relation to the second context Christianity acquires its own image—covertly resenting and overtly piteous moralization—(transposing morality into the metaphysical realm).

Considering this, let us proceed to the all too human development of Christianity with the remembrance of the Madman from The Gay Science, declaring the death of the Christian God. However, at this point, we will pay attention to the line wherein Nietzsche’s “madman” states, “Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.” (GS, 181) This statement is often cited by ignoring the first phrase, yet this phrase (Gods, too, decompose)
involves foundational importance for Nietzsche’s most renowned declaration—“God is dead”. In stating, “Gods, too, decompose” Nietzsche is conveying the decomposability of Gods—not only the Christian God, but also other Gods. Hence, with it one should note that the Christian God is not an exception but an example. Previously we have briefly discussed the service of the Christian moral hypothesis as antidote of theoretical and practical nihilism. Likewise, we have noted this antidote-ness of Christian moral hypothesis (as preventative of theoretical and practical nihilism) resides in its positing of man as having absolute value in the flux of becoming and passing, as well, as having knowledge of absolute values. Without such grounds the “thou shalt and shalt not” of Christian morality would lose their meaning. Morality in this sense is built upon such metaphysical and epistemological postulation to allow unconditional and imperative-istic moral values. This kind of conceptual architecture is not unique to Christianity, for it has been employed before (by the ancient Egyptians, the Vedanta doctrine, and Plato) and after Christianity (by Mohammedanism). At this point, it is important to recognize the separability of the different moral motives and their metaphysical and epistemological foundations. However, regardless of this separability, the conceptual architecture remains the same. Hence, to look its conceptual structure, i.e. how the moral motives become incorporated into a systematic unconditional declaration should not be confused by its chronological account. For instance, in the case of the Christian-moral hypothesis the problem of becoming does not appear as problematic as it was among the Greeks. i.e. in the Christian moral hypothesis, it is implicitly presumed as answered. Likewise, the problem of the possibility of knowledge that was related to the flux-ness of becoming and passing away was implicitly presumed as resolved. Yet, Christianity achieved this not by dealing with the problem of becoming firsthand, rather it absorbed what has been attained by the Greeks, and this marks the first lurking danger. In other words, the metaphysical and epistemo-
logical basis of Christian moral hypothesis is subjected to what we have discussed in the previous chapter under the critique of metaphysics of transcendence and epistemology of dogmatism. Christianity is the same all-too-human phenomena—anthropocentric and anthropomorphic. For the anti-metaphysician, the perspectivist as well as the immoralist, in summa, for the perfect nihilist Christianity appears simply the utilization of Christian-izable constituents of what has been cultivated before. Remark ing the resemblance between Nietzsche’s admiration to Schopenhauer and the pre-Socratics\(^48\), let us briefly discuss the prevalence of the communal old-habit that has hitherto underpinned the theoretical and practical edifice reigning over humanity.

At the beginning of this section, Nietzsche has been quoted asserting the lack of tragic wisdom even in the philosophy of the great Greeks—the pre-Socratics. On the other hand, notwithstanding its dogmatic constitution (denial of perspective), Heraclitus remained an exception for his affirmation of passing away and destroying. Before him with Anaximander,\(^49\) we have recognized the melancholic interpretation that somehow resembles the resenting instinct of the “slave” in the moral revaluation. However, this was moderated by Heraclitus’ positive accreditation. Yet with Parmenides, the process of coming-to-be and passing away lost its validity. Plato took this Parmenidean effect\(^50\) furtherer, by granting the senses and the world of sensation lower degree of reality and inferior epistemic status in his ladder of knowledge. For thousands of years such kind of pessimism remained within metaphysics of transcendence. Moreover, this conviction on the truthfulness of their philosophies remained to be authentic and universally valid (going beyond

\(^{48}\) See P. 106

\(^{49}\) In *Philosophy in the Tragic Ages of the Greeks* Nietzsche regards the melancholic interpretation of Anaximander by saying, “it may not be logical, but it certainly is human, together with Anaximander, all coming-to-be as though it were an illegitimate emancipation from eternal being, a wrong for which destruction is the only penance”. (PTAG, 46); See also P. 57-59

\(^{50}\) See P. 61-64
being *all too human*). Noting we are discussing metaphysics and epistemology as paths through which man approached the world, the philosophers reproach of coming to be and passing away exhibits the “slave’s” *reproach* of the “master”. Here, we should note that what the philosopher and the “slave” have in common is neither metaphysical nor ethical but *how they dealt* with these—how the philosopher approaches the world (passing away and *destroying*) and the “slave” with their “good and evil” reproached the “good and bad” of the “master”\(^{51}\) as well, how they sought to overcome the *juxtaposition*. Taking the case of Anaximander as an archetype of such philosophization, we have noted Nietzsche empathizing the melancholic interpretation of coming to be and passing away as “*human, but certainly not logical*”, similarly he have also empathized the resentment of the “slave” as *understandable*. Nonetheless, in both cases Nietzsche firmly opposed in making this “negative” feelings a ground to defame coming to be and passing away (in the case of the philosopher) and the condition of the “master” (in the case of the “slave”). Previously, we have noted Christianity as *beneficiary* of Greek philosophy. Considering the above discussion on the *parallelism* of how the philosophers dealt with the world and the “slave” dealt with their “master”, the conceptual integrate-ability of the way the Greeks dealt with the world and the Judeo-Christian moral revaluation comes into light. Taking the service of Christian moral hypothesis as antidote of theoretical and practical nihilism, the metaphysic and epistemic establishment of the Greeks can be conceived as a fertile soil for the *theoretical* constitution, which advanced (vivified) through *moralization* into Christian-moral hypothesis. This historical and conceptual kinship of Christianity (which at least goes as far as ancient Egypt) prevents the criticism of Christianity upon the first and broadest ground. For on the radarscope of the perfect nihilist, the appearance of Christianity as supra-terrestrial and dogmatic, blinks as *one among* 

\(^{51}\) See P. 47 -48
many. Yet, this identification stands as a foothold for the examination of Christianity from the second ground\(^ {52} \) (as a manifestation of psychological condition)\(^ {53} \), i.e. there is no shortcut to contemplate it as an expression of a certain condition of life, and this sight comes with “Alas”—“where you see ideal things, I see what is-human, alas, all-too-human”. Hence, without the anti-metaphysician and the perspectivist, the immoralist is impossible, and without the immoralist, the Antichrist is inconceivable. Bearing this connexion in mind, let us proceed to discuss the discourse of nihilism as groundwork of Nietzsche’s philosophy.

### 3.2 NIHILISM AS GROUNDWORK OF NIETZSCHE’S PHILOSOPHY

Our discussion on Nietzsche’s discourse on nihilism vis-à-vis the critique of metaphysics and epistemology has brought us the above-mentioned relation. Nonetheless, there remains further exposition on the role of the philosopher’s journey into nihilism and on the course of his journey against nihilism. In view of that, our first focus will be the discussion of Nietzsche’s notion of

\(^{52}\) In relation to understanding Nietzsche’s evaluation of moralities and religions, one should also be cautious of the presenting grounds of evaluation, for instance at the beginning of the second chapter, we have been acquainted with an eye that indiscriminately acknowledge the hitherto activities of men vis-à-vis the one more condition of existence. On this ground, Nietzsche withholds his ammunitions—here everybody is shouting, “There is something to life, there is something behind life, beneath it; beware!” (GS, 74). This viewpoint marks a thanksgiving for all that has prevented the end of human. Above all, it should also signify a ground on which all that will be attacked falls upon, i.e. whatever is said about these “reasons of life” would not withdraw this gratitude. Hence, the recognition of this “indiscriminative ground” would help us to avoid the confusion that unfolds vis-à-vis the development of various touchstones. One way of understanding this development takes us to Nietzsche’s distinction of religions as “negative” and “affirmative”\(^ {52} \). Compared to the “indiscriminative eye” this approach towards religions involves certain standards of evaluation. At this point, Nietzsche’s enquiry focuses on “What is deified?”—intentionally overlooking the prevalence of deification.

\(^{53}\) What Nietzsche states in The Will to Power depicts the cruxes of his insights discovered with the examination of Christianity from the second ground (as an expression of certain condition of life), accordingly, he asserts, “The whole absurd residue of Christian fable, conceptual cobweb-spinning and theology does not concern us; it could be a thousand times more absurd and we would not lift a finger against it …What is it we combat in Christianity? That it wants to break the strong, that it wants to discourage their courage, exploit their bad hours and their occasional weariness, convert their proud assurance into unease and distress of conscience, that it knows how to poison and sicken the noble instincts until their strength, their will to power turns backward, against itself—until the strong perish through orgies of self-contempt and self-abuse…” (TWP, 146)
eternal recurrence vis-à-vis the critique of metaphysics and epistemology. As it can be recalled, previously we have slightly touched upon this notion as Nietzsche’s way of posing the question of life in its heaviest state.\footnote{See P. 98-99} However, besides creating the “greatest weight” this notion also has a significant implication concerning one of the oldest riddles of philosophy, i.e. that of Being and Becoming. In The Will to Power, Nietzsche explains this human role as imposition of the character of being upon becoming – as “everything recurs”. Through this imposition, Nietzsche did not claim final settlement but the closest approximation of the world of being and becoming “this is a high point of the mediation. That involves a twofold falsification on the point of the senses and the spirit—a world which is, which abides, which is equivalent.” (TWP, 330) Yet this approach towards being and becoming contains the boldest reversal of the hitherto postulation of being and becoming—here, “being” stands as appearance, as reversal of values, as which conferred values. Noting that under this light, the notion of “knowledge-in-itself” becomes inconceivable

Yet it seems appropriate to ask whether Nietzsche himself is sneaked by the idealization he criticized. But, we find his Human, all too human intact. Amid this “imposition”, i.e. becoming too is among the inventions of human beings. The most important point one must grasp is that Nietzsche’s journey against nihilism gains its novelty, in its attempt to deal with Being and becoming with the eye of the human, all too human. As he stated in Ecce homo “no new ideals are erected.” Moreover, the former ideals are not refuted—since refutation requires an authentic conviction on the impossibility of the ideals. This point marks Nietzsche’s redemption from skepticism, (wherein one denies dogmatically). i.e. he ceased to be a skeptic, but in doing so he
has again learned to **affirm**. What is more is that, in relation to this, art stands as the will to overcome becoming—short sighted “eternalization” *depending* on the perspective. Here, the amphibian comes to life. Metaphorically speaking, if hitherto philosophers have been either aquatic or terrestrial, then Nietzsche is the amphibian. Accordingly, the most important peculiarity of Nietzsche’s countermovement resides in *not slipping* to the ideal. At this point, the inclusion of Nietzsche’s “Dionysian philosophy” could do a great deal in elucidating this standpoint. The coinage for Nietzsche’s representation of Dionysus finds its expression through his journey against nihilism. How is this possible, one might ask the answer will be in saying yes to becoming (i.e. in “granting” its supremacy over being in all aspects that were negated and obscured through the mist of being.) all expeditions become “possible”—notwithstanding *human-all-too-human*.

Remarking the *human all too human* as the fusion of the anti-metaphysician, the perspectivist and the immoralist (in relation to the journey into nihilism), as well as the *touchstone* of the journey *against* nihilism. Let us add some important points regarding its prevalence in Nietzsche’s countermovement of nihilism. In view of that, our primary concern will take us to morality. This insight enables us to understand of Nietzsche’s “immoralism” in a way that is far from the pejorative atmosphere of this terminology. Previously we have noted how metaphysics and epistemology served as a nutshell of morality. On the other hand, we have also discussed Nietzsche’s critique of this “nutshell”, which have made his examination of morality possible—i.e. the sight that goes beyond good and evil, and its demonstrativeness through the genealogical approach. At this point, it is appropriate to pose our question mark on, what would come out of a man of such profound renunciation. Should one follow one’s feelings? Or *after pronouncing* “everything is

55 By analogy, the Aquatic as becoming and terrestrial as being—but amphibian as Nietzsche’s way
false! Everything is permitted”, should one plunge and leap uncontrollably?

One way of understanding “morality” in post-nihilism takes us to the exposition of Nietzsche’s journey into nihilism vis-à-vis the shift in the examination of man. In his book *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche criticizes hitherto philosophers for their lack of historical sense in the analysis of man. Noting this lack is not bounded in the analysis of man, but goes to the extent of being the character trait of hitherto philosophers. Above all, Nietzsche’s criticism of this lack of historical sense acquires an indispensable fundamentality in his journey into nihilism. Bearing this, let us discuss how it finds its expression in Nietzsche analysis of man. For him hitherto philosophers have involuntarily thought of ‘man’ “as something everlastingly true, as something that remains constant in the midst of all flux, as a sure measure of things” (HA I, 12). Moreover, in thinking man as such, philosophers have taken the man of a very limited period of time (the man of the four thousand years we more or less know about) as the archetype of man. On the other hand, Nietzsche presumes “Everything essential in the development of mankind took place in primeval times” (Ibid., 13). In understanding this assertion, the omission of the italicization of the word “essential” brings dire misconception of Nietzsche’s point, for by italicizing it Nietzsche is alerting his reader not to mistakenly associate his point with the “essential” that connotes unalterable absolutism. Accordingly, our understanding of his usage of essential in the development of mankind should be considered as a way that is emancipated from such absolutism. Bearing this in mind, Nietzsche asserts during the four thousand years, mankind may well not have altered very much. To explore ‘man’ from this perspective, Nietzsche emphasizes the

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56 See P. 75-76
57 Nietzsche’s emphasis
need for “historical philosophizing”\(^{58}\), and with it the virtue of modesty” (Ibid. , 13). Again, Nietzsche’s italicization of “historical philosophizing” must not be overlooked, since Nietzsche has renovated this historical philosophization. In the case of Nietzsche, historical philosophization is emancipated from any supra-necessity. In spite of its previous prevalence, historical philosophization has reached its apex with the philosophy of Hegel, which is further explored by the Right-Hegelians and the Left-Hegelians (that includes Karl Marx). Nietzsche’s deviation, which is the result of his journey into nihilism, gives his historical philosophization a unique tone. For him the whole teleology of previous attempts of historical philosophizations “is constructed by speaking of the man of the last four millennia as of an eternal man towards whom all things in the world have had a natural relationship from the time he began.” (Ibid. , 13) But, as we discussed so far, for the philosopher of human, all too human “everything has become: there are no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute truths” (Ibid. ). Accordingly, with Nietzsche, historical philosophization is renovated within the human, all too human, and in this renovation modesty is required as opposed to the vanity, which has been discussed in the previous chapter vis-à-vis the mendaciousness of millennia and the aberration of philosophy.\(^{59}\) Bearing this in mind, let us return our focus to condense what has been said so far in relation to Nietzsche’s analysis of man—wherein the philosopher sees “‘instincts' in man and assumes that these belong to the unalterable facts of mankind and to that extent could provide a key to the understanding of the world in general” (HA I, 13). Yet, Nietzsche’s conception of ‘instincts’ is influenced by his journey into nihilism—let us call it “instinctive-ization” and briefly discuss it. In the Dawn, Nietzsche demonstrates the kind of instinctive-ization, which occurs in the commercial culture.

\(^{58}\) Nietzsche’s emphasis

\(^{59}\) See P. 71 and P. 73-74
In view of that, the philosopher resembles the role of commerce as the soul of the culture, as “personal contest was with the ancient Greeks and as war, victory and justice were for the Romans” (D, 106). In this commercial culture, “‘who and how many will consume this?’ is the question of questions. And through time this type of appraisal will prevail instinctively and all the time in the productions of the arts and sciences, of thinkers, scholars, artists, statesmen, peoples and parties, of the entire age—‘in the minutest and subtlest detail and imprinted in every will and every faculty’ (Ibid.). Similarly, Nietzsche also conceives morality as having significance in the development of ‘instinct’. Regarding this, he states in Human, All Too Human, “morality is preceded by compulsion … Later it becomes custom, later still voluntary obedience, finally almost instinct: then, like all that has for a long time been habitual and natural, it is associated with pleasure - and is now called virtue (HA I, 53). In one of his earliest works titled On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, Nietzsche made a point that could shed light in the relation between instincts and “instinctive-ization”. He claims that we are the products of the aberrations, passions, mistakes, and even crimes of earlier generations, moreover he stresses it is impossible to loose oneself from this chain of entirety by saying, even if “we condemn those aberrations and think ourselves quite exempt from them, the fact that we are descended from them is not eliminated” (ADOH, 22). In view of that, Nietzsche asserts the most effective way of dealing with the effects of the past would be to bring about a conflict; between our inherited, innate nature and our knowledge, as well as a battle between a strict new discipline and ancient education and breeding; we implant a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature so that the first nature withers away” (Ibid. ). Here two important points are emphasized, the first being the

60 My emphasis
61 My emphasis
condemnation of the past do not vindicate a complete salvation from it (as if we have not been through). On the other hand, following from this, he devises a possible way out in dealing with the aberrations and errors of the past, which hold creativity as its guiding principle. i.e. even though we cannot change the past, we still have the ability to determine its impact on our future—use or abuse it. One more important point regarding Nietzsche’s sight of ‘instincts’ in man is that instinctive activities go even into philosophical thinking. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche asserts, “behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement, too, there stand valuations or, more clearly, physiological demands for the preservation of a certain type of life” (BGE, 11). The recognition this relation between instincts and “instinctive-ization”, acquires significance in understanding the special effects of Nietzsche’s journey into and against nihilism, on his perspectival standpoints regarding the past and the future of humanity. Most importantly, with the recognition of this relation, a profound understanding of Nietzsche’s teaching of the Lastman and the Übermensch (The Overman) comes into light. In view of that, unless one recognizes Nietzsche’s sight of ‘instincts’ in man, a dire misunderstanding of the relation between the Lastman and the Overman is inevitable. An eye-opening statement that could shed light on this connection is found in The Antichrist, wherein Nietzsche states, “the problem I am posing is not what should replace humanity in the order of being (—the human is an endpoint): but instead what type of human should be bred, should be willed” (AC, 4). Nietzsche claims why this is problematic by saying, “This more valuable type has appeared often enough already: but only as a stroke of luck, as an exception, never as willed” (Ibid., 4). Under this light, we can

62 My emphasis
63 Nietzsche’s emphasis
64 While the italics is Nietzsche’s emphasis, the underline is my emphasis
grasp the most significant factor in Nietzsche’s discourse on man unto the Overman, which demands the valuable type of man should be *willed* and *bred*. In view of that, let us briefly describe how the Overman stands as the *willed* type of man, and how the journey into nihilism (*anti-metaphysician, perspectivist and immoralist*) underpins the *willing* and *breeding* of this type of man. Moreover, this exposition also provides us with insights regarding morality in *post-nihilism*, (i.e. previously, we have placed our question mark on the fate of “morality” after the journey into nihilism—*after pronouncing*, “Everything is false! Everything is permitted”, should one plunge and leap *uncontrollably*? Or Should one follow one’s feelings?).

Let us begin our discussion with the scene from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, wherein the crowd interrupts Zarathustra’s first speech, and shout “‘Give us this last man, O Zarathustra,’… ‘Turn us into these last men! Then we shall make you a gift of the Overman!’” (TSZ, 18). In reaction to the demand of the crows, Nietzsche states, “But Zarathustra became sad and said to his heart: ‘They do not understand me. I am not the mouth for these ears…” (Ibid.). Through these lines, Nietzsche warns his reader against a possible approach that is founded upon the expectation of *command* from the outside—wherein one *obeys*. However, for the Lastman and the Overman are introspective activities that require the *will* to command and obey *within oneself*, external compulsion is of no use—the inner world called ‘man’ is accessed only by the *individual*. Previously we have discussed the foundational role of metaphysics and epistemology in the deification of morality—i.e. the “beyond” is absolutely necessary, if faith in morality is to be maintained. On the other hand, in the journey into nihilism or in *becoming* the Lastman, the freedom from the “beyond” is of vital importance, it is the character trait of the Lastman. Regarding *this* freedom, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra proclaims, “There are some who threw away their last value when they threw away their servitude. Free from what? As if that mattered to Zarathustra! But
your eyes should tell me brightly: free for what?” (Ibid., 63). When we revisit Nietzsche’s journey into and against nihilism under the light of this captivity and freedom, the first journey marks rebellion and freedom, yet when freedom is attained, when everything becomes human, all too human the future confronts us with a trembling question “free for what?” The understanding of the magnitude of this question takes us back to the former question “free from what?” Moreover, the answer to this question also determines the latter—to know what one is free from, determines the extent of possible paths upon which he can embark his expedition. Under this light, Nietzsche’s discourse on the Overman can be understood as the portrayal of his persona that represents the answer for the question “free from what?” In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche asks, “Can you give yourself your own evil and your own good and hang your own will over yourself as a law? Can you be your own judge and avenger of your law?” (Ibid.) When one looks closer, one can grasp the extent of the freedom through the questions asked. In the previous chapter, we have discussed Nietzsche’s criticism of metaphysics and epistemology that is summoned up as human, all too human and previously we have remarked its implication on morality. The Overman represents a new type of man—a new type of countermovement promising the flourish-ment of the human after the twilight of the idols. Yet, this time no idol will be erected, no “believer” is needed—this time, no escape is permitted.

In summa, Nietzsche’s criticism of hitherto philosophers can be conceived from two frontiers, the first marking their failure to realize the twilight of the idols by diving into the ultimate safety place, and, the second that follows from the first failure is their strategy of “an ideal for an ideal”. Considering this, the peculiarity of Nietzsche’s philosophy resides in its attempt to break this cult. And without his critique of metaphysics and epistemology this attempt could have been inconceivable. Besides the complete renunciation of the hitherto “an ideal for an ideal” circle, what
comes after it requires much of the philosopher’s integrity for the expedition involving the exploration of wilderness wherein thinkers have not been allowed to enter. In The Will to Power, Nietzsche inscribed the challenges one will face in attempting to overcome such aberration that has been in the blood for too long. Accordingly, he states, “the old habit, however, of associating a goal with every event and a guiding, creative God with the world, is so powerful that it requires an effort for a thinker not to fall into thinking of the very aimlessness of the world as intended. (TWP, 546). Likewise, Nietzsche also sheds light on a nihilistic way of questioning that could create the effects of the aberration from the beginning, in the same book he states, “the nihilistic question "for what?" is rooted in the old habit of supposing that the goal must be put up65, given, demanded from outside—by some superhuman authority” (Ibid. , 16). Accordingly, he remarks unless this unquestioned yet decisive supposition is brought into question, its recurrence and its lurking dangers are inevitable. Whether one speaks under the authority of reason or the social instinct (the herd), or history with an immanent spirit and a goal within, Nihilism stands at the door—as the uncanniest of all guests.

On the other hand, the Overman represents Nietzsche’s persona that have the strength to flourish in the human, all too human world. With this new type, Nietzsche attempts to make sense of life anew. The Overman is Dionysian he has developed the internal fortitude to live in the godless and idol-less world. He slowly responds to every stimuli and every temptation, for he knows this control is what makes the Overman go over-man. In the past, on the account of these stimulus men has been led and misled, taking “involuntary detours, side lanes, resting places, and sunny places of thought” (GS, 34). The Overman goes over-man with his constant self-overcoming

65 My emphasis
through which he becomes the master—who permits and forbids the expression of the inclination. For too long the permissions and forbiddances have descended from outside, above and beyond; for too long man has managed to escape the Confrontation by taking flights into nothingness. Nietzsche’s portrayal of the Overman also signifies the newfound respect of man for himself. For, in the past man has acquired this respect by identifying himself with superhuman authorities; hence, with the annihilation of these qualifiers, man’s respect for himself will be in jeopardy. On the other hand, the Overman marks the “Adventurer and circumnavigator of that inner world called ‘man’, as surveyor and measurer of that ‘higher’ and ‘one upon the other’ that is likewise called ‘man’”. (HA I, 10). Thus, the Overman represents the newfound respect of man that is acquired by constant self-overcoming. In The Will to Power, Nietzsche distinguishes the Overman from man and the hitherto asceticism by saying, “Greatness of character does not consist in not possessing these affects—on the contrary, one possesses them to the highest degree—but in having them under control. And even that without any pleasure in this restraint, but merely because—\(^{66}\) (TWP, 490). In view of that, the distinction between man and the Overman should not be conceived as essential, i.e. as where the Overman is over-man because he does not possess the character of man, but as the overcoming of these characters—as having them under control. On the other hand, this type of activity has been the character trait of the ascetic ideal—who sought their end chiefly in the overcoming. However, the Overman goes far from this mere overcoming. This farseeing implication of self-overcoming of the Overman is related to man’s one more condition of existence—the why of man’s life. In his Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche pronounces, “To esteem is to create: hear this, you creators! … Through esteeming alone is there value and without esteeming, the nut of existence would be hollow. Hear

\(^{66}\) My emphasis
this, you creators! Change of values—that is a change of creators…” (TSZ, 59). Considering man as the creator of values, Nietzsche’s demand of the Overman (the self-overcoming of man as discussed above) implies his demand of new creators—new esteem-ers. Noting the above exposed uniqueness of Overman from ‘man’ and the hitherto ascetic ideal (the hitherto higher type of man), at least one fundamental position of Nietzsche’s journey against nihilism comes forth—his project of revaluation of values penetrated into the foundation—to the preparation of the creator. Similarly, in recognizing this relation, the question raised regarding the “fate” of morality in post-nihilism also gets its answer—as experimental morality: to give oneself a goal (TWP, 151). Another important point in Nietzsche’s demand to go over-man is his discovery of the “rock bottom” of man’s valuation—a will to nothingness—for man would rather will nothingness than not will. Hence with the self-overcoming of man (the inner world) Nietzsche pursued a philosophy of the future, the Overman—the constant self-overcoming—not to remain stuck, for “one must know how to conserve oneself: the hardest test of independence” (BGE, 52).

3.3 NIETZSCHE AS EDUCATOR

Alas, what are you after all, my written and painted thoughts! … it is only your afternoon, you, my written and painted thoughts, for which alone I have colors … but nobody will guess from that how you looked in your morning, you sudden sparks and wonders of my solitude, you my old beloved—wicked thoughts! (BGE, 236-237)

Nietzsche inscribed these words in his Beyond Good and Evil, through it the philosopher points towards a way of understanding his writings, he demands his readers to guess the “mornings” of his thoughts in the “afternoon”. One way of interpreting the message in Nietzsche’s reference of
“morning” and “afternoon” evokes his approach towards the written and painted thoughts of other philosophers. As we remember, Nietzsche tried to understand the thoughts “in a very different light from what may seem desirable: the hidden history of the philosophers, the psychology of the great names, came to light for me” (EH, 218). Considering this, Nietzsche’s demand to guess the “morning” of his thoughts in the “afternoon” calls for an interpretation that would comprehend his thoughts by reviving the vigor, which is immortalized (i.e. written and painted).

In his book *Heidegger and Jaspers on Nietzsche*\(^6\), Richard Howey states, “every philosopher presents special problems of interpretation. With Nietzsche these problems are especially crucial.” (Howey 1973 , 1). In his examination, Howey identifies the strength and weakness in Heidegger’s and Jaspers’ interpretation of Nietzsche in relation to the difference in their horizons. According to him, while “Heidegger underscores the necessity for taking Nietzsche seriously as a metaphysician, who, rather than being a philosophical anomaly, belongs essentially to a rich philosophical tradition” (Ibid. , 106). On the other hand, Howey states, “Jaspers' attempts at a dialogue with Nietzsche re-instate a human element which is lacking in Heidegger's interpretation” (Ibid. , 106). In his article *The Development of Heidegger’s Nietzsche-Interpretation*, Michael Zimmerman identifies two conflicting sub-horizons within Heidegger’s interpretations of Nietzsche. Accordingly, in the first interpretation, Heidegger conceived Nietzsche as “the first thinker to point the way to a new beginning for the West”. On the other hand, Heidegger made a radical shift in his interpretation of Nietzsche, and assert, “Nietzsche was the final thinker of the first beginning, that is, he was the herald of planetary industrial nihilism, which was the destiny of Greek productionist metaphysics” (Zimmerman 2005, 1). Behind this shift of interpretation

\(^6\) Subtitled “a Critical Examination of Heidegger’s and Jaspers' Interpretations of Nietzsche”
resides Heidegger’s *expectation* (of Nietzsche) that is shaped by the main horizon, which sought Nietzsche’s stance vis-à-vis the history of Western philosophy. In his book *Heidegger Through Phenomenology To Thought*, William Richardson states, Heidegger conceived Nietzsche’s philosophy as an attempt “to overcome the metaphysical nihilism of the times by a nihilism of a higher sort, a positive one” (Richardson 2003, 363). Noting the *positive* character of this counter-movement resides in his conception of Nietzsche’s revaluation as seeking new principle of values in something alive (that is not supra sensible), Heidegger argues the revaluation “fails completely to vindicate its claims simply because it remains metaphysics” (Ibid., 363). Likewise, Zimmerman elucidates this position of Heidegger in relation to his realization of Nietzsche’s failure to “discern the difference between otherworldly, eternity seeking transcendence and the transcendence involved in the truth of Being, on the other. Throwing out the transcendental baby with the metaphysical bath, Nietzsche was unable to develop a post-metaphysical conception of humankind” (Zimmerman 2005, 7). Another way of understanding Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche resides in his analysis of Nietzsche in relation to the previous philosophers of the western metaphysical tradition. Accordingly, in his first interpretation Heidegger considered the philosophy of Hegel as the culmination of western metaphysical tradition. According to Zimmerman, this position allowed Heidegger to “interpret Nietzsche as Nietzsche understood himself”—as the initiator of the necessary new beginning. However, at this point one should stress whether Nietzsche understood himself as it is claimed above, in other words does Nietzsche considers the new beginning as “necessary”. As we discussed Nietzsche’s discourse on nihilism in the previous and this chapter, his strong ground of utterance involved the annihilation of such *compelling* words. Hence, if “necessary” is used to represent the “indispensable new beginning” that will occur as Nietzsche *anticipated* it—regardless of *his* presence, then the way
which claims to understand Nietzsche in his own terms would fail because it overlooked one of the crucial features that constitute his *unique* stand as a philosopher—as the voluntary endeavor that demanded a way that was avoidable. Above all, one way to comprehend this “avoidability” recalls Nietzsche’s criticism of Schopenhauer and his hopeless utterance on the oblivious stance of his contemporaries. Noting this, let us return to, Zimmerman’s discussion on the shift of perspective within Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche. As stated above, Heidegger’s first interpretation has conceived Hegel as the culmination of western metaphysics, and posed Nietzsche as the “initiator of the necessary new beginning. On the other hand, in his second interpretation Heidegger recognizes Nietzsche with the place he conceived Hegel before—in this case, Nietzsche becomes the last metaphysician—who in his own way draws the culmination of western metaphysics. However, such analysis should also include the significant moment that is found between Hegel and Nietzsche—namely the Schopenhauerian moment. At this point, the mentioning of his critique of Hegelianism could shed light on the atmosphere that is emitted by Schopenhauer, which have greatly influenced Nietzsche’s discourse on nihilism. In his essay “On Authorship and Style” Schopenhauer states, “they intend to represent the mask of intellect: this mask may possibly deceive the inexperienced for a while, until it is recognized as being nothing but a dead mask, when it is laughed at and exchanged for another” (Schopenhauer 2005, 32). Schopenhauer stood between Hegel and Nietzsche with such intense spirit, later on, Schopenhauer also became the subject of similar criticism—failed to renounce the absoluteness of the ideal. Yet, when we look at Heidegger’s stand, it appears to place Nietzsche in the place of his predecessor. Keeping this in mind, let us remark some more points on Heidegger’s interpretations of Nietzsche, accordingly the first point concerns how Heidegger’s shift also affected his conception of Nietzsche’s Overman. From the standpoint of his first interpretation, he under-
stood the Overman as “as the transition to the post-metaphysical man of the new beginning” (Ibid., 11). On the other hand, with his radical shift, Nietzsche’s Overman appeared to represent “the culmination of the tradition that reduced humans to clever animals seeking control over all other entities” (Ibid., 11). According to this interpretation, Heidegger conceived the life of the Modern Mensch as bound by this drive, seeking control over all other entities. Nietzsche’s Overman stands among the manifestation of “man bounded by this drive” and in its case, the manifestation appears “as the creating of a humankind which finds its essential Gestalt neither in the ‘individual’ nor in the ‘masses’, but instead in the ‘typus’ i.e. ‘type’” (Ibid., 11). In view of that, Heidegger asserts, “this Overman or ‘typus’ nihilistically negates the previous conception of Mensch as rational animal, by a reversal that puts the rational in the service of the animal (Ibid., 12). Considering this as the sketchy presentation of Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche, let us briefly discuss Karl Jaspers’ interpretation of Nietzsche, which re-instaes the human-element that lacked in Heidegger’s Nietzsche. In his analysis of Jaspers’ Nietzsche, Richard Howey states, “Jaspers reminds us that Nietzsche's ideas were the product of a very real, and very human struggle” (Howey 1973, 106). The distinct feature of Japers’ interpretation resides in his objection to examine the philosopher under certain classification, for him “every great individual event and every attempt to classify and categorize his thought is at best an oversimplification” (Ibid., 3). Moreover, Jasper objects a manner of interpretation that seeks to grasp a fixed and final form. In his book titled Nietzsche68, Jasper insists the attempt to grasp “the whole, which Nietzsche accomplishes through his self-understanding and which we can attain through our own understanding, should throw light upon the existential significance of his life and his thought” (Jaspers 1979, 47). This approach of Jaspers involves the key elements in understanding the

68 Subtitled “An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity”
“morning” of Nietzsche’s written and painted thoughts. Another significant element in Jaspers’ approach is his conception of Nietzsche as a philosopher of contradiction. Considering this claim of contradictions in Nietzsche’s philosophy, with such presumption will cause dire distortion in our understanding.

The previous chapters attempted to comprehend the thoughts of Nietzsche under the light of his discourse on nihilism, and throughout the discussion, one voice has become louder and louder—“human, all too human!” we have read the philosopher exclaiming with grief, with concern, also cheerfully. We have imagined, Nietzsche shouting “human, all too human!” on the apexes of human civilizations, from the ancient civilizations unto his age and then to the upcoming apexes. Could one understand these exclamations by seriously considering Nietzsche as a metaphysician? Or should one seriously consider him as a human being? Or should one seriously consider the metaphysician as a human being? Or the reverse?

Let us involve the words of the psychiatrist Viktor Frankl that survived one of the darkest events in human history—the concentration camp (in Nazi Germany). In his book titled *Man’s search for meaning*, Frankl states, “Whatever we had gone through could still be an asset to us in the future. And I quoted from Nietzsche “That which does not kill me, makes me stronger” Then I spoke about the future (Frankl 1959, 89). The psychiatrist survived the tormenting existential condition in a way expressed by Nietzsche; yet, here our focus will be on how this utterance is possible through Nietzsche’s way. The philosopher inscribed these words in his book *Twilight of the Idols*, perhaps it can be said such utterance is possible after the twilight of the idols. One way of understanding its conceptual root in the philosophy of Nietzsche takes us back to his tragic philosophy. In his *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche explains his conception of the “tragic” by saying, “not
in order to get rid of terror and pity, not in order to purge oneself of a dangerous affect by its ve-
hement discharge... but in order to be oneself the eternal joy of becoming, beyond all terror and
pity—that joy which includes even joy in destroying” (EH, 273). Nietzsche’s statement, which
found its expression in the midst of Auschwitz, has its conceptual parent in the philosopher’s ap-
proach regarding the discourse of being and becoming. As it can be recalled, Nietzsche inferred
such division and valuation of the world in relation to the one more condition of existence, yet in
what has been referred as “being” and “becoming”, and above all what has been valued as “be-
ing” and “becoming” he has found no thinker daring to go beyond such concepts that are consid-
ered as given. Nonetheless, he has also understood the dangers of such journey; above all this
danger becomes even greater in the attempt to devise the mode of valuation that keeps in mind
the aberration of the mode of valuation that has deeply penetrated throughout the history of man-
kind.

As a human being Nietzsche’s actual life has its own extra-requirements, i.e. Nietzsche suffered
from recurring deadly diseases that ended his life after a decade of vegetative life. The most
comprehensive view of Nietzsche as educator comes into light when one attempts to find Nie-
tzsche-the philosopher in the existential condition of Nietzsche – the human. Despite its renewed
appearance, Nietzsche stood firmly against one stationing wherein the geniuses of humankind
retained intact. From ancient times unto the present, this stationing appeared as mysticism, alle-
gory and later on through metaphysics of transcendence and epistemology of dogmatism, this
mode of valuation bestowed the fear-inspiring feature of religions and moralities. Among these
moralities and religions, Christianity remained the most enduring symbol of its triumph. Nie-
tzsche attacked on such mode of valuation because it is underpinned by rejection and vengeance.
As it is said before, Nietzsche has lived much of his life in fluctuating health; in Ecce Homo, he
reinstates his philosophy as a serious war against vengefulness and rancor. He states, “During periods of decadence I forbade myself such feelings as harmful; as soon as my vitality was rich and proud enough again, I forbade myself such feelings as beneath me.” (EH, 231). Moreover, Nietzsche remarks, his fight against Christianity as “merely a special case of this” (Ibid.). Similarly, on the account of the retreat that found its expression in the metaphysics of transcendence and epistemology of dogmatism, mankind has developed a habit in which, “one does not want to fight weakness with a method that strengthens but rather with a kind of justification and moralization; i.e., with an interpretation (TWP, 31). In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche inscribes a statement that would shed light on the mornings of his written thoughts, “Altogether, I have no welcome memories whatever from my whole childhood and youth; but it would be folly to drag in so called, “moral” reasons” (EH, 241). Hence, within the written and painted thoughts, which Nietzsche wrote as anti-metaphysics, perspectivist, and immoralist on the one hand, and what he devised as eternal recurrence, tragic philosophy, and experimental morality on the other, outshines the remarkable metamorphosis of the man who transfigured his states in a way that made him peculiar as a philosopher. Likewise, when one gets into the states wherein the philosopher once transfigured, Nietzsche becomes the educator, as it occurred in Auschwitz, his transfigured states regain the life, and the color they once had in their “morning”.

3.4 CONCLUDING REMARK

The previous three chapters tried to vivify a way of understanding the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. This way of understanding emphasized the role of nihilism in the thoughts of the philosopher. In such a way, an attempt has been made to explore Nietzsche’s journey as into and against nihilism. The examination has tried to expose the relation between what nihilism meant
to him, and how he sought after it, as the possible combination of discovering the treasure of the thinker. Even though Nietzsche has attempted to go for and against his own ideas, there remained basic patterns of thinking that remained intact from the beginning to the end, in view of that, the journey into and against nihilism stands as the chief ground wherein Nietzsche sought the past and the future of philosophy. Nietzsche voluntarily becomes a nomad, he becomes a homeless, for otherwise the discovery of new lands would be impossible. In view of that, to understand the philosopher, one should be willing to go along in this way. Above all, one should acknowledge the difference between “understanding” and “consuming” for the former requires the integrity not fall into the latter. In view of that, the previous chapters tried to expose a possible way of understanding the philosopher. That contends the primacy of the anti-metaphysician and the perspectivist over the immoralist and the antichrist.


