Anthropology of security and security in anthropology: Cases of counterterrorism in the United States

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Abstract
In this article we propose a mode of analysis that allows us to consider security as a form distinct from insecurity, in order to capture the heterogeneity of security objects, logics and forms of action. We first develop a genealogy for the anthropology of security, demarcating four main approaches: violence and state terror; military, militarization, and militarism; para-state securitization; and what we submit as ‘security assemblages.’ Security assemblages move away from focusing on security formations per se, and how much violence or insecurity they yield, to identifying and studying security forms of action, whether or not they are part of the nation-state. As an approach to anthropological inquiry and theory, it is oriented toward capturing how these forms of action work and what types of security they produce. We illustrate security assemblages through our fieldwork on counterterrorism in the domains of law enforcement, biomedical research and federal-state counter-extremism, in each case arriving at a diagnosis of the form of action. The set of distinctions that we propose is intended as an aid to studying empirical situations, particularly of security, and, on another level, as a proposal for an approach to anthropology today. We do not expect that the distinctions that aid us will suffice in every circumstance. Rather, we submit that this work presents a set of specific insights about contemporary US security, and an example of a new approach to anthropological problems.

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In our study of US counterterrorism programs, we found that we needed a mode of analysis that would allow us to consider security as a form distinct from insecurity, in order to capture the heterogeneity of security objects, logics and forms of action. This article first presents a genealogy for the anthropology of security, demarcating four main approaches: violence and state terror; military, militarization, and militarism; para-state securitization; and what we submit as ‘security assemblages.’ Security assemblages allow one to move away from focusing on security formations per se, and how much violence or insecurity they yield, to identifying and studying security forms of action, in all their heterogeneity and whether or not they are part of the nation-state. As an approach to anthropological inquiry and theory, it is oriented toward capturing how these forms of action work and what types of security they produce. We illustrate security assemblages through our fieldwork on counterterrorism in the domains of law enforcement, biomedical research and federal-state counter-extremism, in each case arriving at a diagnosis of the form of action. The set of distinctions that we propose is intended as an aid to studying empirical situations, particularly of security, and, on another level, as a proposal for an approach to anthropology today. We do not expect that the distinctions that aid us will suffice in every circumstance. Rather, we submit that this work presents a set of specific insights about contemporary US security, and an example of a new approach to anthropological problems.

In the winter of 2012, William Law, a staff member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), phoned to share information and insights. During the conversation, he relayed the latest biosecurity concerns of the board and of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), which oversees the NSABB, and discussed their effort to establish a policy regarding Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC). Most immediately, they wanted to address gain-of-function studies of the H5N1 avian influenza virus, which deal with increased transmissibility or virulence. Two groups of scientists had undertaken controversial research that made the virus more readily transmissible, as a means of understanding such an event should it occur without human intervention. They now wanted to publish, putting their methods for altering the virus into the public domain and thereby raising questions of biosecurity.

On the other side of the country that same winter, in a face-to-face interview, the head analyst of an intelligence fusion center described a range of suspicious behaviors his team monitored, what they could signify, and how information about them was shared. The unusual purchase of chemical supplies, reported by a vigilant beauty store clerk, may be a ‘precursor to terrorist activity,’ he explained, while declarations of violent intent made online, or to friends or family, can indicate someone at risk of being recruited to violent extremism. Many in the
US government had been working over the previous decade to develop counter-terrorism initiatives to target and manage such behaviors. The initiatives intersect at the fusion center, the analyst said, but more often than not the first line of contact is a local police officer.

Before 9/11, however, few among American police or biological researchers considered terrorism to be their problem. Biosecurity concerns were historically tied to four domains: infectious diseases, cutting-edge life sciences, laboratory safety, and food safety (Collier and Lakoff, 2008; Masco, 2014). But when letters carrying military-grade anthrax began appearing around the country only one week after 9/11, attention turned to how particular developments in the life sciences might contribute to the terrorist threat. Likewise, although police departments in the late 1990s reported concern about anti-government groups, anti-abortion activists, and what they labeled animal rights and environmental extremists, any act that counted as terrorism fell under federal jurisdiction. Among the details of the 9/11 hijackers’ apparently ordinary American lives, however, were their routine encounters with state and local police officers. Plans were swiftly set in motion to integrate what seemed like a potential wealth of intelligence into counterterrorism efforts (Stalcup, 2015a).

Security in that opening decade of the millennium was not new, nor was it quite a matter of convergence, or of health and policing becoming securitized. Rather, these cases highlight actual permutations of the relationships between what have been, in many ways, co-constituted technologies of governance (Foucault, 2007 [2004]). In this article we pose a set of questions about this situation and consider how anthropology does and could study security. What are the main theoretical approaches? What is the ethical premise of each? How can security and insecurity be distinguished, empirically and conceptually? In answering these questions, we propose a mode of analysis that aims to capture the heterogeneity of security objects, logics, and forms of action in diverse fields. ‘Security assemblages’ is a move to expand anthropology’s existing focus on security formations, and on how much violence and insecurity they yield, by distinguishing security forms of action. In this, we remain dedicated to the anthropological ethos of attention to diversity and distinctions found in fieldwork.

We first undertake a genealogy, and define four main approaches to security within the anthropological literature: violence and state terror; the military, militarization, and militarism; para-state securitization; and what we submit here as security assemblages. We extract these approaches in an ‘after the fact’ process, a secondary reading through which we distinguish between them epistemologically (although they do not necessarily emerge as such ontologically). We categorize anthropological work according to these four topical clusters not because they are linear or evolutionary, but because each takes from the possible field of security a differentially defined object, develops it conceptually, and works within a certain anthropological ethos.

Secondly, we demonstrate a security assemblages approach in our fieldwork on US counterterrorism in the domains of policing, biomedical research, and
federal-local counter-extremism. Though all of these domains have come to be broadly conceived of as part of US national security, each has its own distinctive forms of security action. We thus shift from the spectrum of existing studies to reflect on the more general problem of the anthropology of security and argue that most research eventually deals with ‘insecurity’ as it emerges through different mechanisms (whether state terror, militarization, or the workings of neoliberalism). Rather than making security solely an object (e.g. an institution) and conceptualizing its production of insecurity, we suggest treating it conceptually, that is, describing and analyzing empirical ways that security works (the forms of security action), without subordinating them to a prescribed outcome. We present security assemblages as an analytical framework, drawing on Deleuze’s concept of the assemblage and distinguishing it from apparatuses. Our proposal for security assemblages draws on the Foucauldian governmentality apparatus for its methodological insights, and transfers these to a proposal for a conceptual approach to theory and inquiry in anthropology.

From an anthropology of insecurity to an anthropology of security

In order to organize the distinct approaches to security in anthropology and present their main differences, we provide the following chart (Figure 1). It presents each group according to theoretical categories: objects, concepts, security forms of action, critique, anthropological ethos, and analytical limit.

Violence and state terror

An important set of studies made violence and insecurity objects of study and critique. Earlier ‘anthropology of conflict’ debates had considered the social value of conflict (e.g. LeVine, 1961), questioning whether conflict between subgroups serves to produce broad social cohesion (Gluckman, 1955; Turner, 1972) or to disrupt it (Beals and Siegel, 1966). David Riches (1986) subsequently proposed an ‘anthropology of violence,’ in which violence is a social and cultural resource that can be practical and instrumental or symbolic and expressive.

In the mid- to late 1980s, scholarship continued this move from functionalism to a more ‘critical’ perspective, examining how violence is experienced in everyday life and constructed by social and historical conditions. The discipline’s gaze turned to the causes, circumstances, and lived experience of various forms of violence, social suffering, and state terror. In her groundbreaking Death without Weeping, Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1992) describes ‘everyday violence’ as a chronic state of insecurity. Examining state terror and military violence in Guatemala, Linda Green ‘capture[s] a sense of the insecurity that permeates individual women’s lives wracked by worries of physical and emotional survival, of grotesque memories, of ongoing militarization, of chronic fear’ (1994: 227–8). Around the same time, Philippe Bourgois (1996) presents a critical view of the way anthropology has
<table>
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<th>Approach</th>
<th>Objects</th>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>Security Form of Action</th>
<th>Critique Presented</th>
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<tr>
<td>Violence and Insecurity</td>
<td>Victims and victimhood</td>
<td>Everyday life violence, social suffering, state terror</td>
<td>State-power, insecurity</td>
<td>Violence is socially constructed</td>
<td>Witnessing, documenting, giving voice, activism</td>
<td>Object is insecurity rather than security, thus not an analysis of security forms of action, or how state power works</td>
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<td>Military, Militarization, and Militarism</td>
<td>Military actors and institutions, Militarism</td>
<td>Militarism</td>
<td>Militarism as ultimate power</td>
<td>Study perpetrators and security forms rather than victims; studying up</td>
<td>Denunciation, &quot;critical&quot; vs. &quot;embedded&quot;</td>
<td>The object becomes a theory, one possible form of action (e.g. militarism)</td>
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<td>Para-state securitization</td>
<td>State and para-state security forms–new actors and institutions</td>
<td>Neoliberal security, privatization of security</td>
<td>Proliferation of security that produces insecurity</td>
<td>Security must be understood as part of broader global processes</td>
<td>Analytic and theoretical</td>
<td>Fragmentation of the object, but only one main form of action; new security objects still express insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security assemblages</td>
<td>Security actors and institutions, security forms of action</td>
<td>Resilience, anticipation, preparedness, prevention</td>
<td>Various forms of security action; security and governance</td>
<td>Security is distinct from insecurity; concepts rather than objects or theory</td>
<td>Analytical, conceptual; an ethical mode of adjacency</td>
<td>The objects are concepts; there can be no comprehensive theory</td>
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**Figure 1.** Analytical chart of the anthropology of security.
engaged ‘everyday violence’ with his work on ‘inner-city apartheid.’ He argues that anthropology has been biased toward fieldwork with ‘exotic others’ and shifts the gaze of his scholarship to violence and insecurity ‘at home.’

‘Structural violence,’ elaborated by both Bourgois (2001) and Paul Farmer (2003), also points to the social construction of insecurity. Drawing on the concept of structural violence coined by Johan Galtung (1969), Farmer argues in Pathologies of Power that extreme poverty in Haiti results from political and economic forces deeply embedded in the country’s history. Poverty thus reflects social and economic inequalities that determine who is at risk and who is shielded (Farmer, 2003: 17–18).

Similarly concerned with victims and victimhood, Arthur Kleinman, Veena Das, and Margaret Lock (1997) present the term ‘social suffering’ to bring diverse fields of research, including health, welfare, law, morality, and religion, together into a shared theoretical framework that emphasizes how political, economic, and instrumental forms of power create violence and suffering. These studies stress the social aspects of suffering and the connection between violence and subjectivity (Das at el., 2000; Garcia, 2010; Throop, 2010), as well as pain and the bodily experience of violence (Das, 1995; Jenkins, 1998; Scarry, 1985).

A common tenet of these approaches is that state security is achieved through state violence or terror. Michael Taussig (1984), among others who have written on state violence in Latin America, invokes security as a totalizing power. States, would-be states, and de facto government by corporations create a ‘culture of terror–space of death’ as a way ‘to control massive populations through the cultural elaboration of fear’ (Taussig, 1984: 469). One becomes socialized to this terror, the institutionalization of which, alongside the brutal acts of the military, leads to a militarization of everyday life and chronic societal fear (Green, 1994: 227).

Begoña Aretxaga notes that scholars began to suggest a ‘radical weakening and transformation, if not disappearance, of the modern state’ as a result of globalization, but she counters that ‘despite transformations in the character of the state in an age of globalization, news of its demise is certainly exaggerated’ (2003: 394). Although non-state actors, such as guerrillas, are crucial perpetrators of violence, violence and terror wrought by the state remain central.

Non-state violence, such as intra-state, ethnic violence, however, figures prominently in much anthropological work (Brass, 1997; Das, 1990; Tambiah, 1997; Warren, 1993). Jeffrey Sluka argues that state terror specifically ‘refers to the use or threat of violence by the state or its agents or supporters, particularly against civilian individuals and populations,’ as ‘a means of repression and control (2000a: 2; see also Sluka, 2000b). In fieldwork in Belfast during the early 1980s and 1990s, he studied death squads and state support for armed groups that inflicted terror on the civilian population. For Sluka, the line between state and non-state terror becomes blurred, since the state supports and condones violence by non-state actors. These together produce a culture of terror.

This group of studies takes violence and insecurity as objects of research. The various fields of study are brought together conceptually as ‘violence in
everyday life,’ ‘social suffering,’ and cultures of terror, to present and to document the condition of victims and victimhood. Hence, a particular anthropological ethos is provided, one that gives voice to the muted insecurity of the victims of violence, through witnessing and representing their suffering. The analytic limit of this approach is that insecurity rather than security is the object of study, and thus it does not analyze how security or state security forms of action work.

Military, militarization, militarism

This body of work posits that anthropologists must study not only victims of violence but also perpetrators to understand what constitutes violence and insecurity (Ben-Ari and Frühstück, 2003: 540). Case studies have shifted observation and focus onto military units. Donna Winslow (1997), for example, researches Canadian airborne peacekeepers in Somalia and their engagement in violence against the local population. She argues that military culture and its strong emphasis on ‘group solidarity and cohesion’ (1997: 262) largely explain the violence. In the same vein, Eyal Ben-Ari and Efrat Elron (2001) examine international peacekeeping units that perpetrate violence, arguing that this behavior reflects a tension between national and transnational belonging. John Hawkins (2001) shows intense contradictions between the cultural values of American life and the cultural values necessary to survive in combat among US military units in Germany during the Cold War. An organizational perspective brings other insights. For example, Edna Lomsky-Feder and Eyal Ben-Ari (1999) examine civil-military hybrids and how new organizational structures and processes emerge even as older, conventional patterns persist. These studies take the military as their premier object of research; however, in their approach they again refer to effects of violence and insecurity.

Militarization has been another central concept in this scholarship. In her pioneering work Homefront, Catherine Lutz (2002a) studies the city of Fayetteville, North Carolina, home to the Army’s Fort Bragg. Militarization, she explains in Michael Geyer’s words, is ‘the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence’ (Geyer, 1989: 79; Lutz, 2002b: 723). Lutz argues that the United States has undergone a steady process of militarization since the end of the Second World War and that the symbiotic coupling of Fayetteville-Fort Bragg in popular discourse represents a microcosm of this process. She thus places 9/11 and the American invasion of Afghanistan that followed within the context of this history of US militarization rather than seeing a historical break (Lutz, 2002b).

Lesley Gill (2004) discusses the ‘export’ of US militarization through the School of the Americas (SOA). Seeking political, military, and cultural domination, she writes, the US government has established a constellation of military bases worldwide, an enormous defense budget, a massive stockpile of nuclear weapons, and a system of ongoing alliances with repressive regimes. Other studies discuss processes of militarization or anti-militarization (Ben-Ari and Frühstück, 2003; McCaffrey, 2002; Ochs, 2011; Weiss, 2012).
If militarization draws attention to the direct connection between military formations and procedures and aspects of civilian life, militarism refers to a broader concept that presents processes of militarization as ‘natural.’ Carol Cohn (1990), for example, explains how defense experts naturalize violence in their discourse about nuclear bombs by calling weapons with less fallout ‘clean bombs.’ Hugh Gusterson (1996: 123) argues that scientists naturalize violence and security through ‘nuclear rites,’ using ritual and metaphor to dehumanize potential victims while humanizing the weapons they themselves design.

Militarism scholarship also explores the effects of military culture on public consciousness. Gusterson (2007) contends that this should be the principal lens of study and that the anthropologist’s task is to reveal processes that give it power. Militarism, he claims, should be both a concept and an object of study, and he argues that anthropologists should examine both cases of militarism and its sources. In this vein, Joseph Masco discusses the long-term consequences of the Manhattan Project, explaining that the atomic bomb is ‘a national fetish, indeed perhaps the national fetish of our time’ (2006: 17, emphasis in the original). The bomb, Masco demonstrates, is not just the engine of American technoscientific modernity; it has produced a new cognitive orientation toward everyday life, provoking cross-cultural experiences of what he calls a ‘nuclear uncanny.’

The concept of militarism, which was developed to explain particular societies’ attitudes and acts of imperialism and exploitation, became a prism for studying security formations, a diagnosis built into the design of the research itself, and an explanatory theory (Ben-Ari, 2004; Gusterson, 2007). An associated anthropological ethos emerged around challenging these forms of power by identifying militarist processes. Militarism thus functions at once as an object, a concept, and a theoretical approach – these aspects are melded into one all-inclusive research framework.

The shift to studies in which military and security formations are objects of study, as we present above, reflects an ethical concern. If in studies of insecurity and violence the anthropological ethos is one of witnessing and documenting, militarism presents anthropologists with the dilemma of defining the kind of the relationship they should develop vis-à-vis the military systems they investigate. Scholars have distinguished between ‘critical anthropology of the military’ and ‘military anthropology’ as different responses (Gusterson, 2007). Kerry Fosher, whose work has frequently been categorized as the latter, discusses this dilemma in her work on local security actors:

I wanted to provide some insights on U.S. homeland security from the perspective of an insider/outsider, an anthropologist who set out to study, but has ended up working with, one of the communities involved in creating security and emergency preparedness. (2009: xiv–xv)

The military, which is, on the one hand, a significant exemplar of the institutions of power that anthropology has argued should be studied (i.e. ‘studying up’),
on the other hand has become problematic as a field of participant-observation. An ethos of condemnation or denunciation gains traction as anthropology is once again used to provide reports on ‘savages’ cultures’ subject to military violence (Price, 2002, 2012).

This situation is exemplified in discussions of the Pentagon’s Human Terrain System project in Iraq and Afghanistan, a military program that hired social scientists as counterinsurgency consultants. Its backers contended that ‘speaking truth to power should mean something more than sniping from the ivory tower – rather, it should mean constructive engagement with the national security community in a spirit of open-minded discourse’ (McFate, 2007: 21). But critics of the project argue that this program was but one episode in a long history of government attempts to weaponize culture and anthropology (González, 2007; Price, 2006, 2011). They emphasize that with the Human Terrain System project, the subsequent Global Cultural Knowledge Network, and related algorithmic programs that incorporate sociocultural information, military and intelligence agencies employ social science to target the very subjects of research, using anthropology as one more weapon on the battlefield (González, 2015a, 2015b).

In sum, although the object has shifted to one of military actors and institutions, and new concepts developed (e.g. militarism), the analytical limit is that the object (militarism) has become a theory and the ultimate form of security action. The anthropological ethos is divided between either accepting or denouncing the objects of study themselves.

**Para-state securitization**

A third significant theoretical cluster in the anthropology of security is a group of studies that may appear to constitute a less coherent field than violence and insecurity or military and militarism; we view them, however, as sharing a common perspective on security. They posit that global processes of democratization, de-statization, and neoliberalism reduce the state’s ability to provide security for the population. The objects of study are security formations (rather than violence or militarism) with which a distinctive form of action is identified, one that increases insecurity because of changes that stem from global processes and the decline of the state. In this group of studies, scholars have developed new concepts, such as neoliberal security, corporate security, and (critical) human security, which we collectively term ‘para-state security.’

In this work, democratization, globalization, and neoliberalism are consistently seen as forces that contribute to rising insecurity, although they are processes that are taking place at different rates in different regions in the world. James Holston and Arjun Appadurai (1999) write that as nations democratize, the use of private or market forms of security grows, while simultaneously extra-legal or illegal entities, such as death squads, expand to control the ‘marginal.’ Thus, democratization brings about its own forms of para-state direct violence. Drawing on stories of crime in El Salvador, Ellen Moodie (2010) reveals how, following that country’s
long civil war, new violence and insecurity have emerged in the context of the transition to neoliberalism and democracy. Violent acts are discursively reframed as ‘common crime,’ she notes, and risk and inequality are rendered as driven by common criminality rather than by political, state-organized ideology.

Globalization too may lead to violence. In his *Fear of Small Numbers*, Appadurai (2006) explains how diverse types of violence that emerge within the process of globalization, including ideocide (ideological supremacy or reductionism that leads to enmity), underlie terrorism. Because globalization is tied in so many ways to the spread of capitalism based on exploitation and inequality, it expands the geography of violence and anger as it polarizes rich and poor worldwide.

In this vein, scholars have also studied the ideology of neoliberalism as a driver of insecurity. As Daniel Goldstein explains, ‘security, rather than simply a reaction to a terrorist attack that “changed everything,” is in fact characteristic of a neoliberalism that predates the events of 9/11’ (2010: 487). The post 9/11 security regime is thus presented as a ramification of neoliberalism. By combining ‘techniques of governmentality’ with the ‘neoliberal mode,’ the state ‘frees itself from the various responsibilities of maintaining its subjects, conferring on these subjects themselves the daily obligations of self-maintenance and self-regulation’ (Goldstein, 2010: 491). As a result, local, private security groups proliferate and replace state security.

Many of these studies describe how security formations change and work at the local level, also showing that the proliferation of private security entities does not result in more security or safety (Caldeira, 2000; Hansen, 2006; Low, 2003, 2011, 2013; Thomas et al., 2011; Welker, 2009). Setha Low’s (2003) research on gated communities in the United States, for example, substantiates residents’ claims that they are symbolically and materially trapped in an economic system that generates much of their anxiety and insecurity. Kedron Thomas et al. discuss ‘neoliberal security’ in Guatemala as ‘a new set of practices and strategies that privatize what would otherwise be the state’s responsibility to secure the city’ (2011: 2). They document ethnographically what people do and the new security/insecurity formations that emerge in the context of ‘the country’s new violence’ (2011: 2).

Critical studies have also emerged in response to human security conditions after/beyond the state. This literature ‘argues that there is an ethical responsibility to re-orient security around the individual in line with internationally recognized standards of human rights and governance’ and ‘to encourage security providers – and specifically the state – to invest the attention and resources necessary to address these non-traditional security challenges’ (Newman, 2010: 78–81). Critical human security refuses a strict correspondence between security and the state and the military, or the equation of security with the provision of physical safety (Shani et al., 2007). This critique has emerged in international relations (e.g. Evans, 2010; Newman, 2010; Owen, 2004) as well as in anthropology, in two main subfields: human security (striving for and resistance to) (e.g. Eriksen et al., 2010) and humanitarian intervention (e.g. Beckett, 2013; Fassin and Pandolfi, 2010). Both groups of studies move beyond the moral critique of security and human security,
toward understanding them as new political formations, and in some cases to
discussion of possible forms of resistance.  

Broadly speaking, the object here has shifted from state-directed forms of vio-
lence to para-state forms, from military and national security entities to a prolif-
eration of private, local security formations and new global security forms such as
humanitarianism. Previously subjected to state power and terror, populations are
now often subjected to non-state forms of security, and therein bear witness to
violence and insecurity. Analytic concepts have been developed to introduce these
new security formations, including corporate security (Welker, 2009), human secur-
ity (Eriksen et al., 2010), neoliberal security (Goldstein, 2010; Lippert and Walby,
2013; Thomas et al., 2011), and securitization (Low, 2011). The anthropological
ethos of this approach is not denunciation, as was the case in the study of militar-
ism; rather, it is theoretical and analytical (cf. Fassin). The analytical limit, how-
ever, lies in the fact that while the objects are diverse (many forms of para-state
security), these new forms of security are still reduced to insecurity.

Security assemblages

We have shown that each previous group of studies can be understood as involving
a different form of security, which together provide a genealogy for the anthropol-
yogy of security. Each has a different object of research, analyzes related forms and
practices of security, and has a critical analytical limitation. The approach we
propose here takes up security as an assemblage of forms of governance and
power. We focus on security forms of action and whether these are part of the
nation-state formation or not, ask how they work.

In developing security assemblages as a conceptual approach to anthropological
theory and inquiry, we draw on Michel Foucault’s concepts of governmentality
and the security apparatus, and on the methodology and ethical stance from which
they were produced. Foucault, writing on governmentality (2007 [2004]), presented
three forms of governance – sovereignty, discipline, and a biopolitical security
apparatus – thus highlighting the heterogeneity of power. Each form emerged his-
torically in response to a specific governmental problem, and each was enacted with
a certain aim and through certain practices. However, these technologies are not
mutually exclusive, and the emergence of one does not imply the disappearance of
another. The biopolitical security apparatus refers specifically to a technology of
governing the population through the rationale of normalization (of circulation
and freedom).

While the security apparatus is one specific form of governing, methodologically
it suggests that security’s forms of action are not only distinguishable by way of the
entity that enacts them (i.e. an institution) but can also be conceptualized distinct-
ively (in terms of their action). In other words, types of security are understood and
assessed as particular forms of governance and power, thus shifting the focus from
their effectiveness to their forms of action (e.g. prevention, resilience, prepared-
ness). In this mode of attention, the anthropologist first attends to emerging forms
of security analytically, rather than morally or in terms of a predetermined theory. This approach underscores the diversity of security forms of action: the particular ways that security works in relation to its subjects, whether individuals or populations. The question we pose next is how they emerge within particular empirical situations, and what types of objects, concepts, and anthropological ethos are produced.

The broad literature presents conceptually distinct formations of security in rich perspective, although even in recent work the main form of action continues to be one of increasing militarization and securitization, on the one hand, and insecurity, on the other hand. Masco, for example, describes how the post-Cold War security state emerges as a ‘militarized counterformation’ to threat, in which climate, finance, domestic infrastructure, and health ‘fail to rise to the level of a national security problem despite the widespread destruction and terrors that they produce,’ except to the extent that they are militarizable (2014: 41). He argues that failures in the counterterrorism state become justifications for the expansion of the very mechanisms of governance that allowed the breakdowns, enabling ‘forms of everyday violence that increase the day-to-day insecurity of American society in vital and immediate ways’ (2014: 200). Writing on biosecurity, Carlo Caduff echoes Masco’s observation that security ‘has itself become a significant source of insecurity’ (2014: 115) and suggests moving to the problematization of insecurity. He argues that the emergence of security ‘solutions’ does not ‘solve’ the problem of security discursively or in practice.

This work shows that despite the proliferation of security formations, some forms of insecurity are increasing. We argue, however, that taking up security as insecurity, and more generally as a totalizing process, does not allow us to capture security and its effects in the world. In the cases that follow, the question of what forms security and insecurity take today is refashioned to include inquiry into diverse security forms of action (how they emerge and function). This reorientation can productively challenge basic, taken-for-granted theories of security, from those tied to the nation-state to others that attend only to the reproduction of violence. Rather than subordinating security to an all-encompassing theory, objects, concepts, and rationalities related to different security forms of action as well as the ethical mode of the anthropologist are assembled.

**Anticipation, prevention, and resilience: Three forms of security action in US counterterrorism**

In this section, we present ethnographic cases of counterterrorism to illustrate how, as an anthropological approach, security analytics lends itself to identifying diverse conceptualizations of ‘the terrorist threat’ and responses to it in the domains of policing, biomedical research, and counter-extremism.

**Anticipation and law enforcement**

In September 2001, few police officers thought much about terrorism. They dealt with crime, and, legally, there was little overlap. During the first part of the
20th century, police intelligence units had targeted anarchists, socialists, and other labor agitators, imputing to them diverse acts of violence (Donner, 1990). Later, police infiltrated the Civil Rights movement and anti-Vietnam War activists, encouraged by federal agencies and serving their purposes (Waxman, 2011: 298–301). Following revelations about this abusive surveillance, however (Church and Tower, 1976), these units were pared down, dissolved, or shifted to strictly criminal intelligence. Moreover, their surveillance operations had little to do with ‘counter-terrorism’ until an expansive shift in the concept of terrorism took place, absorbing what had formerly been bombings, kidnappings and assassinations (Zulaika, 2009: 17–18). A former officer whom Stalcup interviewed in 2008, when he was the director of a major urban area intelligence fusion center, reflected on this pre-9/11 worldview:

I guess we never felt like we were engaged in the world of international terrorism. You know, that was something the intelligence community handled, and the FBI; and maybe something Customs handled a little bit and Border Patrol, in protecting our borders; and the Department of Defense handled – nothing we handled.

But in the days after 9/11, the sense of distance felt by state and local police shrank as it became suddenly clear that the terrorists had been living among them. Local newspapers ran stories about how the men had behaved at bars, motels, and gyms (Burdi et al., 2011). And the police had stopped several of them for minor traffic violations. ‘It is always a local cop who saw something,’ said a former vice officer, by then the deputy director of a fusion center, in an interview in 2006, and this insight was central to the resurgence of police involvement in national intelligence, through what would be called the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) (Stalcup, 2015b).

Almost immediately after the events of 9/11, the police themselves and analysts throughout government observed that the sheer number of officers in everyday contact with the public (around 800,000 sworn personnel, the equivalent of nearly 20 percent of the entire federal workforce) made them a valuable counter-terrorism resource. When the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) held a summit in the spring of 2002, they commented on ‘the unique potential for community oriented policing initiatives to aid in the gathering of locally driven intelligence’ (IACP, 2002: i). The SAR initiative would eventually be housed in the Information Sharing Environment (ISE.gov), established by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004; in 2009, drawing on these years of preliminary work, a pilot project was rolled out in multiple cities (US DOJ, 2010).

The pilot tested the initiative’s central idea, that of standardizing what police officers routinely do to recognize and report suspicious behaviors as a way of addressing the perceived surveillance lacuna of 9/11. When officers meet someone in the field and something seems not to ‘belong,’ they have the option of writing up a Field Incident or Field Encounter card. This documentation creates a paper trail that, in the event of a future crime, could help build a case. Drawing on a list
developed by the Los Angeles Police Department, the SAR initiative developed a set of 16 behavioral categories to guide these observations (of an officer, or a write-up, if reported by a civilian) and to code submissions for review. The behaviors themselves ranged from the illegal (e.g. breach, theft, sabotage) to suspect only in context (e.g. testing or probing of security, observation/surveillance, materials acquisition, and, most controversially, photography). Larger law enforcement agencies might have a dedicated unit for assessing the nexus to potential terrorism in such a report; most lack this capacity, and would submit the write-up to a city or regional intelligence fusion center, or to the FBI.

At this next step, the incident would again be evaluated for ties to terrorism. Officially, intelligence analysts must review ‘the newly reported SAR information against [the] 16 pre-operational behaviors associated with terrorism,’ (ISE, 2015: 14). The lead analyst at the fusion center in 2012 explained, however, that he did not want or use a checklist, saying that he needed to assess the ensemble of incidents in a period of time: ‘Let’s say I look through one week’s submitted reports – that collection of reports will tell me something, not the checklist. That will give me a sense of what is going on.’ An incident that has been vetted and deemed ‘reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning associated with terrorism’ becomes an official ISE-SAR (ISE, 2015: 9), and is shared up the federal hierarchy (via compatible communication protocols) and also horizontally between states and regions.

The routine task of observing public behaviors is thus fully systematized into steps for gathering, evaluating, and sharing information in a process that seeks to anticipate events. The goal is to identify a plot in motion, without needing to know or imagine the plot itself. By targeting generic pre-event behaviors, understood as intermediate steps leading to an event, the NSI aims to create a process that can discern the signs of a new kind of threat or attack (unknowable in advance), as well as common acts of violence, already too familiar.

This anticipatory approach is one form of action, which can be distinguished from that of other security efforts to deter terrorist acts or mitigate their consequences, for example. To anticipate, here, is to act as a forerunner or precursor, capturing the suspicious activities understood to come before and anticipate terrorism. Through this mechanism, the NSI addresses one of the central problematics of security, the need to ‘foresee, identify, and act upon threats in time’ (Dunn Cavelty et al., 2015: 5). SARs link the present with the future, as officer and analyst together create a record of behaviors that may be ‘precursors to terrorism,’ amplifying inconspicuous components of the period when an attack could come into existence. This intermediary role of suspicious activity reporting enables it to feed technologies of both prevention and resilience.

Prevention and biomedical research

In 2004, the Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application for Biotechnology issued the Biotechnology Research in
the Age of Terrorism Report (aka the Fink Report), which surveyed biotechnological research options in light of terrorist threats and formulated recommendations for extra precautions in the life sciences (US Department of Health and Human Services [HHS], 2004). The Fink Report defined the problem of biosecurity as a dual use (DU) issue and recommended the establishment of the NSABB to ‘advise all Federal departments and agencies that conduct or support life sciences research that could fall into the ‘Dual Use’ category’ (HHS, 2004).

In March 2006, the NSABB coined the term ‘Dual Use Research of Concern’ (DURC) to replace ‘dual use’ (DU). The new term reflected the idea that since ‘most if not all Life Sciences research could be considered Dual Use,’ it was important ‘to identify specific Life Sciences research that could be of greatest concern for misuse’ (NSABB, 2006; emphasis in the original). Whereas DU refers to preventing leaks of material and information from laboratories, DURC suggests that certain kinds of research, under certain circumstances, are inherently ‘of concern.’ It reflects a shift from the idea of external danger to possible internal risk that must be assessed to be prevented. Prevention, as François Ewald explains, ‘presupposes science, technical control, the idea of possible understanding, and objective measurement of risks. Thus the problem is no longer that of compensating for practically inescapable losses but of reducing the probability of their occurrence’ (2002: 281–2). As evidenced by a controversy that would erupt five years later, neither the NSABB nor the biomedical research establishment could reach a consensus on what constituted a clear case of DURC and on how to assess the risk entailed by such research, in order to prevent it.

In September 2011, Ron Fouchier, a virologist at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, revealed that his research team had transformed the H5N1 avian influenza virus into an aerosol that was transmissible among human beings. At the same time, researchers at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in the United States, led by virologist Yoshihiro Kawaoka, reported similar results (Enserink, 2011; MacKenzie, 2011). Concerns regarding the implications of these results were raised as the research neared publication in the journals Nature and Science (Enserink, 2012; Enserink and Malakoff, 2012). The journals’ editors were asked to seek the NSABB’s advice and receive approval to publish the studies.

Once the articles arrived at the NSABB for review, the question was whether preventing their publication would eliminate the threat. Above all, the idea that risk could be attributed only to actors outside the scientific world began to crumble. Scientists had themselves created a new threat, one that was inherently embedded in the research design and not only in the aftermath of its completion.

The fact that such potentially harmful studies had been conducted without external oversight and had been halted only at publication led to public outcry in the United States and raised questions regarding the ethics and social obligations of scientific researchers, as well as major objections to publication of the studies. Thomas Ingelsby of the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh in
Pennsylvania objected to the publication in these terms:

The benefits of publishing this work do not outweigh the dangers of showing others how to replicate it. ... Someone might try to make it into a weapon ... but a more likely threat is that more scientists will work with the modified virus, increasing the likelihood of it escaping the lab. Small mistakes in biosafety could have terrible global consequences. (MacKenzie, 2011)

A public debate regarding scientific responsibility for producing such threats erupted, with the scientific community torn between the two sides. The idea of weighing risks versus benefits, or calculating a risk/benefit ratio, for DURC experiments began to develop (Osterholm and Henderson, 2012). The New York Times, for example, saw little benefit and expressed this view in an editorial titled ‘An Engineered Doomsday’:

Defenders of the research in Rotterdam ... say the findings could prove helpful in monitoring virus samples from infected birds and animals. ... But it is highly uncertain, even improbable, that the virus would mutate in nature along the pathways prodded in a laboratory environment, so [any such] benefit ... seems marginal. (New York Times, 2012)

Research proponents meanwhile argued that public health could be harmed if the virus were not studied.

At the height of the discussion, in December 2011, the NSABB issued its recommendations following its review of the articles and suggested publishing them without a methodology section:

Due to the importance of the findings to the public health and research communities, the NSABB recommends that the general conclusions highlighting the novel outcome be published, but that the manuscripts not include the methodological and other details that could enable replication of the experiments by those who would seek to do harm. (NIH, 2011)

Additionally, the NSABB recommended that full details be provided to a designated group of scientists ‘authorized’ to use the information to conduct ‘responsible’ research on the topic.

The decision was controversial, and the NSABB was pressured to change it. In February 2012, the American Society of Microbiology (ASM) hosted a meeting on ‘Biodefense and Emerging Diseases’ at which one session was devoted to the H5N1 work. Anthony Fauci (of the NIH) announced that he had asked the two researchers to revise their papers for NSABB review. That same month, a gathering of NSABB members and more than a dozen observers, including NIH director Francis Collins and WHO member Keiji Fukuda, took place at the NIH campus. The participants read the original and revised reports and voted to allow full publication of the revised studies (NSABB 2012), both of which were published in 2012 (Herfst et al., 2012; Imai et al., 2012).
Following the H5N1 controversy, the US government issued a number of policies, including one in March 2012, concerning the oversight of DURC (US Government, 2012). The goal was to establish regular review of possible DURC that was funded or conducted by the government, minimizing the risk of such work while preserving its benefits. In May 2015, the NSABB issued its recommendations for a framework to conduct risk-benefit assessments of gain-of-function research. This framework was predicated on the idea that specific risk-benefit calculations relating to potentially harmful research could be devised, and it addressed the issues of how to evaluate and whether to fund such research, in order to prevent a future bioterrorism event. To summarize, in Brian Massumi’s words: ‘Epistemologically, prevention assumes an ability to assess threats empirically and identify their causes. Once the causes are identified, appropriate curative methods are sought to avoid their realization’ (2015: 5).

Resilience and federal-local counter-extremism

In 2011, the White House launched a new national strategy to tackle concerns about domestic terrorism, titled Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States. The events perpetrated by 19 hijackers on 9/11 were a decade past, and new figures of suspicion had begun to emerge: individuals or groups of friends who were being ‘radicalized to support or commit acts of ideologically-inspired violence’ (White House, 2011b: 2). The White House strategy, labeled ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ (CVE), might eventually collect counterterrorism intelligence but was nonetheless an altogether different initiative that developed a distinctive form of action.

Frédéric Gros, building on analysis by Foucault, contrasts the ‘enemy of the state,’ which threatens sovereign security, with the ‘suspect’ of biopolitical security, a paradigmatic figure which emerges from the generalized distrust that accompanies the global flows and circulation of contemporary life:

> The enemy comes from the exterior and by the very fact of his threat patches up the holes in the national community. The enemy is identifiable and definable. ... The suspect, however, is by definition non-locatable and unpredictable. He is here, close at hand, and his threatening presence turns me into a stranger even to my closest neighbors. (2014: 27)

After a series of fatal shootings in the US, perhaps most influentially by an Army psychiatrist at the Fort Hood military base in 2009, what was clear was that (as in the domain of biosecurity) risk could no longer be attributed only to outside actors, nor suspicion limited to them.

The updated National Strategy for Counterterror issued in 2011 reiterated that the country’s counterterrorism focus was ‘war with a specific organization – al-Qa’ida’ as well as its ‘affiliates and adherents’ (2011a: 1). CVE, in contrast, identified both a different problem and approach. Rather than targeting those
vulnerable to radicalization directly (as the FBI routinely did [Kumar, 2010]), the strategy moved upstream, arguing that American communities were ‘targeted by violent extremists,’ and the solution was to build their resilience against the threat of radicalization.

Resilience has various meanings, but particularly since 9/11, researchers have noted the rise of its ‘security-driven’ sense, in which security practices are repackaged in more palatable expressions of resilience and ‘resilience policy becomes increasingly mobilized by security concerns’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2015: 91). Embedded in this usage is the assumption that ‘the (in)security of a subject depends not only on the character and severity of the threat it is exposed to (its vulnerability), but also on the subject itself – namely, its resilience to detrimental events’ (Dunn Cavelty et al., 2015: 4). The subject of key parts of the CVE effort was the community itself, and it was to be made capable of and responsible for identifying radicalization (and thereby countering violent extremism). 9

When the strategy was launched, CVE community engagement was already under way at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (White House, 2011c). The DHS staff of the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) regularly flew out from Washington, DC, to participate in ‘roundtables,’ hosted by local contacts, often law enforcement. The official aim of the roundtables, which were held quarterly in 15 or so cities (the number was expected to gradually increase), was to bring together members of the ‘diverse American communities whose civil rights may be affected by Department activities’ (DHS, 2016). 10 The meetings usually attracted a mix of Muslim organizations; those often mistaken as Muslim, such as Sikhs; and advocates for diverse constituents included under the ‘homeland security’ umbrella, particularly immigrants: local legal services, NGOs, and representatives for politicians. For all the local attendees, the meetings were conduits for information on DHS policy, and they offered one of the few venues to press back.

At a roundtable on the outskirts of Seattle in 2013, for example, a man got up to explain the treatment he had received at the hands of Transportation Security Administration officials (an agency within DHS), and to question why and how he was routinely singled out. ‘They are checking the turbans at the airport,’ he said, pointing at his own head. ‘They must have a device [to scan the turban], but we are asked to remove it.’ Transportation security officers had also laughed at him during the screening, and, in the end, he had missed his flight. As he sat down, a man from an activist organization stood. ‘There have been several reports,’ he said, of ‘people being threatened with loss of citizenship or denial of pending applications if they refuse to speak with the FBI without an attorney.’ The crowd was attentive. ‘Who do we report this to within USCIS [United States Citizenship and Immigration Services]?’

Other community engagement techniques from DHS include cultural competency training for law enforcement, Community Awareness Briefings (these were updated as concerns increased about youths traveling to join foreign conflicts, particularly in Iraq and Syria), an Incident Community Coordination Team for
rapid two-way communication between the federal government and impacted communities in the event of a homeland security incident, and an adaptable Community Resilience Exercise (CREX). Resilience practices such as these, note Jon Coaffee and Pete Fussey, ‘are seen as simultaneously proactive and reactive, with built-in adaptability to the fluid nature of myriad threats and hazards challenging states and their territories’ (2015: 88). In their review of the development and evolution of the concept of resilience in many different domains, Myriam Dunn Cavelty et al. argue that resilience simultaneously demands a response to past events (‘threats that have materialized as disasters or shocks’), and a reaction that ‘adheres in the future,’ since resilience is ‘that which can be done if future threats cannot be averted in time’ (2015: 9). In the case of CVE, past and future, threat and solution, cohere in the same suspicious and vulnerable subjects and communities.

If the NSABB aimed to prevent biosecurity disasters by identifying causes and addressing them (not funding research that was too risky for too little benefit, for example), the CVE strategy works instead for community engagement techniques to keep the ‘cause’ (radicalization) from taking root in the first place. If Suspicious Activity Reporting tries to preclude terrorist events through telltale behaviors that anticipate potential events, Countering Violent Extremism works even further upstream, a move necessitated by the new understanding of the threat as the potential radicalization of communities and their members, who, however singled-out, are nonetheless definitively located within the United States.

Discussion

While significant ‘anthropologies of’ in their own right, the bodies of scholarship that we characterized in the first part of this article can also be understood as integral to the way that anthropology has approached security more broadly. Each has an object of research, analyzes forms and practices of security (with respect to their production of violence or insecurity), involves a particular anthropological ethos, and has a critical analytical limitation. Security becomes, in these clusters, a formation with more or less power, violence, or insecurity.

Security assemblages, as we present in our ethnographic cases, is a theoretical approach in the sense that it offers general (although not universal) tools for differentiating and describing the inevitably particular relations between different aspects of empirical situations. In their very incompatibility with all-encompassing theory, these tools produce a set of orientations to the anthropology of security. This is an approach which, first, treats security as part of an assemblage of governmental mechanisms that is neither opposed to the state nor solely identified with it. In line with post-Foucauldian scholarship that elaborates multiple forms of governance (Anderson, 2010; Collier and Lakoff, 2008; Lentzos and Rose, 2009), we are interested in diverse actors and forms of security action. Second, security as a governmental form does not necessarily stand in contrast to ‘rights’ or freedom. For Foucault, security apparatuses are biopolitical forms of enabled movement
and circulation under a particular regulatory structure, distinct from other mechanisms of governing. Likewise, security assemblages acknowledge and offer tools for delimiting the intimate relationships between freedom and power in diverse forms of security (as Filippa Lentzos and Nikolas Rose [2009] suggest), rather than totalizing observations of violence or insecurity framed as immanently reducing freedom. Third, the ethical mode of anthropological analysis suggested in this approach is not documenting or witnessing the ‘field’ of study, nor is it positioned as an external critique and denunciation of these security forms and the growth of insecurity. Instead, we move from first-order observation of what is ‘really’ happening (and possible solutions), ontologically, to the extraction of new forms of security action and the development of new concepts. Doing so requires shaking loose presuppositions and fostering breaks (second-order observation; see Luhmann, 1998; Rabinow, 2008).

Critique here is not an act of pointing to moral or analytical blind spots, although it can lead to and support these ends and forms of resistance. Instead, in approaching security through assemblages, anthropological critique takes the form of a demand for an ethical mode of adjacency (Rabinow, 2008), which derives not from being more or less embedded in the field but from awareness of the critical limitations every approach inherently has. Ethically, what one can do is become aware of limitations (such as how a theory may impose an overdetermined holism), able to recognize when one is wrong, and remain open to change in oneself and in one’s ideas (see also Samimian-Darash and Rabinow, 2015). This is to say, security, insecurity, and violence are all ontological forms available to anthropological inquiry, and extracting a particular concept for analysis from any one of them will depend on an ethical stance. The object-concept-subject definitions and theories of violence, insecurity, and security cannot be detached from the preliminary ethical position.

In sum, in presenting security assemblages we observe that it is possible and important to take security as an anthropological object and thus separate it from insecurity and violence. We can attend to more than new formations of security (of the military, the state or other entities) by recognizing their diverse forms of action. The selective yet inflationary mode of security, which ultimately produces more insecurity, is one significant form of action, but there are many others in the anthropology of security with affects and effects that are not so neatly categorized. Our anthropological ethos is second-order and critical: we do not try to solve the problem proposed by the system under study but rather question its premises, practices, and repercussions. By working with concepts that allow us to characterize forms of action, we have access to other levels of observation beyond the one immediately captured, including the ever-changing ways of producing security and insecurity.

Notes

1. The fieldwork discussed in this article was carried out between 2006 and 2014 by the authors, in independent research projects that we frequently discussed with one another. The work on counterterrorism in the domains of law enforcement and homeland security was undertaken by Stalcup while the biomedical research was undertaken
2. Deleuze and Guattari elaborate ‘assemblages’ as complex structures of elements that communicate not hierarchically or through linear connections, but rather as a rhizome (in contrast to trees). They write (1987: 12): ‘All of tree logic is a logic of tracing and reproduction [...] The rhizome is altogether different, a map and not a tracing.’ Tracing describes something that was already there, while: ‘What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward experimentation in contact with the real.’ The tracing always comes back ‘to the same,’ but a map has multiple entryways. Significantly, they can be understood as separating two logics of communication, that of the tree structure and the rhizome. While the logic of the tree, like the state, is that of a central power from which twigs branch out, the rhizome grows as a multiplicity, not subject to a single center. The emphasis, for Deleuze and Guattari, is on the connections between the infinite number of roots, and the fact that the rhizome form is in perpetual motion, and, therefore not given in advance: the units composing a rhizome are themselves changing. This concept of the assemblage is important, especially in how it differs from that of an apparatus. As Rabinow puts it: ‘The apparatus is a specific response to a historical problem. It is however a dominating strategic response’ (2003: 54). An assemblage, in contrast, is heterogeneous, dynamic, and does not represent a major response. Rather, it can be characterized by numerous sub-structures that exist simultaneously (see also Samimian-Darash, 2009).

3. Explanations for each category are as follow. Objects are the objects of research, and here, the specific security objects in the different sets of studies. Concepts are the main concepts scholars have developed to present their approach to security and to the security objects they identify. A security form of action refers to, for main governing formations, how security works, and is presented as acting in that group of studies. There may be multiple or singular forms of action. Critique refers to the critique of security that scholars present in their work. Anthropological ethos is the ethical stand the anthropologist takes in conducting inquiry. Analytical limit draws on Rabinow and Bennett’s concept of the critical limitation as a structural incapacity introduced by unacknowledged externalities (2012: 52). That is, if externalities refer to what is excluded by a particular mode of thought (in economics, factors not taken into account in establishing the market prices), then critical limitations refer to that which cannot be thought through this mode. Likewise, we argue that all anthropological approaches have an analytical limit.

4. In this regard, Veena Das (1995) talks about the ‘missing self’ in the study of violence in anthropology, and she uses the term victim to go beyond the distinction between individual and community. The concept of the victim also explains private pain as socially constructed and enables inquiry into how the state uses suffering to establish itself.

5. This discussion has been carried out over several publications (e.g. González, 2007, 2010, 2015a, 2015b; McFate, 2005, 2007; McFate and Jackson, 2005; Price, 2002, 2006, 2011; Sluka, 2010).

6. In this regard, Eriksen et al. argue that the anthropology of human security has moved ‘beyond both the nostalgia implicit in some of the globalisation literature, as well as the old-style cultural relativism which tacitly assumes that wholly traditional lives are preferable to partly modernised ones... Security-building activities are confronted with risks, some of them transnational; with insecurities associated with war, environmental problems, crime, etc.; and also with individualization and ideological tendencies favouring individual freedom at the expense of sacrificing security’ (2010: 5).
7. The term securitization was famously coined by Ole Wæver (1995) of the Copenhagen School to refer to security as practice rather than idea. Instead of presenting security as a reality prior to language, which is to say, a theoretical explanation marking events ‘in the world,’ securitization refers to security as a speech act with pragmatic intent and consequences. Setha Low explains how the term securitization is used to describe ‘interlocking and overlapping, special, legal, institutional, governmental, and financial strategies of producing security’ (2011: 389); it is specifically connected to recent neoliberal policies and the growth of privatization, followed by the emergence of new forms of (para-state) security.

8. See a comprehensive analysis of this case in Samimian-Darash (forthcoming) and Samimian-Darash et al. (2016).

9. The Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) plan was three-fold in total: develop government and law enforcement expertise, counter (online) violent extremist propaganda, and build community resilience through a series of platforms (White House, 2011c: 2).

10. They list these communities as: American Arab, Muslim, South Asian, Middle Eastern, Somali, Sikh, Latino, Jewish, and Asian/Asian Pacific Islander (DHS, 2016).

References


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