options for the reader to consider’ (ibid.). Interpreting Hume’s views on religion is no easy task, but Yoder’s interpretation is rather forced and it is hard not to see the author projecting his own views onto Hume.

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Earl Stanley B. Fronda does not want to give a new interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion. His book is more or less the defence of the orthodox Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion against its widespread criticism. Although the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion given by Dewi Zephaniah Phillips and other followers of Wittgenstein is very well known among Wittgenstein scholars, there are still rather unconvincing prejudices concerning this subject in the academic community. There are still many philosophers who claim that Wittgenstein was a fideist, a non-realist, or a crypto atheist. Fronda wants to show that none of these claims is true. He argues that it is necessary to adopt the perspective of apophatic theology if you do not want to misunderstand Wittgenstein. This idea is very well known since the 60ies and 70ies of the last century, although in the last decade no scholar defended this idea as intensely as Fronda does. As Fronda did not deal more deeply with Wittgenstein’s and Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion before 2005 and as Fronda seems to have been confronted with many strong prejudices against Wittgenstein, he thinks that it is necessary to write a book which shows that many scholars still misunderstand Wittgenstein as a fideist. Thus, although there is nothing new in Fronda’s book and nearly nothing of deeper interest for Wittgenstein scholars, it may be a helpful book for people who are not so familiar with Wittgenstein’s religious thought searching for a first introduction. For serious scholarly work, it might be interesting how profoundly Fronda stresses the importance of apophatic theology for the understanding of the whole philosophical work of Wittgenstein. Although this idea is rather familiar in Wittgensteinian scholarship, it has – as far as I know – never been elaborated at such length before.
Fronda’s argument runs as follows: When Wittgenstein pretends that he cannot help seeing everything from a religious point of view, Fronda states that this perspective is obviously the perspective of mysticism (p. 22). In chapter 2, Fronda convincingly shows some parallels between the early Wittgenstein’s theology and the mystical approach of Pseudo-Dionysius (pp. 27-52). While this approach is rather conventional, it is interesting that Fronda shows in chapter 3 that the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein is still consistent with this mystical interpretation (pp. 53-77). Moreover, he tries to explain how the mature Wittgenstein opens possibilities of – via criteria – speaking affirmatively of God (pp. 79-107). In chapter 5, Fronda argues that ‘God exists’ is a grammatical statement for the later Wittgenstein, and that St. Thomas Aquinas held a very similar position (pp. 109-128). The problem with this chapter is that Fronda follows very much Norman Malcolm’s interpretation of St. Anselm’s argument of ‘God exists’ as a necessary statement and that the different philosophical approach of St. Thomas is not reflected in Fronda’s book. Naturally, it is true that St. Thomas, like all philosophers in the theistic tradition, knows that God cannot be thought of as an object among other objects (p. 124). But ideas like this really are not specific enough to talk of a ‘Wittgenstein à la St. Thomas’ like Fronda does (p. 128). And the distinction between Platonic and Aristotelian thinking is too important to connect it in the way Fronda does.

In chapter 6, Fronda shows that miracles, extraordinary religious experiences, and the orderliness of the universe are no good evidence for God’s existence from Wittgenstein’s point of view (pp. 129-155). Thus, the ‘supposed body of evidence that is supposed to justify religious belief is itself a product of the same sort of religious belief that it is supposed to justify’ (p. 129). Although these observations are true and also helpful, for example for the current debates on reformed epistemology, it is a pity that the author does not try to show how the subject of foundation of faith can be dealt with constructively from Wittgenstein’s perspective.

After elaborating on Wittgenstein’s attitude towards traditional philosophical theistic arguments, Fronda deals with Wittgenstein’s ideas on religious language. His main point is that Wittgenstein does not adopt a non-realistic view of religious language, but a ‘religious realism with attitude’, i.e. a realism which is developed from a certain world picture without stating anything on reality beyond this word-picture-depending approach (pp. 157-187). In chapter 8, Fronda resumes discussing how Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion is so often misunderstood and that
the mainstream of philosophy of religion as the mainstream in analytical philosophy is anti-Wittgensteinian (pp. 189-211). Against this sceptical denial of Wittgenstein, Fronda tries to show again that there are already important theological roots for Wittgenstein’s thinking in medieval philosophy – especially in the platonic line of thinking. In this tradition God is conceived as ontologically, epistemologically and semantically transcendent (p. 204). Although this tradition obviously exists in Christianity, I wonder whether the wholly-otherness of God really is a very convincing approach to theology. It seems to me that especially the later Wittgenstein also offers other ways for theology, and Fronda does not choose the most convincing one. Thus, Fronda’s last defence of Wittgenstein in his concluding remarks (pp. 213-229) certainly is a legitimate and possible interpretation of Wittgenstein – considering especially the work of the early Wittgenstein. But whether there is no alternative to the idea that Wittgenstein’s point of view is the point of view of apophatic theology seems to be highly doubtable, in my opinion, in medieval thinking.

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Theology, Evolution and the Mind (henceforth TEM) is an edited volume that contains the papers presented in the conference of the Science and Religion Forum in Canterbury in 2007. The volume tackles highly topical and controversial issues in theology and science: the nature of biological evolution and its theological implications, theological anthropology in the context of human evolution and the nature of human minds and brains. These issues are crucial for science, philosophy and theology, and deserve extensive, rigorous and critical treatment. Unfortunately, this is what the volume, for the most part, cannot offer. The book is all too short to deal extensively with the issues it raises. Further, the articles are very uneven with respect to scope and the level of argumentation, and lack much needed philosophical rigor. But perhaps the value of an edited volume does not lie in its coherence and length only, but in the strength of the