BOOK REVIEW

A VERY BRITISH HOBBES, OR A MORE EUROPEAN HOBBES?


As late as 1927, Hobbes’s standing among some in the Anglophone world was such that T. S. Eliot could say of him that John Bramhall had exposed Hobbes as ‘one of those extraordinary little upstarts whom the chaotic motions of the Renaissance tossed into an eminence which they hardly deserved and have never lost’.¹ We have come a long way since then and Noel Malcolm’s three-volume English-Latin critical edition of Hobbes’s Leviathan, published in 2012 in the Clarendon Series of the Complete Works of Hobbes, is worthy of an Englishman today adjudged among the greatest philosophers of the seventeenth century. Malcolm’s critical edition comes as close as one can imagine to technical perfection. The challenge of incorporating two different versions of Leviathan – the English and the Latin versions separated by 17 years and prepared for very different audiences – in a single facing-page edition presents almost insuperable obstacles, for which Malcolm has nevertheless found solutions. The beauty of critical editions is their transparency in terms of the integrity of the text, variants, and the clear separation of commentary and notes. Because of the complexity of this edition, some of that transparency is lost and, for all but the specialist, the apparatus will be difficult to navigate. Mastering it is, however, well worth the effort in order to understand how the English and Latin Leviathan relate to one another. One of Malcolm’s clear purposes is to contextualize Leviathan by establishing Hobbes’s motives for writing it and by clarifying the manner of its production. History of the book is one of Malcolm’s great strengths and the technical expertise with which he is able to establish the sequencing of the printings and their relation to Hobbes’s manuscript is truly impressive. Malcolm has been paid accolades by many reviewers more competent than me in judging these technical aspects, and I will not pursue this matter further, except to say that I cannot imagine that this edition will ever be technically surpassed.

That said, I do believe that previous editions have more virtues than Malcolm is willing to concede. The Cambridge edition edited by Richard Tuck is minimalist in terms of its apparatus, but exact, as Malcolm acknowledges. The Curley edition is particularly user-friendly because it incorporates relevant sections of the Latin *Leviathan*, has an intelligent commentary and editorial apparatus, and includes the pagination to the Head printing as well as numbering the paragraphs so that the reader using any edition of *Leviathan* can easily find the section in question. All this within one volume and at a reasonable paperback price! The only other competing critical edition, and then only of the English *Leviathan*, is the one published by Karl Schuhmann and John Rogers in 2003. Malcolm concedes it was ‘in one sense very accurate: it was not contaminated by mistranslations or misprints,… gave a much more accurate (although not entirely complete) listing of the variants in the manuscript, … [and includes] very perceptive emendations … (but also some very questionable ones)’ (Malcolm 1:35). It nevertheless comes in for scathing criticism for its account of *Leviathan’s* printing and its promotion of the Ornaments text as authorial. But Schuhmann and Rogers did not make this decision without reason. The crucial issue was whether changes introduced in Ornaments could plausibly be explained as in-house corrections by a printer, or not; and their judgement was that some of them demonstrate a sophistication in the understanding of Hobbes’s text that suggests they could not; while other changes seem to show an affinity between the Latin *Leviathan* and Ornaments, and the Egerton manuscript and Ornaments, without reference to earlier printings. These cases are particularly interesting because the printer of Ornaments could not have had access to the presentation copy, which remained in the King’s library. The likely source for Ornaments, therefore, was Hobbes’s original autograph manuscript from which the Egerton manuscript was itself copied. Or, as Rogers speculates, Hobbes had a copy of the second printing in which he entered changes and this provided the text for Ornaments. Either way the case for Hobbes’s involvement in Ornaments is more powerful than Malcolm’s comments would lead the reader to believe.

Although it is a demonstration of great virtuosity in the history of the book, because it does not affect the sense of the work, or reflect any major differences in authorial intention, context or audience, Malcolm’s history of the several printings of *Leviathan* is of less interest than his claims

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2*Leviathan* [1651], with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668, edited by Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994) referencing chapter (small Roman numerals) section (§) pagination of the Head edition/and of the Curley edition. I cite this edition in text accordingly. My citations to Malcolm’s *Leviathan* are also in text, by volume and page number.

concerning the context of *Leviathan*. Here I address mainly his speculations about its purpose, which are presented in his general introduction to the edition (Malcolm, 1:1–100). Noting that *Leviathan* was written by Hobbes while residing in Paris with the exiled Stuart court centred around Queen Henrietta Maria and the teenage Prince of Wales, Malcolm guesses that *Leviathan* took shape while Hobbes was tutoring the prince, the future Charles II, whom he was engaged to teach mathematics, and that it is, therefore, in the nature of an advice book. We know that Hobbes’s previous works, *The Elements of Law*, written at the request of the Earl of Newcastle to put the case for the Royal Prerogative during the Short Parliament; and *De cive*, published in Latin for a continental audience, were also in a sense policy manuals. Malcolm demonstrates a tight connection between *De cive* and *Leviathan*, speculating on the basis of similarities in content and phraseology that Hobbes probably had *De cive* open on his table while writing *Leviathan* – and Aubrey went even further, claiming a direct link between all three of the political works: ‘This little MS. treatise [the *Elements*] grew to be his Booke *De Cive*, and at last grew there to be the so formidable LEVIATHAN.’ Malcolm notes the extraordinary speed with which Hobbes wrote it, which did nothing to hinder the lucidity and directness of its prose. Conceived possibly as early as 1646–7 during the first year of his tutorship, Hobbes began writing only in late summer or early autumn 1649, sending it chapter-by-chapter to the publisher in time for publication in 1651 (Malcolm 1:55). As a pièce d’occasion its purpose shifts with the shifting times, so that while it begins as a treatise for royalists, defending absolutism in the hope of a restored Stuart court, as that prospect becomes less likely, especially after Charles I’s execution, its purpose shifts first to accommodate Cromwellian Independency, and finally to address the universities, whom Hobbes sees as responsible for producing the sectarianism that made civil war inevitable, with the hope of reforming them.

In making such a strong case for the localism of *Leviathan*, which Malcolm supports with internal references to the progress of the King’s cause, the situation in Scotland, and the issue of the sovereign’s power over the militia, he prioritizes events on the ground and debates in which the Royalists were engaged against the Parliamentarians. This leaves us in a slightly anomalous position. It is as if we have in *Leviathan*, Shakespeare’s playbooks and the folios rolled into one – the playbooks in quarto being the texts from which the actors learned their lines, and the folios, beginning with the first folio of 1623, posthumous literary editions. *Leviathan* as playbook makes sense on this interpretation, but how could Hobbes possibly have produced the folio at the same time, and why would he have bothered, if what he

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really was about was an advice book for a teenage prince? How could Hobbes have physically managed to complete the enormously complicated Biblical exegesis, lacking in De cive, that comprises the last two and longest books of Leviathan, while tutoring the prince? We know that this required him to spend time hanging about in waiting rooms – for, the obligations of a baronial secretary were time consuming – time he tried to make use of, as Aubrey tells us, by jotting down his ideas in a notebook he carried for the purpose, a technique he developed into a method of serial composition. During the gestation period for Leviathan, Hobbes was also seeing a second and enlarged edition of De cive through the press in 1647 and came close to dying in the same year! His secretarial duties included engaging with John Bramhall, later Archbishop of Armagh, in a philosophical debate of 1646 on the question of ‘freedom and necessity’, initiated by his patron, William, Earl of Newcastle; and simultaneously engaging with William Davenant, Poet Laureate, on epistemology and sensationalist psychology. Both of these engagements produced substantial texts, although the debate with Bramhall was published only in 1654. In this same time frame Hobbes’s Elements of Law, comprising Human Nature and De corpore politico, was published in London in 1650 as an unauthorized edition. And in March 1651, shortly before Leviathan appeared in April or May, an English translation of De cive by Charles Cotton, member of the Cavendish circle, as Malcolm has established, was published, which may also have required Hobbes’s oversight. In other words, Hobbes was a very busy man who could hardly have found the time for the kind of careful exposition Leviathan displays!

It seems to me that Leviathan is far too complex a work to be reduced to an advice book of the type of, say, Machiavelli’s Prince. For while it has much of the verve and vivacity of that work, it also has long sections of careful exegesis that suggest well-worked-over texts. Malcolm himself admits that ‘the political and biographical context of Leviathan … is very far from exhaust[ing] the meaning of his work’, or the importance and grounds of Hobbes’s philosophical claims (Malcolm, 1:82). Does this suggest an extension of Schuhmann’s thesis about De motu: that when he went to France

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5According to Aubrey, Brief Lives, 151, Hobbes carried ‘always a Note-book in his pocket, and as soon as a notions darted, he presently entred it into his Booke … He had drawn the Designe of the Booke into Chapters, etc. so he knew whereabouts it would come in’. See also note 18.


intent on establishing himself in the Mersenne circle as a duty-worthy philosopher, Hobbes incorporated substantial texts in various stages of preparation into works that, at least in the case of De Motu, were simply hooks on which to hang his hat? This is one of Schuhmann’s major theses, but Gianni Paganini has pointed out that De Motu is not a very good case to illustrate it. The fact that Hobbes follows the structure of White’s book, published in 1642, step-by-step and chapter-by-chapter, completing his own text (Anti-White or De Motu, as it known) the following year, suggests that he had very little scope to incorporate an already prepared text and time enough to write a new one. Moreover, Gassendi had written his own De Motu in 1642, and Hobbes’s work of the same title responds specifically to the concerns of the Mersenne circle, preoccupied as it was with the ramifications of Galilean theory, which White had tried to refute. If, as Paganini argues in the introduction to his excellent Italian translation, De Motu signals Hobbes’s commitment to the Galilean theory of ‘matter in motion’ as constitutive of his first philosophy, it is a much more important work in relation to Leviathan than is usually appreciated. It is likely, then, that Hobbes had begun to develop his position long before 1642, and possibly even before he met Galileo in 1636, given that Hobbes’s letter to the Earl of Newcastle dated 26 January 1634 tells us that he was at that time unsuccessfully trying to purchase Galileo’s Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, which was hard to find because the Inquisition had confiscated it. So, in a sense, the Schuhmann thesis is vindicated.

The likelihood of Hobbes having already prepared texts on theological topics is even greater, and about those long last books of Leviathan, and the new material incorporated in them, we really need to know more. The renowned Jesuit Denis Petau (Petavius), who taught rhetoric and dogmatic philosophy in Paris for 22 years up to his death in 1652, is a likely source for Hobbes, as


12See Curley’s Chronology in the introduction to his Leviathan, xlviii–liii, at l.
Richard Tuck and Gianni Paganini have speculated. Petau’s major works, like those of the famous Jesuits who had developed Patristics as a field, were held in the Hardwick Hall Library to which he had access already in the 1620s. Dionysii Petaviī, *Opus de theologicis dogmatibus auctius in hac nova editione*, t. II, Antverpiae apud G. Gallet, 1700, appears in the Hardwick Hall book list prepared by Hobbes at shelf mark X.3.1. Hobbes’s mention of Lorenzo Valla already in the preface to his *Thucydides* of 1629 suggests that he also had access to Valla’s work early, and may have prepared his attack on scholasticism, for instance, long before his Parisian exile. There is a strong case for claiming that Hobbes’s biblical exegesis in *Leviathan* books 3 and 4 traces a direct line of descent from Valla through Erasmus, who had read and annotated Valla’s *Elegantiae* at the age of eighteen, and who discovered and published Valla’s *Adnotationes in Novum Testamentum* in 1505. An early indication of the impact of Valla’s linguistic theory on the young Erasmus is to be found in his 1489 letter on the decline of studies, further developed in his *Antibarbari*, a work which directly targets the ‘barbarous’ philosophical terminology of the British theologians Ockham and Duns Scotus. We cannot miss the echo of Erasmus in Hobbes’s charge that ‘the writings of School-divines are nothing else, for the most part, but insignificant trains of strange and barbarous words, or words otherwise used than in the common use of the Latine tongue’ (*Lev.*, xlvi, §40, 379/467; Malcolm, 3: 1098, lines 20–25). Nor should we rule out transmission through Gassendi, in whom we find the same echo: ‘Voces commenti sunt barbaras, phrasque loquendi ineoptas, quibus intra Scholarum

15Gianni Paganini, ‘Thomas Hobbes e Lorenzo Valla. Critica umanistica e filosofia moderna’, *Rinascimento, Rivista dell’ Instituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento*, 2nd series, 39 (1999): 515–68, at p. 520 n. 9, presents evidence that Hobbes was acquainted with the (supposed) *Donation of Constantine*, and Valla’s famous exposure of it as a forgery as early as 1620, citing the *Horae Subsecivae* of that year. Paganini also adduces strong internal evidence to suggest Valla as Hobbes’s source in *Leviathan* Chapter 46 on the scholastic derivation of essence from ens.
cancellos ita intumescent, ut rideant caeteros mortales, quod non assequantur illarum mysteria.’ Such erudition does not usually characterize a hastily written advice book, and this is only one of many examples one might give.

It does seem as if Malcolm has something like the Schuhmann thesis in mind when he notes that, having:

already conceived the idea of writing an English-language text for the Prince’s benefit, setting out his theories of human nature and political authority in an accessible way … Hobbes also decided to add new material about the various workings of government and the state. (Malcolm, 1:57)

Malcolm’s explanation of the anomalous ‘table of sciences’ in Chapter ix, ‘that this was something Hobbes had to hand because he had prepared it for rather different reasons’ (Malcolm, 1:143, 146) is consistent with this approach. It is also compatible with Deborah Baumgold’s hypothesis about Hobbes’s serial, and sometimes peripatetic, manner of composition, inserting material into a prearranged plan often while out walking, for which he used a special pen and inkhorn inserted in his walking stick.¹⁸ It was a method of composition further complicated, as Malcolm hypothesizes (Malcolm, 1:61–82), but without noting either Schuhmann’s or Baumgold’s theses, by Hobbes sending off his chapters to the publisher one-at-a-time while the work was still in progress, so that, unable to revise his earlier chapters as the later took shape, he was compelled to add a ‘Review and Conclusion’ that made the substantial adjustments necessary as the ground shifted from under him in the course of writing.

Malcolm’s convictions about the local circumstances of the writing of Leviathan and its purposes cause him to play down the importance of remoter sources. Take, for instance, his deflationary explanation of Hobbes’s resort to traditional ‘body’ language in his explanation of the function of subordinate government entities in the critical Chapters xxii, xxiv and xxix: that this was a trope designed ‘to capture the interest of, and at the same time to entertain, the lively but non-philosophical reader for whom he was writing’, that is, the future Charles II (Malcolm, 1:58). This explanation hardly does justice to the rich tradition of corporation theory in the sources that Hobbes had to hand in the Hardwick library, which he himself helped to assemble and catalogue for his patron, and some of

¹⁷Gassendi, Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos. Amsterdam: Gfrörer, 1649, 1.1.9, 110b.
¹⁸Deborah Baumgold, ‘The Difficulties of Hobbes Interpretation’, argues that Hobbes’s peculiar method of serial composition, inserting new material into a prepared skeleton outline, both led to inconsistencies, but also allows for a type of archeological deconstruction in which we can see the development of his system in terms of those parts which are most complete, foreshadowing his mature system, and those that are less complete. See also my reply to Baumgold, along with Baumgold’s response, Springborg, ‘The Paradoxical Hobbes, a Reply to Baumgold, “The Difficulties of Hobbes Interpretation”’,” Political Theory 37, no. 5 (2009): 676–88.
which we can be fairly sure he read.\footnote{Chatsworth MS E1A is a catalogue of the Hardwick Hall Library in Hobbes’s hand, dating from the 1620s but with additions from the 1630s. See the \textit{Index of English Literary Manuscripts}, vols. I (1450–1625) and II (1625–1700), compiled by Dr Peter Beal (London & New York: Mansell Publishing, 1987) vol. 2, 576–86. In his Latin Verse \textit{Vita}, lines 77–84 (\textit{OL} I, xvii, Curley \textit{Leviathan}, lv–lvi), Hobbes claims the library as his own, but purchased by his patron Cavendish, Earl of Devonshire: ‘Thus I at ease did live, of books, whilst he [Cavendish]/Did with all sorts supply my library’; a report corroborated by Aubrey in \textit{Brief Lives}, 338: ‘I have heard [Hobbes] say, that at his lord’s house in the country there was a good library, and that his lordship stored the library with what books he thought fit to be bought’. A century of German scholarship on Hobbes’s corporation theory begun by Otto von Gierke and continued by Frederic Maitland is the subject of Patricia Springborg’s \textit{Leviathan, the Christian Commonwealth Incorporated}. \textit{Political Studies}, 24, no. 2 (1976): 171–83 (Reprinted in \textit{Great Political Thinkers}, edited by John Dunn and Ian Harris, vol. 2, 199–211. Cheltenham: Elgar, 1997).} By the same token, Hobbes’s indebtedness to Grotius, to whom Curley credits numerous references in \textit{Leviathan} (Chapters x §52; xiii, §8; xiv, §13; xv, §4; xx §4, §16; xxvi, §1, §22; xxvii, §10; xxviii, §1, 3, 23; xxxi, §1, §2), gets scant attention in Malcolm’s commentary, beyond his stating that it was Grotius who influenced Anthony Ascham, whose \textit{Discourse} written during the second civil war of the summer of 1648, on \textit{How farre a Man may Lawfully Conform to the Powers and Command of those who with Various Successes hold Kingdomes Divided by Civill or Forreigne Warres}, led him ‘to a position which resembled Hobbes’s in some important respects (though not in all)’ (Malcolm, 1:68). But Grotius is in Hobbes’s sights the moment he introduces the crucial question of natural right, and Hobbes’s claim that ‘right of nature’ (\textit{ius naturale}) entails also the ‘law of nature’ (\textit{lex naturale}) simply paraphrases Grotius, \textit{De iure Belli ac Pacis}, I.i.10.12, as his contemporaries would have immediately recognized.\footnote{Grotius \textit{De iure Belli ac Pacis}, I.i.10.12 defines natural right as follows:}

\begin{quote}
Natural right (\textit{jus naturale}) is a dictate of right reason indicating some act is either morally necessary or morally shameful, because of its agreement or disagreement with man’s nature as a rational and social being, and consequently that such an act is either commanded or forbidden by God, the author of nature.
\end{quote}

Hobbes (\textit{Lev.}, xiv, §1, 64/79) asks us to compare natural right (\textit{jus naturale}) as defined by Grotius, with law of nature (\textit{lex naturalis}) as the framework within which it is embedded:

\begin{quote}
[\textit{t}he \textsc{right of nature}, which writers [probably meaning Grotius] commonly call \textit{jus naturale} [and which is] the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature [with a] \textsc{law of nature} (\textit{lex naturalis}) which is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the means of preserving the same.
\end{quote}

Alberico Gentili, who was in Hobbes’s day Professor of Roman Law in the University of Oxford, at that time a Royalist stronghold, is another (and not so remote) case in point. Considered in recent scholarship a likely influence on Hobbes’s theories of war and colonization, Gentili gets no mention at all by Malcolm.22 Malcolm’s emphasis on the localism of Hobbes’s purposes, while a healthy antidote to the completely un-contextualized Hobbes of the ‘great books’ tradition, has the perhaps unintended consequence of causing him to neglect even those foreign thinkers whom he suggests in his apparatus to be likely sources for specific aspects of Hobbes’s theory, such as Grotius (Malcolm, 1:2, 313, 431), or those whom Hobbes openly acknowledges to be among his sources, such as Jean Bodin.23 For some time I have wondered why the innumerable commentators on Hobbes, and graduate students writing theses on him, have never thought to undertake a systematic comparison between Hobbes, Bodin, Grotius, John Selden and Alberico Gentili on the important topic of subordinate ‘political systems’ (Hobbes’s term), the role of corporations, ministries, and economics, which together form the subject of *Leviathan* Chapters xxii, xxiv and xxix concerned with the mechanics of public administration. These chapters go more or less unreferenced in Malcolm’s *Leviathan* also. It is even more surprising that Malcolm does not consider how Hobbes’s experience as an active member of the Virginia Company and Somer Islands Company – of the latter, like his patrons the Cavendishes, possibly well into the Restoration – might relate to his account of public administration in these chapters, beyond flatly asserting that in general Hobbes’s experience in the Virginia Company left no traces in his works. This is on the face of it strange if, as Christopher Warren argues, Hobbes’s translation of Thucydides, who was widely read as a handbook for imperialists, especially by Grotius and Gentili,24 was

earl of Newcastle informs him: ‘All I study is a nights, and that for a little while is the reading of certayne new books, especially Mr Seldens Mare Clausum … ’ (Malcolm’s essay is reprinted in his *Aspects of Hobbes*, 53–79; but this and following citations are to the 1981 essay.) Selden is reported by Aubrey as having left Hobbes a small pension.


published in 1629 in the express hope of resurrecting the Company, for which there were in fact several attempted revivals. Malcolm himself was the first to suggest that Hobbes’s political experience in the Virginia Company ‘may have helped to stimulate his interest in Thucydides’, particularly given that the collapse of the Company granted him the time to translate it.

Part of the answer to his downplaying Hobbes’s Virginia Company experience might lie in the fact that, while subscribing to the Cambridge tradition of contextual history, Malcolm is still essentially an intellectual historian, and shows little interest in institutional process or the mechanics of government. This bias translates into his judgement that Hobbes, and even his patron, Cavendish, had no interest in ‘matters of state’ – which I have always considered a strange conclusion in the case of Hobbes. It is even stranger in the case of Cavendish who, elected and re-elected several times as MP for Derbyshire and inheritor of a seat in the House of Lords, became an intimate of James I and was constantly involved in affairs of state – and we have no reason to think reluctantly! However, that Hobbes had no interest in affairs of state is a claim that Malcolm has several times repeated. He made it first in his essay on Hobbes and the Virginia Company, in answering his own question why Hobbes make so little use of his special knowledge in his treatment of American native peoples in Leviathan? ‘The problem of the American Indian in Hobbes’ works’, he suggests, ‘is akin to the problem of the dog that did not bark in the night’. And the answer he gives to his own question is that it ‘must lie mainly in his [Hobbes’s] distaste for anything that might tie his argument to empirical questions of fact’. That Malcolm has not revised his view we know from his 2007 edition of Hobbes’s translation, most probably dating from 1627, of the Altera secretissima instructio, a pamphlet produced by a ‘secretary, counsellor, or protégé of one of the members of the Imperial Council’ in Vienna in late July 1626, offering spurious advice to embarrass the Protestant Frederick V, Elector of the Palatinate, and brother-in-law of


Charles I. Although published more than 25 years later than his essay on Hobbes and the Virginia Company, in his commentary on the Hapsburg tract Malcolm still insists that Hobbes, like his patron, the Earl of Newcastle, displayed a ‘disdain for Parliamentary politics, distrust of foreign “enterprizes”, and distaste for the culture of political news’.30

That Malcolm is now showcasing a Hobbes interested primarily in affairs relating to the British Crown and its prerogative may suggest that he has revised this view. Hence his speculation in the ‘general introduction’ to Leviathan that Hobbes went to Paris hoping to continue his studies in mathematics and the new science, but was lured by his role as royal tutor into studying ‘reason of state’. Certainly, such a view finds support in John Aubrey, Hobbes’s biographer, who reports him taking ten years from his study of mathematics ‘to reflect on the interest of the king of England as touching his affaires between him and the parliament’.31 But if it were true that Malcolm had changed his mind, we would expect from him a more detailed comparison between Hobbes’s nuts and bolts policy recommendations and his experience of day-to-day politics of the early Stuart period. In particular, we would expect a comparison with the politics of those Virginia Company associates with whom he was actively involved, and specifically, we would expect Malcolm to look more closely at the rich empirical evidence for this period in the form of parliamentary records, and court books of the Virginia and Somer Islands Companies, some of which he consulted in these earlier essays.

There are two reasons, I think, why he does not do so. One is his predilection for material over circumstantial evidence – witness his emphasis on history of the book – and his distaste for ‘the murky question of influences, connexions and milieux’.32 In his essay on Hobbes and the Virginia Company, Malcolm acknowledges that Cavendish made him a member, with one share, for the purposes of vote-stacking. The court books record Hobbes, the diligent secretary, attending some 35 meetings between November 27, 1622 and June 7 1624 with his patron; absent only 4 times on which Cavendish attended, and Cavendish absent only 6 times when Hobbes attended; 5 of these meetings attended also by Selden and 3 by Purchas.

31Aubrey, in *Brief Lives*, 333, reported of Hobbes:

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\text{After he began to reflect on the interest of the king of England as touching his affaires between him and the parliament, for ten yeares together his thoughts were much, or almost altogether, unhinged from the mathematiques; but chiefly intent on his De Civ, and after that on his Leviathan: which was a great putt-back to his mathematical improvement.}
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Yet Malcolm concludes ‘that even if one did (or could) succeed in “proving” an influence, one would still be left with the even more intractable problem of saying why the recipient was apt to be influenced in that particular way’. 33

Not if he was a client, surely! Malcolm officially subscribes to a somewhat positivist understanding of historical proof that puts perhaps overly-stringent constraints on admissible evidence, belying his own nuanced and highly imaginative contributions to the understanding of Hobbes’s milieux. So when tracing elaborate networks of association to which Hobbes belonged – and possible chains of influence, therefore – Malcolm always concludes by a modest disavowal on the question of ‘influences, connexions and milieux’. 34

A second reason might have to do with the curriculum divide in the Oxbridge education system between ‘Moderns’ and ‘Greats’ (the Ancients), as they used to be known. The ancient world, for which we have a more or less closed universe of texts, became a field of great methodological inventiveness in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries where, in the absence of such a curriculum divide, European philologists and especially those of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, applied to the pre-modern world techniques of the modern social sciences to study collectivities and aggregate behaviours in new fields such as prosopography and voting behaviour. One has only to think of the use Matthias Gelzer made of the Senatorial Fasti in his study of the Roman Nobility, later translated into Anglophone historiography by Sir Ernst Namier. Russian-Jewish, but Austrian and Swiss-educated, Namier had heard Vilfredo Pareto lecture, and was able to apply Gelzer’s prosopography to Pareto’s ideas about elites in his study of the behaviour of the British Parliament in the age of George III. 35 These same empirical techniques are also available for the study of Hobbes and his circle, for which we have such a fine archive of empirical evidence in terms of factions and corresponding voting behaviour. Malcolm’s project to demonstrate a Hobbes immersed in British politics demands it. The question of ‘influences, connexions and milieux’ might then be salvaged by a more sociological approach to pre-modern society, governed as it was by a grid of family, clan and tribal loyalties, and corresponding obligations in terms of patron–client relations, reminiscent of those which governed the

ancient world. In fact, as far as we know, except for Western post-industrial societies, all pre-modern societies are so constituted – ‘modernity’ being uniquely characterized by a society of disaggregated individuals, which has translated into an exaggerated individualism, for which Hobbes is in part held responsible! This means that associational networks, based on family, clan and clientelism, can be expected to give rise to patterns of influence that are more predictable than in the post-industrial world, just because the grid of obligations is so tight. Possibly it was this consideration that caused Peter Laslett to leave the field of conventional Tudor-Stuart history and study family structures in early modern Britain. And certainly, whether influenced by Laslett or not, a number of scholars have become interested in patron–clientelism in early Stuart England. So, analyses of Hobbes’s connections in the Cavendish and Great Tew circles might yield information on networks that would make the ‘question of influences, connexions and milieux’ less ‘murky’.

At least one thing is clear: given the nature of patron–client relations in his day, Hobbes cannot be treated, as so many Hobbes commentators tend to do, as some kind of free-floating intellectual pursuing his own agenda. The question Hobbes commentators often fail to ask is ‘who was paying Hobbes?’ And to that question we can find answers. Cavendish account books and the Hobbes Correspondence record money changing hands between patron and client, and between author and amanuensis. Two of Hobbes’s works of translation, the letters from Fulgenzio Micanzio to William

Cavendish, and the *Altera secretissima instruction*, were clearly commissioned, and I suspect that his translation of Thucydidides was probably commissioned also, if only informally. Such a large undertaking by a baronial secretary was likely not due to Hobbes’s initiative alone. Indeed Edward Hyde, Lord Clarendon, who made lengthy excerpts from the translation, gives the translator as ‘Secretary to the E. of Devon’ – i.e. William Cavendish, second Earl of Devonshire – without mentioning Hobbes’s name, as if it was really Cavendish’s project. In fact, I would hazard the guess that the only major work of Hobbes that was probably not commissioned in one way or another was his Latin Homer, translated while he was in retirement.

Malcolm’s contextualization of Hobbes lacks important detail, then, that future scholars may be motivated to supply. More attention could be given to how closely Hobbes was governed by the agendas of his patrons, which a comparison between relevant sections of *Leviathan* and the advice books of Cavendish and members of his circle would go some way towards establishing. Such works as Davenant’s Preface to *Gondibert* of 1650, his *Proposition for Advancement of Moralitie, By a new way of Entertainment of the People*, addressed to Prince Charles and published three years later, along with Newcastle’s, *Letter of Instructions to Prince Charles for his Studies, Conduct and Behaviour*, are prime candidates for such a comparison. Acknowledging in his preface to *Gondibert* his great debt to Hobbes’s theories of psychological conditioning, Davenant, in his *Proposition for Advancement of Moralitie*, proposed a programme to promote the state cult by shows and spectacles, including visual forms of persuasion like emblem books, royal processions, coinage and extraordinary theatrical displays. Theories of psychological conditioning were also enlisted in projects such as the Earl of Newcastle’s manuals on how to train horses, and one wonders whether or not Hobbes had a hand in these also. Alternatively, and more plausibly, does Hobbes represent the views of


44See William Cavendish, 1st Duke of Newcastle’s *Méthode Nouvelle et Invention Extraordinaire de Dresser les Chevaux* (Antwerp, 1657) dedicated to Charles II, and undoubtedly
a wider group of mathematicians, philosophers and new scientists engaged in
close consultation and collaboration? For William Cavendish (1593–676) –
Earl, Marquis and Duke of Newcastle – was a patron of the arts as well as
being a military man, who saw himself in the Renaissance mould, mounting a
number of didactic projects, musical, iconographic, theatrical and equestrian.45
His advice book Letter of Instructions to Prince Charles for his Studies,
Conduct and Behaviour, closely paralleling Davenant’s Proposition, expounds
the three pillars of Machiavellian policy, good arms, good laws and civil religion,
displaying Machiavellian pragmatism and Hobbesian nominalism and preoccu-
pation with human passions and interests. Counseling his prince to read history:

and the best chosen histories, that so you might compare the dead with the
living; for the same humour is now as was then; there is no alteration but in
names, and though you meet not with a Caesar for Emperor in the whole
world, yet he may have the same passions.

Newcastle proceeds to a discussion of the pacification of the multitude that
also parallels Davenant’s, emphasizing social distance, court etiquette and
ways to instil it.46 On the face of it this extraordinary congruence of
opinion on the importance of psychological conditioning for crowd
control in the advice books of Hobbes, Newcastle and Davenant – the
latter attributing the theory to Hobbes – requires some notice.

There are undeniable hazards to localizing Hobbes too much, however,
and one of these is to shut him off from the continental tradition, and that
very Republic of Letters for which he so painstakingly translated his
works into the lingua franca of the day, Latin.47 No one has demonstrated
better than Malcolm the importance of Hobbes’s European reception,48
greater in terms of the volume of publications, the circulation of his texts

indebted to the famous manual on horsemanship, Antoine de Pluvinel’s L’Instruction du Roy
(1625). See also Newcastle’s posthumous, A General System of Horsemanship in all its
45Newcastle’s plays included, The Varietie, A comedy lately presented by his Majesties Ser-
vants at the BlackFriers. London: Humphrey Moseley, 1649 and The Country Captaine, A
comoedye lately presented by his Majesties Servants at the Blackfryers. London, 1649,
bound with The Varietie. For his musical endeavours see Lynn Hulse, ‘Apollo’s Whirligig:
William Cavendish, Duke of Newcastle and his Music Collection’, in the special issue of
The Seventeenth Century 9, no. 2 (1994) on The Cavendish Circle, edited by Timothy
Raylor, 213–46.
46Newcastle’s, Letter of Instructions to Prince Charles, 186.
47Malcolm notes that in the seventeenth century ‘the overwhelming majority of continental
scholars, no matter how well educated and scholarly, would not have been able to read
Hobbes in English’, and that Leibniz and later Voltaire, where notable exceptions. See
at 462.
the History of Philosophy 12, no. 3 (2004): 513–34.
and the legacy of doctoral dissertations, than in Great Britain where, after *Leviathan*, Hobbes became the target of ridicule and even persecution, so that none of his further works could be published until after his death. Hobbes was extraordinarily Europe-focussed and it is in this context that we must assess the widely accepted thesis, best elaborated by Karl Schuhmann, that Hobbes went to Paris with well-prepared positions on atomism, corporealism, optics and a mechanistic psychology, to demonstrate that he and members of the Cavendish circle were worthy members of a select group of European philosophers and new scientists working in a post-Galilean milieu. It is probably no accident that on his continental grand tours of 1636 and 1637 with Cavendish, Hobbes made the acquaintance of Galileo, the Abbé Mersenne and Gassendi, and that once in exile in Paris he managed so quickly to integrate himself as a respected member of the Mersenne circle. Nor is it accidental that the Parisian clique of French *Libertins érudits* centred around de La Mothe le Vayer should have embraced Hobbes – even meeting to discuss his atomism as a species of Epicureanism, as we know from Malcolm’s superbly edited Hobbes *Correspondence*. All of this speaks in favour of Schuhmann’s view.

Yet if this thesis of a Europe-focussed Hobbes is correct, we need to know much more about Hobbes’s milieu in Paris and how the Mersenne circle, and in particular Gassendi, impacted on the development of *Leviathan*. A letter from Mersenne to Rivet of 17 September 1632, reported on the progress of Gassendi’s *De vita et doctrina Epicuri*, which was completed in draft by 1633; while a letter dated 10 October 1644 from Charles Cavendish to John Pell, reports: ‘Mr Hobbes writes Gassendes his philosophie is not yet printed but he hath reade it, and that it is big as Aristoteles philosophie, but much truer and excellent Latin.’ Cavendish refers of course to Gassendi’s *Life of Epicurus* and *Animadversions on the Ten Books of Diogenes Laertius*, published only in 1649. But as Paganini demonstrates, the Hobbes–Gassendi dialogue was not all one way. Gassendi made an important concession to Hobbes by including his famous aphorism, ‘homo homini lupus’ in his comment to Epicurus *Ratae sententiae* 33 late in the *Animadversions* to illustrate human aggressivity in the state of nature.

And in the ethical part of the *Syntagma*, dating to the years 1645–6, so after the publication of the first edition of *De Cive* in 1642 and before the second, which Gassendi helped his friend Samuel Sorbière promote, he made transparent reference to Hobbes on freedom in the state of nature.⁵⁴

This mutual conversation between the French scholar of Epicurus and the English atomist, Hobbes, may well have contributed to important changes in Hobbes’s anthropology between *De cive* and *Leviathan*, and specifically the change that Quentin Skinner finds pivotal: ‘a new and far more pessimistic sense of what the powers of unaided reason can hope to achieve’ and a focus on human interests that was more characteristic of French, than of English, political philosophy of the 1640s.⁵⁵ Nor should the infamous feud over who was the better philosopher and who the better mathematician obscure the extraordinary congruence of Hobbes’s project with that of Descartes. Hobbes’s long letter of 5 November 1640, ‘56 pages in folio’, sent to Descartes through Mersenne as an intermediary, is no longer extant but, as reported by Mersenne, challenged Descartes to embrace the logical conclusion of his own studies of mechanism: a ‘corporeal God’.⁵⁶ Descartes, terrified that the Inquisition might visit upon him the punishments with which they threatened Galileo, responded only to Mersenne, claiming that the Englishman both ‘calomnified him’ and was trying to make a career at his expense.⁵⁷ The situation was not improved when Hobbes’s Third set of


Objections to Descartes’ *Meditations*, one of Hobbes’s earliest published works, was incorporated into the printed edition of 1641. All this notwithstanding, these warring philosophers finally shared a mutual respect and more in common than is generally acknowledged; for, while Descartes’ famous dualism remained undeveloped, his mechanism was uncannily close to that of Hobbes.  

Over-emphasis on the British political context for *Leviathan* is at the expense of the rich European continental tradition of Hobbes scholarship, which, dating from the publication of Hobbes’s *Opera Philosophica* in 1668, saw an immediate response in a considerable volume of dissertations and commentary. It is missing from the commentary, notes and bibliographies of Malcolm’s edition, despite his excellent treatments elsewhere. As one might expect, Hobbes’s indebtedness to European continental sources has mostly been undertaken by continental scholars. But the apparatus to this edition is missing the wide-ranging work of Yves Charles Zarka, the work of Italian scholars like Arrigo Pacchi, Gianni Paganini and Agostino Lupoli on Hobbes’s indebtedness to the Epicureans; the many works of Paganini, on the indebtedness of *Leviathan* to Lorenzo Valla (particularly on points of Biblical exegesis), and Renaissance sceptics; the many works of Karl Schuhmann, the


German Hobbes scholar, and all but one of the essays of his Dutch student, Cees Leijenhorst, on Hobbes’s indebtedness to Aristotle and to Renaissance Italian philosophers and new scientists;\(^2\) as well as the works of almost of all the continental scholars included in my *Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan* (2007), many of whom represent long European traditions of Hobbes scholarship. In a critical edition of *Leviathan* that will be canonical for decades if not centuries to come, this is a great lack. Without it we do not have a complete, or even a credible, picture of how Hobbes accomplished this extraordinary feat of producing in *Leviathan* both an advice book for his prince, and a philosophical treatise of great standing – his playbook and Folio edition rolled into one! His point of reference was local but his audience was European-wide and, by now, more or less universal. So, without wishing to take anything away from the extraordinary technical virtuosity of this edition, ‘a very British Hobbes, or a more European Hobbes?’ That is the question. History of the Book may be an exact science, but Hobbes interpretation never will be!

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2014.896248